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Wie soll Munition am Seegrund umweltschonend und sicher geborgen werden? Armasuisse hat drei Ideen prämiert. Doch erprobt ist keine – und ändern tut sich vorerst nichts.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Members debated with the European Council and European Commission on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18 December 2025 and the geopolitical tensions currently facing Europe. Parliament also heard and debated a presentation of the Cyprus Council Presidency’s programme of activities.

Several debates on external issues were held with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, including: on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark and the need for a united EU response to the United States, the situation in Venezuela following the extraction of Maduro and the need to ensure a peaceful democratic transition, and Iran’s brutal repression of protesters.

Further debates were held following Council and Commission statements on: preparations for the EU-India Summit; tackling AI deepfakes and sexual exploitation on social media through full use of the EU’s digital rules; the pending approval of the Hungarian national plan for Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding; the attempted takeover of Lithuania’s public broadcaster and the threat to democracy in Lithuania; online piracy of sports and other live events; and the proposed cybersecurity and digital networks acts.

Finally, Members rejected a motion of censure against the European Commission, and adopted a resolution requesting an opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility of the proposed EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) with the EU Treaties.

40th anniversary of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Union

Celebrating the 40th anniversary of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Union, His Majesty Felipe VI, King of Spain, and His Excellency Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of the Republic of Portugal, addressed Parliament in a formal sitting. Parliament also observed a minute’s silence in memory of the victims of the rail accident in Spain on 18 January.

Air passenger rights

Proposed reform of EU air passenger rights to address issues such as delays, cancellations, weak enforcement and unclear rules had been stalled in the Council for over a decade due to disagreements on compensation, extraordinary circumstances and enforcement. Members debated and adopted a recommendation from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) at second reading. The report rejects the Council’s position in favour of higher delay thresholds and reduced compensation, and supports distance-based compensation of €300-€600, a closed list of exemptions, and stronger passenger protection, such as free hand luggage, bans on unfair fees and longer claim deadlines. The file now returns to the Council for its second reading, with conciliation to follow unless the Council accepts Parliament’s amendments.

Critical medicines act

Critical medicine shortages and the EU’s growing reliance on external suppliers for critical ingredients pose a threat to EU public health. The proposed ‘critical medicines act’ aims to improve the availability and security of supply of critical medicines in the EU by decreasing dependency on single suppliers and non-EU countries, such as India and China, and improving pharmaceutical manufacturing in the EU. Members debated and approved a report from the Committee on Public Health (SANT) regarding the proposed regulation, and set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations. The report expands the definition of a ‘strategic project’ to improve EU manufacturing capacity and calls for the creation of a critical medicines security fund within the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework, and an EU coordination mechanism for national stockpiles and contingency stocks of critical medicines.

28th regime

The 28th regime is a proposed EU-level legal framework that would allow innovative companies to operate across the EU under a single set of rules. Companies would not have to deal with differing regulations across Member States, which would help boost the single market. Parliament debated and adopted a legislative-initiative report on the 28th regime from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). The report suggests national limited liability companies be able to register as ‘Societas Europaea Unificata’ (S.EU), which would be automatically recognised in all Member States. It recommends a harmonised EU legal framework for corporate law to align national rules across all Member States, while ensuring safeguards for national laws to avoid undermining labour and social laws. It proposes a common digital direct entry point allowing entrepreneurs to establish companies within 48 hours, and harmonised rules on employee financial participation schemes.

Just transition in the world of work

Parliament debated and adopted a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) proposing a new directive to protect workers who may become unemployed in the move towards a greener and more digital society. The report calls on the European Commission to create a comprehensive framework to ensure EU countries create jobs in regions where jobs are most likely to disappear. This framework should ensure the development of viable economic 2

alternatives and attract the necessary investment. The report also calls to set certain workplace conditions, including the right to training during working hours, health and safety measures, the right to worker consultation and collective bargaining and stronger protections against unfair dismissal. It also calls for increased support for a just transition in the 2028-2034 MFF. Lastly, the proposed directive would require Member States to develop national strategies and business support programmes for small and medium-sized businesses.

Drones and new systems of warfare

The EU is facing a rising drone threat linked to Russian provocations, and is boosting drone and counter-drone capabilities. Parliament debated and adopted an own-initiative report from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) setting out a comprehensive strategy to prepare the EU for drone-enabled conflict, calling for the rapid integration of drone and counter-drone capabilities across EU defence planning and stronger protection of civilian infrastructure. It stresses the need to build a robust, autonomous European drone industry, reduce reliance on non-EU suppliers and shift from a primarily regulatory approach to a security model focused on operational capabilities and strategic autonomy.

