Agrégateur de flux

Les discussions entre le Danemark, le Groenland et les États-Unis concernant la sécurité sur l'île arctique vont commencer «assez rapidement», a déclaré vendredi 23 janvier le ministre danois des Affaires étrangères Lars Rasmussen. La volte-face de Donald Trump à Davos, indiquant qu’il renonçait au recours à la force pour s’emparer de l'île arctique, révèle que les États-Unis ont besoin des marines européennes pour opérer dans le Grand Nord.

­23 janvier à 14h00 | Centre de Congrès – Auditorium | 33 bd. Carnot, 49100 Angers
24 janvier à 21h30 | Cinémas Les 400 Coups – 5 | 2 rue Jeanne Moreau, 49100 Angers
Le film Alișveriș, réalisé par Vasile Todinca (Roumanie, 2025, fiction, 15', VOST), sera projeté en présence du réalisateur les 23 et 24 janvier, dans le cadre de la compétition « Courts métrages européens » du Festival du film Premiers Plans d'Angers (17–25 janvier).
Synopsis : Au chômage, Tatiana passe ses journées à (…)

- Agenda / France - Régions, Roumanie

Quelques jours après la reconduction de Robert Beugré Mambé au poste de Premier ministre, la Côte d’Ivoire dévoile son nouveau gouvernement. Peu de changements, mais quelques nouvelles figures. Le premier Conseil des ministres s’est tenu ce samedi.

Le Premier ministre sénégalais Ousmane Sonko doit se rendre à Rabat à partir de lundi. Cette visite officielle est prévue une semaine après la finale de la CAN 2025, remportée par le Sénégal face au Maroc, le 18 janvier. Ce match a été émaillé d'incidents et des tensions ont subsisté les jours suivants entre les supporters des deux pays.

Chaque semaine, Judith Grimaldi reçoit un invité dans son podcast "Avec Judith". Cette semaine, c'est Hemley Boum, romancière née à Douala, au Cameroun. Elle aborde aujourd’hui son parcours d’écrivaine, ses racines, ou encore la lutte contre le racisme. Zack, l'un des personnages de son roman "Le Rêve du pêcheur", "s'imagine qu'en faisant semblant de ne pas le voir, le racisme n'existe pas. Mais ce n'est pas vrai", explique-t-elle.

Au Soudan, la guerre entre l'armée et les paramilitaires a fait des femmes ses premières victimes. Violences sexuelles, esclavage et viols utilisés comme armes de guerre marquent un conflit que la ministre aux Affaires sociales décrit comme un "condensé de toutes les pires choses" vécues dans le monde. Et les auteurs "sont très fiers de ce qu'ils font".

Faut-il boycotter la Coupe du Monde de Football 2026 organisée au Mexique, au Canada et aux États-Unis ou faut-il retirer aux États-Unis l’organisation de ce tournoi ?
Voilà le débat qui a émergé à la suite des différentes prises de position de l’administration Trump, notamment envers des pays considérés comme alliés avec la menace de prendre de force le Groenland ou l’imposition de droits de douane exorbitants. Cependant, il est très irréaliste de penser que l’organisation de la compétition pourrait être retirée aux États-Unis ou que des pays participants décident de boycotter l’évènement sportif. Mais ne pas boycotter ne veut pas dire se taire. Le problème vient de la FIFA, de Gianni Infantino, qui devrait imposer des règles à Trump et ne le fait pas. Trump va donc imposer sa loi et complètement bousculer la compétition. Il vaut donc mieux y participer et prendre position que de rester à la maison et se taire.

L’article Boycotter la Coupe du Monde 2026 ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Le président américain a fait une série de déclarations controversées, allant du statut du Groenland aux dépenses de l'OTAN.

Twins whose classmates were killed by shelling say their deaths have made them determined to finish their studies.

La situation humanitaire à Uvira, ville du Sud-Kivu prise par les rebelles de l’AFC/M23 mi-décembre, juste après la signature d'un accord de paix sous l'égide de Washington, est très difficile, malgré le retrait des paramilitaires au profit des autorités congolaises. L'ONG Human Rights Watch alerte sur le risque d'abus auxquels pourraient être confrontés les civils.

Les humains ont essayé de nombreuses façons de se rapprocher du centre de la Terre - mais que se trouve-t-il là-dessous ?

By CIVICUS
Jan 23 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS speaks with Belarusian activist, blogger and journalist Mikola Dziadok about his experiences as a two-time political prisoner and the repression of dissent in Belarus. Mikola was jailed following mass protests in 2020.

