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In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

In recent years, the international relations of African countries have been increasingly analysed through the lens of multipolarity and the growing economic, political and strategic competition between external powers. This debate started to gain prominence around 2018–19, when The Economist identified a “new scramble for Africa”. It has since intensified in the context  of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine finally
exposed the sharp divides as Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and its Western partners, on the other, sought to mobilise African governments in pursuit of international support for their respective positions within the UN.
The world’s political superpower – the US – has been in a process of relative disengagement from Africa for more than a decade now. By contrast, China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded their presence on the continent in the areas of trade,
investment, diplomatic support and security engagement. At the same time, Russia, a major player during the Cold War, has renewed its engagement, although, arguably, its activities remain more limited both in scope and in scale. The increasing presence in Africa of the BRICS – South Africa became a member in 2010, while Egypt and Ethiopia followed in 2024 –
is another manifestation of today’s shifting power relations and multipolarity. Similarly, the recent entry of the African Union (AU) into the G20 underscores the external recognition of Africa’s importance. Moreover, it demonstrates the continent’s growing ambition to shape international politics and defend its interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. [... ]A common thread running through all the chapters in this volume is that in Africa, multi-polarity is not simply a tale of the decline of the West and the rise of competitors like China, Russia, the UAE and Turkey. Rather, there is a complex reconfiguration of power relations under way in which African governments, institutions and societies have their say in negotiating the terms of engagement with the rest of the world, despite the undeniable persistence of asymmetries in terms of material power.

Over the past few years, European political elites have increasingly viewed the EU’s and China’s engagement in Africa through the lens of a political rivalry between democracy and autocracy. As early as 2019, the European Commission described China as a strategic rival aiming to normalize its authoritarian model as an alternative to Western democracy. This perception has only deepened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further reinforcing concerns among  policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals. While Chinese leaders avoid publicly framing the relationship as a systemic rivalry, in practice they invest heavily in public diplomacy and international networks, at least partly in order to promote China’s political model and modernization approach. When it comes to democracy and political regimes more generally, multipolarity in Africa’s external relations thus takes the form of systemic political rivalry, at least in the view of Western and Chinese policymakers.

Over the past few years, European political elites have increasingly viewed the EU’s and China’s engagement in Africa through the lens of a political rivalry between democracy and autocracy. As early as 2019, the European Commission described China as a strategic rival aiming to normalize its authoritarian model as an alternative to Western democracy. This perception has only deepened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further reinforcing concerns among  policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals. While Chinese leaders avoid publicly framing the relationship as a systemic rivalry, in practice they invest heavily in public diplomacy and international networks, at least partly in order to promote China’s political model and modernization approach. When it comes to democracy and political regimes more generally, multipolarity in Africa’s external relations thus takes the form of systemic political rivalry, at least in the view of Western and Chinese policymakers.

Over the past few years, European political elites have increasingly viewed the EU’s and China’s engagement in Africa through the lens of a political rivalry between democracy and autocracy. As early as 2019, the European Commission described China as a strategic rival aiming to normalize its authoritarian model as an alternative to Western democracy. This perception has only deepened in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, further reinforcing concerns among  policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals. While Chinese leaders avoid publicly framing the relationship as a systemic rivalry, in practice they invest heavily in public diplomacy and international networks, at least partly in order to promote China’s political model and modernization approach. When it comes to democracy and political regimes more generally, multipolarity in Africa’s external relations thus takes the form of systemic political rivalry, at least in the view of Western and Chinese policymakers.

The global rush for critical minerals has intensified amid a changing and complex world order. Multiple powers, including China and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) and others, are vying for influence in Africa, which holds vast reserves of cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other minerals essential for the clean energy transition. Demand for these resources is surging; for example, global lithium demand is expected to increase tenfold by 2050, driving billions in new mining investments, with Africa likely to attract a substantial share. African countries collectively hold around 30 per cent of the world’s known mineral reserves – including 70 per cent of global cobalt reserves, a metal crucial for batteries. Historically, African economies were trapped in a “primary commodity” model, exporting
raw materials under conditions shaped mainly by external powers, thereby limiting African agency and development.[...]

The global rush for critical minerals has intensified amid a changing and complex world order. Multiple powers, including China and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) and others, are vying for influence in Africa, which holds vast reserves of cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other minerals essential for the clean energy transition. Demand for these resources is surging; for example, global lithium demand is expected to increase tenfold by 2050, driving billions in new mining investments, with Africa likely to attract a substantial share. African countries collectively hold around 30 per cent of the world’s known mineral reserves – including 70 per cent of global cobalt reserves, a metal crucial for batteries. Historically, African economies were trapped in a “primary commodity” model, exporting
raw materials under conditions shaped mainly by external powers, thereby limiting African agency and development.[...]

The global rush for critical minerals has intensified amid a changing and complex world order. Multiple powers, including China and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) and others, are vying for influence in Africa, which holds vast reserves of cobalt, lithium, rare earths, and other minerals essential for the clean energy transition. Demand for these resources is surging; for example, global lithium demand is expected to increase tenfold by 2050, driving billions in new mining investments, with Africa likely to attract a substantial share. African countries collectively hold around 30 per cent of the world’s known mineral reserves – including 70 per cent of global cobalt reserves, a metal crucial for batteries. Historically, African economies were trapped in a “primary commodity” model, exporting
raw materials under conditions shaped mainly by external powers, thereby limiting African agency and development.[...]

Africa’s digital transformation is deeply intertwined with questions of power, strategic influence, and an evolving world order.1 As multipolarity reshapes international relations, the continent has become a focal point in the intensifying competition among major global powers for digital supremacy. Key actors that embrace techno-optimistic narratives and stand ready to partner with the region include the European Union (EU) and its member states, the United States (US), China, and India, among others.

Africa’s digital transformation is deeply intertwined with questions of power, strategic influence, and an evolving world order.1 As multipolarity reshapes international relations, the continent has become a focal point in the intensifying competition among major global powers for digital supremacy. Key actors that embrace techno-optimistic narratives and stand ready to partner with the region include the European Union (EU) and its member states, the United States (US), China, and India, among others.

Africa’s digital transformation is deeply intertwined with questions of power, strategic influence, and an evolving world order.1 As multipolarity reshapes international relations, the continent has become a focal point in the intensifying competition among major global powers for digital supremacy. Key actors that embrace techno-optimistic narratives and stand ready to partner with the region include the European Union (EU) and its member states, the United States (US), China, and India, among others.

Russia is preparing to gradually withdraw Visa and Mastercard cards from circulation following the expiration of their security certificates in early 2025. Financial institutions must first agree on alternative payment solutions before submitting proposals to the Central Bank for review. Expired Certificates Raise Security Risks The head of the National Payment Card System (NSPK), Dmitry Dubynin, explained that the security certificates for all Visa and Mastercard cards in Russia expired on January 1, 2025. He warned that using such cards under current conditions poses security risks, as expired certificates directly affect the safety of financial operations. “It is advisable to begin gradually withdrawing these cards from circulation,” said Dubynin. “However, before proceeding, the market must develop a common position and determine suitable alternatives to Visa and Mastercard.” Once consensus is reached, the proposals will be submitted to the Central Bank for consideration, he added.

On n'a pas besoin d'être expert pour séduire. Parfois, de gestes simples comme dire des mots sympas et doux ou lancer un regard intense suffisent pour mettre du piment dans une relation ou la démarrer.

With European Parliament elections and leadership changes for both the EU and the AU focusing attention elsewhere, 2024 could in some respects be considered a ‘slow news’ year and continued the longer paralysis felt in the continent-to-continent relationship. Fundamental changes in the Sahel were ongoing. Elsewhere, progress was made in trade relations while the EU continued to place strong emphasis on its Global Gateway initiative to promote investment and increase its visibility. Changes at the European level, notably a new balance of power in the European Parliament and European Commission (also reflecting ongoing electoral shifts in the member states), pointed to a more transactional and assertive approach to the EU’s cooperation with Africa.

With European Parliament elections and leadership changes for both the EU and the AU focusing attention elsewhere, 2024 could in some respects be considered a ‘slow news’ year and continued the longer paralysis felt in the continent-to-continent relationship. Fundamental changes in the Sahel were ongoing. Elsewhere, progress was made in trade relations while the EU continued to place strong emphasis on its Global Gateway initiative to promote investment and increase its visibility. Changes at the European level, notably a new balance of power in the European Parliament and European Commission (also reflecting ongoing electoral shifts in the member states), pointed to a more transactional and assertive approach to the EU’s cooperation with Africa.

With European Parliament elections and leadership changes for both the EU and the AU focusing attention elsewhere, 2024 could in some respects be considered a ‘slow news’ year and continued the longer paralysis felt in the continent-to-continent relationship. Fundamental changes in the Sahel were ongoing. Elsewhere, progress was made in trade relations while the EU continued to place strong emphasis on its Global Gateway initiative to promote investment and increase its visibility. Changes at the European level, notably a new balance of power in the European Parliament and European Commission (also reflecting ongoing electoral shifts in the member states), pointed to a more transactional and assertive approach to the EU’s cooperation with Africa.

A COP action agenda is not only for those who negotiate agreements but also for those, such as the indigenous people and local communities, essential for putting them into practice. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

By Joyce Chimbi
NAIROBI, Oct 8 2025 (IPS)

Once a year, the COP presidency or the role held by the Minister of Environment from the host government at a Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting, sets out on an ambitious, year-long journey in hopes of delivering the climate deal of a lifetime.

A deal that could stop and reverse the negative shifts in temperatures and weather patterns, such as intense flooding and prolonged drought, currently wreaking havoc all over the world, leading to loss of life, damage and destruction to property and a real threat of whole territories being wiped off the map.

