The Rohingya did not choose dependency on aid. It was created by the restrictions surrounding them. Credit: UNHCR/Amanda Jufrian
By Mohammed Zonaid
COX’S BAZAR, Bangladesh, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)
While global attention right now is on escalating geopolitical tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, another crisis continues quietly in Bangladesh.
Beginning April 1, 2026, the World Food Programme (WFP) introduced a revised Targeting and Prioritisation Exercise (TPE) for Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, according to a statement released by the United Nations in Bangladesh on April 2.
Under the new system, refugee households will receive food assistance of $12, $10, or $7 per person per month, depending on their assessed level of food insecurity. Previously, all refugees received $12 per person.
On paper, vulnerability-based targeting appears reasonable. In many humanitarian crises, such systems help ensure that limited resources reach those most in need. However, the Rohingya context is different.
Nearly nine years after fleeing genocide and persecution in Myanmar, more than one million Rohingya refugees remain confined to camps in Bangladesh, according to the latest data from UNHCR Bangladesh including 144,456 biometrically identified new arrivals and 1,040,408 Registered refugees 1990s & post-2017. 78% them are Women and children.
Unlike refugees in many other countries, Rohingya in Bangladesh have extremely limited freedom of movement and cannot legally work or run small businesses within the camps. Refugees are also not formally employed by humanitarian organizations—except as volunteers receiving small daily allowances. As a result, they remain almost entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance.
Within this context, reducing aid raises serious concerns. When refugees are not permitted to engage in meaningful economic activity, food insecurity becomes less a household condition and more a structural outcome.
Humanitarian agencies have provided life-saving support for years, and their efforts should not be overlooked. But survival is not the same as stability. Instead of creating pathways toward self-reliance for Rohingya and local communities in Cox’s Bazar who are affected due to refugee statements, the current system has largely institutionalized dependency.
Many programs labeled as “livelihood initiatives” have not produced meaningful outcomes. Skills training programs—such as electrical repair or other technical courses—often fail to translate into real opportunities because refugees do not own motorbikes, electricity access is limited in many camp areas, refugees cannot legally move beyond the camps to seek work, and humanitarian organizations don’t employ trained refugees within their own operational structures.
This raises difficult questions: Why invest donor resources in skills that cannot realistically be applied? And what long-term strategy do these initiatives serve?
The new targeting model categorizes refugees as extremely food insecure, highly food insecure, or food insecure. Some vulnerable households—such as those led by elderly individuals, persons with disabilities, or children—will continue receiving the highest level of assistance.
Yet the broader reality remains unchanged: the entire Rohingya population in Bangladesh faces severe restrictions on economic participation.
Recent protests in the camps are often described as reactions to ration reductions. In reality, they reflect deeper concerns about uncertainty and the absence of long-term planning. Refugees are asking a simple question: What happens if funding declines further in the future? Where will we go? Well Bangladesh alone will be left dealing with the Rohingya crisis?
They want to send a message to the world: dependency on aid was designed around the Rohingya. It is time to think beyond relief and give them the tools to stand on their own feet.
Long-term strategic thinking is urgently needed. This includes serious discussions about ensuring safe and dignified lives in the camps until the Rohingya are able to return to Myanmar, expanding economic participation for refugees, and creating policies that allow them to contribute economically while remaining under appropriate regulation.
At the same time, Bangladesh itself is going through a transitional period after the election, and the new government and said it will work closely to make Rohingya repatriation possible and shared data on 8.29 lakh Rohingyas with Myanmar.
But the Rohingya crisis cannot be a lesser priority, the new government also needs to recognize that prolonged displacement cannot be managed indefinitely through restriction and relief alone—the same approach that largely characterized the policies of the previous government.
Carefully regulated work opportunities—such as camp-based enterprises, pilot employment schemes, or limited work authorization programs—could help reduce humanitarian dependency while preserving government oversight.
If even one or two members of each refugee household were allowed to work legally under controlled frameworks, humanitarian costs could gradually decline, camp economies could stabilize, and youth frustration could decrease.