Mikola Dziadok

Amid continued repression, Belarus experienced two limited waves of political prisoner releases in 2025. In September, authorities freed around 50 detainees following diplomatic engagement, and in December they pardoned and released over 120, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski and opposition figure Maria Kolesnikova. Many were forced into exile. Human rights groups stress that releases appear driven by geopolitical bargaining rather than systemic reform, with over 1,200 political prisoners believed to remain behind bars.

Why were you arrested following protests in 2020?

I was arrested because I was not silent and I was visible. During the 2020 uprising, I ran Telegram and YouTube channels where I shared political analysis, explained what was happening and gave people advice on how to resist repression. I talked about strategies to protect ourselves, counter state violence and survive under authoritarian pressure. The regime viewed this as extremely threatening.

By that time, I had around 17 years of experience in the anarchist movement, which is a part of a broader democratic movement in Belarus. But most people who joined the protests weren’t political at all: they’d never protested before, never faced repression, never dealt with police violence. They were desperate for guidance, particularly as there was an information war between regime propaganda, pro-Kremlin narratives and independent voices..

Authorities made a clear distinction between ‘ordinary people’ who apologised and promised never to protest again, who were released, and activists, organisers and others who spoke publicly, who were treated as enemies. I was imprisoned because I belonged to the second category.

What sparked the 2020 uprising?

By 2020, Belarus had already lived through five fraudulent elections. We only had one election the international community recognised as legitimate, held in 1994. After that, President Alexander Lukashenko changed the constitution so he could rule indefinitely.

For many years, people believed there was nothing they could do to make change happen. But in 2020, several things came together. The COVID-19 pandemic left the state’s complete failure exposed. As authorities did nothing to protect people, civil society stepped in. Grassroots initiatives provided information and medical help. People suddenly saw they could do what the state couldn’t. From the regime’s perspective, this was a very dangerous realisation.

But what truly ignited mass mobilisation was violence. In the first two days after the 9 August presidential election, over 7,000 protesters were detained. Thousands were beaten, humiliated, sexually abused and tortured. When they were released and showed their injuries, the images spread through social media and Telegram, and people were shocked. This brought hundreds of thousands onto the streets, protesting against both election fraud and violence against protesters.

What’s the situation of political prisoners?

Since 2020, over 50,000 people have spent time in detention, in a country of only nine million. There have been almost 4,000 officially recognised political prisoners, and there are now around 1,200, although the real number is higher. Many prisoners ask not to be named publicly because they fear retaliation against themselves or their families.

Repression has never subsided. Civil society organisations, human rights groups and independent media have been destroyed or forced into exile. Belarussians live under constant pressure, not a temporary crackdown.

Political prisoners are treated much worse than regular prisoners. I spent 10 years as a political prisoner: five years between 2010 and 2015, and another five years after 2020. During my second sentence, I spent two and a half years in solitary confinement. This is deliberate torture designed to break people physically and psychologically.

How did your release happen?

My release was a political transaction. Lukashenko has always used political prisoners as bargaining chips. He arrests people, waits for international pressure to reach its peak and then offers releases in exchange for concessions. This time, international negotiations, unexpectedly involving the USA, triggered a limited release.

The process itself was terrifying. I was taken suddenly from prison, handcuffed, hooded and transferred to the KGB prison in the centre of Minsk. I was placed in an isolation cell and not told what would happen. It was only when I saw other well-known political prisoners being brought into the same space that I realised we were going to be freed, most likely by forced expulsion.

No formal conditions were announced, but our passports were confiscated and we were forced into exile. We were transported under armed guard and handed over at the Lithuanian border. Many deportees still fear for relatives who remain in the country, because repression often continues through family members. That’s why I asked my wife to leave Belarus as quickly as possible.

What should the international community and civil society do now?

First, they should make sure Belarus continues receiving international attention. Lukashenko is afraid of isolation, sanctions and scrutiny. Any attempt to normalise relations with Belarus without real change will only strengthen repression and put remaining prisoners at greater risk.

Second, they should financially support independent Belarusian human rights organisations and media. Many are struggling to survive, particularly after recent funding cuts. Without them doing their job, abuses will remain hidden and prisoners will be forgotten.

Most importantly, activists should not lose hope. We are making history. Dictatorships fall and fear eventually breaks. Freedom always returns – but only if we hold fast to our values and sustain the struggle.

