Agrégateur de flux

Not long ago Jeff Shockey was being investigated over his role in multiple political scandals as a congressional staffer and lobbyist, but

With war raging on Hungary's doorstep, former military intelligence chief Jozsef Kovacs is establishing himself as a central but discreet

In Vienna, where Western spymasters and their counterparts come in from the cold have traditionally met, agents from the Austrian

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) broke with its usual discretion for the launch of its geostationary orbit satellite monitoring system

Ammertex, a small firm registered in Singapore since 2009, has been busy of late trying to cater to its Russian

On-the-ground help will bolster Kyiv without risking escalation.

The West Struggles to Understand Russia—But Can Still Help Ukraine Win.

Farming fish has seen rapid growth in Africa but it can be an expensive, high-risk operation.

Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, recently warned attendees at the Kiev Security Forum that “World War III is already underway.” He may be onto something.

The war between Russia and Ukraine began on February 24, 2022. In the first few weeks, it seemed as if the Russians would crush the Ukrainians in a blitzkrieg-style offensive. That prediction was wildly inaccurate. The Russian army was ill-prepared for the mission, and its equipment was far less effective than expected. To say that the morale of its soldiers was not high is an understatement.

By late Spring 2022, the Washington Blob was once again wildly off-base, with experts predicting that Russia would capitulate under the Western sanctions. Those expecting a calamity for the Russian economy learned nothing from Western sanctions on North Korea and Iran—two countries much smaller than Russia that have endured severe sanctions over many years. The sanctions undeniably damaged their economies but didn’t change the fundamental nature of the regimes.

Today, Russia and Ukraine appear locked in a “foxhole” war, similar to World War I, where both sides suffered massive casualties without significant territorial or strategic gains. It seems increasingly likely that this stalemate may last for years. There are several reasons to believe this could be the case.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine appears to have the military capability to defeat the other side. At the same time, neither Vladimir Putin nor Volodymyr Zelensky can quit. If Zelensky throws in the towel, his country will no longer be free, and he will likely fall from power. If Putin quits, he will demolish his image as Russia’s strongman and face challenges to his rule.

Some journalists have predicted that the war’s unpopularity, owing to the high casualty count, coupled with the heavy toll of the sanctions, could turn the Russian people against Putin. This, too, is wildly off-base. Russian history is replete with leaders who imposed enormous losses on the population without paying the price of regime collapse. Major strategic miscalculations by Joseph Stalin and his top brass led to humiliating military defeats to the invading Nazi army throughout Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The Soviets lost vast territory, and their casualties numbered in the millions even before the notoriously bloody Battle of Stalingrad commenced. As Russians still boast today, the hardship steeled the resolve of the Russian army and people, leading to a historic victory over the German invaders.

Of course, none of this means the world is marching toward a total war. But key scenarios still could precipitate a turn for the worst. For example, a collapse of the Russian frontlines (e.g., Ukrainian troops breaking through Zaporizhia, Kherson, and surrounding areas and establishing a significant bridgehead on the Crimea peninsula) could prompt Russia to deploy nuclear weapons (tactical or strategic) to restore the balance. Deputy Chairman of Russia’s National Security Council Dmitry Medvedev has repeatedly warned that Russia won’t hesitate to use such weapons if necessary. Similarly, a sudden Ukrainian collapse—leading to the fall of Kiev—may cause the United States and its NATO allies to introduce new, more destructive weapons or even deploy “boots on the ground” to restore the balance. In either scenario, the road to WWIII is not only a scenario for science fiction.

More broadly, a miscalculation by either party could have unintended consequences. For example, a Russian anti-aircraft battery downing a NATO jet fighter crossing from Polish airspace into Ukraine due to a navigational error could push NATO to invoke Article 5. Similarly, if Russian long-range missiles accidentally strike a target in one of Ukraine’s NATO neighbors, causing significant fatalities, Article 5 invocation, again, is not out of the question.

