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Airbus n'a pas baissé les bras, pour ravitailler les hélicoptères depuis un Atlas. Cette capacité
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Chaque semaine, l'agenda européen liste les principaux événements politiques à venir. A retenir pour la semaine du 20 au 26 juin : le référendum britannique qui inquiète l'Union européenne, de nouvelles élections espagnoles et le droit pour l'UE d'arraisonner des navires au large de la Libye.

Date: Lundi 20 Juin 2016

Europe’s four most powerful men are in peril, fighting for their political lives in some choppy and unusual electoral waters. Whether this week in the case of Britain’s David Cameron or Spain’s Mariano Rajoy, or in the coming months with regard to Matteo Renzi and Francois Hollande, each one is nearing a career-defining reckoning with voters. The four cover opposite ends of the mainstream political spectrum, but share a common fear: being undone by primal anti-establishment forces. Such is the lot of Europe’s political princes.

David Cameron’s verdict There is a touch more optimism in Downing Street on the EU referendum. After a tumultuous week, poll momentum has swung back to Remain (as well as defections). Mr Cameron also delivered a solid TV performance on Sunday night, channelling his inner Winston according to the FT’s Henry Mance. Note the emphasis on this referendum being a no-turning-back decision on the EU – but not on Mr Cameron. His approval ratings have plummeted but he insists this vote is not a verdict on him. It appears he may try, against the odds, to hold on to power after a Brexit win. Given what it would do to his legacy, what does he have to lose?

Matteo Renzi’s star falls Once the golden-child of this political quartet, the restless Italian Socialist is facing a ballot-box revolt. The Five Star movement routed Mr Renzi in Rome’s municipal elections last night, making Virginia Raggi the eternal city’s first female mayor. In a big upset Turin was lost as well to a 31-year old Five Star insurgent, Chiara Appendino. Mr Renzi’s Democratic party did manage to draw the line there, hanging on to Milan and Bolgna, where it was facing a more traditional run-off with centre-right opponents. All eyes are now on the October referendum on constitutional reform that Mr Renzi said he would win or quit. His enemies are circling.

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The European Defence Agency (EDA) is developing its cooperation with CSDP civilian Missions in the field of Satellite Communications (Satcom). 

Since early June, the civilian Mission EUCAP SAHEL Mali in Bamako which aims at supporting the internal security forces in the country, is taking advantage of a Framework Contract established between Airbus Defence and Space and the EDA to cover its requirement for SatCom services.

In concrete terms, this allows the Mission to benefit from a strategic satellite link between Mali and Europe. The services provided by Airbus Defence and Space include the rental, shipping, and installation of a C-band remote satellite communications terminal in Bamako, high data rate satellite bandwidth and anchoring in Europe. The services also include training of Mission personnel, 24/7 technical support and on site-intervention if required. In addition, the Mission is also provided with mobile satellite services to include e.g. a number of satellite phone subscriptions to cover the communication needs for Mission personnel moving around in the country.

EDA’s Chief Executive, Jorge Domecq, welcomed this first use of EDA EU SatCom Market contract by a civilian CSDP Mission as “a concrete example of how the European Defence Agency and CSDP civilian missions can develop cooperation to make best use of resources”. Mr Domecq also said he was confident that other EU entities will make use of the extensive support the Agency can provide in this domain, thus further increasing the pooling effect and reducing costs for the benefit of all EU SatCom Market members.

CSDP civilian Missions EUCAP SAHEL Niger and EUAM Ukraine have also ordered similar services to be provided in their theatres of operation.

Fruitful cooperation

The establishment of this satellite link is the result of extensive discussions to develop cooperation between the Agency and the relevant services in the European External Action Service (EEAS), especially the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) directorate and the Service for Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI).

The EEAS Civilian Operations Commander, Kenneth Deane, stated: “I very much welcome the possibility offered to civilian CSDP Missions to make use of the services provided through the EU SatCom Market Project. I am confident this will ensure best value for money and effectively help deployment and development of the CSDP civilian Missions in line with the relevant conclusions of the European Council.”

