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The Trump administration is pursuing an explicitly anti-multilateralist policy rooted in national sovereignty, geopolitical calculation, and transactional economics. Conspiracy theories played a significant role in justifying actions like the dismantling of USAID. Global norms, including the SDGs, are cast as threats to U.S. interests precisely because they promote forms of cooperative governance. The withdrawal from international organizations, disregard for established norms (even to the point of military threats), and blunt pressure on other nations—such as the baseless accusations of “genocide” against South Africa—signal a paradigm shift. It redefines the balance between values and interests, privileging short-term political dominance over long-term global cooperation.

The Trump administration is pursuing an explicitly anti-multilateralist policy rooted in national sovereignty, geopolitical calculation, and transactional economics. Conspiracy theories played a significant role in justifying actions like the dismantling of USAID. Global norms, including the SDGs, are cast as threats to U.S. interests precisely because they promote forms of cooperative governance. The withdrawal from international organizations, disregard for established norms (even to the point of military threats), and blunt pressure on other nations—such as the baseless accusations of “genocide” against South Africa—signal a paradigm shift. It redefines the balance between values and interests, privileging short-term political dominance over long-term global cooperation.

Deutschland tut immer noch viel zu wenig, um Frauen vor Gewalt zu schützen. Das ist auch ein wirtschaftliches Problem. Dabei ist längst klar, was sich ändern müsste., Es ist eine traurige Realität, die immer noch zu wenig Beachtung findet: Gewalt gegen Frauen ist in Deutschland ein systemisches Problem: Für 2023 erfasste das Bundeskriminalamt 360 Frauen und Mädchen, die aufgrund von Tötungsdelikten starben. Von diesen 360 wurden 247 der innerfamiliären Gewalt ...

An undercover BBC investigation reveals the women who involve children as young as 13 in sex work.

Turkey’s geopolitically motivated industrial and supply chain policy implies close ties to Germany as well as a security and economic policy orientation towards the EU. Ankara wants to bring production and sales into line with EU standards and establish a green high-tech and services economy. However, its decarbonisation measures remain inadequate. Turkish stakeholders see disruptions to global supply chains as creating the opportunity to relocate European production chains to Turkey (nearshoring). The government, the private sector and business organisations are all working to expand sustainable energy supplies. Turkey’s authoritarian domestic policy – namely, the dismantling of democracy, repression and disregard for the rule of law – makes it extremely difficult to deepen bilateral cooperation. Despite close economic ties, there are normative differences between Germany and Turkey and a consistent strategy to overcome them is lacking. Rather, the Turkish government is focused on using industrial policy to compensate for shortcomings in the rule of law. Amid the geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, Turkey is performing a delicate balancing act: it is maintaining its ties to the West while at the same time expanding its technology partnership with China and energy cooperation with Russia. German policy towards Turkey requires a strategic rethink. It should endeavour to promote economic stability, strengthen Turkey’s security policy integration into Europe and counteract Ankara’s strategic rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing. Going forward, cooperation should be made conditional on democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Valérie Bony reçoit la designeuse de mode franco- ivoirienne Maelys Plivard pour sa marque LEWA

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Background: Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown policies emerged as pivotal measures to contain viral transmission. Questions arose about whether their implementation challenged access to care, particularly in regions with fragile or less resilient health systems, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Robust evidence on the effect of lockdowns on healthcare access remains sparse, partly due to a lack of suitable data. We addressed this gap and assessed the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown policy on facility-based delivery during the first pandemic wave in Kenya. Methods: We triangulated findings from two independent quantitative analyses, exploiting the fact that lockdowns in Kenya were implemented only in selected counties. First, we used nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys from 2018 and 2020, applying a pre-post-test design with independent controls. Second, we analyzed monthly data from the Kenya Health Information System (Jan 2019–Nov 2020) using an interrupted time series (ITSA) with independent controls, with April 2020 set as the interruption point. Results: The controlled pre-post analysis found no significant effect of lockdowns on facility-based delivery in lockdown vs. non-lockdown counties. The ITSA showed an immediate increase of 4.97% (CI: 0.51%, 9.43%) in facility deliveries in lockdown counties, followed by a significant monthly decrease of 0.97% (CI: -1.60%, -0.34%) compared with non-lockdown counties. Conclusion: We found no overall effect of lockdowns on facility-based deliveries. Our results suggest that, when managed well, lockdowns do not necessarily disrupt access to maternal health services—demonstrating elements of resilience even under crisis conditions. These findings underscore the value of context-specific, adaptive strategies to ensure continuity of essential services during health emergencies. Future research should explore localized and socioeconomic factors shaping responses to public health interventions and further examine how resilience can be strengthened at all levels of the health system.