Most importantly, dignity could begin to return.
After nearly nine years, international agencies have managed one of the world’s largest refugee operations with remarkable logistical capacity. Yet the central question remains: what durable systems have been created to help refugees stand on their own feet?
As global funding pressures increase and donor fatigue grows, humanitarian assistance is being recalibrated downward. Without structural reforms, this risks managing dependency more efficiently rather than reducing it.
The Rohingya did not choose dependency on aid. It was created by the restrictions surrounding them. Food assistance remains essential. But the future of an entire population cannot be defined solely by ration cards and vulnerability categories.
The Rohingya crisis requires more than improved targeting of aid. It requires policies that combine protection with participation and living with safety.
The world has learned how to feed the Rohingya.
The real test is whether it will allow them to stand—until the day they can safely return home to Myanmar with rights, safety, and dignity.
Otherwise, families quietly reduce meals. Young people seek unsafe informal labor. The risks of child labor, early marriage, unsafe migration. and involvement in illicit activities increase. When opportunity disappears, desperation fills the gap.
Mohammed Zonaid is a Rohingya SOPA 2025 honoree, freelance journalist, award-winning photographer, and fixer. He works with international agencies and has contributed to Myanmar Now, The Arakan Express News, The Diplomat Magazine, Frontier Myanmar, Inter Press Service, and the Myanmar Pressphoto Agency.
IPS UN Bureau
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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)
Trump 2.0 has been marked by the blatantly aggressive exercise of power to secure US interests as defined by him. While many recent trends even predate his first term, his reduced use of ‘soft power’ has exposed his bullying, extortionary use of US power.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Rule of law?The US has illegally weaponised more laws and policies, especially by unilaterally imposing sanctions and tariffs, especially on dissenting regimes.
Often, such threats are not ends in themselves but actually weapons to strengthen the US bargaining position to secure more advantageous deals.
Under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, members are obliged to extend ‘most favoured nation’ status to all other member nations.
On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced supposedly ‘reciprocal tariffs’, ostensibly responding to others having trade surpluses with the US.
Appealing to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is futile, as the US has blocked the appointment of Appellate Body members since the Obama presidency.
Trump 2.0 has also been trying to get rich investors and governments – mainly from Europe, Japan, and the oil-rich Gulf states – to invest in the US.
Most such investments are in financial markets, rather than the real economy. Such portfolio investments have propped up asset prices, even bubbles.
Trump’s bullying is resented but has not been very effective vis-à-vis strong adversaries. Consequently, allies have been most affected and resentful.
Deepening stagflation
Meanwhile, much of the world economy has never really recovered from the COVID-19 slowdown, while Western sanctions and tariffs have raised production costs, worsening inflation.
Recent trends have also deepened the stagnation since 2009. Many governments and the IMF have made things worse by cutting spending when most needed.
Impacts have varied, generally worse in poorer countries, where the IMF limits policy options and credit rating agencies raise borrowing costs.
US Fed chair Powell’s interest rate hikes, ostensibly to address inflation, also reversed ‘quantitative easing’, which had lowered interest rates from 2009.
Trump’s aggression has reduced economic engagement with the US, inadvertently accelerating de-dollarisation, thus undermining the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’.
Central banks worldwide have responded predictably, refusing to be counter-cyclical in the face of economic slowdown, citing inflationary pressures.
Transactional?
Trump’s transactional approach has meant bilateral, one-on-one dealings, further advantaging the world’s dominant power.
Involving one-time asymmetric ‘zero-sum games’, such transactions ensure the US gains, necessarily at the expense of the ‘other’. Transactionalism also enables ‘buying influence’, or corruption.
The resulting uncertainty reduces investments, not only in the US, but everywhere, due to greater perceived risks, exacerbating the stagnation. Thus, Trump 2.0 policies have reduced investment and growth.
The whole world, including the US, has suffered much ‘collateral damage’, but the White House seems content as long as others lose more.