The head of the EUCAP SAHEL Mali mission, Albrecht Conze (Germany), said he was “very happy about the fact that, thanks to the hard and dedicated work done by Mission CIS experts, the EDA and the contractor Airbus Defence & Space, the Mission now has a stable strategic SatCom link to Europe as well as all the other satellite communication services the mission needs.”

EUCAP SAHEL Mali

The EUCAP SAHEL Mali civilian Mission, launched on 15 January 2015 at the invitation of the Malian government, is an important element of the regional approach taken in the European Union strategy for security and development in the Sahel.

In addition to the action already taken in Mali by the EUTM Mission providing support to the Malian armed forces and by the European Union Delegation, and in connection with EUCAP SAHEL Niger, the EUCAP SAHEL Mali Mission is helping the Malian government with the reform of its internal security forces (ISF) to enable them to provide more security and justice for Malians.

EUCAP Sahel Mali is dedicated to supporting the Malian authorities' commitment to restructuring their defence and security forces.

EU SatCom Market

Within the EU SatCom Market project, the EDA acts as the central purchasing body on behalf of the contributing members. It purchases the services from a commercial provider. The project uses a ‘pay-per-use’ model, so members do not have to contribute with regular fees; instead they only pay for what they order. Since May 2013, 38 orders have been passed for a total value of over €6.2 million with more orders planned. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Romania, the United Kingdom, Serbia, the Athena Mechanism, EUCAP SAHEL Niger, EUCAP SAHEL Mali, EUAM Ukraine, EUCAP NESTOR in Somalia and EUMM Georgia are the 18 members of the project.

More information:

• News “EDA provides satellite communications services for EUTM Somalia” (13 October, 2015)
• EU SatCom Market project page

Une note de l’Etat-major des armées confirme les « ajustements budgétaires ». La réserve opérationnelle en fait les frais. 

2016. június 10-én a Biztonságpolitikai Szakkollégium tagjai komplex válságkezelő gyakorlaton vettek részt a Nemzetbiztonsági Szakkollégium tagjaival. A gyakorlat célja nem csak egy adott problémakör szimulálása volt, hanem az is, hogy a résztvevők egyéni és csoportos munka során is képesek legyenek a napjaikban zajló krízishelyzetek lényegei elemeit felismerni és a bekövetkező változásokra érdemben reagálni.

Az egész napos program során a résztvevők ellátást kaptak, amely az NTP-SZKOLL-2015 “A felsőoktatásban működő szakkollégiumok támogatása” pályázat révén a Nemzeti Tehetség Program keretein belül valósult meg.

A recent video posted by The Financial Times showed a gentle pastel-dressed English old lady smiling to the camera. While her cheekbones suggested fresh baked cookies around a cup of tea, when asked about her intention to vote at the referendum her steel voice firmly cut one word “Britishness”. This fear of losing the quintessence of Great Britain (not discussing if such a thing exists or not) constitutes one of the main causes ‘Brexiters’ put in advance when motivating their will to abandon the perilous water of European membership. Whether a list of well established characteristic of Britishness is debatable, lost of national identity has been twinned with lost of sovereignty since the beginning of the process of European integration. During the last months of referendary campaign, public opinion has been shaken the more and more violently by an escalation of commentaries on migration, pushed in front of the Leave campaign. Even if London is a historical example of meltin’ pot culture, the attitude of the country as a whole has been gradually shaped by nationalist and xenophobic forces.

At European level, immigration has been increasingly felt as a particular challenge, as showed by a survey released by the European Parliament last October. In 2013, when asked what was the main challenge facing the EU and its Member States in order to face the future, the answer pointed basically to the financial crisis. In the EU-28, 55% of the respondents considered unemployment the first challenge, followed by social inequalities (33%), public debt of Member States (32%) and access to jobs for young people (29%). At the same time, migration was considered of primary importance only by 14% of the respondents. In 2015, the answer to the same question showed an increase of 33% of those declaring immigration as the first challenge, and an increase of 15% of those indicating terrorism. Against this European trend, in 2013 the main phenomenon to tackle perceived in the UK was unemployment (49%), followed by immigration (37%, higher than EU average) and terrorism in the third place (30%). In 2015, the podium was differently occupied: migration came first (52%, with an increase of 15% since 2013), then terrorism (39%, or 9% more than 2013) and, finally, unemployment (38%, or a decrease of 11%). If we consider that in the same period unemployment rate in the UK decreased from 7.6% to 5.3% (Eurostat 2016), the change in its perception is motivated, while the extent reflects the diversion of attention to the “migration crisis” and other phenomena perceived as consequences/ part of the problem. As the most recent figures provided by Eurostat show, net migration has slightly increased from a crude rate at national level of 3,8 in 2013 to 4.9 in 2014, lower, for example, than Italy’s 2013 rate of 19,7 or Germany’s 2014 rate of 7,2.

