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L'Ukraine va recevoir cette année de France un nouveau système de défense SAMP/T et le testera contre des missiles balistiques russes comme « alternative » au système américain Patriot, a déclaré le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky. Le nouveau système franco-italien de défense antiaérienne SAMP/T, que l'Ukraine va recevoir cette année pour le tester selon le président Volodymyr Zelensky, est conçu pour contrer les missiles balistiques et se présente comme une alternative au Patriot américain. 

Ce dimanche 15 mars est jour de fête nationale en Hongrie, qui commémore le soulèvement de 1848 contre la domination autrichienne et le règne des Habsbourg. Le parti du Premier ministre souverainiste Viktor Orban et celui de son rival Péter Magyar ont chacun organisé un grand meeting pour mobiliser leurs électeurs, à quatre semaines des élections législatives.

Ce n'est pas juste un phénomène. C'est un mystère. Tout le monde connaît l'inoxydable « S'il vous plaît, dessine-moi un mouton ». On en est tout ému ou tout crispé, peu importe, on connaît. Depuis quatre-vingts ans, on connaît. De près, de loin, comme s'il faisait partie depuis toujours ou (…) / Littérature, Livre, Enfance

Le socialisme municipal ne se construit pas dans une seule ville, mais au sein d'un vaste réseau, sur trois continents. Dans les décennies qui suivent la Commune de Paris, véritable matrice, les élus socialistes conquièrent des centaines de mairies, démocratisent la vie publique et améliorent (…) / À propos du « Diplo », Ville, Élections, Socialisme, Histoire

Le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a dénoncé dimanche 15 mars l’alliance entre Moscou et Téhéran, et accuse la Russie de fournir une aide logistique et de renseignement au régime iranien. Car Téhéran a activement soutenu l'effort de guerre russe contre Kiev depuis 2022, avec plus de 50 000 drones kamikazes Shahed lancés par Moscou. En envoyant de l’aide au Moyen-Orient, Kiev cherche à obtenir des avantages en contrepartie.

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The routine use of the term “World War III” (WWIII) in public discourse and political communication during the nuclear era is not merely rhetorical exaggeration but a risk factor in its own right. This study examines classic cases of strategic stability and crisis management through a historical lens—particularly the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC – Kubai rakétaválság) and the 1985 Geneva Reagan–Gorbachev joint statement—then identifies contemporary drivers of escalation risk: Russian–Western nuclear rhetoric amid the post‑2022 war, the erosion of arms‑control regimes including the Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF – Közepes Hatótávolságú Nukleáris Erők Szerződése), the Open Skies Treaty (Nyitott Égbolt Szerződés), the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START – Új Stratégiai Fegyverzetcsökkentési Szerződés), and the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty (CTBT – Átfogó Atomcsend Egyezmény); Asia‑Pacific escalation nodes (notably the Taiwan Strait); and vulnerabilities created by cyber–space–command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I – Irányítás, Parancsnokság, Kommunikáció és Felderítés) “entanglement.” The analysis integrates deterrence theory (Schelling), the security dilemma and perceptual‑bias literature (Jervis), audience‑cost theory (Fearon), media studies (agenda‑setting, framing), and risk psychology (Slovic; Sunstein) to formulate recommendations for responsible language use and for rebuilding crisis‑communication channels and arms‑control guardrails. [archives.gov], [europeanle…etwork.org], [2017-2021.state.gov], [sipri.org], [nuclearnet…k.csis.org], [bing.com], [jstor.org], [carnegieen…owment.org] [armscontrol.org], [cambridge.org], [web.stanford.edu], [academic.oup.com], [academic.oup.com], [researchgate.net], [chicagounb…hicago.edu]

1. Introduction: When Words Become Risks

The traumas of the twentieth century—two world wars and the advent of nuclear weapons—taught that “war” is not a metaphor; its invocation in the nuclear age can itself shape risk perceptions and decision‑making. The 21st‑century media environment and platform incentives often attach “WWIII” to heterogeneous events for attention maximization, blurring the line between political symbolism and military readiness and increasing the chance of misinterpretation under crisis pressure. The present study systematizes these concerns, building on a prior opinion draft with a documented, scholarly analysis. (Conceptual section; no external factual claims beyond those cited below.)