CFSP and CSDP 2025 annual reports

Members considered and approved the 2025 annual implementation reports on common security and defence policy from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and on common foreign and security policy from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). Both reports identify Russia’s war against Ukraine as a primary threat to the EU and Member States, and call for stronger support for Ukraine to protect European security. They both acknowledge the importance of EU relations with the United States in securing peace in Ukraine, with the SEDE report noting the risks of isolationist US foreign policy and expressing concern at the US government’s threats against Greenland’s sovereignty. The AFET report highlights the current global geopolitical instability and accelerated erosion of democratic norms, stating that the EU’s credibility depends on its ability to act coherently and decisively. It calls for a gradual transition to qualified majority voting for common foreign and security policy decisions without military or defence implications, while encouraging greater use of constructive abstention.

Human rights and democracy in the world and the 2025 EU annual report

Members also debated and adopted a resolution on the AFET committee’s annual report on human rights and democracy in the world. This report aims at informing a post-2027 EU action plan for human rights and democracy, and reiterates Parliament’s call for a stronger plan based on a full review of the current framework, with clear benchmarks, indicators and timelines. It highlights growing threats to human rights and the international system, proposes improvements to EU tools such as human rights dialogues, support for human rights defenders, conditionality in EU trade and international agreements and human rights sanctions. It also stresses the need for earmarked funding for human rights anddemocracy support in the next MFF, notably through the proposed Global Europe instrument.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from Parliament’s Committees on Defence (SEDE) and Internal Market (IMCO) on simplification of intra-EU transfers of defence-related products and the simplification of security and defence procurement and acceleration of permit-granting for defence readiness projects, as well as one further decision from the Committees on Defence (SEDE), Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) on defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry were approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – January I 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The calculus of global power is shifting. In early January 2026, Turkey moved to join a defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that could fundamentally alter the balance of power from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia. Yet the most consequential dimension of this emerging alliance is not military. It is financial. Together, these three states sit at the core of the rapidly expanding Islamic banking system—an industry valued at approximately $4.5 trillion and growing at an annual rate of 10–15 percent annually. What is taking shape is not merely a regional alignment, but the foundations of an alternative financial and strategic architecture capable of challenging Western economic dominance and the centrality of the U.S. dollar.   For decades, Washington assessed the Middle East and South Asia primarily through military alliances and energy flows. That framework is increasingly obsolete. The Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan axis represents a far more disruptive phenomenon: the fusion of Islamic finance, strategic deterrence, and non-Western institutional design. According to the Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index—which evaluates political, economic, technological, military, informational, cultural, and cognitive sovereignty across 193 states—the combined sovereignty score of these three countries reaches 1,315.7 out of a possible 2,100, placing them among the most consequential regional blocs in the emerging multipolar order.   The strength of this axis lies in its complementarity. Pakistan contributes nuclear deterrence as the only Muslim-majority country with atomic weapons, possessing an estimated 165–170 nuclear warheads and a battle-hardened military establishment. Saudi Arabia supplies financial depth, controlling nearly one-third of global Islamic banking assets and maintaining the fiscal capacity to finance long-term military and technological programs. Turkey adds advanced defense production capabilities, including drone warfare systems proven in Ukraine, Libya, and Karabakh, as well as an increasingly autonomous military-industrial base with localization rates approaching 70–80 percent.   Formal trilateral defense coordination began with meetings in Riyadh in August 2023 and Rawalpindi in January 2024. The emerging framework mirrors collective-defense logic: aggression against one partner is treated as aggression against all. Turkey’s participation—while remaining a NATO member—introduces a structural contradiction into the Atlantic alliance and accelerates the erosion of traditional Western security architectures.   