Die Europäische Kommission erwägt seit 2024, die Zuständigkeiten und Aktivitäten von Europol auszubauen. Das Personal der Agentur soll dabei verdoppelt und ihr Mandat um drei Themen erweitert werden – Sabotage, Desinformation und hybride Bedrohungen. Angepeilt werden eine noch zu definierende Umgestaltung von Europol in eine »schlagkräftige« Polizeibehörde und eine stärkere Kontrolle über die Agentur. Diese Vorhaben, die auf politischen wie bürokratischen Überlegungen beruhen, kamen ohne vorherige Konsultation der EU-Mitgliedstaaten und technische Abschätzung zustande. 2026 will die Kommission den Mitgliedstaaten einen Vorschlag für die Mandatsänderung vorlegen. Der Schwerpunkt einer Weiterentwicklung von Europol sollte jedoch nicht unbedingt auf einem neuen Mandat liegen, sondern sich vorrangig nach dem operativen Bedarf richten, den die nationalen Strafverfolgungsbehörden bei der Bekämpfung von Drogenhandel, Cyberkriminalität und Terrorismus haben. In diesen Kernbereichen sind Personalaufstockung und Innovation erforderlich, jedoch nicht zwingend durch eine Mandatsreform. Generell bedarf es bei der EU einer langfristigen Strategie für die künftige Architektur der inneren Sicherheit, an der sich eine Ausgestaltung von Europol orientieren sollte.
La nature duale des technologies provenant des écosystèmes chinois et américain
conduit les deux pays à entrer en rivalité selon le modèle de la course aux armes avec peu de
leviers pour réduire l’intensité de cette compétition. Cette note propose d’examiner les
caractéristiques de cette structure sociale de rivalité technologique selon ce modèle de course
aux armes et d’identifier les facteurs structurant de cette situation.
L’article La rivalité technologique sino-américaine est-elle une course aux écosystèmes ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are under political and financial pressure. In his letter dated 10 October 2025, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on nine missions to prepare contingency plans for spending cuts of up to 25 per cent. The peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964, shows why Europe has a fundamental interest in the UN remaining engaged.
The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus in the Greek-speaking south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish-speaking region recognised only by Ankara, has been largely frozen since the de facto division of the island. This certainly has also been due to UNFICYP’s presence. Since the 1974 ceasefire, the mission has controlled the “Green Line”, a 180-kilometre strip separating the two parts that is intended to prevent direct confrontation.
Nevertheless, the mission continues to record numerous military and civilian violations in and along the buffer zone By doing so, it still prevents “those sparks from bursting into flames”, as Colin Stewart, head of UNFICYP until August 2025, put it. To this day, there still is no direct military contact mechanism between the parties. In fact, the threat perception has increased again on both sides recently.
New impetus for peace effortsFor this reason alone, the European Union and its member states cannot be interested in any further reduction or even a potential withdrawal of the mission. The political process is just beginning to tentatively gain momentum. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar was reappointed as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy in May 2025 and is tasked with exploring possibilities for a new round of formal negotiations and breaking the deadlock.
This is a difficult undertaking. While the UN Security Council continues to pursue a federal solution, Northern Cyprus and Turkey have been promoting a two-state solution for years. However, the election of Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman in October has raised hopes that the door could open for new negotiations under UN auspices. The first trilateral meeting between him, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Holguín has just taken place. But a rapprochement is likely to take time. Confidence-building measures and the safeguarding of peace by the UN therefore remain essential.
The essential role of the UNAs the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU, the Union itself can hardly act as an impartial mediator. It therefore primarily supports the UN-led political process. The EU’s options in the security domain are also constrained. A separate EU mission – as is currently being considered for Lebanon following the withdrawal of UNIFIL – would be unrealistic, if only because of the tense relationship between Greece and Turkey, both of which, alongside the United Kingdom, are the guarantor powers for Cyprus.
Therefore, the stabilising function of the UN mission remains essential for the foreseeable future. It also creates the framework for practical rapprochement, for example through the projects of the Technical Committees. Under joint Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and facilitated by the UN, these initiatives promote understanding between the two communities, and the EU provides a large portion of the funding.
UNFICYP is in a better financial position than many larger UN missions, as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus cover about half of the budget. However, staffing and operational cuts will be necessary. At the same time, the raison d'être of a mission that has been running for decades is repeatedly being called into question. At the end of January 2026, the mandate is up for renewal again. Despite all the criticisms from the Turkish government and former leaders in Northern Cyprus, the UN Security Council's position has remained unchanged so far.
In order to break the deadlock in negotiations, there is a need for more economic engagement from the European side to improve the situation in the north. In the short term, however, EU member states should make it clear that UNFICYP – and UN peacekeeping as a whole – is indispensable.
By CIVICUS
Dec 19 2025 (IPS)
CIVICUS discusses climate displacement and Tuvalu’s future with Kiali Molu, a former civil servant at Tuvalu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently a PhD candidate at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and the University of Bergen in Norway. His research focuses on state sovereignty and climate change in the Pacific.
