Agrégateur de flux

Small Swiss-Luxembourg asset management firm Horizon Capital AG has a debt on its balance sheet it would rather forget. That's because

Die Gewinnerin des diesjährigen Alfred-Nobel-Gedächtnispreises für Wirtschaftswissenschaften ist die US-Ökonomin Claudia Goldin von der Harvard University. Dazu äußert sich DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher wie folgt:

Die Wahl von Claudia Goldin als Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträgerin 2023 ist exzellent und auch überraschend. Die Ungleichheit von Chancen gewinnt in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften international zunehmend an Bedeutung. Claudia Goldin hat mit ihrer Forschung viele Leerstellen gefüllt, insbesondere in der Forschung zur Ungleichheit zwischen Männern und Frauen. Sie zeigt auf, wie groß die Bedeutung von Werten, aber auch von Diskriminierung, für die Ungleichheit von Bildungschancen, Jobs, Bezahlung und Karrieren immer noch sind.

Die Wahl von Claudia Goldin als Nobelpreisträgerin sollte vor allem uns in Deutschland ein wichtiges Signal sein, die vielen blinden Flecken in Bezug auf die Gleichstellung von Männern und Frauen zu beseitigen. In kaum einem vergleichbaren Land ist der Gender Pay Gap mit 18 Prozent so groß wie in Deutschland. Aber auch andere Unterschiede (oder „Gaps“) sind in Deutschland ungewöhnlich groß: bei den Arbeitsstunden, den Karrierechancen, der sozialen Absicherung und bei der für Pflege und Familie aufgebrachten Zeit klaffen in Deutschland große Lücken zwischen Männern und Frauen, die nur langsam kleiner werden.

Die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau und die damit verbundenen Chancen für Frauen sind heute das größte ungehobene wirtschaftliche Potenzial für Deutschland. Fast die Hälfte aller Frauen arbeitet in Teilzeit. Viele würden gerne mehr und besser arbeiten können, wenn ihnen die vielen Hürden genommen würden: eine unzureichende Betreuung in Kitas und Schulen, eine steuerliche Schlechterstellung, geringere Bezahlung, weniger Wertschätzung, eine unzureichende Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf und schlechtere Karrierechancen. Der deutsche Staat kann und muss endlich diese Hürden adressieren, allen voran durch längst überfällige Reformen des Ehegattensplitting und der Mitversicherung, der Minijobs, in der Pflege und durch mehr Transparenz und Vereinbarkeit auf dem Arbeitsmarkt.

Dieser Preis für Claudia Goldin sollte ein Weckruf für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland für mehr Chancengleichheit sein. Wir als DIW Berlin treiben diese Thematik, unter anderem mit einer eigenen Forschungsgruppe Gender Economics, seit zehn Jahren aktiv voran und wollen diese Bemühungen weiter stärken.

On February 4, 2026, the New Start Treaty (NST) will expire. When it does, there will be no formal restrictions on either the American or Russian nuclear arsenals. Due to the NST’s framework, the treaty cannot be extended or renewed again; therefore, if Russia and the United States want a follow-on arms control agreement, then they will have to renegotiate. So far, the Russian government has rejected all U.S. proposals for new negotiations. For this reason, the fate of any follow-on arms control remains uncertain.   

The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review articulates a desire to engage in arms control agreements to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and enhance strategic stability. Recently, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan emphasized that arms control helps limit arms races, manage escalation, and ensure the safety and security of the American people from nuclear threats. While these are noble intentions, they may be impractical given the emerging two-peer problem. The United States should evaluate whether arms control is a useful way to secure U.S. national interests. 

The Emerging Two-Peer Challenge

The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the People’s Republic of China as the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security” with good reason. China is projected to deploy up to 1500 nuclear warheads by 2035—a significant increase from their present nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, China’s leaders refuse to engage with U.S. officials regarding nuclear arms control and demand the United States continue to reduce its nuclear forces. While this argument may seem reasonable given the disparity between China and U.S. nuclear forces, the United States has significantly reduced its nuclear stockpile despite China’s intention to do the opposite. China also refuses to establish formal crisis communication channels and is not transparent about the size and types of its nuclear weapons like other P5 nations. Considering this, the United States needs to consider how future arms control agreements absent of China could impact U.S. interests. 

Additionally, the 2022 National Security Strategy recognizes Russia as a “persistent threat to international peace and stability.” Russia’s military invasions of Georgia and Ukraine violated international law and led to an increase in tensions among nuclear powers. Also, Russia has been an unreliable strategic partner, having violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and having recently suspended its participation in the NST due to American support for Ukraine. Moreover, Russia has up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons in its stockpile. The Russian government refuses to be transparent about its non-strategic nuclear weapon systems. President Biden should consider all of this before engaging in arms control with Russia and rewarding nearly two decades’ worth of bad behavior. 

Both Russia and China view the United States as a threat to their security interests. President Xi has accused the United States of attempting to contain and suppress China’s development. President Putin has gone even further in stating that the “West” seeks to erase Russia from the map. These views have pushed Russia and China closer. Over the past decade, these two nations have expanded cooperation in a variety of areas, such as economic trade and military operations. The United States cannot turn a blind eye to this growing challenge. The time has come to assess whether arms control is a useful tool to address the current security environment. 

Going Forward with Arms Control

The Biden Administration’s inclination toward arms control is understandable, especially when you look at its enduring legacy as a part of the U.S. Cold War strategy. There is no doubt that arms control helped navigate one of the most tumultuous relationships to ever exist in international politics. However, the security environment we face today is remarkably different than that of past decades. While arms control may have protected us in the past, it may not serve our interests now. During the Cold War, the United States only had to deter the Soviet Union. Now, the United States and its allies must strengthen deterrence simultaneously against two adversaries in multiple theaters under a variety of complex conditions. 

To determine if arms control is feasible and advantageous, the United States should examine the following questions as a starting point before pursuing further arms control agreements with our adversaries:

Is the United States better off in an unconstrained or constrained security environment? This question must account for U.S. adversaries’ capabilities and capacity if unconstrained. It should also assess what capabilities and capacity the U.S. military should possess to ensure flexibility, credibility, and leverage if unconstrained.  

Under what conditions should the United States constrain itself, and in what ways? This question should identify more than just mutually beneficial agreements. It must also examine the political will of our adversaries and what steps are needed to get them to engage in arms control with seriousness. This analysis should also identify possible strategies the United States could consider when negotiating with two nuclear adversaries.

Has arms control contributed to U.S. nuclear modernization challenges? While there are many reasons why the United States is struggling with its current nuclear modernization efforts, new analyses that investigate how arms control impacts U.S. nuclear force developments may be necessary.

How should Washington use arms control to manage strategic stability in the new era? U.S. efforts to bolster strategic stability relative to either China or Russia, whether through arms control outreach or enhanced deterrence, could paradoxically undermine strategic stability with the other. Neither country is presently willing to engage in formalized strategic stability dialogue either. U.S. leaders need to fundamentally reassess whether legally binding arms reduction or limitations treaties, non-binding tacitly-agreed-upon norms, or other methods of arms control are viable and beneficial for ensuring stability in the emerging three-party balance.  

The point in asking these questions is not to dismiss arms control or argue that it has no place in U.S. national strategy. If arms control is a realistic option to address U.S. security concerns, we should pursue further arms control agreements. But more questions need answering before deciding whether arms control should remain a focal point of national strategy. 

Cody Kennedy is a Program Analyst at Systems Planning & Analysis, supporting naval nuclear modernization efforts. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. The views expressed are his own and do not represent the opinions of his employer. 

Image: Shutterstock. 

It has been over forty-eight hours since the large-scale Hamas offensive into southern Israel started on October 7, in what the organization calls Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Israeli cities and military targets were caught by surprise at the sheer volume and magnitude of Hamas’ three-pronged attack. This came a day after the 1973 Yom Kippur War anniversary when a simultaneous assault from Egyptian and Syrian forces struck Israel. Analysts are drawing comparisons between the two conflicts, particularly Israeli intelligence’s failure to anticipate both attacks.

Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, minced no words in an address to his people, “citizens of Israel, we are at war.” He has vowed to extract a “mighty revenge” and has ordered a mass mobilization of Israeli reservists. Now, there is fear that this new war between the Gaza Strip and Israel could spread across different parts of the region, including Lebanon. Is that a real possibility? 