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SEE ALSO
‘Belarus is closer than ever to totalitarianism, with closed civic space and repression a part of daily life’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Human Rights House 14.Oct.2025
Belarus: ‘The work of human rights defenders in exile is crucial in keeping the democratic movement alive’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Natallia Satsunkevich 15.Feb.2025
Belarus: a sham election that fools no one CIVICUS Lens 31.Jan.2025

 

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/ Palestine (Gaza), Palestine, Conflit israélo-palestinien, Crime de guerre - Proche-Orient / Palestine (Gaza), Palestine, Conflit israélo-palestinien, Crime de guerre

Andrii Melnyk, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, briefs the United Nations Security Council meeting on the maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 23 2026 (IPS)

Nearly four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine faces another winter marked by widespread humanitarian suffering and continued indiscriminate attacks. The final months of 2025 were particularly volatile, characterized by routine bombardment of densely populated areas and repeated strikes on residential neighborhoods, critical civilian infrastructure, and humanitarian facilities. As hostilities expanded into new territories over the past year, humanitarian needs grew sharply, with many war-torn communities residing in uninhabitable areas.

According to figures from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), at least 55,600 civilians have been killed or injured since the wake of the full-scale invasion, with 157 civilians killed and 888 injured across Ukraine and Russian Federation-occupied areas in the final months of 2025 alone. Additionally, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that over 3.7 million people have been internally displaced since the invasion.

Additional figures from OHCHR indicate that 2025 marked the deadliest year for civilians since the start of the full-scale invasion, with the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reporting that 2,514 civilians were killed and 12,142 were injured as a direct result of conflict-related violence. This marks a 31 percent increase from 2024.

“The 31 per cent increase in civilian casualties compared with 2024 represents a marked deterioration in the protection of civilians,” said Danielle Bell, head of HRMMU. “Our monitoring shows that this rise was driven not only by intensified hostilities along the frontline, but also by the expanded use of long-range weapons, which exposed civilians across the country to heightened risk.”

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that roughly 10.8 million people across Ukraine are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, with 3.6 million identified as particularly vulnerable and prioritized in relief operations. OCHA underscores the exacerbation of humanitarian conditions over the past few months, noting that front-line areas and northern border regions face higher rates of military shelling, destruction of civilian infrastructure, mass civilian displacement, and repeated disruptions to essential services.

Civilians residing in Russian Federation-occupied zones remain largely cut off from essential services and protection measures, facing heightened risks of serious human rights violations.

According to Matthias Schmale, The UN Human Coordinator for Ukraine, the nation is currently in the midst of a severe protection crisis, marked by rapid shrinking of humanitarian resources, consistent escalations of insecurity, and no signs that 2026 will be safer for civilians or humanitarian aid personnel. “The nature of warfare is evolving: more drone attacks and long-range strikes increase risks for civilians and humanitarians, while causing systematic damage to energy, water and other essential services,” said Schmale.

The first few weeks of 2026 saw a sharp escalation in targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, particularly water and energy systems. According to figures from the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, between January 8 and 9, Russian authorities launched 242 drones and 36 missiles toward Ukraine. These attacks struck the port city of Odesa, disrupting electricity and water supplies there and in the cities of Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. The strikes also crippled mobile communications and public transport, prompting the mayor of Dnipro to declare a state of emergency.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russia had launched roughly 1,300 drones between January 11 and 18 alone. For the following two days, more than 300 drones struck the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Dnipro, Odesa, and Khmelnytskyi regions, killing two civilians and injuring dozens.

On January 19, the Russian Federation launched a series of attacks on energy facilities in Ukraine, shutting down heating and electricity in numerous major urban areas, including Odesa and Kyiv. The mayor of Kyiv informed reporters that approximately 5,635 multi-story residential buildings were left without heating the following morning, 80 percent of which had only gained back access to heating after prolonged outages caused by a similar attack on January 9.

“Civilians are bearing the brunt of these attacks. They can only be described as cruel. They must stop. Targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure is a clear breach of the rules of warfare,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk. According to figures from OHCHR, hundreds of thousands of families across Ukraine lack access to heating—an especially dire development as freezing temperatures persist. Numerous communities in Kyiv also lack access to water, which has disastrous consequences for the most vulnerable, including children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.

“For people in Druzhkivka and in many communities along the front line, daily life is overshadowed by violence and attempts to survive. A strict curfew means they can only go outside for a few hours a day, timing their lives around shelling patterns and the increased risk of drone attacks. They face hard choices: to flee for safety, leaving their homes and lives behind, or remain under constant shelling,” Schmale added.

The UN’s Ukraine office underscored that the consequences for civilians will be long-lasting, even when they reach a definitive end to hostilities. They noted that the war’s impact will “long outlive the current emergency and humanitarian phase.” Psycho-social harm is widespread, with severe mental health needs reported among adults, children, former combatants, and their families- many of whom have endured displacement, the damaging or destruction of their homes, and repeated exposure to explosions and shelling.