Yet the most destabilizing element of this alignment is financial rather than military. Islamic banking operates on principles fundamentally distinct from Western finance. Interest-based lending is replaced by profit-sharing and asset-backed transactions. Speculative instruments are constrained, leverage is limited, and ethical investment criteria are embedded into the system itself. During both the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 economic shock, Islamic banks demonstrated notable resilience precisely because they were less exposed to speculative excess.   For much of the Global South, this model offers more than ideology—it offers insulation. As Western economies cycle through recurring debt crises, inflationary shocks, and financial volatility, Islamic finance increasingly appears not as a niche religious system but as a viable counter-cyclical alternative. When paired with sovereign energy resources and credible military deterrence, it becomes a strategic instrument.   The Burke Institute’s data reveals why apparent weakness becomes strength within this alliance. Pakistan’s lower economic sovereignty score reflects decades of operating under sanctions, capital constraints, and external pressure—experience that now translates into institutional resilience. Turkey’s defense-sector localization surge demonstrates how external pressure can accelerate autonomy rather than dependency. Saudi Arabia’s low debt-to-GDP ratio and vast foreign exchange reserves provide the financial ballast necessary to sustain long-term systemic transition.   This bloc does not operate in isolation. China acts as a strategic amplifier. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deliberately subordinated its financial sector to the “real economy,” rejecting speculative financialization in favor of industrial development. Since 2022, more than 100 senior banking executives and regulators have been targeted in anti-corruption investigations, while salary caps and regulatory controls have reinforced state authority over capital. Chinese banks increasingly channel investment into productive sectors rather than real estate speculation, aligning finance with national development priorities.   This internal transformation dovetails with China’s external de-dollarization agenda. Pakistan is already deeply embedded in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are exploring settlement mechanisms outside dollar-based systems. When Islamic banking instruments intersect with Chinese payment rails and BRICS financial infrastructure, the petrodollar system faces structural—not rhetorical—pressure.   The geopolitical context is equally significant. Confidence in American security guarantees has weakened across the Middle East. The muted response to the 2019 Abqaiq attacks, the withdrawal of air-defense assets, and Washington’s gradual regional disengagement signaled the limits of U.S. protection. For regional actors, diversification of security and financial dependencies has become a rational strategy rather than a hostile one.   Expansion scenarios further magnify the implications. Potential inclusion of the UAE, Qatar, Malaysia, or Egypt would elevate the bloc’s share of Islamic banking assets beyond 60 percent while linking it to critical maritime checkpoints, energy corridors, and demographic scale. At that point, the system ceases to be an alternative and becomes a parallel order.   The immediate threat to the West is not military confrontation. It is gradual erosion: reduced dollar demand, sanctions circumvention, alternative development models, and declining leverage over regional decision-making. Financial systems rarely collapse suddenly; they weaken through the accumulation of credible alternatives.   For Israel, this transformation carries direct security implications. The consolidation of a Turkey-centered axis endowed with financial autonomy and strategic depth risks reshaping Israel’s regional environment from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Any framework that strengthens Ankara’s independent leverage while diluting Western influence affects deterrence, intelligence cooperation, and regional balance—particularly as Israel confronts threats from Iran and its proxy networks.   The challenge facing Washington is conceptual rather than tactical. Military superiority alone cannot preserve financial hegemony in a world where parallel systems are deliberately designed to be sanction-resistant. The Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan alignment does not seek to defeat the West; it seeks to render Western pressure optional.   The era of unchallenged dollar centrality and singular security patronage is ending. What replaces it will not emerge through declarations, but through institutions. The question for the United States, Israel, and Europe is no longer whether this shift is underway—but whether they recognize its strategic depth in time to respond.

