European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Citizens are calling on the European Union to boost the European railway sector. Many citizens have written to the European Parliament’s Transport Committee on this subject since October 2025, asking for more subsidies for railways, the development of high-speed rail networks and tax reductions for rail.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the Transport Committee.

EU support for rail travel

One goal of the European Union’s (EU) Green Deal is to reduce emissions in the transport sector by 90 % by 2050.

To achieve this, the EU has adopted a sustainable and smart mobility strategy and an action plan for rail to boost long-distance and cross-border travel. The action plan aims to double high-speed rail traffic by 2030 and treble it by 2050, using targeted investments, standardisation of European rail systems and better connectivity for rural and remote regions.

In 2023, the European Commission proposed new rules to better manage railway tracks, increase reliability and help reduce transport-related emissions. The European Parliament adopted its position on the proposal in 2024.

In 2025, the EU invested €2.8 billion through its Connecting Europe Facility programme, mostly for rail, to modernise the railways and improve cross-border transport across the trans-European transport network (TEN‑T).

In 2025, the Commission announced it would develop a sustainable transport investment plan to support cleaner transport in Europe. One of the aims is to encourage more people to use the railways.

European Parliament position

In June 2025, the European Parliament addressed railway transport in the EU in two separate resolutions.

In the first resolution, Parliament said that road, rail and maritime (sea) transport links needed to be developed through EU co-funded programmes, to reduce the isolation of rural areas and facilitate the sustainable mobility of people and goods. In the second resolution, Parliament regretted the shortage of viable cross-border measures, including high-speed railways, that are essential for completing the TEN‑T network.

In an earlier resolution adopted in 2022, Parliament recognised the crucial role of rail in decarbonising mobility. It supported the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and welcomed the Commission’s action plan.

Aviation fuel tax exemption

In 2021, as part of the Green Deal, the Commission tabled a proposal to review the Energy Taxation Directive. The proposal would remove the mandatory tax exemption for aviation (aeroplane) fuels.

The proposal is subject to the ‘special legislative procedure’, which means the European Parliament is only consulted, and national governments must reach unanimous agreement in the Council. So far, the national governments have not reached an agreement. Further information is available in this briefing from the European Parliament’s Research Service.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Sidonia Mazur, updated on 23 October 2025.

On 22 October 2025, Parliament voted on amendments to the Council’s position and thus adopted its reading of the Union budget for 2026, aiming at a higher budget that better matches the EU’s key priorities than the European Commission’s draft. Parliament proposes an overall level of commitments at €193.9 billion and €192.6 billion in payments, including special instruments such as the Ukraine Facility or European Solidarity Reserve. To reach an agreement, a 21-day conciliation period runs until 17 November 2025. These negotiations aim at finding a compromise between Parliament and Council, without which the Commission will need to present a new budget proposal.

Background – 2026 budget procedure

The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). Although it is the Commission’s right and duty to propose a draft budget for the upcoming year, the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, play their part in the run-up to its presentation by submitting their views. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2026 EU budget on 18 February 2025. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III, on 2 April 2025.

On 9 July 2025, the Commission adopted the 2026 draft EU budget (DB). The Commission proposed 2026 EU budget commitments of €193.26 billion, and €192.20 billion in payments. The Commission in its General introduction to the DB underlined that ‘the draft budget 2026 will continue to provide the necessary funding for the agreed priorities of the Union, but the limited remaining availabilities leave virtually no space for any further unforeseen events or new initiatives’.

The Council adopted its position on the 2026 draft budget on 5 September, proposing to cut the proposed commitments by €1.3 billion and payments by €696.7 million.

Parliament’s rapporteur for the 2026 budget, Andrzej Halicki (EPP, Poland), presented his analysis of the Commission’s proposals and his assessment of the Council’s position in two working documents.

Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) adopted amendments to the Council’s position on 6 October, and adopted an explanatory motion for a resolution on 13 October. BUDG set the overall level of commitments at €193.9 billion and payments at €192.6 billion, thereby restoring the 2026 draft budget appropriations on all lines cut by the Council. Moreover, BUDG proposed specific increases ‘to boost research, competitiveness, and defence’ for:

• Horizon Europe;
• transport and energy networks;
• support for small and medium-sized enterprises;
• health (EU4Health);
• education and youth (Erasmus+);
• Creative Europe;
• the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme;
• the European Social Fund Plus;
• young farmers;
• the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, including the wine sector;
• the LIFE programme;
• the Civil Protection Mechanism;
• the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund;
• the Border Management and Visa Instrument;
• military mobility;
• the Southern Neighbourhood;
• the Eastern Neighbourhood; and
• humanitarian aid.

The BUDG committee drew attention to the fact that repayment of the EU Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the Union and a non-discretionary expenditure item in the EU budget; and stressed that the Council cuts in sub-heading 2b are particularly disconcerting, as the only motivation is to use the money to cover the financing cost of the Recovery Instrument. The committee also remarked that the most affected programmes – Horizon Europe, CEF digital and Erasmus+ – are flagship Union programmes.

The Commission published Amending letter No 1/2026 on 8 October, lowering draft 2026 budget expenditure by €386.1 million in commitments and by almost €1.89 billion in payments. On 22 October 2025, Parliament voted on amendments to the Council’s position and thus adopted its reading of the Union budget for 2026 in line with the Committee on Budgets’ position.

Next steps

Parliament’s adoption of amendments to the Council’s position has triggered a conciliation procedure. The Conciliation Committee will seek to reach a compromise between Parliament and Council. The 21-day conciliation period will run until 17 November 2025, with the first conciliation meeting scheduled for 4 November. If conciliation fails to result in an agreement, the Commission is obliged to present a new draft budget.

Further reading

• For Parliament’s reading of 2026 budget see: Parliament’s reading of the 2026 EU budget
• For key issues in EU budget see the EPRS flagship publication: Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2025
• For key dates see: Timeline for the three key EU budgetary procedures in 2025
• For Parliament’s guidelines for the 2026 budget: Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget; Section III – European Commission
• For more on Parliament’s role in the EU annual budgetary procedure see: Annual EU budgetary procedure: An introduction to the steps in the European Parliament

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This blogpost is an update of a publication of 23 June 2025.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

The United States (US) Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is the world’s largest, comprising over 60 000 companies and 1.17 million employees. It is dominated by five major corporations – Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman – which together account for around one third of US Department of Defense (DoD) contracts and half of the revenue of the top 100 defence companies in the world. While the DIB sustains US technological dominance, it faces challenges linked to market consolidation, supply chain resilience and workforce shortages. The 2023 Biden administration’s National Defense Industrial Strategy seeks to address these issues, among other things, through enhanced supply chain resilience, workforce development and flexible acquisition. However, experts expect vast changes, including for the DIB, in strategy under the new Trump administration’s national defence strategy that is currently being developed.

By contrast, the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) remains fragmented, and has been under-invested in for decades. In 2024, EU defence spending reached €343 billion, roughly 2.5 times less than the US level (around €864 billion in 2024), with a large part of procurement sourced from the US. The 2024 European defence industrial strategy and the European defence industry programme aim to strengthen European defence industrial sovereignty, promote collaborative procurement, and emphasise a ‘Buy European’ approach. The European Parliament supports close EU–US cooperation but insists that EU programmes must primarily reinforce the EDTIB and increase strategic autonomy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘United States Defense Industrial Base: How does it differ from the European defence technological and industrial base?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The October II plenary session featured a formal address by Sergey Tihanovski and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, laureates of the 2020 Sakharov Prize, just after the announcement of the award of this year’s prize to imprisoned journalists, Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli. Members also debated the European Commission’s 2026 work programme and the preparations for the European Council meeting of 23 October 2025. Members held debates, inter alia, on the rule of law in Malta; intimidation of journalists; International Day for the Eradication of Poverty; policing’s central role in the EU’s internal security strategy; allegations of espionage by the Hungarian government; polarisation and repression in Serbia; combating violence against women and girls; and the anniversary of the DANA floods in Spain. Parliament also discussed the need for united support of Ukraine and for a just and durable peace; the use of Russian frozen assets; and ending energy imports from Russia.

