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A French court last month upheld the interior ministry's 2021 refusal to grant French nationality to a woman of Chinese

Whistleblower allegations obtained by Intelligence Online show that the FBI probe into the client list of two Luxembourg asset management

Alors que nous nous approchons à pas pressés du week-end, ce jeudi 14 mars, qui coïncide avec le quatrième jour du mois sacré de Ramadan, […]

L’article Le temps en Algérie ce jeudi 14 mars : voici les prévisions météo de cette fin de semaine est apparu en premier sur .

La scène économique algérienne continue d’être animée par les fluctuations incessantes des devises, avec une danse complexe entre le marché officiel et le marché informel. […]

L’article Euro, Dollar, Riyal saoudien… : quels sont les cours de change de ce jeudi 14 mars ? est apparu en premier sur .

President Biden’s initiative to have the U.S. military build a temporary port in Gaza to deliver relief supplies, announced on March 7 during the annual State of the Union address, has the potential to eventually contribute to resolving the food shortage in the strip. But it essentially sidesteps the immediate urgency of the problem and delays the brewing confrontation between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government over Palestinian refugees in Gaza. 

U.S. officials stressed that “we are not waiting on the Israelis,” and in that sense, the United States is breaking with Israel by not asking permission. Yet, another way to look at this is that it avoids the need for the United States to force Israel to allow greater volumes of aid to come into Gaza via existing border crossings. That would be a much more helpful solution given the immediacy of the need and the fact that it will take nearly two months for the temporary port to get set up and start functioning. However, given Netanyahu’s failure to respond to repeated requests from Biden for increased throughput in a manner that sustainably delivers it, this would probably require Biden to threaten some conditions on U.S. supplies to Israel, which he remains unwilling to do. 

The port project itself also is fraught with potential problems. The Biden administration has asserted that no U.S. military personnel will go ashore in Gaza to unload or deliver aid or to provide security. Still, their presence in waters very near the Gaza coast could put them within range of Hamas weapons. It also has been reported that U.S. contractor personnel could be involved in organizing the distribution of supplies once they reach the pier, which would require them to go ashore. The operation also would reportedly rely on Israeli forces to provide security onshore, while Palestinians would distribute the aid and move it to recipients. 

This raises potential problems. A recent convoy of aid on trucks that came into Gaza from the north, escorted by Israeli forces, ended up sparking a melee in which over 100 people were killed as desperate Palestinians rushed the trucks. Also, given the apparent foot-dragging by the Netanyahu government over facilitating increased volumes of supplies coming in by land, can we be sure Israel will facilitate increased supplies coming in? 

That question inevitably ties in with Netanyahu’s stated desire to undertake a military offensive into Rafah, where substantial Hamas forces and probably Hamas leadership remain. He has said the offensive will go forward, even as President Biden has said that doing so without a viable plan to move the more than one million Palestinian refugees crammed into the city was unacceptable to the U.S.” It remains highly unclear, however, whether or not the Biden administration would finally be willing to impose any substantive penalties on Israel—in terms of military supplies or otherwise—in Israel ignores U.S. concerns about the potential for a humanitarian disaster and possibly forcing refugees into Egypt as a result of a Rafah offensive. Several U.S. officials told Politico yesterday that the United States would consider conditioning U.S. military aid to Israel in a case where Israel defied the White House on Rafah. However, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan forcefully denied yesterday morning that there were any “red lines.”  “The president didn’t make any declarations or pronouncements or announcements” in last weekend’s interview, according to Sullivan. 

The pattern seems to be repeating U.S. behavior since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza—the Biden administration is stating concerns, making exhortations and requests, but avoiding any threats of concrete consequences if Israel ignores its wishes. In that context, the Gaza port initiative looks like an attempt to prevent policy differences with Israel being brought to a head. The United States is now “doing something” for starving Palestinians with an impact two months away, but only if Israel chooses to facilitate it when the U.S. equipment arrives after having previously failed to facilitate adequate supplies by land, despite repeated pleas from Biden. 

Even with the potential for a humanitarian disaster looming in Rafah, which could also do severe damage to American interests in the region and possibly lead to a wider war, the Biden administration is backing off from any suggestion that it even has any “red lines.” As Netanyahu observed in an infamous open microphone incident in 2001, “America is something that can easily be moved.” Until the Biden administration finds its spine and stops avoiding confrontation, we can expect that Netanyahu will continue to ignore the United States and our national interests.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Entre l’Algérie et la France, si les relations politiques sont plutôt « tièdes » depuis quelques mois, et que le dossier de la mémoire piétine […]

L’article Les échanges commerciaux en hausse : entre Alger et Paris, les affaires se portent bien est apparu en premier sur .

In the days following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) stood alone in Congress to oppose the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which permitted the president to wage war in Afghanistan or against anyone else complicit in harboring or aiding Al Qaeda. Lee again urged restraint in the use of military force by suggesting a diplomatic alternative to the 2002 Iraq AUMF. Both military campaigns combined carried a price tag of $8 trillion, the immense loss of U.S. military and overseas civilian life, and a damaged reputation among the international community. In retrospect, Congresswoman Lee’s appeal for restraint, when the American public largely favored the use of overwhelming military might, was a harbinger of costs to come.

Lee’s actions need to be placed in the context of the linked themes of race and foreign policy. It is no coincidence that Lee—a Black woman with experience working with Oakland grassroots organizations, a daughter of a U.S. Army veteran, and representative of the progressive and racially diverse Twelfth District of California—was skeptical of a muscular foreign policy. Lee’s sentiments are an extension of a longstanding tendency in African American political thought to prefer the judicious use of military might abroad.