Should another nation-state join the war, it could spark a wider war. During the last eighteen months, thousands of foreign fighters have joined both sides. The situation is reminiscent of the international brigades that fought for the Nationalists and the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). But, as the stalemate persists on the front lines, we may see other nations step in. Belarus, where President Lukashenko has sided with the Russians from the start, is an obvious candidate. Another candidate is North Korea. Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un recently replenished Russian stores of weapons and ammunition from his own arsenals. Kim will likely shed no tears if North Korean troops die in Ukraine, gaining him a more significant role on the world stage.

On the other side of the ledger, it remains unlikely that Western countries like Britain, Germany, or France would dispatch troops to Ukraine. But given the deep historical enmity and suspicion that some Eastern European nations, like Poland, harbor toward Russia, who knows what could happen?

So far, China has attempted to convey a policy of neutrality, even as Beijing helps Moscow behind the scenes. China understands that its current economic crisis is partially related to deteriorating relations with the United States. However, conflict may not be a deterrent for Beijing. The Chinese leadership is actively weighing a war of conquest or forced integration of Taiwan. President Xi Jinping could, at some point, offer the Russians a deal whereby they would back his invasion of Taiwan in exchange for Chinese support against the United States and Europe. While some might dismiss this, it is instructive to remember that the People’s Liberation Army (the largest in the world) is about to enter the fifth and final year of its major modernization plan. If the war between Russia and Ukraine is still raging in 2025, such a scenario may be more realistic. 

Thankfully, there are also good news scenarios that could end the conflict and, therefore, the diminished likelihood of a global conflict. In a sense, Ukraine and Russia have proven their ability to maintain some sort of ceasefire by avoiding an all-out war after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. Relative calm endured through 2022. It wasn’t a complete ceasefire, as regular skirmishes continued in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (where most of the population are ethnic Russians). Still, it was kept (more or less) under control. Thus, both sides might agree to a ceasefire if it means not accepting defeat.

One significant wildcard is former president Donald Trump. If Trump returns to the White House next year, he will likely uphold his promise and cut all aid to Ukraine. He could even apply pressure on his NATO allies to stop their support. In such a scenario, the Ukrainians may reluctantly agree to a ceasefire under disadvantageous conditions. 

While the chances for the war in Ukraine to evolve into a global conflict are not high, they are not nil either. Tensions are high, and European nations are increasing their defense spending. The fear of wider Russian aggression has many of these countries on edge. They understand that as the war drags on, as the casualties mount, and the sanctions pressure grows, the “wounded bear” can become even more dangerous and potentially more prone to miscalculation.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion. He previously served as Prime Minister Netanyahu’s national security advisor and the head of Israel National Security Council (acting).

Lt. Colonel (res.) Boaz Golany is a Professor at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, where he has served as a Dean, VP for External Relations & Resource Development, and Executive VP & Director General. His research interests cover diverse areas of applied operations research. He has also served as a board member and consultant to various companies and organizations.

Image: Shutterstock.

It is commonplace to observe that Beijing enjoys control over much of the globe’s rare earth and critical mineral extraction and processing industries. China built this dominance over two decades and is unwilling to give it up. On the other hand, America’s critical minerals supply chains feature extensive vulnerabilities that private enterprise cannot resolve independently. The U.S. government faces a daunting challenge in establishing resilient, competitive, and alternative critical mineral supply chains immune to disruptions and economic coercion.

The United States must cooperate with its allies on critical minerals for two reasons. First, its industries have expansive demands that cannot be met by increased domestic production alone. Second, it does not possess enough mines and accessible deposits of all the critical minerals industry needs.

The U.S. economy’s already extensive critical minerals demand will grow almost exponentially in the coming decades. Demand for lithium, a crucial input in electric vehicle (EV) batteries, is projected to increase by 4,000 percent in the coming decades. 

