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Seit dem Einsturz des Vordachs am Bahnhof von Novi Sad im November 2024 protestieren Studierende in Serbien gegen das autoritäre System der regierenden Partei SNS und des Staatsoberhauptes Aleksandar Vučić. Sie sehen ihn als Hauptverantwortlichen für die Verfestigung dieses Systems. Die Bewegung ist von Beginn an sehr heterogen. Die Regierung bezeichnete sie in regierungsnahen Medien abwechselnd als westlich gesteuerte »Farbrevolution«, als anarchistisch, totalitaristisch oder terroristisch. Zugleich wird versucht, die Studierenden durch nationalistische Zuschreibungen in der EU zu diskreditieren. Dieser Vorwurf erhielt neue Nahrung, nachdem beim Protest am 28. Juni viele nationalistische Reden zu hören waren. Was steckt dahinter?

Die Bedeutung des 28. Juni für das serbische Nationalverständnis

Der 28. Juni (Veitstag, »Vidovdan« auf Serbisch) ist ein symbolträchtiger Tag für das serbische Nationalverständnis. An diesem Tag fand die Schlacht am Amselfeld im Mittelalter statt, ein zentrales Ereignis für die serbische Identität, das den Bezug zum Kosovo als historisch und emotional aufgeladenen Ort unterstreicht. Während des Protests griffen viele Reden diese Symbolik auf. Darüber hinaus hat der Tag auch eine staatstragende Bedeutung. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurde am 28. Juni die Vidovdan-Verfassung verabschiedet, die die Gründung des Königreichs der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen besiegelte. Interessanterweise wurde am selben Datum, im Jahr 2001, der ehemalige Präsident Serbiens, Slobodan Milošević, an den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof ausgeliefert, wo er zuvor wegen Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit angeklagt worden war. Für historisch informierte Beobachtende war es daher nicht überraschend, dass nationalistische Stimmen zu Wort kamen.

Nationalismus und Demokratie: Eine komplexe Beziehung

Die nationalistischen Äußerungen innerhalb der Bewegung lassen sich durch mehrere Faktoren erklären. Zum einen versucht die Bewegung, nationale Symbole wie die serbische Flagge neu zu besetzen, um sie so der Vereinnahmung durch Vučić und die SNS zu entziehen. Diese stellen sich nämlich als einzige Kraft für Serbiens »wahre« Interessen dar und diffamieren andere als Verräter:innen. Zum anderen gibt es strategische Gründe: Die jüngere Geschichte Serbiens zeigt, dass kein Regimewechsel vom Autoritarismus zur Demokratie ohne die Nationalist:innen möglich war. So etwa beim Sturz Miloševićs, nach dem mit Vojislav Koštunica ein Politiker mit nationalistischen Überzeugungen erster prodemokratischer Präsident wurde.

Obwohl die aktuelle Bewegung laut repräsentativen Umfragen mit 43,6 Prozent weiterhin die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung hinter sich hat – im Vergleich zu 33,5 Prozent Unterstützung für die Regierung – verliert sie an Rückhalt bei 22,9 Prozent Unentschlossenen. Genau diese Bevölkerungsgruppen versucht die Bewegung durch nationalistische Diskurse zu erreichen.

Aktuelle Umfragen zeigen jedoch, dass der Nationalismus nicht die tragende Ideologie der aktuellen Proteste ist. Die Mehrheit der serbischen Jugend bewertet die 1990er Jahre und die damit verbundenen nationalistischen Narrative negativ. Sie empfindet das Erbe dieser Zeit als belastend. Zwar möchte die Mehrheit die Wahrheit über die Kriege erfahren, aufgrund des sozialen Drucks und anderer struktureller Probleme hat sie jedoch Angst vor einer Infragestellung der Vergangenheit.

Auch die Beteiligung von Studierenden aus dem Sandžak – einer überwiegend muslimischen Region, die sich ethnisch-politisch eher Bosnien-Herzegowina zuordnet – weist darauf hin, dass der Nationalismus nicht überwiegt. Diese Studierenden tragen bei den Protesten ebenso serbische Flaggen wie diejenigen, die sich als ethnische Serb:innen definieren.

