Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Corinne Balleix propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Sarah Lamort, Europe, terre d’asile ? Défis de la protection des réfugiés au sein de l’Union européenne (PUF, 2016, 216 pages).
Dans un contexte où, depuis 2014, le système d’asile européen commun est ébranlé par une crise migratoire grave, le livre de Sarah Lamort arrive à point nommé. L’auteur, qui a également travaillé plusieurs années pour le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés en Turquie, prend ses distances vis-à-vis des discours militants accusant la politique d’asile européenne d’affaiblir le droit d’asile, et explore les relations complexes entre gestion des flux migratoires et promotion des droits de l’homme au travers de la politique d’asile européenne. Soulignant que l’Union européenne constitue au niveau mondial l’espace de protection le plus perfectionné, Sarah Lamort estime que la protection est inséparable du contrôle, l’État devant pouvoir identifier chaque personne qui sollicite sa protection.
Revenant sur la construction du régime d’asile européen commun, elle rappelle qu’il a pour objectif de répondre aux défis de la protection de l’espace Schengen et du shopping de l’asile, de l’interdépendance entre les systèmes d’asile des États membres, ainsi qu’à la question de la répartition équitable des charges de l’accueil des migrants.
S’agissant du partage des charges de l’asile, plusieurs systèmes sont envisageables, selon le nombre d’États qui y participent, et ce qu’ils partagent (normes communes, répartition des personnes, redistribution des charges financières). À cet égard, les outils européens (règlement Dublin, relocalisation, directive « Protection temporaire ») ont montré leurs limites.
Est ensuite analysé le phénomène de la sanctuarisation de l’espace commun d’asile, qui a pour objectif de partager les charges de l’accueil avec des pays tiers. Cette sanctuarisation doit toutefois respecter les principes de la convention de Genève : le non-refoulement et la non-pénalisation des entrées irrégulières. L’Union européenne répond à ce défi par les procédures d’asile à la frontière et l’intégration des questions d’asile dans l’action extérieure de l’UE – programmes de réinstallation, recherche de voies légales d’accès à l’asile dans l’UE, programmes nationaux ou régionaux de protection dans les pays tiers, ces dernières options pouvant soulever des difficultés si on les considère comme des alternatives, et non des compléments, à l’accueil des demandes d’asile spontanées en Europe.
Enfin, l’ouvrage présente le cas de l’extra-territorialisation de l’asile en Turquie, où la capacité de l’UE à influencer le système d’asile turc diminue parallèlement aux perspectives d’adhésion de ce pays à l’UE.
L’auteur conclut que le renforcement des frontières extérieures de l’Union rend l’espace européen de protection plus difficilement accessible. La relation de protection et de contrôle exercée par un État sur un individu, éventuellement hors du territoire de l’UE, au travers de systèmes d’information numériques et biométriques, fait du demandeur d’asile un objet de contrôle en réseau, mais aussi un sujet de droits en réseau, dont le statut méritait des recherches plus approfondies.
L’ouvrage, qui a reçu le prix Le Monde de la recherche universitaire 2016 et celui des Droits de l’homme de la ville de Lyon 2014, se fonde sur une analyse de l’Europe de l’asile close en septembre 2013. Le cadre proposé permet cependant d’éclairer utilement la crise actuelle du régime d’asile européen, et offre des pistes de réflexion précieuses pour les chercheurs et praticiens quant à la réforme de ce régime.
Corinne Balleix
Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson concluded his visit to China earlier this month, meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and pledging to his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, that relations between the two countries would be based on “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.”
The statement by Tillerson is a Chinese concept, first put forth by Beijing in 2010, perhaps in an effort to avoid the much-quoted “Thucydides trap”, after a theory developed by an Athenian historian after the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens. The “Thucydides trap” simply says that a rising power causes fear in an established superpower which escalates toward war.
Tillerson’s seemingly easy endorsement of a Chinese phrase is in sharp contrast to the previous Obama administration’s refusal to do so, largely because the term “mutual respect” was seen as implying that other nations should respect China’s “core interests,” including Beijing’s claims to the East and South China Seas.
Tillerson’s acquiescence to the phrase also contrasts with his testimony during the confirmation process, when the aspiring secretary of state sent this confrontational message to Beijing: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”
During that testimony, he also reiterated Beijing’s building and placing military equipment on the contested South China Sea islands were “illegal actions” and “extremely worrisome,” arguing “They’re taking territory or control, or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China’s,” while adding the territorial grabs were “akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine.