Unipolar sovereigntism
The transitions to unipolar sovereigntism and then to a multipolar world have been much debated.
Three decades ago, the influential US Council on Foreign Relations’ journal, Foreign Affairs, argued that the post-Cold War unipolar world was actually ‘sovereigntist’.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s ‘Daddy’ reference to Trump suggests that the sovereigntist moment is not quite over, as the US ‘No Kings’ mobilisation suggests.
Trump’s ‘America First’ clearly opposes multilateralism, generating broader concerns. He has withdrawn the US from many, but not all, multilateral bodies.
On January 7, the US withdrew from 66 international organisations deemed “wasteful, ineffective, or harmful”, addressing issues it claimed were “contrary” to national interests.
Trump’s continued, selective use of multilateral bodies has served him well, retaining privileges, e.g., permanent membership of the UN Security Council with veto power.
The UN Security Council’s Gaza ceasefire resolution was used to create and legitimise his Board of Peace, now touted by some as an alternative to the UN!
Trump will not withdraw from the WTO as its Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement is key to US tech bros’ trillions from transnational IP.
End of soft power
Some of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 20th remarks at Davos are telling:
“More recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.
“You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination… If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”
Besides exercising overwhelming military superiority, Trump 2.0 has increasingly weaponised rules, agreements and economic relations to its advantage.
The abandonment of ‘soft power’ – accelerated by Elon Musk’s DOGE – has ripped the velvet glove off US ‘hegemony’, exposing the mailed fist beneath.
USAID and other US government-funded agencies and programmes have been crucial for soft power, fostering the illusion of domination with consent. Abandoning soft power may well increase the costs of achieving America First.
IPS UN Bureau
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By CIVICUS
Apr 13 2026 (IPS)
CIVICUS discusses recent regressive changes to Argentina’s labour laws with Facundo Merlán Rey, an activist with the Coordination Against Police and Institutional Repression (CORREPI), an organisation that defends workers’ rights and resists state repression.
Facundo Merlán Rey
Argentina has just passed the most significant changes to labour legislation in half a century. Driven by President Javier Milei following his victory in the October 2025 parliamentary election, the law profoundly changes the conditions for hiring and dismissing workers, extends the working day, restricts the right to strike and removes protections for workers in some occupations. The government says the measures will boost formal employment and investment, but trade unions and social organisations warn they erode decades of hard-won rights. The law has triggered four general strikes and numerous protests.What does the new law change and why did the government decide to push it through?
Capitalising on its victory in last year’s legislative election, which gave it a majority in both parliamentary chambers, the government pushed through a labour law that introduced changes on several fronts simultaneously.
It increases the daily maximum of working hours from eight to 12, with a weekly cap of 48. Hours worked beyond this limit no longer need to be paid separately, but can be accumulated and exchanged for days off at a later date.
It also introduces the concept of ‘dynamic wage’, allowing part of an employee’s pay to be determined based on merit or individual productivity. The employer can decide this unilaterally with no need for a collective agreement. This would allow two people to be paid differently for doing the same work.
The law creates the Labour Assistance Fund, an account to which the employer contributes three per cent of a worker’s salary, of which between one and 2.5 percentage points come from the worker’s pay. If dismissed, the worker receives the amount accumulated in that fund. This is deeply humiliating. It makes the worker contribute to the financing of their dismissal. Given that these contributions previously went into the pension system, the effect will also be to weaken pensions.
The law restricts the right to strike by expanding the list of occupations deemed essential, which means they are required to maintain at least 75 per cent of their operations during a strike. Previously, this category included air traffic control, electricity, gas, healthcare and water. Now it also includes customs, education at all levels except university, immigration, ports and telecommunications. In practice, this means that in these fields a strike will have a much more limited impact.
Finally, the law repeals the special regimes that regulated working conditions in some trades and professions. Over the next six months, hairdressers, private drivers, radio and telegraph operators and travelling salespeople will lose these protections. The Journalists’ Statute will be abolished from 2027 onwards.
