European Union

In the course of my research on budgeting in international organizations, I just stumbled over this quote from 1947 article in the journal “International Organization” titled “The Refugee: A Problem for International Organization” which seems quite timely again today:

“Even the governments which are most concerned over the welfare of individuals and the economic and social and political stability of Europe devote few of their resources of personnel and finance to refugee thought and action. Despite occasional prolonged periods of highly-publicized wrangling over general principles, they do not make up their minds on practical policies until the very last minute. The stubborn facts are that there are too many other problems of greater size and urgency, and that the refugee problem discourages attention because it is disproportionately tangled and expensive.“ (Malin 1947: 445, my highlights)

The article’s introduction speaks of 25 million displaced persons in China, 10 million Soviet citizens, and 8 million Germans, with 2 million European refugees being those “with whom a general international organization for uprooted people must deal” and who were “bristling with political complications”, providing more details on the many different groups and the respective challenges later on.

When it comes to the topic of repatriation and whether refugees will stay, the conclusion also seems almost like today:

“The advance of industrialization, even where it is far from complete, has produced vested interests among workers already established in those countries, and a pervasive community fear of unemployment. National societies think of their racial, religious and political pattern as fixed, and dread the importation of Europe’s feuds. (Unofficial anti-Semitism is rising almost everywhere.) Hence, though reception countries are beginning to realize that the refugees are not typically a mass of miserable and demoralized human beings, but a reservoir of sturdy and independent-minded workers of many crafts, the emphasis is sure to be kept on careful individual selection by the reception countries‘ own representatives.” (Malin 1947: 457)

Just in case you wondered how much has changed in the last 70 years when it comes to refugees, refugee policies, and the public perception of those who are refugees…

The post The refugee in Europe: policy and perception right after WWII appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

How might the EU respond to the unprecedented event of a Brexit? Its response will be defined by 5 I’s: ideas, interests, institutions, the international, and individuals. Looking at these 5 I’s also sheds light on various theoretical approaches to understanding Brexit.

How would the rest of the EU respond to a British vote to leave? Would the EU’s approach to a withdrawal be defined by institutional links, opinions of key leaders, economic and security interests, international pressures, or ideas about integration or disintegration? Will it be a mix of these, in which case, which will be the most influential? What should the British government and public look to in order to understand what to expect from the EU? How should academics theorise a Brexit?

We can understand how the EU might respond to a British withdrawal by looking at five I’s: ideas, interests, institutions, the international, and individuals. No one ‘I’ will dominate, and identifying which will dominate more than others will be a key challenge in understanding and applying theoretical approaches to a Brexit.

Ideas

A vote to depart completely from the idea of an ‘ever closer union’ would challenge the very idea in an unprecedented way. Will the idea of European disintegration then take hold across the EU as somedomino effect sees other governments and their citizens give up on the EU? Or will other EU member states respond in much the same way as they have to many other crises by trying to integrate further? If so, then any new deal with the UK would prioritise EU unity, blocking any UK-EU deal that allows Britain a privileged alternative relationship that could weaken the Union.

Individual member states will assert their own ideas of what Brexit means for them. For example, the Irish Government has made clear it will not be caught in the slipstream of British decisions. Independence and links to the EU are viewed as equal to or of greater importance than relations with Britain. For statesranging from Greece and the Baltic states through to France and Germany, the UK and the Brexit debate are already something of a distraction from various ideas of how European integration can better ensure the security and stability of Europe.

Interests

With Britain as one of the world’s largest economies, some Eurosceptics argue the EU needs the UK more than the UK needs the EU. Britain does run a trade deficit with the EU (£61.6 billion in 2014), meaning the rest of the EU has an economic incentive to find a solution. However, from the perspective of the rest of the EU it is the UK that is vulnerable. Britain represents somewhere around 16% of total EU trade (admittedly excluding services) while the EU represents 44.6% of the UK’s exports of good and services in 2014.

Nevertheless, economic, social and security interests can play a powerful role. To take one example, fear amongst German car manufacturers at a bad UK-EU exit deal could force the German government to push for a relationship that avoids any disruption to trading links. The potential costs for Ireland (including violence in Northern Ireland) could force it to reconsider its ideas of resisting British decisions. The large EU population in the UK and UK population elsewhere in the EU mean a mutually beneficial deal will need to be hammered out.

The argument works against Britain as some states will seek to gain economically by seeking to attract investment that would have gone to Britain.  Some countries might also use a Brexit to push a more social and protectionist EU, limiting any UK efforts to use a Brexit as a means to undercut the EU economically.

If the potential economic interests are not strong enough, then the same cannot be said for Britain in European foreign and defence cooperation. Common areas of concern such as Iran, Russia or migration mean the UK and EU could continue to need one another. At the same time, the UK has been one of the blocks to cooperation in this area, with its exit potentially paving the way for further such efforts.

Institutions

Several processes and institutions will shape a Brexit. Article 50, the EU treaty’s withdrawal clause, provides a degree of structure for both sides, albeit one that is untested and which contains a range of flaws. The legal and administrative issues alone make Article 50 a Pandora’s Box that both sides will face with a sense of trepidation. Agreeing a new UK-EU relationship will require the consent of every member state, the European Parliament, and potentially may draw in the European Court of Justice. None of these can be relied on to grant a quick agreement that meets UK demands.

The UK and EU would also be constrained by existing wider European and international structures. If no new relationship was reached then the EU would still have to work within the limits of World Trade Organisation rules, although Britain is highly unlikely to benefit much from a WTO defined relationship. The European Free Trade Area and the European Economic Area have existing agreements that Britain would have to fit into with the agreement of members such as Norway or Switzerland.