Anti-Autoritarismus als gemeinsamer Nenner

Trotz der Heterogenität der Bewegung ist der Anti-Autoritarismus weiterhin der gemeinsame Nenner. Dieser beinhaltet Anti-Korruption und demokratische Institutionen, wofür sich die Bewegung seit November 2024 einsetzt. Jede heterogene Bewegung benötigt einen minimalen Konsens zur Organisation. Dieser kann ideologisch vielfältig unterfüttert sein und sowohl pro-europäische, universelle als auch nationalistische, partikularistische Anforderungen enthalten. Dies ist sowohl in der politischen Theorie als auch in der Praxis belegt.

Laut Umfragen halten 46,9 Prozent der Bevölkerung die Demokratie für die beste Regierungsform. Nur 24,3 Prozent befürworten das »Regieren mit eiserner Hand«. Die Studierendenbewegung sollte daher nicht als rein nationalistisch abgestempelt werden, sondern als Ausdruck breiterer demokratischer Bestrebungen. Deutschland und andere EU-Länder sollten die Bewegung klarer unterstützen, anstatt weiterhin auf Vučićs Politik zu setzen. 

OPINION on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Barry Andrews

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

En 2023, l'Union européenne prenait des sanctions contre Pristina. La société civile du Kosovo est la première touchée. Ainsi, la rénovation du cinéma Lumbardhi de Prizren a perdu le soutien financier de Bruxelles. Le cri d'alarme et de colère de son directeur, Ares Shporta.

- Articles / Kosovo, Gratuit, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Culture et éducation, Questions européennes

The concept of generic fascism helps understanding Russia’s war against Ukraine

 

Andreas Umland

 

The use of the term “fascism” in connection with the modern Russian state and its actions has at least three dimensions. First, it is a historical analogy used to guide public interpretation of current events in light of well-known developments in the recent past. Second, it is a Ukrainian code expressing the lived experience of millions of Ukrainians today. Third, “fascism” is an academic umbrella term that serves scientific classification, enables comparisons across time and space, and highlights differences and similarities between historical fascism, on the one hand, and Putinism, today on the other.

 

Fascism as a historical analogy

Most public references to Putin’s regime as fascist serve as a diachronic analogy or metaphorical classification to better understand recent developments in Russia and its occupied territories. Such historical comparisons and verbal visualizations of current phenomena with events and images from the past help to identify key characteristics and challenges of today’s Russia. The attribution of “fascism” to Putin’s regime serves to illustrate to the general public what is happening in Russia and the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.

This comparison is justified insofar as there are numerous parallels between the political rhetoric and actions of Putin’s Russia, on the one hand, and Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, on the other. By mid-2025, many political, social, ideological, and institutional similarities will have accumulated. These range from increasingly dictatorial and partly totalitarian features of the Russian regime to revanchist and increasingly genocidal features in the Kremlin’s external behavior. Against this backdrop, the use of the term fascism serves to guide debates in mass media, civil society, and educational institutions.

 

Fascism as lived experience

The use of the term “fascism” to describe Putin’s regime by outside commentators aims to give audiences outside Russia and Ukraine an impression of current Russian domestic and foreign affairs. In contrast, the Ukrainian use of the term “fascism” and the neologism “rashism” – a combination of “Russia” and “fascism” – is primarily an expressive act. In Ukraine, describing Russia as fascist has, since 2014, articulated the collective shock, deep grief, and ongoing despair at the Kremlin’s morbid cynicism toward ordinary Ukrainians—especially in the last three and a half years of war.

“Fascism” or “rashism” also serves as a battle cry for the Ukrainian government and society to mobilize domestic and foreign support for resistance against Russian aggression. These terms are intended to draw the outside world’s attention to the serious consequences of Russia’s war of expansion and destruction for Ukraine. The adjectives “fascist” and “rashist” indicate that Russia’s military expansion is not just about conquering Ukrainian territory. Russia’s revanchist adventure, especially since 2022, aims to destroy Ukraine as an independent nation-state and a cultural community separate from Russia.

The words and deeds of the Russian government are largely consistent in this regard. Statements by Russian government officials, parliamentarians, and propagandists, especially since February 24, 2022, indicate that Russia’s intentions toward Ukraine go beyond merely redrawing state borders, restoring regional hegemony, and preventing the Westernization of Eastern Europe. Moscow has already since 2014 been ruthlessly suppressing Ukrainian identity, culture, and national sentiment in Crimea and the Donbas.