2. Historical References and Normative Milestones 2.1. The Cuban Missile Crisis as a “Negative Precedent”

For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union navigated the closest approach to nuclear war, involving a U.S. naval “quarantine,” Soviet missile deployments, the downing of a U‑2 aircraft, and eventually a diplomatic settlement (public Soviet withdrawal, a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba, and the non‑public removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy). The crisis produced procedural innovations—most notably the Washington–Moscow “hotline”—and catalyzed a sustained emphasis on arms‑control guardrails to mitigate miscalculation. [archives.gov], [history.com] [en.wikipedia.org]

2.2. “A Nuclear War Cannot Be Won” – The Geneva Formula

At their 1985 Geneva summit, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev jointly affirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” a norm that subsequently underpinned key strategic‑arms agreements and crisis‑management expectations during the late Cold War and beyond. [europeanle…etwork.org]

3. Contemporary Risks: Eroding Institutions and Escalation Nodes 3.1. The Erosion of Arms‑Control Regimes

The collapse or degradation of core regimes has diminished transparency, verification, and predictability. The INF Treaty ended in 2019 after U.S. withdrawal citing Russian noncompliance; without it, formerly banned ground‑launched missiles are no longer constrained. The Open Skies Treaty saw a U.S. withdrawal (effective 2020) and a Russian withdrawal (effective 2021), removing a tool for cooperative aerial observation in Europe. Russia announced a “suspension” of participation in New START in 2023, undermining the last U.S.–Russian treaty limiting deployed strategic forces. In 2023 Russia also “deratified” the CTBT, symbolically weakening the testing‑ban norm even as the International Monitoring System remains operational. [war.gov], [geneva.usmission.gov] [sipri.org] [nuclearnet…k.csis.org] [bing.com]

3.2. Russia, Ukraine, and Nuclear Rhetoric

Since February 2022, Russian officials—including the president—have issued statements hinting at the potential use of “all available means,” contributing to a pattern of nuclear signaling that has had mixed deterrent effects and generated international pushback. Concurrently, nuclear‑safety risks emerged at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA – Nemzetközi Atomenergia‑ügynökség/NAÜ) has maintained an unprecedented on‑site presence and repeatedly warned the UN Security Council that a nuclear accident has come “dangerously close” amid military activity. [congress.gov], [cnbc.com] [reliefweb.int], [nucnet.org]

3.3. East Asia—The Taiwan Flashpoint

The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis involved PRC missile tests near Taiwan, U.S. aircraft‑carrier deployments, and heightened tensions during Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, revealing how signaling and misperception can interact dangerously in a nuclear‑shadowed regional rivalry. Contemporary conditions—denser cyber‑space‑C3I dependencies and faster decision cycles—make such crises even harder to manage. [ndupress.ndu.edu] [cambridge.org]

3.4. Nuclear Arsenal Trends

At the start of 2024, the nine nuclear‑armed states possessed an estimated 12,121 nuclear warheads; about 3,904 were deployed and roughly 2,100 were on high operational alert—numbers reflecting a halt in the post‑Cold War trajectory of reductions in operational stockpiles. By January 2025, the total inventory was estimated at 12,241, with about 9,614 in military stockpiles and 3,912 deployed, indicating continued modernization and incremental growth in several arsenals alongside declining transparency. [aero-space.eu] [globalpolitics.in]

4. Theoretical Frameworks: Why Exaggerated Language Is Dangerous 4.1. Deterrence, Coercion, and Brinkmanship

Schelling’s Arms and Influence emphasizes that strategic interaction in the nuclear era often hinges on the manipulation of risk—the “threat that leaves something to chance”—rather than on the direct use of force. Exaggerated “WWIII” rhetoric artificially inflates perceived stakes, compressing the space for mutually face‑saving de‑escalation. [armscontrol.org]

4.2. The Security Dilemma and Perception

Jervis shows that measures taken for defense can appear offensive to adversaries, producing spiral dynamics in which misperception is central. Overheated war language exacerbates the security dilemma by magnifying threat perceptions and making conciliatory signals harder to interpret. [cambridge.org]