At CORREPI, we believe all these measures are unconstitutional, as they directly contravene article 14 of the constitution, which guarantees the right to work and the right to decent living conditions. The changes put employers in a position of almost absolute dominance in an employment relationship, leaving workers with no real scope to defend their rights.
How have trade unions and social organisations reacted?
The most militant groups highlighted the problems with the new law clearly, but the response from the organised labour movement has been insufficient.
Union leaders responded with a belated and low-profile campaign plan. They have long been criticised for preferring discreet agreements to open confrontation, and this time was no different. They negotiated behind the scenes and secured concessions to protect themselves. The law maintains employers’ contributions to trade union health schemes and the union dues paid by workers for two years. The rights of workers as a whole were sidelined.
What impact are the changes having?
Although the law is already in force, its full implementation faces obstacles, partly because it has internal consistency issues that hinder its practical application. When the government attempts to apply it in employment areas that still retain rights, it will likely face legal challenges, which will increase social unrest.
Even so, some of its effects are already being felt. Unemployment is rising slowly but steadily. Factory closures, driven by the opening up of imports and the greater ease of dismissal, are pushing more workers into informal employment and multiple jobs. The result is a fall in consumption and a level of strain with outcomes that are difficult to predict.
The consequences extend beyond the economic sphere. Increasingly demanding working conditions, combined with high inflation and rising household debt, are taking a toll on workers’ mental health. Regrettably, there is already a worrying rise in the suicide rate.
There’s also a consequence that is harder to measure: this reform erodes the collective identity of workers. When work is informal, individuals tend to solve their problems on their own, making it much harder to organise to demand better conditions. In working-class neighbourhoods, drug trafficking is becoming established as an alternative source of employment, generating situations of violence that largely go unnoticed. Unfortunately, everything points to an ever-deepening social breakdown.
What lessons does this experience hold for the rest of the region?
Regional experience shows it is very difficult to reverse this kind of change. In Brazil, President Lula da Silva came to power in 2022 promising to repeal the labour law passed in 2017 under Michel Temer’s government, similarly opposed by social organisations and trade unions. However, he failed to do so, and the framework Temer left remains in force. Once passed, these laws tend to remain in place regardless of who governs next.
That’s why what’s happening in Argentina should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. The reform appears to be part of a broader direction that regional politics is taking under the influence of the USA, one of the main drivers of these changes and a supporter of the governments implementing them.
The weakening of labour rights and collective organising is not a side effect; it is the objective being pursued. Dismantling workers’ ability to organise collectively facilitates the advance of extractive and financial interests and guarantees access to cheap labour. In that sense, Argentina offers a warning to the rest of the region.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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SEE ALSO
‘Milei managed to capture social unrest and channel it through a disruptive political proposal’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Carlos Gervasoni 13.Dec.2025
‘Society must prepare to act collectively to defend rights and democracy’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Natalia Gherardi 27.Feb.2025
‘The state is abandoning its role as guarantor of access to rights’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Vanina Escales and Manuel Tufró 22.Jul.2024
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A motorcycle rider riding through flood in Kolkata, India. Cities should transform into sponges to absorb flood as part of climate adaptation. Credit: Pexels/Dibakar Roy
By Temily Baker, Leila Salarpour Goodarzi and Elisa Belaz
BANGKOK, Thailand, Apr 13 2026 (IPS)
As the Pacific recovers from a severe cyclone season and Asia braces for the monsoon, flood readiness has become a defining test of sustainable urban development.
The Asia and the Pacific 2026 SDG Progress Report signals a hard truth: while poverty reduction, health and basic infrastructure have advanced, the region is regressing on climate action, disaster resilience and biodiversity—areas now decisive for long-term development.
The widespread flooding across the region in November 2025 was not merely a weather event; it was a warning and a new baseline. From Hat Yai to Colombo, dense urban districts were underwater for days, exposing millions of people and billions in assets to cascading disruption.
