Mindig fontos, mondhatni alapvető dolog a viszonyítás. Ezért is köszöni a LégierőBlogger, hogy 2007 (Román Légierő, MiG-21 LanceR-C) és 2009 (Cseh Haderő, első JAS-39 "éles" telepítés) után a Honvéd Vezérkar (és akit még illet :-) jóvoltából visszatérhetett ma a litvániai Siauliaiba, hogy riportot készíthessen a NATINAMDS Balti Légtérrendészeti (BAP) misszió 39. váltásáról, mindenekelőtt a Magyar Honvédség kecskeméti gripenes közösségéről. A téma ráadásul nemcsak azért kihagyhatatlan, mert a feladat a maga nemében elsőnek, úttörőnek számít; azért is, mert a felkészülés távolról sem optimális körülmények között zajlott, a csapatot idén kellemetlen, még ha szerencsére nem is tragikus kimenetelű események, jelentős változások sújtották-érintették; továbbá másra is kellett-kell koncentrálniuk (V4 EUBG CAS).
Két magyar Gripen, a 35-ös és a 39-es a két permanens fedezék között, természetesen teljes fegyverzetben.
A mai rotációt a 406-os és 603-as Ancsa személyzete tette lehetővé. Itt a 406-os iramodik neki Kecskeméten a reggeli ködben.
Útvonalon: távolban a Magas-Tátra, előtérben Igló.
Szepesvár és Szepesváralja fölött.
Ez már Siauliai, a fedezékben pihenő Gripenen csatlakoztatott MAGG-konténer segítségével folyik a munka.
A Baltikumban először adnak keszit a Gripenek AMRAAM rakétákkal. Itt a forró vége a fúvócsővel és a MCG-antennával. A függesztmény egy BOL-zavarótöltetszóróval megtoldott Cobham NMML-sínen csüng.
A rakétafüggesztményt két póttartály egészíti ki. A fedezék óriási, leporellós ajtaja félig van nyitva.
Ha szárnyvég, akkor kettős a mérce.
Fekete Tamás alezredes, kontingensparancsnok (aki idén éppen tíz éve az első, Gripen típussal egyedülrepülést végrehajtó magyar hajózó lett Sátánosban) az Ancsa rámpájánál.
Visszatekintés...
2007. október. Éjszakai Tango után tolják vissza a 71. légibázis (Aranysogyéres) egyik Lancer-C-jét a britek által hátrahagyott telepíthető sátorhangárba.
A(z akkor még csak leendő) LégierőBlogger Laurentiu Chirita alezeredest hallgatja. Kiru két évvel később, az aranyosgyéresi bázis tőszomszédságában egy LanceR-B-vel szenvedett katasztrófát. (Fotó: M. G.)
2009. május. Jaroslav Míka, az első cseh és gripenes BAP-kontingens parancsnoka magyaráz az újságíróknak.
Az egyik cseh keszi Gripen kabinja.
A csehek szárny alatti Sidewinder-függesztést használtak (a pilon is "svéd"). Csörgőkígyóikat a gyári azonosítók mellett hazai lajstrommal is ellátták.
Zord
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Ambassadors, military advisors, and members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) secretariat discussed the future of peace operations at an IPI Vienna roundtable. The November 5th informal brainstorming session drew thirty participants and focused on peace operations in the OSCE area.
Arthur Boutellis, Director of IPI’s Center for Peace Operations, gave an overview of the recent UN report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO). He emphasized four main points from the report: the primacy of politics; the introduction of the term “peace operations” that covers a wide spectrum of tools; the importance of partnership, for example with regional arrangements; and the emphasis on a field-focused/people-centered approach.
The Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, shared his impression of the evolution of the SMM under difficult and constantly changing conditions. He stressed that the SMM’s most important task is to be present. He attributed the mission’s success to its ability to adapt – without changing its mandate – and to be impartial and objective. He highlighted the challenges of being “a civilian mission in a war zone.” It was pointed out that the precedent of civilian “monitors” could be copied in other parts of the world, like Colombia.
