Agrégateur de flux

The EU wants to deepen defence ties with New Delhi despite its longstanding relationship with Russia

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Des équipes de secours, appuyées par les FARDC et des jeunes volontaires, se sont rendues ce lundi matin 26 janvier dans la chefferie de Walese Vonkutu, en Ituri, pour récupérer les corps de vingt-cinq personnes tuées dimanche par des rebelles ADF. Les attaques ont visé les villages d’Apakulo, Ahombo et Mangwalo, plongeant une nouvelle fois la région dans la consternation.

OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU – Commission for the financial year 2024
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Evin Incir

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU – Commission for the financial year 2024
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Evin Incir

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 90'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 90'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 90'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 90'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In recent years, sovereignty has ceased to be defined solely by borders, armies, or economic output. According to the Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index, one of the most decisive indicators of state resilience in the 21st century is technical sovereignty—the capacity of a country to control its digital infrastructure, data flows, cybersecurity architecture, and technological decision-making without excessive dependence on external actors.   The Burke Institute’s methodology evaluates sovereignty across seven dimensions—political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military—using open national statistics, global datasets from organizations such as the UN and World Bank, and structured expert assessments from hundreds of specialists worldwide. Within this framework, technical sovereignty emerges as a core pillar of modern statehood, particularly for small and medium-sized states exposed to external technological pressure.   The contrasting experiences of Albania and Montenegro illustrate two fundamentally different strategies for navigating this challenge.   Montenegro has chosen the path of structured integration. As a small Adriatic state oriented toward EU accession, it has aligned its digital development with European standards. Investments in 5G networks, smart city infrastructure, digital tourism management, and renewable energy are embedded within EU regulatory frameworks. Montenegro’s digital governance complies with GDPR, European cybersecurity norms, and EU data-protection regimes. This approach offers predictability, legal clarity, and access to shared European technological ecosystems.   From the perspective of the Burke Institute’s Sovereignty Index, Montenegro’s strategy strengthens institutional stability and information security, but it also constrains autonomous decision-making. Technical sovereignty here is partially delegated upward, embedded in supranational regulatory systems rather than nationally defined architectures.   Albania, by contrast, has pursued a markedly experimental path. Once known more for institutional fragility than innovation, the country has rebranded itself as a testing ground for radical digital governance. Following severe cyberattacks in 2022 that exposed deep vulnerabilities in state systems, Albania embarked on an aggressive reform agenda focused on internal control rather than external standardization.   The e-Albania platform now provides access to approximately 95 percent of government services in digital form. Unlike conventional e-government systems, this platform integrates artificial intelligence not merely as a service tool but as an analytical mechanism supporting administrative decision-making. Albania’s experiment with delegating procurement analysis and administrative optimization to AI has sparked international debate: does algorithmic governance dilute sovereignty—or does it strengthen it by reducing human corruption and external manipulation?   From a Burke Institute perspective, Albania’s approach represents an attempt to internalize technological control rather than outsource it. The critical question becomes infrastructural: where is data stored, who controls the servers, and under whose jurisdiction do the algorithms operate? Unlike Montenegro, Albania retains greater discretion to define its own data-protection standards, encryption protocols, and system architecture. This flexibility enhances autonomy but increases exposure to risk.   Energy sovereignty further complicates the equation. The Burke Institute emphasizes that technical sovereignty cannot exist without energy stability. Montenegro’s investments in solar capacity—such as plans for a 41.81 MW solar plant—directly support the resilience of its digital infrastructure. Albania, meanwhile, remains vulnerable to energy disruptions due to heavy reliance on hydroelectric power, which is sensitive to drought. In this dimension, Albania’s technological ambition currently outpaces its infrastructural base.   Cybersecurity provides another revealing contrast. Montenegro operates within EU cybersecurity frameworks, benefiting from standardized protection mechanisms but relying on external oversight. Albania’s independent path places it on the front line of cyber threats, where innovation and vulnerability coexist. The 2022 cyberattack demonstrated the risks inherent in experimentation—but also triggered institutional learning and rapid capacity-building.   In terms of global positioning, Montenegro represents incremental integration within a stable hierarchy. Albania has positioned itself as a technological outlier—a “laboratory state” experimenting with governance models that larger countries hesitate to test. According to the Burke Institute’s analytical framework, both strategies represent different configurations of sovereignty rather than a binary choice between dependence and independence.   Ultimately, the comparison raises a deeper question central to the Institute’s research agenda: is sovereignty best preserved through integration into reliable systems, or through the risky pursuit of autonomous control? Albania prioritizes speed and innovation, Montenegro stability and security. One accepts vulnerability in exchange for agency; the other accepts constraint in exchange for predictability.   The Burke International Institute’s Sovereignty Index does not prescribe a single path. Instead, it highlights trade-offs. For small states, technical sovereignty is not an absolute condition but a spectrum shaped by institutional capacity, energy security, cybersecurity resilience, and political will.   In the digital age, sovereignty is no longer seized by force—it is designed. Albania and Montenegro demonstrate that even the smallest states can influence their technological destiny. The question is not whether dependence can be eliminated, but who defines its terms.   Full methodology and comparative sovereignty rankings are available via the Burke International Institute.