The strain on Ukraine’s health and education systems compounds these effects, with UN Ukraine warning that “fractures in social cohesion” will shape the country for years to come.

In response, the UN and its partners launched the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan to provide life-saving support to affected communities, aiming to reach 4.1 million people in 2026. The plan includes operations to deliver food, healthcare, protection services, cash assistance, and other essential needs to besieged communities, calling for USD $2.3 billion.

“I urge all humanitarian, development and governmental partners to work together around our shared values and key identified strategic priorities, respecting the distinct role of principled humanitarian action and recognizing where others must lead,” said Schmale.

He added: “We ask our donors to sustain flexible, predictable funding so that we can respond rapidly to new shocks while maintaining essential services for those who cannot yet stand on their own feet. Only together we can ensure that the most vulnerable, like the family I met in Druzhkivka, receive timely assistance.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Palantir is not the only intelligence data fusion tool used by the French government. According to our sources, customs authorities [...]

The calculus of global power is shifting. In early January 2026, Turkey moved to join a defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that could fundamentally alter the balance of power from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia. Yet the most consequential dimension of this emerging alliance is not military. It is financial. Together, these three states sit at the core of the rapidly expanding Islamic banking system—an industry valued at approximately $4.5 trillion and growing at an annual rate of 10–15 percent annually. What is taking shape is not merely a regional alignment, but the foundations of an alternative financial and strategic architecture capable of challenging Western economic dominance and the centrality of the U.S. dollar.   For decades, Washington assessed the Middle East and South Asia primarily through military alliances and energy flows. That framework is increasingly obsolete. The Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan axis represents a far more disruptive phenomenon: the fusion of Islamic finance, strategic deterrence, and non-Western institutional design. According to the Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index—which evaluates political, economic, technological, military, informational, cultural, and cognitive sovereignty across 193 states—the combined sovereignty score of these three countries reaches 1,315.7 out of a possible 2,100, placing them among the most consequential regional blocs in the emerging multipolar order.   The strength of this axis lies in its complementarity. Pakistan contributes nuclear deterrence as the only Muslim-majority country with atomic weapons, possessing an estimated 165–170 nuclear warheads and a battle-hardened military establishment. Saudi Arabia supplies financial depth, controlling nearly one-third of global Islamic banking assets and maintaining the fiscal capacity to finance long-term military and technological programs. Turkey adds advanced defense production capabilities, including drone warfare systems proven in Ukraine, Libya, and Karabakh, as well as an increasingly autonomous military-industrial base with localization rates approaching 70–80 percent.   Formal trilateral defense coordination began with meetings in Riyadh in August 2023 and Rawalpindi in January 2024. The emerging framework mirrors collective-defense logic: aggression against one partner is treated as aggression against all. Turkey’s participation—while remaining a NATO member—introduces a structural contradiction into the Atlantic alliance and accelerates the erosion of traditional Western security architectures.   Yet the most destabilizing element of this alignment is financial rather than military. Islamic banking operates on principles fundamentally distinct from Western finance. Interest-based lending is replaced by profit-sharing and asset-backed transactions. Speculative instruments are constrained, leverage is limited, and ethical investment criteria are embedded into the system itself. During both the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 economic shock, Islamic banks demonstrated notable resilience precisely because they were less exposed to speculative excess.   For much of the Global South, this model offers more than ideology—it offers insulation. As Western economies cycle through recurring debt crises, inflationary shocks, and financial volatility, Islamic finance increasingly appears not as a niche religious system but as a viable counter-cyclical alternative. When paired with sovereign energy resources and credible military deterrence, it becomes a strategic instrument.   The Burke Institute’s data reveals why apparent weakness becomes strength within this alliance. Pakistan’s lower economic sovereignty score reflects decades of operating under sanctions, capital constraints, and external pressure—experience that now translates into institutional resilience. Turkey’s defense-sector localization surge demonstrates how external pressure can accelerate autonomy rather than dependency. Saudi Arabia’s low debt-to-GDP ratio and vast foreign exchange reserves provide the financial ballast necessary to sustain long-term systemic transition.   This bloc does not operate in isolation. China acts as a strategic amplifier. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deliberately subordinated its financial sector to the “real economy,” rejecting speculative financialization in favor of industrial development. Since 2022, more than 100 senior banking executives and regulators have been targeted in anti-corruption investigations, while salary caps and regulatory controls have reinforced state authority over capital. Chinese banks increasingly channel investment into productive sectors rather than real estate speculation, aligning finance with national development priorities.   This internal transformation dovetails with China’s external de-dollarization agenda. Pakistan is already deeply embedded in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are exploring settlement mechanisms outside dollar-based systems. When Islamic banking instruments intersect with Chinese payment rails and BRICS financial infrastructure, the petrodollar system faces structural—not rhetorical—pressure.   The geopolitical context is equally significant. Confidence in American security guarantees has weakened across the Middle East. The muted response to the 2019 Abqaiq attacks, the withdrawal of air-defense assets, and Washington’s gradual regional disengagement signaled the limits of U.S. protection. For regional actors, diversification of security and financial dependencies has become a rational strategy rather than a hostile one.   Expansion scenarios further magnify the implications. Potential inclusion of the UAE, Qatar, Malaysia, or Egypt would elevate the bloc’s share of Islamic banking assets beyond 60 percent while linking it to critical maritime checkpoints, energy corridors, and demographic scale. At that point, the system ceases to be an alternative and becomes a parallel order.   The immediate threat to the West is not military confrontation. It is gradual erosion: reduced dollar demand, sanctions circumvention, alternative development models, and declining leverage over regional decision-making. Financial systems rarely collapse suddenly; they weaken through the accumulation of credible alternatives.   For Israel, this transformation carries direct security implications. The consolidation of a Turkey-centered axis endowed with financial autonomy and strategic depth risks reshaping Israel’s regional environment from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Any framework that strengthens Ankara’s independent leverage while diluting Western influence affects deterrence, intelligence cooperation, and regional balance—particularly as Israel confronts threats from Iran and its proxy networks.   The challenge facing Washington is conceptual rather than tactical. Military superiority alone cannot preserve financial hegemony in a world where parallel systems are deliberately designed to be sanction-resistant. The Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan alignment does not seek to defeat the West; it seeks to render Western pressure optional.   The era of unchallenged dollar centrality and singular security patronage is ending. What replaces it will not emerge through declarations, but through institutions. The question for the United States, Israel, and Europe is no longer whether this shift is underway—but whether they recognize its strategic depth in time to respond.