No single nation can meet the projected global demand for critical minerals on its own. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that fifty new lithium mines, sixty new nickel mines, and seventeen new cobalt mines will be required to meet global demand. These are only three of fifty minerals that the United States now classifies as “critical minerals.”

No nation has enough proven resources to meet this demand, but a few are key. The concentration of minerals is spread worldwide, including in China, Russia, the Congo, South America, and Australia. Many countries with large mineral reserves are strategic competitors or politically unstable.

China currently controls the critical minerals and rare earth marketplace. It is the global lead producer of twenty-nine commodities, including twenty-two metals and seven industrial minerals. It refines up to ninety percent of the world’s rare earth ore.

Where China does not possess a near monopoly, it can control the market through “monopsony”—a market condition featuring one overbearingly and singularly important customer. While it does not produce the most essential battery materials—lithium, cobalt, and graphite—it buys, refines, and exports them to incomparable degrees.

Beijing is using this market power in increasingly coercive ways. It has increased restrictions on its critical minerals exports nine times between 2009 and 2020, more than any other supplier. It has cut off Japanese supply for geopolitical reasons and threatened U.S. defense contractors’ supply chains.

Removing China entirely from global critical mineral supply chains is not economically feasible. But competition is needed. America’s critical minerals supply chains cannot depend on a single nation, especially an unreliable one.

With its unparalleled natural wealth in critical minerals, rare earths, and other vital commodities, Australia has emerged as the key ally to bolster the United States’ security and resilience in this vital domain.

However, Australia needs more capital and foreign investment to transform potential into viable supply chains. To date, Chinese state-owned investors have been more than happy to meet this need. 

As a global region, Oceania alone has outstripped Asia’s mineral production since 2000, and this growth has been driven almost exclusively by Australia. But China was also Australia’s largest buyer—fueling its growth with Australian raw materials. 

The Australian government has already acted to inhibit Chinese ownership of critical minerals mining projects, creating space for capital from the United States and like-minded nations.

Australia’s vastness and lack of funding have left significant natural reserves untapped. It has also left Australia, in mining terms, underexplored. Vast reserves might remain hidden in the Land Down Under. 

The United States is not alone in its demand for critical minerals. Global demand is increasing broadly across large economies, and there will be healthy competition from Japan, the EU, and India. The United States has already begun to deepen critical minerals cooperation with Australia, with President Joe Biden promising to designate Australia as a “domestic source” under the Defense Production Act (DPA), allowing Australia to benefit from the $369 billion Inflation Reduction Act clean energy incentives.

A solid economic incentive exists for mutual investment between Australia and the United States in critical mineral mining, refining, and manufacturing. U.S.-Australia ties are also significant and deepening in other areas, principally in defense through the trilateral AUKUS agreement.

At the 2023 Darwin Dialogue, a one-point-five track dialogue with representatives from the US, Japan, and Australia, a clear message emerged for the way forward. Australian, Japanese, and American governments and industry leaders must work together to develop viable, competitive alternative critical mineral markets that offer products through supply chains secure from domestic policy disruptions and economic coercion.

Dr. John Coyne is Head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institutes Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre.

Henry Campbell is the Coordinator of the Australian Strategic Policy Institutes Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau sparked a diplomatic crisis by accusing India’s government of complicity in the June 2023 murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canada-based Sikh leader, in suburban Vancouver. The Canadian government alludes publicly to supposed intelligence that it neither details nor releases. Trudeau’s publication of the matter comes against the backdrop of declining popularity and a frosty reception at the G20 Summit.

After Trudeau’s comments, both Canada and India expelled senior diplomats from the other’s embassies. Canada has reportedly sought U.S. support in the spat. The Biden administration denies rebuffing Canada, but appears wary of antagonizing India.

Frankly, Biden is right to avoid giving immediate support to Trudeau.

First, there is the problem of Nijjar himself. Canadians may say he simply was a plumber who was a political activist on the side. The reality is more complicated.