Of course, with his latest comments, Chinese and foreign media were quick to jump on the apparent reversal of Tillerson’s earlier hawkish statements and serve their respective readerships. The Global Times, a state-owned nationalist tabloid, referred to “analysts believing that this means Tillerson has implicitly endorsed the new model of major power relations.”
The critics from the Western media also pounced, with the Washington Post running the headline: “In China Debut, Tillerson Appears to Hand Beijing a Diplomatic Victory.” Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued Tillerson’s acceptance of “mutual respect” translates into “the US is in effect saying that it accepts that China has no room to compromise on these issues.”
With Xi Jinping praising the U.S. Secretary of State’s comments: “You said that China-US relations can only be friendly,” adding, “I express my appreciation for this,” Tillerson has chosen to save face for his Beijing hosts. His face-saving gesture may be an effort not to rock the boat in the days preceding the planned Trump-Xi summit in April.
Yet if we are to take Tillerson’s and Trump’s previous statements at face value, the foreign policy they will adopt toward China will unlikely be one of ‘non-conflict”. One skeptic is Shi Yinhong, director of the Center for American Studies at the Renmin University of China. “Tillerson said these words because Trump wants to create a friendly atmosphere and environment for the upcoming summit,” according to Shi.
For despite the pleasantries offered by Tillerson to his hosts, the Trump administration has plans for a huge new arms sale to Taiwan, officials are preparing measures to punish Chinese trade practices in the automotive industry, and Tillerson has said that military force might be an option should North Korea persist with its development of nuclear weapons. Trump may want to create a friendly atmosphere for the upcoming summit, but if these issues are still on the table in April, the practice of saving face may be swept aside.
The post Tillerson Gives Beijing Face appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
The Trump Administration’s budget proposal cuts 28% from the State Department’s funding, reducing foreign aid and de-funding a range of programs. The plan’s well-known focus on the military, and the absence of discussion of detail, or entitlements, lead many to view the so-called “skinny budget” primarily as a statement of intent.
Still, presidential expressions carry clout. In any case life will not return to what it was before the inauguration, no matter how many terms President Trump serves, or who may follow him. Disruptive as the budget plan is, State should take the opportunity to contemplate its mission, and how to fulfill it in the long run with reduced resources.
Secretary Tillerson, in a letter to the Department speaks of programs, more efficient execution, and national and economic security. These are familiar formulas for hard-power advocates and aid staffers alike. But is State’s purpose defined by programs and by security?
State is the home of the diplomatic service. This blogger gained an insight during a Foreign Service posting in Brazil in 1991. The Brazilian government ran a publicity campaign on children’s welfare, asking for assistance from foreigners, including the U.S., who had cited them for human rights abuses. I was directed to mount a “juvenile justice” program with no funds.
When I protested the assignment’s impossibility to a colleague, his encouragement was that this was a chance to practice ”pure diplomacy.” Introducing a few U.S.-based experts and Embassy staff to Brazilian agencies and NGOs, it turned out, successfully showed sympathy with Brazil’s challenges while standing by our policy. My annual review credited me with starting a program, but really what I did was carry out a U.S. answer to Brazil’s diplomatic “put up or shut up” challenge.
Diplomacy is what puts a context around military action, aid, PR programs, or even inaction, regarding issues of economic and national security—and everything else. We need to set a narrative of our motives and concerns whether we are fighting a war or doing nothing at all. The nature of the function has been obscure to professionals and public alike for decades, hence my citation for starting a program rather than executing diplomacy. If State’s budget cuts any number of programs and aid efforts, the diplomatic mission still remains vital. Furthermore the function is not expensive; if State will now have to practice more pure diplomacy, the Department should re-focus on delivering it.
Diplomacy’s basic currency is credibility, which rests on consistency of words with actions, and coherence of national policy. For it, the U.S. diplomat today needs a durable picture of our core national interest. During the Cold War, U.S. diplomats knew that the Containment Doctrine explained almost any actions of our government. Since we lost that focus, U.S. policy has reacted to crises, such as terrorism, and veered between political priorities, from trade liberalization to climate policy to energy independence to women’s rights.
Given today’s volatile politics and a swirling internet-connected world, Containment’s consistency will not be replaced any time soon. We must be able to name a core interest that can fit shifting priorities, more fundamental than partisan politics, drawn in our own terms rather than in reaction to adversaries or crises.
The post-modern world does not only disrupt American foreign policy. Any nation’s priorities are perpetually overtaken by events, discoveries, and new voices. Many are turning for guidance to traditions of ethnicity, religion, or nationalism. The U.S. does not have this option. Individual Americans carry such old markers of personal identity, but our nation was conceived on principle, invoked by our founders as they divorced their ethnic homeland.