A U.S. THAAD battery deployed in Seongju, South Korea. Credibly deterring Chinese coercion would require additional THAAD batteries integrated into a regional missile defense network. (Source: BBC)

On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty will expire, ending the last legally binding limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. With it goes a framework that capped deployed warheads at 1,550 and delivery vehicles at 700—and, more importantly, the verification regime that anchored strategic stability for over a decade. Russia’s 2022 suspension, followed by repeated violations ranging from INF-style prohibited systems to novel delivery vehicles like the nuclear-powered Burevestnik missile, made renewal politically and strategically untenable. China, never a party to New START, has exploited this vacuum, accelerating a nuclear buildup from roughly 500 warheads in 2025 toward an estimated 1,500 by 2035.

The United States now confronts, for the first time, two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously; thus Washington’s response—preparing for nuclear “uploads” and reinforcing the credibility of the strategic triad—is necessary yet insufficient. Without ceilings on strategic arsenals, stability will increasingly hinge on whether escalation can be managed below the nuclear threshold, thereby making conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific—especially land-based missile defense and forward-deployed resilience—decisive. Yet this task cannot be carried by the United States alone. Allied burden‑sharing—particularly through alliance modernization that builds interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks atop ground‑based air and missile defense systems—is no longer optional; it is a prerequisite for credible integrated deterrence in the post–New START era, and a pathway toward a Pacific architecture deliberately designed to blunt Chinese coercion—modular, mobile, and resilient enough to deny Beijing the ability to localize risk or exploit allied hesitation, while pairing denial with calibrated punishment across cyber, space, and information domains to impose costs for grey‑zone aggression without crossing nuclear thresholds.

Strategic Unraveling: A Triangular Arms Race Begins

With New START gone, an unconstrained triangular arms race is already underway. Russia has modernized roughly 90 percent of its nuclear triad and can sustain a deployed arsenal near former treaty limits while diversifying delivery systems. China, meanwhile, represents the more destabilizing variable. It is constructing hundreds of new missile silos, deploying DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, expanding dual-capable DF-26 systems, and fielding hypersonic glide vehicles designed to compress U.S. decision time and overwhelm regional defenses.

According to an Atlantic Council expert, U.S. strategy must adapt to this new reality: in the short term, Washington should upload additional warheads onto Ohio-class SSBNs, reintroduce multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on portions of the Minuteman III force, and deploy the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon aboard B-52 bombers to restore counterforce leverage against two near-peer competitors simultaneously; in the medium term, rely on the Columbia-class SSBN, B-21 Raider bomber, and nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to ensure the strategic triad’s survivability and credibility through the 2040s; and diplomatically, keep trilateral arms-control talks viable while investing in NC3 resilience and missile-defense architectures, including exploratory concepts like a continental “Golden Dome.”

