Russland strebt offenbar an, vom Ladogasee aus Ziele in der Ostsee-Region angreifen zu können. Das Gewässer befindet sich nördlich von Sankt Petersburg und ist nur 40 Kilometer von der finnischen Grenze entfernt. Seit 2023 erprobt Russland dort die Stationierung von Korvetten, die mit Marschflugkörpern ausgestattet sind. Solche Kriegsschiffe haben bereits im Syrien- und im Ukraine-Krieg aus großer Entfernung Landziele beschossen. Ihr Einsatz im gut zu schützenden Ladogasee würde die ohnehin komplizierte Verteidigung der nordöstlichen Nato-Staaten weiter erschweren. Abschüsse von dem Gewässer aus sollen im Herbst 2024 erstmals simuliert geübt worden sein. Im Westen fehlt es jedoch an Informationen über den Ladogasee. Die Entwicklung dort unterstreicht, dass es der Fähigkeit zu konventionellen Schlägen ins russische Hinterland bedarf, um Moskau wirkungsvoll abschrecken zu können.
La Cour de Bosnie-Herzégovine a rendu son verdict : le président de la Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik a été condamné à un an de prison et à une interdiction de six ans d'exercer la fonction de président de la RS. Des milliers de sympathisants manifestent à Banja Luka.
- Articles / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Relations régionales, Politique, RS sécession, Courrier des BalkansAn Istanbul prosecutor has launched two legal investigations against Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, amidst a judicial crackdown on municipalities run by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). The indictment charges İmamoğlu with “insulting and targeting a public official” and “attempting to influence a trial”, and demands a prison sentence of at least two years and eight months. The first hearing will be held on 11 April 2025. Finally, on 22 February, another investigation was opened against İmamoğlu, this time claiming that his university diploma was “forged”.
The legal manoeuvres only deepen concerns that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aims to neutralise İmamoğlu, who is currently the CHP’s strongest potential challenger for the 2028 elections. This marks a qualitative leap in Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory, a shift from merely repressing the opposition to using judicial means to systematically eliminate the most viable electoral challengers.
Towards full authoritarianismTurkey’s political system has been undergoing a gradual authoritarian consolidation for years. President Erdoğan controls most of the media and effectively dictates judicial decisions. Turkey remains one of the worst jailers of journalists, and the government continues to suppress protests and harass civil society groups. While political rights and freedoms erode, the opposition faces growing threats from the government.
Criminalising the oppositionKurdish opposition leaders have long been subject to repression. Selahattin Demirtaş has been imprisoned since 2016 alongside many other Kurdish politicians. A former leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP), he is arguably the opposition’s most charismatic figure. And for years now the state has been appointing trustees (kayyum) to govern municipalities won by the HDP and its successor, the Democracy Party (DEM). Mayors are removed on terrorism charges within months of their election, and state administrators take over. Terrorism charges are used sweepingly to suppress opposition leaders and civil society actors. While public attention often focuses on high-profile cases like Demirtaş or businessman Osman Kavala, millions of ordinary citizens – including teachers, academics, civil servants and small business owners – have also faced terrorism investigations.
Despite the shrinking political space, Turkey’s electoral system has remained resilient, allowing the opposition to secure local election victories in major cities in 2019 and 2024. While political competition is increasingly restricted, the electoral process itself has been historically resistant to outright fraud.
Now, however, Erdoğan is taking steps to eliminate electoral turnover entirely. Repression that historically focussed on Kurdish politicians has now expanded to target the broader opposition. The recent prosecution of nationalist leader Ümit Özdağ and renewed legal action against Gezi Park protestors from the cultural scene signal a wider crackdown.
The targeting of Ekrem İmamoğluThe escalating lawfare against Istanbul’s CHP mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu underscores this shift. A state trustee has been appointed in Esenyurt district in Istanbul, the first time this has happened in a metropolitan municipality outside the Kurdish-majority areas. The investigation into alleged corruption in Istanbul’s local administration appears designed to eventually implicate İmamoğlu. This is not the first time İmamoğlu has been targeted. In 2022, a trial for allegedly insulting judges was used to prevent his nomination as the opposition’s presidential candidate in 2023.
If Erdoğan continues dismantling opposition forces the next elections may be a mere formality. He has already signalled his intention to run again in the next presidential election, despite term limits. Turkey’s political future is at a critical juncture. If Erdoğan succeeds in neutralising İmamoğlu and the broader opposition, the next elections may be little more than a sham, marking the final transition to a fully authoritarian regime.
Minden járás garantált éves fejlesztési forráshoz jut a "Versenyképes Járások" programnak köszönhetően. A 65 milliárd forinttal rendelkező program legfőbb célja a területi különbségek csökkentése.
jQuery(document).ready(function($){$("#isloaderfor-wcmsrq").fadeOut(300, function () { $(".pagwrap-wcmsrq").fadeIn(300);});}); Download the Report
Through the Action for Peacekeeping and Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P/A4P+) frameworks, member states and the UN Secretariat have reiterated their commitment to collective coherence behind a political strategy as a priority within UN peacekeeping. While this is often interpreted as pertaining to national-level political processes, local-level processes are also key to consolidating peace, and there is often a close relationship between local-level and national-level political dynamics.
In this context, IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN cohosted a policy forum on “The Primacy of Politics at the Local Level: The Work of UN Civil Affairs” on February 25th.
The purpose of this event was to discuss how missions understand and implement the primacy of politics at the local level by looking particularly at the work of UN Civil Affairs within peacekeeping settings. It also served to launch an IPI publication on the same topic, co-authored by Jenna Russo, IPI’s Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, and Allard Duursma, Assistant Professor in Conflict Management and International Relations at ETH Zurich.
Building on the insights of the report, this forum brought together representatives of the UN Secretariat, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss how UN Civil Affairs components navigate local political dynamics and explore ways to strengthen their role in aligning local engagement with mission-wide political strategies.
Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Speakers:
Allard Duursma, Assistant Professor in Conflict Management and International Relations, ETH Zurich (Virtual)
Marco Donati, Team Leader Civil Affairs, Policy and Best Practices service of DPO
Hiroko Hirahara, Director of Civil Affairs Division, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (Virtual)
Eiko Ikegaya, Chief, Mediation Support and Gender, Peace and Security, Policy and Mediation Division, United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
The post The Local-Level Engagement of UN Civil Affairs appeared first on International Peace Institute.
On 8 December 2024, the Assad regime in Syria was overthrown by a rebel alliance led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The collapse of the family dictatorship was made possible by shifts in regional and international power dynamics. Key factors included Turkish support for the rebels, the weakening of Iran and Hezbollah owing to Israeli military strikes and Russia’s changing priorities in the context of its war against Ukraine. At the same time, the fall of the Assad regime has led to another shift in power relations in the region. The interests, priorities and actions of regional and international actors will define the room for manoeuvre of the new rulers in Damascus. Turkey and Israel have occupied territories in the north and southwest of the country, respectively. The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are expected to exercise influence, too, as they will play a crucial role in the reconstruction of Syria. And the United States still maintains a military presence in Syria, although its future involvement in the country is uncertain.