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Valérie Bony reçoit la designeuse de mode franco- ivoirienne Maelys Plivard pour sa marque LEWA

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Voyage à reculons dans les Balkans occidentaux, Carnet de voyage, d'Ombeline Duprat, éditions Spinelle, 2025, 170 pages, 18 euros.

- Lettres de l'Est et des Balkans • Le blog de Pierre Glachant / Kosovo, Grand Bazar - Diaporama, Serbie, Bosnie-Herzégovine

Voyage à reculons dans les Balkans occidentaux, Carnet de voyage, d'Ombeline Duprat, éditions Spinelle, 2025, 170 pages, 18 euros.

- Lettres de l'Est et des Balkans • Le blog de Pierre Glachant / Kosovo, Grand Bazar - Diaporama, Serbie, Bosnie-Herzégovine

Funktioniert Trumps Wirtschaftspolitik etwa? Kurz sah es so aus, als ob er ökonomische Regeln außer Kraft setzen könnte. Doch mittlerweile zeigen sich ernste Probleme.

Le tourisme de croisière a le vent en poupe partout dans le monde. En Adriatique, ce sont de « nouvelles » destinations, comme l'Albanie et le Monténégro, qui connaissent les plus fortes progressions.

- Articles / Albanie, Monténégro, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Environnement, Tourisme balkans, Adriatique

Le tourisme de croisière a le vent en poupe partout dans le monde. En Adriatique, ce sont de « nouvelles » destinations, comme l'Albanie et le Monténégro, qui connaissent les plus fortes progressions.

- Articles / Albanie, Monténégro, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Environnement, Tourisme balkans, Adriatique

L'urbanisation incontrôlée et les constructions illégales menacent l'inscription du lac et de la ville d'Ohrid au classement du patrimoine mondial. L'Unesco laisse une dernière chance jusqu'au 1er février 2026, tout en exigeant un plan d'action et plus de coopération entre la Macédoine du Nord et l'Albanie.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Culture et éducation, Environnement, Macédoine du Nord

Azerbaijan is undergoing a significant geopolitical realignment, moving away from Moscow’s traditional dominance and pursuing a more independent, multi-vector foreign policy. This strategic shift has been shaped by historical grievances, the post-war dynamics of the South Caucasus, and the weakening of Russia’s regional influence following the Ukraine war.   For years, Azerbaijan maintained a careful balance with Russia, recognizing Moscow’s power while safeguarding its own sovereignty. However, Russia’s decades-long alliance with Armenia, its reluctance to ensure the implementation of post-war agreements, and its failure to restrain Armenian provocations have eroded trust in Moscow’s role as a “neutral” mediator.   The 2020 Second Karabakh War highlighted a changing reality: Turkey’s military and diplomatic support, rather than Russian involvement, enabled Azerbaijan’s decisive victory. This demonstrated that Moscow was no longer the only power capable of shaping events in the South Caucasus.   Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 weakened its global standing and diminished its ability to project power in the South Caucasus. Preoccupied with the conflict and isolated by Western sanctions, Moscow’s influence in the region has noticeably declined.   This created an opportunity for Azerbaijan to strengthen its role as a reliable energy partner for Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor, supplying gas to European markets, has made Baku a key player in Europe’s energy security strategy, further reducing its reliance on Moscow.   The proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nachshivan through southern Armenia, is a strategic priority for Baku. This corridor would not only enhance regional trade and connectivity but also reduce Azerbaijan’s dependence on Russian-controlled routes.   Moscow’s lukewarm stance on this project and its attempts to maintain control over all transit links in the South Caucasus have created additional friction. Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, seeks to establish the corridor as a sovereign project without Russian oversight.   Moreover, the corridor is viewed by Western and regional partners as a critical route that would integrate the South Caucasus with global trade networks, bypassing both Russia and Iran.   Azerbaijan’s partnership with Turkey has evolved into a robust strategic alliance. Military cooperation, defense industry collaborations, and joint regional initiatives underscore the “one nation, two states” principle.   At the same time, Baku has strengthened its relations with Israel, particularly in defense technology, intelligence sharing, and energy. The European Union and the United States have also deepened their engagement with Azerbaijan, viewing it as a vital partner in energy diversification and regional stability.   Azerbaijan’s growing influence is reshaping the South Caucasus power dynamics. While Russia remains a factor due to geography and trade, its weakened position has allowed Baku to pursue a more independent path. By leveraging its energy resources, modern military capabilities, and strong alliances, Azerbaijan is positioning itself as a leading regional power that is no longer bound by Moscow’s dictates.   Azerbaijan’s strategic pivot is not about severing ties with Moscow but about redefining its role in a multipolar world. The combination of energy diplomacy, the Zangezur Corridor initiative, and strong partnerships with Turkey, Israel, and the West reflects Baku’s determination to act as an autonomous and influential force in the South Caucasus.

