Afghan media workers face growing restrictions under Taliban rule, with women journalists pushed further from reporting, broadcasting and public visibility. Credit: Learning Together.
By External Source
KABUL, Jun 11 2026 (IPS)
Afghanistan ranks 175th in the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index this year. Out of 180 countries on the list, only Iran, Syria, China, North Korea and Eritrea ranked lower than Afghanistan.
Arrests narrow opportunities for workThe Taliban’s arrests and imprisonment of journalists have further narrowed opportunities for journalism.
Several prominent journalists are currently in prison. They include Shakib Ahmad Nazari, who is reportedly being held for collaborating with international media outlets. He was arrested in 2025 and sentenced to three years in prison according to sources.
Spokespersons for government ministries and agencies are reluctant to speak to female journalists and often do not even provide basic information or short statements. In the past, we had to sit in the last row of benches at press conferences, but recently we have not even been allocated seats anymore
Hamid Farhadi, a prominent freelance journalist, was arrested in September 2024 while working for foreign media outlets and the Afghan Etilaat Roz media outlet. He was sentenced to two years in prison. According to the human rights organization Amnesty International, Farhadi was sentenced without right to legal representation.
His arrest was allegedly related to a report he made for foreign media outlets about the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan.
The media in Afghanistan is overseen by the Taliban-run Audit Commission. Journalist and former member of the commission, Bashir Hatef, was arrested in 2025 for collaborating with foreign media and sentenced to two years in prison.
Self-censorship has become a daily routine
The arrests of male journalists, however, pale in comparison to the situation of female journalists, who face professional restrictions and are subject to gender-based discrimination. Over the past four years, many have been threatened, arrested, banned from work or treated violently.
Samandar (name changed) has 13 years of experience in television and radio. According to her, journalists currently do not have the right to criticize the Taliban, officials or state institutions.
Journalists are also not able to choose their guests freely. Only experts approved by the Taliban can be invited to programs that cover politics. Regular street interviews are practically impossible.
“We are forced to self-censor or our employer gets into trouble and we are threatened with imprisonment. So we remove criticism of the Taliban from our programs,” says Samandar.
Self-censorship is also visible in practice. A well-known television channel in Kabul – whose name will not be revealed for security reasons – was planning a program on the role of women journalists in communication.
Everything was ready and guests had been invited. However, the program had to be canceled because it was feared that the discussion would cause problems for both the channel and the guests.
Female journalists face double restrictions
Salma (name changed) is a female journalist with a journalism degree and nine years of work experience. She describes how spokespersons for government ministries and agencies are reluctant to speak to female journalists and often do not even provide basic information or short statements.
Routine press conference arrangements have also changed, she says. “In the past, we had to sit in the last row of benches at press conferences, but recently we have not even been allocated seats anymore.”
According to her, separate rooms have been built for women, from where they can follow the events but not participate in them equally.
“A partition has been erected in the hall, and we are forced to sit in a separate booth. We can only listen to the speeches of officials but are not allowed to ask questions.”
Even when questions are allowed in exceptional cases, limits are placed on what can be asked. “On rare occasions, when questions are allowed, we are not allowed to ask anything critical.”
Questions can only be asked at certain events where Taliban-approved officials, such as Zabihullah Mujahid, are present. He is considered somewhat more flexible in his approach to female journalists.
According to Salma, the restrictions do not end there. Movement and work are closely monitored.
“At press conferences, officials from the Taliban’s Ministry of Virtue and Prevention of Vice demand to know who we are with and whether we have a male escort.”
Salma also criticizes news directors who favor male journalists. According to her, it is well known in newsrooms that women are practically prevented from doing normal journalistic work and that Taliban representatives do not want to talk to female journalists.
“In most media outlets, we are not treated as employees but rather as interns who are paid only for our travel expenses. The media outlets take advantage of the restrictions imposed by the Taliban on female journalists.”
According to Salma, many women accept the situation because there are few options.
“In addition to the restrictions imposed by the Taliban, we are forced to tolerate this abuse so that we are not completely excluded from editorial and media work.”
No more female journalists in many provinces
Due to Taliban restrictions, female journalists are required to be accompanied by a male guardian even when they are supposed to be at work elsewhere, which is often practically impossible. Some women have left their jobs for fear that their family members could be arrested.
A writer in Kandahar, “Shazia,” uses a pseudonym. According to her, the restrictions on interviews imposed by the Taliban have significantly changed the way they work.
Male colleagues conduct the interviews, and female journalists have to rely on their recordings when writing their articles. Male colleagues are not always willing to cooperate in situations when follow-up questions or supplementary interviews are needed for a story.
Articles written by women are often published under the names of male colleagues. Women’s voices are not even allowed to be heard on the radio.
According to Reporters Without Borders, four out of five female journalists and media workers in Afghanistan lost their positions after the Taliban returned to power.
Before August 2021, there were 2,490 women working in the media, of whom only about 410 continued to work after the Taliban took power. According to the organization, there are no active female journalists in 15 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.
Ban on image further tightens surveillance
Freedom of speech in Afghanistan is also significantly restricted by the ban on the display of images of living beings.
According to the Afghan Journalists Center, the ban is in force in at least 23 provinces. Reports indicate that many media outlets have been forced to switch to audio-only format and at least 20 television stations have been closed.
Dwindling female journalists work in the media industry
Recent data highlights the scale of decline in Afghanistan’s media workforce. According to Naeem (not real name), a member of association of media organization, there are currently 4,073 male journalists and 746 female journalists working across the country.
Another female journalist, Nabila (not real name) provided similar figures, estimating that more than 4,700 journalists remain active, around 700 of them women.
These figures reflect a sharp contraction compared to previous years. According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), there were previously around 700 women journalists working in Kabul alone; that number has now dropped to fewer than 100
Laila (name changed) was previously part of one of three women-led journalist associations and unions that supported female journalists before the Taliban returned to power.
She says none of these groups is active anymore. According to her, institutions and organizations can no longer be officially registered in women’s names under the Taliban regime.
The media sector in Afghanistan is also structurally restricted. There is no clear legal framework, live broadcasts are prohibited, the number of guests on programs is limited, and access to information is difficult.
Excerpt:
The author is an Afghanistan-based female journalist, trained with Finnish support before the Taliban take-over. Her identity is withheld for security reasonsDer Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins um 25 Basispunkte anzuheben. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):
Die EZB handelt richtig, wenn sie die Zinsen erhöht. Der starke Anstieg der Inflation infolge des Iran-Kriegs und der höheren Energiepreise zwingt sie zum Handeln. Auch wenn die EZB die Ursache dieses Preisschubs nicht bekämpfen kann, muss sie verhindern, dass die Inflationserwartungen von Unternehmen, Gewerkschaften und Finanzmärkten steigen. Es geht um das höchste Gut der EZB: ihre Glaubwürdigkeit.
Gleichzeitig ist diese Entscheidung mit erheblichen Risiken verbunden. Die Wirtschaft im Euroraum ist schwach, die deutsche Wirtschaft besonders verwundbar. Höhere Zinsen können Investitionen bremsen, Unternehmen zusätzlich belasten und das Rezessionsrisiko erhöhen. Die EZB befindet sich damit in einem echten Dilemma: Ihr Mandat verlangt Preisstabilität, die Konjunktur würde aber eher Entlastung brauchen.
Deshalb sollte die EZB vorsichtig vorgehen, sich nicht auf einen Zinspfad festlegen und sich alle Optionen offenhalten. Niemand weiß, wie lange der Iran-Krieg andauert, wie stark Energiepreise und Lieferketten belastet werden und wie die US-Notenbank reagiert. Flexibilität ist jetzt entscheidend.