Sakharov Price for Freedom of Thought

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Sergey Tihanovski – recently freed after five years of imprisonment for his political views and his defence of democracy in Belarus – made a formal address to Parliament. The 2020 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded to the Belarusian democratic opposition, led by Tsikhanouskaya following her husband’s imprisonment. Members debated the current situation in Belarus, where human rights have deteriorated since the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections.

2026 EU budget

Parliament debated and adopted amendments to the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2026. The EU borrowed heavily to support recovery after the COVID‑19 pandemic, and now needs to finance the repayments for the Next Generation EU instrument. At the same time, funding is urgently needed for the EU’s new competitiveness, research and defence priorities. The Committee on Budgets (BUDG) proposed to increase the 2026 budget for these priorities. The vote sets Parliament’s position for conciliation talks.

Discharge for the 2023 budget

In its role in ensuring the EU budget is spent according to the rules, Parliament again refused to grant budget discharge for 2023 to the European Council and the Council, criticising the Council’s continued refusal to cooperate. As for the postponed discharge for the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA), Members granted discharge to the agency for its 2023 accounts. while nevertheless noting criticism of its financial and general management and concerns about accountability at the agency

COP30 climate change conference in Brazil

In advance of the COP30 climate change conference in Brazil, Parliament adopted a resolution urging the parties to reaffirm their commitment to limit global warming to 1.5°C and a maximum of 2°C. To maintain this ambition, it recommends more frequent stocktakes. It regretted that the Council failed to agree an EU nationally determined contribution (NDC) before the deadline set by the United Nations.

Statute and funding of European political parties and foundations

Members adopted a provisional agreement on revising the rules regarding the statute and funding of European political parties and political foundations. Lengthy negotiations resulted in a text that reinforces safeguards against foreign interference and ensures financial stability, improving transparency and visibility.

New GDPR rules for cross-border cases

Members also adopted a provisional agreement on additional procedural rules for treating cross-border enforcement of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The text retains the proposed early-scoping exercise to speed consensus between supervisory authorities on cross-border GDPR cases, and new rules on hearing parties to the procedure. To settle issues quickly, an early resolution procedure and a simple cooperation procedure are also introduced.

European forests

Members voted on Parliament’s position on a proposed forest monitoring law and to renew the standing EU expert group on forests and forestry. Parliament’s ENVI and Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committees, jointly, proposed to reject the proposed increased monitoring of forests and forestry activity, on the grounds that it duplicates existing systems and would increase red tape. However, the committees supported the continuation of the expert group, but would nevertheless clarify its role.

Driving licences and Union-wide effect of driving disqualifications

To reduce reckless driving and impunity from disqualification for offences committed in other Member States, Members adopted a provisional agreement on EU-wide enforcement of driving disqualifications. The text aims at disqualifying drivers across the EU for drink-driving, speeding, drug-impaired driving, and conduct causing death or serious injury. The revised Driving Licences Directive would enable digital driving licences and an EU-wide accompanied driving scheme for young drivers. All professional drivers will have to undergo a medical check to obtain or renew a licence.

Soil monitoring and resilience

Healthy soils are the basis of most agricultural production, as well as providing carbon storage, yet EU soils are in poor condition. Parliament approved the agreement reached by the co-legislators on a proposed soil monitoring law that should ensure the good health of this essential element for life in the EU therefore stands. The new law would allow EU countries to support those who work on the land, with flexibility to take account of local conditions. It also addresses contamination, notably pollutants such as pesticides and per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and requests a public register of contaminated sites within 10 years.

Microplastic pollution from plastic pellet loses

Microplastic pollution has reached much of our environment, from the sea to our own bodies. Parliament approved the agreement reached between the co-legislators on proposed action to halt the loss of plastic pellets that contribute to this pollution, especially at sea. Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in imposing pictograms and warning statements when handling plastic pellets, and the agreement sets penalties for endangering people’s health.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

A decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies was approved without vote. A second decision, from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee on corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements, was rejected by Parliament, and will be placed on the agenda of the November I part-session.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – October II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s escalating hybrid attacks, including drone incursions, have prompted NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry and the European Union’s (EU) plans for a European Drone Wall and Eastern Flank Watch. These initiatives aim to strengthen eastern defences but face disputes over cost, feasibility and strategic focus. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have welcomed the initiatives.

Eastern Shield and Baltic Defence Line
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are jointly developing the Baltic Defence Line, a fortified line along their borders with Russia and Belarus to delay and disrupt incursions while enabling NATO reinforcements to deploy. Poland is also building an East Shield, a defence infrastructure project along its borders with Belarus and Russia to enhance NATO and EU security through surveillance, mobility infrastructure and physical barriers. The Baltic States and Poland aim to coordinate these efforts to secure EU funding and jointly procure equipment under SAFE, improving efficiency and interoperabilit

Background

In the past few months, there has been a marked escalation of Russian hybrid warfare directed against EU and NATO member states, prompting alarm among European leaders and citizens. Moscow has also resorted to conventional military measures, including incursions by manned fighter aircraft into Estonian airspace and drones in Polish and Romanian airspace. Furthermore, at least 10 European countries (Belgium, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Norway, Romania, Poland, Estonia, Germany and France) have reported drone sightings over airports and military installations, with officials suggesting in some cases that the drones may have been launched from vessels operating offshore. The French military authorities detained two persons aboard a Russia-linked oil tanker suspected of launching drones. Although many of the devices recovered so far were unarmed and some merely decoys, European governments regard these intrusions as a form of hybrid threat designed to test air-defence readiness and impose psychological and economic costs. Several statements by European leaders noted that they assume Russian responsibility. Following the drone incursions, Poland invoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, triggering urgent NATO consultations just days after Estonia had done the same. In response, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry. Its primary objective is to strengthen NATO’s capabilities in the air, at sea and on land to counter military threats from Russia, with a particular focus on intercepting Russian drones violating the airspace of NATO member states. Eastern Sentry introduced a collective framework and operational approach to air defence along NATO’s eastern flank. The incidents have also hardened national positions. Six European NATO allies have declared that they will use force to defend their airspace, with Lithuania authorising peacetime drone shoot-downs. According to an IISS expert, NATO now faces the challenge of mounting a cost-effective defence. Deploying fighter jets and expensive air-to-air missiles to counter drones is operationally possible but fiscally unsustainable.

Eastern Flank Watch and European Drone Defence Initiative

Commission President von der Leyen first called for the establishment of an ‘Eastern Flank Watch’ during her 2025 State of the Union address. The defence readiness roadmap 2030 scoping paper, which was circulated to Heads of State and Government prior to the informal European Council in Copenhagen, underlines that ‘In light of the continued military aggression against Ukraine, and the recent increase of violations of air space of Member States, two flagship projects – The European Drone Wall and The Eastern Flank Watch – require special urgency and should be moved forward expediently.’ According to media reports, the initiative has split EU capitals: frontline states such as Poland, the Baltic States and Finland see it as an urgent necessity, while countries further from Russia’s borders, including France, Germany, Italy and Greece, question its cost, technical feasibility and the risk of Brussels encroaching on national defence prerogatives. Although EU leaders in Copenhagen ultimately endorsed the plan in principle – the main results of the informal European Council note that leaders broadly supported priority flagships presented by the Commission and the High Representative, including the European Drone Wall and the Eastern Flank Watch – significant divisions remain over funding, scope and branding. Sceptics warn it will not address broader vulnerabilities such as cyberattacks, ammunition shortages or command structures.