Given the high rates of military service among African Americans, alongside a heightened present concern with addressing racial and economic domestic challenges, it is no surprise that many Black Americans are sensitive to the human and material costs associated with a muscular U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, policymakers in the past have not made it a priority to account for Black American opinion on the U.S.’s role in the world. Black American public opinion on U.S. military engagements has often foreshadowed broader public discontentment with poor foreign policy decisions. The historical record shows that foreign policy officials could have benefited from listening to Black American views on the U.S. role in the world. As Washington recalibrates to face a new set of global challenges, thoughtful engagement with Black American thinking on overseas military engagement offers a chance to build a more disciplined foreign policy attuned to the aspirations of the American people.

To be sure, Black American opinion has not always opposed involvement in foreign wars. While some Black intellectuals viewed both world wars as the “white man’s war,” many Black Americans saw both conflicts as an avenue to display their patriotism and a way to undermine the logic for formal Jim Crow segregation and discrimination. However, after the conclusion of the Second World War, and as the United States adopted a policy of global supremacy and containment of the Soviet Union, many Black American thought leaders such as Paul Robeson, WEB Dubois, and Martin Luther King, Jr. shifted against Washington’s Cold War policies. For them, their disillusionment with Washington’s foreign policy was driven in part by the persistence of domestic challenges such as racial and economic inequality, the immense loss of overseas civilian lives, and ensuing geopolitical instability born out of a militarized foreign policy.

It has long been known that the two flashpoints in the Cold War, the Korean and Vietnamese Wars, were largely unpopular among African Americans. In the case of the Vietnam War, Black Americans were some of the earliest opponents of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, well before the antiwar movement gained nationwide momentum. Many Black American leaders’ discontent was rooted in the human and financial costs of the war while the battle against racial and economic inequality remained unfinished. Furthermore, while Washington understood the war as an attempt to stop the spread of communism, many Black American leaders understood the conflict as the Vietnamese people’s fight for self-determination. When the fog of war cleared in 1975, the war’s consequences reshaped the social fabric of America, led to regional instability in Southeast Asia, and undermined human rights. Rather than dismissing the logic of Black leaders as being “unamerican” or “communists,” policymakers could have benefitted from listening to the polemics of Black American civil rights activists and avoided the loss of overseas civilians and American servicemembers lives and saved the millions in military spending.

Although more than half a century ago, the lessons of Cold War conflicts remain with us. Today, among Americans both within and outside the Beltway, there is consensus that Washington’s attempt at regime change and dominance in the Middle and Near East was ill-fated. However, two decades ago, the American public favored a hawkish foreign policy, while African American public opinion stood largely in opposition to military intervention in the region. For instance, polling conducted a year after the invasion of Iraq in 2004 revealed that an overwhelming majority of African Americans (76 percent) felt it was a mistake to send troops to Iraq, compared to 42 percent of Whites. While African Americans, of course, did not have more predictive power than their fellow Americans, their unique experience with military interventions of the Cold War, alongside a concern with America’s perennial domestic challenges, partially explains the heightened sense of skepticism towards the war well before costs were incurred.

President Biden’s painful but overdue withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2021 has provided foreign policy officials little reprieve as Washington is now met with a new set of global challenges. Washington’s commitment to global hegemony has resulted in a balancing act that includes anxiously managing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas War, and China’s rise. Such challenges have increased the specter of great power conflict, which could very well produce the level of carnage unseen since the twentieth-century wars in Europe.

Indeed, pundits are correct in noting that most Americans have not fully come to terms with the costs associated with the challenges of the twenty-first century. Perhaps the Black American community, with its high rates of military service, is in a unique position to fathom the costs of a great power conflict. For instance, a September 2022 poll conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reveals that only 20 percent of Black Americans would support sending troops to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion or sending troops to Taiwan in the case of a conflict with China. In an October 2023 poll, enthusiasm for sending troops to the Middle East if Israel were attacked by its neighbors was low among white respondents but especially lower among Black respondents.

Of course, these findings do not mean that many in the Black American community do not see the need for American leadership or that they do not support democracy, liberty, and human rights globally. Rather, it means they would prefer to see their country showing more discernment and prudence about its engagement in global conflicts and alliances. For instance, another Carnegie Endowment poll reveals that many  Black Americans believe the United States should be engaged in the world, but in a different manner. Findings from the survey indicate a plurality of Black Americans believe the United States should play a supporting role in sending humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and coordinating an international response to China’s rise, for example. That number is significantly higher among those respondents who believe racial issues persist at home. Such findings speak to the fact that a U.S. foreign policy that helps our allies do more in defense of common interests would bode well with many in the community.

Washington’s understanding of diversity should not stop merely at incorporating more Black faces into the foreign policy apparatus. It should also include seriously examining and weighing the opinion of a community that has participated in and thought critically about every American conflict. The point here is that understanding the African American tendency to favor diplomacy over direct military action has implications for the twenty-first century. First, understanding the distinct foreign policy ethos of the African American community in our polarized political climate can serve both political parties in their messaging to Black Americans. Polling and pundits have pointed to the fact that African American enthusiasm has dipped significantly, leading to real concerns about voter turnout and the outcome of the 2024 Presidential election. As I have argued in previous works and as Naima Green-Riley and Andrew Leber point out in their recent Foreign Affairs article, at a minimum, such insights can aid in crafting political messaging that sparks voter enthusiasm and speaks to the needs and aspirations of the community beyond domestic concerns.

More importantly, Black American opinion on the use of force abroad makes a compelling case for a foreign policy that prioritizes sharing defense responsibilities with our allies, establishing competitive coexistence with a rising China, and retrenching from a posture of global dominance. Adopting such a foreign policy will help avoid future foreign policy decisions and policies that risk squandering resources, costing the lives of American servicemembers and overseas civilians, and damaging America’s international reputation.