4.3. Audience Costs and the Credibility Trap

In Fearon’s model, leaders who make public threats incur domestic “audience costs,” making subsequent de‑escalation politically costly; maximalist rhetoric therefore narrows diplomatic exit ramps and increases the likelihood of endurance contests that risk escalation. [web.stanford.edu]

4.4. Media and Risk Perception

Agenda‑setting research (McCombs & Shaw) demonstrates that media prominence confers perceived importance, while framing research (Entman) shows how interpretive schemata constrain understanding. These dynamics, combined with the psychology of “dread risks” (Slovic) and “probability neglect” (Sunstein), help explain why alarmist “WWIII” narratives can distort public and elite risk judgments. [academic.oup.com], [academic.oup.com], [researchgate.net], [chicagounb…hicago.edu]

4.5. The Nuclear Taboo and the Role of Norms

The nuclear taboo—a deeply internalized normative prohibition on nuclear use—constrains leaders beyond material deterrence calculations and has contributed to the non‑use of nuclear weapons since 1945. Tannenwald shows that the taboo is sustained by moral stigma and reputational costs, reinforced through public discourses and doctrinal assumptions. Casual references to nuclear use or “WWIII” can, over time, desensitize publics and elites, reframing nuclear options as politically conceivable and eroding this stabilizing norm. [ir101.co.uk], [books.google.com]

4.6. Technological “Entanglement” and Signaling Uncertainty

The growing interdependence of nuclear and non‑nuclear capabilities—particularly dual‑use early‑warning satellites, ground‑based radars, and cyber‑vulnerable C3I nodes—creates pathways for inadvertent escalation. Limited conventional or cyber operations against such systems can be misread as steps toward nuclear war, especially under time pressure. [carnegieen…owment.org]

5. Where We Stand: Three Faulty Linguistic Reflexes and Their Consequences

1. Describing everything as “war.” Media and political actors often attach “WWIII” labels to limited or localized conflicts, normalizing apocalyptic frames and narrowing perceived policy options. [academic.oup.com]
2. Treating every threat as equally serious. Mixed or contradictory nuclear signaling—e.g., during the Russia–Ukraine war—can desensitize audiences and obscure genuine red lines, raising the risk of miscalculation. [cnbc.com]
3. Maximalist language inflates audience costs. Leaders who embrace world‑ending rhetoric face higher political costs for compromise, prolonging crises and making de‑escalation harder. [web.stanford.edu]

6. Counter‑Trends: Why Global War Remains Unlikely 6.1. Mutually Assured Destruction as a Structural Constraint

Despite friction, direct nuclear war among major powers remains politically and militarily irrational; deterrence continues to discourage first use even as rhetoric fluctuates. Competition therefore tends to manifest via proxies, cyber operations, and information campaigns rather than open inter‑state war. [cnbc.com] [carnegieen…owment.org]

6.2. Economic Interdependence—With Caveats

Complex interdependence constrains escalation incentives, while empirical studies associate higher trade ties with lower conflict probability; however, Copeland’s “trade expectations” theory warns that if leaders anticipate a deterioration in future trade, the pacifying effect weakens. [cambridge.org], [prio.org], [amazon.com]

7. Recommendations: Rebuilding Linguistic, Institutional, and Technical Guardrails  7.1. Linguistic and Communication Norms

Institutionalize rhetorical discipline. Establish internal guidelines to avoid casual invocations of “WWIII” and “Armageddon,” reserving such terms for material changes in posture. (Conceptual recommendation.)
Reaffirm the taboo publicly. The P5 should restate that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought—updating the Geneva formula for a multipolar era.
Invest in risk communication. Public education can mitigate probability neglect and help citizens distinguish symbolic messaging from operational signaling.
Media responsibility. Editorial standards should discourage alarmist “WWIII” headlines for local conflicts; algorithmic amplification of sensational content warrants scrutiny. [europeanle…etwork.org] [chicagounb…hicago.edu] [academic.oup.com]