In October 2025, the Commission and the High Representative put forward the European defence readiness roadmap 2030. It proposes a series of European Readiness Flagships to strengthen the EU’s collective defence through coordinated investment in critical capability areas. These initiatives – the (now renamed) European Drone Defence Initiative,the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield – aim to reinforce Europe’s resilience against emerging military and hybrid threats while enhancing strategic autonomy and operational readiness. Open to all Member States, the flagships are cross-sectoral, covering defence, border management, internal security and the protection of critical infrastructure. Member States would lead the initiatives, determining objectives, governance and funding allocations; the Commission would facilitate coordination, offer technical assistance and ensure coherence across EU instruments and funding mechanisms; and the High Representative would ensure alignment with agreed EU capability priorities and coherence with NATO defence plans. Coordination frameworks should be agreed upon by spring 2026. According to the roadmap, the EU Military Staff will conduct a classified annual assessment of Member States’ capabilities and shortfalls – aligned with NATO’s targets and Ukraine’s needs – to inform procurement priorities and underpin an annual defence readiness report to the European Council each October, tracking collective progress across key capability areas.

The European Drone Defence Initiative aims to develop a cutting-edge interoperable system for countering and deploying drones. It will establish a multi-layered network capable of detecting, tracking and neutralising hostile drones, while also enabling precision-strike capabilities through advanced drone platforms. Drawing extensively on Ukraine’s battlefield experience, it will be closely connected to the proposed Drone Alliance with Ukraine (President von der Leyen announced during her State of the Union address that Europe will allocate €6 billion from the interest generated on immobilised Russian assets to support Ukraine’s drone production). Its dual-use dimension would allow applications in civilian contexts such as border protection and disaster response. It is expected to be launched in Q1 2026, reach initial operational capacity by the end of 2026 and be fully functional by the end of 2027.

The Eastern Flank Watch would reinforce the EU’s eastern borders against hybrid, cyber, maritime and conventional threats from Russia and Belarus through the integration of air defence, electronic warfare, surveillance and maritime security systems. It will combine anti-drone and air-defence capabilities with improved ground and naval assets, supporting situational awareness and rapid response capacity, coordinated closely with NATO’s integrated command and control structures and operations, such as Baltic Air Policing and Operation Eastern Sentry. This will enhance deterrence, strengthen interoperability and secure the EU’s land and sea frontiers. Implementation is to begin in 2026, with initial operational capabilities expected by late 2026 and full functionality achieved by the end of 2028.

The European Council is expected to endorse the two flagship projects by the end of 2025. An expert contends that the Drone Wall does not constitute a strategic response to Russian hybrid warfare, as it fails to counter it directly. Instead of investing in largely symbolic defences, states should focus on deterrence by enhancing Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. The main purpose of the Drone Wall is to reassure worried populations. Another analyst argues that the Drone Wall paradigm is ‘promising’ as a start, provided it is institutionalised, properly coordinated and legal frameworks are adjusted.

European Parliament position

MEPs condemn Russia’s violations of airspace and drone incursions targeting EU and NATO members as part of Moscow’s hybrid warfare. They welcome initiatives such as the EU Drone Wall and Eastern Flank Watch, while emphasising the importance of providing full protection for all Member States facing direct security threats, including those along the EU’s southern flank. They also call for deeper defence cooperation with Ukraine, particularly on drone technology and countermeasures, using instruments like the European defence industry programme (EDIP) and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Eastern Flank Watch and European Drone Wall‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Annastiina Papunen and Astrid Worum with Diogo Vieira Ferreira.

Only three weeks after the informal European Council meeting in Copenhagen on 1 October 2025, EU leaders will reconvene to continue their discussions on defence as well as Ukraine. On defence, the leaders’ main focus will be on the new Roadmap on European Defence Readiness 2030 and on addressing immediate threats on the eastern flank. Regarding the war in Ukraine, they will continue their discussion on Russia’s frozen assets and on the 19th sanctions package against Russia. Another prominent topic at this meeting will be competitiveness, with special attention on simplification, the nexus of green transition and industrial renewal, as well as Europe’s digital sovereignty. Additional agenda points include the situation in the Middle East, housing and migration. Following the European Council meeting, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit focusing on the capital markets union, the international role of the euro and the digital euro initiative.

1.   General

As usual, the European Council will start with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. In line with European Council President António Costa‘s new approach, the meeting is intended as a one-day event, but could extend to the next day if needed. Following parliamentary elections in Czechia, this meeting is expected to be the last one for Prime Minister Petr Fiala.

2.   European Council meeting Ukraine

In the context of intensified Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukraine, notably against civilian and energy infrastructure, the European Council is expected to reiterate its unwavering political, financial, military and humanitarian support for Ukraine. EU leaders may have an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who could brief them on his disappointing visit to the US as regards the supply of missiles, and try to gather support ahead of the announced meeting in Budapest between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

As indicated in Costa’s invitation letter, EU leaders will focus on financial support for Ukraine in the coming years and consider options for the use of up to €140 billion of Russia’s frozen assets for interest-free ‘reparation loans’ to Ukraine. While this plan is backed by a majority of EU Member States, some remain sceptical about the use of foreign assets, notably Belgium, host of Euroclear, and Luxembourg, who want further guarantees from the European Commission and the G7 that all partners would share the financial risk in case of lawsuits. A political decision at this European Council meeting would enable legislation to be put forward with a view to possibly starting payments in 2026. The meeting could also discuss burden-sharing within the G7 on a separate €45 billion loan scheme.

Determined to increase pressure on Russia, EU leaders will also need to find an agreement on the 19th sanctions package against Russia, which Slovakia continues to oppose; Austria has lifted its veto. The new package targets oil revenues, gas, banks, crypto-currencies and shadow fleets, with the EU and US aligning on measures to halt Russian oil purchases.

The European Council is also likely to discuss both i) ways of addressing Ukraine’s most pressing defence needs, notably air defence and drone systems, and ii) post-war security guarantees, to which the EU intends to contribute. In that context, it may welcome the ongoing revisions of the mandates of EUAM (EU civilian advisory mission in Ukraine) and EUMAM (European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine) to include cyber-defence and ‘strengthening Ukraine’s combat power by investing €2 billion in drones’. In addition, the European Council is likely to call on Russia and Belarus to ensure the safe return of forcefully deported Ukrainian children.

Finally, EU leaders could reiterate their support for Ukraine’s EU accession path and commend the progress achieved, with three clusters ready to be opened.

Middle East

Following the agreement reached on the initial phase of the peace plan between the Israelis and Palestinians proposed by President Trump and signed at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit for Peace, EU leaders are likely to welcome the immediate release of the hostages held by Hamas and call for unimpeded humanitarian access to Gaza. President Costa, who attended the summit, commended the success of the peace plan and stressed that the EU ‘is fully committed to actively engage with all parties involved in the implementation of this Peace Plan’. He also noted that the EU ‘will expand our humanitarian assistance’ and ‘contribute to Gaza’s stabilisation and reconstruction’. In addition, EU leaders may call for de-escalation in the West Bank, notably in East Jerusalem, and an end to settler violence and to the expansion of illegal settlements. Finally, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their support for a two-state solution, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions.

European defence and security

In the context of an evolving threat landscape, and following intense discussions on defence at their 1 October meeting, EU leaders will review progress on EU defence readiness initiatives aimed at closing critical capability gaps by 2030. The ‘Roadmap on European Defence Readiness 2030′, presented on 16 October by the High Representative/Vice-President and the Commission at the request of EU leaders, will feed into the discussion. It translates the White Paper/ReArm Europe into operational milestones and outlines four European flagship projects (Eastern Flank Watch, European Drone Wall, European Air Shield, and European Defence Space Shield), while aiming to strengthen the EU’s military industrial complex and boosting joint procurement to an ambitious 40 % of defence purchases by 2027. The roadmap also calls on Member States to form Capability Coalitions in nine key areas through joint development and procurement. Even if generally well received, certain countries such as France, Germany and Sweden have insisted that Member States remain sovereign in their national defence – a point strongly underlined by the Commission in its proposal.

