Agrégateur de flux

Washington is committed to partnership with New Delhi, despite U.S. intelligence cooperation in the Hardeep Singh Nijjar case.

Since his election in 2017, President Emmanuel Macron has tried to distance himself from established and widely criticised patterns of France’s Africa policy. He diversified relations with Africa in regional and substantive terms, integrated non-state actors and cultivated a comparatively open approach to France’s problematic past on the con­tinent. However, Macron’s efforts to craft a narrative of change was overshadowed by path dependencies, above all the continuation of the military engagement in the Sahel and incoherent relations with autocratic governments. The involuntary military withdrawal first from Mali (2022), from Burkina Faso (2023) and finally from Niger (announced for late 2023) marks a historic turning point in Franco-African relations. The question is no longer whether relations between France and its former colonies will change; the real question is whether Paris will be able to shape this change or if it will be a mere bystander to a transformation that is largely driven by African actors.

Across public sectors in the Arab world, international consultancy firms already play a pivotal role and are further expanding their operations. Among other projects, con­sultancies have (co-)designed such high-profile strategies as Saudi Arabia’s‎ “‎Vision 2030”‎ and Morocco’s‎‎“‎Green Agenda”. Currently, they are stepping up their activities in national energy and climate strategies. Their operations involve almost no local public participation, which diminishes the legitimacy and quality of the policies crafted and undermines local development. Besides the ramifications for the Arab world, the consultancies’ work in that region also affects German and European interests, even when it is commissioned by European actors or international orga­nizations. If negative impacts are to be avoided, greater awareness and more transparency about the consultancies’ activities are needed. Moreover, it is crucial to scrutinise whether, when and to what extent it is expedient to commission inter­national consultancy firms.

Dans la note ci-après, le gouvernement burkinabè de transition annonce qu'un Coup d'Etat a été déjoué le mardi 26 septembre 2023 par les services de renseignements. Le communiqué précise par ailleurs que plusieurs acteurs présumés impliqués dans cette tentative ont été interpellés.

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Le Gouvernement de Transition informe l'opinion publique qu'une tentative avérée de coup d'État a été déjouée ce 26 septembre 2023 par les services de renseignement et de sécurité burkinabè. A l'heure actuelle, des officiers et d'autres acteurs présumés impliqués dans cette tentative de déstabilisation ont été interpelés et d'autres, activement recherchés.

Les acteurs de ce funeste projet de déstabilisation, mus par des intérêts aux antipodes de la dynamique de reconquête de notre territoire national et de la souveraineté de notre cher pays nourrissaient le sombre dessein de s'attaquer aux institutions de la République et de précipiter notre pays dans le chaos.

En attendant que le Procureur militaire apporte plus de détails sur ce complot, le Gouvernement regrette profondément que des Burkinabè qui plus est des officiers dont le serment est de défendre la Patrie, se soient fourvoyés dans une entreprise d'une telle nature qui vise à entraver la marche du peuple burkinabè pour sa souveraineté et sa libération totale des hordes terroristes qui tentent de l'asservir.

Le Gouvernement salut l'action patriotique et le sens élevé du devoir des Forces de défense et de sécurité qui ont permis de mettre un coup d'arrêt à cette entreprise. Il rend un vibrant hommage à l'ensemble du peuple burkinabè et singulièrement à sa jeunesse pour son engagement résolu et historique à défendre la Patrie et à la protéger contre tous ceux qui veulent nous faire entrer à reculons dans l'histoire.

Le Gouvernement rassure que toute la lumière sera faite sur cette tentative de coup d'État. Il invite les populations à la vigilance face aux amalgames savamment entretenus notamment sur les réseaux sociaux tendant à impliquer certaines personnalités dont le chef d'état-major général des armées et l'Ambassadeur du Burkina Faso au Ghana. En tout état de cause les investigations en cours permettront de démasquer les instigateurs de ce complot.

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Six Portuguese youth have accused 32 European nations of violating their human rights by not doing enough on climate change.

 

Les arrivées sur les côtes italiennes continuent, avec Lampedusa comme symbole des difficultés que rencontre l’Italie. Les afflux de migrants sur la petite île ont relancé un débat vieux de dix ans qui ne semble pas trouver de solution. Cependant, la médiatisation massive actuelle impose une réflexion sur cette situation et pour tous les acteurs de cette crise.

Une nouvelle crise qui n’en est pas une

Les images des navires de fortune entrant dans le port de Lampedusa ont fait la une de toute la presse, montrant un exode vers l’Europe disproportionné par rapport à ce que peut accueillir l’Italie. Il est vrai que la situation géographique de Lampedusa est atypique. L’île ne fait qu’un peu plus de 20 km2 pour près de 6000 habitants. Les arrivées des dernières semaines doublent voire triplent la population de l’île. Il faut également prendre en compte que le centre d’accueil de Lampedusa n’a que 400 places, un chiffre dérisoire par rapport aux flux migratoires sur ce territoire, et ce depuis des années.