Január 26-tól indul a pályázat kiegészítő támogatásra a Kisfaludy Turisztikai Hitelközpont Start-kölcsönei mellé.    A különleges, egyedi akció célja, hogy a legkisebb üzemméretű turisztikai szereplők mellett a mikro-, kis- és középvállalkozások gyorsan, kedvező feltételekkel, egyszerűen jussanak finanszírozási forráshoz, elősegítve versenyképesebb pozíciójukat a következő főszezonban, és biztosítva üzemszerű működésüket.

Hamarosan indul a Falusi Civil Alap pályázat, amely a kistelepüléseken működő civil szervezetek számára nyújt jelentős támogatási lehetőséget. A program keretében akár 7 millió forint vissza nem térítendő támogatás igényelhető közösségi célú fejlesztések és eszközbeszerzések támogatására. 

Während die Welt nach Grönland schaut, bleibt es in Gaza unruhig.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

Background

In her political guidelines for 2024-2029, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen paid special attention to the role of citizens in our democracy as she pledged to strengthen citizens’ voice in the EU and to step up engagement with civil society organisations (CSOs). Following up on this, the Commission announced a comprehensive strategy on CSOs in its 2025 work programme. This initiative was praised by a number of CSOs and stakeholders and EU bodies such as the European Economic and Social Committee. Many stakeholders have in fact been voicing concern about shrinking civic space, which has sparked a range of recommendations, including calls for policy interventions. The European Parliament, too, in a resolution from March 2022, recognised the stress under which CSOs increasingly operate and called for a range of interventions such as an EU alert mechanism, a statute for European cross-border associations, enhanced monitoring to ensure that civic space is not negatively affected, including the use of infringement procedures, a coherent policy framework to foster inclusive participation, and ‘long-term predictable, adequate and enabling financing for CSOs’, in addition to a reduction in red tape.

The strategy

On 12 November 2025, after a public consultation which attracted a significant number of contributions from CSOs, including ones from third countries, the Commission issued a communication outlining the EU strategy for civil society. This document builds on existing frameworks and sets out concrete actions at EU and national level, in order to protect CSOs within and outside the EU. The strategy is addressed to CSOs covering a broad set of organisations: non-state, not-for-profit, independent, non-partisan, non-violent organisations, through which people pursue and defend shared objectives and ideals, including human rights defenders (HRD). The protection offered is aimed at those CSOs that are accountable, independent, transparent and respect EU common values of democracy, dignity and respect for fundamental freedoms.

The strategy is based on three main pillars.

The first pillar focuses on strengthening effective engagement with CSOs as partners in governance. The strategy recognises that CSOs contribute by providing advice and expertise in many fields and that they help shape EU policies. In addition to the existing tools (e.g. Have your say, better regulation tools, local councillors, civil society dialogues, consultations), the strategy identifies 10 guiding principles that must be observed in the dialogue with civil society: partnership; comprehensiveness; predictability and regularity as to the dialogue; transparency; representation; inclusivity; accessibility; accountability; resourcing; and safety. The strategy also emphasises the importance of Commission Recommendation 2023/2836 on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes, which calls on Member States to enable CSOs to participate. The Commission, to enhance the role of CSOs as partners in policymaking, made a number of commitments: to establish a Civil Society Platform and to organise an annual summit of the Platform; to promote the 10 guiding principles mentioned above; to engage with civil society through existing or newly created toolssuch as the Youth Advisory Board, the Youth Stakeholders Group, the Youth Dialogue and policy dialogues; to engage with citizens’ panels as a way to create a bridge between CSOs and citizens; to support national capacity-building; and to institutionalise and standardise in-country consultations of CSOs.

The second pillar highlights the need to support and protect CSOs. In this respect, the Commission acknowledges the difficulties faced by CSOs, such as an increasing range of threats, from attacks on their staff to smear and disinformation campaigns. Both preventive and reactive measures are therefore proposed, together with increased engagement to monitor the challenges faced by the civic space. Further to existing tools (its annual rule of law reports, SLAPP legislation (strategic lawsuit against public participation), the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme (CERV) and the European fact-checking network), the Commission committed to: creating an online knowledge hub on civic space, to document existing civic space monitoring initiatives, reports and protection resources; exploring ways to strengthen CSOs and HRDs at risk in the EU; supporting training for justice professionals on SLAPPs that target CSOs, and litigation on rights derived from the Charter; supporting national capacity-building in implementing Recommendation 2023/2836; and strengthening the EU’s warning system where civic space is shrinking in enlargement countries.

The third pillar of the strategy focuses on ways to provide ‘long-term, predictable and sufficient funding’. Funding can be of a public or private nature. In the latter case, it is necessary to create a favourable environment for private donors in which philanthropic freedom is protected. The EU already supports CSOs financially through programmes like CERV, Agora EU, Erasmus + and the EU Solidarity Corps. For the future, the Commission will explore possible funding gaps, work to connect communities and pro bono lawyers with CSOs across sectors, and explore possibilities to extend financial support to third-party schemes across relevant EU funding programmes.

Finally, the strategy highlights the need to support civil society in EU external action. To that end, the Commission committed, among other things, to strengthening dialogue with CSOs in all policy areas, including through EU delegations; consulting CSOs in the preparation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; and strengthening CSOs’ participation in multilateral fora.