Sommaire
Actualité :- Algérie : règlements de comptes chez les janissaires- Boualem Sansal condamné à cinq années de prison pour avoir rappelé qu’avant la colonisation, l’ouest algérien était marocain - La CIJ donne raison à la Guinée Equatoriale dans son contentieux avec le Gabon au sujet des îles de Mbanié Dossier : L’embrasement du Sahel
Histoire :- Les Berbères ont toujours peuplé l'Afrique du Nord- Madagascar : l’insurrection de 1947 entre vérité et propagande
Editorial de Bernard Lugan
L’Algérie du Père Ubu
L’Algérie manque de tout. En dehors des hydrocarbures et des dattes, elle ne produit rien. Pas même le grain pour le couscous ou le concentré de tomates. Aussi, afin d’éviter l’explosion sociale, le gouvernement vient-il de légaliser la contrebande. Par le décret n°25-170 du 28 juin 2025, les « auto-importateurs », lire les « trafiquants-entrepreneurs », sont désormais autorisés à importer jusqu’à 24.000 euros de marchandises par mois. Certes, mais comme il est interdit de sortir de son compte bancaire plus de 7.500 euros par an, le « trafiquant-entrepreneur » va donc acheter sur le marché parallèle ses euros à un taux deux fois supérieur au taux officiel. Début juillet, la Banque d’Algérie affichait ainsi un euro à un peu plus de 150 dinars quand le marché parallèle le proposait à un peu plus de 270 dinars.Puis, le « trafiquant-entrepreneur » va déposer ses précieux euros sur un compte régulier ouvert en devises, et sans que la banque l’interroge sur l’origine de cet argent.Or encore, dans ce royaume du Père Ubu qu’est l’Algérie, le décret du 28 juin 2025 impose aux auto-importateurs de ne pas être salariés, commerçants ou bénéficiaires d’aides sociales.Conclusion, seuls les inactifs sont donc autorisés à devenir officiellement « trafiquants-importateurs ».Mais comment des chômeurs ou des inactifs peuvent-ils justifier d’être porteurs de 24.000 euros en espèces ? En réalité, c’est le blanchiment et le recyclage des fonds occultes qui est donc désormais officiellement possible... Enfin, comme l’Algérie doit importer tout ce qui permet de nourrir, habiller, soigner et équiper sa malheureuse population, et alors que l’urgence serait de soutenir la diversification et les productions locales, des milliers de « trafiquants-entrepreneurs » vont donc achever de tuer ce qui reste de commerce licite puisque la contrebande officialisée est plus rentable que l’entreprise...
Dans ce numéro, un article est consacré à une découverte importante au sujet de l’indigénéité des Berbères. L’analyse génétique de deux momies naturelles datées de 7000 ans montre ainsi que :
1) Ces proto-Berbères n’ont aucune trace génomique sud-saharienne, c’est-à-dire avec les actuelles populations noires.
2) Qu’ils sont génétiquement apparentés à l’homme de Taforalt qui vivait au Maroc il y a environ 15000 ans, et dont l’ADN ne montre aucune trace de gènes sudsahariens ou associés à des populations du Levant, mais qui, en revanche, avait des liens légers avec l’homme de Néandertal européen.
Comme ils remplissent tous les critères de l'ONU, à savoir l'antériorité, l'identité distincte, l'auto-identification par rapport au territoire, leur statut de Peuple autochtone qui est une évidence scientifique, vient encore d'être renforcé par la génétique.
Conclusion : les Berbères forment bien le socle ancien de la population de l’Afrique du Nord.
Pour en savoir plus, voir mon livre Histoire des Berbères des origines à nos jours.