Nijjar lived in India for twenty years, during which he joined the Khalistan Tiger Force—a separatist group waging an insurgency in Punjab, an Indian state twice the size of Massachusetts with a population the size of Florida’s.

The Khalistan movement argues for a separate Sikh state, a goal the militants often seek to impose with violence since the majority of Sikhs reject such religious nationalism. In 1997, Nijjar reportedly fled to Canada using a fake passport under the name Ravi Sharma. Police at the Toronto airport arrested him, but he countered with an asylum claim based on alleged police harassment in India. The courts ultimately rejected his asylum claim, but then he sought citizenship based on a marriage to a Canadian woman. Immigration authorities initially rejected this, too, based on suspicion the marriage was fake. But on appeal, the Canadian government awarded him citizenship and a passport.

In 2015, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency allegedly used Nijjar to help them establish a training camp for Khalistan militants near Mission, British Columbia. India accused Nijjar of involvement in a number of terror acts, including planning the 2007 bombing of a Ludhiana cinema, the 2009 murder of prominent Sikh politician Rulda Singh; a conspiracy to kill Hindu religious leader Kamaldeep Sharma in Jalandhar; involvement in a temple explosion in Patiala in 2010; and a number of assassinations.

In effect, Canada knowingly harbored a person suspected of having plenty of blood on his hands. India is right to be upset by Canada’s tolerance for Sikh extremism. Not only does the country harbor the Khalistan Tiger Force, but it also hosts the World Sikh Organization, Sikhs for Justice, and Babbar Khalsa International, all groups that Indian officials say promote violence and/or have links to foreign powers.

Canada, after all, would be right to be angry if a Quebecois fringe decided the proper way to pursue the goal of Quebec nationhood was to assassinate politicians and bomb cinemas. If such terrorists then based themselves in India, Canada’s rhetoric would be far different.

That might be hypothetical, but the inconsistencies in Trudeau’s approach to violence on his watch are real. Consider the death of Karima Baloch, a Pakistani human rights activist found murdered in Toronto. Canadian police took the lead on the case. Even after suggestions of Pakistani government complicity, Trudeau remained silent.

The Canadians also appear to blame India for what might simply be the manifestation of intra-Sikh violence on their own soil. Nijjar’s death could easily have been reprisal for an earlier killing. In July 2022, two gunmen murdered Ripudaman Singh Malik, a prominent Sikh once accused but then acquitted of the bombings of two Air India flights, in Vancouver.  Malik later became president of a large credit union, served as the chair of two schools, and managed the Satnam Religious Prachaar Society. Nijjar protested the group’s printing of Sri Guru Granth Sahib, a major Sikh holy book, without permission from other Sikh figures. Just days before Ripudaman’s murder, Nijjar led a group of Sikhs to storm one of his schools and seize its printing press. The simple reality is the situation is complex.

Could Indian agents have murdered Nijjar? Certainly, though it does not seem the likely scenario. After Saudi agents killed Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, Turkey provided evidence to back its claims. That Trudeau is unable to do so suggests he may very well have shot from the hip and politicized an investigation.

Trudeau is cynical. Sikh activists are influential in key swing districts for the forthcoming election. Trudeau might simply have wanted to change the domestic political conversation when he accused India, without recognizing that he would create a diplomatic incident. Fair enough. American politicians do the same thing. Donald Trump promised to make Mexico pay for the border wall he hoped to build. As Senator Barack Obama’s running mate, Joe Biden unleashed a fierce broadside against Afghanistani president Hamid Karzai as a proxy for criticism about George W. Bush’s foreign policy prowess. The U.S.-Israel feud grew after a senior Obama administration official called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an expletive. In each case, what essentially was rhetoric meant for the domestic audience snowballed into an international incident.

 Trudeau’s broadside against India is likely no different. The U.S.-India relationship is simply too important to sacrifice for the venality of a Canadian politician who increasingly shows himself to be shallow and unserious.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

The day after a RAF Typhoon carried out the first ever landing on a road strip in Finland, RNoAF (Royal Norwegian Air Force) F-35A aircraft have operated out of Tervo road base too. Two F-35As [...]

The post Norwegian F-35A Jets Carry Out Type’s First Highway Landing On Finnish Road Strip appeared first on The Aviationist.

A small tax on the richest 0.5 percent would increase EU tax revenues by €213.2 billion, says a new report by the Greens.

EU money spent on migration in Tunisia, Libya, and Niger is likely breaching its own and international aid rules, according to a new report by Oxfam.

Following years of pressure and activism, the Dutch government published a report estimating that fossil fuel subsidies in the country amount to an annual sum ranging from €39.7bn to €46.4bn.

(B2) Les mois passent. Et le couple franco-allemand patine toujours. Sur une question-clé : la défense. La rencontre des ministres Lecornu et Pistorius, aujourd'hui à Évreux, pourra sans doute aplanir quelques difficultés passagères. Mais elle ne suffira pas à redynamiser une relation difficile. De partenaires, Paris et Berlin, sont devenus rivaux. L'enjeu : le leadership européen dans ce domaine.

Les Allemands bien présents lors de l'évacuation au Soudan, mais en deuxième temps (Photo : Bundeswehr)

Des ratés en cascade

Entre la rénovation en commun des hélicoptères Tigre, stoppée, le projet d'avion de patrouille maritime, avorté, la liste des projets interrompus ces dernières années est désormais plus longue que celles des projets enclenchés. La réalité est cruelle : sur les quatre projets définis il y a cinq ans, au sommet de Meseberg, un seul a été enclenché : le SCAF. Non sans difficultés. Et toujours sans certitude sur son aboutissement (1).

Un encalminage révélateur d'un blocage

Quant au dernier, le  système de chars du futur, alias MGCS, il est encalminé. On peut se demander si le projet allemand de préparer le successeur du char Leopard actuel enterre le projet commun ou, au contraire, lui donne un coup de pression ? L'un se situant à cout terme, à l'horizon 2030, l'autre à plus long terme, à l'horizon 2040 (lire : [Actualité] MBT versus MGCS. Quelles répercussions sur la coopération franco-allemande ?). Peu importe. Ce qui est intéressant c'est de bien voir que dans l'un ou l'autre des projets, ce n'est pas la France, mais l'Allemagne qui est au cœur des projets.

Une Allemagne plus fédératrice que la France

Idem pour le bouclier anti-missile lancé par l'Allemagne. Présentée à l'automne 2022, l'initiative European Sky Shield (ESSI) fédère. Aux quinze pays de départ, sont venus s'ajouter quatre autres : Danemark, Suède en février, puis Autriche et Suisse en juillet (cf.Carnet 04.07.2023). Et pas à pas, le projet prend forme. Un contrat vient ainsi d'être signé, il y a quelques jours, entre Allemands et Baltes(cf. Carnet 14.09.2023) . Les Français peuvent bien tempêter (lire : [Actualité] Défense aérienne : Emmanuel Macron dézingue l’approche allemande sans proposer d’alternative concrète), le projet avance inéluctablement. Là encore l'Allemagne est au centre du jeu. La France, sur la touche.

Un réarmement en cours

Nous assistons à un changement majeur d'orientation politique en Allemagne. Pour autant qu'il soit assumé dans la durée - ce qui n'est pas encore assuré à ce stade - ce changement pourrait reconfigurer la carte de l'Europe stratégique. Pour l'heure, l'Allemagne est décidée à se réarmer, à s'équiper et le fait savoir haut et fort. Le temps des atermoiements sur la défense, de grandes déclarations à Berlin suivies de peu d'effet (lire : Défense. L’Allemagne cause beaucoup et agit peu. Pourquoi ?) semble terminé. Certes c'est lent, et parfois balbutiant.