Net migration, national identity and discourse framing

Perception of migrants, coming either from EU either from third countries, is largely shaped within the current context by the perception of self. In cultural terms, a positive political discourse could have helped to support the Remain cause, but until now the campaign has focused its message of “migrants as a resource” only in economical terms. This last phenomenon has been reinforced by the large support of companies to the Remain side.

Under the perspective of enrichment, the orientation to vote to Remain could have been supported through a relatively positive attitude towards cultural diversity. With regard to EU migrants, in 2015 76% of UK citizens agreed that the presence of nationals from other EU Member States contributed to the diversity of cultural life in their country, against a European average (EU-28) of 66% (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015). A further differentiation has to be mentioned, as within Great Britain there is an ongoing process of emerging English nationalism with a Eurosceptic penchant, while in Scotland citizens are generally pro-Europe, with their Scottish National Party foreseeing an eventual second independence referendum if Brexit will become a reality. At the same time, in Wales the Independent Party (Cymru Annibynnol) has a more utilitarian stake in remaining in the EU, namely pursuing the fruitful participation at Structural Funds programs. If Scotland has benefited economically of its oil resources, England has been the more concerned by deindustrialisation, started by Margaret Thatcher and completed under Tony Blair. Along with the need of a transition in production terms, England has not fully achieved a transition in identity terms. Blair’s government devolution of powers to newly-instituted assemblies in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast made once more England feel deprived of its centrality within the UK, after the demise of its colonial centrality in the Commonwealth and the Empire. The idea of regaining the sovereignty, lost by accessing the European Economic Community in 1973, is at the centre of the Leave campaign today, in a way as a consequence of this recherche de l’identité perdue.

Campaign strategy of fear: benefit tourism vs fact and figures

In her intervention at the at CEPS in Brussels on 13 June 2016, political scientist Sophia Vasilopoulou (University of York) affirmed that one of the most powerful emotions Brexit campaigners have targeted until now is fear, combined with anxiety. Even if in electoral terms emotions are neutral as: “from a democracy point of view, anxiety can be positively seen, because motivates citizens to get more informed”, positivity or negativity come from the context in which the potential (perceived) risk is framed by campaigners to influence voters. Even fear, in her statement, has no value per se, but is a ‘massive weapon’ because it triggers the “will to eliminate concretely an obstacle”, which magnifies actual activation against abstention or vote in favour of the status quo. In this referendary campaign, fear has been framed with respect to migration negatively by the Leave partisanship, while the Remain camp has centred simply abstained from a true defence. This last message has insisted on rational reasoning with economical pros and cons of migration, in terms of contribution to different sectors of the economy (services, tech industry, culture and science), but without resorting to the emotional side of the message.

Migration has historically been a scapegoat for problems within a society, nothing new on British soil. Politically, both Conservatives and Labour have integrated the issue in their programmes, coupling it with different matters. In the present case, fear of migration has been exploited by Leavers in association with fear of terrorism and poverty: on one hand, extra-EU migration managed at European level has been presented as reinforcement of the risk of incurring in terrorist attacks, notably with incoming foreign fighters. On the other hand, intra-EU migrants have been depicted as undeservedly exploiters of British National Welfare. On this last point, the last phase of the campaign has seen some Tories among the partisans of the Leave side, namely Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, reiterating the imminent threat of a “Turkish invasion” following the alleged accession of Turkey in the EU – a move that resembles more to the traditional UKIP communication. While in rational choice terms these politicians are playing the card of populism, the message once spread has gained more and more importance, an echo that has started to reach the more deprived social strata in de-industrialised regions. In these areas, Labour has traditionally been the first choice: since the absence of clear facts in the debate has put the blame on freedom of movement, the strongest edge-cut declarations of UKIP and pro-Brexit Tories have been gradually pierced the left-wing electorate.

To sum up, three major elements have characterized the campaign until now:

1. The campaign has been conducted without recourse to professional expertise (academics/think thanks), with an explicit denial of resorting to this kind of knowledge by anti-establishment parties (as experts are seen as part of the “system”) and a more implicit attitude by moderates tempted by the populist flair. A large part of the electorate is, in this respect, unaware of the accessible facts and figures or doesn’t have a degree of education that allows an individual research of a deeper knowledge;
2. Both Labour party and the Conservatives partisans of Remain have adopted ambiguous positions. Labour, before under Ed Miliband and now under James Corbyn, has even called for a “control on migration” in its 2015 Manifesto, probably trying to keep close the low-wage affiliated that contemplate migration as a threat in terms of competition in the national labour market, as mentioned above;
3. The Tory government and the national right-wing oriented press have insisted negatively on immigration as main issue. Firstly, David Cameron and his acolytes have played too far with the card of ‘established success’ of February 2016 ‘new settlement’ agreement between UK and EU-27. The chapter of restrained possibility for new incoming migrants to UK to claim social benefit and the chapter against an “ever closer Union” de facto suggested that behind the measures there was a negative phenomenon. Few months of campaign and few declarations by companies’ associations have not been enough communicative to erase this kind of prejudice against the so-called ‘benefit tourists’. At the same time, national right-wing press (The Daily Telegraph, The Sun) has amplified the proposal of most passionate Brexiters, as the introduction of a new system of migrants’ acceptance based on the Australian regulation, even if several surveys have showed that British citizens are not convinced by it.

Actually, the myth of the “benefit tourist” has been debunked by a clear cut study produced by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. Published in May, the Report on “EU Migration, Welfare Benefits and EU Membership” has enlightened several key points worth to mention in order to discredit common discourse on EU-migrants.

First of all, the real criterion to discuss EU nationals’ access to UK’s system of benefit is activity: with a job, migrants from EU have similar access as UK citizens, while for jobseekers or people not working, rules for eligibility vary significantly according with the type of benefit. Under UK law, a European Economic Area (UE27+Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland) citizen needs to have a job “genuine and effective” to claim in-work benefits, automatically valid if the worker earns at least 155 pound per week (equivalent to about 23 hours of work at the 2015-16 minimum wage).

Secondly, the researchers found that, compared to UK-born, EU migrants are more likely to claim in-work benefits, like tax credits. Among this group of active members of society, available data suggest that only between 10-20% newly arrived EU adults received tax credits in early 2014 and more than half of EEA adults that reported receiving tax credits in 2015 were working full time.

In conclusion, migration has been exploited as a fear trigger by Brexit camp, but not really addressed by the Remain one, because of the heterogeneity of the parts involved (and lack of a ‘block strategy’). In an article published online on Social Europe, economist Thomas Fazi has commented on how the daily life of the British citizens and the most dramatic effects of a policy change on their daily life are still determined by decisions taken autonomously by national government: “The fundamental problem with the whole Brexit debate is that both sides of the argument are premised on a wildly embellished notion of the extent to which being part of EU impacts (positively or negatively) the scope of government action (..) This is what makes this whole debate so surreal. The decision to slash social provisions to the poorest and most vulnerable members of society (such as disabled people); to cut funding for libraries, healthcare, education and environmental protection, while allowing massive corporations to get away with paying little or no taxes; to part-privatise the NHS, etc”. And again on perceived crisis “while the reasons include a failure to build council housing, the lack of an industrial strategy to promote skilled secure jobs, economic policies that have slashed living standards and cut services, these culprits are not readily identified. Immigration has become a convenient framework to understand ever growing social and economic insecurities”.

As several cases presented by the Guardian and The Independent have shown, it is because of government policies that there is a structural lack of available workforce, basically requiring several sectors to employ foreigners. In 2015 one in four nurses had to be recruited abroad because of a slash of nursing training places, that has provoked original solutions as the newly twinning between the hospital of Preston and the association of Italian nurses.