Christopher Shell is a fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research explores Black American attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. His writing has appeared in Responsible Statecraft, Foreign Policy, and elsewhere.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

The Hamas terrorist attack on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent Israeli military intervention in the Gaza Strip marks a turning point in relations not only between the two parties to the conflict but also between Egypt and Israel. Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, those ties were steadily being expanded in the areas of economic and security policy right up until the events of last October. Now they are characterized by mutual recriminations: while Egypt accuses the Israeli leadership of working towards the expulsion of the population of the Gaza Strip to Sinai, Israel criticizes Egypt for its alleged support of Hamas. Neither accusation is unfounded and both should be taken very seriously by Germany and its European partners. In fact, the Europeans should stand alongside Egypt in rejecting expulsion, which implies putting pressure on Israel to ensure the protection of the civilian population in Gaza. At the same time, it is important to support Israel’s insistence that going forward, the secu­rity of the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip cannot be left to Cairo alone.

Summary: As China continues its ambitious naval expansion, speculation arises regarding potential collaboration with Russia in building aircraft carriers. Some analysts suggest such cooperation could benefit both nations, potentially altering global naval power dynamics. China's growing carrier fleet, though not on par with the U.S., enhances its regional influence. Collaborating with Russia could further bolster its capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia, lacking modern carriers, could gain from Chinese assistance to fulfill its naval ambitions. However, skepticism remains about the likelihood of such collaboration, with doubts over strategic alignment and resource allocation. Despite shared interests, alternative methods may prove more viable for both nations in challenging U.S. dominance.

The Aircraft Carrier Alliance Between Russia and China? 

China is deepening its strategic partnership with Russia, and at the same time, Beijing is aggressively working to expand its naval capacities. Some observers are beginning to wonder whether the two revisionist nations might soon collaborate on building aircraft carriers.

As Brandon Weichert argues, naval cooperation between Russia and China would be mutually beneficial. It would allow the two nations to perhaps tilt the global balance of naval power.

Benefits for China

China is in the midst of one of history’s most ambitious shipbuilding sprees. It already possesses three aircraft carriers, with a fourth on the way. And while the Chinese carrier fleet is nowhere near as sophisticated, large, or generally capable as the U.S. supercarrier fleet, it has augmented China’s ability to deploy airpower abroad. 

China has shown itself willing to build an expansive aircraft carrier fleet. Here, outside collaboration could be helpful, especially when chasing the United States. Aircraft carriers are expensive, and the U.S. has 11 supercarriers. China would have a hard time, even with Russian assistance, building a fleet that is the peer of the United States’. But augmenting its carrier fleet would help China assert itself regionally and back its aggressive territorial claims throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Benefits for Russia

Russia does not have a single functioning aircraft carrier at the moment. The Admiral Kuznetsov is an outdated dog, running on black-smoke-belching Mazut and sailing with a tugboat escort. The Kuznetsov has been under repair for several years, leaving observers to wonder whether she will ever sail again. Regardless, the Russians clearly need help developing and maintaining a carrier fleet – that is, if a carrier fleet is any kind of priority to Moscow.

Russia does have a history of naval ambition, “yearning to become a dominant naval power since the time of Peter the Great,” according to Weichert. But a lack of warm-water ports has always held the Russians back, and so has their inability to create a reliable aircraft carrier. Perhaps with Chinese assistance, the Russians could expand their aircraft carrier capabilities.

How Likely is an Aircraft Carrier Collaboration?

According to Weichert, China’s ambition to become one of the world’s dominant weapons manufacturers, paired with Russia’s desire to become a naval power with their own carrier fleet, means these two nations may well collaborate to build carriers together. 

“Russia wants [aircraft carriers], and China is proving it can mass-produce [aircraft carriers],” Weichert argues. “China wants Russia to be more of a fly in the strategic ointment for the United States. Beijing sees Moscow as a means to distract and drain the U.S. military, boosting China’s ability to accomplish their own revanchist goals in their part of the world.”

That may be so, but I’m less certain. I am not convinced that Russia and China are so strategically aligned that they would embark on the world’s first multi-nation aircraft carrier-building effort. I’m not convinced that China would invest its own resources to expand Russia’s naval prowess. There are cheaper, more efficient, lower-risk, and more effective ways to facilitate Russia’s disruption of U.S. objectives.  

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Summary: The Biden administration's decision to cut one of two planned Virginia-class submarines from the upcoming budget has sparked criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. While some argue it leaves the Navy ill-prepared for potential conflicts with China, others suggest it reflects a need to prioritize spending in a resource-constrained environment. Representative Joe Courtney, a Democrat from Connecticut, who advocates for increased submarine production, criticizes the move, citing its implications for national security and job creation. However, amidst debates over military spending, some experts caution against overstating the significance of the decision, suggesting it may not greatly impact efforts to address the perceived missile gap with China.

The U.S. Navy's Virginia-Class Submarine Problem: Really Cut a Sub? 

The Biden administration has cut one of two planned Virginia-class submarines from the upcoming year’s budget. 

The decision has sharpened criticism that the U.S. Navy is not adequately equipping itself for a potential conflict with China. But President Joe Biden is also taking heat from fellow Democrats who represent states where the Virginia class is built. 

“Democrats from states that build Navy subs are already vowing to fight the Biden administration’s decision to break with tradition and halve purchases of the Virginia-class attack sub in Pentagon spending plans unveiled on Monday,” Politico reported.

Rep. Joe Courtney, a Democrat who sits on the House Armed Services Seapower panel, has pushed in the past for increases to submarine production and was critical of the president’s budget.