Une lenteur allemande qui ne doit pas faire illusion

Toutes les promesses d'un réinvestissement massif — le fameux fonds de 100 milliards — ne sont ainsi pas encore tenues. Et nul ne sait ce qu'il adviendra à l'échéance. Le budget de défense reste encore grevé par les dépenses en personnels, sociales et de santé. Mais, avec la part annuelle de l'enveloppe exceptionnelle, il devrait atteindre dès 2024 la bagatelle de 71 milliards d'euros, avec pas moins de 19 milliards consacrés aux équipements. A comparer aux 47 milliards d'euros du budget français, on a un écart budgétaire de près de 25 milliards d'euros (près de 30 milliards si on rajoute le nucléaire auquel n'est pas assujetti l'Allemagne).

Une double menace sur l'Allemagne

Les Allemands n'ont pas soudainement redécouvert la géopolitique et l'outil militaire. Ils n'ont pas vraiment envie d'avoir une défense propre. Mais le contexte a changé. Et l'Allemagne, inquiète, s'adapte. Pays du centre-européen, elle doit se garder des deux côtés. Sur son flanc Ouest, l'Allemagne est inquiète (sans le dire ouvertement) d'un retour trumpiste ou de son avatar qui veuille s'en prendre à l'OTAN. Une Alliance atlantique qui reste à Berlin l'alpha et l'oméga de la défense collective. Sur son flanc Est, la stabilité acquise depuis la fin de la Seconde guerre mondiale, avec le Mur de Berlin, puis sans le Mur de Berlin, est aujourd'hui menacée, durablement, par une Russie agressive.

Une agressivité russe qui fait peur

L'espionnage du Bundestag, l'assassinat en plein cœur de Berlin d'un opposant (lire : [Décryptage] Le GU (ex GRU). Un service russe hyperactif… dans l’ingérence), l'affaire Navalny, etc. ont peu à peu nourri cette inquiétude. L'offensive brutale de la Russie sur l'Ukraine a été le point de bascule. De partenaire, la Russie est devenue une menace, voire un adversaire. Ensuite, les sanctions contre la Russie se mettent en branle. Le gazoduc Nordstream est suspendu. Le soutien militaire l'Ukraine prend de l'ampleur, jusqu'à faire d'une Allemagne, auparavant hostile à exporter des armes dans un pays en guerre, le deuxième soutien de l'Ukraine, derrière les États-Unis.

Un tournant dont on doit prendre conscience

Ces changements sont souvent minorés en France. De même qu'on a peu conscience de la révolution en cours dans le rapport allemand à la défense. Alors que dans le passé, l'Allemagne était prête à s'effacer derrière le leadership français, ce n'est plus le cas aujourd'hui. L'Allemagne d'Olaf Scholz ne semble plus (du tout) disposée à se laisser dicter une conduite et joue sa carte personnelle et celle de leader européen. Si en matière opérationnelle, Berlin reste prudente dans ses engagements militaires, répugnant à s'avancer en premier ou de façon aventureuse comme sait le faire la France (2), elle n'a pas ses pruderies dans le domaine de la défense territoriale, de l'industrie de défense et de la politique de défense à l'échelle de l'Europe. La France d'Emmanuel Macron n'a ni vu venir cette évolution, ni réussi à s'y adapter. En mesure-t-elle seulement les enjeux ?

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, avec OJ)

1. Ce n'est un secret pour personne que chez Dassault, un des principaux acteurs du projet (avec Airbus), on se verrait bien mener le projet en solo (autour du Rafale F5).
2. Une attitude aventuriste dont Berlin se méfie de plus en plus. L'intervention de la Libye est restée dans les mémoires. L'attitude guerrière au Sahel, tout récemment encore au Niger, augure d'un schisme plus profond. L'Allemagne, positionnée dans une stratégie d'influence économique et politique, notamment en Afrique de l'Ouest, préfère le soft power.