Lebanon’s Hezbollah had expressed solidarity with its Hamas ally and what it describes as a common cause with the Palestinian people in their struggle against Israeli occupation. In the southern Beirut suburb of Dahieh, a top Hezbollah official and cleric, Hashem Safieddine, spoke in front of a crowd of supporters, declaring, “our history, our guns and our rockets are with you. Everything we have is with you.” It was a clear affirmation by the group that it stood by Hamas and its actions. As the situation develops, it is difficult to ascertain where this conflict is heading. 

The number of casualties varies. It is estimated that over 700 Israelis have been killed by the Hamas strike deep into the southern part of the country, and over 100 people have been taken prisoner. Israel responded with an airborne barrage over Gaza and bombing areas it claims are Hamas targets. However, the Health Ministry in Gaza said over 400 people have been killed, including women and children. Israel’s armed forces are still trying to regain full control of the areas infiltrated by Hamas fighters. The fighting has only intensified with each passing hour.

This attack was more extraordinary because Israel controls all land, sea, and air crossing into the Palestinian territory. And yet, Hamas still managed to pull off a ferocious asymmetrical invasion of Israel, stunning the country and the world. The leadership of the Gaza-based group has called on others to join the fight. Hezbollah said it fired upon the Israeli position on the Lebanon-Israel border. A radar station was among three Israeli sites targeted in the disputed Shebaa Farms. Israel controls this part of the Syrian Golan Heights, captured in the June 1967 war. Lebanon has long claimed the Shebaa territory belongs to it. Some believe Hezbollah’s missile attack on the Israeli-occupied territory was deliberately calculated so as not to escalate tensions even further since the area is already a region of contention. 

The Israelis retaliated by firing artillery shells into southern Lebanon, which caused property damage and injuries. Currently, one Hezbollah soldier was killed in an Israeli strike on a Hezbollah observation tower. A statement was issued from the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for both sides to restrain themselves and not to allow greater escalation. 

“We are in contact with authorities on both sides of the Blue Line, at all levels, to contain the situation and avoid a more serious escalation. Our peacekeepers remain in their positions and on task. They continue to work, some from shelters for their safety.” Lebanon’s armed forces also increased its presence near the border.

The Lebanese people are waiting to see how this new round of violence will develop and if it will drag them into a new war with Israel. Something both countries cannot afford. One source told The National Interest that although the conflict in Gaza is still in its early stages, it may spread to Lebanon if it continues and Israel “crosses the red lines.” This attack may trigger a wider war. If it continues and Israel crosses various red lines, Lebanon will be dragged into it. What red lines might these be?

Israel invades Gaza, inflicting high casualties on Palestinians. 

Israel attacks Hezbollah’s positions.

Israel assassinates local leaders, either Lebanese or Palestinian. 

Considering these conditions and possibilities, the source added, “I think the only way out is to start negotiations over prisoners. This is the only way to reduce tensions, and both Israeli and Palestinian people will be satisfied with this.” 

Nonetheless, Israel has rejected the idea of negotiating with Hamas. The Islamist group has also raised the stakes by threatening to execute one Israeli prisoner for every attack on Palestinian civilians. There is no doubt that Hamas’ initial attacks on Israel were a strategic shock for Tel Aviv that many observers are calling a defeat. Yet, this war has only begun, leaving questions but no guarantees of how it will end. Now, everyone waits to see what the next phase of this war will be. 

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock. 

The 1973 Yom Kippur War began as a surprise attack on one of the holiest days on the Jewish calendar. And, now, history has repeated itself.

Today, Hamas, an Iran-backed terror group, launched a surprise attack by land, water, and air—including glider assaults and more than 5,000 rocket strikes in the first 20 minutes. On the ground, Hamas punched through the border fence, attacked armored vehicles, and waged gun battles with police and Israeli reservists for hours. Countless neighborhoods have become battlefields. Dozens of civilians and soldiers have been taken hostage.

The total death and injury toll, which tops 800, is expected to pass 1,000 by the day’s end. One hospital in the border region of Beersheba reports that it is treating some 280 civilians, more than 60 with life-threatening wounds. This is the most extensive Hamas combined-arms campaign in memory. Within hours of the invasion, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu concluded in a solemn televised address: “We are at war, and we will win it.”

Today is Simchat Torah, a holy day of celebration, which translates as “joy of the Torah.” On this day, observant Jews do not work, drive, write, or turn on electronic devices. It was a perfect day to attack a quietly celebrating democratic nation.

Already, social media is polluted by those trying to justify the unprovoked barbarity of the surprise attacks. Some said that Israel should give land for peace. This ignores that Hamas planned its attacks from the Gaza Strip, which Israel handed over in 2006 to make peace. Others talked of the “humiliation” of having to show their identification at the border fence, just as millions do at border checkpoints and airports all over the world. Still, others talk about self-determination—forgetting that Palestinians elect their own leaders in the Gaza Strip and those leaders ordered these attacks.

And all this babble ignores the human view: the wives who watched their husbands die outside their homes, the children lost in rocket attacks or slain by stray machine-gun rounds. The suffering of the many who have no part in politics is immense.

The Abraham Accords, which brought peace between Israel and four Arab nations, offered historic hope. Finally, it seemed the Arab nations and Israel would work together to focus on improving the lives of ordinary Palestinians who, like the Israelis, want jobs, housing, health care, and schools for their children.

But Iran had other plans, supplying vast amounts of rockets, mortars, guns, and ammunition to the Gaza Strip by ship, plane, and truck. (Some of those deadly cargoes were intercepted by the U.S. Navy and diverted to Ukraine.) Iran wanted war, and Hamas complied.

Hamas has killed more Americans than any other terror group, except for Al Qaeda. It has access to underground weapons warehouses, platoons of drones, squadrons of rockets, thousands of fighters, and training facilities to produce more. Hamas plans, promotes, and encourages terrorists and then lionizes them as “martyrs.”

Its war with Israel could last longer than the Yom Kippur War.

If we tolerate extremism, it will erode the rock of security and ultimately destroy all U.S. efforts to stabilize the Middle East.

Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh, should no longer be received as a hero in some Arab capitals. The U.S. Treasury Department must sanction Haniyeh and his loved ones and deprive them of travel and international payments.

It is also not normal that Hamas continues to be supported by a series of non-state initiatives and foundations, some of which are based in Europe.

This terrorist attack comes as the United States works to negotiate a historic deal that normalizes relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which could transform the Middle East. Perhaps that is the real target of today’s attacks.

President Joe Biden expressed his support for Israel in a phone call with Netanyahu. “We stand ready to offer all appropriate means of support to the Government and people of Israel,” Biden said in a statement.

This is important, but the United States must do more. The State Department confirmed that nine American citizens perished in the attacks. Hamas is now a threat to America’s national security and its attempts to bring peace to the region.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

This summer, the European Commission passed the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, a set of burdensome Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting requirements for companies that operate in the European Union (EU), even those based elsewhere. The Biden administration has done so little to push back against the law that some congressmen have suggested it may even coordinate with European officials behind the scenes. With or without active collusion, President Biden’s silence will lead to a host of problems that will hurt the American consumer. EU regulations will tacitly govern large American corporations that do business abroad, while smaller companies will see higher barriers to entering the European market.

Starting next year, all companies with more than 500 employees operating in the European Union must report to EU authorities more than 250 pages of disclosures related to environmental, social, and governance matters like climate change and extensive supplier due diligence. In 2025, these regulations will apply to companies with 250 employees or 20 million euros in assets, and in 2028, to all companies. 

Such reporting will require dramatic shifts of corporate resources toward ESG and compliance departments, burdening companies with bureaucratic work rather than value-adding functions like research and development. Inevitably, many companies––especially smaller ones––will choose not to operate in Europe because of these expensive and time-consuming compliance regulations. 

Meanwhile, many large companies will find it more practical to restructure their worldwide operations around EU regulations. This is known as the “Brussels effect” and will lead to the EU having an outsized effect on how regulations affect the global economy—not just Europe. 

In the short term, American businesses may need to decide if complying with EU regulations is worth it and how that will affect how they do business at home.

As large U.S. corporations become used to European requirements, we may see similar changes at home. In many cases, strict regulations in a large market lead to less-regulated markets adopting similarly strict rules, welcomed by big businesses prepared to deal with such changes at the expense of smaller players. 

If legislators and the president accept the EU’s ESG regulations without pushback, it would clear the way for passing similar regulations in the United States down the road.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has already proposed less extreme ESG reporting rules. Still, these have been significantly delayed and, fortunately, may not pass at all. 

However, once major American companies are made to adapt to stringent European reporting requirements, incentives may change. Big businesses might find that crippling domestic regulations are just what they need to corner their respective markets. And as long as Congress continues to outsource its lawmaking to our growing administrative state, we risk allowing such decisions to be made by bureaucrats far removed from electoral politics.

The overhead spent complying with burdensome EU regulations could compromise price, quality, and innovation in the products offered here. In a globalized world, these are tariffs by another name, replacing populist rhetoric with vague notions of saving the planet via big business. The United States is almost as populous as the EU and far more affluent on a per-capita basis, and the European market has been shrinking relative to the U.S. market since the Great Recession. We should be calling the shots on our side of the pond, but we can only do that if Congress and the President act and stop accepting what European bureaucrats dictate. 

The President and Congress must show Europe that if it chooses to kneecap American businesses, the indispensable defense and extensive trade the United States can offer will no longer be a given.

Mike Viola is the Director of Business Intelligence at the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) and previously worked in investment research for five years. He tweets at @mf_viola.

Rencontre avec l'historienne Catherine Pinguet, le collectionneur Pierre de Gigord et Alexandra Patrikiou, chercheuse au musée juif de Grèce, animée par François Azar.
Autour de l'exposition « Salonique, Jérusalem des Balkans, 1870-1920 »
Retour sur l'histoire singulière de cette cité qui pendant plus de deux millénaires a abrité sans discontinuité une importante communauté juive. Au début du XXe siècle elle constituait la majorité de la population, faisant de cette capitale économique (...)

- Agenda / Agenda - Diaporama, Région parisienne, Grèce

Encadré par Svetlana Spajić en collaboration avec Erik Marchand Cette formation de 35h vous propose 3 ateliers : chant par Svetlana Spajić, violon par Filip Krumes et soufflant par Miloš Nikolić.
Cette formation s'adresse aux instrumentistes, aux chanteurs et aux chanteuses, de niveau professionnel pratiquant les instruments suivants : Chant, violon ou cordes frottées, soufflants. Les musiciens pratiquant d'autres instruments proches de ceux proposés peuvent toutefois proposer leur candidature qui (...)

- Agenda / Serbie, Dans les Balkans

Encadré par Svetlana Spajić en collaboration avec Erik Marchand Cette formation de 35h vous propose 3 ateliers : chant par Svetlana Spajić, violon par Filip Krumes et soufflant par Miloš Nikolić.
Cette formation s'adresse aux instrumentistes, aux chanteurs et aux chanteuses, de niveau professionnel pratiquant les instruments suivants : Chant, violon ou cordes frottées, soufflants. Les musiciens pratiquant d'autres instruments proches de ceux proposés peuvent toutefois proposer leur candidature qui (...)

- Agenda / Serbie, Dans les Balkans

(B2) C'est la Pologne qui a, la première, dimanche (8 octobre) annoncé le lancement de l'évacuation de ses concitoyens d'Israël. Le Portugal a embrayé ainsi que la république Tchèque. D'autres suivent. Le mouvement s'accélérant même en milieu de semaine.

(Photo : MOD Pologne)

Après l'attaque multiple menée par les militants du mouvement Hamas contre plusieurs villes et habitations civiles dans le Sud d'Israël, aux alentours de Gaza, de nombreux touristes sont restés coincés — de nombreuses compagnies aériennes civiles ayant interrompu leur vol. « Nous sommes prêts à assurer rapidement et efficacement le retour chez eux des touristes polonais qui séjournent actuellement en Israël » a assuré le ministre de la défense, Mariusz Błaszczak.

Trois avions mobilisés

Varsovie a mobilisé au début trois avions de transport : deux avions C130 Hercules et un Boeing 737 pour cette opération, dénommée NEON. Deux avions polonais se sont posés à l'aéroport Ben Gourion de Tel Aviv dès dimanche (8 octobre). Le troisième a décollé de Varsovie dimanche soir avec, à son bord, une équipe médicale militaire. Les avions pourront au besoin évacuer d’autres citoyens européens et étrangers qui souhaiteraient quitter le pays, précise le gouvernement polonais. Des avions Casa ont pris le relais assurant à partir de lundi (9 octobre) un pont aérien entre Tel Aviv en Israël et Chania en Crète, permettant ainsi de raccourcir le temps d'évacuation. Douze navettes ont ainsi été organisées jeudi (12 octobre).

L'expérience polonaise

L'aviation de transport et les forces spéciales polonaises ont « une certaines expérience dans ce type d'opérations » précise l'état-major : elles avaient mené une opération d'évacuation des Polonais de Wuhan (Chine) lors de l'épidémie de Covid-19 en 2020, et en 2021 pour l'évacuation de Kaboul.

D'autres pays embraient le pas

Le Portugal a aussi mobilisé un C-130 de ses forces aériennes pour « effectuer une mission d'aide au retour des Portugais » d'Israël, a annoncé en début de soirée, la défense portugaise.

L'Italie a assuré plusieurs rotations de ses avions militaires de Tel Aviv vers Pratica di Mare. Deux ont atterri mardi (10 octobre) dans la matinée à Pratica di Mare, ramenant environ 200 personnes, un troisième avion militaire a atterri dans l'après-midi. Deux autres vols assurés par une compagnie aérienne privée (Neos) à « prix contrôlés » (NB : 350 euros) seront assurés mercredi (11 octobre), indique la Farnesina. De nombreux pèlerins se trouvaient dans le pays, coincés par l'annulation des vols réguliers.

De son côté, la Tchéquie a profité du déplacement de son ministre des Affaires étrangères Jan Lipavský en Israël — pour exprimer son soutien à son homologue Eli Cohen —, pour ramener des citoyens tchèques bloqués dans le pays.

34 ont ainsi pu rentrer dans l'avion ministériel dès mardi (10 octobre) soir. Une autre rotation a été assurée mercredi (11 octobre) dans la nuit, permettant de rapatrier une quarantaine de citoyens tchèques à l’aéroport militaire de Kbely, à Prague, à 3h40.

Des citoyens tchèques évacuent de Tel Aviv à bord de l'A319 ministériel (Photo : MFA Tchéquie)

L'Autriche a préféré envoyé un avion C-130 vers Chypre. De là, un service de navette vers Israël sera mis en place pour ramener les Autrichiens. Il devait décoller de Linz mercredi (11 octobre) en matinée annonce la Bundesheer. A bord de l'avion, des psychologues de l'armée. (mis à jour) Mais l'opération a été reportée. L'avion étant tombé en panne. Construit en 1966 (57 ans d'âge !), il est en fonction depuis 2003 dans l'armée autrichienne s'excuse Michel Bauer, le porte-parole de l'armée.

Les Pays-Bas ont annoncé mardi (10 octobre) envoyé un avion de transport militaire de type A330 de l'unité multinationale d'avions de transport multirôles (MRTT) stationnée à la base aérienne d'Eindhoven, gérée par l'Otan, pour « rapatrier les personnes possédant un passeport néerlandais et souhaitant quitter Israël » comme l'a précisé la ministre de la Défense Kajsa Ollengren.

199 personnes ont ainsi pu être rapatriées mercredi (11 octobre). Une deuxième rotation a été organisée dans la foulée. L'appareil se posant à Eindhoven vers 1h30 du matin dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi (13 octobre) avec plus de 200 Néerlandais à bord et une vingtaine d'Européens, précise le ministère néerlandais des Affaires étrangères. D'autres vols sont prévus dans les prochains jours, indique la défense néerlandaise.

La Roumanie a choisi de privilégier des vols privés, organisés notamment par la compagnie nationale Tarom, à la demande du ministère des Affaires étrangères. 239 ressortissants roumains ont ainsi été rapatriés entre mercredi et jeudi, à bord de quatre vols (Tarom, El Al et deux compagnies privées). En tout depuis le début du conflit, 18 vols spéciaux, assurés par Tarom et d’autres compagnies privées ont permis de rapatrier environ 1800 ressortissants roumains assure le porte-parole du ministère, Radu Filip à Agerpress

Il reste encore 300 citoyens roumains en Israël qui ont demandé une aide pour rentrer et 150 vivant à Gaza (350 Roumains sont recensés dans le territoire palestinien).

La France a annoncé qu'un vol spécial opéré par Air France sera assuré jeudi (12 octobre) pour permettre aux « compatriotes qui le souhaitent, et n’ont pu trouver de places disponibles dans les vols commerciaux encore ouverts à Tel Aviv, de regagner le territoire national » indique le quai d'Orsay, mardi (10 octobre) en fin de soirée.

Le premier vol a atterri à l'aéroport Charles de Gaulle jeudi (12 octobre) au soir ramenant 377 personnes. D'autres vols sont prévus vendredi (13 octobre).

L'Allemagne a demandé à la compagnie nationale Lufthansa d'effectuer plusieurs vols spéciaux jeudi et vendredi à destination d'Israël pour rapatrier les ressortissants et binationaux. Quatre vols avaient déjà été organisés jeudi (12 octobre) permettant d'évacuer 950 personnes, annonce le ministère des Affaires étrangères.

La Hongrie a choisi (comme l'Autriche) Chypre comme hub d'évacuation. 65 citoyens hongrois d'Israël, dont 18 enfants, ont pu rejoindre Chypre par bateau jeudi (12 octobre) annonce le ministre des Affaires étrangères Peter Szijjártó. Ils seront rapatriés par avion en Hongrie.

Après avoir hésité le Royaume-Uni a lancé jeudi (12 octobre) son opération d'évacuation. Via des avions privés, avec trajet payant. Chaque personne devant acquitter un montant de 300 £ précise le communiqué du Foreign Office.

À suivre...

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Mis à jour le 10 octobre (Italie, Tchéquie, Autriche, Pays-Bas, Allemagne, France) - le 12 octobre (Hongrie, Allemagne, Royaume-Uni, Pologne, Roumanie) - le 13 octobre (bilan chiffré Italie, Pays-Bas, Tchéquie)

We have been to Gioia del Colle for NATO Tiger Meet 2023. The NATO Tiger Meet 2023 is underway at Gioia del Colle Air Base, alternating high-level tactical training missions with various traditional social events. [...]

The post NATO Tiger Meet 2023 In Full Swing At Gioia del Colle Air Base appeared first on The Aviationist.

The IDF has launched Operation “Swords of Iron” in response to a massive attack from the Gaza Strip that involved also paragliders, unmanned aircraft and speedboats. In the morning on Oct. 7, 2023, Palestinian militant [...]

The post Israel ‘At War’ In Gaza After Hamas Launches Massive Surprise Hybrid Attack appeared first on The Aviationist.

Hamas' assault on Israel on October 7 was a surprise not only in terms of its unexpected nature but also in terms of the unprecedented events that accompanied the assault: Israel's intelligence community's failure to anticipate the attack, Israel’s military's initial lack of an effective rapid response, and the unexpected success of militias in the early hours. Although it is still too early to identify the causes of these circumstances, there are educated guesses we can make.

Israel Did Not See the War Coming

For starters, in recent years, Israel’s intelligence community has been largely focused on Iran and its borders with Syria and Lebanon. Essentially, Israelis have been using their espionage capability primarily to counter the development of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs, and secondarily to prevent the transfer of advanced military equipment from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria. Tel Aviv’s recent state of high alert regarding Iran and Hezbollah's joint construction of an airport in Southern Lebanon, activities of the Iran-backed Hussein Brigade in Syria, and Hezbollah’s recent installment of tents in the City of Ghajar are indicators of the intelligence community's diverted attention. In this context, one might argue that Hamas and its backers, mainly Iran and Hezbollah, were counting on this diversion and have been attempting to exacerbate it. As of now, neither Israeli nor any other sources know what exactly was inside Hezbollah’s tents, leading some to speculate if it was a “false red flag” operation.

Beyond what caused Israel’s intelligence lapse, we need to understand its impact. Just three weeks ago, on September 12th, the so-called Gaza Strip’s Joint Operations Room, comprising various Palestinian militias led by the military wing of Hamas, al-Qassam Brigades, conducted a military drill. They practiced mass rocket attacks, utilized offensive drone capabilities, and refined their urban guerrilla warfare techniques. All these tactics have been employed in the current assault, yet Israel’s intelligence community failed to anticipate the attack.

In addition to the diversion of intelligence attention, it seems Israel, in the recent assault, has been deprived of one of its primary advantages: the element of surprise.

Strategic Paralysis

With the exception of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, in most other conflicts, Israel had the advantage of surprising the enemy with mass aerial attacks to achieve “strategic paralysis.” However, in this conflict, Hamas not only deprived Israel of this advantage but also turned it against the IDF. To compound the “tactical paralysis” Israel faced, the Palestinians employed a Blitzkrieg-like strategy, focusing their forces on specific entry points, then rapidly advancing, followed by periodic outbreaks behind Israel’s defense lines. Additionally, Hamas seems to have attempted to create chaos among the public and distract the Israeli military by launching attacks from the sea using boats and motor-powered hang gliders.

Hamas’s tactical innovations also included the use of new weaponry and the projection of unprecedented firepower. Reflecting on their 2021 conflict with Israel, Hamas realized that while they couldn't out-tech the Iron Dome, they might outpace its reloading capabilities. By concentrating their fire, launching numerous rockets, shells, and kamikaze drones towards Israeli territory, they hoped to overload the Iron Dome’s capacities. Their success in this seems relative. Drawing inspiration from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Hamas employed hardly detectable quadcopter drones to target Israeli troops and observation posts.

In this conflict, Hamas appears to be trying to neutralize one of Israel’s major advantages: aerial superiority, by taking 100 Israelis hostage. While the primary objective of taking hostages is likely to use them as bargaining chips in future negotiations - as Hamas leadership already stated that they have enough hostages to free all Palestinian prisoners - it's worth noting that Hamas is likely housing these hostages in bunkers and tunnels. This tactic not only restricts the Israel Air Force's freedom of movement but also increases the potential for collateral damage. In past conflicts, militias stockpiled their ammunition and troops in civilian areas to create a human shield. By adding Israeli citizens to the mix, they've now created a double-edged sword: if Israel attacks, it risks its citizens; if it doesn't, it still faces challenges.

In the end, despite these tactics, the asymmetrical military capability between Israel and Hamas remains evident. The IDF has absolute superiority in every domain, prompting the question: why was the assault even launched? As we move forward, we may get closer to answering this. For now, it seems Hamas hopes that by leveraging the hostages, they can press Israel to ease restrictions on the Gaza Strip or release prisoners. Or perhaps, all of Hamas' actions are part of a grander strategy, luring the IDF into a land invasion of the Gaza Strip and drawing them into a war of attrition. Only time will tell.

Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer of Russian Studies and International Affairs and a researcher at the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute. Follow him @MahmoudianArman.

Image: Creative Commons. 

In the tumultuous wake of an unprecedented attack on Israel by Hamas forces from Gaza, a defining moment has arisen for United States foreign policy.

As a longstanding ally of Israel, the U.S. is compelled to reevaluate its stance and actions amidst a conflict steeped in complexity and historical precedent. The escalation of violence prompts the consideration of stringent policy measures aimed at curbing the Islamist organization’s aggression and restoring stability in the region.

The adoption of a “Dismantle Hamas” resolution represents one such measure. In the face of ongoing crisis, rhetorical support or increased pressure on Hamas proves insufficient. A Congressional resolution calling unequivocally for the eradication of the Hamas threat would signify a paradigm shift, underscoring the United States’ unyielding commitment to Israel’s sovereignty and safety, and the eradication of threats to Israel, and the wider region.

Yet, Israel’s security is intertwined with regional dynamics, notably the role of Qatar in funding Gaza. While ostensibly aimed at humanitarian relief, the financial aid flowing from this Gulf state has inadvertently fueled Hamas’s militancy. A recalibration of U.S.-Qatar relations is urgent. Measures such as the revocation of Qatar's Major Non-NATO Ally Status, threatening Qatar’s access to US financial systems, and even the potential relocation of the Al Udeid Air Base, hang in the balance as potent levers to enforce a cessation of all funding to Gaza.

In tandem with these international diplomatic maneuvers, a domestic reassessment of aid to Gaza is pivotal. The recent conviction of World Vision’s Gaza Director for siphoning off tens of millions of dollars for Hamas shows that even well-intended USAID funds can easily be used for nefarious purposes. A comprehensive review of aid to Gaza is required. No U.S. aid should reach Gaza’s shores so long as it can be siphoned off by a terrorist organization running a functional military dictatorship, thereby perpetuating the tragic situation it ostensibly seeks to mitigate.

Global efforts to corner Hamas’s leadership, ensconced in the safe havens of “frenemy” countries, Turkey and Qatar in particular, can tighten the noose around the organization. Nations providing refuge to these leaders must face a stark choice – sever ties with the organization, including expelling senior leaders who live in luxury as ordinary Gazans suffer, or confront a cessation in U.S. military and intelligence support. This measure exemplifies an act of international solidarity against terrorism. Regional dynamics hold the key to further isolating Hamas.

Egypt, in particular, has a pivotal role to play. The U.S. should consider restoring military aid to Egypt, on the condition that it assists in dismantling Hamas and offers refuge to Gazan citizens fleeing the conflict. Such a policy aligns mutual interests for regional stability and underscores the role of cooperative diplomacy in quelling violence.