Our founding creed, voiced in the Declaration of Independence, is the source of America’s legitimacy, the national beacon and bedrock of a U.S. diplomat’s credibility. To re-hone its diplomatic mission, State must create a body of people expert in the creed’s meaning, who are able to transmit it in policy.
Knowing the creed rigorously takes a rare understanding. It is abstract, enumerating minimal, overarching concepts. It is paradoxical, as free individuals do abuse each other, and government charged to secure rights must restrain itself—and also some individuals. Its words alone cannot guide policy in the flesh, yet their meaning has grown ever more real in our society as we have developed, strained, and fought among ourselves. It is both eternal and fragile: the words shape our view for any circumstances in any times, but we must perpetually prove both our commitment to open-ended rights and our competence to meet people’s needs.
Capturing the creed in policy and diplomacy will require a specialized skill, as distinct as military expertise. The diplomat must be aware that an abstract creed admits of multiple interpretations. They must be ready to agonize over the proper mix of prudence and ideals, and able to translate choices into policy. An extensive and intensive course of professional formation will be needed. It will have to integrate studies of praxis, social sciences, and history; deep immersion in the philosophy and nuances of our creed; grounding experiences in the realities of American life; and personal preparation for the dilemmas and stresses of applying our paradoxical creed in a complex world.
A diplomatic service formed in this light will represent us, their sovereign, by our true national nature. It will also carry our values into policy-making, via the diplomats’ role in interagency processes. As the desk for America’s founding values in our government, and as America’s face to others, they can imbue our actions with our creed.
In the diplomatic function, explicitly oriented to this core national interest, State can revive its mission and guide policy, to keep America true to our founding. If there are programs and actions to be managed, diplomacy will set them in context and support them; if resources limit those, diplomacy will express our motives. As a response to the proposed budget, this re-focus can bring benefit out of shock. The focus is needed, whatever the budget.
The post Diplomacy As A Budget Friendly Program? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Jean-Loup Samaan propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Paul Rogers, Irregular War: ISIS and the New Threat from the Margins (I.B. Tauris, 2016, 224 pages).
Auteur prolifique, Paul Rogers propose ici une réinterprétation du phénomène Daech comme conséquence des dysfonctionnements du système international contemporain. Si la majeure partie des travaux consacrés au groupe terroriste a jusqu’ici étudié sa genèse irakienne et syrienne, Paul Rogers affirme que l’État islamique (EI) est aussi l’expression de ce qu’il nomme « les révoltes de la marge » (revolts from the margins). Les formes du terrorisme moderne tel que l’EI seraient un symptôme du dérèglement du système international, un système marqué par l’aggravation des inégalités économiques, le renforcement d’élites transnationales déconnectées des réalités locales et une dégradation des conditions environnementales. « D’autres exemples [que l’EI] incluent des groupes islamistes tels que Boko Haram, le front Al-Nosra, mais aussi la rébellion néomaoïste naxalite en Inde ainsi que dans un passé récent, les néomaoïstes du Népal et le Sentier lumineux au Pérou », précise-t-il dans le premier chapitre.
Pour étayer sa thèse, l’auteur retrace le développement des inégalités économiques à l’échelle mondiale, soulignant que la croissance des grands pays du Sud a été, à partir des années 1980, avant tout destinée au profit des élites locales. Non seulement les autorités nationales ont failli à leur mission publique, mais l’incapacité des organisations internationales – ONU, OMC, OIT – à endiguer ce phénomène enrichit le terreau pour les « révoltes de la marge ». À cela s’ajoutent la détérioration de l’écosystème et ses implications pour la sécurité alimentaire.
Le lecteur de Politique étrangère pourra rester dubitatif devant l’argument de l’auteur qui renvoie, peu ou prou, à une lecture marxiste des relations internationales. Cette originalité fait toutefois l’intérêt de l’ouvrage. Dans un style agréable, Paul Rogers excelle à mettre en relation les tendances climatiques, l’évolution du système économique international et les guerres d’Irak et d’Afghanistan. Son chapitre sur les divergences de narratifs entre les États-Unis et l’Europe d’une part, et les populations du Moyen-Orient ou d’Asie du Sud d’autre part, est particulièrement bien mené et souligne les dommages causés par les guerres récentes sur la perception de l’Occident dans les régions considérées.