Following repeated violations of European airspace in recent weeks, which require a united response, as stressed by the European Parliament, EU leaders could underline the need to address the immediate threat to European security on the Eastern flank as a priority. They may discuss ways of reinforcing cooperation between Member States as well as efforts to develop anti-drone and air defence capabilities. While calling for the strengthening of the European Defence Agency in the capabilities development process, the European Council is also likely to review progress on financing and investment in the field of defence, notably regarding the €150 billion SAFE financial instrument and the European defence industry programme (EDIP), on which an agreement between the co-legislators has been reached. 

Governance and oversight of defence readiness projects may also be raised, with a possible annual reporting system by defence ministers to the European Council to keep track of progress.

Competitiveness

Competitiveness has been a frequent agenda point during this legislative period, appearing in all regular European Council meetings, except for that of December 2024. The April 2024 special meeting conclusions, the Letta report, the strategic agenda, the Draghi report, the November 2024 Budapest declaration and the March 2025 conclusions have all fed into the discussion. At their October meeting, EU leaders are expected to focus on three themes: i) simplification, ii) strategic debate on the climate objectives for 2040 and iii) Europe’s digital sovereignty.

Costa’s invitation letter stressed that the EU needed to ‘step up’ its efforts to deliver on simplification. The Budapest declaration had already called for a ‘simplification revolution’ to ensure ‘a clear, simple and smart regulatory framework for businesses and drastically reducing administrative, regulatory and reporting burdens, in particular for SMEs’. The work on the ‘Omnibus’ simplification packages is ongoing, but EU leaders may call for further efforts.

At the request of six Member States (France, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Latvia), EU leaders will discuss the EU’s 2040 climate targets, which will determine the 2035 intermediate target to be submitted to the COP30 climate summit in Belém, Brazil. Currently, the Council has only agreed on a ‘declaration of intent’, setting a range for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Back in June, ahead of the presentation of the ‘European Climate Law’, EU leaders had discussed the issue – which was not on the agenda – at length, as certain Member States feared the impact of the transition to carbon neutrality on EU competitiveness and industry. Thus, EU leaders are expected to approach the climate topic from a strong competitiveness perspective, calling for decarbonisation as a vector for industrial renewal, a notable change of approach.

The agenda point on Europe’s digital sovereignty is expected to repeat many points that have been discussed in previous meetings, including the importance of advancing digital transformation, strengthening sovereignty and basing digital policies and solutions on EU values and interests. Interestingly, EU leaders may also mention EU regulatory autonomy in digital issues, which has been brought up recently in connection with US trade negotiations.

Housing

EU house prices have increased by 60.5 % and rents by 28.8 % on average from 2010 to 2025. This rise has generated financial difficulties for many EU citizens, especially as prices of many everyday items and utilities have also increased over the same period. As mentioned in the Leaders’ Agenda, EU leaders are expected to discuss the situation and support (additional) measures at European level to help improve access to affordable and decent housing. The European Council may also request the Commission to swiftly publish the European Affordable Housing Plan, currently under preparation. The European Parliament has set up a special committee to look into the EU housing crisis.

Migration

EU leaders will review the implementation of their June 2025 conclusions on migration, many of which are currently being discussed by the co-legislators, notably the return of irregular migrants and the mutual recognition of return decisions. As has been the usual format in recent European Council meetings, the discussions will be informed by a letter from the European Commission President. The elephant in the room is the migration pact which was adopted in 2024. Some EU leaders call for rapid implementation of the migration pact (e.g. Luxembourg Prime Minister Luc Frieden), while others, such as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, have stated that they will not implement the pact, even claiming that they had got an exemption.

Although the number of irregular migrants has fallen by 20 % in 2025, in October 2025 nine Member States (Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and the Netherlands) were still carrying out long-term temporary internal border controls.

Other points Republic of Moldova

EU leaders will address the recent elections in Moldova, pledging their continued support for the country’s resilience and stability. They may reiterate Moldova’s accession path and acknowledge the significant progress achieved so far, inviting the Council and the Commission to take work forward, in line with the merit-based approach.

Pact for the Mediterranean

It is likely that EU leaders will welcome the new Pact for the Mediterranean, announced in the political guidelines 2024-2029 and published on 16 October 2025.

3.   Euro Summit

The second Euro Summit of the year (the first one was in March 2025) will take place in inclusive format (with non-euro-area countries attending) on the same day as the regular European Council meeting. As usual, the current economic situation will be discussed with Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe and European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde. Ahead of the meeting, Donohoe sent Costa a letter outlining themes currently important for the euro area, such as the capital markets union, the international role of the euro and the digital euro initiative.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 23 October 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Sergey Tihanovski– recently freed after five years of imprisonment for his political views and his defence of democracy in Belarus – are due to make a formal address to Parliament on Wednesday. The European Parliament awards the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to individuals or organisations for their outstanding achievements in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms. Parliament has long supported Belarusians in their struggle against repression, calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners, and awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize to the Belarusian democratic opposition, led by Tsikhanouskaya following her husband’s imprisonment. Belarusian political prisoner Andrzej Poczobut is on the shortlist of nominees for the prize in 2025, together with Mzia Amaglobeli from Georgia, another imprisoned journalist fighting for freedom. Following statements from the Council and Commission on Wednesday, Members are set to debate the situation in Belarus, where human rights have deteriorated since the fraudulent 2020 presidential elections.

In its role of EU budgetary authority, Parliament is due on Wednesday to debate amending the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2026. The EU borrowed heavily to support European citizens and businesses recover from the effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, and now needs to finance the repayments for the Next Generation EU instrument. At the same time, funding is urgently needed for the EU’s new competitiveness, research and defence priorities. The Committee on Budgets (BUDG) proposes to increase the 2026 budget for these priorities, rather than transferring expenditure for such flagship programmes to financing the loans. The vote on the file will set Parliament’s position for the next step in the procedure, which will be the convening of the Conciliation Committee.

In its role in ensuring the EU budget is spent according to the rules, Parliament postponed its decision on granting budget discharge to the European Council and the Council, criticising the Council’s continued refusal to cooperate. After reviewing the situation, Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends Parliament again refuses to grant discharge for 2023, with the vote set for  Wednesday. Parliament has already granted discharge to all decentralised agencies, bodies and joint undertakings for 2023 – except for the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA). On Wednesday, Members are due to to reconsider granting discharge, based on a CONT proposal, and to vote on a resolution criticising delays and obstruction at the EUAA regarding financial and general management, as well as raising concern about accountability at the agency.

In advance of the COP30 climate change conference in Brazil, Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) has tabled a motion for a resolution on Wednesday. The committee urges the parties to reaffirm their commitment to limit global warming to 1.5°C and a maximum of 2°C. To maintain this ambition, ENVI also recommends more frequent stocktakes and submissions on nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The committee highlights the need to tackle debt crises and simplify access to climate finance for climate-vulnerable countries. It also regrets that the Council failed to agree an EU NDC before the deadline set by the United Nations.

Parliament will also focus on measures to protect the environment nearer to home on Tuesday. Members are first expected to adopt Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations on a proposed forest monitoring law and to renew the standing EU expert group on forests and forestry. Under the joint committee procedure, Parliament’s ENVI and Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committees voted to reject the proposed increased monitoring of forests and forestry activity, on the grounds that it duplicates existing systems and would increase red tape. However, the committees support the continuation of the expert group but would nevertheless clarify its role.