Le 7 juin 2026, les Arméniens étaient appelés aux urnes pour élire leur Premier ministre. À l’issue du scrutin, Nikol Pachinian a été réélu avec 49,8 % des voix, loin devant le candidat pro-russe Samvel Karapetian, qui a obtenu 23,3 % des suffrages. Cette élection intervient dans un contexte marqué par de profonds bouleversements pour l’Arménie. La défaite face à l’Azerbaïdjan lors de la guerre de 2020, puis la reprise du Haut-Karabagh par Bakou en 2023, ont profondément marqué le pays et entraîné le déplacement massif de populations. Malgré leur alliance historique, Moscou n’est pas intervenu pour empêcher la perte de l’enclave, alimentant une forte défiance à l’égard de la Russie au sein de la société arménienne. Dans quel contexte se sont déroulées les élections législatives en Arménie ? En quoi ce scrutin traduit-il une volonté du pays à prendre ses distances avec Moscou ? Un rapprochement avec l’Union européenne et les États-Unis est-il envisageable ? Enfin, quelles perspectives le résultat des élections ouvre-t-il pour la normalisation des relations entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan ? Le point avec Didier Billion, directeur adjoint de l’IRIS.
Quel est le contexte dans lequel se sont tenues les élections législatives en Arménie ?
L’Arménie sort de plusieurs années de fortes tensions qui ont traumatisé une grande partie de la population. Cela s’explique tout d’abord par la lourde défaite militaire face à l’Azerbaïdjan en 2020, puis la reprise du Haut-Karabagh par celui-ci en 2023 qui entraina le départ de 100 000 à 120 000 Karabakhiens dont une majorité se réfugie en Arménie.
Plus récemment, la guerre israélo-étatsunienne contre l’Iran voisine aggrave les inquiétudes, même si l’Arménie n’a pas été touchée par les combats. Les relations économiques avec la République islamique ne sont certes pas significatives – moins de 4 % des échanges –, mais c’est en l’occurrence la frontière commune qui constitue une véritable ouverture et donc un enjeu stratégique vital pour un pays enclavé dont les frontières avec la Turquie et l’Azerbaïdjan sont fermées depuis de nombreuses années.
Enfin, si un texte traçant la perspective de la signature d’un accord de paix a été validé avec l’Azerbaïdjan en août 2025 à Washington sous l’égide de Donald Trump, il n’est pour l’instant pas ratifié par les parlements arménien et azerbaïdjanais.
Dans quelle mesure la réélection de Nikol Pachinian traduit-elle la volonté de la société arménienne de se détacher de l’influence russe ? Quelles pourraient être les conséquences sur les relations bilatérales entre Erevan et Moscou ? En quoi le résultat de ce scrutin pourrait-il renforcer les perspectives de rapprochement de l’Arménie avec l’Union européenne et les États-Unis ?
Le score obtenu par le Premier ministre sortant, Nikol Pachinian, affleurant les 50 % des suffrages exprimés, traduit un indéniable soutien à la politique qu’il mène, notamment au niveau régional. Une forte défiance à l’égard de la Russie est manifeste, notamment depuis les guerres de 2020 et 2023 au cours desquelles beaucoup d’Arméniens se sont sentis trahis en raison de la non-intervention de Moscou, en dépit du rôle de protecteur qu’il prétendait incarner depuis la proclamation de l’indépendance. Cette situation a abouti au gel de la participation de l’Arménie à l’Organisation du traité de sécurité collective (OTSC), organisation politico-militaire dominée par la Russie dont font partie plusieurs États anciennement membres de l’URSS. C’est aussi pourquoi Nikol Pachinian oriente avec précaution son pays vers les puissances occidentales.
Dans ce contexte Moscou n’a pas hésité pour sa part à proférer des menaces en termes assez peu voilés, au cours des dernières semaines. Vladimir Poutine a ainsi déclaré durant la campagne électorale en Arménie que les ventes de gaz à tarif préférentiel pourraient passer au prix européen, soit environ quatre fois plus cher, si le processus de rapprochement avec l’Union européenne (UE) se poursuivait, alors qu’une loi enclenchant la procédure d’adhésion à l’UE a été votée par le parlement arménien en mars 2025. Le tropisme pro-européen existe donc à Erevan, mais c’est aussi sa relation avec les États-Unis qui inquiète la Russie.