Voyage à reculons dans les Balkans occidentaux, Carnet de voyage, d'Ombeline Duprat, éditions Spinelle, 2025, 170 pages, 18 euros.

- Lettres de l'Est et des Balkans • Le blog de Pierre Glachant / Kosovo, Grand Bazar - Diaporama, Serbie, Bosnie-Herzégovine

Voyage à reculons dans les Balkans occidentaux, Carnet de voyage, d'Ombeline Duprat, éditions Spinelle, 2025, 170 pages, 18 euros.

- Lettres de l'Est et des Balkans • Le blog de Pierre Glachant / Kosovo, Grand Bazar - Diaporama, Serbie, Bosnie-Herzégovine

Funktioniert Trumps Wirtschaftspolitik etwa? Kurz sah es so aus, als ob er ökonomische Regeln außer Kraft setzen könnte. Doch mittlerweile zeigen sich ernste Probleme.

Le tourisme de croisière a le vent en poupe partout dans le monde. En Adriatique, ce sont de « nouvelles » destinations, comme l'Albanie et le Monténégro, qui connaissent les plus fortes progressions.

- Articles / Albanie, Monténégro, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Environnement, Tourisme balkans, Adriatique

Le tourisme de croisière a le vent en poupe partout dans le monde. En Adriatique, ce sont de « nouvelles » destinations, comme l'Albanie et le Monténégro, qui connaissent les plus fortes progressions.

- Articles / Albanie, Monténégro, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Environnement, Tourisme balkans, Adriatique

L'urbanisation incontrôlée et les constructions illégales menacent l'inscription du lac et de la ville d'Ohrid au classement du patrimoine mondial. L'Unesco laisse une dernière chance jusqu'au 1er février 2026, tout en exigeant un plan d'action et plus de coopération entre la Macédoine du Nord et l'Albanie.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Culture et éducation, Environnement, Macédoine du Nord

Azerbaijan is undergoing a significant geopolitical realignment, moving away from Moscow’s traditional dominance and pursuing a more independent, multi-vector foreign policy. This strategic shift has been shaped by historical grievances, the post-war dynamics of the South Caucasus, and the weakening of Russia’s regional influence following the Ukraine war.   For years, Azerbaijan maintained a careful balance with Russia, recognizing Moscow’s power while safeguarding its own sovereignty. However, Russia’s decades-long alliance with Armenia, its reluctance to ensure the implementation of post-war agreements, and its failure to restrain Armenian provocations have eroded trust in Moscow’s role as a “neutral” mediator.   The 2020 Second Karabakh War highlighted a changing reality: Turkey’s military and diplomatic support, rather than Russian involvement, enabled Azerbaijan’s decisive victory. This demonstrated that Moscow was no longer the only power capable of shaping events in the South Caucasus.   Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 weakened its global standing and diminished its ability to project power in the South Caucasus. Preoccupied with the conflict and isolated by Western sanctions, Moscow’s influence in the region has noticeably declined.   This created an opportunity for Azerbaijan to strengthen its role as a reliable energy partner for Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor, supplying gas to European markets, has made Baku a key player in Europe’s energy security strategy, further reducing its reliance on Moscow.   The proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nachshivan through southern Armenia, is a strategic priority for Baku. This corridor would not only enhance regional trade and connectivity but also reduce Azerbaijan’s dependence on Russian-controlled routes.   Moscow’s lukewarm stance on this project and its attempts to maintain control over all transit links in the South Caucasus have created additional friction. Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, seeks to establish the corridor as a sovereign project without Russian oversight.   Moreover, the corridor is viewed by Western and regional partners as a critical route that would integrate the South Caucasus with global trade networks, bypassing both Russia and Iran.   Azerbaijan’s partnership with Turkey has evolved into a robust strategic alliance. Military cooperation, defense industry collaborations, and joint regional initiatives underscore the “one nation, two states” principle.   At the same time, Baku has strengthened its relations with Israel, particularly in defense technology, intelligence sharing, and energy. The European Union and the United States have also deepened their engagement with Azerbaijan, viewing it as a vital partner in energy diversification and regional stability.   Azerbaijan’s growing influence is reshaping the South Caucasus power dynamics. While Russia remains a factor due to geography and trade, its weakened position has allowed Baku to pursue a more independent path. By leveraging its energy resources, modern military capabilities, and strong alliances, Azerbaijan is positioning itself as a leading regional power that is no longer bound by Moscow’s dictates.   Azerbaijan’s strategic pivot is not about severing ties with Moscow but about redefining its role in a multipolar world. The combination of energy diplomacy, the Zangezur Corridor initiative, and strong partnerships with Turkey, Israel, and the West reflects Baku’s determination to act as an autonomous and influential force in the South Caucasus.