Reactions to the strategy

While there is an overall consensus that such an initiative was long overdue, reactions to the strategy have been mixed. The Good Lobby and La Strada International considered the strategy to be a good starting point, but that it is not enough and needs consistent follow-up by the Commission; other commentators highlighted the contradictions with the Commission’s approach to policymaking, which often sidelines CSOs. Civil Society Europe considered the strategy to be a positive signal overall, while the European Civic Forum and the European Centre for Not-for-profit Law emphasised the importance of implementation. Liberties lamented the lack of concrete actions, while the European Movement International considered the strategy to be a significant step in embedding democratic resilience.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘An EU strategy for civil society‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Wolf-Peter Schill spricht in Folge #39 von 'fossilfrei' mit Prof. Patrick Plötz, Leiter des Geschäftsfelds Energiewirtschaft am Fraunhofer-ISI, über das vermeintliche Aus vom Verbrenner-Aus (don’t call it Verbrennerverbot). Was genau steckt im Automobilpaket der EU-Kommission, und was bedeutet das ...

Angoisse des captifs, silence dans les puits des enchaînés, douleur, peur... ces sentiments demeurent jusqu'aujourd'hui dans ces lieux de mémoires pour les peuples africains.

Le jeune Moshen Meftah finance ses études en reprenant le travail qui fut celui de son père : il prie et jeûne pour les défunts de familles qui le paient à cet effet. Il nettoie les tombes, les asperge d'eau de rose, s'applique à bien prononcer l'arabe des prières. Il gère son emploi du temps funéraire sur son portable, et se fait payer par virement. Il admire Mahmoud Darwich, et rêve d'aller finir ses études à Beyrouth. Une de ses clientes lui a confié la tâche de s'occuper des rites pour (…)

- Contrebande / Iran, Littérature, Guerre irano-irakienne

Written by Pieter Baert.

Simplification strategy

As highlighted in the recent reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, barriers to cross-border business operations continue to hinder the effective functioning of the EU single market. Removing such obstacles is not only central to the idea of the EU, but also represents an important opportunity for economic growth. In response, the European Commission has launched a broad initiative to ‘stress-test’ the entire EU rulebook to eliminate overlaps, contradictions, and unnecessary complexity. This agenda includes legislative simplification, for instance through a series of Omnibus proposals, and renewed efforts to deepen the single market. Among the options under consideration is the introduction of a ’28th regime’, to offer innovative companies a pan-European legal framework that companies can opt into.

In terms of taxation policy, the European Commission intends to table an omnibus package on taxation for the second quarter of 2026, and a recast of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC).

Costs, fragmentation and uncertainty

In the context of cross-border activity, a tax obstacle can be understood broadly. It not only refers to explicit discrimination, but to any fiscal or administrative friction, such as: legal uncertainty; duplicative reporting requirements that disproportionately affect cross-border activity, as businesses must navigate multiple tax authorities; reporting systems; relief procedures; and divergent interpretations of the same EU rules. From an economic perspective, such barriers distort competition by favouring firms that remain domestic or that already operate at scale. They weaken the competitive pressure that the single market is meant to generate, with knock-on effects on prices, innovation, and market concentration. Empirical evidence further suggests a negative impact on investment decisions when businesses face uncertainty about the final tax treatment of an investment.

Any discussion of tax barriers must start from a fundamental legal and political reality: direct taxation remains largely within the competence of the Member States. Member States retain the right to determine who is taxed, on what, when, and at what rate, leaving the EU with a mandate to act only as necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. These limited legal pathways for the EU result in distinct national tax environments, compelling cross-border workers and businesses to navigate different tax rulebooks including those governing labour income, corporate income, and capital gains. Attempts at harmonisation are long-standing: the idea of a common corporate tax base has been discussed since the 1960s. However, successive proposals failed to secure sufficient support, and the most recent proposal – BEFIT – is pending in the Council since 2023.

Even in areas where EU law provides a common framework, tax barriers can remain pervasive. For instance, despite the existence of the VAT Directive, value added tax (VAT) was identified as the most frequently reported tax-related obstacle in the single market in the Commission’s 2025 Single Market and Competitiveness Report. A particularly acute problem is VAT registration in another Member State. While the underlying VAT concepts are largely harmonised, administrative procedures are not. Registration procedures can vary widely between Member States in terms of documentation requirements, digitalisation, and processing times (see Table 1). The forthcoming expansion of the VAT One-Stop Shop under the VAT in the digital age package will significantly lower the need for multiple VAT registrations. However, where a company carries out activities outside the scope of the One-Stop Shop or where timely recovery of input VAT is commercially critical, companies may still need, or choose, to obtain VAT registrations in several Member States, each subject to national administrative procedures and compliance burdens.