Healthy soils are the basis of most agricultural production, as well as providing carbon storage, yet EU soils are in poor condition. On Thursday, Members are scheduled to consider an agreement reached by the co-legislators on a proposed soil monitoring law that should ensure the good health of this essential element for life in the EU. The new law would allow EU countries to support those who work on the land, with flexibility to take account of local conditions. It also addresses contamination, notably pollutants such as pesticides and per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and requests a public register of contaminated sites within 10 years.

Meanwhile, microplastic pollution has reached much of our environment, from the sea to our own bodies. On Thursday, Parliament is set to consider an agreement reached between the co-legislators on proposed action to halt the loss of plastic pellets that contribute to this pollution, especially at sea. The pellets are used to manufacture plastic products and are often released into the environment during transport or industrial processes. Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in imposing pictograms and warning statements when handling plastic pellets, and the agreement sets penalties for endangering people’s health.

At present, if someone commits a serious driving offence in an EU country, only the country that issued their licence can disqualify them from driving. To reduce such impunity and reckless driving in the EU, Members are due on Tuesday to consider a provisional agreement on EU-wide enforcement of driving disqualifications. The text aims at disqualifying drivers across the EU for drink-driving, speeding, drug-impaired driving, and conduct causing death or serious injury, with the provisions to be integrated into the Driving Licences Directive. As this directive is due for revision, to bring it up to date with today’s goals and technology, Members are also scheduled to vote on Tuesday on a provisional agreement endorsed by the Transport and Tourism committee. The new law would enable digital driving licences and an EU-wide accompanied driving scheme for young drivers. All professional drivers will have to undergo a medical check to obtain or renew a licence, but EU governments will decide for other drivers.

On Tuesday, Members are due to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council on additional procedural rules for treating cross-border enforcement of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The text agreed by the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) negotiators retains the proposed early-scoping exercise to speed consensus between supervisory authorities on cross-border GDPR cases, and new rules on hearing parties to the procedure. To settle issues quickly, an early resolution procedure and a simple cooperation procedure have also been introduced.

Turning to their own house on Tuesday, Members are due to debate a provisional agreement with the Council of the EU on revising the rules regarding the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. Lengthy negotiations have resulted in a text, endorsed by Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) that reinforces safeguards against foreign interference and ensures financial stability, aimed at improving transparency and visibility.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

• The situation in Belarus five years after the fraudulent presidential elections
• Parliament’s reading of the 2026 EU budget
• Discharge for the 2023 budget: European Council and Council
• Discharge for 2023 budget: EU Asylum Agency
• COP30 climate change conference in Brazil
• European forests
• Soil monitoring and resilience
• Microplastic pollution from plastic pellet losses
• Union-wide effect of driving disqualifications
• Revision of the Driving Licences Directive
• New GDPR procedural rules for cross-border cases
• Recasting the rules applicable to European political parties and foundations

Written by Clare Ferguson and Sebastian Clapp.

Security has become a top concern for Europeans. With Ukrainians battling to protect their country against Russia’s aggression and reports of drone and aerial incursions almost a daily occurrence in several EU countries, the European Parliament is determined to ensure that the conditions are optimum for EU governments to step up their defence readiness. The European Commission is expected to publish a non-legislative defence readiness roadmap this month. In the meantime, the Parliament has repeatedly made its position clear that defence spending should increase.

Finding funding for defence was a low priority for many EU countries in recent years. This changed definitively with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and total Member State defence expenditure has since risen to €343 billion in 2024. Nevertheless, this is far below what other world powers spend on defending their countries, relative to the size of their respective economies. Whilst decisions on defence spending remain in the hands of national governments, Members of the European Parliament are backing moves to complement EU government defence projects through additional EU funding for defence-related investment.

Presciently, the EU already launched its first approach to boosting defence with the European Defence Fund in 2021. To increase cooperation between EU countries, this €8 billion fund promotes joint defence research and capability development, defence innovation and cross-border industrial cooperation through over 160 collaborative projects. However, the interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) highlighted the need for funding to be faster, more flexible, and for better definition of projects for real strategic impact.

The EDF is just one way in which the EU aims to tackle the European defence industry’s high fragmentation, where Member States take national positions that nevertheless undermine overall efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness at the EU level. Today’s goal to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU defence spending is to develop a true common market for Europe’s security and defence industry. Less red-tape and greater defence alignment between EU countries could lead to governments enjoying the advantages of economies of scale in both industrial processes and procurement. Companies operating in the European defence technological and industrial base (known as EDTIB) could expand, and less funding would be lost to procurement from non-EU firms. Parliament is a strong supporter of a competitive EU defence market, which would lead to improved deterrence and resilience, and help EU countries better protect their sovereignty in today’s unpredictable geopolitical environment.

The principal mission of EU countries’ armed forces is to protect their borders and citizens. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, the mutual defence clause, also commits EU countries to aid and assist other Member States who are under attack. Most EU countries are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and therefore subject to Article 5, the collective defence clause. The armed forces of one or several EU Member States may therefore be called on to defend a border or a NATO Ally, and so need to be able to move swiftly across EU territory. However, military mobility today faces considerable barriers – outdated, inadequate or missing infrastructure (such as bridges) and inconsistent legislation. While some improvements have already been seen on customs and transport procedures, tackling the under-investment and regulatory barriers in this area as a collective could lead to benefits almost three times higher than when EU countries do not coordinate their investment.

Returning to the situation in Ukraine, military drones are the main cause of casualties among both civilians and troops. The EU is already using EDF funding to develop drone technology and countermeasures, with EU governments already investing heavily in drone production. Parliament is monitoring the situation carefully to ensure robust ethical guardrails and strong accountability – and is particularly concerned that military drone innovation should not lead to development of lethal autonomous weapons.

Finally, to help Ukraine defend its borders and its people, a recurring question is how to use Russian central bank assets, frozen by Western countries because of Russia’s attack, to sustain Ukraine against its aggressor(s). While legal opinions on the lawfulness of confiscating Russia’s money diverge, G7 countries have already agreed to use the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine. The EU channels its support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, and has already allocated €6.1 billion to address military and defence needs (2022-2024). This funding adds to military support directly provided by EU Member States, leading to an estimated €63.2 billion in total support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Fully behind the principle that Russia should pay for the damage it has inflicted, Parliament is unwavering in its support for Ukraine.

Further reading:

• EU defence funding
• The interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund
• Building a common market for European defence
• Military mobility
• Towards a comprehensive and beneficial approach to military mobility
• Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks
• Confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets: State of play, arguments and scenarios
• European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only

Written by Marie Lecerf.

Updated on 14.10.2025.

At more than one in five, the number of children at risk of poverty in the European Union (EU) remains high. This year’s International Day for the Eradication of Poverty presents an opportunity to take stock of what the EU is doing to fight child poverty. Even though legal competence for child policy remains primarily with the Member States, the fight against child poverty is a major EU priority. The European strategy on the rights of the child now reflects the EU’s increasing willingness to tackle child poverty, while the use of European funds is key to success.

Background

It is now 33 years since the United Nations (UN) established the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty. The objective of the international day’s 2025 edition, to be marked on 17 October, is to ‘end social and institutional maltreatment by ensuring respect and effective support for families’. In recent decades, there has been marked progress in reducing poverty worldwide. Nevertheless, the number of people living in poverty remains very high, even in the EU, in particular among children. In 2024, 93.3 million people in the EU‑27 were living in households at risk of poverty or social exclusion (i.e. 21.0 % of the EU‑27 population, according to Eurostat). With an at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of 24.2 % for the EU‑27, children were at greater risk in 2024 than adults (see Figure 1).

Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU, 2024 EU contribution to the fight against child poverty Legal basis

The EU is guided by the principles set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by all EU Member States. The objective of promoting protection of the rights of the child is established in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union. Moreover, the EU and its Member States are bound to comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 24 of which is dedicated entirely to the rights of the child.

EU policy responses

Fighting child poverty in the EU is primarily a Member State responsibility. Nevertheless, at EU level there is broad consensus that action is needed to lift children out of poverty and to promote children’s wellbeing.

The proclamation of the European pillar of social rights in November 2017 demonstrated increasing willingness to tackle child poverty in the EU. Principle 11 is clear that the fight against child poverty is a priority of today’s social Europe, while referring to children’s right to protection from poverty.

In June 2021, the European Commission adopted, and the Council endorsed, a recommendation on the European Child Guarantee, demanding that social exclusion be tackled by guaranteeing that children in need have access to services, such as early childhood education and care, education, healthcare, nutrition, housing, cultural and leisure activities. Many of these services are provided at regional and local levels, as highlighted by the Commission in its April 2024 recommendation on developing and strengthening child protection systems in the best interests of the child. Three years after the publication of their national action plans, Member States have submitted progress reports, which generally emphasise the need for better monitoring and clearer targets, tackling regional inequalities, expanding proven pilot projects, improving data sharing, reaching more vulnerable children, building the workforce and ensuring stable long-term funding.

In her 2025 State of the Union address, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to eradicating poverty by 2050 and announced a European anti-poverty strategy.

The EU has also committed to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, not least Goal 1, which aims to halve the number of people, including children, in poverty, by 2030.

EU funds

Numerous financial instruments offer Member States EU support for measures to address child poverty.

• For the 2021-2027 programming period, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) provides a broad range of funding opportunities to fight child poverty. The Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived (FEAD) is built into ESF+, allowing greater synergies between the two funds to address child poverty; the ESF+ also links to the national recovery and resilience plans. ESF+ supports measures to eradicate child poverty in the EU through the implementation of the European Child Guarantee.
• Under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), €200 billion (2018 prices) is dedicated to measures to promote social inclusion and combat poverty, notably by supporting investment in social infrastructure, equipment and access to quality services, such as new classrooms or modernised capacity for childcare, and education facilities.
• Member States can also make use of the InvestEU and REACT-EU programmes or the Recovery and Resilience Facility to fund measures combating child poverty and social exclusion.

European Parliament

Demonstrating its commitment to child wellbeing, Parliament has had a Coordinator on Children’s Rights since 2018, a position held by Parliament Vice-President Ewa Kopacz (EPP, Poland) since 2019.

Parliament has also adopted several resolutions and reports addressing child poverty over the years. Most recently, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) has been working on a draft report on developing a new EU anti-poverty strategy (rapporteur: João Oliveira, GUE/NGL, Portugal), scheduled for a committee vote by the end of the year. The rapporteur’s draft report calls for a comprehensive EU strategy to eradicate poverty by 2035, highlights that child poverty constitutes a violation of human rights, and urges the adoption of integrated measures across social, educational and health policies.

In a March 2024 resolution, Parliament called for a European Capitals for Children initiative to help fight child poverty, make a comprehensive examination of children’s living conditions and ensure effective implementation of the European Child Guarantee.

On 21 November 2023, with resolutions on reducing inequalities and promoting social inclusion in times of crisis for children and their families and on strengthening the Child Guarantee, Members urged the Commission and the Member States to do more to tackle the challenge of child poverty.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘EU contribution to the fight against child poverty‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Georgia compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, Georgia achieved a sustained growth rate of its economy of 9.4%, while the EU-27 managed only a growth rate of 1.1%. Georgia’s public debt as a percentage of GDP continues to decline, recovering from the significant increase in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The EU-27 is Georgia’s primary trading partner, accounting for 22.1% of its trade share, with Germany being the leading country. The main exported goods to Georgia are vehicles, aircraft, mechanical appliances, and electrical equipment, while the EU mainly imports ores, slag, ash, and agri-food from Georgia.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Georgia: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances
Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) Public finances, monetary and financial data EU trade with Georgia Main trade partners (2024)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports Top EU partners (2024)
Trade in goods EU exports of goods to Georgia (2024) EU imports of goods from Georgia (2024)

Written by Gregor Erbach.

The forthcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference – COP30 – to be held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025, is a decisive moment in international climate action. By September 2025, countries have to submit the third round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC 3.0) that will determine whether the targets of the Paris Agreement remain within reach. NDCs are countries’ climate plans, setting national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets and means of implementation. Parties to the Paris Agreement must update them every five years to ensure progress towards the agreement’s temperature target. The updated NDCs cover a timeframe up to 2035 and must align with the outcomes of the first global stocktake and with Parties’ long-term GHG emissions reduction objectives.

Analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme shows that current efforts would lead to global warming of between 2.6 and 3.1 °C by 2100. Therefore, NDCs should demonstrate increased ambition, backed by concrete measures to deliver on the targets. Those major economies that have already submitted NDCs 3.0 (Brazil, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) have set higher targets for 2035 compared with 2030. However, these pledges would already take up about 36 % of the remaining post-2030 carbon budget for 1.5 °C, while these Parties represent only 19.2 % of global emissions.

The EU needs to submit its collective NDC 3.0 in September 2025, informed by the legislative proposal for amending the European Climate Law with a climate target for 2040.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The third generation of national climate plans: Analysis of major economies’ nationally determined contributions ahead of COP30‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timelines of major economies’ successive waves of NDC submissions NDC 3.0 share of the remaining global post-2030 carbon budget

Written by Tim Peters and Jakub Przetacznik with Ana Luisa Melo Almeida.

Updated on 07.10.2025

In response to Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have provided unprecedented financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. According to European Commission figures, Team Europe, consisting of the EU and its Member States, has made available around €173.5 billion in support to Ukraine. This support encompasses macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and the European Peace Facility, as well as support to Ukrainian refugees in the EU.

The overall support for Ukraine provided by Team Europe is now larger than the support provided by the United States, except in terms of military support allocation, even though Team Europe has provided 83 % of the tanks and 61 % of the air defence systems given to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war.

The disbursement of EU payments is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan – an ambitious reform and investment plan drafted by Ukraine’s government and endorsed by the EU. The G7 have agreed upon a further €45 billion loan, with €18.1 billion of the whole amount to be financed by the EU. For that purpose, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism has been established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and associated interest costs. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for a full confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets with the objective of making Russia pay for the destruction it has brought on Ukraine. The European Commission has proposed to use those assets for a ‘reparation loan’ to Ukraine.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of Play: EU support to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Team Europe financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, February 2022 to September 2025, in € billion Bilateral and EU budget contributions to Ukraine by EU and non-EU Member States, 2022-2025, in € billion and as a % of GNI

Written by Vasilis Margaras.

Towns and cities are home to nearly three quarters of the EU’s population. Many EU cities and urban areas constitute vibrant spaces of economic growth and innovation. However, they also face multiple challenges, such as building inclusive societies, tackling inequalities, addressing climate change and environmental degradation, and dealing with housing issues and demographic challenges. Cities are at the forefront of implementing EU legislation in several policy areas, including cohesion, and have been demanding a stronger role in shaping these policies and greater access to EU financial resources.

Cohesion policy has a strong urban dimension. Its support for sustainable urban development was reinforced in the current 2021-2027 programming period to help cities take an active role in designing and implementing policy responses to their own challenges. Cohesion funds invest more than €100 billion in towns and cities. For their part, cities are directly responsible for designing and implementing investments worth over €24 billion under the cohesion policy programmes.