Across the Asia-Pacific region, climate extremes are intensifying, increasing water inflow to drainage systems by over 53%. In coastal areas, flooding can halt transport, isolate communities, delay emergency response and lead to saltwater intrusion that damages agriculture and freshwater supplies.
ESCAP’s analysis (Figure 1) examines how these threats are expected to continue to increase in the region’s low-lying river deltas, small island nations and rapidly growing coastal cities. For example, Seenu Atoll in the Maldives is expected to face a six-fold jump in population exposure to coastal flooding by 2050.
Looking across the region, Jiangsu Province in China, West Bengal in India, Khula and Marisal Divisions of Bangladesh, and Bến Tre and Bạc Liêu Provinces of Viet Nam are all expected to see hundreds of thousands of people exposed along their respective coastlines in the next 25 years.
Figure 1 – Percentage of People Exposed to Coastal Flooding of 0.5 Meters and Above in States/Provinces Across the Asia-Pacific Region and in Atolls of the Maldives (2018 Baseline vs. 2050 RCP8.5).
In the face of these risks, cities become engines of growth only when they are resilient. So, why do many cities across the Asia-Pacific region find themselves underwater while others weathered the storm with far less disruption? The answer lies in whether cities treat rain as a resource or as waste
Traditional “grey” systems, such as pipes, pumps and channels, aim to move water out fast. In a nonstationary climate and denser urban fabric, this is no longer sufficient. Sponge city design blends green-blue-grey systems (permeable surfaces, parks, wetlands, bioswales, green corridors) with modernized drainage to capture, store, and safely release rainfall at the source.
China’s national Sponge City Initiative (launched in 2015) built on international practice and showed how integrated planning can retrofit districts and guide new growth to manage water where it falls. The logic is simple: expand infiltration and storage, reduce peak runoff and use engineered conveyance when and where needed.
Results from early adopters are tangible
In Wuhan, sponge city measures contributed to a 50% reduction in locations experiencing overflow and pipe overloading during high flow years. Over the life of assets, green-blue systems can cost significantly less than like-for-like grey expansions, while delivering co-benefits that traditional drains cannot: cooler neighborhoods, improved air quality, biodiversity and accessible public space.
For cities facing rising loss and damage under SDG 11.5 (deaths, affected people and economic losses), sponge city programmes generate a resilience dividend—not just a flood fix.
Sponge city thinking is also evolving toward smart hybrid infrastructure
Nature-based systems are being coupled with engineered assets and digital tools, such as digital twins, to model urban hydrology and optimize performance in real time, enabling city planners to simulate rainfall scenarios, forecast flood hotspots and manage infrastructure adaptively, thereby improving the effectiveness of sponge-city interventions.
This pairing turns static drainage into adaptive urban water management, essential as rainfall intensity and patterns shift, reducing and managing risk through early warning, community preparedness and basin scale controls.
Urban resilience is also ecological
The Asia-Pacific region is home to an estimated 30–40% of the world’s wetlands, yet only around 22% are formally protected. As wetland buffers are drained or reclaimed, cities lose natural absorption, filtration and surge moderation, just as extremes intensify. Protecting and restoring urban and peri-urban wetlands is therefore core infrastructure policy, reinforcing SDG 15 while directly advancing SDGs 11.5 and 13.1.
Sponge city approaches are not a panacea. Their effectiveness can be constrained by governance capacity, implementation scale and maintenance requirements, land availability and high-density development. They must therefore be complemented by robust end-to-end early warning systems and coordinated disaster risk management frameworks.
To this end, ESCAP supports countries across the region by providing regional and national risk analytics through its Risk and Resilience Portal, enabling policymakers to integrate climate and disaster information directly into development planning.
These analyses and tools are tailored to regional and country needs, such as ClimaCoast, which focuses on coastal multi-hazard and socio-economic exposures. These initiatives are complemented by targeted financing from the Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness, through programmes that strengthen coastal resilience in Asia and the Pacific. Together, these initiatives aim to reverse the current regression in resilience related SDG targets and help safeguard sustainable development in the region’s high risk hotspots.