It would be going too far to equate Russian Ukrainophobia with the biological and eliminatory anti-Semitism of the Nazis. With its irredentist war, Moscow “only” wants to destroy the Ukrainians as a self-confident nation and integrated civil society. The Kremlin does not aim to physically eliminate all Ukrainians, as the Nazis attempted to do with the Jews. Nevertheless, the Russian agenda goes beyond “mere” expulsion, harassment, deportation, re-education, and brainwashing of Ukraine’s inhabitants. It also includes the expropriation, terrorization, imprisonment, torture, and murder of those Ukrainians (as well as some Russians) who oppose Russia’s military expansion, political terror, and cultural dominance in Ukraine in word and/or deed. It is therefore hardly surprising that many Ukrainians, as well as some Russian observers, spontaneously describe Russia’s genocidal behavior as “fascist.”

 

Fascism as a scholarly concept

A growing number of prominent experts on Central and Eastern Europe today describe Putin’s Russia as fascist. In contrast, many contemporary historians and political scientists who work with comparative methods have so far avoided using the term fascism to categorize Putinism. This has to do with the narrow definitions of generic fascism used by many of these academics. According to these definitions, the key feature that distinguishes fascists from other right-wing extremists is their goal of political, social, cultural, and anthropological rebirth.

Fascists often refer to a supposed Golden Age in their nation’s distant past and use ideas and symbols from this mythologized prehistory. However, they do not want to preserve or restore a past era, but rather to create a new kind of national community. Fascists are right-wing extremists, but they are more revolutionary than ultra-conservative or reactionary. Today, many comparativists would be cautious about applying the term fascism to Putinism, as Putin seeks to restore the Russian Empire rather than create an entirely new Russian state and people.

Admittedly, Putin’s transformation of Russian domestic and foreign policy over the past 25 years has had a clear direction. It has meant a continued increase in rhetorical aggression, internal repression, external escalation, and general radicalization, which now culminates in monthly Russian threats of world war. For most comparative historians, nevertheless, these and similar changes in the last quarter-century of Russian history would still be insufficient to classify Putinism as fascism.

 

Ukraine as Russia’s interior

On the other hand, Russia’s policy in the occupied Ukrainian territories could be classified as quasi-fascist in a more direct sense. The ruthless Russification campaign that the Russian state is carrying out in the annexed parts of Ukraine through targeted terror, forced re-education, and material incentives aims to achieve a profound sociocultural transformation of these areas. Admittedly, such irredentist, colonizing, and homogenizing policies are not seen as necessarily fascist in comparative imperialism studies. However, the instruments used by the Kremlin to implement its Ukraine policy and the desired outcomes are in some respects similar to those of the fascist revolutions attempted by Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany.

Moscow wants to fundamentally reshape the conquered Ukrainian municipalities and turn them into cells of a culturally and ideologically standardized Russian people (russkii narod). Russian imperial ultra-nationalists regard most parts of Ukraine as originally Russian territory and refer to them as “New Russia” and “Little Russia” (Novorossiya, Malaya Rossiya). Ukrainians – insofar as the term is accepted at all – are thus merely a sub-ethnic group of the greater pan-Russian people, whose Ukrainian language is merely a Russian dialect and who have regional folklore rather than a national culture.

According to the Russian irredentist narrative, the western Russian border dwellers were misled by anti-Russian forces in order to form an artificial nation, “the Ukrainians.” Foreign actors such as the Catholic Church, imperial Germany, the Bolsheviks, and/or the West today have divided the larger pan-Russian people. They have alienated the “Great Russians” (velikorossy) of the Russian Federation from the “Little Russians” (malorossy) of Ukraine.

Moscow’s occupation policy in Ukraine, aimed at reversing this supposedly artificial division of Russian civilization allegedly caused by foreign powers, could be understood as an attempt to give new birth to “Little Russia.” The Kremlin’s goal is to bring about a local political, social, cultural, and anthropological revolution in the Ukrainian territories annexed by Russia. The Russification policy in Ukraine is thus sufficiently similar to classic fascist domestic and occupation policies, so that Moscow’s transformative goals and actions with regard to Russia’s Ukrainian “brothers” could be classified as, at least, quasi-fascist.

 

Dr. Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

 

This article is the summary of larger chapter forthcoming in: Ian Garner and Taras Kuzio, eds., Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2025.

A Tennessee osztály története hivatalosan 1915 március harmadikán kezdődött, amikor a Kongresszus két új, első osztályú csatahajót rendelt meg a haditengerészet részére. A tervezés, illetve az új hajók paraméterein és költségein való vitatkozás persze már korábban elkezdődött. A flotta ezúttal is 406 mm-es ágyúkkal felszerelt csatahajót akart, a minisztérium pedig ezúttal is tartotta magát ahhoz, hogy amíg az új lövegek fejlesztése nem fejeződik be, és amíg azok nincsenek rendesen kipróbálva, nem kockáztatja meg beépítésüket a csatahajókra. A két új csatahajó így végül ismét csak a Nevadával kezdődött sorozat folytatása lett, lényegében a New Mexico osztály ismétlése, kisebb-nagyobb változtatásokkal.

A pénzügyminisztérium az év végén utalta át az új hajók megépítésére szánt összeg első részleteit, ezt követően kötötték meg a szerződéseket a hajógyárakkal és a bedolgozó üzemekkel, s ezután kezdődhettek meg az előkészítő munkálatok. Miután nem teljesen új konstrukcióról volt szó, a tervezés gyorsan haladt, és a hajógyárak következő év áprilisára megkapták a csatahajók tervdokumentációját. A háborús helyzet miatt a két hajó építése némi késedelemmel végül csak 1917 tavaszán kezdődött, és már csak a háború után állították őket szolgálatba.

[...] Bővebben!

Die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union streiten wieder einmal über Geld. Genauer gesagt darüber, wie viel Geld sie für Verteidigung zahlen wollen, woher dieses Geld kommen soll und ob sie es gemeinsam ausgeben möchten. Unstrittig ist in Brüssel und den Hauptstädten, dass Europa sich besser verteidigen muss. Trotz vieler Diskussionen, Gipfelbeschlüsse, Dokumente und Initiativen ist noch immer offen, für welche Ziele und in welcher Form die EU finanzielle Aufwendungen für eine bessere europäische Verteidigungsfähigkeit aufbringen sollte. Neben frischem Geld ist vor allem eine Verständigung auf gemeinsame europäische Aufgaben und Ziele erforderlich. Auf deren Basis wäre es dann möglich, die militärische Unterstützung für die Ukraine fortzusetzen und zu verstärken, einen Binnenmarkt für Rüstungsgüter und ‑dienstleistungen zu schaffen und diese dann zumindest teilweise aus dem EU-Budget zu finanzieren.

Morocco midfielder Salma Bouguerche says medicine "chose her" as a career, having qualified as a doctor last year.

In einer unübersichtlichen Welt bekommen verlässliche Partnerschaften eine größere Bedeutung. Wie Deutschland das für sich erreichen kann.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Monday, 1 September 2025 from 15.00-18.30 in Brussels (room ANTALL 4Q1).

Further information about the SEDE meeting can be found here.

_______________________

SEDE missions 2025:

• Norway - 27-30 May 2025
• Moldova and Ukraine - 14-17 April 2025
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 24-27 February 2025
• Israel and Palestine - 5-8 February 2025

SEDE missions 2024:

• United Kingdom - 28-30 October 2024
• Ukraine - 25-26 October 2024

SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2025
EP calendar 2025
SEDE meetings' calendar 2nd half of 2024 - 10th legislature
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Monday, 1 September 2025 from 15.00-18.30 in Brussels (room ANTALL 4Q1).

Further information about the SEDE meeting can be found here.

_______________________

SEDE missions 2025:

• Norway - 27-30 May 2025
• Moldova and Ukraine - 14-17 April 2025
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 24-27 February 2025
• Israel and Palestine - 5-8 February 2025

SEDE missions 2024:

• United Kingdom - 28-30 October 2024
• Ukraine - 25-26 October 2024

SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2025
EP calendar 2025
SEDE meetings' calendar 2nd half of 2024 - 10th legislature
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Fermeture d'Al Jazeera Balkans, disparition de l'USAID, pressions croissantes sur les chaînes régionales... La liberté de la presse dans les Balkans occidentaux est aujourd'hui en péril, alors que les dernières voix indépendantes risquent de s'éteindre.

- Articles / Radio Slobodna Evropa, Médias indépendants, Albanie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Bulgarie, Grèce, Croatie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Serbie, Slovénie, Turquie

Fermeture d'Al Jazeera Balkans, disparition de l'USAID, pressions croissantes sur les chaînes régionales... La liberté de la presse dans les Balkans occidentaux est aujourd'hui en péril, alors que les dernières voix indépendantes risquent de s'éteindre.

- Articles / Radio Slobodna Evropa, Médias indépendants, Albanie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Bulgarie, Grèce, Croatie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Serbie, Slovénie, Turquie

June 20, 2004—South Korean national Kim Sun Il was brutally beheaded by an al-Qaeda-linked extremist group, a tragedy that underscores how the spread of Islamic extremism—fueled in part by Iran’s 1979 revolution and, as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has acknowledged, the export of radical ideology—continues to claim the lives of innocent civilians simply because of their countries’ alliances.

On June 22, 2025, in a moment of blistering clarity, the Iranian regime stripped away the last fig leaf of plausible deniability. In a declaration broadcast on state television, Tehran vowed that “every American citizen or military personnel in the region is now a target.” This was not a coded message, nor a vague allusion—it was a direct threat against innocent civilians, a calculated act of rhetorical terrorism from a regime unraveling in the wake of its own miscalculations.

The context is clear: mere hours before this pronouncement, US-led strikes had decisively disabled critical components of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It was a blow aimed at halting Tehran’s march toward nuclear armament—one that, in the absence of good-faith diplomacy from Iran, had become necessary. But instead of addressing its own provocations, the regime lashed out with characteristic fury, scapegoating Americans—military and civilian alike—as acceptable collateral in its campaign of revenge and propaganda.

Let’s not mistake this for a novel turn. Iran’s leaders are not new to the politics of terror. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, they have deployed violence not just as a defensive tool, but as a primary mechanism of statecraft. Whether through the brazen hostage crisis of 1979, the devastating Beirut bombings of 1983, or the countless proxy attacks on US troops across Iraq and Syria in the decades since, the Islamic Republic has honed a consistent strategy: when diplomacy falters or its ambitions are thwarted, it targets the innocent.

This is not the tactical desperation of a beleaguered nation. It is the doctrine of a regime that views terrorism not as a shameful aberration but as a legitimate expression of power. And with this latest threat—an open call to murder civilians—it has once again reminded the world of its moral bankruptcy.

The regime’s calculus is cynical but revealing. It cannot defeat the United States militarily. Its conventional forces are outmatched, its economy is strained, and its legitimacy is eroded both domestically and abroad. So it falls back on its tried-and-true method: asymmetrical terror. It empowers proxies, radicalizes militias, and weaponizes fear—hoping that the West, weary of endless conflict, will trade justice for quiet, and leave tyrants to rule without consequence.

What Tehran perhaps failed to calculate is how utterly this declaration confirms everything its critics have said for decades. For years, some insisted that Iran’s aggression was reactive, that its support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas was strategic rather than ideological, that it could be coaxed into moderation through economic engagement. But threats to murder civilians—for the crime of holding a blue passport—leave no room for such illusions. This is not realism. This is raw, unreconstructed terrorism.

And yet, this moment must not be wasted on outrage alone. The United States and its allies must recognize that this is more than a rhetorical shift; it is a declaration of intent. Every American in the Middle East is now living under a threat sanctioned by a sovereign government. That is an extraordinary—and extraordinarily dangerous—development.

It also places an urgent burden on the international community. The rules-based order cannot survive if state actors are allowed to incite violence against civilians without consequence. The targeting of innocents must remain a red line—not just in theory, but in enforcement. If the regime in Tehran is allowed to get away with this, it will not be the last to abandon international norms in favor of the politics of fear.

Ultimately, the Iranian regime has revealed what it truly is: not a misunderstood player seeking regional autonomy, but a paranoid, theocratic oligarchy whose first instinct in crisis is to threaten murder. That instinct—nurtured over decades, bolstered by proxy wars, and now made explicit on national television—should end any remaining debate about its nature.

The world has been warned. Now it must respond

Selon les autorités sénégalaises, l’homme connu sous le pseudonyme de Kocc Barma serait le cerveau derrière plusieurs plateformes numériques diffusant des vidéos et photos à caractère pornographique, mettant en scène des personnes parfois mineures et souvent sans leur consentement. Plus de 5 000 victimes ont été recensées à ce jour.

Following his re-election in 2024, US President Donald Trump and the MAGA movement initiate a change of course in domestic and foreign policy, weakening US institutions while calling international order and partnerships into question. This dossier provides an overview of the new circumstances in foreign and security policy, domestic policy and society, and economy and trade.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for June 2025.

On June 5, 2025, the 15th Bilateral Military Cooperation between the Hellenic Navy and the United States Navy was held in Athens. The Greek delegation was headed by Commodore Stefanos Sarris HN, Director of Branch A, while the U.S. delegation was led by Rear Admiral Patrick S. Hayden, Director Maritime Headquarters (DMHQ), U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa. Discussions addressed issues of mutual interest and strengthening cooperation for stability and development in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region. On the sidelines of the talks, the head of the U.S. delegation held a brief meeting with the Deputy Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, Rear Admiral Spyridon Lagaras HN.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. State Department is formally moving forward with the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle as the next American ambassador to Greece, undercutting widespread media speculation that she had declined the post. In a move that clarifies the administration’s intent, the State Department issued on June 18 an official “Certificate of Competency” for the nomination, a standard step preceding a confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate. Guilfoyle is set to appear before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 9, 2025, as part of her confirmation process to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece.

During his visit to Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland from June 12 to 18, 2025, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yannis Loverdos conveyed a message of support from the Greek government to the Greek American community and of strengthening ties with Greeks abroad. During the visit, he had a series of meetings with prominent members of the Greek-American in several fields and informed them about the Greek government’s initiatives for the Greeks abroad.

At the NATO Summit, on June 25, 2025, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis held a high-level meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscoring the growing importance of Greek-American cooperation in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio emphasized Greece’s role as a reliable NATO ally and a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. He acknowledged the importance of Greece’s contributions to regional security, while Minister Gerapetritis praised U.S. efforts to de-escalate tensions in the broader Middle East. Both officials reaffirmed their intent to further deepen bilateral strategic relations.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), an undisclosed number of Greek Patriot missile systems are being relocated to the Hellenic Navy and NATO base at Souda Bay, Crete, to provide anti-ballistic protection to American assets in the region. The move comes amid increased U.S. military activity in the area following the escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict. Several U.S. F-16 fighter jets have also been temporarily deployed to Crete ahead of their participation in the upcoming “Anatolian Eagle” exercise in Turkey in early July.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

By Rachel Avraham

It might not have caught the attention of Westerners, but people in the Global South noticed it long ago: Europeans exhibit a double standard when it comes to violations of sovereignty and civilian lives. What does that mean? In Europe, it’s customary to support a particular side in a military conflict based on the defense of a specific value. For example, a country whose territory has been invaded by soldiers from another nation can be supported in the name of defending territorial integrity, the right to sovereignty, or the right to life, and so on.

However, every now and then, we notice a phenomenon where European countries choose to support nations that don’t represent the very values they championed when it came to other countries. This exposes the hypocritical and sycophantic self-interest of the “enlightened” Western nations. This double standard is one of the reasons many countries in Eurasia and Africa are not taking sides in the Russia-Ukraine war. While many European countries engage in this demeaning and hypocritical behavior, one country acts this way most overtly: France.

When the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, France gave its absolute and unequivocal support to Ukraine, claiming that Russia had invaded its legal territorial boundaries and that Ukraine had the right to defend its independence and sovereignty over its lawful territories. The truth? There’s some truth to what the French say. However, what’s infuriating about this story is that France is playing favorites when it comes to supporting countries that need to defend their territories and sovereignty from external attacks by other nations. The most striking example of this is France’s support for Armenia in its military conflict with Azerbaijan. Why, in the Caucasus war, does France support the aggressor who initiated the illegal occupation of territory legally belonging to another country, rather than the one defending its sovereign territories?

Let’s take a step back. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, two countries disagreed with the territorial division for each nation that separated from the Soviet Union: Russia and Armenia. According to the division, each Soviet Republic that became an independent state received its territorial area as a country based on its territory as a Soviet Republic. This fundamental division was agreed upon in the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21, 1991. From Russia’s perspective, its leaders have always viewed the post-Soviet Eurasian countries as semi-independent states, allowing them (the Russian leadership) to act in these countries as they please. As for Armenia, it decided not to be content with its original territory and forcibly conquered the Azerbaijani region of Karabakh. Thus, Armenian nationalists managed to create “Greater Armenia” from the territory they seized from Azerbaijan in the “First Karabakh War,” a territory that constituted a fifth of Azerbaijan’s landmass.

According to the French moral compass, as demonstrated by France’s support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, we would infer that France would also support Azerbaijan, whose territory was shamefully occupied. But no. Not only does France not support Azerbaijan but Armenia, it also tried for years to prevent Azerbaijan from reclaiming its occupied territory and intensified its opposition to Azerbaijan after the “Second Karabakh War” in 2020, in which Azerbaijan regained its occupied land.

As mentioned, it seems France wasn’t content with just standard diplomatic support for Armenia but engaged in direct external intervention in an issue not directly related to it (and frankly, not even indirectly so much). France is a member of the OSCE Minsk Group (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). This organization was established in 1992 to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with France being one of the three co-chairs of the group, along with the United States and Russia. It’s important to note that each of these three countries has a large and politically powerful Armenian lobby. The OSCE Minsk Group largely failed in all its endeavors for three decades, not only in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict but also in conflicts created by Russia in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine in 2014-2021. Furthermore, the group failed to negotiate a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the Alma-Ata Declaration, which would have forced the Armenians to withdraw militarily from Karabakh. Beyond that, the group achieved no breakthrough in resolving the conflict.

Over time, questions arose about France’s participation in the group and its role as a co-chair. Firstly, as mentioned, France has the third-largest Armenian diaspora in the world (after Russia and the United States), which constitutes a strong political force. You tell me, what French politician would want to disappoint such a large number of potential voters over some conflict that doesn’t concern their private life in any way? I imagine none.

Secondly, in recent years, France has been grappling with large-scale Muslim immigration, which is not sitting quietly and is shaking the streets of France and French politics. Today, many French people understand that opening their country’s doors to anyone seeking assistance from the Middle East was not the best decision made in Paris, leading to a significant political shift across France towards the far-right. Based on the anti-Muslim sentiment that has become so prevalent in France, the decision to support Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan is the only decision supported across the entire French political spectrum. Politicians like Le Pen use crusade-like terminology to defend the Christian Armenian population from the Muslim Azerbaijanis, even though Azerbaijan is a completely secular country, and its conflict with Armenia has nothing to do with religion or any particular civilization, but rather with international law. And frankly, it’s ludicrous to portray Azerbaijan as an evil Muslim country, given that one of its greatest allies is the Jewish state of Israel. Thirdly, France also supported (Christian) Greece against its conflict with (Muslim) Turkey, so it’s not surprising that France would not support Turkey’s close and significant ally—Azerbaijan.

In November 2020, that was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Both French parliaments unanimously voted for French recognition of the independence of the separatist enclave of Artsakh (the Armenian name for Karabakh), mirroring the positions of Russia and Armenia. Subsequently, a frustrated Azerbaijan called for the closure of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The conflict between France and Azerbaijan is not just a conflict between two countries but a mirror image of a larger conflict between the West and the Global South, ignited by double standards and justice. Western countries will not gain the support of the Global South, even on substantive issues like the Russia-Ukraine war, as long as justice is not served and Western countries stop supporting other occupiers who act against international law, similar to the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. We must not normalize double standards regarding separatism, the sanctity of states’ territorial integrity, and colonialism. Countries like France must not continue to behave in such a despicable manner, dictating the “right” and “wrong” sides of conflicts between different countries based on their political interests. Only in a political world like the one countries such as France are trying to bring us into, does it make sense to support Ukraine but vehemently oppose Azerbaijan.