“To me, this is going in the opposite direction of where the Navy, Joe Biden and the Congress has been going consistently, towards recognizing we need a bigger fleet,” Courtney said. 

Courtney represents a Connecticut district that is home to General Dynamics Electric Boat shipyards, which help build the Virginia class.  

Preparing for Conflict with China

Political considerations aside, the Virginia class is considered crucial to U.S. naval preparedness as the threat from China rises. 

The Virginia is especially important because the submarine class was designed to accommodate heavy missile payloads with the Virginia Payload Module. This helps mitigate the gap that grew while the U.S. was beholden to a treaty with Russia that prohibited the stockpiling of intermediate-range missiles. China, unfettered by any such treaty, built up a considerable arsenal of these missiles, developing a niche advantage over the United States. 

The Virginia class, modified to carry more missiles than preceding classes, is intended specifically to address this shortfall. The administration’s decision to cut production of a Virginia-class­ boat thus has implications for the effort to close the missile gap with China – and more generally, to be ready for a possible conflict with that nation.   

Can’t Have it All

Despite a yearly defense budget that is nearing a trillion dollars, American resources are finite, and choices need to be made. 

Frankly, if the Biden administration can’t fit another Virginia submarine into the budget, it probably means the U.S. does not need another Virginia-class submarine, despite the drive to close a missile gap with China.

In a perfect world, the U.S. would be producing multiple Virginia-class submarines each year. But with such a substantial military budget, its absence from the final request indicates the second Virginia submarine sat quite low on the hierarchy of needs, as arbitrarily as those needs might be defined. 

Rep. Courtney’s complaints offer insights into the nature of military spending. Courtney is dressing up his complaint with a national security gloss, but at its heart, it is a complaint about job creation. And when you multiply Courtney’s perspective across multiple districts and throw in the backing of corporate entities, you’re going to find yourself with a peacetime military budget exceeding what the U.S. spent during World War II, when it operated a multi-front war with existential ramifications.    

My point is: Don’t lose too much sleep over the slashing of next year’s second Virginia-class submarine.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

U.S. Navy Warships at a Crossroads: Overcoming China's A2/AD Challenge: For centuries, navies around the world have taken pride in their large surface warships. The dominance of these warships persisted even after the advent of submarines. In fact, during the Second World War, when submarines became a primary weapons platform for navies, the aircraft carrier stole all the headlines. 

Today, however, things are changing. 

A Sizeable Liability

The rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) means that the large surface warship’s days as the primary form of power projection in a naval fleet are coming to an end.

Consider that the Ford-class aircraft carrier, America’s newest, costs $13 billion per unit, plus hundreds of millions of dollars per year to maintain. The more numerous Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, while older than the Ford-class, are also very expensive. 

An aircraft carrier is a large, highly complex warship. Its purpose is to maneuver a floating airbase near the territory of an enemy in order to threaten that rival with precise and consistent airstrikes. 

Yet for a fraction of the cost, China’s Dong-Feng 26B missile can either sink an aircraft carrier outright or simply destroy its flight deck, rendering the carrier useless in battle. 

The carrier is the primary means of American power projection. Its absence or limitation leaves a critical gap in U.S. military capabilities. That is a strategic gap that a rival like China can easily exploit. 

It's not just aircraft carriers that are vulnerable to China’s growing anti-ship capabilities. Other surface warships are also targets. 

The Chinese military has developed a growing coterie of hypersonic weapons capabilities that it is planning to launch against incoming U.S. warships. Whatever defenses those warships have against conventional anti-ship missiles, there are no known countermeasures on U.S. warships to protect against these hypersonic systems. 

A Warning to the U.S. Navy from the Ukraine War

The world has already seen the asymmetrical risks posed to large surface warships in the Ukraine War. The Moskva, a Slava-class Russian battlecruiser and the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, was sunk by a Ukrainian drone in the dead of night while still docked in port. Similar attacks have targeted several other Russian surface warships since the Moskva sunk. 

All that money, all those precious resources committed to the larger surface warship fleet, and what does Russia have to show for it? 

Not a thing.

Events in the Ukraine War should be a lesson for U.S. naval planners, especially in relation to a potential conflict with China. Any such conflict, because of the geography involved, would require the U.S. Navy to lead the charge. The Navy would do so by deploying its massive aircraft carriers. 

China’s A2/AD capabilities far outstrip whatever the Ukrainians were using against Russia in the Black Sea. Therefore, the likelihood that America’s surface warships would be held at bay by China’s A2/AD forces is great.

America’s navy has no backup plan for dealing with this. 

American Submarines Are One Solution

You might believe that if surface warships are unable to do their jobs, the U.S. submarine fleet would be available. It would be, but there are a few sticky wickets involved with boomers. 

The first is that the U.S. Navy has been shortchanging its submarine fleet for years. In its budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2025, the Navy again made onerous cuts to its initial request for more submarines. 

The next problem is that naval shipyards have been in the doldrums for years. They cannot meet increased demand. This is at a time when China is rapidly expanding its navy. 

Even Subs are Not a Panacea to America's A2/AD Concerns 

Beyond these concerns is the fact that China has developed a suite of sophisticated submarine-tracking devices.

One example is the Yaogan constellation of satellites. China aims to use this “hidden aperture radar” system to intercept radio signals from the ground and triangulate the location of warships. The Navy has a similar system. 

The Yaogan constellation joins other Chinese systems meant to track U.S. subs—some more advanced than others. 

For example, China has developed a sophisticated laser tracking system that can scour the depths of the ocean from space. Beijing’s forces also utilize less sophisticated balloons mounted with advanced sensors to track the oceans from above.

US Navy Must Burst China's A2/AD Bubble

Still, submarines are much harder to kill than large surface warships. 

The Navy must focus on expanding its submersible fleet. What’s more, in the age of A2/AD, long-distance warfare will be essential. Bursting the A2/AD bubble will be key. 

Beyond submarines, then, the Navy requires a robust arsenal of unmanned drones and hypersonic weapons to annihilate known A2/AD emplacements. 

Yet the Navy isn’t investing in these systems. Instead, the Pentagon continues splurging on legacy systems—notably the costly aircraft carrier—and hoping that China’s A2/AD systems aren’t as effective as Beijing claims they are.

In other words, the Pentagon would rather spend its money enriching defense contractors instead of building relevant, cost-effective systems that can actually defeat the Chinese.

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

C’est dans une atmosphère conviviale et détendue que Soolking a fait son entrée sur le plateau de ABtalks l’émission d’interview animée par Anas Bukhash sur […]

L’article Soolking chez ABtalks : « la musique c’est haram ! » est apparu en premier sur .

Dans une logique de Vendetta, DZ Mafia et Yoda se mènent une guerre sanglante dans le Sud de la France. Depuis plusieurs mois, Marseille est […]

L’article Narcobanditisme à Marseille : 13 membres présumés du gang « DZ Mafia » arrêtés est apparu en premier sur .

(B2) Un navire marchand a été capturé par les pirates somaliens a confirmé ce mercredi (13 mars) le QG de l'opération anti-piraterie de l'UE, EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

L'incident s'est produit en plein océan indien, à 600 nautiques à l'est de Mogadiscio. Le vraquier Abdullah, battant pavillon bangladais, parti des Émirats arabes unis vers le Mozambique, a alors été abordé par plusieurs pirates présents dans deux navires, l'un plus large et l'autre un simple dhow.

Les pirates sont montés à bord et ont pris le contrôle du navire. Les 23 membres d'équipage sont sains et saufs selon le QG d'Atalanta. Mais ils ont été pris en otage. Le navire contrôlé par les pirates a pris la direction des côtes somaliennes, suivi à la trace par la marine européenne.

Un navire de pêche iranien avait été capturé le 2 mars dernier. Procédé classique pour les pirates afin de se procurer un navire plus puissant permettant de servir de bateau-mère pour partir à l'attaque de navires plus gros ou plus loin. Le centre de veille maritime européen (MSCHOA) avait signalé d'ailleurs son départ de Jiffle en Somalie avec 11 personnes armées à bord.

La force maritime européenne est actuellement commandée sur zone par le contre-amiral italien Francesco Saladino à bord de la frégate de type FREMM, l'ITS Federico Martinengo (F-596). Elle dispose d'un autre navire, la frégate espagnole Canarias. Et un avion de patrouille maritime espagnol de type Vigma D4.

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Mis à jour : correctif sur l'avion disponible

William Whitworth, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic from 1981 to 2000, died at the age of eighty-seven last week. If his name escapes you, that was part of his design. After Mortimer Zuckerman hired Whitworth away from The New Yorker to run the Boston magazine that Zuckerman had just bought, Whitworth, despite having been a prominent writer and editor at The New Yorker, sublimated his ego for the next two decades at The Atlantic. He didn’t write anymore, not even an editor’s note. He didn’t network nearly as much as he could have in New York or Washington and rarely appeared on television. He was no operator. Terrifically low-key—in the spirit of his New Yorker mentor William Shawn—he submerged his whole being in the world of text and was often skeptical of the fads of the moment. You could do that then!

“Bill,” as he was known, rarely had soundbites to offer. He was not particularly quick on his feet. He was penetrating, soft-spoken, and replete with polite common sense expressed in a mild southern drawl. A native of Arkansas and a graduate of the University of Oklahoma, after he left The Atlantic, despite pleas to remain part of the East Coast media world, he quietly returned to Little Rock, where he edited books for top Manhattan publishers, making authors as varied as Conrad Black and Anjelica Huston appear at their best in print.

Bill, a liberal editing a liberal magazine, was also quietly and regularly brave. In the March 1982 issue of The Atlantic, Bill published a cover story by criminologist George L. Kelling and political scientist James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” about how tolerating low-level disorder such as breaking windows and jumping subway turnstiles leads to an atmosphere of more serious crime. It was a plea based on social science for law and order. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani adopted it, and New York City became safer as a result. In the September 1990 issue, Bill published the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis’s cover story, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” which told difficult truths about the Islamic world and helped spark Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory. The April 1993 cover declared “Dan Quayle Was Right,” in which sociologist Barbara Dafoe Whitehead systematically mounted a defense of traditional, two-parent families, something that the former vice president had championed, much to the liberal media’s distaste.

All of those stories and more pushed back at elite prejudices, not just of our time but of that time, too. Bill’s open mind and determination to avoid news cycles were part and parcel of his tolerance for new and different ideas. In the 1980s, when the elite media in the United States was fixated on the wars in Central America and Lebanon, Bill and managing editor Cullen Murphy immediately grasped why I wanted to turn my attention to the Balkans, resulting in a July 1989 piece that appeared months before the Berlin Wall collapsed and two years before the start of the war in Yugoslavia. As a liberal, Bill was not especially a fan of Henry Kissinger. Yet, he published my June 1999 essay, “Kissinger, Metternich, and Realism,” which defended the former secretary of state as the greatest statesman of the age. This was in spite of a suffocating media climate of moral triumphalism and aversion to the national interest that dominated the 1990s.

Bill’s attitude to pieces he disagreed with was simple: Is this piece well-argued or not? If it is well-argued, then publish it. Because he was not an ideologue, he did not consider your argument immoral simply because he didn’t share it. He was a classic liberal in the sense that he inhabited uncertainties and thus was indefatigably curious. Moral huffiness and superiority were foreign to Bill. In this aspect, the establishment media has undergone an unfortunate transformation.

Bill hoarded stories, holding a piece for many months before he used it, a method he probably inherited from Shawn. These were the days when magazines like The Atlantic had longer lead times than they do now. He used to tell me that if a piece couldn’t hold up for many months, it was possibly of limited value in the first place. When the magazine moved to Washington in the mid-2000s, its editorial pace quickened, and The Atlantic became more in tune with the conventional sensibilities of the nation’s capital.

Bill brought the “highly-engineered” article, as he put it, to the publication. That is, every piece was combed over by a number of editors and a rigorous fact-checker. Knowing what was in store for their pieces, writers were less inclined to wing it and inject their pieces with attitude. “A long piece is never 100 percent accurate,” Bill once told me. “What happens is that with a deadline looming, you simply run out of time.”

Bill never forgot that he edited a general interest magazine. Thus, he covered what people all across America in different professional situations were interested in, not just the fixations of the bicoastal media world. He published pieces arguing against bilingual education and physician-assisted suicide and essays years and decades ahead of their time about race, the environment, and the social effects of technology. Writers and thinkers such as management guru Peter Drucker, military historian John Keegan, and environmentalist Bill McKibben achieved enhanced national stature in Whitworth’s Atlantic. I recall a snooty young interviewer from an Ivy League journalism program who remarked that The Atlantic was just so boring back then. “Boring to whom?” I retorted.

Whitworth’s Atlantic worked to unite the country because it respected all elements within it. Bill advised me to pay close attention to the great middle of the continent, where he said so many fascinating people lived and worked. Taking his advice and traveling through the Midwest, I wrote that Nebraska lay on a slab tilting upwards to the High Plains. “No,” Bill wrote to me, somewhat angrily, “Nebraska did not lay on a slab, it lies on a slab.” A stickler for usage, he was continually saddened by what he said was a decline in grammatical standards at The New York Times.

Whitworth was a formalist in writing, speech, dress, and manners, emblematic of much that journalism as a profession and our society has lost. But you don’t have to remember his name. He wouldn’t have expected you to.

Robert D. Kaplan wrote on foreign affairs for The Atlantic for thirty years until 2016. He holds the Robert Strausz-Hupé Chair in Geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary:  While aircraft carriers are a formidable power projection tool, their effectiveness is challenged by Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies from near-peer adversaries. The F-35C and F-35B variants, designed for carrier and vertical/short takeoff and landing operations, face operational range and combat radius limitations, potentially reducing their battlefield impact in A2/AD environments. Despite these challenges,  the F-35's capabilities against previous generations of fighters must also be considered. 

The F-35 Lightning II: Evaluating the Backbone of US Naval Power Projection

In many respects, aircraft carriers are the main weapon of the U.S. Navy and, by extension, of the U.S. military. 

Aircraft carriers can project power like no other conventional weapons system. They do that through their fighter jets, which can take out warships, bomb ground targets, and establish air superiority over the battlefield.

However, near-peer U.S. adversaries have been developing Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) systems to restrict U.S. aircraft carriers. If a flattop cannot get close enough to the action, its impact is severely blunted. 

One response to A2/AD measures would be to fly aircraft with superior range. Yet for the F-35 Lighting II, the newest fighter jet to operate from American aircraft carriers, range might be an issue. 

F-35: Let’s Talk About Fuel 

The Navy uses the C version of the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet, while the Marine Corps operates both the F-35C and the F-35B. (Marine aviators operate from Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships and fly alongside their Navy brethren.)

The F-35C is designed for carrier operations, while the F-35B is a Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft that can take off and land like a helicopter. 

According to Lockheed Martin and the Navy, the F-35C Lightning II can carry about 20,000 lbs of fuel in its internal fuel tanks, which translates into an operational range of approximately 1,200 nautical miles (1,380 miles). The fighter jet can carry additional fuel in external fuel tanks, but this limits the stealth capabilities of the aircraft and largely defeats its purpose on the battlefield. 

The aircraft’s combat radius – the range a fighter jet can operate in combat conditions and with a full loadout – is much smaller. The F-35C has a combat radius of about 600 nautical miles. 

The F-35B is even more limited. It can carry slightly over 13,000 lbs of fuel in its internal fuel tanks, which translates to an operational range of about 900 nautical miles and a combat radius of 450 nautical miles. 

All versions of the F-35 can support mid-air refueling to extend their range. However, the air tanks that would do the refueling are not stealth aircraft, and refueling operations would undermine the low-observable capabilities of the F-35. Mid-air refueling in a permissive or non-permissive battle environment would range from risky to downright foolish. 

But to judge the operational range of these two versions of the F-35, we have to look at the capabilities of the fighter jets that have gone before them, namely, the F/A-18 Hornet, F/A-18 Super Hornet, AV-8B Harrier, and F-14 Tomcat. 

The F/A-18 Hornet has a combat radius of approximately 1,100 nautical miles, while the F/A-18 Super Hornet can go about 1,300 nautical miles. The AV-8B Harrier has a combat radius of 300 nautical miles, and the retired, legendary F-14 Tomcat could go approximately 285 nautical miles, which could be stretched to 650 nautical miles with external fuel tanks. 

So the F-35C has a better combat radius than the F-14 Tomcat, but half that of the F/A-18 Hornet and F/A-18 Super Hornet.

In the STOVL category, the F-35B does better than its comparable aircraft, the AV-8B Harrier, but vastly underperforms the combat radii of to the F/A-18 Hornet and F/A-18 Super Hornet. 

