Agrégateur de flux

China’s coercion threshold is set by its own internal logic – not by external “precedents.”

Expanding access to independent information is essential for U.S. security interests, human rights objectives, and long-term regional stability. 

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to Cyprus’s parliamentary system

Cyprus is a presidential democracy with a President directly elected by universal suffrage in a secret ballot. The President is both Head of State and Head of Government as he or she appoints the ministers and exercises executive power together with them. The President is formally invested by the Parliament, but the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are strictly separated.

The President and ministers are scrutinised by the Parliament, but they are not accountable to it. Reciprocally, the executive cannot dissolve the Parliament; only an absolute majority of the Parliament can decide to do so (Article 67 of the Constitution). The President and ministers cannot be members of the Parliament.

Legislative power is exercised by the House of Representatives, the unicameral parliament of the Republic of Cyprus. It is elected by universal and secret suffrage every five years through a system of simple proportional representation in six electoral districts. Both the President and the members of parliament are elected for five-year terms but in different years. The President does not necessarily have the support of a parliamentary majority and can govern without it.

The Constitution sets the number of members of the House of Representatives at 50 (two thirds Greek Cypriots, and one third Turkish Cypriots), but this number may be altered by the House of Representatives. Since 1985, the number of seats has been set at 80, keeping the same proportions between the two communities (Law 124/85): 56 Members come from the Greek Cypriot community, and 24 seats are reserved for Members coming from the Turkish Cypriot community – currently vacant due to the de facto division of the island. In addition, the minority religious groups of Armenians, Maronites and Latins each elect a representative who can express views but not vote.

The main role of the House of Representatives is to examine and adopt legislation, including on the state’s budget. Both the executive and the Parliament can make legislative proposals, but in practice, most are proposed by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, this right is constrained for the Parliament, as bills it proposes should not result in any increase in budgetary expenditure.

The House of Representatives has the right to amend the Constitution, with the exception of the articles determining its form of government, the separation of powers and the bicommunal character of the state.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Parliament of Cyprus and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Il évoque la « loi du plus fort » d'un monde sans droit, compare le Groenland avec le Kosovo et lui-même avec Milošević. Pour Aleksandar Vučić, depuis l'enlèvement de Nicolás Maduro, la crise mondiale se résume à des menaces… contre lui-même.

- Articles / Relations internationales, Serbie, Politique, Vucic, USA Balkans, Vreme (Serbie)

Ces dernières années, le Maroc est passé du statut de pays de transit et d’émigration à celui de pays d’installation. Cette évolution est en grande partie due à l’augmentation des restrictions frontalières et des refoulements, lesquels ont rendu les routes migra­toires vers l’UE moins accessibles. En conséquence, Casablanca, qui accueillait déjà des migrants de manière durable, s’affirme désormais davantage comme un lieu central d’installation urbaine que comme une étape transitoire du parcours migratoire. Des entretiens menés avec des ONG et des OSC travaillant avec des migrants urbains et des personnes déplacées à Casablanca ont mis en évidence les façons dont la coopération au développement peut avoir un impact positif sur les contextes de migration urbaine. En effet, l’attitude plus permissive des autorités locales de Casablanca à l’égard des communautés migrantes contraste avec les pratiques policières répressives courantes à Rabat et dans les zones frontalières, ouvrant ainsi un espace à l’émergence d’organisations informelles de migrants au sein des communautés d’accueil. Ces organisations sont devenues des inter­locuteurs clefs des institutions officielles, jouant un rôle essentiel dans le rétablissement de la confiance des migrants et des communautés d’accueil envers celles-ci. Avec le soutien des OSC et des ONG, les com­munautés elles-mêmes ont également trouvé des moyens de favoriser l’inclusion et la coopération. Les valeurs islamiques et la tradition marocaine d’hospitali­té influencent la mise à disposition des biens communs au niveau des ménages et des quartiers. Les commu­nautés d’accueil et les migrants bénéficient égale­ment, sur le plan légal, des services d’éducation et de santé fournis par les organisations gouverne­mentales et non gouvernementales. Le principal défi consiste àgarantir que toutes les parties soient informées des services qui leur sont accessibles, dans de nombreux cas indépendamment de leur statut migratoire. Pourtant, le discours contemporain sur la migration et le déplacement au Maroc est imprégné de xéno­phobie, d’exclusion et de racisme, problèmes aggra­vés par un environnement médiatique très critique à l’égard des migrants et des personnes déplacées. Néanmoins, les experts ont souligné l’impact des interactions positives répétées entre les migrants et les communautés d’accueil pour tempérer ces discours hostiles.
Messages politiques clefs :
- La santé, l’éducation et le logement sont des besoins universels pour les communautés d’accueil et les migrants. Il faut veiller à ce que les programmes financés soient accessibles à toutes les personnes vivant dans le quartier, qu’elles soient hôtes ou migrantes, et que les espaces, services ou ressources auxquels ils aboutissent constituent des biens communs autour desquels l’identité de la communauté peut se construire.
- Il est essentiel de faire connaître l’histoire des migrations dans les zones d’arrivée. Ces récits peuvent aider les organisations internationales à con­textu­aliser leurs programmes et à inscrire l’immigration et les installations dans une histoire plus large autour de laquelle peut se construire une identité inclusive. Renforcer la coopération entre les organisations au niveau des villes et des municipalités à l’échelle nationale. La coopération entre les villes peut combler les lacunes en matière de connaissances sur la politique migratoire nationale et réduire la dispersion des efforts des OSC et des ONG qui travaillent avec les migrants.