7.2. Institutional and Legal Measures

Post‑New START transparency. Even without a treaty, a minimal U.S.–Russian data‑exchange on deployed strategic systems would preserve predictability.
Protect the CTBT regime. Sustain and fund the International Monitoring System (IMS – Nemzetközi Megfigyelőrendszer) and reaffirm test moratoria to prevent a resumption cascade.
Mitigate entanglement. Define norms against attacks on early‑warning assets and critical C3I nodes; adopt a cyber incident “code of conduct” that routes suspected intrusions through de‑escalatory channels.
Pursue modular arms control. Narrow‑scope arrangements—e.g., on hypersonic test notifications or ASAT moratoria—can cumulatively reduce escalation pressures. (Conceptual recommendation.) [nuclearnet…k.csis.org] [bing.com] [securityan…nology.org]

7.3. Crisis‑Management Channels and Exercises

Permanent hotlines and redundancy. Maintain U.S.–Russia, U.S.–China, and NATO–Russia crisis hotlines with verified protocols robust to cyber disruption. (Conceptual recommendation drawing on hotline history.)
Regular simulations. Track‑2/1.5 exercises can reveal blind spots and build shared vocabularies for cross‑domain incidents. (Conceptual recommendation.)
Region‑specific mechanisms. Expand U.S.–China military maritime communication to cover air, unmanned, and cyber incidents in the Taiwan Strait; in Europe, restore incident‑notification practices to reduce border risks.
Strengthen the IAEA’s conflict‑zone role. Back the IAEA to enforce its “seven pillars” and “five concrete principles” at Zaporizhzhia and other Ukrainian sites. [en.wikipedia.org] [cambridge.org] [reliefweb.int]

8. Conclusion

Language is not neutral in the nuclear age: it is a strategic instrument that can either stabilize expectations or amplify danger. The inflationary use of “World War III” compresses decision space, inflates audience costs, and corrodes the nuclear taboo that has helped maintain non‑use since 1945. Historical experience—1962’s near‑miss and 1985’s normative reaffirmation—shows that communication guardrails and clear norms reduce catastrophic risk; their erosion does the opposite. [ir101.co.uk] [archives.gov], [europeanle…etwork.org]

Global war remains unlikely because deterrence, norms, interdependence, and institutional routines still exert restraint. Yet these are not self‑sustaining. Arms‑control erosion, normalized nuclear rhetoric, and technological entanglement collectively make restraint more fragile than at any time since the late Cold War. The way forward is dual: reaffirm normative brakes (taboo, responsible rhetoric, non‑use commitments) and rebuild technical and institutional guardrails (transparency, hotlines, entanglement‑mitigation, regional protocols). Fear can become self‑fulfilling; disciplined language and resilient institutions can keep it from doing so. [nuclearnet…k.csis.org], [bing.com], [carnegieen…owment.org]

References (APA)

Acton, J. M. (2018). Escalation through entanglement: How the vulnerability of command‑and‑control systems raises the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. International Security, 43(1), 56–99. [carnegieen…owment.org]

Arms Control Association. (2019, August 2). Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty. [commonslib…liament.uk]

Arms Control Association. (2023, March). Russia Suspends New START. [nuclearnet…k.csis.org]

Arms Control Association. (2023, November). Russia ‘Deratifies’ Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. [bing.com]

Brookings Institution (Pifer, S.). (2023, October 13). Russia, nuclear threats, and nuclear signaling. [cnbc.com]

Copeland, D. C. (2015). Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton University Press. [amazon.com]

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. [academic.oup.com]

Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592. [web.stanford.edu]

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. [cambridge.org]

IAEA. (2022– ). Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine (rolling updates and reports). [reliefweb.int]

Jervis, R. (1976/2017). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press. [cambridge.org]

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and Interdependence (4th ed.). Longman. [cambridge.org]

McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda‑setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. [academic.oup.com]

National Archives (U.S.). (2024). Cuban Missile Crisis—Special topics portal. [jfklibrary.org]

Office of the Historian (U.S.). (n.d.). The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962. [archives.gov]

Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (1999). Assessing the liberal peace: Trade still reduces conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 423–442. [prio.org]