Si la thèse de Paul Rogers est originale et séduisante, elle n’est pas toujours convaincante. L’auteur semble parfois se perdre dans sa théorie englobante, lorsqu’il veut établir une corrélation entre les « révoltes de la marge » et l’évolution de l’art de la guerre. Ainsi les chapitres sur les armes de destruction massive et sur la guerre à distance menée grâce aux drones américains semblent-ils confus, peinant à convaincre de leur pertinence. Par ailleurs, la grille de lecture proposée par l’auteur n’explique pas le phénomène d’attraction du groupe Daech dans des populations jeunes et européennes qui n’appartiennent pas toujours à « la marge ». La « révolte des marginaux » qui serait engendrée par les inégalités économiques et l’insécurité alimentaire ne nous aide guère à comprendre comment de jeunes Français, parfois issus de la classe moyenne, parfois parfaitement insérés socialement et économiquement, en viennent à basculer dans la radicalisation.
Dans cette perspective, cet ouvrage déçoit quelque peu. Si la thèse initiale permet d’ouvrir des réflexions nouvelles, qui dépassent la simple analyse militaro-centrée de Daech et du Moyen-Orient, la démonstration qui en découle reste incomplète.
Jean-Loup Samaan
Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently concluded a trip to Asia which included visits to Japan, South Korea, and China. With respect to the Chinese leg of the tour, the North Korean crisis and trade were among the many issues discussed between the two sides. As the North Korean situation has proved particularly intractable over several decades, perhaps more novel solutions need to be investigated. One of these solutions may be a proposal for a permanent, non-aligned stance for a unified Korea in order to allay the security concerns of the great powers within the region.
Ghosts of Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD)To combat the increasing range of North Korean ballistic missiles following the most recent test, the U.S. has begun deployment of its THAAD system to not only better protect itself from possible attack, but also to protect its South Korean and Japanese allies as well. However, THAAD deployment has been highly controversial due to the capability of its X-band radar component to surveil deep into both Chinese and Russian territory. This ability not only has the potential to upset the existing regional balance of power within Northeast Asia itself, but global security as a whole as the THAAD radar would impact both Chinese and Russian missile strike capabilities against the U.S. proper.
Most likely, this will simply lead to an accelerated arms race by both China and Russia focused on newer missile technology in order compensate for the THAAD radar capabilities. This security dilemma reflects China’s stance that it simply is not possible to have “perfect” security for oneself, while simultaneously denying the legitimate security concerns of others. Additionally, this stance was a major impetus behind China’s endorsement of Kazakhstan’s Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) initiative.
China has also proposed its own “double cancellation” deal in order to resolve the North Korean dilemma. This proposal would involve the cessation of North Korean missile tests in exchange for the termination of joint U.S.-South Korean military drills in the region. Unfortunately, the proposal is considered infeasible by the U.S. as it wouldn’t allow it to fulfill its treaty obligations to South Korea. These regional drills affect Russia’s security interests in the area as well and are surely a factor in Russia’s recent deployment of troops to the Kuril Islands, further inflaming ties with both Japan and the U.S.
The Cold War Never Truly EndedPivoting back to Europe, yet another security dilemma affecting Russia may hold an answer to the North Korean situation, namely the Ukraine Crisis. While the Ukraine Crisis may not have lasted as long as the situation on the North Korean peninsula, it is sure as equally intractable. The two situations are also similar in other ways. Whereas the Six-Party Talks have failed to provide a permanent solution with respect to North Korea, the Minsk Agreements have had little to no effect in resolving the underlying security concerns of the parties involved. Additionally, both situations are legacies of the Cold War, further proving that a war’s end can have long-lasting effects on both “winners” and “losers” alike.
Several advocates of realism in international relations have proposed that only a Ukraine that professes permanent neutrality between The West and Russia can hope to solve the Ukraine Crisis. These advocates, including Dr. John Mearsheimer of The University of Chicago, maintain that only such a solution will permanently address the underlying strategic issues currently dividing The West and Russia. There is historical precedent here as well, as neutrality for a re-unified Germany was the original condition proposed by the Former Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War.
While such a corresponding solution to the North Korean situation may indeed be labelled as “radical”, with details sketchy, surely now is the time for radical thinking given that the U.S. has clearly stated that its policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea is now over and is also stating that “all options are on the table”. In theory, such a solution has the potential to allay the legitimate security concerns of China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. Both China and the South Korean people as a whole have repeatedly favored continued dialogue with North Korea as opposed to “other options”.
Lastly, and most importantly, a unified and permanently neutral Korea may not only be the key to Korea’s re-emergence as a great power within the region itself, but ultimately is a question that the Korean people (and no one else) have to decide for themselves.
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