Lire aussi :

• [Analyse] Une relation franco-allemande, difficile. Une Alliance des contraires nécessaire à l’Europe
• L’intervention militaire russe en Ukraine. Un tournant pour la défense européenne ?
• (à suivre) A Evreux, Lecornu et Pistorius recollent les morceaux du char du futur

Europe should speed up military supplies so that it can help Ukraine alone if isolationist US politician Donald Trump re-entrs the White House.

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IPI together with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs cohosted the thirteenth annual Trygve Lie Symposium on September 21st on the topic of “Civil Society’s Crucial Contribution to Promoting and Protecting Human Rights.” The event took on a particularly urgent tenor this year as recent attacks on human rights all over the world were juxtaposed against the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.

The discussion focused on recognizing the contributions of civil society in the fight for human rights. Panelists addressed contemporary threats to fundamental freedoms and the interrelated challenge of repression of civil society towards the essential questions of the event: Why is civil society getting weaker? And what can we do to strengthen it in the struggle for human rights?

Key to understanding the increased repression of civil society is an analysis of the factors that have contributed to recent attacks on human rights and human rights defenders. H.E. Anniken Huitfeldt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, provided the necessary framework. She opened with a reflection on 75 years of progress in fulfilling human rights but contrasted this progress with the rise of authoritarianism and democratic backsliding in the last decade. All speakers made clear that under authoritarian governments, disinformation campaigns, pushback against women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights, impunity for rights violations, concerted attacks against journalists and free speech, and military aggression thrive.

While the weakening of democratic institutions is tied to the rise of authoritarian tactics, panelists articulated the way a strong and supported civil society sector goes hand in hand with a strong democracy. Hina Jilani, Member of The Elders, illustrated the full scope of the kind of antidote to authoritarianism that civil society can be in her remarks: “Human rights defenders are not only a part of strengthening democracy, they are an indication of democratization itself and a model of further development.” Within this relationship between civil society and democracy, Lysa John, Secretary-General of CIVICUS identified how an explosion of civic action has been met with equal levels of repression and backlash. Calling 2020, “the year of censorship and surveillance,” she highlighted recent attempts to restrict dissent and the great threat that a loss or weakening of our fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression pose to civic organizing.

As the conversation came to a close, speakers provided strategies to combat the tactics deployed against civil society. Ulrika Modéer, UN Assistant Secretary-General highlighted the kind of intersectional approach that can maximize the contributions of civil society if the private sector and increased funding is leveraged to build greater institutional support. Zane Dalgor, Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa offered an important reminder not to romanticize or generalize when we invoke “civil society” because it is not homogenous. Instead, he called for a deeper analysis of the financial backing of certain organizations and a closer look at the weakening of progressive civil society as a way of analyzing how authoritarian governments may be instrumentalizing civic organizations.

Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO of the International Peace Institute

Speakers:
H.E. Anniken Huitfeldt, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Hina Jilani, Member of The Elders, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Member of the High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, and founder of Pakistan’s first all-women law firm, as well as Pakistan’s first Legal Aid Center and the Women’s Action Forum (Virtual)
Lysa John, Secretary-General of CIVICUS
Ulrika Modéer, UN Assistant Secretary-General and Director of the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy, UNDP

Moderator:
Douglas Rutzen, President of the International Centre for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL)

L’introduction d’un taux de change flexible du naira a porté les bénéfices bancaires, tout en plombant les résultats des entreprises qui peinent à financer leurs importations.

Alors que la Russie s'est retirée de l'accord sur les céréales ukrainiennes, menaçant de ce fait les expéditions par navire, Bruxelles tente de maintenir des corridors sécurisés, en évitant que certains États membres ne ferment leurs frontières aux exportations de Kiev. Au-delà du conflit en cours, cette (...) / Accord international, Céréales, Conflit russo-ukrainien 2022- - 2023/09