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Actualité :- Algérie : règlements de comptes chez les janissaires- Boualem Sansal condamné à cinq années de prison pour avoir rappelé qu’avant la colonisation, l’ouest algérien était marocain - La CIJ donne raison à la Guinée Equatoriale dans son contentieux avec le Gabon au sujet des îles de Mbanié Dossier : L’embrasement du Sahel
Histoire :- Les Berbères ont toujours peuplé l'Afrique du Nord- Madagascar : l’insurrection de 1947 entre vérité et propagande
Editorial de Bernard Lugan
L’Algérie du Père Ubu
L’Algérie manque de tout. En dehors des hydrocarbures et des dattes, elle ne produit rien. Pas même le grain pour le couscous ou le concentré de tomates. Aussi, afin d’éviter l’explosion sociale, le gouvernement vient-il de légaliser la contrebande. Par le décret n°25-170 du 28 juin 2025, les « auto-importateurs », lire les « trafiquants-entrepreneurs », sont désormais autorisés à importer jusqu’à 24.000 euros de marchandises par mois. Certes, mais comme il est interdit de sortir de son compte bancaire plus de 7.500 euros par an, le « trafiquant-entrepreneur » va donc acheter sur le marché parallèle ses euros à un taux deux fois supérieur au taux officiel. Début juillet, la Banque d’Algérie affichait ainsi un euro à un peu plus de 150 dinars quand le marché parallèle le proposait à un peu plus de 270 dinars.Puis, le « trafiquant-entrepreneur » va déposer ses précieux euros sur un compte régulier ouvert en devises, et sans que la banque l’interroge sur l’origine de cet argent.Or encore, dans ce royaume du Père Ubu qu’est l’Algérie, le décret du 28 juin 2025 impose aux auto-importateurs de ne pas être salariés, commerçants ou bénéficiaires d’aides sociales.Conclusion, seuls les inactifs sont donc autorisés à devenir officiellement « trafiquants-importateurs ».Mais comment des chômeurs ou des inactifs peuvent-ils justifier d’être porteurs de 24.000 euros en espèces ? En réalité, c’est le blanchiment et le recyclage des fonds occultes qui est donc désormais officiellement possible... Enfin, comme l’Algérie doit importer tout ce qui permet de nourrir, habiller, soigner et équiper sa malheureuse population, et alors que l’urgence serait de soutenir la diversification et les productions locales, des milliers de « trafiquants-entrepreneurs » vont donc achever de tuer ce qui reste de commerce licite puisque la contrebande officialisée est plus rentable que l’entreprise...
Dans ce numéro, un article est consacré à une découverte importante au sujet de l’indigénéité des Berbères. L’analyse génétique de deux momies naturelles datées de 7000 ans montre ainsi que :
1) Ces proto-Berbères n’ont aucune trace génomique sud-saharienne, c’est-à-dire avec les actuelles populations noires.
2) Qu’ils sont génétiquement apparentés à l’homme de Taforalt qui vivait au Maroc il y a environ 15000 ans, et dont l’ADN ne montre aucune trace de gènes sudsahariens ou associés à des populations du Levant, mais qui, en revanche, avait des liens légers avec l’homme de Néandertal européen.
Comme ils remplissent tous les critères de l'ONU, à savoir l'antériorité, l'identité distincte, l'auto-identification par rapport au territoire, leur statut de Peuple autochtone qui est une évidence scientifique, vient encore d'être renforcé par la génétique.
Conclusion : les Berbères forment bien le socle ancien de la population de l’Afrique du Nord.
Pour en savoir plus, voir mon livre Histoire des Berbères des origines à nos jours.