IPI Vice President Walter Kemp presented an overview of the OSCE’s field activities throughout the conflict cycle, aligning key UN and OSCE deployment concepts, from preventive diplomacy through peacemaking and peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding, under the unifying umbrella of “peace operations.” It was noted that while the OSCE has a more than twenty-year tradition of conflict prevention, it has also engaged in crisis management in volatile environments (including Albania in 1997 and Kyrgyzstan in 2010), as well as monitoring and stabilization operations (like in Kosovo in 1999 and eastern Ukraine today). The OSCE’s policing work was also highlighted.
Several participants spoke of the “primacy of politics,” a point made in the HIPPO report as well as the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on lessons learned from the OSCE’s engagement in Ukraine. Furthermore it was stressed that “the mandate must be clear and achievable and linked to a political strategy.”
One suggestion for shrinking the distance between the political and operational leadership of OSCE field activities was to appoint Special Representatives of the OSCE Secretary-General rather than Personal Representatives of the Chairmanship or Heads of Mission.
Among the issues raised was the challenge of civilian missions carrying out military tasks. It was noted that people with military skills are often integrated into civilian missions; or services like medevac, de-mining, or airlift are increasingly provided by private contractors. Several speakers emphasized the need for civilian leadership of such peace operations.
In the discussion, participants underlined the need for greater planning capacity in the OSCE Secretariat, as well as sufficient resources and administrative procedures to quickly launch field activities. The challenges of force generation, command and control, and overcoming the lack of a legal personality for the OSCE were also raised.
There was a debate about whether the OSCE was well placed and well equipped to carry out peacekeeping operations. It was recalled that the OSCE has a mandate for peacekeeping dating back to the Helsinki Document of 1992, and a high-level planning group has been preparing different scenarios for a peace operation in Nagorno-Karabakh for two decades. While some said the OSCE should never have “boots on the ground,” others suggested that this option should not be taken off the table.
The HIPPO report says that the UN “should embrace a future role of not only working alongside regional organizations but also enabling them to share the burden in accordance with the UN Charter.” Participants discussed how to strengthen the OSCE’s profile as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
As part of its Innovative Peace Incubator (IPI+) project, funded by Switzerland, IPI is supporting the ongoing internal OSCE review process on Peace Operations through its research and convening capacity.
In June 2015, I published a short article in the Oxford Analytica Daily Brief discussing the capabilities of new Russian aircraft. Here’s the text, as usual with no edits other than restoring some cuts made for space reasons.
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SUBJECT:The Russian T-50 fighter and PAK DA bomber.
SIGNIFICANCE:In early June, a series of high profile crashes involving Russian military planes led to Moscow grounding the Tu-95 ‘Bear’ bomber fleet. Additionally, on June 4, a Su-34 strike fighter crashed near Voronezh and a MiG-29 crashed near the Caspian. Military leadership is hoping that the air force’s reliance on old systems will be solved by two new programmes: the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA and the PAK–DA bomber.
ANALYSIS: Impacts
PAK FA T-50
The Russian Air Force has been developing a fifth-generation fighter aircraft since the late 1980s. The PAK FA T-50, has been under development at Sukhoi for about 15 years. The first flight of a prototype aircraft took place in January 2010. A total of five prototype aircraft have been delivered over the last five years. It is expected that the jet will enter service in 2016.
Stealth abilities
This aircraft will be the first operational stealth aircraft operated by Russia. It is expected to be built at least in part out of composite materials, highly manoeuvrable, with supercruise capability and advanced avionics. It will initially use a variant of the Saturn 117 engine currently installed on the Su-35S. A new engine, Product 30, is to be ready for production no earlier than 2017 and will become the standard engine in the 2020s. This engine is supposed to provide 17-18% more thrust, improved fuel efficiency, and higher reliability than the existing engine.
While recently constructed prototypes have been equipped with advanced avionics, reports indicate that the T-50’s electronic components are likely to be upgraded further before serial production begins. The need for continued work on avionic equipment and engines means that the initial production run of the aircraft will retain fourth-generation characteristics and will be comparable to earlier US F-16/18s. The Russian air force will therefore not have a complete fifth-generation fighter until 2020 at the earliest.
F-22 and F-35 comparison
Russia generally compares the T-50 to the F-22, rather than to the F-35. The T-50 has cruising (Mach 1.7) and top (Mach 2.5) speeds that are comparable to the F-22, though it is designed to be significantly faster than the F-35, which has been tested to a top speed of Mach 1.6. The maximum range without refueling is also comparable to the F-22, at 2,000 kilometres, and slightly inferior to the F-35’s 2,200 kilometres. Service ceiling is also relatively comparable, at 20,000 metres for the F-22 and T-50 and over 18,000 metres for the F-35.