Mais ces images ‒ très médiatiques ‒ ne sont pas pour autant totalement représentatives de la situation. Bien que le nombre d’arrivées soit supérieur à celui de l’année dernière, il est dans la lignée de nombreuses années précédentes, comme 2016 ou 2017, soit environ 150 000 migrants enregistrés dans les centres d’accueil en Italie. Si le nombre d’arrivants reste stable, la route que ceux-ci empruntent a changé. En février dernier, une mauvaise coordination entre l’État italien et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (dite Frontex) faisait 94 morts en Calabre, à Cutrò. Devant un tel danger, un passage vers Lampedusa (qui dure moins de 10 heures par beau temps depuis Sfax) est privilégié. Il faut également prendre en compte la situation de la Tunisie elle-même : la crise économique et l’instabilité du pays incitent certains de ses ressortissants à chercher fortune ailleurs, à quelques milles plus à l’Est, en Europe.

Les traversées depuis la Tunisie sont bien plus fréquentes à présent tandis que les départs depuis la Libye ou la Turquie s’amenuisent. Résultat : Lampedusa représentait moins de 10% de l’arrivée de migrants durant les années précédentes. Aujourd’hui c’est le contraire : 90%. Une situation difficile pour la petite île et pour la région, Lampedusa faisant partie de la région de la Sicile, qui doit gérer ce contingent de plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes. Il faut tout de moins saluer les Lampedusanis pour leur disponibilité, leur accueil et leur gentillesse : malgré les années qui passent et un sentiment d’être les oubliés de la crise migratoire, ils continuent chaque jour d’accueillir et de nourrir les nouveaux arrivants, souvent à leurs frais.

Cette crise n’est donc pas nouvelle, juste plus visible actuellement, car focalisée sur un seul point géographique et mise en exergue par le gouvernement italien qui espère une réaction de ses partenaires européens.

L’excuse « Pool Factor » ne tient plus

L’actuel gouvernement italien a accusé pendant des années les Organisations non gouvernementales de la mer Méditerranée d’être les “taxis de la mer”, insinuant que celles-ci collaboraient avec les passeurs pour faciliter la venue des migrants en Europe, ou que leur présence encourageait les migrants à partir : l’effet dit Pool Factor. La Première ministre italienne Giorgia Meloni a d’ailleurs écrit cette semaine au Chancelier allemand Olaf Scholz pour lui faire savoir le mécontentement de l’État italien, opposé aux financements allemands des ONG de sauvetage en Méditerranée. Les ONG seraient le catalyseur des arrivées en Italie, mais ce scénario n’est toujours pas démontré. Il est surtout une excellente manière de remettre les responsabilités de l’arrivée massive des migrants sur une entité externe, car, aujourd’hui, ces organisations ont un rôle presque nul : environ 10% des personnes arrivant en Europe proviennent de bateaux appartenant à ces organisations.

Difficile pour Giorgia Meloni de jeter la faute sur un élément externe : cette situation renvoie le gouvernement italien à ses responsabilités en matière de gestion des arrivées. C’est ici le point central de cette crise migratoire : l’identification et la gestion des demandes d’asile.

Une nouvelle réforme européenne pour aider l’Italie

La gestion des nouveaux arrivants est régie par le traité de Dublin, qui prévoit que la demande d’asile soit évaluée par le pays d’arrivée. L’Italie est donc fortement impactée par cette norme, qui l’oblige à gérer plus de 100 000 dossiers chaque année. Il est bon de rappeler que ce traité ‒ tant décrié par l’actuel gouvernement italien ‒ a été voté par les élus de la Lega.

Une nouvelle réforme européenne est à l’étude. Elle prévoirait une plus grande solidarité et une répartition plus rapide des migrants arrivant dans l’Union européenne. Des changements qui pourront très certainement aider l’Italie dans ses tâches, mais à deux conditions.

La première est l’identification plus rapide des migrants. Les nouvelles normes italiennes ne semblent pas aller dans ce sens, car une nouvelle loi votée permet aux centres d’accueil (et d’expulsion) de garder enfermés dans leur structure les migrants pendant une durée prolongée allant jusqu’à 18 mois. Cette prolongation montre toutes les difficultés logistiques auxquelles l’Italie doit faire face, surtout en interne. Les dernières mesures du gouvernement italien prévoient la construction d’un centre par région. Une initiative qui a été immédiatement critiquée (pour ne pas dire refusée) par plusieurs présidents de régions, dont le très apprécié et médiatique Luca Zaia (Vénétie), pourtant inscrit à la Ligue.