Les accords conclus avec l’Azerbaïdjan déjà évoqués sont en effet significatifs. Non seulement ils ont fait apparaître Donald Trump comme un faiseur de réconciliation entre deux peuples depuis longtemps en guerre, ce dont il s’est largement vanté, mais surtout il a considérablement fait avancer le projet, modestement intitulé « Route Trump pour la paix internationale et la prospérité ». Si cela se concrétise, ce corridor – comportant routes, voies ferroviaires, oléoducs et gazoducs – reliera l’Azerbaïdjan à son exclave le Nakhitchevan facilitant ainsi considérablement le transit entre l’Asie centrale et l’Europe, singulièrement la Turquie, tout en contournant la Russie et l’Iran. L’influence étatsunienne s’est encore renforcée à l’occasion de la visite du vice-président J. D. Vance – une première de ce niveau en Arménie – au mois de février 2026. Plusieurs contrats ont alors été signés portant notamment sur les drones, le nucléaire civil, les puces informatiques. Cette visite se poursuivit par une étape à Bakou au cours de laquelle a été signé un accord de coopération stratégique avec l’Azerbaïdjan.
On le comprend, Moscou a quelque raison de s’inquiéter en constatant sa perte d’importance graduelle. Le résultat des élections encourage clairement Nikol Pachinian à poursuivre dans la même voie et approfondir son rapprochement avec l’Union européenne d’une part et les États-Unis d’autre part.
Nikol Pachinian a déclaré vouloir « institutionnaliser un accord de paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan ». À l’issue de cette élection et en l’absence d’une majorité au Parlement pour adopter des amendements constitutionnels, quelles sont ses marges de manœuvre quant au dossier du conflit au Haut-Karabagh ? Doit-on s’attendre à une stabilisation des tensions dans le Caucase ou au contraire à une intensification des rivalités régionales ?
La question qui se pose désormais ne concerne plus à proprement parlé le Haut-Karabagh, puisque la quasi-totalité de ses habitants a été obligée d’en fuir en 2023 et que le territoire a désormais rejoint l’Azerbaïdjan. Ce fait a été reconnu par Nikol Pachinian lui-même – ce qui lui vaut des accusations récurrentes de trahison – mais le président azerbaïdjanais, Ilham Aliev, en position de force, exige des amendements dans la constitution arménienne pour retirer toute référence au Haut-Karabakh.
En tout état de cause, c’est désormais la relation directe et la normalisation entre les deux États du Caucase du Sud qui est centrale. Les cicatrices ne sont pas refermées et les défis nombreux tant les trois décennies de conflit ont engendré des haines réciproques. L’Arménie accuse par exemple l’Azerbaïdjan d’occuper illégalement 200 km2 de son territoire et le processus de délimitation des frontières n’est pas terminé. Par sa politique atlantiste et de rapprochement avec l’Union européenne Nikol Pachinian cherche à renforcer ses soutiens et continuera dans cette voie confirmant la perte d’influence russe dans la région.
L’article Victoire électorale des forces pro-occidentales en Arménie : et maintenant ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Kaveh Zahed, Assistant Director-General and Director of FAO’s Office of Climate Change, Biodiversity and Environment (left), speaks during a press briefing on agri-food system solutions at the GEF Assembly in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, where he emphasised that agriculture can play a central role in addressing climate and biodiversity challenges. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS
By Kizito Makoye
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 11 2026 (IPS)
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has approved USD 6.4 million for a new conservation initiative in Papua New Guinea that seeks to protect 700,000 hectares of critical highland ecosystems by placing Indigenous Peoples and local communities at the centre of conserving and managing their ancestral lands.
Implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and with expected USD 16.7 million in co-financing, the project aims to strengthen biodiversity corridors, support peacebuilding and improve environmental management across protected and productive landscapes. It is expected to improve management effectiveness across more than 276,000 hectares of protected areas, extend sustainable environmental practices to 1.6 million hectares, directly benefit 21,000 people and avoid nearly one million tonnes of carbon emissions.