Január 26-tól indul a pályázat kiegészítő támogatásra a Kisfaludy Turisztikai Hitelközpont Start-kölcsönei mellé.    A különleges, egyedi akció célja, hogy a legkisebb üzemméretű turisztikai szereplők mellett a mikro-, kis- és középvállalkozások gyorsan, kedvező feltételekkel, egyszerűen jussanak finanszírozási forráshoz, elősegítve versenyképesebb pozíciójukat a következő főszezonban, és biztosítva üzemszerű működésüket.

Hamarosan indul a Falusi Civil Alap pályázat, amely a kistelepüléseken működő civil szervezetek számára nyújt jelentős támogatási lehetőséget. A program keretében akár 7 millió forint vissza nem térítendő támogatás igényelhető közösségi célú fejlesztések és eszközbeszerzések támogatására. 

According to Intelligence Online sources, an elite commando unit of the French navy, Commando Hubert, was on the front line [...]

La première participation depuis le coup d’État du 1er février 2021 du général Min Aung Hlaing, chef de la junte militaire birmane, au sommet de l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS) à Tianjin, est largement passée inaperçue dans le paysage médiatique. À l’inverse, l’inauguration, en avril 2025, de la base de Ream, rénovée grâce au financement chinois, a largement retenu l’attention de la presse. Ces deux événements, bien que distincts, traduisent une même réalité : sous l’impulsion du président Xi Jinping, la Chine cherche à affermir sa position dans la sécurisation de son voisinage qu’elle conçoit comme son sanctuaire stratégique.

Cette note vise à adopter une grille de lecture sécuritaire, plutôt qu’un point de vue économique, très souvent choisi quand il s’agit de la Chine. Elle s’attache à mettre en lumière la conception chinoise élargie de la sécurité, qui dépasse la seule dimension militaire pour englober des instruments policiers. Elle examine les moyens et modes d’action déployés par la Chine – bilatéraux et multilatéraux, militaires et policiers. Elle relativise également l’impact de certaines initiatives chinoises, qui versent parfois davantage dans une stratégie de communication. Enfin, elle invite à nuancer la perception d’une dépendance univoque des « petits États » comme la Birmanie et le Cambodge à l’égard de leur puissant voisin, qui disposent de plusieurs choix stratégiques et à reconsidérer, dans ce contexte, la centralité de l’Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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L’article La posture sécuritaire de la Chine dans le Mékong est apparu en premier sur IRIS.