Le second point est la collaboration des autres pays membres. Les autres pays de l’Union européenne parlent de solidarité en ce qui concerne la gestion des arrivées, mais rien n’est encore clair. Pour l’instant, les pays voisins, la France et l’Autriche, renforcent leurs effectifs aux frontières. Il ne serait pas surprenant de voir des pays souverainistes comme la Hongrie refuser de prendre de nouveaux migrants, malgré une amitié consolidée entre Giorgia Meloni et Viktor Orbán. En toute logique, les partis d’extrême-droite ne seront pas enclins à accepter cette répartition. Marine Le Pen, par exemple, n’est pas allée à Lampedusa lors des dernières semaines, mais elle est allée en Italie, avec Matteo Salvini, au meeting annuel de la Ligue, près de Milan.

La fin de la lune de miel pour Giorgia Meloni ?

Les excuses s’amenuisent pour l’actuel gouvernement italien, qui promettait des solutions miracles afin de limiter définitivement l’entrée de migrants, notamment par un utopique blocage naval de toute la mer Méditerranée. Pour l’instant, les résultats sont à l’opposé. La venue de Giorgia Meloni et d’Ursula Von der Leyen à Lampedusa a été targuée par la foule présente de passerella (de défilé) avec l’ennemi des électeurs des Fratelli d’Italia : l’Union européenne. Meloni n’a pourtant pas le choix : sans Bruxelles, l’Italie est dans l’impasse, aussi bien d’un point pour la gestion migratoire que du plan de relance économique.

La présidente du Conseil tente un grand écart, une fois de plus, pour contenter Bruxelles et la droite italienne. En un an, les rôles se sont inversés avec Matteo Salvini. Lorsque le leader de la Ligue était au pouvoir (avec Mario Draghi), Giorgia Meloni n’hésitait pas à critiquer le gouvernement pour sa politique jugée trop centriste. Aujourd’hui, c’est le contraire : alors que Giorgia Meloni sourit à Ursula Von der Leyen, Matteo Salvini était en Lombardie pour le rassemblement annuel de la Lega, où les discours sont toujours très durs, surtout en ce qui concerne l’immigration. Deux leaders, deux partis au pouvoir, mais une vraie compétition qui pourrait user la coalition à moyen terme, bien que les deux protagonistes de droite continuent d’insister sur leur bonne entente et leur cohésion.

L’opposition du Parti démocrate est pour l’instant timide : la néo-secrétaire du parti Elly Schlein ne fait pas l’unanimité et ses rapports ambigus avec le Mouvement cinq étoiles n’aident pas les électeurs à avoir une vision claire des objectifs de la gauche modérée. Le PD stagne à 20% depuis des mois. Mais, paradoxalement, ce silence de l’opposition fait plus mal à Giorgia Meloni : elle ne trouve aucun adversaire à qui répondre, ce qui l’oblige à affronter certaines réalités du pays, comme une inflation galopante et un coût de l’énergie qui ne descend pas. Le litre d’essence est à 2€ au Bel Paese. Et chaque Italien se remémore la vidéo de l’actuelle présidente du Conseil qui promettait, en cas de victoire, de diminuer de 50% le prix du carburant. Pour l’instant, Meloni reste en haut des sondages, avec un électorat fidèle ou qui n’a pas encore trouvé d’alternative politique crédible à ses yeux.

Franck Diongo, président du parti politique Mouvement lumumbiste progressiste (MLP), a déposé mercredi 27 septembre au siège de la Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI), sa candidature à la présidentielle du 20 décembre 2023.

Le gouvernement français a eu recours mercredi à l'article 49.3 de la Constitution pour faire adopter à l'Assemblée nationale son projet de loi de programmation des finances publiques. La gauche a aussitôt annoncé qu'elle allait déposer une motion de censure.

Plusieurs personnes déplacées internes de la province du Nayala ont regagné leurs localités d'origine à la faveur des opérations de sécurisation du territoire national en cours.

À la date du mardi 26 septembre 2023, plusieurs centaines de PDI originaires de certains villages de la province du Nayala ont regagné leurs agglomérations. Les personnes déplacées internes de trois villages, dans la province du Nayala, regagnent ainsi progressivement leurs localités d'origine depuis le dimanche 24 septembre 2023.

Deux de ces villages dont nous préférons taire les noms pour l'instant, avaient été sommés par des groupes armés terroristes en juillet 2023 de déguerpir. Quant au troisième village qui se repeuple, c'est en mars 2023 que sa population a été obligée de fuir après un ultimatum donné par des hommes armés non identifiés.

Les provinces du Nayala et du Sourou, dans la région de la Boucle du Mouhoun, sont harcelées depuis plusieurs mois par les groupes armés terroristes qui font tout pour asphyxier ces zones, avec un blocus imposé.

Selon les chiffres du ministère en charge de la solidarité, à la date du 31 août 2023, 191 937 PDI sont retournées dans leurs localités respectives dans les différentes régions du pays. Au cours du conseil des ministres du 20 septembre 2023, il a fait un communiqué relatif au retour d'autres PDI dans leurs localités. En effet, des actions ont été mises en place en plus de celles déjà en cours pour encourager le retour des PDI dans leurs localités d'origine.

« Les actions à venir concernent la poursuite de la consolidation des zones pacifiées, le retour de l'administration, la poursuite des actions de sensibilisation à l'endroit des PDI et des populations, le ravitaillement systématique des localités de retour, en eau potable, en vivres et non vivres », précise le communiqué.

Babakourou Fougui
Lefaso.net

Ce soir, à 20h22, une secousse sismique de magnitude 2,8 sur l’échelle de Richter a été enregistrée dans la région nord-est de la commune de […]

L’article Tremblement de terre : la wilaya d’Annaba secouée ce 27 septembre est apparu en premier sur .

In mid-September, Vietnam bypassed the intermediate strategic partnership tier and elevated the United States directly to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP). The unprecedented upgrade not only manifests a striking rise in trust between the two partners but also offers pivotal opportunities for the two to fortify their relations, one of which is new technology collaboration. Leaders on both sides have recently emphasized that the CSP centers on technology, innovation, and investment.

The United States is working to deepen ties with Vietnam because of its critical role within its strategic blueprint to safeguard the semiconductor supply chain from potential dangers posed by China’s dogged pursuit of technological dominance. During a July visit to Hanoi, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen underlined that “Vietnam has emerged as a critical node in the global semiconductor supply chain.” To fortify technology cooperation, the United States has pledged to help Vietnam develop its own semiconductor industry and provide training in semiconductor assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP). American companies such as Amkor, Onsemi, and Intel Corporation are also deepening their engagement in Vietnam, especially by expanding chip assembly and test manufacturing facilities. 

On the occasion of U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Hanoi, the United States lauded Vietnam for its potential “as a partner in ensuring the semiconductor supply chain is diverse and resilient.” The two countries highlighted the importance of discovering fresh avenues that could “attract industry investments and expand the technical workforces in both countries.” Biden also announced numerous business deals in semiconductor, aerospace, and infrastructure, heralding a “new stage” in the economic relationship between the United States and Vietnam. The Biden administration also pledged that Vietnamese technology companies would be listed on the U.S. stock market while picking “new semiconductor partnership” as the new pillar for collaboration in the first portion of the CSP’s statement. The two countries recently inked a Memorandum of Cooperation on Semiconductor Supply Chains, Workforce, and Ecosystem Development, which would help Vietnam utilize the American International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund to develop workforce and infrastructure needs and expand its semiconductor capacity ecosystem, particularly in semiconductor design centers and training.

Vietnam, for its part, has sought to bolster its technological industry while entangling itself in Southeast Asia’s supply networks, particularly in electronics. The country has advanced digital transformation and invested heavily in its digital sector, with the dual goals of strengthening domestic technology capabilities and attracting foreign investment. The Vietnamese government also offers a preferential corporate income tax rate of 10 percent for fifteen years and 17 percent for ten years for large manufacturing ventures, especially those in the high-tech industry. Moreover, Vietnam is now home to Intel Technology Group’s largest chip assembly and testing plant and ranks third in chip sales to the U.S. market, behind Malaysia and Taiwan. A significant chunk (10 percent) of the United States’ entire chip import volume comes from Vietnam, making Hanoi a crucial partner in Washington’s “friend-shoring” policy for semiconductors. Moreover, through collaboration in the Developing Electronics & Leading Technology Advancement Partnerships (DELTA) Network, Vietnam is well-positioned to collaborate with the United States and like-minded regional partners to build a robust technology supply chain.

Vietnam would be sensible to join forces with the United States to benefit from the superpower’s technological edge and highly skilled professionals. The Southeast Asian country has been implementing a series of reform policies, commonly referred to as “renovation” or “Đổi mới” in Vietnamese, since 1986. The country’s economy has gradually restructured and transitioned from a centralized to a more open market system. Now more than ever, policies centered on technology and innovation are needed to revitalize Vietnam’s economic growth. Pham Minh Chinh, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, has recently underscored that bolstering supply chains and expanding semiconductor chip production are at the heart of the country’s economic development. As a result, Vietnam requires both state-of-the-art equipment and skilled workers to operate it.

While enhancing its ties with the United States in emerging technologies, Vietnam has also attempted to cut down on its technological dependency on China. In 2017, Vietnam offered an open welcome to Chinese corporations to participate in the country’s burgeoning high-technology industry. Nevertheless, after six years, this overture is conspicuously absent from economic deliberations between Hanoi and Beijing. Instead, Vietnam has made concern-driven attempts to attract high-quality American investments while proactively seeking engagement with Washington’s semiconductor ecosystem through high-tech collaborative frameworks outlined in the CSP’s agenda. For Vietnam, investment and technological support are essential to assisting the nation in escaping the foreseen middle-income trap.

This discernible shift indicates Vietnam’s growing preference for the United States over China as a destination for high-tech investment at a time when the technological chasm between Washington and Beijing on supply chains is widening. Given the current sanctions and constraints imposed by the United States and Western countries on China’s high-tech sector, Vietnam is in danger if it decides to engage closely with China. Not to mention maritime tensions between the two neighbors in the South China Sea, Vietnam is also cognizant of China’s sway over trade and technology. These concerns prompt Hanoi to decide who will be its crucial partner in promoting high-tech economic development.

However, due to Vietnam’s reliance on China for imported components, pundits hold a gloomy view of Hanoi’s ability to disengage from Beijing economically. However, by making this statement, the significance of Vietnam’s endeavors to enhance the synergy of its supply chain is undermined. Instead of conceptualizing Vietnam’s ongoing strategy as “decoupling” from China, it is more prudent to recognize that the country is actively pursuing a “de-risking” strategy. This strategy involves a discerning process of mitigating economic vulnerabilities stemming from excessive reliance on the Chinese market rather than giving Beijing a wide berth or turning inwards. This process also involves efforts to diversify Vietnam’s supply chain market while at the same time avoiding severing ties with the economic giant. Having the highest level of diplomatic relations with the world’s two largest economies, China (since 2008) and the United States (since 2023), is a nuanced indicator of Vietnam’s efforts to pursue a two-pronged strategy that is strengthening economic security and bolstering its regional stature.

Vietnam has risen to be Washington’s “friend-shoring base” and “key production site for semiconductors and other high-tech products.” Accordingly, the country stands to gain access to American cutting-edge technology and investment. Yet, Vietnam has grappled with a talent shortage and over-reliance on raw materials and components from Beijing. Nonetheless, the United States is not immune to these difficulties. There will be a shortfall of roughly 67,000 skilled workers in Washington’s semiconductor industry by 2030. In addition, one-third of essential components used in manufacturing American-made technological products come from China.

To address these challenges, the United States should support projects and initiatives that could help cultivate talent in Vietnam’s high-tech sectors through funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), universities, institutions, organizations, and foundations. Additionally, the Fulbright University Vietnam, sponsored by the United States and renowned for its science and engineering, economics, mathematics, and computing programs, should serve as the vanguard of Vietnam’s efforts to train a skilled workforce in this sector. To sum up, Washington’s promise to help Vietnam acquire technological capabilities and address the country’s lack of experienced technicians depends on the synergy of financial and human resources support.

De-risking supply chains is gaining ground as geopolitical clashes may entail far-reaching geoeconomic ramifications, and this is precisely what Washington and Hanoi are adopting to shield the high-tech supply chain from China’s rising power and influence. In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, friend-shoring with like-minded partners has become an indicator of economic friendship, and the United States and Vietnam are working together to develop technological ties that will help solidify the Indo-Pacific region’s supply chains. If the U.S.-Vietnam CSP is to reach its full potential, collaboration on new and cutting-edge technologies should become its cornerstone and perhaps even the “signature” of the U.S.-Vietnam alignment.

Huynh Tam Sang is a Lecturer at the Faculty of International Relations, Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, a Young Leaders Program member of the Pacific Forum, and a Research Fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation. He tweets at @huynhtamsang2.

Vo Thi Thuy An is a Research Assistant at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities and a Research Associate at Social Life Research Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.

China’s Huawei, a technology giant that has been facing Western-led sanctions for years, has unveiled its Huawei Mate 60 Promade, a breakthrough development in the ongoing chip war between the United States and China, According to the analysis of TechInsights, the smartphone is powered with a 5G chip Kirin 9000S processor based on the 7nm (N+2) technology. The chip is designed by Huawei’s division HiSilicon and is developed with Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation’s (SMIC) N+2 technology. 

Both Huawei and SMIC are Entity List companies. The U.S. Bureau of Industry Standards (BIS) in October 2022 updated the U.S. Entity list that names companies that are scrutinized. For American companies to do business with the listed companies requires a prior license by U.S. government authorities. Experts anticipated a sharp cut in the flow of technology and equipment from the United States to China that will effectively limit China’s growth in the chip industry and throw Chinese chip capability decades behind the United States’ advanced chip capabilities. However, Huawei’s resurgence with a 7nm chip capability raises doubts about the efficacy of Western sanctions among those who discounted China’s capability in microchip manufacturing and now wonder how China has been able to mass produce 7nm leading-edge semiconductor technology despite embargos.

The 2022 October regulations introduced by the BIS clearly stated that “No company should be assisting Chinese companies with below 14-nanometer using American technology.” Huawei’s resurgence with 7nm chip-making capability marks a failure of America’s entity list and licensing regime. One, the companies on the entity list are not the only companies that ensure the flow of equipment to China. Say, if ten companies are enlisted, ten new companies would emerge to ensure an unhindered flow of business with the American suppliers and vendors, which are also looking forward to running a profitable business with Chinese buyers. A host of shell companies have been set up in China to trade with American equipment makers to bypass the sanctions. Second, several companies dealing with American sellers are ultimately routed to SMIC, especially in the wake of October 2023 licensing requirements. In many cases, these companies will attain licenses just to ensure final shipping to SMIC. According to an industry expert, Dylan Patel, licenses are being handed out as candy, and the entity list is not really bulletproof. 

Another loophole lies in understanding the chip development capability within various thresholds on the nanometer scale. American shortsightedness lies in underestimating the capability of Chinese ways of acquiring high-tech with clandestine means. The ban on equipment sales used only for the production of high-end chips never banned the business in equipment and technology used in producing lower-end chips. The Chinese strategy lies in producing the leading-edge chips by repurposing the lagging-edge tools and equipment. For example, a metal disposition tool that is used for a 28 nm chip can also be used in a 10 nm chip.

Also, it is not possible for China today to make 7nm or 14nm chips without external support. Since China’s semiconductor industry is developed sporadically with no company providing end-to-end solutions to producing even lagging-end chips, it's impossible to build a 7nm capability without the support of Western tools, machinery, and software provided collectively by the global players in the value chain. TechInsights in their hardware analysis also revealed that SMIC has access to sophisticated EDA tools that they are not supposed to have. The anticipation that banning China’s access to Dutch ASML’s advanced lithography tools would render China with no facility to implant circuits on silicon wafers turned ineffective. The DUV tool 1980i was used by both TSMC and Intel in their production of 7nm chips. The same tool can be shipped to China which can be used by the Chinese manufacturers for 7nm or even 5nm chips. Equipment distribution companies like Applied Materials, Tokyo Electronics, Kokusai, Lam Research, ASM International, etc. have been selling equipment for 28nm chips to China, which can also be used for the production of 7nm chips.

Huawei’s Kirin 9000S processor is similar to Intel 10 which was renamed to Intel 7. According to American experts, the technological equipment that was used in the production of Intel 7 was not restricted from being shipped to China under the export control regime. Also, specific restrictions are built around equipment devices that lie under a particular threshold. For example, restrictions of EDA (a chip designing software) tools are imposed only for 3nm chips. That means specific equipment used for above 5nm chips can still be accessible to the Chinese, and especially to various Chinese shell companies that have proliferated to skirt sanctions. The Chinese have exploited the grey areas in the export control measures that hardly considered that the equipment being sold to the lagging-edge buyers can also be used by the leading-edge manufacturers. This policy loophole is very clear and having this ignored by regulators clearly reflects a lack of policy insight.

Also, there’s doubt about how deep political will is among allies like Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, and South Korea to restrict the flow of their instruments to China, which is one of their largest markets. If the Netherlands is selling spare machine parts to China, will they not retrograde an outdated tool with a better tool to bypass the rules and carry on their business with China? Thus, blind negligence to regulatory restrictions or the support provided by other countries has also contributed to China getting material supplies.

China’s successful launch of a 5G-powered device with 7nm technology reveals that Western regulators have failed to understand the intricacies of semiconductor manufacturing and simply anticipated a completely restricted flow of technology to China with a bunch of export control regulations. It was a strategic mistake of policymakers and pundits who underestimated China’s perseverance in pursuing trial-and-error methods and well-known competence of acquiring talent, technology, and tools through back channels. As the applied rules were practically irrelevant, Huawei’s 7nm capability is not even a breakthrough, rather it came as a surprise due to the repeated lack of determination by American policymakers to see it through. The stated loopholes in the regulations not only enabled the Chinese manufacturers to source exactly what America did not intend to but rather helped in spurring a wave of indigenous manufacturing capability in the chip segment.

Megha Shrivastava is a Dr. TMA Pai Fellow and a Doctoral Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India. Her work focuses on China’s ICT industry. She also writes on the semiconductor industry and the U.S.-China technology conflict.

Image: Karlis Dambrans / Shutterstock.com

 

Although demographic policy has long been discussed at an international level, family policy has typically been viewed as a domestic policy concern. Yet it is becoming clear that this field—a way of orienting national legislation toward fostering and defending family life—provides an alternative value basis that is drawing increasing interest in international relations. Indeed, elements of a quiet consensus on family policy are beginning to take hold among countries that want to strengthen their societies.

Family Policy as a National Interest

In recent years there have been two alternative approaches to managing demographic challenges within countries. One approach emphasizes the free movement of peoples as an overall win-win: “Rich, aging countries need workers,” as a 2010 New York Times report put it, while “people in poor countries need jobs.” A few countries, however, have begun to follow the other approach of family policy, whereby national governments incentivize domestic population growth and encourage talent retention.

Family policy has not typically been viewed as a matter of international affairs. Contemporary international institutions have been largely oriented toward advancing a liberal understanding of sexual freedom, particularly through international norms such as the Beijing Declaration and the Istanbul Convention. The Biden administration has trumpeted its global prioritization of LGBTQ issues “through U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance,” and EU institutions have done the same.

Developments in family life have reflected the same shift in recent decades. During the second half of the twentieth century, global birth rates fell while expectations around industrial capacity increased. International efforts at managing population growth were common, especially through promoting the use of birth control. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the theme of global discussions shifted toward breaking down international barriers—from borders to glass ceilings to norms around marriage and family.

In retrospect, it is clear that the post-1990 consensus had a demographic thesis embedded in its foreign policy; one of global mobility under a soft regime of social liberalism. With the advent of the Schengen Area, Europe became a model of how free-trade areas and shared economic zones could lead to the free movement of peoples. It no longer mattered where things were made. Classical family structures were likewise viewed as restrictive.

But the traditional family has returned to international discussion. First, economists such as Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan have pointed out that societies with low birth rates are aging societies. Aging societies tend to become industrially sclerotic and experience intergenerational tensions. Industry must shift toward medical care, and economies can become inflation-prone. Yet declines in family formation seem to be common across all industrial societies, outside of certain highly-religious subgroups. For this reason, measures supportive of family life ought to have broad consideration in international discourse.

Second, the values that promote family formation are no longer taken for granted. Western societies have steadily moved away from a classical definition of the family. Western governments, as well as popular culture, have also placed greater emphasis on defending and even celebrating alternative lifestyles than on the classical definition of the family.

With each passing year, it becomes clearer that demographic challenges lie at the heart of international affairs as well. A report from the New York Times this summer highlighted the fact that, “By 2050, people age 65 and older will make up nearly 40 percent of the population in some parts of East Asia and Europe.” In these aging societies, working-age populations will shrink, while “the best-balanced work forces will mostly be in South and Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East.” The geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of this shift are only beginning to be envisioned.

In light of reports like this one, at the European Council meeting this past summer heads of state requested that the European Commission develop a “Demographic Toolbox,” citing in particular the relationship between demographic strength and economic competitiveness. The reason is fairly simple: governments around the world are beginning to realize—both individually and in common—that demographic challenges won’t be helped by putting further pressure on traditional family structures or by further encouragement of mass migration.

It is in this context that, in recent years, “family policy” has emerged as a nationally oriented approach to managing demographic challenges. In my view, family policy is built on three pillars: 1) a state support system linked to the family and incentivizing family life; 2) protection of and promotion of the traditional family as integral to the functioning of society; 3) rejection of mass migration and emphasis on the integrity of borders and an orderly approach to immigration. Together, these three elements are aimed at bolstering the role of the family within society.

All large economic structures have the ability to, and are designed to, shift incentives around life choices. When state support and welfare systems are not tied to family structures, the system itself can come to take the place of fathers. Contrast this with Hungary, where the family support system built since 2015 is designed to make the choice to start a family more financially beneficial than the alternative. Mothers receive their full salary for an extended period after the birth of their child, parents can apply for large loans and grants to cover the cost of setting up a household, and a variety of other financial incentives are in place to encourage family formation. This suite of policies has drawn broad foreign attention: the recently concluded fifth Budapest Demographic Summit included official representation from the governments of Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia, Tanzania, Kazakhstan, Türkiye, Qatar, Bahrain, Tunisia, and Ecuador. In recent years, former U.S. vice president Mike Pence as well as official representatives from Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Latvia and elsewhere have also attended. The Polish government has also introduced family support policies in recent years, as well.

The International Implications of Family Policy

Although family policy is currently pursued at a national level, each element of family policy has potential international repercussions. For this reason, it has all the elements of an alternative international consensus. But because existing international structures are oriented against strong border policies and interpret human rights institutions against domestic pro-family policies, this phenomenon has not fully reached international visibility.

Will the global geopolitical order shift in such a way as to allow the emergence of international mechanisms for promoting family policy on these lines? The post-1990s global order was built on a unitary package of American-led military security, economic opportunity (through expanding free-trade facilities), and a liberal interpretation of ever-expanding human rights. But with the rise of non-Western-led economic organizations and with an ever more aggressive Western approach on sexual lifestyles, the incentives for a “multi-vector” foreign policy are rising. In that environment, states have a stronger mutual rationale for sharing good practices with regard to the promotion of stable family life, even where they differ in other respects.

The reality is that the overall package of a country’s demographic policies is now of immense importance in the international context, given that many states are facing similar challenges. But instead of waiting for the European Union to create a “Demographic Toolkit,” the basic elements of family policy already exist—and are needed in different respects in different parts of the world.

In Europe, the mass migration experienced since 2015 has not been followed by increasing social cohesion; meanwhile, the key elements of strong family life have continued to decline. Since the turn of the century, illegitimacy rates have risen by nearly 70 percent, so that 42 percent of births in Europe are now outside wedlock. During the height of the migration crisis in 2015, EU leaders confidently predicted that the arrival of three million migrants would bring an economic benefit to Europe. Instead, the European economy now looks more sclerotic than at any point in recent years.

While the United States—itself unique due a long history of processing and assimilating immigrants, along with well-developed immigration-related institutions—has maintained population growth through immigration, current circumstances with millions of border crossers per year seem unsustainable. At the same time, cultural and economic pressures on American families have made family life less attractive for the young.

Even among the rising countries that will soon lead the world in working-age population—like South Africa, India, or the Philippines—family policy will be necessary to maintain a strong social structure and avoid following the path of aging Western societies.

Now that the “package” of the post-1990s global order is becoming unbundled, it is no surprise that the world is becoming more polarized, not more liberal, in terms of attitudes toward socially liberal family structures. As Western societies have progressed beyond twentieth-century norms to become more aggressive in promoting alternative lifestyles, even through diplomatic channels, some governments have quietly grown more skeptical. Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America benefit from Chinese investment yet, from the Western side, feel only pressure to change their fundamental cultural values.

The arrival of demographic policy as foreign policy is also a sign that the “values” identified at the heart of the existing global order are considered by many global actors to be insufficient to power it. With the West trying to step back from fully integrated global markets—sanctioning its geopolitical opponents and “de-risking” from trade with China—the reasons for accepting the “values” part of the Western package have also begun to decline. Countries will have to evaluate whether their demographic position requires economic development to meet a rising population, financial incentives to rescue a falling population and, in conjunction with this, other types of cultural and legal support for traditional family structures.

A Turning Point?

The most interesting question concerning the international aspect of family policy is whether it could constitute a new element for a “values-based” international policy. Is public support for robust family life sufficient to bring countries together that otherwise diverge? From the standpoint of classical geopolitics, where conflict over resources and territory defines international relations, the answer is “No.” Countless wars and conflicts have occurred between countries with robust demography.

Yet stable family life can no longer be taken for granted in international relations. In modern societies, family life is not simply an assumed input into social strength, economic growth and military readiness, but an output of favorable culture, protective legislation and sound policy. With global markets still highly integrated, a steady collapse in demography in one area—either through aging, family collapse, or mass migration—can cause immediate problems in another. And if a country’s economy becomes more sclerotic through demographic decline, its value as an export market or industrial provider is likely to fall, as well.

Finally, there is another reason that a strong, values-oriented family policy can go along with a flexible or more pragmatic interests-based foreign policy: a strong family policy enables economic growth and increases overall confidence, which together provide more room for maneuver in foreign policy. A country with a strong national culture and growing families need not fear that economic exchange and partnerships will undermine it.

How could a new consensus favoring family policy as a core element of international affairs come into being? Looked at from the standpoint of existing international institutions, the situation might seem rather challenging. But global institutions are also now at an inflection point. With new economic arrangements like the BRICS+ coming into view, it remains to be seen what set of values might be attached to institutions eventually built out of them. Yet it is entirely likely that values will return to international institutions in unexpected ways. As countries face many upcoming demographic challenges, there will be strong incentives for them to create new platforms through which to hash out good policy practices. In the meantime, the tight bundle of post-Cold War international policy will likely have fallen further apart. When that moment comes, it won’t be surprising if attention turns toward family policy. In the coming decades, family policy will not merely be an answer to domestic demographic challenges, but a core part of a functioning global order.

Gladden Pappin is president of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.

The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.

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