These positive examples have not sufficiently been spread among public audience, and will not probably be the object of these last bitter days of campaign.

Francesca Sanna

For further information:

• The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford,

http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/

• “Immigration resonates on the streets for Brexit campaign”, Financial Times http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e7bfc9b4-2bcb-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc.html?ftcamp=social/free_to_read/hull_brexit/awareness/editorial&segid=0100320#axzz4AydHyA1E
• “Brexit: A Massive Smokescreen (But Britain Should Still Leave)”, Social Europe, https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/06/brexit-massive-smokescreen-britain-still-leave/
• “It’s a cruel deceit to blame all our problems on immigration”, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/09/cruel-deceit-problems-immigration-brexiters-truth?CMP=fb_gu
• “Tony Blair is coming back. He will be Britain’s Prime Minister again soon. Maybe”, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/10/tony-blair-is-coming-back-he-will-be-britains-prime-minister-aga/?WT.mc_id=tmgoff_soc_spf_fb-sf28399042
• “Crude rate of net migration plus adjustment”, definition by Eurostat (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tsdde230
• NHS has to recruit one in four nurses from abroad, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/apr/04/nhs-recruits-one-in-four-nurses-from-abroad
• « Gli infermieri di Preston: quanti italiani nell’ospedale inglese », La Repubblica,

http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2016/05/17/news/gli_infermieri_di_preston_e_nell_ospedale_inglese_spunta_la_little_italy-139953247/

 

Classé dans:Conditions d'accueil des migrants et réfugiés, Droit à la liberté et à la sûreté, Liberté de circulation des personnes, MIGRATIONS ET ASILE

Az elmúlt héten hivatalosan is átadták a honvédségnek a légimentőktől átvett két AS350B Ecureuil helikoptert. Az immár 101-es és 102-es oldalszámot és az állami légijárművek ék alakú felségjelét viselő könnyű forgószárnyasok 1991-92-től HA-BDA és HA-BDB lajstromjellel több mint két évtizedig szolgálták a magyar légimentést. Az alábbi fotók ennek az időszaknak egy-egy mozzanatát örökítik meg.

Budaörsi Repülőtér

2007 ősze Budaörsön. A háttérben a Pintér Művek Agusta 119 Koalája áll.

2007 februárja. A éjszakára hangárban tárolt gépet egy kis traktorral vontatták ki az előtérre. A HA-BDB ma már 102-es oldalszámmal repül.

Az előtér másik oldalán már ott áll a leendő váltótípus, az EC135-ös.

A közel két tonna maximális felszállósúlyú típus egy tankolással 2 óra 40 percet repülhet.

Az AS350-es hagyományos faroklégcsavarral, az EC135-ös Fenestronnal rendelkezik.

Járó hajtóművel, felszállás előtt a gurítható helipadon.

A budaörsi körépület előtt készenlétben álló HA-BDA. 

Napfürdőzik a Hotel-Alpha-Bravo-Delta-Alpha. A gép a honvédségnél a 101-es oldalszámot kapta.

A hangárból ezúttal nem a helipadon, hanem a talpakra felhelyezhető kerekekkel gurították ki az AS350-est.

A földi mozgatást lehetővé tevő kerekek.

Hajtóművezés a januári hidegben 2008-ban, a budaörsi nagyhangár árnyékában. A háttérben egy EC-135-ös száll le a körépület elé. A légimentők akkoriban egy faházban települtek a budaörsi repülőtéren.

Nyitva a HA-BDA hajtóműtere, akad némi tennivaló a hajtóművezés után.

Piros, sárga, kék - a forgószárny lapátokat és a bekötési pontokat színlogika alapján párosították.

Jobbról így néz ki a Turbomeca Arriel 1B hajtómű.

Balról pedig így.

A faroklégcsavar pókvezérlése. Mivel a faroklégcsavar csak kétágú, a "póknak is két lába" van.

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Budapest, XIII. kerület

Messziről készült 2008-as fotó a honvédkórház tetején leszállt AS350-esről. Talán kiképzési repülés volt, de az is lehet, hogy éppen életet mentettek a helikopterrel. Az Ecureuil egy fő sérültet szállíthatott.