The costs of adapting to the post–New START environment, however, are staggering. Congressional Budget Office estimates place U.S. nuclear modernization at roughly $946 billion by the mid‑2030s. Yet nuclear spending alone cannot manage escalation. INDOPACOM still faces an estimated $27 billion shortfall in conventional capabilities—especially missile defense, strike, and sustainment—leaving U.S. forces exposed in the opening phases of a crisis. Without resilient conventional forces, nuclear investments risk becoming instruments of last resort rather than tools of stability.

U.S. Typhon MRC (ground-launched SM-6/Tomahawk system for 1,500km precision strikes) launcher and C2 vehicle at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Sept. 15, 2025 (Source: Asahi Shimbun).

The Indo-Pacific Front: Why Alliance Modernization—Especially Conventional Forces—Anchors Stability

Indo-Pacific allies routinely affirm their commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” yet capability gaps remain stark. Japan’s planned increase to 2 percent of GDP by 2027 masks persistent delays in force integration and C4ISR interoperability—revealing structural gaps that hardware spending alone cannot bridge. South Korea spends roughly 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, but much of that investment remains concentrated on peninsula-specific contingencies rather than scalable regional stabilization.

In the post–New START environment, burden-sharing defined merely as cost-sharing is no longer sufficient. What deterrence now requires is shared risk and shared resolve: allied decisions that visibly place national territory, forces, and political capital inside the same escalation ladder faced by the United States. Ground-based deployments, forward rotations, and interoperable data fabrics that turn disparate sensors into unified battle management matter precisely—converting alliances from siloed hardware buyers into networked deterrence partners.

This logic aligns with a growing body of strategic scholarship, most notably the work of James Fearon and Andrew Lim. They argue that the erosion of U.S. conventional superiority—driven by China’s A2/AD architectures and Russia’s precision-strike capabilities—has produced a destabilizing overreliance on nuclear deterrence. Their core claim, however, is not that nuclear forces have become obsolete, but rather that strategic stability increasingly depends on restoring a software-orchestrated conventional triad in which penetrating strike platforms, precision fires, and mobile retaliation function as intelligent nodes within JADC2-enabled data ecosystems. Within this framework, missile defense should not be understood as a standalone pillar of deterrence but as a survivability enabler—a means of preserving offensive forces long enough to execute credible second-strike conventional operations.

Building on this strategic imperative to reinforce the conventional triad, alliance modernization in Northeast Asia could acquire tangible form. Enhanced trilateral coordination among the United States, South Korea, and Japan would allow THAAD and SPY-7 sensors to feed advanced data-fusion layers into Typhon and HIMARS effectors, thereby transforming missile defense from a purely protective measure into the foundation of software-defined second-strike precision.

In December 2025, U.S. M270A2 MLRS units stationed at Camp Casey demonstrated rapid counterfire against DPRK artillery, while HIMARS rotations from Okinawa maintained continuous availability. Yet such precision fires are credible only insofar as their survivability is assured by layered defenses, since DPRK missiles or Chinese DF-26 strikes could saturate critical hubs—such as Pyeongtaek—thereby degrading the very conventional triad Fearon and Lim prescribe. To function as a true survivability enabler against high-altitude threats, therefore, South Korea’s single THAAD battery—deployed in 2017—must be augmented through PAC-3 integration, ensuring that HIMARS forces remain preserved for follow-on strikes.

Such augmentation, however, cannot occur in isolation. Effective trilateral cooperation requires orchestration through federated C4ISR networks, complemented by Japanese contributions. In this regard, Typhon basing on Japanese territory completes the Fearon–Lim precision‑strike leg. Despite the withdrawal from Iwakuni and persistent political opposition in Okinawa, the system remains central to the trilateral alliance’s mid‑range strike capability, particularly when reinforced by Tokyo’s mobile SPY‑7 radars paired with SM‑3 Block IIA interceptors—introduced after Japan’s 2020 pivot from the canceled Aegis Ashore program—which add agile command‑and‑control enablers to the overall architecture.