Over the years, climate action or initiatives and measures to stop or at least reduce this loss and damage, has expanded, with companies setting out to reduce and ultimately end emission of harmful gases into the atmosphere, cities launching local measures to better cope with climate change, and indigenous communities restoring damaged ecosystems.

But these and many other replicable solutions are ongoing in isolation in every corner of the world. The COP30 presidency, now in the hands of Brazil, is working jointly with the UN Climate High-Level Champions team to ensure that in all matters climate, the right hand will, at all times and in real time, know what the left is doing.

A first in the history of COP, they have jointly developed and launched the Granary of Solutions, a platform that features concrete actions and instructive case studies designed to drive progress for people, the climate, and the global economy. The platform showcases a wide range of initiatives already driving change in various corners of the world. While many of the links are not yet populated, the aim is to provide an easily searchable database of climate fixes.

From weather information systems co-created with local communities to private-sector innovations in marine biofuels for cleaner shipping to subnational government actions that combine conservation, restoration, and sustainable production, these examples will showcase practical solutions delivering real-world results for people on the frontlines of climate change.

In other words, it is a showroom of successful climate action or initiatives and measures taken by individuals, communities, companies and governments to address climate change and its devastating impacts. Built on hundreds of initiatives and coalitions launched since COP21 in Paris, the granary brings together existing solutions and is open to the new contributions of best practices.

The granary is informed by the mantra that action leads to more action and that the more people learn about high-impact solutions to climate change, the more likely they are to do the same in their communities. This way, the UN and COP30 presidency believe the global community will accelerate and scale up solutions and impact in line with the Global Stocktake and the goals of the Paris agreement, adopted during COP21.

The global stocktake is a UN report card released after a periodic review of the world’s collective progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement. The first report card was completed during COP28 in 2023, after a global inventory of ongoing measures to meet the climate crisis demand as outlined in the Paris Agreement.

The agreement has 196 Parties, comprising 195 countries plus the European Union. It is a legally binding international treaty adopted within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the goal of limiting global warming.

UNFCCC is the multilateral, involving many parties, environmental agreement adopted in 1992 to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. It is the parent agreement for other key international climate agreements, such as the Paris Agreement, that primarily seek to ensure global average temperatures do not rise above pre-industrial levels.

This agreement is critical, as it changed how climate change is discussed and addressed by shifting from a top-bottom approach and opening the door for cities, regions, investors, businesses and civil society to contribute more directly as opposed to just governments. It is within this context that many different actors can contribute to the granary of solutions and help close the gaps identified in the 2023 UN’s global stocktake.

Home to real, replicable solutions that are already delivering impact, the granary of solutions is meant to be a trusted source to speed up global climate action. Only practical climate actions that align with the global stocktake and the Paris Agreement are included.

Experience of the past decade has shown that while the UNFCCC has broadened participation and resulted in significant progress in achieving global climate goals, it has not led to stronger coordination, clearer delivery, and more consistent support to boost action all over the world. The granary will connect efforts across countries and sectors.

It will also be the springboard for the COP30 action agenda. Since COP21, when the Paris Agreement was reached, every COP has established an agenda or a set of issues on the table for negotiation in line with the Paris Agreement and the overall UNFCCC goal.

It is this agenda of negotiations that then produces the annual COP agreement adopted by all the countries party to the Paris Agreement and is valid as international law. Importantly, the Action Agenda also engages actors who do not negotiate agreements, yet are essential for putting them into practice.

Drawing from the first global stocktake and the granary of solutions, the COP30 action agenda is a comprehensive framework or unified plan to mobilize all actors around new and existing initiatives designed to meet the climate crisis demands in the next five years. The next UN global stocktake will be implemented in 2028, as the process is designed to occur every five years.

Against this backdrop, the COP30 agenda is organized around six key areas: transitioning energy, industry, and transport; stewarding forests, oceans, and biodiversity; transforming agriculture and food systems; building resilience for cities, infrastructure, and water; and fostering human and social development.

Other issues, such as finance, technology, and capacity building, are considered cross-cutting. In all, objectives range from tripling renewable energy capacity and halting deforestation to achieving universal access to clean cooking and ensuring safe, sustainable and equitable water systems.

Through these six key areas, the COP30 agenda speaks directly to the first Global Stocktake by translating its findings into concrete solutions such as providing finance, technology and capacity building to undertake the climate actions or initiatives that can reduce or prevent climate change to hasten the implementation of the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the overall goals of the UNFCCC.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Note: This explainer is published with the support of Open Society Foundations.

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
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Excerpt:

Since COP21 in Paris, thousands of climate solutions by communities, businesses, cities, regions, and financial institutions have been developed in pursuit of the goals of the Paris Agreement. Now COP 30’s searchable database and platform, the Granary of Solutions, should make these accessible to all.

Les députés ont approuvé un mandat de négociation qui garantira des conditions de travail correctes aux stagiaires et dissuadera les entreprises de déguiser des emplois en stages.
Commission de l'emploi et des affaires sociales

Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

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