There are extensive debates among aviation specialists regarding the relative merits of the three aircraft. These debates are complicated by the lack of reliable information on the characteristics of final versions of various T-50 components, including in such key areas as engines and avionics. At the same time, there is some consensus that the T-50 is more manoeuvrable but less ‘stealthy’ than the F-35 and F-22. Because of this characteristic, the T-50 is expected to be slightly superior to US aircraft in air battles but less successful in attacking ground targets. However, these comparisons are being made based on real data about Western aircraft but only statements regarding the T-50. Given Russian officials’ track record of hiding problems and exaggerating the capabilities of new technology, it is possible, perhaps likely, that the T-50’s performance may not match expectations.
Cooperation with India has stalled
Since 2007, the T-50 project has included a two-seater version designed for the Indian Air Force and commonly known as the FGFA (Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft). Original plans called for the production of 500 aircraft, with serial production to begin in 2015. Disagreements between the two sides have resulted in serious delays. The Indian side has complained that the aircraft’s engine is underpowered and unreliable, that problems with the airframe reduce the aircraft’s stealth features, that radar and other electronic systems are inadequate, that construction quality is poor, and that as a result of these defects the per unit cost is too high. As a result of these delays, India is expected to receive only three prototypes by 2017.
Procurement plans
Original plans called for the air force to receive 52 T-50 aircraft by 2020 and a total of 250 by 2030. However, officials have announced that due to the deteriorating economy, only twelve of these aircraft will be procured during the next five years. Four planes are expected to be produced during 2015, though these will still be considered prototypes. Therefore, the T-50 will not become a mainstay of the Russian air force in the foreseeable future.
Overall, it is unclear whether the Russian defence industry will be able to produce some of the advanced features on this aircraft, particularly in the areas of stealth technology, avionics and fifth-generation engines. Furthermore, the cost of the aircraft, estimated to be at least 50 million dollars per unit, may make large-scale procurement unaffordable given Russia’s current economic problems.
PAK DA bomber
Development of what is known as the PAK–DA bomber began in 2007. Tupolev won the initial tender to design the new long-range bomber. By 2009, company officials were anticipating that the research and development phase would be complete in 2012, the engineering phase would be finished in 2017 and the Russian air force would have 100 PAK DA aircraft by 2027. Subsequently, there have been debates regarding the need for such a plane and its capabilities. In August 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that any new strategic bomber will need to possess hypersonic technology to avoid falling behind the United States. This idea was later rejected in favor of a subsonic flying wing design with a long range and the ability to carry a heavy payload of weapons.
Long range
Given the lack of a prototype, there is little certainty about the plane’s design features. Experts believe that it is likely to have an initial weight of around 120-130 tons and a range of approximately 12,000 kilometres. Early indications that the two aircraft (T-50 and PAK DA) may also share engines appear to have been rejected in favour of an updated version of the engines found on the Tu-160. Last year, Russian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev said that the miltiary would start receiving the PAK DA in 2023. However, there have been indications that the timeline for developing a new bomber could possibly be pushed back, with some air force officials stating a potential in-service date range for the new plane of 2025 to 2030. The project is currently at the prototype design and construction stage.
CONCLUSION: The requirements of the air force will provide further stimulus to Russia’s defence industry import substitution scheme. As a result of Western sanctions and broken defence cooperation with Ukraine, Russia is embarking on an ambitious programme to make its defence industry self-sufficient within three years. However, increasingly the defence industry may be forced to retrench, returning to old designs and recycling components as it is unable to meet this ambitious target. The high cost of the T-50 fighter will eat into the overall budget, sapping chances for full-spectrum reforms.
Lorsque l’on s’intéresse à la question du nucléaire, les problématiques environnementales surgissent immédiatement. Avant même de mentionner la technologie, la compétitivité économique ou les aspects régaliens de l’énergie atomique, l’environnement est la première question qui apparait quand est prononcé le mot « nucléaire ». Les détracteurs de l’énergie atomique pointent invariablement la gestion des déchets issus de la production électrique, signe pour eux du danger structurel lié à la fission de l’atome sur un plan énergétique. Par contre, peu de voix s’élèvent pour s’interroger sur les bénéfices éventuels que peut apporter le nucléaire dans l’optique de la lutte contre le changement climatique. Le sujet pourrait presque apparaitre tabou. Heureusement la COP 21 qui se tient cette année à Paris offre l’opportunité de s’y intéresser en profondeur.