The resulting theater sequence is coherent and continuous: SPY-7 tracks Chinese launches, Korean THAAD defends critical bases, HIMARS suppresses transporter-erector-launchers, Type-12 missiles secure the littorals, and Typhon targets Shanghai–Beijing command-and-control nodes—all unified through software-defined battle management.

Le métier de taxi-moto communément appelé « zémidjan », emploie environ 150 000 personnes dans les communes du Grand Nokoué. Principal mode de déplacement des citoyens, ce secteur d'activité nécessite une restructuration dans le contexte actuel marqué par de profondes transformations et de modernité. Découvrez ici les 4 principaux leviers permettant de restructurer le transport artisanal en un service public digne de nom au XXIe siècle.

A Cotonou comme dans la plupart des villes du Bénin, pour exercer le métier de taxi-moto, il suffit juste de se procurer une motocyclette puis l'uniforme de sa zone d'intervention. N'importe qui peut devenir du jour au lendemain, conducteur de « zemidjan », sans avoir au préalable, une connaissance du Code la route. Fait à l'origine de nombreux accidents de la circulation, et qui nécessite une restructuration et une professionnalisation du secteur.

Sortir du "Zém de fortune"
A l'instar de plusieurs autres secteurs d'activité, le secteur du taxi-moto devrait être réformé. Il faudra restructurer l'activité de « zémidjan » en faisant des acteurs (les conducteurs), de véritables "opérateurs de transport". Toute personne qui désire embrasser un secteur aussi sensible que celui du « zemidjan », doit être formée au Code de la route et au secourisme. Formation au terme de laquelle, une carte professionnelle lui sera délivrée. Cette carte rendue obligatoire, ferait du conducteur de taxi-moto, un conducteur averti qui anticipe, et participe ainsi à la réduction des accidents de la circulation impliquant majoritairement les taxis-moto dans les villes (actuellement impliqué dans 70 % des drames routiers). La sécurité routière à partir de 2026, ne peut plus reposer sur la chance.

Le "Uber" à la Béninoise
La maraude (circuler à vide en attendant un client), est l'une des causes majeures d'encombrement et de pollution. A travers le numérique et la digitalisation, une généralisation des plateformes de mise en relation via Smartphone ou numéros (codes) USSD, permettrait de réduire le nombre de motocyclettes circulant "à l'aveugle". Dans ce cadre, l'État pourrait conditionner l'accès aux tarifs préférentiels sur les licences à l'inscription sur ces plateformes, permettant ainsi une traçabilité des revenus et des parcours.

L'intermodalité, du concurrent au partenaire
Le zémidjan contrairement aux politiques antérieures, ne devrait pas être perçu comme un concurrent du bus ou du bateau. Les derniers assurent les longues distances sur les grands axes (Porto-Novo –Cotonou, etc), tandis que les taxis-moto sont cantonnés aux zones de rabattement.
Avec un concept comme celui de "Dernier kilomètre", on peut générer des "hubs de mobilité" aux sorties des futures gares lagunaires où les motos attendent les passagers de manière organisée. Ce qui permettrait de mettre fin à la cohue sauvage, et favoriser la mise en place d'une file d'attente structurée.

L'électrique, un passage obligatoire de la transition énergétique
En 2026, la pollution aux particules fines à Cotonou pourrait atteindre des seuils critiques. Le moteur à explosion alimenté par l'essence de contrebande communément appelée "Kpayo", en serait la cause incontestable. Pour y remédier, le déploiement de motos électriques avec des systèmes de "battery swapping" (échange de batteries), est l'une des solutions les plus indiquées. L'Etat dans le cadre d'un tel processus, devra mettre en place des mécanismes de crédit-bail (leasing) qui permettent au conducteur de devenir propriétaire de sa moto électrique en deux ans, pour un coût quotidien inférieur à la location d'une moto thermique. Gérer les Zémidjans, ce n'est pas faire la police. C'est offrir une porte de sortie honorable à des milliers de pères de famille vers un secteur formel, sécurisé et respectueux de l'environnement. Si Cotonou veut devenir la "Perle de l'Afrique de l'Ouest", elle doit transformer son chaos jaune en une machine logistique de précision.