The initiative reflects a broader shift in conservation thinking in Papua New Guinea and internationally – away from externally driven protection efforts and toward approaches that connect biodiversity conservation with livelihoods, land rights and local governance.
That shift is especially significant in Papua New Guinea, where roughly 97 percent of land remains under customary ownership, making conservation efforts dependent on local consent and participation.
“In a culturally rich and highly diverse country that is both geographically isolated and challenging to access, community empowerment is essential for achieving sustainable social and economic development,” Aaron Becker, FAO-GEF Regional Coordinator for Asia and the Pacific, told IPS.
“The key to successful conservation efforts in Papua New Guinea is recognising and respecting that 97 percent of the country’s land is held under customary ownership,” Becker said.
According to project designers, conservation in Papua New Guinea can only succeed when it is rooted in customary land systems, respects local cultural realities and builds upon traditional natural resource management practices rather than bypassing communities.
Under the project’s community-led landscape model, local people will determine which areas should be protected, which can continue supporting livelihoods and what conservation rules should apply. The initiative is expected to support recognition of 10 community-led conservation areas across biodiversity hotspots.
The programme will rely on participatory processes grounded in Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGT) while helping communities strengthen governance systems and develop land-use plans informed by traditional knowledge.
“This project provides the facilitation, training, equipment, and access to finance — and keeps the decisions within the community,” Becker said.
“Importantly, communities are not being asked to implement somebody else’s conservation agenda.”
Project officials say the initiative has also been designed to avoid intensifying land disputes or creating new social tensions.
“The project is designed carefully to avoid making tensions, such as around natural resources, worse,” Becker said, adding that site selection takes into account governance conditions, conflict risks and community readiness.
The emphasis on community ownership reflects a broader evolution in global conservation policy, according to Kaveh Zahed, Assistant Director-General and Director of FAO’s Office of Climate Change, Biodiversity and Environment.
“It’s not just about protecting biodiversity – it is about conservation, regeneration and sustainable use of biodiversity,” Zahed told journalists on the sidelines of the GEF Assembly.
“That’s a recognition that much of this biodiversity is linked to people and to livelihoods – and nowhere is that demonstrated better than with agriculture and agricultural communities, who are custodians of a great deal of that biodiversity.”
Rather than treating conservation as a restriction on development, the project combines environmental protection with biodiversity-friendly livelihoods, including sustainable agriculture, agroforestry, coffee systems, non-timber forest products, ecotourism and small-scale livestock.
Zahed said agriculture and food systems can become part of the solution rather than a source of tension between conservation and economic development.
“That’s where the beauty of agri-food system solutions lies,” he said. “They are interventions that are about food security, producing more with less, and helping communities maintain that food security while at the same time bringing biodiversity and climate benefits.”
For Becker, the broader lesson extends beyond Papua New Guinea.
“So, the message is simple: conservation should not create new insecurity,” he said. “Done well, it will reinforce land rights, support livelihoods, and build cooperation across landscapes that communities already know, use and manage.”
Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
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Written by Silvia González Vidal.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced the World Day Against Child Labour in 2002. The day is observed annually on 12 June. The 2026 World Day focuses on reinforcing and accelerating actions aimed at preventing and eliminating child labour, with a key message: ‘Red Card to Child Labour: Fair play for children, decent work for adults’.
BackgroundThe United Nations (UN) defines child labour as work performed by children under the minimum legal age specified for that kind of work, or work that, because of its hazardous nature or detrimental conditions, is prohibited. Forms of work that are beneficial to a child’s personal and social development, that do not interfere with schooling, but rather provide useful experience and skills, may be encouraged. Child labour is driven by poverty, paired with a lack of access to decent work for adults and young people, weak social protection and a lack of free, high-quality public education.