The emergence of the Urban Agenda for the EU in 2016 and the beginning of participatory partnerships raised new expectations about the role of urban authorities in the EU decision-making process. The Pact of Amsterdam provided for urban partnerships focusing on key urban themes such as air quality, urban poverty and housing. However, progress in empowering cities within cohesion policy has been limited. Stakeholders evaluating the progress of the Urban Agenda for the EU highlight issues such as limited EU resources channelled to tackling urban issues, obstacles in achieving direct EU funding, a lack of effective long-term urban governance mechanisms in EU policymaking, and limited input of urban areas into EU policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A new urban policy agenda for the EU: Addressing cities’ current challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

Japan’s culture of national resilience is one of the most advanced in the world. The UN-backed definition of preparedness was adopted in 2017 in Japan, a country highly exposed to natural hazards, under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Through national resilience, the country aims to prevent human loss by any means, avoid fatal damage to important functions for maintaining administration as well as social and economic systems, mitigate damage to private property and public facilities, and achieve swift recovery and reconstruction.

The COVID-19 pandemic made Japan an early mover in the implementation of economic security policies, including reducing the dependence of its supply chains on China. Japan appointed the world’s first minister for economic security and adopted legislation to protect the country from coercion by others through economic dependency. Japan’s initiatives also made it a leader in global green supply chains. The adoption of three main documents in December 2022 helped Japan reshape its approach to national security and defence and become better equipped to face the current complex geopolitical environment.

In March 2025, the European Commission launched the preparedness union strategy. The EU and Japan are increasing cooperation in several aspects related to preparedness and resilience, including in economic security, cybersecurity and foreign information manipulation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Japan’s preparedness strategies: Lessons for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Parliament’s first October plenary session featured a formal address by Jens-Frederik Nielsen, Prime Minister of Greenland. Members discussed the European Union’s relations with countries outside the Union in various debates, including on the EU’s role in supporting peace efforts for Gaza and a two-state solution; a united EU response to Russian violation of EU Member States’ airspace; an EU strategy to face Iran’s nuclear threat and on EU sanctions; the situation in Afghanistan; and the Second World Summit for Social Development. Members also considered and rejected two motions of censure of the Commission. A debate addressed rising antisemitism in Europe. Members also debated intergenerational fairness; completing the single market; and promoting EU digital rules. Finally, a debate marked World Mental Health Day (10 October), and Members debated the public health risks exacerbated by global warming.

This is Europe debate

The October I 2025 session featured the first ‘This is Europe‘ debate of the current term, with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden.

Visa suspension mechanism

Many non-EU nationals can visit the Schengen area for 90 days without having to apply for a visa. To protect the system from abuse, the visa suspension mechanism allows the EU to temporarily end the visa exemption for citizens of certain countries for security reasons. A proposal to strengthen the mechanism has been on the table since 2023. Members held a debate and adopted the text agreed between Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Council, which emphasises the links between the EU’s external relations and the need to revise the visa suspension mechanism to cover, for instance, cases of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, investor-citizenship schemes and human rights violations.

Common agricultural policy simplification

Following a debate on the common agricultural policy (CAP), Members approved a report on the European Commission proposal to amend the current rules on payments to farmers, aimed at cutting red tape, one of the farming community’s key demands. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development proposes the CAP simplification include more flexibility on environmental rules, easier access to crisis payments and increased support for small and medium-sized farms. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

European works councils

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached by Parliament’s negotiators on a revision of the European Works Councils Directive. European works councils represent workers employed by multinationals operating in at least two EU countries. The revision of the legislation aims at strengthening the enforcement of transnational information and consultation rights, excluding trivial issues and including stronger provisions on gender balance. Parliament has succeeded in including rules to ensure penalties will be dissuasive, effective and proportionate.

Amending budget No 2/2025

Members adopted amending budget No 2/2025, updating the revenue side of the current year’s EU budget. The report from Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) endorsed the Council position on the Commission proposal to take revised revenue forecasts into account and notes the need for increased gross national income contributions from the Member States. The committee also reiterates that the EU must endeavour to find fresh funding streams for new EU policy priorities.

Inland waterway transport: River Information Services

Members adopted an agreed revision to the legislation ensuring safety and environmental protection on the EU’s inland waterways. Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) reached an agreement with the Council that the revision should establish a single digital information platform, ensure harmonised reporting, introduce a feedback mechanism and update privacy and security requirements. The committee would, however, prefer that the scope of the revision of harmonised river information services apply only to waterways and ports that are part of a cross-border network.

Extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions

The EU aims at reducing CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles by 43 % by 2030, with higher targets to follow. However, as zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles remain expensive, EU law allows governments to encourage their use by granting reductions or exemptions to road charges for such vehicles. Members approved, under the urgent procedure, an extension of the derogation for heavy-duty vehicles with zero emissions to June 2031.

New strategic EU-India agenda

Members held a debate on Council and Commission statements on a joint communication, which lays out the path for negotiations on a new strategic EU-India agenda, set for adoption at a bilateral summit in 2026. The debate covered progress on a free trade agreement, financial supervision arrangements and security and defence ties.

EU-Côte d’Ivoire Fisheries Partnership Agreement

Following a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH), Members granted Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of a new protocol covering the EU’s fisheries agreement with Côte d’Ivoire. The protocol sets opportunities for EU vessels from Spain, France and Portugal to fish for tuna in Côte d’Ivoire’s waters, in exchange for a financial contribution to the country’s sustainable fisheries sector.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Four decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from: the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committees on the public interface connected to the Internal Market Information System for the declaration of posting of workers; from the EMPL committee on improving and enforcing working conditions of trainees and combating regular employment relationships disguised as traineeships (‘Traineeships Directive’); from the IMCO committee on market availability of measuring instruments: electric vehicle supply equipment, compressed gas dispensers, and electricity, gas and thermal energy meters; and from the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee on incentivising defence-related investments in the EU budget to implement the ReArm Europe Plan were approved without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

When asked how many microcontrollers they have on their desk, most people would only consider the one in their laptop, whereas in fact, a laptop alone contains several. Besides the microprocessor hosting the Control Processing Unit (CPU), which is not a microcontroller properly speaking, microcontrollers govern laptop functions such as communications, drivers, the power supply, touchpad and screen. There may also be another microcontroller (or several) in their smartphone, plus those in their landline phone, watch, earphones, mouse, calendar, thermometer, printer, chargers, external screen – and even in the coffee machine and the desk lamp. Microelectronics technology is everywhere: it includes semiconductors and components, but is far broader than that. It ranges from the control units for cars, planes and drones to small appliances, medical equipment or mobile phones, reaching over US$600 billion in revenue, up by 19.7 % year-on-year, excluding software development for artificial intelligence (AI).

The microelectronics industry is a strategic asset for Europe, which the European Commission ranks as one of the most research and development (R&D) intensive sectors. The sector supports around 200 000 jobs directly and more than 1 000 000 indirect jobs in Europe. However, the EU share in global chip capacity has decreased from 13 % in 2010 to 7‑8 % in 2025. This can be attributed to factors such as growing manufacturing costs – including energy – and low public investment in the required R&D to deploy the complex supply chain and to support initial investment in manufacturing equipment.

The major manufacturers of semiconductor chips are based in the USA (Intel, Micron), Taiwan (TSMC) and South Korea (Samsung, SK Hynix), and most designers (or Fabless semiconductor companies) are also based in the USA (NVIDIA, AMD). Nevertheless, the EU has traditionally been at the forefront of the global semiconductor value chain, holding specific know-how, such as in the production of equipment for manufacturing semiconductors (e.g. ASML in the Netherlands). Furthermore, and although they are decreasing and insufficiently widespread, Europe retains the basic skills for non-advanced everyday (but highly strategic) versions of microelectronics technology.