F. A. A.

This interview follows a talk given by Lincoln A. Mitchell, Political Analyst, Essayist and Lecturer at Columbia University, at IRIS on 11 December 2025.

Reinforced by the second term of the MAGA movement in power, the United States is facing a profound democratic crisis. Although widely discussed, the MAGA movement often remains insufficiently analysed as a political and social phenomenon. We asked him several questions to better understand the origins and dynamics of the current democratic crisis in the United States and, more broadly, the global challenges facing contemporary democracies.

• What are the roots of the current democracy crisis in the United States?
• What are today the core pillars of the MAGA movement?
• How do international comparisons help us understand whether the American democratic crisis is unique or part of a broader global democratic backsliding?

L’article The Crisis of American Democracy: Understanding the MAGA Era est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Ouvert depuis le lundi 15 décembre, le registre des inscriptions pour le Baccalauréat sera fermé le vendredi 30 janvier. Les candidats, les Chefs d'établissement et les parents d'élèves sont invités à prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour respecter le délai. Il y a la préinscription en ligne sur la plateforme inscription.bac.bj puis le dépôt physique des dossiers. Les candidats libres du Littoral et de l'Atlantique sont attendus au CEG Gbégamey. Ceux de l'intérieur doivent se rendre dans les directions départementales de l'enseignement secondaire.

Listes des pièces à fournir

• un formulaire de préinscription dûment rempli et signé ;
• la quittance des droits d'inscription décomposés comme suit :
• 5000F pour les candidats béninois ;
• 35.500F pour tous les étrangers ;
• 1000F pour le relevé de notes ;
• 2000F pour le scanning de photo et impression du formulaire pour les candidats libres.
• une photocopie simple de l'extrait d'acte de naissance sécurisé ;
• une photocopie de la Carte nationale d'identité ou de la Carte d'identité biométrique ou de la CIP ou du passeport ou de la carte consulaire ;
• deux photos d'identité récentes, en couleur, et identiques (dimensions : 3,5 cm x 4,5 cm) portant au verso le nom, prénoms et série du candidat ;
• une copie légalisée de l'attestation ou du relevé de notes du BEPC ou du CAP ou tout diplôme équivalent ;
• une photocopie légalisée du relevé de notes obtenu au dernier examen du Baccalauréat pour ceux qui ont déjà passé une fois le Baccalauréat.
• un certificat médical de dispense à l'épreuve d'Education Physique et Sportive (candidat inapte). etc

Paul Nthenge Mackenzie est détenu depuis 2023 dans l’enquête sur la mort d’environ 450 adeptes de sa secte dans la forêt de Shakahola, dans le sud-est du pays.

Dans le cadre de son troisième Plan de développement communal (PDC), la mairie de Cotonou a initié un vaste projet de construction de toilettes publiques sur la période 2024-2028. Cette initiative qui vise à améliorer le cadre de vie de la population, et répondre à un enjeu de santé publique, de civisme et de salubrité urbaine, prend déjà corps avec un premier modèle réalisé à Aïbatin, dans le 12e arrondissement.