Une solution pertinente ?
Il appartient ainsi de poser un regard dépassionné et critique sur la question des émissions de gaz à effet de serre dans le secteur de l’énergie pour comprendre si, oui ou non, le nucléaire est une solution pertinente pour équilibrer la délicate balance énergétique des pays qui regroupe accès à l’énergie, sécurité énergétique et lutte contre le changement climatique. Des études ont ainsi été menées sur la question des émissions de gaz à effet de serre – majoritairement de CO2 dans ce cas – du secteur électrique.
La plupart des travaux s’intéressent à l’ensemble du cycle de vie des installations de production d’électricité nucléaire, prenant en compte la totalité de la chaine de valeur allant de l’extraction d’uranium au retraitement des déchets en passant par la construction et l’opération des centrales. Le rapport The Role of Nuclear Energy in a Low Carbon Energy Future de l’OCDE paru en 2012, synthétise les résultats de nombreux travaux scientifiques pour aboutir à la conclusion suivante : le nucléaire est, en moyenne, une énergie particulièrement peu émettrice de CO2. Alors que le charbon, première source d’énergie de l’OCDE et, de fait, de nombreux pays européens, émet en moyenne 888 tonnes de CO2 par GWh produit et le gaz naturel 499 t/GWh, le nucléaire s’établit à 29 t/GWh soit à peu près l’équivalent des énergies les moins émettrices, l’hydraulique et l’éolien (env. 26 t/GWh).
Les émissions en amont du process
Néanmoins la production d’électricité elle-même n’émet quasiment pas de CO2 puisque la quasi-totalité des émissions est due à l’amont du cycle (extraction de l’uranium) et à la construction des installations. Cela signifie donc pour notre pays qu’il est particulièrement vertueux, au niveau de son secteur électrique dans l’optique de la lutte contre le changement climatique. En effet si l’on s’intéresse aux émissions de CO2 de la France, tous secteurs confondus, celles-ci s’établissent à 370 000 kt en 2014 (données EDGAR ; Commission européenne) à comparer avec les 840 000 de l’Allemagne, les 5 300 000 des Etats-Unis et les plus de 10 millions de la Chine. Au niveau des émissions par habitant, la France atteint les 5,7 tonnes, à comparer là aussi avec les 10,2 tonnes pour l’Allemagne, 8,5 tonnes pour la Pologne, 7,5 tonnes pour le Royaume-Uni ou 6,4 tonnes pour l’Italie. En comparant la France aux autres grands pays européens, par l’économie ou la population, il apparait que notre pays est bien plus sobre en carbone que ses voisins.
Augmenter la part du nucléaire?
Cette sobriété, comparativement au niveau de développement et d’industrialisation de notre pays, est avant tout due à la faiblesse des émissions du secteur de l’énergie. En effet l’électricité produite en France est très majoritairement – environ aux trois quarts – issue du nucléaire. Les choix politiques opérés dans les années 70 à la suite du premier choc pétrolier, ont eu non seulement un effet majeur sur les approvisionnements énergétiques français ainsi que sur le développement d’une filière d’excellence mais aussi un impact non-négligeable sur la lutte contre le changement climatique.
Le nucléaire est ainsi une énergie particulièrement importante au regard des objectifs climatiques fixés par le GIEC.
De nombreux rapports – le scénario 450 de l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie par exemple – pointent ainsi la nécessité d’augmenter résolument la part du nucléaire dans le mix énergétique mondial, laquelle n’est pour le moment que de 6% environ. Le nucléaire possède l’avantage de permettre de disposer d’une puissance installée importante pour chaque réacteur, tout en émettant peu de gaz à effet de serre. Toutefois c’est une énergie qui nécessite une maitrise technologique certaine et une attention toute particulière aux aspects de sureté et de sécurité. Là encore notre pays, en tant que leader technologique, dispose d’atouts indéniables pour envisager un futur sobre en carbone, pour la France et le monde.