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Hajmáskér, MH Bakony Harckiképző Központ központi gyakorló- és lőtér

Ki gondolta volna a 2008-as Cooperative SAREX nemzetközi kutató-mentő gyakorlaton, hogy a HA-BDA 2016-ban a honvédséghez kerül majd...

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MH Pápa Bázisrepülőtér

"Várjatok, engem mindig itt hagytok!" A két dübörgő Mil nyomában repül az Ecureuil a pápai tengelyben.

A Cooperative SAREX-en a légimentők is Pápára szállították a "sérülteket".

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HA-BDC, a harmadik Ecureuil

A harmadik Ecureuil az 1994 óta üzemeltetett HA-BDC volt. A helikopter 2009-ben Balatonfüreden felborult és annyira megrongálódott, hogy selejtezni kellett. Ezen a 2007 decemberében készült képen még a budaörsi hangárban áll.

A HA-BDC az eredeti festéssel, 2000. augusztus 19-én, a mátyásföldi repülőnapon.

Mátyásföldön mentési bemutatót is tartottak az AS350-essel. Sajnos kevés repülőnapon tartanak légimentő bemutatót, pedig azok a látványosság mellett hasznos tudnivalókkal is szolgálhatnak.

A légimentők helikoptere a légirendészet R505 lajstromjelű MD-500-asa mellett kapott helyet Mátyásföldön.

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Fotó: Szórád Tamás

A l'occasion de la fête des pères, Toute l'Europe sur France Bleu 107.1 s’intéresse au rôle des pères en Europe. Congé parental, congé paternité... quelles sont les législations dans les Etats membres ? La politique de la famille est-elle un exemple dans les pays nordiques comme certains l'imaginent ? Quel est le rôle de l'Union européenne dans ce domaine ? Géraldine Mayr, accompagnée d'Alexandra Lesur (Toute l'Europe) et de Marie-Christine Vallet (Radio France), reçoit trois invités pour en parler.

Der heutige Weltflüchtlingstag kommt mit einem neuen traurigen Rekord daher: Ende 2015 waren 65 Millionen Menschen weltweit auf der Flucht – so viele wie nie. Aber auch trotz stark gestiegener Flüchtlingszahlen in Deutschland und Europa bleibt die so genannte globale Flüchtlingskrise vor allem eine Krise der armen Länder dieser Welt. Die allermeisten der weltweit Fliehenden kommen nicht nur aus Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern. Ein Großteil von ihnen verlässt auch das eigene Herkunftsland oder die Herkunftsregion nicht. Von Pakistan und dem Iran über Jordanien, den Libanon und Äthiopien bis Nigeria oder Kolumbien – die Liste der Länder, die die meisten Flüchtlinge und Binnenvertriebenen beherbergen, liest sich wie ein Querschnitt durch den globalen Süden. Schlägt deshalb nun die „Stunde der Entwicklungspolitik“, wenn es darum geht die Ursachen von Flucht und Vertreibung zu bekämpfen? Welches sind eigentlich die Kernursachen – und was kann und sollte Entwicklungspolitik zu ihrer „Bekämpfung“ tun?

Der Hauptgrund für Flucht und Vertreibung sind zweifellos bewaffnete Konflikte. Daneben sind Terror, Repression, Hunger oder Naturkatastrophen weitere Fluchtursachen. Größere Fluchtbewegungen aber entstehen zumeist erst durch das gleichzeitige Auftreten mehrerer dieser Faktoren.