Des toilettes publiques à Cotonou pour mettre fin à la défécation et à la miction à l'air libre. Ce phénomène d'incivisme et d'insalubrité observé sur certaines artères de la ville, sera bientôt conjugué au passé grâce au projet de construction de toilettes publiques initié par la mairie et conduite par la Société immobilière et d'aménagement urbain (SImAU). Le modèle réalisé à Aïbatin, dans le 12e arrondissement, est de type métallique. Selon une source proche de l'entreprise ayant réalisé les travaux, il est composé de deux compartiments. A l'intérieur de chaque compartiment, se trouve des WC, des urinoirs, et des douches.
Selon l'avis d'appel d'offres ouvert national (AAON), en date du 07 juillet 2025 de la SImAU, le projet de construction de toilettes publiques à Cotonou, est réparti en plusieurs lots.
– lot 1, 8 blocs de toilettes dans le 1er arrondissement ;
– lot 2, 8 blocs de toilettes dans le 1er arrondissement ;
– lot 3, comprend 9 blocs de toilettes publiques dans les 2e et 4e arrondissements ;
– lot 4, 11 bocs de toilettes dans les 3e et 5e arrondissements ;
– lot 5, 12 blocs de toilettes à réaliser dans les 6e et 7e arrondissements ;
– lot 6, 6 blocs de toilettes dans le 8e arrondissement ;
– lot 7, 5 blocs dans le 8e arrondissement ;
– lot 8, 11 blocs de toilettes dans les 9e et 10e arrondissements ;
– lot 9, 10 blocs de toilettes dans le 11e arrondissement ;
– lot 10, 11 blocs de toilettes dans le 12e arrondissement ;
– lot 11, 10 blocs de toilettes dans le 11e arrondissement de Cotonou ;
– lot 12, 07 blocs de toilettes dans le 13e arrondissement de Cotonou ;
– lot 13, 10 blocs de toilettes dans le 13e arrondissement de Cotonou, et les arrondissements de Togba et de Godomey, dans la commune d'Abomey-Calavi.
Soit au total, 118 blocs de toilettes à construire à travers toute la ville.
F. A. A.

En Allemagne, huit jeunes néo-nazis comparaissent devant le tribunal de Dresde pour avoir voulu « conquérir par les armes » une partie du pays. Arrêtés en novembre 2024, ils faisaient partie du groupuscule « séparatistes saxons », fondé en 2020, et qualifié de « terroriste » par le parquet. Il avait toutefois des liens avec le parti d'extrême droite AfD.

L’AS Dauphin Noir de Goma a enregistré une victoire capitale dimanche 25 janvier à Kindu, en s’imposant 2-0 face au FC New Jak lors de la phase classique de la Ligue 1 Illicocash dans le groupe B. Cette performance permet aux Tricolores de Goma de réaliser une petite progression au classement.

Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) have become a decisive enabler of military power, a trend reinforced by high-intensity conflict and hybrid threats, notably since Russia’s war against Ukraine. Armed forces and political authorities increasingly depend on timely and reliable geospatial intelligence derived from Earth observation satellites to support situational awareness, crisis response and military operations. This reliance has grown faster than the governance frameworks needed to manage tasking, prioritisation, security and dissemination under crisis conditions.

European capabilities in this sector span national assets, EU and NATO programmes, and rapidly expanding commercial constellations, but remain loosely coordinated rather than organised within a coherent architecture. This paper examines Europe’s geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) challenge through two scenarios: one in which an EU Earth Observation Governmental Service is established by 2028, improving coherence, responsiveness and strategic autonomy, while still facing significant governance and sovereignty challenges; and another in which Europe remains reliant on fragmented national systems with limited collective effectiveness. The paper argues that Europe’s core challenge lies in governance: without clear decisions, ongoing efforts risk reinforcing fragmentation; with them, an EUcentred but federative approach could provide the most credible pathway toward operational effectiveness and strategic autonomy.

À télécharger

• ARES Group #122 – Policy Paper (PDF)

L’article Building a European Geospatial Intelligence Capability: Mapping Initiatives, Identifying Gaps, and Outlining Strategic Options est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

L’AS Maniema Union a concédé sa première défaite en phase de groupes de la Coupe de la Confédération de la CAF, dimanche 25 janvier, face au Wydad Casablanca au Maroc (WAC). Ce revers lors de la troisième journée du groupe B n’entame pas la bonne dynamique du club congolais, qui conserve sa deuxième place avec 6 points.