US-Haltung zu Israel

Ce fut « le plus grand défilé militaire de l'histoire de la Croatie ». Jeudi, à quelques jours du trentième anniversaire de l'opération Oluja, la Croatie a sorti le grand jeu dans les rues de Zagreb.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Oluja, Relations Croatie - Serbie, Histoire, Politique, Relations régionales

Le plan de redressement est majoritairement financé à 90 % par des ressources nationales, limitant ainsi l’endettement public. L’objectif est de mobiliser 5 667 milliards de FCFA sur la période 2025–2028, issus notamment de nouvelles recettes fiscales, du recyclage d’actifs et de financements non adossés à la dette.

A few short weeks into the Ceasefire with Iran, Iranian backed Houthis Kill Four, 15 kidnapped/missing after Houthis sink Greek ship in Red Sea.

After much talk and negotiations, the US has finally decided to go full steam ahead and resume its natural state of being as the tip of the spear for NATO in support of Ukraine. With much of the EU pushing for further kinetic involvement and border countries near Ukraine, notably Poland becoming the next major security superpower, the alignment of NATO comes after tough discussions between the Europeans and the United States on financial and supply obligations to the organisation. The new wartime commitment of 5% matches the reality of the current situation in Europe, a conflict that has erupted in other parts of the world despite the haughtiness of European denials on the reality of these situations. While not part of the common discussion in many NATO capitals, Europeans outside of Ukraine are being fired upon as European shipping fleets continue to be targeted and sunk abroad with limited response by the noble Western alliance. These actions during a supposed Ceasefire has resulted in deaths and likely more hostages, with an insufficient response by NATO against one of Russia’s allies. This trend of weak responses does nothing but encourage more conflict it seems, as Russia’s test of NATO’s fortitude continues to fuel more destruction.

In a sincere effort to end the war between Russia and Ukraine, new tariff measures aim to end Russia’s export of oil and gas to its main customers in many BRICS nations. Since the 2022 war began, there has been a concerted efforts to end the dependence on Russian oil and gas, while silently purchasing much of those same products by countries helping Ukraine to the tune of billions in military aid. The prohibition on the sale of North America energy to allies in Europe and Asia likely did more to fund Russia’s war machine than any attempted sanctions, as with high oil prices and the unwillingness to apply workable limits, the Russian military industrial complex would always be able to outproduce NATO with funding being constant. With these half measures, the war could always continue as long as there were men and metal available to put on the field, and Russia seems to be using many allies for these missions.

Effective sanctions on oil and gas must come with the displacement of these resources so other nations dependent on Russian energy have an alternative to conflict themselves. Acknowledging this reality was always a step never truly taken since 2022. A further acknowledgment of the greater war also prohibited and end to the conflict in Ukraine, as NATO sat on intelligence for years on drone production from Iran being sent to Russia. The scourge of these drones have become the essential terror weapon that are now murdering civilians at night in Ukraine. Now that drone facilities are operating in Russia, tank factories are on 24 hour shifts producing new armour and weapons, and former Soviet weapons storage facilities are being emptied out in record time providing refurbished equipment for the front, these targets should be met with the same vigour as the mission to end many of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet on the ground by Ukraine’s intelligence service.

A concerted effort should be taken against Russia’s military supply allies so that all sources of weapons can be limited along with tariffs and sanctions limiting funds towards Russia’s war production. Taking small steps to claim ceasefires only works when the ceasefire is committed to by both sides. In many situations, there is no rational side that can hold to any ceasefire agreement as it is usually just a tactic to delay a conflict until the West tires of the mission, leading to many deaths of innocents until that time comes. The war of delay is one that will always be lost as since the War in Vietnam, all adversaries of the United States have used this tactic with great effectiveness, now mixed with internal conflicts degrading the security situation in many of Europe’s and America’s great cities. Anarchy mixed with the normalisation of disproportionately undemocratic actions is the internal conflict that will likely weaken one side to such a great degree, that they will be unable to counter any conflict. To admit there is a war is the first step, to fight the war is what these new actions hope to achieve before it is no longer an option. Only time will literally tell of the eventual outcomes.