Table 1 VAT registration challenges VAT registrationRegistrationVAT rules may be particularly complex: suppliers may not be aware that they must register for VAT in another country, leading to unintentional non-compliance, disputes and loss of tax revenue.DocumentationDifferent Member States may request different supporting documents (originals/copies) during the registration process (invoices, company statutes, company directors’ identity, etc.).LanguageLanguage barriers can hinder communication for foreign traders. Authorities may require documents in the local language, requiring professional translation.Nature of processDegree of digitalisation varies between Member States; manual procedures, delays and inconsistent follow-up increase uncertainty.ReportingOnce registered, the business must file VAT returns, EC-sales listings, etc.PaymentsOnce registered, the business must remit VAT according to local deadlines.Tax adviceComplexity of registration and subsequent obligations may force businesses to rely on external tax and accountancy expertise.

Table Source: P. Baert, Single market, single VAT registration? Development and future of the one-stop shop, EPRS, European Parliament, 2025

More broadly, the unanimity requirement in tax matters represents a high barrier to achieving legislative progress at EU level. As a result, directives — rather than directly applicable regulations — remain the default legislative instrument. This inevitably leaves room for divergent national transposition and application. In response, the EU has increasingly relied on coordination and soft-law instruments, including guidance issued by the VAT Committee, recommendations and initiatives such as the European Trust and Cooperation Approach (ETACA) framework, to mitigate fragmentation.

New challenges

As the economy evolves, new tax barriers are emerging. Digitalisation has enabled employees to work from anywhere, but where an employee resides in one Member State and works for an employer established in another, overlapping national rules can lead to double taxation, disputes and high compliance costs. Employers may also face a ‘permanent establishment’ risk if an employee’s home office is deemed to create a taxable presence in another jurisdiction. These risks act as hidden barriers to labour mobility within the single market. The Commission plans to propose a recommendation to Member States on this issue in 2026.

The increased ‘servitisation’ of the EU economy presents a further challenge for the single market, as new business models combine elements of both goods and services (e.g. subscription-based manufacturing models). Current VAT rules, however, continue to rely on a rigid distinction between supplies of goods and supplies of services, each with different place of taxation rules. In hybrid scenarios, this can create legal uncertainty and disputes between Member States over taxing rights, increasing compliance costs and litigation risks for businesses.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Tax obstacles in the single market‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Die Abteilung Makroökonomie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) analysiert gesamtwirtschaftliche Zusammenhänge mit empirischen und theoretischen Methoden. Die Forschungsarbeiten der Abteilung ordnen sich den drei Themenbereichen Konjunkturpolitik der europäischen Währungsunion, Makroökonomie und Verteilung und Makroökonomische Aspekte des Klimawandels zu. In den Forschungsarbeiten werden Modelle entwickelt und Datensätze generiert. Die Forschungsergebnisse bilden die Grundlage für die Infrastruktur der Prognose und Politikberatung. So fließen die Ergebnisse direkt in die Prognosen des DIW Berlin und die Gemeinschaftsdiagnose ein.

Wir suchen zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/d) für jeweils 12 Wochenstunden.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © Union européenne, 2026 - PE

Kanadas Premier Mark Carney sieht die bestehende Weltordnung am Ende und wirbt für neue Bündnisse. Welche Rolle Europa dabei spielen könnte und wo die Grenzen einer engeren Anbindung Kanadas an die EU liegen, erläutert Politologin Laura von Daniels.

With climate change advancing, the planned relocation of entire com­munities from risk areas is becoming unavoidable. It is already a reality worldwide and will become increasingly necessary in the future as a measure of climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Relocation can save lives and reduce the risk of displacement. Never­theless, this measure is considered a “last resort” because it is expensive, deeply affects livelihoods, social networks and cultural identities, and carries new risks. To be effective, it must be participatory, human rights-based, and accom­panied by development-oriented measures that strengthen the well-being and resilience of those affected and reduce structural inequalities. Many places lack the political will, concrete strategies and resources for this – especially in low-income countries with already limited adapta­tion capacities. These countries are therefore heavily dependent on inter­national support, which has mostly been fragmented, ad hoc and uncoordinated. The longer the absence of adequate structures persists, the greater the risk that human security will be severely compromised, fundamental human rights violated and entire communities (once again) displaced – posing risks to regional stability and global security. The German government should specifically address gaps in the inter­national system, facilitate access to knowledge and resources, and strengthen multi-sectoral learning. Germany’s current engagement in Fiji should be expanded in the medium term to other climate-vulnerable regions and countries, with a focus on community-driven relocation projects.