Reagan Presidential Library. (1985, November 21). Joint Soviet–United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva. [europeanle…etwork.org]

Schelling, T. C. (1966/2020). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. [armscontrol.org]

SIPRI. (2024). SIPRI Yearbook 2024—World nuclear forces (Overview & Table 7.1). [aero-space.eu]

SIPRI/Oxford Academic. (2025). Yearbook 2025—World nuclear forces (Chapter 6). [globalpolitics.in]

Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280–285. [researchgate.net]

Sunstein, C. R. (2002). Probability neglect: Emotions, worst cases, and law. Yale Law Journal, 112, 61–107. [chicagounb…hicago.edu]

Tannenwald, N. (1999). The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non‑use. International Organization, 53(3), 433–468. [ir101.co.uk]

Tannenwald, N. (2007). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non‑Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge University Press. [books.google.com]

U.S. Department of State. (2019, August 2). U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019. [war.gov]

Williams, H. (2023). Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric & Escalation Risks in Ukraine. CSIS. [brookings.edu]

Additional literature for Section 4.5 (norms/taboo):
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917.
Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. Columbia University Press.
Paul, T. V. (2009). The Tradition of Non‑Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford University Press.
Price, R. (1995). A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo. International Organization, 49(1), 73–103.
Rublee, M. R. (2009). Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint. University of Georgia Press.

A “World War III” as a Discursive Risk Factor: Historical Lessons, Contemporary Escalation Drivers, and Implications for Nuclear Stability bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Le coût de la guerre, mesuré en termes de dommages économiques et de coûts politiques pour Trump, commence seulement à apparaître.

Les bureaux de vote de métropole ont ouvert pour le premier tour des élections municipales : si une majorité des communes connaîtront leur maire dès dimanche, le scrutin s'annonce très incertain dans les grandes villes et promet de vifs débats sur les alliances d'entre-deux-tours. Les précisions de James André, journaliste de France 24 présent dans un bureau de vote à Meudon, près de Paris.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Introduction

Since the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the EU in 2020, the parties have continued to cooperate on various digital policy issues. While their regulatory approaches differ in some areas – notably AI – their broader objectives are similar. Both the EU and the UK are pursuing greater digital sovereignty and enhanced global competitiveness, seeking to reduce their strategic dependencies in critical technologies in an increasingly adversarial geopolitical context.

Digital cooperation is evolving alongside efforts to strengthen and formalise the EU-UK partnership. For example, at the first EU-UK summit on 19 May 2025, the parties agreed to establish a new strategic partnership. While digital policy was not explicitly mentioned in the summit’s joint statement, the document outlining the security and defence partnership mentioned further cooperation on cyber issues, countering hybrid threats, strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, and addressing FIMI, including through coordination in multilateral fora, such as the G7.

Core framework

The EU-UK relationship is governed by the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Windsor Framework. The TCA explicitly recognises the parties’ ‘right to regulate’ in their respective jurisdictions, while also expressing their wish to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. For example, they have committed to ensuring cross-border data flows, facilitating digital trade and holding regular cyber dialogues. According to Article 776 of the TCA, the parties have to review the implementation of the agreement in 2026, five years after its entry into force. Digital trade issues are discussed in the joint Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade.

In accordance with the TCA, the European Parliament and the UK Parliament established a Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA) in 2021 to enable the exchange of views on the implementation of the TCA. Parliamentarians meet twice a year, with the next EU-UK PPA scheduled to take place in Brussels on 16-17 March 2026.

Since 1 January 2024, the UK has been associated to the Horizon Europe programme.

Artificial intelligence

Although the EU and the UK have different approaches to AI regulation, they share the common goal of promoting the responsible development and uptake of AI. The EU has adopted a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework through the 2024 AI Act, categorising AI systems by risk and imposing strict obligations on high-risk areas such as critical infrastructure, while banning harmful practices. Minimal-risk AI systems remain largely exempt. In November 2025, the Commission proposed a digital omnibus on AI – amendments to the AI Act – on which the Council and Parliament are currently working.