Addressing root causes and advancing social justice were at the heart of the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, held in Morocco in February 2026, in the context of the failure to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 8.7 on ending child labour by 2025. The Conference adopted the Marrakech Global Framework for Action against Child Labour, a renewed roadmap aimed at eliminating child labour by 2030 through a human rights-based approach centred on social dialogue and multi-sectoral cooperation. The Marrakech commitments prioritise aligning national legal frameworks with international labour standards, ensuring universal access to quality education, and expanding social protection systems. They also highlight the unique challenges within the African region, the agricultural sector, one of the largest for child labour, and the emerging threat of online exploitation.
World Day Against Child Labour 2026The 2026 World Day Against Child Labour comes after the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour. Building on the Marrakech commitments, the 2026 campaign carries the message ‘Red Card to Child Labour: Fair play for children, decent work for adults‘, highlighting the link between child labour, poverty, and the lack of adequate work opportunities for adults. At the same time, it emphasises the shared responsibility of governments, employers, workers’ organisations, businesses and consumers, aiming to encourage governments and international partners to translate the Marrakech commitments into concrete national measures ahead of the 2030 deadline.
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF, 138 million children worldwide are still affected by child labour, with nearly 54 million exposed to hazardous work. In response, the 2026 campaign advocates for stronger action to prevent child labour and support the withdrawal and rehabilitation of affected children through access to quality education, universal social protection, decent work and sustainable livelihoods for adults, strengthened legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, improved data collection and monitoring systems, as well as responsible practices across agriculture and global supply chains.
International legal frameworkFreedom from child labour is a fundamental human right, enshrined in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), the ILO Conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). ILO Convention No 138 on the minimum age, adopted in 1973, has been ratified by 177 countries, including all EU Member States. This key document lays down standards for the minimum age for employment. ILO Convention No 182 on the worst forms of child labour, adopted in 1999, has been ratified by 187 countries, including all EU Member States. It calls on members to take measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. These include all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery; commercial sexual exploitation or illicit activities; and work likely to harm children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States. The CRC confers upon children the right to protection from economic exploitation, and urges parties to set a minimum age for employment, regulate working hours and conditions, and provide for penalties. Despite international commitments made by nearly all United Nations member states, 41 countries still lack important legal protections against children doing work that could be harmful or interfere with their education.
EU actionThe EU’s firm commitment to eliminating child labour is enshrined in Article 32 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which prohibits the employment of children and states that the minimum age of employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age. Moreover, young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education.
The main legal instrument prohibiting child labour in the EU is Council Directive 94/33/EC. It allows Member States to set a minimum age for employment below the minimum school-leaving age only exceptionally. The EU action plan on human rights and democracy (2020-2027) calls for stronger child protection systems and a zero-tolerance policy on child labour. Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market further contributes to this goal. In 2024, the European Commission also adopted a recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child, as a commitment in the EU strategy on the rights of the child, prompting Member States to adopt an integrated approach in their external action, under the aim of eradicating child labour.
European ParliamentThe European Parliament has repeatedly condemned child labour and its various forms, both within and outside the EU, through a number of resolutions. In its February 2020 resolution on child labour in mines in Madagascar, Parliament stressed that the EU’s long-term budget should reflect its commitment to eliminating the worst forms of child labour. In its March 2021 resolution on children’s rights in view of the EU strategy on the rights of the child, Parliament also urged the Commission and Member States to eradicate child labour and all forms of work harmful to children’s health, safety and development. Later that year, in its resolution on sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour, Parliament advocated banning imports of products linked to severe human rights violations, including child labour, and stressed that combating such practices should be systematically reflected in EU free trade agreements. In the same vein, Parliament further reinforced provisions aimed at preventing forced and child labour in global supply chains during negotiations on the directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, adopted in 2024. Finally, in its 2022 resolution on new EU rules on products made with forced labour, Parliament called for stronger cooperation with international partners committed to eradicating forced labour globally and banning goods produced under forced labour conditions. In addition, Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, currently Vice-President Ewa Kopacz, acts as a central contact point to help ensure that children’s rights are systematically integrated into EU policies and legislation.
This is a further update of an ‘At a glance’ note, the previous edition of which was by Yanis Stefanou, in 2025.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Day Against Child Labour‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.