Yet, these diplomatic and financial efforts must be complemented by direct actions to stem the flow of arms to Gaza. Inspired by the Biden Administration’s recent interception of Iranian weapons bound for Yemen, which were brilliantly then shipped to Ukraine, the U.S. should intensify efforts to halt the supply of arms destined for Hamas and repeat this success by sending captured arms to Ukraine. Each weapon intercepted represents a concrete step towards de-escalating ongoing conflicts and restoring a semblance of peace.

Lastly, the legislative arsenal of the United States can be fortified by reviving and reinforcing the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Prevention Act, perhaps to be aptly renamed as the ‘Dismantle Hamas Through Sanctions and Direct Action Act.’ Adapted to the current crisis, this legislative initiative should aim to disempower Hamas, cutting off its financial and political lifelines. As Israel grapples with the onslaught initiated by Hamas, the U.S., fortified by its unwavering commitment to the Jewish state, is not only expected to stand with its ally but also to enact decisive actions.

The proposed policy measures represent a comprehensive approach, reflecting the necessity for a sustained solution to a conflict that has festered far too long. In this defining moment, the U.S. can exemplify international leadership, affirming that its support for an ally is not only resilient but unyielding.

Gregg Roman has been the director of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum since 2015. His work with the organization includes management of all aspects of its day-to-day communications and financial strategies. Gregg Roman’s writing has appeared in publications that include Newsweek, The Jerusalem Post, The Times of Israel, Los Angeles Times, and the Miami Herald. 

Clifford Smith is the director of the Middle East Forum's Washington D.C. office. He is a liaison to decision makers and opinion leaders in Washington, D.C. He holds a B.A. from Washington State University, an M.P.P. with a focus on international relations from Pepperdine University, and a law degree from the Catholic University of America. He is a member of the Maryland Bar. An experienced political operative, he is the veteran of numerous campaigns and has held several positions in Congress, most recently communications director for U.S. Rep. Gary Palmer. His writings have been published in the Daily Caller, the American Spectator, PJ Media, and other outlets.

Image: Shutterstock. 

In early August, I visited Kfar Aza—a kibbutz in southern Israel only two kilometers from the Gaza Strip. This is a community where residents have mere seconds to seek refuge once loudspeakers go off, signaling an imminent Hamas rocket or mortar attack. One of these residents, Chen Kotler Abrahams, invited my colleagues and me to her home, served lemonade, and pulled out body-height remnants of these rockets for us to see. Despite the grim conversation, life in Kfar Aza appeared fairly normal: children played in groups, adults gardened, and the like.

As of the time of this writing, there is a chance that many of the people I met are dead.

As many recall, Israel was caught off-guard fifty years ago during one of its holiest days, Yom Kippur. The war that followed was one of the hardest fought in Israel’s history, with repercussions that still shape the Middle East today. Half a century later, history has a grim way of rhyming, if not repeating. Today, on the holiday of Simchat Torah, as Jews worldwide were completing the annual reading of the Torah and dancing in celebration, Hamas launched an unprecedented and massive surprise attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip.

This operation has sent shockwaves around the world. This isn’t just another episode in the Israel-Hamas conflict or a bold attack by terrorists; it is a watershed moment that might reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.

Yom Kippur War Redux

The situation is still unfolding, but developments thus far have been shocking. Hamas fired over 5,000 rockets, overwhelming Israel’s Iron Dome system. Multiple Israeli communities near the Gaza border, including two military bases (Re’im and Kerem Shalom), faced not only the terror of rocket fire but also on-the-ground incursions. Dozens of Israeli civilians have been killed in their homes and communities, with graphic recordings of these heinous acts circulating on social media as gruesome propaganda. Meanwhile, an undetermined number of Israeli civilians and soldiers—including, supposedly, an Israeli general—have been kidnapped and reportedly taken back to Gaza, amplifying the atmosphere of terror. That this attack came on a Jewish religious holiday devoted to celebrating the Torah—a vital part of the Jewish connection to God and, by extension, their historical connection to the land of Israel—makes it more than a military maneuver; it’s a symbolic gesture.

Yet, unlike the Yom Kippur War, which was a conventional conflict involving state actors, this Simchat Torah offensive is marked by the asymmetric warfare that has come to define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years: Hamas fighters taking off from Gaza in paragliders and descending onto Israeli settlements, drones dropping bombs on vehicles and guard posts, and more.

Why now? Why on this particular day?

The answer lies in the realm of geopolitics. Hamas’ attack, besides its obvious goal of inflicting pain on Israel, aims to “veto” the budding rapprochement between Israel and other Muslim Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Though in its nascent stages, the recent thawing of relations between the countries is a monumental shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For decades, the prevailing trend set Israel and the Arab states on opposing fronts. But shared concerns, especially about the United States’ military drawdown from the region and Iran’s growing influence, have made former adversaries reconsider their stances.

For Hamas itself, the assault is due to a variety of reasons. The group has long positioned itself as the uncompromising vanguard of the Palestinian cause but has seen its legitimacy questioned and regional influence wane in recent years. Moreover, any hint of normalization between Israel and Arab states is regarded as a betrayal and a death knell for the Palestinian cause. By launching this brazen, massive attack and taking numerous hostages, Hamas has not only proven its resilience and competence as a fighting organization and put its political rival, the Palestinian Authority, on the back foot, but also it has placed Arab states under the spotlight—especially if Israel launches massive retaliatory attacks. Moreover, the 1973 conflict holds an iconic status in the Arab psyche. It is seen as a moment when Arab forces, even if momentarily, regained their dignity against the Israeli military might. By choosing this symbolic date, Hamas aims to rally the wider Arab world around its cause, invoking memories of past glories.

There’s another layer to this strategy. By striking on Simchat Torah, Hamas seeks to challenge the spiritual narrative of the Jewish state. They aimed not just at bodies but at souls, attempting to dampen the spirit of a people celebrating their divine covenant. This act reveals the deep-seated ideological battle at play.

Moves and Countermoves

As Israel begins its retaliation and the search for its kidnapped citizens, there’s a realization that the Middle East stands at the cusp of another potential large-scale conflict. In a move that underscores the gravity of the situation, Israel has authorized a massive counterattack. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a televised address to the nation, declared, “Citizens of Israel, we are at war. Not an operation, not a round [of fighting], at war!” The country’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has stated, “We will change reality on the ground in Gaza for the next fifty years. What was before, will be no more. We will operate at full force.” The gloves may be coming all the way off.

For years, Israel has hesitated from launching a full-scale operation to take Gaza, primarily due to the sheer military cost, the international repercussions, and the humanitarian concerns such an assault might trigger. But the scale and audacity of the recent attack may have shifted the calculus in Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s coalition government, composed of hard right elements, will not accept anything less than the destruction of Hamas. Moreover, Israel’s political and military establishment now feels pressured to restore its reputation and prestige. The scale and audacity of Hamas’ operation raise alarming questions about the massive intelligence failure by Israel and, to some extent, the United States. For an operation of this magnitude, planning would have spanned weeks, if not months. How was it that the Israeli defense establishment missed the brewing storm on their doorstep?

At the same time, any actions Israel takes must take into account the protection of the diplomatic gains; winning the immediate war will not amount to much in the long run if Israel is once again left isolated in the region with an Iran that is growing ever stronger.

The Arab world, particularly the governments of the Gulf states that have pursued improved ties with Israel, is in a tricky situation. At present, the Gulf states have called for de-escalation (the UAE), restraint (Oman), or blamed the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar). This response must be understood in a broader context; if Israel’s past responses to Hamas attacks are any guide, then the Israeli response will be great and terrible, with casualties in thousands, if not greater. Urban warfare, particularly in a densely populated area like Gaza, is fraught with difficulties. Civilian casualties are practically impossible to avoid in such circumstances, especially if they—along with any kidnapped Israelis—are used as human shields by Hamas. Gulf states would be hardpressed by domestic politics to respond to the deaths of so many fellow Arab Muslims.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, is in a precarious position. Riyadh’s recent overtures for Israel have been driven by mutual concerns over Iran, along with a desire to access Israeli technology. A stable relationship with Israel could serve as a bulwark against Tehran’s regional ambitions. But the Kingdom, with its deep-seated historical support for the Palestinian cause, will find it challenging to navigate the currents without alienating its populace.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies are “assessing” the situation and testing boundaries. If Israel appears weak, then there is a strong chance these groups will also attack Israel via Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Syria. This would create a second front for Israeli forces and possibly set off a broader regional war.

Israel’s operation presents a double-edged sword for the Palestinian Authority, which has been losing its grip on power and influence to Hamas. On one hand, the weakening or removal of Hamas could restore the PA’s primacy in Palestinian politics. On the other, any large-scale humanitarian crisis in Gaza resulting from the Israeli incursion will undoubtedly stoke anti-Israel sentiments, making its own situation all the more challenging.

The United States, traditionally Israel’s staunch ally, is also in a precarious situation. That Washington also didn’t see this attack coming speaks ill of its intelligence capabilities, especially in signals intelligence. The Biden administration will find itself under fire. Only mere days ago, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan argued that “The Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades now.” On the same day, Semafor revealed that Iran built a significant influence network that reached deep into the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. Finally, the administration’s decision to release $6 billion to Iran in exchange for five American hostages hostage will only face harsher criticism in the coming days; it is not unlikely that some of that money funded or otherwise supported Hamas’ current operation. Pressure to support Israel will be immense, complicating an already delicate situation with a public already tired of supporting conflicts abroad.

Perhaps the worst off are Gaza’s civilians, who’ve endured years of blockade and conflict, along with their own share of suffering under Hamas’ rule, and are now once again caught in the crossfire. Much like the broader Middle East’s, their future hangs in the balance, dependent on the choices and actions of regional and global powers in the coming weeks.

Coming Apart at the Seams 

It’s hard to guess what will happen to Kfar Aza, the kibbutz I visited two months ago. According to the latest reports, a baby was found alive but alone amid the community's charred remains.

Likewise, it is difficult to ascertain what will come next for the Middle East. With Israel’s announced intention to take Gaza and obliterate Hamas, the Arab world finds itself at a crossroads. Will they condemn Israel’s actions and risk derailing the recent diplomatic warmth? Or will they, even tacitly, support Israel’s move, viewing the eradication of Hamas as a pathway to a more stable Middle East? Either choice carries with it massive geopolitical implications. But now, it feels as if the Israeli/Palestinian situation is about to be resolved, one way or the other. 

This, perhaps, is what is truly terrifying Western policymakers: the sense that the Western-led, rules-based world order, such as it is, is coming apart. The previous constraints imposed on states are no longer as constraining. The war in Ukraine, the retaking by force of what remained of the Karabakh Armenian breakaway entity by Azerbaijan, heightening tensions over Taiwan, growing instability in the Balkans, military coups in Africa, and myriad other events are all grim portents of this trend. Which domino will fall next?

The Simchat Torah War, as this conflict will soon likely be called, is thus not just another skirmish. It’s a turning point, one with vast implications that heralds a coming age of disorder. The world watches with bated breath. 

Carlos Roa is a contributing editor and former executive editor for The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Rarely have two major democracies descended into as ugly a diplomatic spat as the one now unfolding between Canada and India. With the traditionally friendly relationship already at its lowest point ever, both sides are now engaging in quiet diplomacy to arrest the downward spiral, using the United States, a Canadian ally and Indian partner, as the intermediary. But even if the current diplomatic ruckus eases, Canada’s tolerance of Sikh separatist activity on its territory will continue to bedevil bilateral ties.

The latest dispute began when Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sensationally claimed that there were “credible allegations” about a “potential link” between India’s government and the fatal shooting in June of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist and Canadian citizen, on Canadian soil. India’s government fired back by demanding that Canada reduce its diplomatic staff in India, suspending new visas for Canadians, and accusing Canada of making “absurd” accusations to divert attention from its status as “a safe haven for terrorists.”

Nijjar was hardly the only Sikh separatist living in Canada. In fact, the country has emerged as the global hub of the militant movement for “Khalistan,” or an independent Sikh homeland. The separatists constitute a small minority of the Sikh diaspora, concentrated in the Anglosphere, especially in Canada. Sikhs living in India—who overwhelmingly report that they are proud to be Indian—do not support the separatist cause.

With British Columbia as their operational base, the separatists are waging a strident campaign glorifying political violence. For example, they have erected billboards advocating the killing of Indian diplomats (with photos), honored jailed or killed terrorists as “martyrs,” built a parade float on which the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was re-enacted, and staged attacks on Indian diplomatic missions in Canada. They have also held referendums on independence for Khalistan in Canada.

But, much to India’s frustration, Canada has been reluctant to take strong action to rein in Sikh separatism. Trudeau’s first official visit to India in 2018 turned into a disaster after it was revealed that a convicted Sikh terrorist who had spent years in a Canadian prison following the attempted assassination of a visiting Indian state cabinet minister had made it onto the Canadian guest list. At last month’s G20 summit in New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave Trudeau a dressing-down for being soft on violent extremists.

It was against this tense backdrop that Trudeau made his allegations about Nijjar’s murder. When countries have linked foreign agents to a domestic death—for example, in 2010, when the Dubai police chief accused Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, of killing a Hamas commander in a local luxury hotel—they have typically presented video, audio, or forensic evidence. And they have mostly avoided blaming the government that the foreign agents represent.

Trudeau, by contrast, cast blame directly on the Indian government without presenting a scintilla of evidence. He says the allegations are based on credible intelligence, apparently from a Five Eyes partner country (Australia, New Zealand, the UK, or the US), but refuses to declassify the information or share it with Indian authorities.

Trudeau apparently hasn’t provided “any facts” even to Canadian opposition leader Pierre Poilievre, a member of the Privy Council. And, according to the premier of British Columbia, the province where the killing occurred, the intelligence briefing he received on the matter included only information “available to the public doing an internet search.”

Meanwhile, Canadian investigators haven’t made a single arrest in the case. This has left many wondering to what extent Canada’s powerful but unaccountable intelligence establishment controls the country’s foreign policy.

In any case, there’s no doubt that Sikh radicals wield real political influence in Canada, including as funders. Trudeau keeps his minority government afloat with the help of Jagmeet Singh, the New Democratic Party’s Sikh leader and a Khalistan sympathizer. According to a former foreign policy adviser to Trudeau’s government, action was not taken to choke off financing for the Khalistani militants because “Trudeau did not want to lose the Sikh vote” to Singh.

Canada must wake up to the threat posed by its Sikh militants. Rising drug trade profitability and easy gun availability in British Columbia have contributed to internecine infighting among Khalistan radicals in the province. The volatile combination of Sikh militancy, the drug trade, and gangland killings has serious implications for Canadian security, but it is not only Canadians who are in danger.

Under the premiership of Trudeau’s father, Pierre Trudeau, Canada’s reluctance to rein in or extradite Sikh extremists wanted in India for terrorism led to the 1985 twin bombings targeting Air India flights. One attack killed all 329 passengers, most of whom were of Indian origin, on a flight from Toronto; the other misfired, killing two baggage handlers at Tokyo’s Narita Airport. With Khalistani militants continuing to idolize Talwinder Singh Parmar—the terrorist that two separate Canadian inquiries identified as the mastermind behind the bombings—history is in danger of repeating itself.

By reopening old wounds, not least those created by the Air India attacks, Trudeau’s accusations have created a rare national consensus in fractious and highly polarised India. Many are calling for New Delhi to put sustained pressure on Ottawa to start cleaning up its act. But more bitterness and recriminations won’t restore the bilateral relationship. For that, both sides must use effective, cooperative diplomacy to address each other’s concerns.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi–based Centre for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s new battleground. He tweets at @Chellaney. 

This article was originally published in the Australian Strategic Polic Institute’s journal, The Strategist.

Image: Shutterstock.

In January 2024, Taiwan will hold its presidential election to choose its next leader. President Tsai Ing-wen, currently in her second term, will soon conclude her tenure as mandated by the constitution's two-term limit. Her tenure has been marked by several noteworthy developments, with one of the most pivotal decisions being the launch of the New Southbound Policy in 2016. This policy was designed to broaden Taiwan’s economic engagement and strengthen its foreign relations. It encompasses eighteen countries from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, focusing on eight key target countries.

With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at the helm, Taiwan has successfully raised its regional profile, and Taiwan’s foreign policy is no longer solely focused on the West or China. Since 2016, a noteworthy development has been the continuous effort to foster strong relations with its immediate and extended neighbors. 

Taiwan’s Window to Asia

There have been several tangible benefits that Taiwan has achieved through the implementation of the New Southbound Policy. It would not be an overstatement to describe this policy as a holistic approach to Taiwan’s foreign relations. The initiation of this policy has meaningfully enhanced the institutionalization of Taiwan’s engagements with countries to its south, particularly those that had previously received limited attention from Taiwan. Before the initiation of the policy, Taiwan, as an Asian country, had fewer substantial ties or linkages within its geographical region. Taiwan’s implementation of the New Southbound Policy and its utilization of medical diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic have significantly enhanced Taiwan’s engagement with the countries in the region.

Furthermore, the New Southbound Policy also served as a gateway to the Indo-Pacific region. During the 2022 Yushan Forum, an annual dialogue dedicated to Taiwan’s relationships with New Southbound Policy countries, President Tsai connected the New Southbound Policy with the country’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy. She affirmed, “The New Southbound Policy is at the center of Taiwan’s own Indo-Pacific strategy. Through this policy, we are working to bolster our security and economic ties with partners across the region.”

A Unique Response to China’s Aggression 

Seven years since its inception, the New Southbound Policy has consistently delivered striking outcomes in trade and investment. For instance, between 2016 and 2022, the overall bilateral trade between Taiwan and the New Southbound Policy countries surged by an impressive 88.2 percent, with investment demonstrating similar notable growth. In 2022, Taiwan’s investments in the New Southbound Policy partner countries surpassed those in China. Even more significantly, the New Southbound Policy has actively and effectively enabled Taiwanese businesses to generate higher profits than those earned from China.

Government-led initiatives have furthered the establishment of regional networks, including Bilateral Investment Agreements, mutual recognition agreements, memorandums on the avoidance of double taxation, investment guarantee agreements, educational cooperation, talent development, and fostering quality enterprises, among other areas. These accomplishments have enhanced Taiwan’s ability to withstand China’s aggressive tactics and deepened its multifaceted partnerships with Indo-Pacific neighbors.

While the New Southbound Policy has its share of shortcomings and there is still much room for improvement, it has provided a unique and nonconventional response to China’s escalating aggression and its attempts to limit Taiwan’s international space. However, despite this obvious objective, the New Southbound Policy goes beyond the China factor. Through the policy, Taiwan has attempted to convey to the New Southbound Policy partner countries that Taiwan is much more than China and engagement with the government is mutually beneficial. This is one of the major reasons the New Southbound Policy is not focused on the security and political aspects of Taiwan’s foreign relations. Since many of the New Southbound Policy countries have been exercising caution to avoid crossing China’s perceived redlines, Taiwan’s strategic approach within the New Southbound Policy framework, which prioritizes enhancing economic cooperation, facilitating regional connectivity, promoting resource sharing, and fostering talent exchange, enables these countries to cultivate closer ties with Taiwan without being unduly concerned about the China factor.

What’s Next?

With the West increasingly focusing on the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan must engage with Asia comprehensively. The New Southbound Policy has provided Taiwan with a valuable avenue due to its alignment with the policy objectives of several other countries, including India’s Act East Policy. As the upcoming election draws near, there is ongoing deliberation about the fate of this policy. While there still has been a lack of enthusiastic response to the New Southbound Policy, its mere existence has given Taiwan a structured framework for engagement. The multifaceted, non-security, and nonpolitical nature of the policy has allowed Taiwan to develop a blueprint that is well suited for the New Southbound Policy countries as well. 

Since the onset of the pandemic, Taiwan has garnered renewed attention. This has presented a prime opportunity for Taiwan to bolster its engagement with and presence in Asia, and the policy framework has proven to be a valuable tool. As Taiwan enters a period of election frenzy, it becomes imperative not to overlook Taiwan’s crucial engagement with several significant Asian countries. Taiwan has become a focal point for both political and nonpolitical reasons in recent years, and the progress made should serve as a foundation for further development. To enhance its prominence in the region, Taiwan must maintain and advance the New Southbound Policy consistently. Given China’s consistent defiance of the rule of law and its threats to the rules-based order, it becomes increasingly vital for Asia to mirror Taiwan’s eagerness for engagement.

Alan H. Yang is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies and Executive Director at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF). 

Sana Hashmi is a Fellow at TAEF and George H. W. Foundation for U.S.-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi1. 

Image: Shutterstock.

It would be the most transformative moment in world history since the end of the Cold War, a mega-deal that could change everything. So say the advocates of the proposed grand bargain among the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. In outline, the deal entails a U.S. defense pact with Saudi Arabia, the recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia, and the accompanying transformation of the security and economic environment. The deal would promote the creation of an integrated U.S. air defense system across the Middle East (directed at Iran). It would spur investment in a new shipping and rail corridor (IMEC) linking India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Israel with Europe. Israel and Saudi Arabia, in effect, would reconcile over their shared fear of Iran. They would do so under the protective mantle of the United States. 

In return for the recognition of Israel, the Saudis are said to want four things: a formal U.S. guarantee of their security, like the bilateral treaties signed with Japan and South Korea in the Cold War; U.S. help in building civilian nuclear reactors; better access to U.S. arms; and Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. 

It is widely accepted among the commentariat, among both those who support and oppose the deal, that all these demands or “asks” are to be taken at face value as signifying a package that the Saudis really want and believe they can get. I think that is highly unlikely. Something else is going on. No one has a beeline into the brain of Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman, including U.S. officials, but their theory—that MBS really wants a security treaty and is willing to give a lot to get it—strikes me as highly implausible. Please consider the opposing theory that the Saudis don’t want a tighter alliance with the United States and that these negotiations are part of their preparations for a world without that. 

The Revolution in Saudi Policy

The assumption underlying the grand bargain is that the Saudi position is inherently weak and vulnerable, requiring American succor. The Saudis long for renewed embrace today, though Biden hated on them yesterday. Saudi actions of the past two years suggest a far more independent stance. Consider these steps:

They agreed to a truce in Yemen.

They thumbed their noses at American requests to increase oil production in 2022, nullifying Biden’s releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve by barrel-for-barrel cuts of their own. In 2023, they coordinated with Russia in reducing production further (by, respectively, 1 million barrels a day and 500,000 BPD), spurring an increase in the oil price from a low of $64 a barrel in the summer to the $80-$90 range today. 

In December 2022, they gave a lavish welcome in Riyadh to Chinese president Xi Jinping, heralding an “epoch-making milestone” in China’s relations with the Arab world. As part of that summit, the Saudis agreed to a memorandum that called for Huawei, the US-sanctioned Chinese firm, to build cloud computing and high-tech complexes in Saudi cities.  

They led the effort, over considerable opposition, to readmit President Bashar al-Assad of Syria into the Arab League last May and want to work with China in rebuilding the country.

They have shown a keen interest in developing ties with both BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in both of which Russia and China play key roles. 

They reduced their holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds, contributing their might to the ongoing U.S. funding crisis. 

Last but not least, they agreed in March 2023 to restore diplomatic relations with Iran under the auspices of China. 

Taken together, these initiatives amount to a revolution in Saudi policy. Yemen apart, each was strongly opposed by the United States. The White House went ballistic over Saudi oil policy in the fall of 2022, charging collusion with Vladimir Putin and putting the White House and the Democratic Party “on a mission to punish the kingdom.” U.S. leaders have vehemently opposed the normalization of ties with Assad. They have feared and protested growing Sino-Saudi trade and investment ties. U.S. leaders want the Saudis to continue pricing oil in dollars and to park their surpluses in U.S. Treasury bonds. They don’t want the Saudis to have any sort of military relationship with China or Russia.  

The grand bargain, in effect, seeks to reverse the bold new Saudi foreign policy of the last year. Biden began his presidency by treating MBS as a pariah whom he could trash talk. Then it gradually dawned on him and his advisors that the outcome of the epochal conflict with Russia and China could turn on the struggle for influence in the Middle East, making Riyadh the pivotal player in that great game. So a lot is at stake. The administration’s means of getting the Saudis to reverse course is the U.S. security treaty.

Treaty Ally? 

There are lots of things that are passing strange about this proposed bilateral pact. It almost certainly couldn’t get the approval of sixty-seven U.S. senators. When the administration chose New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman to reveal (on July 27) that Biden was weighing a big Middle East deal, Friedman wrote that Biden himself hadn’t fully committed to it, though the president is now said to be an enthusiast. MBS pretty much reviles the supposed guarantor. He refused to take Biden’s phone calls for over a year. He made fun of Biden in private. MBS is vilified in Congress as often as Putin or Xi, among Democrats and Republicans alike.  Treaties are matters of trust. Trust is lacking between Saudi Arabia and America.  

Here’s another oddity, which is that the treaty would simply affirm what was, over many decades, seen as a key pillar of U.S. policy in the region. The distinction between the historic commitment and the proposed new commitment has garnered virtually no discussion in the press, but there are a few obvious questions. If the old commitment is no longer in existence, when did it go away? If the commitment went away before, couldn’t it go away again? If so, what’s it worth?

In fact, the traditional U.S. commitment has been worth something to Saudi Arabia, but that something has rested not on U.S. affection for the Saudis but on fear and loathing of Iran. So long as hostility to Iran is the centerpiece of U.S. policy in the region, as it seems likely to remain, the Saudis achieve about as much “security” as they would under a formal treaty. Whereas the United States has been irresolute in its commitment to its clients—it abandoned Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak; it double-crossed Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi; it turned tail in Afghanistan—its enmity with Iran is eternal. This factor is far more important for the Saudis than vague words on paper about mutual protection.

That applies also to all the lesser “guarantees” that have been bruited about, including a mutual defense understanding that would be “less than a full treaty” or an executive agreement that would bypass Congress (practically impossible given the inherent congressional prerogative to block aspects of any deal). Whatever form the guarantee might take, there is no possibility of it being truly “iron-clad,” as the Saudis are said to want. A future White House or Congress would interpret its terms as they liked.  

China Interposes

In the history of the grand bargain, the news of three Saudi “asks”—a formal security treaty, a civilian nuclear program, and guaranteed arms sales—broke on March 9, 2023. A few hours later, to the apparent surprise of Washington, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced their diplomatic rapprochement under Chinese auspices.  

This was a significant development, most unwelcome in Washington, and a “lose, lose, lose” for the neoconservatives. But good relations with China are essential for Saudi security because China is vital to Iran, giving China sway over decision-making in Saudi’s chief rival. The isolation from much of the world that the United States has imposed on Iran makes China an especially vital lifeline for it. 

Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf insisted that China’s role in the deal was insignificant; the agreement “was not brokered by the Chinese; they hosted it.” That’s not Salman’s view. “We had a few obstacles,” Salman noted in his interview with Fox News. “China come in and solve it.” 

What China likely told Iran and Saudi Arabia was that it would not stand for either side infringing on the vital interests and national rights of the other. Saudi Arabia has in China a lever to restrain Iran. This is worth just as much, if not more, than the U.S. threat to blow up Iran’s nuclear installations. Given that the Saudis would be deeply exposed in the event of a U.S.-Israel attack on Iran, a peaceful route to Iran’s restraint sponsored by China probably looks more promising to the Saudis than the bellicose U.S. approach.  

Palestine: On Back Burner? 

A central part of the grand bargain is an apparent solution, but not really a solution, to the Palestinian question. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland told PBS that the deal will ensure that “the prospect of a two-state solution stays vibrant and strong.” As that “solution” has been dead and buried for many years, existing solely in speech as a fraught hypothetical, Nuland’s formulation is bizarre. Events on the ground—above all, 700,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank—have long pointed toward no settlement that respects Palestinian rights. The last two decades showed that the Israelis didn’t want an independent Palestinian state and that the Americans couldn’t or wouldn’t make them want it. 

Even before the savage October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, the prospect of a real settlement was remote. Factors barring a settlement include the most extreme government in Israel’s history, a fractured Palestinian leadership, continued Palestinian terrorism, and what critical observers call a “second Nakba.” For the Israeli government, the issue is only a “checkbox that you have to check to say you’re doing it.” That is, it is to be without substantive meaning. The Biden administration apparently intends to win the consent of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu with sweet talk but no threats. That seems unlikely to work in the future. It has never worked on Netanyahu in the past.  

Will the Saudis consent to a fig leaf? Their formal position is, no, they won’t. According to Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, “There is no way to resolve the conflict other than by ensuring the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.” It must “return to the forefront.”  The foreign minister was yet more emphatic in his September 23 speech to the UN General Assembly. MBS did say in his recent interview that “every day we get closer” to an agreement, but the Saudis have not publicly retreated from their 2002 peace plan.  The Saudi response to the October 7 war was to recall “its repeated warnings of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities.”

Insiders say that the Saudis will accept far less—a settlement freeze, formal disavowal of annexing the West Bank, more Palestinian control over a few parcels in the West Bank—but even these limited steps pose insuperable obstacles for Israel. Netanyahu can’t accept them without breaking his coalition. A national unity government could be formed in response to the October 7 war, but it is most unlikely to favor concessions to the Palestinians.  

Even if Israel’s acquiescence is miraculously secured, it is difficult to see why the Saudis should break so radically from past policy. Overwhelmingly, Arab and Islamic public opinion opposes such recognition if it simply ratifies existing realities of Israeli annexation and Palestinian dispossession. That includes Saudi opinion. The United Arab Emirates, the most important Arab signatory of the Abraham Accords, complains of Israel’s violation of its limited commitments under the accords and the new conditions the United States imposed on selling it F-35s (the breaking of relations with Huawei), causing the arms deal to fall apart. The Saudis have watched closely the UAE experience with the Abraham Accords. They don’t like what they see. 

Recognition of Israel bears on Saudi security. Underwriting the Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians could potentially constitute a threat to the security of bin Salman and his regime, as it might well work to undermine his legitimacy at home and his leadership position in the Muslim world. A refusal to recognize Israel, unless it consents to an independent Palestinian state, protects MBS from the accusation that he is complicit in the unjust treatment meted out to the Palestinians. 

The critical Saudi dependency on U.S. arms—much of its air force could not operate without U.S. logistical support—is often taken as a source of considerable U.S. leverage on Saudi Arabia. Still, it is also true that the U.S. defense industry is critically dependent on the Saudis, who are responsible for $13 billion in U.S. arms sales between 2016 and 2020.  The leverage works both ways. The Saudi dependency on U.S. support for key weapons systems also constitutes a good reason for diversifying away from the United States. According to MBS, it would “cause headaches” if the Saudis were forced to seek new arms suppliers, but he wants those U.S. arms without the conditions Washington wishes to impose. 

That’s probably their bottom line on a civilian nuclear industry, too. The Saudis have put this forward as something comparable to U.S. help in building its military, but they have also made clear that they are open to competing offers from China, itself on the cusp of agreement with Turkey to build a new nuclear power plant. The U.S.-Saudi negotiations are shrouded in secrecy, so it is challenging to assess the state of play with respect to these offers, but it seems evident that a Saudi deal with China would be less subject to subsequent cancellation than one with the United States. The United States, under pressure from Israel and Congress, would probably insist on conditions so onerous—it’s on your soil, but under our control—as to make the U.S. offer appear unattractive.

To the Dustbin of History

So, the grand bargain is destined to flop. There are half a dozen deal breakers. The United States has wildly overestimated the leverage a formal offer of American protection affords it. The failure of the negotiation will, in turn, underscore the limitations of U.S. power and influence in the region. 

The U.S. reversal toward MBS, from odious pariah to best new pal, has painfully demonstrated the Biden administration’s new-found appreciation of Saudi power and independence. Alarmed by the new Saudi diplomacy, the United States has been making a last-ditch effort over the past six months to get them to reverse it.  The Saudis have responded by stating conditions that they know the Americans cannot satisfy. 

Instead of taking the Saudi demands at face value, we should infer that what MBS really wants is the demonstration that the United States cannot deliver on most of the agenda he has set forth. That demonstration would justify his refusal to yield ground on Israel and his desire to maintain good relations with Russia and China while not wholly alienating the United States. Saudi diplomacy today is not about the ways and means of reaffirming its status as an American protectorate but about accumulating points for the blame game to follow the collapse of the negotiations. 

David C. Hendrickson is President of the John Quincy Adams Society and emeritus professor of political science at Colorado College. You can find out more about his work at davidhendrickson.org. He tweets at @dhendrickson50. 

Image: Shutterstock.

L'exposition « Milorad Mišković », dédiée au danseur de ballet et ancien président du Conseil International de la Danse auprès de l'UNESCO, sera ouverte le 29 septembre 2023 à 19h30 au Centre culturel de Serbie.
La carrière de Milorad Mišković débute dans les années 40 à Belgrade, au Ballet de l'Opéra national. Néanmoins, c'est son arrivée en France en 1947 qui lui ouvre les portes d'un succès international, notamment grâce à Roland Petit, fondateur des Ballets de Paris. Le succès de (...)

- Agenda / Région parisienne, Serbie

L'exposition « Milorad Mišković », dédiée au danseur de ballet et ancien président du Conseil International de la Danse auprès de l'UNESCO, sera ouverte le 29 septembre 2023 à 19h30 au Centre culturel de Serbie.
La carrière de Milorad Mišković débute dans les années 40 à Belgrade, au Ballet de l'Opéra national. Néanmoins, c'est son arrivée en France en 1947 qui lui ouvre les portes d'un succès international, notamment grâce à Roland Petit, fondateur des Ballets de Paris. Le succès de (...)

- Agenda / Région parisienne, Serbie