About the Author

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: In a riveting NATO wargame named Operation Nordic Response 2024, the French frigate Normandie achieved a simulated victory over a German submarine in Norway. This exercise underscored the critical importance of anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Despite facing a challenging environment in the Scandinavian fjords, the French crew, utilizing the Normandie's helicopter and sonar technologies, identified and "destroyed" the German sub, demonstrating the realism and value of such training exercises. This event, part of a series of drills in the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia, not only highlights the strategic importance of the region, given its proximity to Russian military bases but also reinforces NATO's commitment to interoperability and preparedness in the face of potential threats.

French Frigate Normandie "Sinks" German Sub in High-Stakes NATO Wargame

In a simulated clash reminiscent of World War Two, the French warship, the Normandie, managed to “sink” the German sub. 

The exercise in Norway showed the importance of anti-submarine warfare drills. 

The French warship did not have an easy job. In the days before the clash, the German submarine delivered an imaginary torpedo hit to the Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. In similar exercises, submarines have managed to penetrate the defenses of aircraft carriers and score hits against big flattops.  

As soon as the French crew understood that an “enemy” submarine was in the area, it scrambled into action. 

One of the newest warships of the French Navy, the Normandie launched its helicopter to help spot the submarine through sonar. It soon succeeded. 

“Intelligence confirmed to us that there were no friendly submarines in the sector, so we were certain that it was an enemy submarine,” the NH90 helicopter pilot who helped track the German submarine said.  

Although the German submarine was more familiar with the Scandinavian fjords, the French crew managed to overcome its disadvantage and score a hit against the German sub. 

As soon as the French crew spotted the German submarine, it fired a munition that “destroyed” the threat, winning the day for the Normandie. 

Capt. Thomas Vuong, the commanding officer of the Normandie, told the Associated Press the exercise was “extremely beneficial, because we reach a very high degree of realism and so we better prepare our teams.”

“The fjords are a special environment, with a temperature profile different to what we know in the Atlantic. To be able to train our teams here, against this threat, is extremely valuable and extremely stimulating. This is their playing field. So they know the hiding places,” the French naval officer added. 

Operation Nordic Response 2024

The clash between the two NATO warships was part of Operation Nordic Response 2024, a series of wargames in the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia. 

Although the area is surrounded by NATO countries – including Sweden, the newest member-state – Russia has a presence as well. St. Petersburg sits in the Gulf of Finland, in the region’s east. But most important is the Kaliningrad exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. Kaliningrad is essentially a big military base that houses nuclear weapons. The Russian Navy has been sending submarines in the Baltic waters to spy or to train in very realistic conditions. 

These exercises help militaries identify weaknesses and work to prevent operational mistakes. In addition, they enhance interoperability. NATO is an alliance. In a potential war with Russia, all countries would be expected to contribute to the conflict and fight closely together.

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: Just days after officially joining NATO, the Swedish Air Force marked its integration into the Alliance with the first intercept of Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea. This operation saw Swedish JAS-39 Gripen jets joining forces with German Luftwaffe Eurofighters and Belgian Air Component F-16AM Fighting Falcons to intercept a Russian Antonov An-26 and a Tupolev Tu-134. 

Swedish JAS 39 Gripen Jets in Historic NATO Intercept Over Baltic Sea

The Swedish-built JAS 39 Gripen has been in service with NATO members the Czech Republic and Hungary, but on Monday aircraft from the Swedish Air Force took part in the first intercept of Russian aircraft as part of a NATO air mission. It came just a day after the Nordic nation officially the international alliance.

Swedish JAS-39 Gripen jets launched under NATO arrangements to safeguard the skies over the Baltic Sea flying with German Luftwaffe Eurofighters and Belgian Air Component (BAC) F-16AM Fighting Falcons, NATO Air Command announced. The NATO warbirds intercepted a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Antonov An-26 (NATO reporting name "Cash) transport aircraft and Tupolev Tu-134 (NATO reporting name Crusty") military airliner over the Baltic region.

"This swift coordinated reaction of NATO jets from Belgium, Germany and Sweden safeguarding the skies over the Baltic Sea region underlines the close integration and responsive command and control arrangements within the Alliance," the command said in a statement.

NATO Air Command shared images from the sortie on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The alliance further noted that it served as an impressive demonstration of the deep integration the Swedish Air Force has achieved with NATO Air Policing forces and the close and smooth interoperability in support of safeguarding NATO over the Baltic Sea.

NATO fighter jets regularly take to the skies to intercept and identify Russian planes flying in international airspace near member nation territory. For the German Luftwaffe, it was the second scramble since taking over the Air Policing mission at Lielvarde on March 1, while Belgian jets have been scrambled roughly a dozen times since beginning their mission at Šiauliai on December 1, 2023.

Sweden Has Become a Major NATO Asset in the Baltic Region

It was also last week that a pair of Swedish Air Force JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters escorted a U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer and B-52 Stratofortress over Stockholm to commemorate Sweden joining NATO. During the planned flight, the aircraft flew over Avicii Arena, Sweden’s Parliament House, the Stockholm Arlanda Airport, and the Uppsala Airport.

The Swedish Air Force also conducted its first reconnaissance flight near the Russian border – with one flight made by a Swedish Gulfstream S102B Korpen GIV-SP Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), a heavily modified Gulfstream IV equipped with signal intelligence gathering sensors. The aircraft reportedly flew over Poland near the borders of Russia's Kaliningrad enclave and Belarus. A second flight was carried out by a Saab 340 early warning and control (AEQ&C) aircraft over the Baltic Sea. It is capable of tracking ships, planes, and missiles up to 190-250 miles while at an altitude of 20,000 feet.

Sweden officially joined the international military alliance this month after more than two centuries of neutrality, driven by Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine two years ago.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: Over the past month, the Russian Aerospace Forces have faced significant losses, including more than a dozen combat aircraft, notably several Su-34 fighter-bombers and at least three Su-35 fighters. The Su-35, an advanced derivative of the Su-27 and intended for export, has been in Russian service since 2014 and seen action in Syria. Despite its advanced capabilities and designation as a "4++ generation" fighter, recent engagements have led to the downing of several Su-35s, with claims of at least one being a result of friendly fire. The Su-35 is praised for its versatility, maneuverability, and heavy armament but has faced criticism over its avionics compared to Western counterparts. The recent losses highlight potential vulnerabilities in its design and operational deployment. As of December 2022, Russia had 110 Su-35s, with ongoing production to replenish its forces.

Russian Su-35 Fighters Downed: A Blow to Aerospace Prowess?

Over the past month, the Russian Aerospace Forces have lost more than a dozen combat aircraft, including several of its highly touted Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers, but it was just last week that at least three Sukhoi Su-35 fighter was reported to have been shot down in the past month.

According to reports on social media, the Su-35 disappeared from radar near Mariupol. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not confirmed the loss of the jet, and its downing hasn't been independently verified. However, the loss of another Su-35S was confirmed last month near Avdiivka – and there are reports that it may have been the victim of friendly fire.

As many as eight Su-35s may have been destroyed since Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine just over two years ago.

The Su-35 Fighter from Russia in the Crosshairs

The Su-35 is noted for being a heavily upgraded derivative of the Su-27 aircraft (NATO reporting name "Flanker") that was originally intended for export. However, it has been in service with the Russian Air Force since 2014 and made its first combat deployment in Syria in 2015 – where it was employed to provide cover for other Russian aircraft on bombing missions. It was further utilized in guided and unguided strikes against ISIS and rebel forces in Syria.

Whereas the Su-27 was initially developed to address the development of the U.S. military's F-15 Eagle in the 1970s, the Su-35 was a response to the F-16. According to its designers, as a multirole fighter, the Su-35 can be used in a variety of missions and is capable of attacking ground and naval targets, including infrastructural facilities shielded by air defense systems, as well as those located at a considerable distance from home airfields

The Sukhoi Su-35 is actually the second improved version of the Su-27M; it is a single-seat, twin-engine, supermaneuverable aircraft. It reportedly features thrust-vectoring engines in place of the Su-27's canards. Designated the "Flanker-E" by NATO, this "4++ generation" fighter has been touted by Kremlin officials as being a very capable foe to current U.S. aircraft, including the F-15 Eagle, the F-18, and even the F-35 Lightning II.

According to United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), the Su-35 "combines the qualities of a modern fighter (super-maneuverability, superior active and passive acquisition aids, high supersonic speed and long range, capability of managing battle group actions, etc.) and a good tactical airplane (wide range of weapons that can be carried, modern multi-channel electronic warfare system, reduced radar signature and high combat survivability)."     

Su-35: Well-armed Warbird

The Su-35's armament includes a GSh-30-1 30mm autocannon with 150 rounds, along with 17,630 pounds of payload on twelve external points. It can carry a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation, and anti-ship missiles, as well as a number of TV, laser-, and satellite-guided bombs. By comparison, the new U.S.-built F-22 has just four hardpoints on its wings and three on internal weapon bays.

The Su-35 is capable of employing an entire range of existing and future air-launched air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, including precision weapons. It carries a 30mm GSh-30-1 gun, short-, medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles, Kh-31, Kh-35U or Kh-59M anti-ship missiles and various types of precision munitions and rockets as its basic armament. The fighter integrates the IUS-35 information and control system and a phased array radar capable of detecting targets at a range of 100 km-400 km.

It has a maximum take-off weight of 34.5 tons and can accelerate to 2,500 km/h. The Su-35 has an operational range of 1,500-4,500 km and a service ceiling of 20,000 meters. The twin Saturn AL-41F1S turbofans provide the Su-35 with maneuverability that can easily match or exceed the evasion techniques of nearly all existing fourth-generation fighters. With a maximum speed of 1,550 mph and a ceiling of 59,050 feet, it is a well-armed, speedy aircraft.

Yet, Ukraine has still managed to shoot at least a few of the Su-35s out of the sky.

One issue may be that the aircraft doesn't fully live up to the hype, a point noted by The Aviation Geekclub, which quoted aviation expert Abhirup Sengupta.

"Despite being marketed as 4++ gen, Su-35 has the least capable avionics suite among its competitors. It's the only major 4th gen. aircraft without an AESA radar or any form of Sensor Fusion. The Irbis-E is marketed as having a 350 km range against 3 m^2 target while in reality that's only in cued-search in a tiny FoV. What's rarely stated is that in normal volume search that range shrinks down to 200 km," noted Sengupta.

Moreover, the expert added, that "Su-35's radar has a maximum targeting range of 250 km – even for a B-52 like target," and further suggested, "The Su-35 is definitely the most capable Fighter in Russian Air Force and there is no doubt that it presents a serious threat to any 4th gen aircraft out there. But to say that it's on the same level as today’s F-15E, F/A-18E/F, Typhoon or Rafale, much less 'superior' is defying reality."

How Few Remain?

The Kremlin was believed to have had 110 of the aircraft in its inventories as of December 2022. It is in service with several fighter aviation regiments of the Russian Air Force, including the 22nd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment.

Production of the aircraft is currently underway at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant located in the Russian Far East (part of the United Aircraft Corporation within the state tech corporation Rostec), and according to Russian state media, it delivered the latest batch of Su-35S fighter jets in July of last year.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

On Wednesday, MEPs endorsed the renewal of trade liberalisation measures for Moldova and amended the proposal on Ukraine to reinforce safeguards for EU farmers.
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