The UK prefers a lighter-touch approach, regulating AI rather in the context in which it is used. It has established an AI Security Institute and adopted an AI opportunities action plan to boost AI investment, uptake and development. In March 2025, a private member’s bill, the Artificial Intelligence (Regulation) Bill, was introduced in the House of Lords, but, it has not made significant progress. If passed, it would create a central AI authority to oversee AI governance.

Both the EU and the UK are pursuing initiatives to strengthen the AI ecosystem. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan to build large-scale AI data and computing infrastructure across Europe, including AI factories and AI gigafactories. The UK is participating in the AI factories initiative and planning to host an AI factory antenna at the University of Edinburgh. The UK is also establishing its own AI Growth Zones – designated sites for AI-enabled data centres and supporting infrastructure.

At the international level, the EU and the UK collaborate on AI safety and security through their respective bodies – the EU’s AI Office and the UK’s AI Security Institute. The EU and the UK have both signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI, adhered to the OECD AI principles, contributed to international AI safety reports, and worked on shared approaches for measuring and evaluating advanced AI capabilities. They also cooperate on AI standards development through CEN and CENELEC (the European Committee for Standardization and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization). However, the UK has not signed some AI declarations, such as the Paris AI Action Summit Declaration.

Data flows

Both the EU and the UK are committed to maintaining seamless cross-border data flows. In December 2025, the Commission renewed the two adequacy decisions originally adopted in 2021, confirming that personal data may continue to move freely and safely between the European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK. The Commission concluded that the UK legal framework contains data protection safeguards essentially equivalent to those in the EU. Unless extended, the decisions will expire on 27 December 2031.

Cyber dialogues

The EU and the UK have been holding regular cyber dialogues, as set out in the TCA. Since December 2023, three formal cyber dialogues have taken place: the first in Brussels in December 2023, the second in London in December 2024 and the third in December 2025 in Brussels. These meetings are used to align positions on international cyber norms, exchange views on cyber threats and coordinate responses to malicious cyber activity. Parties provide updates on policy and regulatory developments. The next dialogue will be held in 2026 in London.

Online platforms and search engines

In May 2024, the European Commission’s DG CNECT signed an administrative arrangement with Ofcom – the UK’s regulator for communications services. The arrangement will support the enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and the UK’s Online Safety Act, which introduce new obligations for online platforms and search engines, including measures to protect users from illegal and harmful content. The two authorities plan joint training, expert dialogues and studies on issues such as protection of minors, age-appropriate design and platform transparency.

European Parliament

The European Parliament has repeatedly encouraged close cooperation with the UK on digital issues. In its resolution of 27 November 2025 on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Parliament welcomed the administrative arrangement signed between the Commission and Ofcom, as well as plans to extend data adequacy decisions. It asked the UK not to go too far from the fundamental principles of the two main EU digital regulations: the Digital Markets Act and the DSA.

Acknowledgements

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author. AI was used to improve the readability of the text.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK digital cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Cinq listes se sont qualifiées pour le second tour des municipales à Paris, qui ont vu Emmanuel Grégoire arriver largement devant Rachida Dati. L'Insoumise Sophia Chikirou arrive troisième, suivie de Pierre-Yves Bournazel (Horizons-Renaissance) et Sarah Knafo (Reconquête !) qui s'est qualifiée en fin de comptage. 

Le premier tour des élections municipales s'est déroulé dimanche en France. Voici les résultats des principales villes françaises (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, Nice, Nantes, Montpellier, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Lille, etc.), mais aussi des municipalités à suivre lors de ce scrutin.

Le RN en dynamique, percée de LFI : les deux partis, qui ont fait des municipales un test en vue de la présidentielle, sortent confortés du premier tour dimanche, dans un scrutin qui voit globalement la gauche se maintenir, notamment à Paris, Marseille et Lyon. Revivez la première journée électorale de ces municipales 2026.

They have engaged a lobbying firm with close ties to the US president to argue their case.

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À chaque ville, sa crise du logement — et, en période d'élections municipales, sa promesse de remèdes. Les causes divergent mais les effets convergent : se loger, l'un des besoins fondamentaux de l'humanité, devient une gageure dans l'un des pays les plus développés du monde. / Élections, (…) / Élections, Logement, Ville

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