Elise Delespesse est une consultante indépendante basée à Bonn, en Allemagne.

Ces dernières années, le Maroc est passé du statut de pays de transit et d’émigration à celui de pays d’installation. Cette évolution est en grande partie due à l’augmentation des restrictions frontalières et des refoulements, lesquels ont rendu les routes migra­toires vers l’UE moins accessibles. En conséquence, Casablanca, qui accueillait déjà des migrants de manière durable, s’affirme désormais davantage comme un lieu central d’installation urbaine que comme une étape transitoire du parcours migratoire. Des entretiens menés avec des ONG et des OSC travaillant avec des migrants urbains et des personnes déplacées à Casablanca ont mis en évidence les façons dont la coopération au développement peut avoir un impact positif sur les contextes de migration urbaine. En effet, l’attitude plus permissive des autorités locales de Casablanca à l’égard des communautés migrantes contraste avec les pratiques policières répressives courantes à Rabat et dans les zones frontalières, ouvrant ainsi un espace à l’émergence d’organisations informelles de migrants au sein des communautés d’accueil. Ces organisations sont devenues des inter­locuteurs clefs des institutions officielles, jouant un rôle essentiel dans le rétablissement de la confiance des migrants et des communautés d’accueil envers celles-ci. Avec le soutien des OSC et des ONG, les com­munautés elles-mêmes ont également trouvé des moyens de favoriser l’inclusion et la coopération. Les valeurs islamiques et la tradition marocaine d’hospitali­té influencent la mise à disposition des biens communs au niveau des ménages et des quartiers. Les commu­nautés d’accueil et les migrants bénéficient égale­ment, sur le plan légal, des services d’éducation et de santé fournis par les organisations gouverne­mentales et non gouvernementales. Le principal défi consiste àgarantir que toutes les parties soient informées des services qui leur sont accessibles, dans de nombreux cas indépendamment de leur statut migratoire. Pourtant, le discours contemporain sur la migration et le déplacement au Maroc est imprégné de xéno­phobie, d’exclusion et de racisme, problèmes aggra­vés par un environnement médiatique très critique à l’égard des migrants et des personnes déplacées. Néanmoins, les experts ont souligné l’impact des interactions positives répétées entre les migrants et les communautés d’accueil pour tempérer ces discours hostiles.
Messages politiques clefs :
- La santé, l’éducation et le logement sont des besoins universels pour les communautés d’accueil et les migrants. Il faut veiller à ce que les programmes financés soient accessibles à toutes les personnes vivant dans le quartier, qu’elles soient hôtes ou migrantes, et que les espaces, services ou ressources auxquels ils aboutissent constituent des biens communs autour desquels l’identité de la communauté peut se construire.
- Il est essentiel de faire connaître l’histoire des migrations dans les zones d’arrivée. Ces récits peuvent aider les organisations internationales à con­textu­aliser leurs programmes et à inscrire l’immigration et les installations dans une histoire plus large autour de laquelle peut se construire une identité inclusive. Renforcer la coopération entre les organisations au niveau des villes et des municipalités à l’échelle nationale. La coopération entre les villes peut combler les lacunes en matière de connaissances sur la politique migratoire nationale et réduire la dispersion des efforts des OSC et des ONG qui travaillent avec les migrants.