Asia and the Pacific region can no longer rely on drainage systems built for a different climate and century. By adopting sponge city principles, Asia Pacific cities can embed resilience into everyday urban life—a development imperative, not just a technical shift.
Strengthening urban resilience is essential to advancing SDG 11 and SDG 13 and protecting hard won development gains that too often wash away when floods strike.
Temily Baker is Programme Management Officer, ESCAP; Leila Salarpour Goodarzi is Associate Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP and Elisa Belaz is Consultant, ESCAP
IPS UN Bureau
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El kell dönteni, hogy mi a fontos és mi a nem fontos, és persze el kell dönteni, hogy mi mennyire fontos. Ideális esetben a védelmi szféra a szuverén nemzeti létezés - rosszabb esetben az arra irányuló remény - alapvető intézményrendszere. Állapota annak tükre. Következésképp sem szolgalelkűségnek-önfeladásnak, sem öncélnak-kisajátításnak nem a terepe ugye.
Addig is, ha nem vagy képes háborúzni, keresd a békét.
Zord
La route des Balkans reste toujours l'une des principales voies d'accès l'Union européenne, pour les exilés du Proche et du Moyen Orient, d'Afrique ou d'Asie. Alors que les frontières Schengen se ferment, Frontex se déploie dans les Balkans, qui sont toujours un « sas d'accès » à la « forteresse Europe ». Notre fil d'infos en continu.
- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Bulgarie, Questions européennes, Populations, minorités et migrations, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Turquie, Grèce, Moldavie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Slovénie, Roumanie, Serbie, Gratuit, Grèce immigrationLes perturbations du trafic aérien et la hausse des coûts de transport liées au conflit au Moyen-Orient pourraient modifier les flux touristiques en Europe. La Croatie et l'Albanie apparaissent comme des alternatives attractives, tandis que le Monténégro et la Grèce pourraient être plus exposés aux incertitudes du secteur.
- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Tourisme balkans, Guerre Moyen Orient, Albanie, Croatie, Grèce, Monténégro, Economie, Une - Diaporama - En premierLes perturbations du trafic aérien et la hausse des coûts de transport liées au conflit au Moyen-Orient pourraient modifier les flux touristiques en Europe. La Croatie et l'Albanie apparaissent comme des alternatives attractives, tandis que le Monténégro et la Grèce pourraient être plus exposés aux incertitudes du secteur.
- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Tourisme balkans, Guerre Moyen Orient, Albanie, Croatie, Grèce, Monténégro, Economie, Une - Diaporama - En premierLes perturbations du trafic aérien et la hausse des coûts de transport liées au conflit au Moyen-Orient pourraient modifier les flux touristiques en Europe. La Croatie et l'Albanie apparaissent comme des alternatives attractives, tandis que le Monténégro et la Grèce pourraient être plus exposés aux incertitudes du secteur.
- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Tourisme balkans, Guerre Moyen Orient, Albanie, Croatie, Grèce, Monténégro, Economie, Une - Diaporama - En premierLes perturbations du trafic aérien et la hausse des coûts de transport liées au conflit au Moyen-Orient pourraient modifier les flux touristiques en Europe. La Croatie et l'Albanie apparaissent comme des alternatives attractives, tandis que le Monténégro et la Grèce pourraient être plus exposés aux incertitudes du secteur.
- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Tourisme balkans, Guerre Moyen Orient, Albanie, Croatie, Grèce, Monténégro, Economie, Une - Diaporama - En premierFin mai 2025, des attentats racistes visaient des mémoriaux juifs, des synagogues et des mosquées à Berlin et Paris. Momčilo Gajić, un ressortissant serbe soupçonné d'avoir coordonné ces actes de vandalisme, se trouverait aujourd'hui en Russie.
- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Serbie, Défense, police et justice, Une - Diaporama