Kiali Molu
In Tuvalu, one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations, rising seas and intensifying storms have made life increasingly precarious. Over 80 per cent of people have applied for Australia’s new climate visa under a treaty signed in November 2023. Under the treaty, 280 Tuvaluans can resettle in Australia each year through a ballot system. While recognising Australia’s willingness to host Tuvaluans, civil society continues to pressure major emitters, including Australia, to cut greenhouse gas emissions and fund climate adaptation measures in vulnerable countries to prevent further displacement.Why have so many Tuvaluans applied for Australia’s climate mobility visa?
This visa is part of the Falepili Union Treaty agreed by Australia and Tuvalu. The treaty combines a special mobility pathway, guarantees around Tuvalu’s statehood and sovereignty and a broader security arrangement. Under the mobility component, Tuvaluans can apply for residency in Australia through a ballot system, without being forced to permanently relocate.
Many applications are driven by practical reasons, such as employment opportunities to be able to support families back home. Others value the ability to travel more freely, particularly given Australia’s historically long and uncertain visa processes. Access to education opportunities and social protections also matter. What’s important is that selection under this pathway does not require people to leave Tuvalu. It creates choice and security in a context where the future feels increasingly uncertain.
How is climate change reshaping daily life in Tuvalu?
Rising sea levels and frequent king tides regularly flood homes, public buildings and roads, interrupting community gatherings, education and work. Coastal erosion continues to reduce habitable land, while saltwater intrusion contaminates groundwater and destroys pulaka pits that are central to food security, as they’re used to grow staple root crops.
These impacts extend beyond infrastructure: higher reliance on imported food means families face rising costs, and stagnant water means a rise in waterborne diseases. Constant flooding is increasing anxiety about displacement and cultural continuity, and farming and fishing livelihoods are becoming harder to sustain. Climate change affects our food, health, housing and identity every single day.
What does potential resettlement mean for Tuvaluan culture and identity?
Our identity is inseparable from our community, our land and the ocean surrounding it. Tuvaluan culture is rooted in fenua – shared practices around agriculture and fishing, church life and the falekaupule, a community meeting house. Large-scale resettlement risks disrupting these foundations. The transmission of everyday cultural practices, language and oral history may weaken if younger Tuvaluans grow up away from the islands.
However, mobility doesn’t automatically mean cultural loss. Tuvaluan communities abroad are finding ways to preserve collective life, language and traditions through associations, churches and digital platforms. Initiatives such as the Tuvalu Digital Nation aim to safeguard cultural heritage virtually. Still, there is no substitute for ancestral land, and this raises profound questions about what it means to be Tuvaluan if our homeland becomes uninhabitable.
What climate adaptation measures does Tuvalu urgently need?
Adaptation for Tuvalu is not only about renewable energy and seawalls. While these remain essential, there’s also a critical legal and political dimension. The international system still defines statehood on the basis of physical territory, offering little protection to nations facing permanent land loss due to climate change.
We believe Tuvalu should push for a new global legal framework that rethinks sovereignty in the context of climate displacement. This would protect Tuvalu’s international legal personality, maritime boundaries and political rights even if parts of its territory become uninhabitable. This diplomatic strategy is needed as much as physical adaptation measures because it addresses national survival, not just infrastructure resilience.
What responsibilities do major polluters have towards climate-vulnerable states?
Major polluters have legal and moral obligations towards climate-vulnerable countries. International law increasingly recognises duties to reduce emissions, prevent environmental harm and cooperate in protecting those most at risk. Recent legal developments, including advisory opinions from international courts, reinforce that these responsibilities are enforceable, not optional.
These obligations go beyond emissions cuts. They include providing climate finance through mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund, supporting adaptation efforts and sharing technology. For countries like Tuvalu, this support is fundamental to preserving lives, culture and sovereignty. Continued inaction by major emitters should not be seen solely as political failure, but also as a breach of international law.
GET IN TOUCH
LinkedIn
SEE ALSO
‘The ICJ’s advisory opinion strengthens climate justice by establishing legal principles states cannot ignore’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Abdul Shaheed 24.Sep.2025
International Court of Justice signals end to climate impunity CIVICUS Lens 01.Aug.2025
‘Australia must turn its climate rhetoric into action’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jacynta Fa’amau 27.Sep.2024
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
Le prochain budget de l'UE offre l'occasion de restaurer la crédibilité du processus d'adhésion à l'UE. Cela est urgent. Et abordable.
- Libres opinions. L'espace de débat du Courrier des Balkans / Elargissement UE, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, SerbieLe prochain budget de l'UE offre l'occasion de restaurer la crédibilité du processus d'adhésion à l'UE. Cela est urgent. Et abordable.
- Libres opinions. L'espace de débat du Courrier des Balkans / Elargissement UE, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, SerbieLe prochain budget de l'UE offre l'occasion de restaurer la crédibilité du processus d'adhésion à l'UE. Cela est urgent. Et abordable.
- Libres opinions. L'espace de débat du Courrier des Balkans / Elargissement UE, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, SerbieLe prochain budget de l'UE offre l'occasion de restaurer la crédibilité du processus d'adhésion à l'UE. Cela est urgent. Et abordable.
- Libres opinions. L'espace de débat du Courrier des Balkans / Elargissement UE, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Albanie, Kosovo, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Serbie