Die Zahl und Intensität bewaffneter Konflikte hat in den letzten Jahren erheblich zugenommen. Die Anzahl der Menschen, die pro Jahr in kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen rund um den Globus getötet werden, hat sich seit 2010 auf etwa 200.000 Tote vervierfacht. Die Flüchtlingskrise ist daher in erster Linie eine Krise der internationalen Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik. Zwei Ursachenbündel kommen zusammen: innergesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen um Macht, Anerkennung und Chancen zum einen; und eine Außenwelt, die teils aus Desinteresse, teils aus Eigennutz nicht alles unternimmt, um Aggressoren den Zugang zu Waffen und Finanzen zu verwehren, sondern oft das Gegenteil bewirkt. Konflikte und Kriege wie in Syrien, Afghanistan oder dem Südsudan allein mit dem westlichen Lebensstil und seinen Auswirkungen auf Entwicklungsländer, der Geo- oder Nahostpolitik der USA oder internationalen Waffenexporten erklären zu wollen, griffe also zu kurz. Dennoch kann Entwicklungspolitik eine wichtige Rolle als Stimme im Interesse der betroffenen Zivilbevölkerungen spielen und – auch im Sinne eines aufgeklärten Eigeninteresses – dafür werben, die Vermeidung von gewaltsamen Konflikten zur Richtschnur allen politischen Handelns zu machen.

Darüber hinaus zielt Entwicklungspolitik meist direkt auf die Verminderung innergesellschaftlicher Konflikte ab. Kriege und Bürgerkriege resultieren oftmals aus einer Verzahnung unterschiedlichster Faktoren, die ökonomischer, sozialer, historischer, ethnischer bis hin zu (geo-)politischer Natur sein können. Entwicklungspolitik hat zum Ziel, zur Transformation solcher strukturellen Konfliktlagen beizutragen.

Es wäre aber so verlockend wie falsch, davon auszugehen, dass Entwicklungspolitik schnell und einfach etwas gegen die Ursachen von Flucht und Vertreibung bewirken kann. Entwicklungspolitik wirkt langfristig. Kurzfristig kann – und muss – Leid gemindert und Schlimmeres verhindert werden. So muss es etwa darum gehen, Flüchtlingen in den Hauptaufnahmeländern eine bessere Zukunftsperspektive zu geben. Dabei gilt es, lokale Verwaltungen einzubinden, aufnehmende Kommunen und Länder zu unterstützen – nicht zuletzt auch um Konflikte zwischen Flüchtlingen und Alteingesessenen zu verhindern – und Menschen in Lagern nicht nur zu „verwalten“, sondern sie aktiv teilhaben zu lassen. Dabei muss gar nicht der Gedanke im Vordergrund stehen, dass Menschen ohne Aussicht auf ein festes Gehalt, bessere medizinische Versorgung oder eine bessere schulische Bildung für ihre Kinder nach Europa „weiterfliehen“ könnten. Die meisten Flüchtlinge verfügen dafür ohnehin nicht über die notwendigen (finanziellen) Mittel.

Langfristig muss die internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit vor allem zukünftigen Konflikt- bzw. Fluchtursachen entgegenwirken. Hierzu muss neben dem Kampf gegen Armut, Hunger und Umweltzerstörung auch die Schaffung funktionierender politischer Strukturen – die keine Bevölkerungsgruppen von der Möglichkeit der Teilhabe ausschließen und dem friedlichen Zusammenleben der Menschen verpflichtet sind – stärker in den Vordergrund gestellt werden. Krisenprävention und Friedensförderung sollten als entwicklungspolitische Schwerpunktthemen gestärkt werden. Auch die Förderung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit muss wieder eine größere Rolle spielen.

Im weltweiten Maßstab scheint die Demokratie als Herrschaftsform seit Jahren auf dem Rückzug zu sein, während Bürgerkriege und Gewalt zunehmen. Das zeigt: Wenn es an demokratischer Teilhabe mangelt, können Staaten schnell instabil werden und Konflikte leicht eskalieren. Allzu lange haben westliche Geberländer autoritäre Regime im Nahen Osten und Afrika unterstützt, um sich so kurzfristige politische Stabilität zu erkaufen. Zukünftig muss es darum gehen, die Wohlfahrt und Teilhabe der Bürger in diesen Ländern zu verbessern. Das heißt, dass Geberländer in diesen Staaten viel stärker mit der Zivilgesellschaft zusammenarbeiten müssen. Das alles ist langwierig, zäh und gewährt leider keinerlei direkte Erfolgsgarantien. Dennoch ist es unabdingbar, um auf Dauer Krisen, Kriegen und Massenflucht entgegenzuwirken. --
Die Kolumne ist ebenfalls auf der Seite der Deutschen Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V. (DGVN) erschienen.

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