Potential impacts and developments

Microelectronic components are complete miniaturised circuits composed of standard electronic parts, such as transistors, capacitors, diodes, and resistors, which operate at microscopic scale. These circuits are designed to perform specific functions and, therefore, are closely linked to optimisation in the assembly of new products and devices. Modern versions of technological products rely on microelectronics technology to the extent that no product can compete in the market today without it, which risks excluding the small and medium-sized enterprises that are – and will remain – vital to the EU and usually lack the required skills and resources. This is not always about the newest technologies and the highest levels of integration for big production series, it is also about everyday components in a broad variety of industrial sectors. The competitive advantage of already strong microelectronic players has become overwhelming.

According to the European Semiconductor Industry Association (ESIA), in the EU this sector has a multiplier effect of around 2.5 (meaning that every euro invested in the industry generates an additional €2.5 in economic activity), whereas this same factor is 4.3 in the USA and 3.5 in China. Microelectronics accounts for around 1.4 % to 1.6 % of the EU’s GDP (€230 billion to €250 billion), 2.2 % to 2.5 % of the USA’s GDP (€380 billion to €440 billion) and 2.5 % to 3.0 % of China’s GDP (€390 billion to €480 billion).

Strategic sectors such as the automotive industry, AI, telecommunications and defence are fast evolving to models that are ever more dependent on microelectronics to provide new functionalities, which are becoming key market assets. The European Chips Act entered into force on 21 September 2023, together with the Critical Raw Materials Act; they have become key pillars for EU open strategic autonomy, setting a reliable foundation for a competitive EU.

Anticipatory policymaking

While addressing competitiveness in her 2025 State of the Union speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need to ‘keep up the speed’. The Commission will therefore ‘propose an industrial accelerator act for key strategic sectors and technologies’. Von der Leyen concluded that, ‘when it comes to digital and clean tech’, the EU aims to be ‘faster, smarter and more European’. However, and although she particularly referred to critical raw materials and this was implicit in her speech, she did not specifically mention microelectronics or semiconductors. However, they are fundamental to achieving the proposed goals of a competitive knowledge economy and enhanced defence capacity.

Pillar I of the European Chips Act establishes the chips for Europe initiative, which will support technological capacity building and innovation in the Union by bridging the gap between the Union’s advanced research and innovation capabilities and their industrial (and dual-use) exploitation. Horizon Europe allocates significant funding for R&D in the microelectronics sector, while the Chips Joint Undertaking (Chips JU) aims to support its development. Related technologies such as the internet of things, edge computing and AI benefit from complementary initiatives such as smart anything everywhere (SAE) and the European processor initiative (EPI). The EU is addressing the skills shortage through programmes such as the digital education action plan and the more specific large-scale partnership (LSP) in microelectronics, which promotes specialised training. Additionally, the Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) in microelectronics allows EU Member States to support related projects with State aid, and initiatives such as Eurostack aim to improve the EU’s strategic autonomy.

While the Chips Act is a definite step forward, the strong strategic aspect of this sector requires continued monitoring and sustained action. Policymakers and industry leaders can work together to promote public and private investment and the development of a sustainable business environment suitable for the microelectronics industry, including to support the development of skills, talent, innovation and risk-taking that will bolster European prosperity and security.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the EU ran on microelectronics?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Ukraine compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, Ukraine experienced an economic growth rate of 3.5%, while the EU-27 recorded a growth rate of only 1.1%. Both regions continue to see declining inflation rates. However, increasing exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia reveals a weakening currency, alongside a rise in the country’s public net debt, which has climbed to 89.8%. The EU-27 is Ukraine’s primary trading partner, accounting for 53.6% of its trade share, with Poland being the leading country with trade value €17.8 billion. In 2024, while overall EU exports are on the rise, imports from Ukraine to the EU are experiencing a declining trend.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Ukraine: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data EU trade with Ukraine Main trade partners (2024) Top EU partners (2024) EU exports of goods to Ukraine (2024) EU imports of goods from Ukraine (2024)

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Martin Höflmayr with Falk Vambrie.

The European defence industry is highly fragmented, with limited collaborative investment and procurement, divergent national regulations, and protectionist tendencies that undermine efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness. The Letta report makes the case for a concerted effort to advance towards the development of a ‘Common Market for the Security and Defence Industry’, which focuses on regulatory simplification, pooled procurement, and cross-border industrial integration. While the Draghi report puts its finger on the EU defence sector’s fragmentation, under-investment, and external dependencies, it urges coordinated action to strengthen the industrial base, boost joint innovation, and align national efforts through common policies and incentives. According to the White Paper for European Defence, a truly integrated EU defence market would be among the largest globally, strengthening competitiveness, readiness and industrial scale. It would enable firms from the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to expand across the Union and stimulate cross-border cooperation, mergers and new ventures, increasing the availability of EU-made defence products.

The new Defence Readiness Omnibus aims to remove procedural bottlenecks and facilitate up to €800 billion in defence investment under the Rearm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, combining streamlined procurement rules, simplified intra-EU transfers, and revised financial instruments. Achieving readiness and autonomy requires predictable joint planning, harmonised standards, and public-private coordination. Without genuine market reform, Europe’s rising defence spending risks being absorbed by inefficiencies rather than delivering real capability gains. A functioning common defence market is therefore essential not only for competitiveness, but also for deterrence, resilience and strategic sovereignty in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.

The European Parliament advocates a fully integrated internal market for defence to overcome fragmentation, urging regulatory reform, joint procurement, and cross-border industrial cooperation as essential steps towards greater efficiency, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Building a common market for European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU members of NATO: Composition of defence spending

Written by Maria Niestadt.

As the global race to harness the power of artificial intelligence (AI) accelerates, the European Union has set the objective of becoming a leading AI continent. The adoption of the Artificial Intelligence Act in 2024 was a milestone in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for AI in the EU, but regulation alone cannot make the EU a technological leader. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan, a communication that attempts to look beyond rules and combine regulatory oversight with investment, infrastructure and skills development. It also aims to increase the use of AI in both the private and public sector. The plan illustrates the Commission’s growing attention to competitiveness, moving away from its previous focus on setting usage rules

Despite progress in some areas, the EU is still far from being a global leader in AI, in terms of scale, investment, and uptake of AI. Structural weaknesses such as a fragmented single market, limited private investment, and reliance on foreign cloud and semiconductor technology continue to hinder progress. Stakeholders are divided on the road to follow. While industry representatives call for simplifying regulation to boost innovation, civil society warns against sacrificing democratic safeguards.

The EU’s prospects of becoming an AI continent depend not only on its ability to implement the AI continent action plan but also on its decisiveness in acting on other fronts such as making progress on the Savings and Investments Union, and its progress in reducing reliance on foreign technologies. The European Parliament will play a central role in scrutinising the Commission’s activities and shaping legislation such as the forthcoming Cloud and AI Development Act.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Making Europe an AI continent‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

CONTEXT

On 25 June 2025, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the European Union (EU) (‘the EU space act’). A majority of Member States have already adopted or are considering adopting legislation on space activities. The regulation’s relevance was highlighted by Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, which explained the role of space systems and services in supporting the EU’s sovereignty and economy.

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU (internal market) is the legal basis of the proposed regulation. It aims to create a single market for space activities, grounded on common safety, sustainability and resilience rules, which should apply in principle to any space operator providing space services in the EU. The proposal is expected to lay down rules on: the authorisation, registration and supervision of space activities and services carried out by space service providers; orbit traffic management; and the establishment of an EU space label. On resilience, the proposed regulation is expected to complement Directive (EU)2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the EU, and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities. In the Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which has appointed Elena Donazzan (ECR, Italy) as rapporteur. In the Council, the working party on space has started examining the proposal.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0335(COD) – Proposal for a regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union – COM(2025) 335, 25 June 2025

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0335(COD) EU space law

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.