Elise Delespesse est une consultante indépendante basée à Bonn, en Allemagne.

Ces dernières années, le Maroc est passé du statut de pays de transit et d’émigration à celui de pays d’installation. Cette évolution est en grande partie due à l’augmentation des restrictions frontalières et des refoulements, lesquels ont rendu les routes migra­toires vers l’UE moins accessibles. En conséquence, Casablanca, qui accueillait déjà des migrants de manière durable, s’affirme désormais davantage comme un lieu central d’installation urbaine que comme une étape transitoire du parcours migratoire. Des entretiens menés avec des ONG et des OSC travaillant avec des migrants urbains et des personnes déplacées à Casablanca ont mis en évidence les façons dont la coopération au développement peut avoir un impact positif sur les contextes de migration urbaine. En effet, l’attitude plus permissive des autorités locales de Casablanca à l’égard des communautés migrantes contraste avec les pratiques policières répressives courantes à Rabat et dans les zones frontalières, ouvrant ainsi un espace à l’émergence d’organisations informelles de migrants au sein des communautés d’accueil. Ces organisations sont devenues des inter­locuteurs clefs des institutions officielles, jouant un rôle essentiel dans le rétablissement de la confiance des migrants et des communautés d’accueil envers celles-ci. Avec le soutien des OSC et des ONG, les com­munautés elles-mêmes ont également trouvé des moyens de favoriser l’inclusion et la coopération. Les valeurs islamiques et la tradition marocaine d’hospitali­té influencent la mise à disposition des biens communs au niveau des ménages et des quartiers. Les commu­nautés d’accueil et les migrants bénéficient égale­ment, sur le plan légal, des services d’éducation et de santé fournis par les organisations gouverne­mentales et non gouvernementales. Le principal défi consiste àgarantir que toutes les parties soient informées des services qui leur sont accessibles, dans de nombreux cas indépendamment de leur statut migratoire. Pourtant, le discours contemporain sur la migration et le déplacement au Maroc est imprégné de xéno­phobie, d’exclusion et de racisme, problèmes aggra­vés par un environnement médiatique très critique à l’égard des migrants et des personnes déplacées. Néanmoins, les experts ont souligné l’impact des interactions positives répétées entre les migrants et les communautés d’accueil pour tempérer ces discours hostiles.
Messages politiques clefs :
- La santé, l’éducation et le logement sont des besoins universels pour les communautés d’accueil et les migrants. Il faut veiller à ce que les programmes financés soient accessibles à toutes les personnes vivant dans le quartier, qu’elles soient hôtes ou migrantes, et que les espaces, services ou ressources auxquels ils aboutissent constituent des biens communs autour desquels l’identité de la communauté peut se construire.
- Il est essentiel de faire connaître l’histoire des migrations dans les zones d’arrivée. Ces récits peuvent aider les organisations internationales à con­textu­aliser leurs programmes et à inscrire l’immigration et les installations dans une histoire plus large autour de laquelle peut se construire une identité inclusive. Renforcer la coopération entre les organisations au niveau des villes et des municipalités à l’échelle nationale. La coopération entre les villes peut combler les lacunes en matière de connaissances sur la politique migratoire nationale et réduire la dispersion des efforts des OSC et des ONG qui travaillent avec les migrants.

Elise Delespesse est une consultante indépendante basée à Bonn, en Allemagne.

On dit qu'on ne prononce leur nom qu'à des occasions rares. Les divinités Thron, Sakpata, Hébiésso, Mami... s'apprêtent à quitter leur antre et à prendre place au milieu du public au Bénin.

By Anis Chowdhury
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Jan 8 2026 (IPS)

As many of you know, out of the blue, I have been called in to assist the Interim Government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus in stabilising the economy left in ruins by the fallen autocratic-kleptocratic regime that looted the banks, stole public money and robbed small investors in the capital market to siphon off billions of dollars out of the country. I had never served in a government; neither had I ever expected this opportunity. However, my UN experience and political economy understanding have been handy.

Anis Chowdhury

Reflecting back the year that we have just passed, I trust, you have been well as we wished each other at the start of 2025 the best of our health and spirit. Unfortunately, despite our earnest wish, the world was not peaceful during 2025.