International

International pressures on the UK and the EU could define how they manage an exit. The negotiation of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) reflects a desire by the USA and the EU to use their interdependent economic relationship to shape global economics and politics. While the UK could be locked out of the main processes by which TTIP will be setup and launched, its long-term exclusion would run counter to the aims of TTIP to extend beyond the EU and USA. The agreement will also frame how the UK attempts its own trade deals with countries such as China or Brazil.

International events may also drive UK-EU cooperation. Terrorist attacks, aggressive behaviour by Russia (perhaps creating an ‘other’ against which common UK and EU resolve is formed), common concerns about environmental or migration crises could mean international events push the UK and EU into a harmonious new relationship. British ideas about restructuring the EU and freedom of movement have gained some traction thanks to developments connected to Syria. That said, international events could cause divisions and animosity between the UK and parts of the EU, such as happened over the Iraq War.

Individuals

If there is one place where animosity could be a particular problem it is in the relations between leaders. David Cameron is likely to resign should he lose a referendum where he backed the UK staying in. A victorious Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative party would then deliver a Conservative British Prime Minister unlikely to be in a position to compromise in negotiations over a new UK-EU deal.

EU leaders could also be in a mood to concede much, particularly if the British people had rejected a renegotiated relationship the rest of the EU made the effort to craft at a time when they would rather have been focusing on issues such as the Eurozone, Russia or migration. Angela Merkel, in particular, could find herself in a difficult position. With German elections scheduled in 2017 she may be in no position – or personally inclined – to offer much. Without German support, Britain will face a much bigger struggle in securing the agreement of every other EU state and its leadership.

Theorising Brexit

The study of the EU is filled with theories of European integration. Brexit confronts us with the need totheorise European disintegration. Theories are tools that allow us to focus on certain aspects of developments in the world around us, highlighting – and testing – their importance over others. These 5 I’s above touch on some of the various theoretical approaches we can use to try and understand where a Brexit could take the EU and UK. In a simplified way, constructivism points to the role of ideas as paramount in shaping how a Brexit is handled. In realism it is the interests and international pressures that will be decisive. Institutionalist or neofunctionalist theories throw light on the powerful limits existing institutions and networks will play (or might not play if Brexit exposed any weaknesses in them). Liberal intergovernmentalism draws in a mix of interests, institutions and ideas to highlight that Britain and the EU (especially Germany, France and other big states) are caught up in a deeply enmeshed set of interdependencies from which there is no easy escape whatever their leaders may want.

This article first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit Vote blog.

The post How the EU responds to a British withdrawal will be determined by five key factors appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Colombia is in the middle of negotiating a peace deal with FARC rebels and the number of discussion points between the two groups range from the implementation of justice for crimes committed to the finer nuisances of the deal that could save many lives. Armed conflict in Colombia has resulted in numerous bloody battles, and the loss of many lives because of fighting inbetween paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. But what President Juan Manuel Santos has done is, he has gone ahead and agreed to pardoning people responsibile for these atrocities in exchange for swifter national peace.

Santos believes that the more lives that peace can solve faster the better it will all be for economic growth, which is true but the nature of the feuds cannot be simplified so much. Most of the people involved in the fightings have been civilians and this has also both raised the profile for criminal violence in the country and thrown some six million Colombians from their homes right into the countryside. Pardoning so many wrongs in the name of peace and a stronger Colombia seems to ask people to forget all of their bruises.

The FARC rebels are known to not really stick to plans of disarming, which result in blood-fueled battles and too much of violence can mean negotiations breaking down once more and that cannot be a positive outcome for either of the two parties involved. Public support for the negotiations often waiver, while the government and the rebels both try to extert their point of views over the agreement. The last fifteen years has seen a reduction in national violence in Colombia but economic growth has gone the opposite way, fuelled by a heightening of incomes and a drop in oil price.

Colombia is individualistic in South America: it does not really have too much of military dictatorship written in it’s history, considers itself as the oldest democratic country in the region, has wet areas and portions of the Amazon rainforest, counts the rich as people who love political responsibility, there is land ownership that breeds inequality, violence with seeds in politics and and guerrilla fighting. A peaceful national climate can aid with getting back those lands grabbed by guerrillas and reducing the victimisation of Colombians on a daily basis.

The FARC has contributed to many ills of Colombian society, from drugs trafficking to extortion, and sometimes they have even fed into troubled land owners. Coming back from the brinks of societal failure, is not an easy task because once upon a time Colombia used to be a land filled with frequent reportings of kidnappings and murders. Villages would be invaded and child soldiers would be recruited into rebel groups. The economy was in a pitiful state of recession then as mass unemployment and growth of banks failure become commonplace.

The problem is trusting the FARC will not go back on their words because on previous accounts of striking a peace deal, the guerrillas only used those opportunities to grow their forces, both in paramilitary terms and politically, or simply kill idealists. FARC has stated that they are no longer interested in power-grabbing because military growth is happening nationally and the country is improving but it is not too much of an assurance when there is income inequality, and Venezuela is persistant with it’s support of the FARC rebels, spelling political trouble in its shores for it.

Education rates for children are mending, but universal healthcare seems to be asking too much because only a fraction of the population can contribute to it, whilst the government pays for the other half. No one political figure in the country has been able to solve this crisis, and whenever any had gone far, it would later be revealed that innocent civilians were murdered and passed off as guerrilla fighters. Perhaps this time it will be different and that “much awaited” peace deal will bring home national reforms, from rural areas to the provincial countrysides.

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 406 - Draft report on implementation and review of the EU-Central Asia Strategy
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP