Capital is grabbing back land allocated through diverse national land reform and landrestitution programmes globally. This article critically analyses this trend, which has so far received insufficient attention from land grab scholars. Drawing from independent research in South Africa, Bolivia, Canada, and Zimbabwe, we define a future research agenda investigating the capital segments and grabbing mechanisms involved as well as the factors that encourage or retard capital in grabbing back redistributed and restituted lands. We point to the need for further research into the land grabbing-land reform/restitution nexus in different geographic contexts and its implications for future land and agrarian struggles.
Capital is grabbing back land allocated through diverse national land reform and landrestitution programmes globally. This article critically analyses this trend, which has so far received insufficient attention from land grab scholars. Drawing from independent research in South Africa, Bolivia, Canada, and Zimbabwe, we define a future research agenda investigating the capital segments and grabbing mechanisms involved as well as the factors that encourage or retard capital in grabbing back redistributed and restituted lands. We point to the need for further research into the land grabbing-land reform/restitution nexus in different geographic contexts and its implications for future land and agrarian struggles.
Capital is grabbing back land allocated through diverse national land reform and landrestitution programmes globally. This article critically analyses this trend, which has so far received insufficient attention from land grab scholars. Drawing from independent research in South Africa, Bolivia, Canada, and Zimbabwe, we define a future research agenda investigating the capital segments and grabbing mechanisms involved as well as the factors that encourage or retard capital in grabbing back redistributed and restituted lands. We point to the need for further research into the land grabbing-land reform/restitution nexus in different geographic contexts and its implications for future land and agrarian struggles.
Enfances brisées, frites huileuses, percussions libératrices… Deuxième salve de perles glanées au festival « off » d'Avignon.
- Contrebande / ThéâtreThis paper analyses the structural vulnerabilities of Latin American economies amid recent United States (US)-China tariff escalations and identifies strategic opportunities emerging from these shifts. Based on descriptive bilateral trade data from 2023 for the largest Latin American economies – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico – the study assesses exposure to US tariffs at the industry level. It further highlights sectors with the potential to benefit from diverted trade flows in the context of trade polarisation between China and the US. The degree of exposure varies across countries, depending on export structure and trade partners. While the tariff conflict may enable some countries to expand exports to China or the US, most Latin American economies – except Mexico – export their largest share of their manufactured goods within the region. Strengthening regional trade integration can therefore enhance resilience to external shocks and support technological upgrading.
Melike Döver and Martin Middelanis are researchers at Freie Universität Berlin in Germany.
This paper analyses the structural vulnerabilities of Latin American economies amid recent United States (US)-China tariff escalations and identifies strategic opportunities emerging from these shifts. Based on descriptive bilateral trade data from 2023 for the largest Latin American economies – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico – the study assesses exposure to US tariffs at the industry level. It further highlights sectors with the potential to benefit from diverted trade flows in the context of trade polarisation between China and the US. The degree of exposure varies across countries, depending on export structure and trade partners. While the tariff conflict may enable some countries to expand exports to China or the US, most Latin American economies – except Mexico – export their largest share of their manufactured goods within the region. Strengthening regional trade integration can therefore enhance resilience to external shocks and support technological upgrading.
Melike Döver and Martin Middelanis are researchers at Freie Universität Berlin in Germany.
This paper analyses the structural vulnerabilities of Latin American economies amid recent United States (US)-China tariff escalations and identifies strategic opportunities emerging from these shifts. Based on descriptive bilateral trade data from 2023 for the largest Latin American economies – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico – the study assesses exposure to US tariffs at the industry level. It further highlights sectors with the potential to benefit from diverted trade flows in the context of trade polarisation between China and the US. The degree of exposure varies across countries, depending on export structure and trade partners. While the tariff conflict may enable some countries to expand exports to China or the US, most Latin American economies – except Mexico – export their largest share of their manufactured goods within the region. Strengthening regional trade integration can therefore enhance resilience to external shocks and support technological upgrading.
Melike Döver and Martin Middelanis are researchers at Freie Universität Berlin in Germany.
United States (US) trade policy has undergone a series of significant changes introducing far-reaching uncertainty for trading partners in both the short and long term. Among the most vulnerable to these changes are low- and middle-income countries. Anticipating the potential impact of proposed or enacted US trade measures ex-ante is difficult. Therefore, this discussion paper examines the structural vulnerabilities of a selection of African countries – Lesotho, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Tunisia – to recent shifts. Using descriptive trade data, the paper maps direct and indirect channels of exposure and highlights the structural constraints that amplify vulnerability. While Africa is not among the most directly exposed regions, several countries face significant risks due to concentrated export structures, reliance on a few trade partners, and limited capacity to redirect trade in the short term. This highlights the strategic importance for African countries to strengthen regional integration, industrial upgrading, and reduce external dependencies.
Sascha Berndt and Andreas Edele are trade policy experts at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.
United States (US) trade policy has undergone a series of significant changes introducing far-reaching uncertainty for trading partners in both the short and long term. Among the most vulnerable to these changes are low- and middle-income countries. Anticipating the potential impact of proposed or enacted US trade measures ex-ante is difficult. Therefore, this discussion paper examines the structural vulnerabilities of a selection of African countries – Lesotho, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Tunisia – to recent shifts. Using descriptive trade data, the paper maps direct and indirect channels of exposure and highlights the structural constraints that amplify vulnerability. While Africa is not among the most directly exposed regions, several countries face significant risks due to concentrated export structures, reliance on a few trade partners, and limited capacity to redirect trade in the short term. This highlights the strategic importance for African countries to strengthen regional integration, industrial upgrading, and reduce external dependencies.
Sascha Berndt and Andreas Edele are trade policy experts at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.
United States (US) trade policy has undergone a series of significant changes introducing far-reaching uncertainty for trading partners in both the short and long term. Among the most vulnerable to these changes are low- and middle-income countries. Anticipating the potential impact of proposed or enacted US trade measures ex-ante is difficult. Therefore, this discussion paper examines the structural vulnerabilities of a selection of African countries – Lesotho, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, and Tunisia – to recent shifts. Using descriptive trade data, the paper maps direct and indirect channels of exposure and highlights the structural constraints that amplify vulnerability. While Africa is not among the most directly exposed regions, several countries face significant risks due to concentrated export structures, reliance on a few trade partners, and limited capacity to redirect trade in the short term. This highlights the strategic importance for African countries to strengthen regional integration, industrial upgrading, and reduce external dependencies.
Sascha Berndt and Andreas Edele are trade policy experts at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.
In this merged edition of MORE, Bledar Feta and Çelik Rruplli examine the trajectory of Albania’s judicial reform, launched in 2016 as part of the country’s EU accession efforts and broader attempts to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and public trust in institutions. A central component of the reform is the establishment of SPAK, the Special Anti-Corruption Structure, an independent judicial body tasked with investigating and prosecuting high-level corruption and organized crime.
Operational since late 2019, SPAK has filed charges against senior officials from both the current and former administrations. Public trust in the institution has grown significantly, with recent data from a Euronews Albania Barometer survey indicating that 52.1% of citizens now express confidence in SPAK, making it the most trusted institution in the country for the first time. Furthermore, 70.7% of respondents evaluated its performance positively, while both figures have risen by 10% since January 2025. High-profile cases including the arrest of Tirana mayor Erion Veliaj have further solidified SPAK’s credibility in the public eye. While this progress has contributed to Albania advancing its EU accession process, particularly in the areas of fundamental rights and the rule of law, major challenges remain. These include a shortage of magistrates, case backlogs, and perceptions of corruption that remain persistently high, despite signs of increased public cooperation with judicial institutions.
This paper is part of the Media Observatory Reports (MORE) and covers the period from October 2023 to February 2025. It highlights how media coverage of justice reform in Albania—particularly regarding SPAK—has been extensive but often polarized. While the media plays a vital role in shaping public understanding, it also tends to amplify political narratives, undermining objective scrutiny and contributing to confusion about the aims and progress of the reform. The Media Observatory Reports are part of the broader “ALGREE – Albania-Greece: Understanding. Connecting. Partnering” project implemented by the South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for Foreign & European Policy (ELIAMEP) with support from the Open Society Foundations Western Balkans (OSFWB) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Greece and Cyprus (FNF). They are based on the systematic monitoring and analysis of leading Greek and Albanian media, with a focus on how each country reports on the other as well as on issues of common interest.
Issue de la communauté aroumaine de Macédoine du Nord, la linguiste Lila Kona s'inquiète de la lente disparition de sa langue maternelle, dernier pilier identitaire d'un peuple sans État. Elle appelle à la pleine reconnaissance d'une minorité tsintsare en Serbie, son pays d'adoption.
- Articles / Macédoine du Nord, Serbie, Populations, minorités et migrations, Culture et éducation, Vreme (Serbie)In ihrer 2025 neu erstellten Bedrohungseinschätzung (Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment, SOCTA) konstatiert die europäische Polizeibehörde Europol einen deutlichen Wandel der Bedrohungslage durch organisierte Kriminalität. Gegenüber dem Vorgängerbericht von 2021 stellt Europol sogar eine veränderte DNA der organisierten Kriminalität fest. Diese hat sich besonders im Zuge der Covid-19-Pandemie verstärkt auf digitale Kanäle verlagert, wo kriminelle Dienstleistungen einfach und mit niedrigen Zugangsschranken angeboten werden. Transnational organisierte kriminelle Lieferketten verbinden Deutschland und Europa inzwischen fest mit anderen Weltregionen. Das zeigt sich an der aktuellen Kokainschwemme und der wachsenden Konkurrenz auf europäischen Märkten. Auch benutzen gerade autoritär regierte Staaten organisierte Kriminalität zunehmend als geopolitisches Vehikel, etwa um Sabotageakte zu verüben, Spionage zu verschleiern oder Sanktionen zu umgehen. Davon sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union (EU) und ihre direkte Nachbarschaft besonders betroffen. Neben engerer internationaler Zusammenarbeit bedarf es besserer Abstimmung von Instrumenten des Innen- und Außenhandelns.
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IPI’s Women, Peace and Security program, in partnership with the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations (led by Global Affairs Canada), the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Gender and Security Sector Lab, cohosted a virtual policy forum on July 30th on “Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (SEAH) in UN Peace Operations.”
As part of its ongoing partnership with the Elsie Initiative, IPI is launching two issue briefs that contribute to improving the United Nations’ approach to preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual harassment (SH) in UN peace operations.
One of the issue briefs, “Connecting Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment in UN Peace Operations,” examines the divide between SEA and SH, arguing for a shift toward the more holistic concept of sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH). This step could allow the UN to better prevent both SEA and SH by addressing the gendered power imbalances that lie at their root. The second issue brief, “Training on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for Uniformed Peacekeepers: Effectiveness and Limitations,” published in collaboration with the Gender and Security Sector Lab, explores the effectiveness of UN-mandated training on SEA. The paper highlights key findings from an analysis of cross-national survey data representing more than 4,000 military and police personnel, considers the effectiveness and limitations of current SEA trainings, and provides recommendations for enhancing the prevention of SEA.
Panelists discussed recommendations for improving the UN’s approach to combating and preventing SEAH, making peacekeeping safer for peacekeepers and the populations they serve.
Welcoming and Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
Jacqueline O’Neill, former Women, Peace and Security Ambassador for Canada, Director, Global Affairs Canada
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute
Speakers:
Christian Saunders, Under-Secretary-General and Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
DeAnne Roark, Postdoctoral Scholar, Gender and Security Sector Lab
Olubuckola Awoyemi, Chief Conduct and Discipline Officer, MINURSO
Evyn Papworth, Policy Analyst, Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute
Aiko Holvikivi, Assistant Professor in Gender, Peace and Security, The London School of Economics and Political Science
Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute
The post Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (SEAH) in UN Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.
A decentralized emirate system based on traditional governance structures could offer
Palestinians sustainable development and peaceful coexistence.
In recent days, the possibility of transforming governance in Judea and Samaria from the
failed Palestinian Authority model to a United Emirates system has been making headlines.
This model, based on traditional clan structures and local governance, represents a fundamental
shift from centralized authoritarian rule to decentralized, community-based administration that
prioritizes economic development and peaceful coexistence.
The emirates model offers what neither Hamas nor the PA can provide: legitimate local
governance rooted in traditional social structures, economic opportunity through industrial
zones and regional cooperation, and a pathway to joining the Abraham Accords framework.
Unlike the current system where over 80% of Palestinians view their government as corrupt
and disconnected from their needs, the emirates model builds on existing social trust within
communities.
Itamar Marcus, head of Palestinian Media Watch, emphasizes the systemic advantages: “There are communal leaders that care about their people. For years, there has been business going on between Jews living in Judea and Samaria and local Palestinians, with the blessing of the clan leaders for these people want the best for the Palestinians. If we are able to transition from the PA to the clan leaders, it will be for the people and for Israel as well.”
The economic dimension is crucial. As the Dor Moria Center research demonstrates,
sustainable peace requires addressing the root causes of conflict – particularly economic
exclusion and underdevelopment. With Human Development Index levels below 0.7 strongly
correlating with conflict, the emirates model’s focus on industrial zones, economic cooperation,
and integration into regional trade networks offers a concrete pathway above this critical
threshold.
The transition mechanism matters as much as the end goal. The current PA survives not
through legitimacy but through international funding – particularly from Europe. A phased
transition would involve redirecting this support from maintaining a failed centralized authority
to empowering local governance structures that can deliver actual services and economic
opportunities to their communities.
A Palestinian journalist, speaking on condition of anonymity, highlighted the systemic
failure: “Before 1988, we had dignity through economic integration. Today, 350,000
Palestinians who once worked in Israel are unemployed. The financial restrictions have
paralyzed our economy. People are so desperate they risk injury jumping the security barrier
just to find work. This isn’t about changing faces at the top – it’s about changing the entire
system.”
The emirates model addresses these structural problems through:
• Decentralized governance that maintains local accountability
• Economic integration through industrial zones and the Abraham Accords
• Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms that have legitimacy
• Direct service delivery without the corruption of centralized bureaucracy
Dr. Mordechai Kedar notes that the primary obstacle isn’t Palestinian opposition but
institutional inertia within certain Israeli administrative structures that have grown comfortable
with the dysfunctional status quo. The success of the emirates model requires Israeli support
for this systematic transformation – not just tolerating it, but actively facilitating the transition
from failed centralization to successful decentralization.
The window for this transformation is now. Each month that passes entrenches the failed
system deeper, while the population’s desperation grows. The United Emirates model offers
not just new leadership but a new system – one built on traditional legitimacy, economic
opportunity, and peaceful coexistence within the Abraham Accords framework.
2025. III. negyedévében újra élelmiszeripari üzemek fejlesztését támogató felhívás várható a KAP Nemzeti Irányító Hatóság 2025.07.23-án közzétett menetrendje alapján, 50% támogatással.