Hopes and global disorder

Hopes kindled briefly for justice for the Palestinians as the European powers, including Australia (a European settler colony) were forced to recognise the Palestine State, and Narcissist Trump pushed for some peace in both Ukraine and Gaza in his mad desperation for a Nobel Peace Prize.

Yet Gaza is still being bombarded with Israel’s genocidal intent, making a mockery of deranged Trump’s rhetorical claim of achieving “peace in the Middle East for the first time in 3,000 years”, and the illegal occupation of the West Bank along with settler violence continues unabated with complete immunity in blatant violations of international laws.

Narcissist Trump sanctioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ) in his desperate attempt to save Israeli war criminals, including Benjamin Netanyahu and justify Israel’s genocide and settler violence. Trump upended his assault on the rule-based order with arbitrary so-called ‘reciprocal tariff’.

Bangladesh

As for the post-fascist Hasina Bangladesh, the year 2025 began with high expectations. And as for me, the year 2025 has been extra-ordinary.

Today, I am pleased to say that we have been able to avert a full-blown crisis. Heart-felt thanks to our ‘remittance fighters’ who whole-heartedly trusted the Interim Government’s various reform initiatives. Expatriate Bangladeshis sent a record $30.04 bn in remittances in the 2024–25 fiscal year, the highest amount ever received in a single fiscal year in the country’s history. Forex reserves surged to $33 bn, hitting 3-year high as December remittances crossed $3bn. You can get a report card by Finance Advisor, Dr. Salehuddin and myself, published in the Daily Star on 18 August 2025.

Of course, not everything has been rosy. The much-hoped systemic transition remains full of uncertainty. I see systemic transition as the process of total transformation of a caterpillar inside a cocoon. We still do not know whether the ‘caterpillar in the cocoon’ will turn out to be a butterfly or a moth. People are genuinely worried as the past systemic transition opportunities were wasted.

I myself found road-blocks at every turn. Bureaucratic inertia and resistance have frustrated my efforts for genuine reforms. It has been a real-life experience of the classic British political satire, “Yes, Minister”. Like Sir Humphrey Appleby, the bureaucrats will display outwardly extra-ordinary humbleness, but will politely defy citing rules of business. Bureaucratic resistance is the main stumbling block for achieving coordination, coherence and integration in policy making and implementation, thus, causing wasteful duplications, inefficiency and lack of effectiveness.

Nevertheless, I achieved some success. One of them is the agreement to expand the voluntary Bangladesh National Cadet Corps programme to cover ALL youths (aged 18) in 10-12 years, so that we can have a disciplined workforce to be readily deployed during any national emergency. Needless to say, that this is an imperative to realise demographic dividend. We are hoping to roll out the programme from July 2026 to coincide with the July Revolution anniversary.

Despite frustrations and uncertainties, I am hopeful as I can see a seismic shift in the political dynamics of the country. This coincides with the demographic shift – the youth (15-30 years) representing nearly 30% of the population. These youths have a different vocabulary of politics; they want justice, inclusion, self-respect, and dignity – they are fiercely nationalist.

Recently martyred Hadi is their embodiment. The establishment is understandably threatened and tried to silence the youth by assassinating Hadi; but they failed to extinguish the flame, instead, everyone has become a Hadi, standing unwavering in their commitment to carry out Hadi’s mission of building a just nation where citizens can live with dignity, free from fear, subjugation, and oppression. Hadi re-centred our national conscience on Insaf: justice, dignity, and fairness not as rhetorical slogans, but as non-negotiable ethical foundations of the State and society.

In an era of moral drift, Hadi reminded the nation that no political order can last without justice at its core. He ignited a generation with civic courage and moral responsibility. Free from fear, patronage, or transactional politics, young people saw in Hadi a new model of leadership: ethical, principled, and accountable. In doing so, he reshaped the future political character of Bangladesh and moved national thinking beyond entrenched legacy power structures toward people-centric, principled governance. He challenged the inevitability of corruption and coercion, insisting instead that politics could be reclaimed as a moral vocation. His life poses an enduring question to those who seek power: Will you serve justice, or merely rule?

Let me end this year-end message with my personal tribute to Khaleda Zia, who has recently passed away after a long illness imposed on her by the vindictive Hasina regime, falsely convicting her and imprisoning in a substandard cell. Like her husband, Shaheed President Zia, she was thrust into the whirlpool of history. They never sought power; but when the responsibility fell on their shoulders, they carried out their duties to the nation whole-heartedly and selflessly; thus, they became a true statesman (woman), winning hearts and minds of their people.

Perhaps Khaleda Zia’s most enduring legacy lies in her extraordinary restraint and dignified disposition, even under severe and prolonged adversity. Her self-restraint, rooted in grace rather than weakness, distinguished her from many of her contemporaries and offers a powerful lesson for today’s often abrasive and confrontational political culture.

Warmest regards and best wishes for the New Year

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Now in its sixth year, ELIAMEP’s annual forecasts return with the Special Edition ““ELIAMEP Outlook – Predictions for 2026” offering expert insights into the year ahead. Twenty-four analysts and collaborators of ELIAMEP examine the key challenges, emerging trends, risks, and opportunities expected to shape Greece, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the wider world in the coming year. This year’s edition is further enriched by five contributions from voices of the “next generation,” bringing fresh perspectives and new ideas into the conversation. A selection of essays was featured in a special supplement of TA NEA on January 3. Read the paper here (in Greek). The full collection will be published in English next week.

The policy brief authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska “The Western Balkans and Europe’s Defence Readiness: An Industrial Perspective” is an expansion of the finding of the thematic report “Europe’s Overlooked Allies: Why the Western Balkans Matter for EU Defence Readiness” and part of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration which is supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

As Europe faces an increasingly complex security environment marked by the war in Ukraine, renewed great-power competition, and growing concerns over defence industrial capacity, this brief examines the often-overlooked role of the Western Balkans in strengthening Europe’s defence readiness. Adopting an industrial perspective, the analysis highlights the region’s manufacturing capabilities, cost advantages, and strategic location, positioning it as a potential contributor to the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

The brief explores the defence-industrial capacities of Western Balkan countries, their alignment with key EU defence priorities—such as ammunition production, drones, and supply-chain resilience—and the strategic benefits of closer integration. It also identifies persistent barriers, including institutional exclusion from EU defence instruments, governance challenges, and political constraints that hinder deeper cooperation.

Drawing on these findings, the paper argues that defence industrial cooperation can serve as both a security multiplier and a credibility-enhancing tool for EU enlargement. It concludes with concrete policy recommendations aimed at integrating Western Balkan defence industries into EU frameworks, improving regulatory alignment, fostering public–private partnerships, and strengthening strategic communication. In doing so, the brief reframes enlargement as a mutually beneficial, capability-building process essential to Europe’s long-term strategic autonomy.

You can read the policy brief here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network, led by Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

US-Präsident Donald Trump düpiert seine Bündnispartner mit rechtswidrigen Aktionen und will etwa Grönland in den Besitz der USA bringen – obwohl es zum NATO-Mitglied Dänemark gehört. Wie kann sich Europa wehren?

AMENDMENTS 1 - 284 - Draft report EU strategy to face the new theories against democracy
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Bernard Guetta

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 284 - Draft report EU strategy to face the new theories against democracy
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Bernard Guetta

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Two malnourished children receive food supplements at a health centre in Tawila, North Darfur, Sudan. Credit: UNICEF/Mohammed Jamal

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 8 2026 (IPS)

As Sudan approaches 1,000 days of civil war, late December and early January saw a brutal escalation of violence, with drone strikes hitting areas at the center of the country’s deepening hunger crisis.

While the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advance across western and southern Sudan, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) tighten control over the east and the capital, civilians are at a high risk of being caught in the crossfire. Thousands have been displaced as a direct result of violence, humanitarian access remains severely strained, and most civilians are unable to access basic, essential services.

In late December, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) released its annual Emergency Watchlist report, outlining the humanitarian crises in 20 countries and identifying those at the greatest risk of deteriorating conditions in 2026. For the third year in a row, Sudan ranked at the top of the list, with the IRC describing the nation’s crisis as the “largest humanitarian crisis ever recorded”, as well as the largest and fastest growing displacement crisis in the world.

“This crisis is entirely man-made,” said IRC country director for Sudan, Eatizaz Yousif. “The ongoing conflict has decimated livelihoods, displaced millions, and blocked life-saving aid from reaching those in desperate need.” According to IRC estimates, roughly 150,000 Sudanese civilians were killed in 2025—a number expected to rise in the new year as the conflict intensifies and collapsing emergency services struggle to meet rapidly growing needs.

The first week of 2026 have been particularly turbulent for besieged civilians in Sudan. Between January 1 and 3, multiple drone strikes occurred in Dilling, South Kordofan, causing numerous civilian deaths and injuries and generating considerable panic among residents.

On January 3, drone strikes targeted a market and a medical clinic in the Al Zurg and Ghurair villages in North Darfur, which has been described as the “epicenter of Sudan’s hunger crisis” by the United Nations (UN), causing extensive damage. The same day, two drone attacks occurred in the Kulbus locality in West Darfur, leading to the displacement of over 600 civilians.

According to figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), between December 31 and January 4, over 1,000 civilians were driven from their homes and fled to South Kordofan as a result of violence. On January 6, brutal clashes between warring parties caused over 2,000 civilians to flee from North Kordofan in a single day.

Conditions for displaced civilians in North Darfur are extremely dire, with the IRC underscoring a widespread lack of access to basic services. Approximately 400,000 families fleeing violence in neighboring El Fasher have arrived in Tawila, overwhelming the region’s already strained humanitarian capacity. Many are living in makeshift shelters without adequate food, clean water, or healthcare. IRC teams have also reported more than 170 young children in Tawila separated from their families, highlighting the severe protection risks facing displaced communities.

“The sight of these small children arriving alone, without the whereabouts or the fate of the rest of their family, is harrowing,” said Arjan Hehenkamp, IRC’s Darfur crisis lead. “Extremely disturbing reports and satellite imagery confirm that people are not able to flee El Fasher to safe places like Tawila, which means they are trapped, detained, or worse.”

On December 29, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) conducted a nutritional assessment in North Darfur’s Um Baru locality—one of the regions most affected by conflict and food insecurity—and found that 53 percent of nearly 500 children screened showed signs of acute malnutrition, many of them being under five years old. Eighteen percent of the screened children were found to suffer from severe acute malnutrition, which can be fatal in weeks if left untreated.

“When severe acute malnutrition reaches this level, time becomes the most critical factor,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “Children in Um Baru are fighting for their lives and need immediate help. Every day without safe and unhindered access increases the risk of children growing weaker and more death and suffering from causes that are entirely preventable.”

According to estimates from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), roughly 21.2 million people across Sudan—nearly half of the population—are experiencing high levels of food insecurity, with over 3.7 million children under five, as well as pregnant and lactating women, urgently requiring treatment for acute malnutrition. Furthermore, famine was officially declared in El Fasher and Kadugli in November, with humanitarian experts projecting that it could spread to 20 additional localities across Darfur and Kordofan.

In late December, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced a large-scale seed distribution campaign to assist in winterization efforts and combat Sudan’s deepening nutrition and hunger crisis for the new year. Launched in Khartoum in November, the campaign aims to strengthen and rehabilitate Sudan’s local food production. FAO seeks to reach over 134,000 households, or 670,000 people, across ten states, including Al Jazirah, Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum, Northern State, Red Sea, River Nile, Sennar, and the White Nile states.

Targeted households will receive a variety of vegetable seeds including eggplant, green pepper, jute mallow, okra, onion, pumpkin, rocket, snake cucumber, tomato, and zucchini. This campaign aims to restore dietary diversity, improve household nutrition, and revitalize livelihood opportunities. This is crucial for a country like Sudan, in which roughly 80 percent of the population relies on agriculture as a lifeline for food and income.

Additionally, the UN and its partners are working on the ground in Khartoum to strengthen protection services for vulnerable civilians. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is currently in the process of removing debris, distributing medications, creating short-term employment opportunities, and providing psychosocial support.

In late December, UNDP and the UN Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) launched a campaign titled Strengthening Capacities for Peace and Social Cohesion in Kassala and Red Sea States, in cooperation with UNICEF, to promote gender equality, social cohesion, youth engagement, equitable governance, and successful livelihoods.

“During the war, many of us felt hopeless, but being part of this group gave me purpose,” said Khawla, a youth ambassador from Kadugli trained by the program. “When I see young people listening, asking questions, and starting to believe that peace is possible, I know our work matters. It’s not just about awareness—it’s about restoring trust and rebuilding our communities from the ground up.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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President António Costa travelled to Nicosia (Cyprus) to attend the opening ceremony of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union where he delivered a speech.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2586 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela.