Agrégateur de flux

As the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) nears its end, the US intelligence community has begun reorganising itself to [...]

Like Taiwan, the South China Sea could spark a U.S.-China war.

Réunis à Chypre dans le cadre d'un sommet informel, les chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'Union européenne ont enfin réussi à valider un prêt de 90 milliards d'euros à Kiev grâce à la levée du veto de la Hongrie, jeudi 23 avril. De son côté, le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky a profité de l'occasion pour remettre la pression sur les Vingt-Sept, réclamant pour son pays « une pleine adhésion » à l'UE. La journée de vendredi doit, quant à elle, être consacrée à la guerre au Moyen-Orient.

The announcement was Washington's latest effort to combat Southeast Asia's multibillion-dollar online scamming industry.

The government of Sanae Takaichi may need to risk its political standing.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The state election results stand to impact border enforcement, trade flows, and water negotiations, as well as political messaging on both sides of the border.

As drones prove decisive in modern warfare, Kazakhstan is working to embed them in its military while slowly making a shift toward domestic production.

Kathmandu's new government was elected to right Nepal’s economic ship. It must now confront an external economic threat.

Frames from White House video. Original video: https://telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2025/10/19/king-trump-bombs-protesters-with-brown-liquid-in-ai-video

By Peter Costantini
SEATTLE. USA, Apr 23 2026 (IPS)

This is the first part of a three-part commentary. Read Part 2: No Kings? Meet King Don and King John – Part 2 of 3,   Part 3 of 3

After Donald Trump’s second election as president in November 2024, he said coyly that he wanted to be a dictator … but just for a day. On his first day in office, his sharpie signed an impressive pile of presidential orders, many of dubious legality. The next day he continued to govern like a DIY duce. He has not stopped since.

He has brought family members, incompetent political boot-lickers, and fellow kleptocrats into what is looking less like an administration and more like the Bling Dynasty, ruled by the Golden Emperor, Donald Khan. He continues to troll his opponents by hinting at a third term, which is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.

A far-flung grassroots opposition coalition has adopted the motto “No Kings”, which has resonated across a wide political spectrum. After all, British subjects began a war of independence 250 years ago to liberate their colonies from the vagaries of the reputedly bipolar King George III of England.

So far, No Kings has held three spirited days of national action, the last of which reportedly attracted some eight million people to thousands of locations across all 50 states. Many demonstrators carried homemade signs taking the piss out of Trump on a great variety of issues. One favorite read, “Sorry world, grandpa’s gone off his meds again”; another, “Fight Truth Decay”. Big inflatables of Trump as a baby in diapers, penguins, frogs, and other fanciful creatures abounded. Also very visible in Seattle-area demonstrations were Vietnam -era military veterans and American flags.

The movement has been broadened by a wide range of other constituencies challenging mass persecution and deportation of immigrants, defending laid-off public employees, trying to reinstate devastating Medicaid (public health insurance) cuts, opposing military intervention abroad and at home, and getting up in Trump’s face on other critical issues.

In response to the October 18th No Kings rallies, Trump posted what looks like an artificial intelligence-generated video on Truth Social, his personal social media platform. It features a cartoonish figure of him wearing a golden crown, flying a jet fighter that drops massive amounts of excrement on demonstrators in city streets below. It’s the kind of dreck that a troubled third grader addicted to AI might come up with if left unsupervised. (Apologies to the many third-graders who are much more mature than that).

Nevertheless, barring some deus ex machina, the world is stuck with Donald Trump for at least three more years. So as he reinvents royalty as reality show, whom could he adopt as a model and inspiration?

Which king?

There have certainly been constitutional monarchs who served their countries honorably in ceremonial and advisory roles. Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands earned widespread respect by supporting the resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II. King Juan Carlos I of Spain played a key role in guiding his country back to democracy in the 1970s after decades under Generalísimo Francisco Franco Bahamonde’s fascist dictatorship.

But this does not seem to be the sort of reign Trumpísimo has in mind.

In a more colonialist and mercantilist vein, there’s always el Rey Fernando II of 15th and 16th Century Spain. With la Reina Isabel, he completed the Reconquista, expelling Jews and Muslims from Al-Andalus (an early foreshadowing of Trump’s Muslim Bans). His reign unleashed the mind-bending tortures of Torquemada and the Holy Inquisition (so much more imaginative than the ham-handed bludgeoning at Trump’s Salvadoran rent-a-gulag). Fernando’s conquistadores plundered the gold (so much sexier than tariffs), demolished the temples, and subjugated the peoples of the ancient civilizations of the Americas with sword and cross. Trump is off to a slow start with his incoherent threats and clumsy aggressions against Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Canada, and Palestine.

For sheer absolutist excess, don’t forget Louis XIV of France. His little country place at Versailles throws shade all over Mar-a-Lago. Whereas Lou could rock a moniker like “le Roi Soleil” (the Sun King), Trump will have to settle for “the Tanning Bed King” or perhaps “the Drill Baby Drill King”. And how about “L’état, c’est moi” (The state is me)? Sorry, but does the Donald have anything punchier than “I’d like you to do me a favor, though”? Or “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters, OK?” (Unfortunately, his supine Supreme Court majority has his back on this one.) Then there’s “I have the right to do anything I want to do. I’m the President.” Sounds like a third-grade class president throwing a tantrum. (Again, apologies to the many third graders who would never behave this boorishly.)

Compared to these historical peers, Trump comes out more mafioso than monarch.

But fear not. British historian Marc Morris has highlighted a promising spiritual forefather for the Trump monarchy.

King John, also known as John Lackland, ruled England from 1199 until his death in 1216. He came to be nicknamed Bad King John for his treachery, lechery, mendacity and cruelty. Morris quotes a contemporary chronicler, Anonymous of Béthune: “He was a very bad man, more cruel than all others. He lusted after beautiful women and because of this he shamed the high men of the land, for which reason he was greatly hated. Whenever he could he told lies rather than the truth … He was brim-full of evil qualities.” Remind you of anyone?

Troubadour Bertran de Born piled on: “No man may ever trust him, for his heart is soft and cowardly.”

“He was a total jerk,” wrote Morris. “He didn’t just kill, he was sadistic. He starved people to death. And not just enemy knights, but once a rival’s wife and son.” In another incident, John locked 22 noble prisoners of war in a castle and left them to die of starvation.

In 1215, the English barons (the most powerful nobles) rebelled against King John and forced him to sign the Magna Carta. This historic accord established a prototype for the rule of law in the English-speaking world. It evolved to apply to kings and paupers, although at the time it was mainly an agreement between the monarchy and the nobility.

“For the first time Magna Carta established publicly the principle that the king was subject to the law,” wrote historian Nick Higham. “It also led indirectly to the development of a new kind of state, in which the money to govern the country came from taxation agreed by parliament.” (Russell Vought take note.)

Article 39 articulated the legal concept of habeas corpus (“you have the body” in Latin), which established freedom from arbitrary detention by the government without just cause. This became a keystone of due process under the law. The Magna Carta also established that the king could levy taxes only with the approval of a council of nobles. This evolved into the first parliament fifty years later.

The Magna Carta was intended to resolve conflicts between the Crown and the barons. But within a few weeks, John disowned it and failed to honor his commitments. The document specified that the remedy for non-compliance was that the nobles could go to war again against the king, which they did. France then invaded England in support of the rebels, and the barons invited the French Prince Louis to assume the throne of England.

When John died of dysentery in 1216, he was widely reviled. Chronicler Matthew Paris wrote an epitaph for the king: “Foul as it is, Hell itself is made fouler by the presence of John.” But after his death, Louis was chased out of England and the Magna Carta was eventually revived again.

As a poster prince for unbridled monarchical power, then, John ended up leaving a mixed legacy from a MAGA point of view. On the downside, Trump might consider him “a loser” because he signed away the unlimited divine right of kings. But on the upside, he rapidly reneged on the Magna Carta and duked it out with the nobles and France until the end.

All told, King John the Bad checked most of the boxes for an early political progenitor of King Don the Con.

The Con?

Did you catch the clever double entendre? The President is a felon, convicted on 34 counts of “fraudulently falsifying business records” by concealing a $130,000 payment of hush money to adult film star Stormy Daniels to influence the 2016 elections. He is also a world-class con artist, snagging a $400 million Boeing 747 as an emolument from Qatar. It will initially serve as Air Force One, but the sweet part is that after he leaves office, the “flying palace” will be housed in the lobby of his presidential library and hotel in Miami.

And let’s not forget that Don was also found liable for sexual assault and defamation in a civil lawsuit. A jury awarded plaintiff E. Jean Carroll a settlement of $83.3 million dollars, of which $65 million was for punitive damages. An appeals court upheld the judgement, finding that: “The record in this case supports the district court’s determination that ‘the degree of reprehensibility’ of Mr. Trump’s conduct was remarkably high, perhaps unprecedented”.

On the policy front, the title of the second Trump administration’s master plan, Project 2025, apparently contained a typo: it should have been called Project 1214. In practice, it has become a blueprint for rolling back human rights, democracy and good government to pre-Magna Carta irrelevance, unleashing the king’s unchecked power, and disemboweling essential government functions.

Clearly, in many domains of regal malfeasance, King Don has already surpassed King John. He has made so many efforts to demonstrate that the rule of law does not apply to him that we can only consider a few of the most egregious here.

His pièce de résistance remains his efforts to declare the 2020 presidential election invalid and to overturn the outcome by a violent coup d’état on January 6, 2021. The details have been replayed endlessly: more than 60 lawsuits in nine states against the election, all thrown out of court as baseless; Trump’s speech spurring on the armed, violent mob; the rioters at the Capitol, equipped with gallows and noose, chanting “Hang Mike Pence” (the Vice President responsible for certifying the count of the electoral results); their violent incursion into the Capitol in an effort to stop the electoral process; a rioter defecating on Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s desk; the killing and maiming of police trying to protect lawmakers. All this took place in front of the entire nation in newscasts and congressional hearings for long afterwards.

Perhaps the most stunning outcome, however, is that Trump, the MAGA movement, and most of the Republican Party have never acknowledged that in 2020 the electorate told the President, “You’re fired.” Instead, he tethered his return to office in 2024 to a dark-matter constellation of lies about the elections. He called J6 “a day of love”, and pardoned some 1,500 convicted members of the most dangerous rabble of terrorists to attack this country since 9/11. He continues to force gutless Republicans to drink the same Kool Aid for many years after his story has been thoroughly discredited.

Don the Con also has doubled down on other debunked lies about the 2020 election, such as widespread electoral corruption and voting by non-citizens. Using these falsehoods, he is pushing to take control of elections and voter rolls away from the states, to whom the Constitution grants these powers, and give them to himself. He is also trying to make voting harder for lower-income and elderly people with ploys like requiring proof of citizenship to vote – such as a birth certificate or passport – which has never before been a requisite.

Trump’s power to negate the rule of law by spawning alternative realities is one that King John might have envied.

Modern communications technologies give Trump the means to corrode our shared understandings that were inconceivable 800 years ago. The President assaults social and news media like a “leaf blower”, as satirist Stephen Colbert put it, deafeningly flooding the zone with simple, mendacious messages. Don will probably not perish from dysentery as John did, but he has infected global political spaces with informational dysentery. His propaganda machine serves as a disinformation sump pump that sucks out poison from MAGA cesspools and inundates physical and virtual public squares.

During Trump’s first term, the Washington Post counted 30,573 false or misleading claims, around 20 per day. In his second term, the pace seems to have picked up.

Veteran White House correspondent Peter Baker wrote a New York Times piece headlined “Trump’s Wild Claims, Conspiracies and Falsehoods Redefine Presidential Bounds”. He observed, “Truth is not always an abundant resource in the White House under any president, but never has the Oval Office been occupied by someone so detached from verifiable facts.”

Anthony Scaramucci, Trump’s former White House communications director, told Baker that Trump has completed “50 years of distorting things and telling lies and … 50 years of getting away with it, so why wouldn’t he make the lies bigger and more impactful in this last stretch?”

In one case, Trump accused the United States Agency for International Development of sending $50 million worth of condoms to the Palestinian organization Hamas. After journalists debunked the original story, Trump continued to repeat it, but increased the alleged total to $100 million.

“What were dubbed ‘alternative facts’ in his first term,” wrote Baker, “have quickly become a whole alternative reality in his second.”

This is the first part of a three-part commentary. Read Part 2: No Kings? Meet King Don and King John – Part 2 of 3,   Part 3 of 3

About the author

 

Meloni sagte, diese Einschätzung bestätige, dass Italiens Vorgehen richtig gewesen sei, und zeige, dass die letzten zwei Jahre durch erzwungene und unbegründete Gerichtsverfahren „verschwendet“ worden seien.

Beekeepers harvest honey from an ABL hive in the Tana Delta, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

By Chemtai Kirui
GOLBANTI, Kenya, Apr 23 2026 (IPS)

Lydia Hagodana stands next to a bee yard (apiary) in Golbanti, Tana Delta, where she lives. The air carries a low, steady hum as bees move in and out in a constant stream. She lifts the back of one hive slightly, gauging its weight.

“This hive is mine,” she says. “I have two.”

Hagodana is one of 25 members of the Golbanti women’s group, which manages about 50 hives shared between them. Each member keeps a pair, harvesting honey a few times a year. Some of the income is kept individually, while a portion is pooled into group savings to support a small communal vegetable farm.

The apiaries sit along the southern banks of the Tana River, where it begins to split into the channels that form the lower delta. In the rainy season, the land opens into floodplains, drawing migratory birds and supporting wildlife, including hippos, crocodiles and the rare Tana River topi.

Lydia Hagodana in the area where she keeps one of her beehives in the Tana Delta, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Patches of gallery forest along the riverbanks are home to two critically endangered primates – the Tana River red colobus and the crested mangabey.

In recent years, beekeeping has offered an alternative source of income in a place where livelihoods have long depended on farming, fishing and livestock. For women in particular, managing hives marks a shift from more physically demanding work and from roles traditionally dominated by men.

Before the bees, these same floodplains were at the centre of proposals for large-scale biofuel plantations – plans that raised concerns about converting wetlands into industrial agriculture.

“This was linked to the European Union policy to blend biofuels with fossil fuels,” said Dr Paul Matiku, executive director of Nature Kenya. “Africa was seen as a place with ‘idle’ land that could be converted to these crops, including jatropha and sugarcane.”

At the time, the Kenyan government framed the projects as part of vision 2030 – a way to bring development and jobs to what officials described as an “empty” region.

Land clearing had begun. In some places, fields were ploughed before indigenous families had gathered their belongings. A wildlife corridor used by elephants and other species was carved into plantation blocks.

Tensions Rose

By 2012, violent clashes had erupted, turning the delta into what investors began calling a “red zone”.

“We woke up to a challenge about where the Tana Delta was going,” said Matiku, who helped lead the legal fight to stop the expansion. “You cannot convert wildlife land and food-producing land into fuel for cars. We had to unleash every bit of machinery we had to stop it.”

A coalition of conservation groups and local communities took the government to court.

In February 2013, Lady Justice Mumbi Ngugi halted the proposed large-scale developments in the delta, ruling that the state had failed to account for the rights of local people.

“The court said no one could move forward without a land-use plan developed with the people,” Matiku said.

Over the next two years, communities, county officials and conservation groups worked together to map the delta – dividing the landscape into zones for grazing, farming and conservation under what became the Tana Delta Land Use Plan (LUP).

For the first time, the delta had a formal set of rules.

But another question followed: could conservation pay?

A group of community members gather outside an African Beekeepers Limited facility in Kenya’s Tana Delta to discuss the business of beekeeping. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

From Idle Land to Natural Economy

With support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), researchers began calculating the economic value of the delta’s ecosystems – reframing them from “idle land” into a functioning natural economy.

The partners approached the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the world’s largest multilateral fund for the environment. In 2018, after a technical review process, the fund approved a USD 3.3m grant for restoration in the Tana Delta under the Restoration Initiative.

The funding aimed to stabilise a landscape long marked by land disputes and failed biofuel schemes. Working with UNEP and Nature Kenya, the program supported consultations, legal drafting, and the work needed to turn the land-use plan into law.

Between 2019 and 2024, the county enacted 29 policies and legislative instruments aimed at regulating land use, conservation and climate action.

“We have moved from loosely coordinated conservation projects to a law-driven governance framework that integrates land use, climate change and community engagement,” said Mathew Babwoya Buya, Tana River county’s environment executive.

Tana River county has set aside at least 2% of its development budget for climate resilience and ecosystem restoration.

For the 2024/25 fiscal year, the county’s total budget is about KSh 8.87 billion (USD 68.76 million). Of that, roughly KSh 3 billion (USD 23 million) is development spending, implying annual allocations of about KSh 60 million (USD 460,000) for restoration programmes.

The commitment helped secure new funding from the GEF, which approved a grant of about USD 3.35 million for the Tana Delta under its Restoration Initiative.

Project documents show the program mobilised roughly USD 36.8 million in co-financing, about eleven dollars for every dollar of GEF funding, a commonly cited measure of leverage in conservation finance.

The Tana Delta project shows what is possible when country ownership is strong and priorities are clearly aligned.

“The Tana Delta project shows what is possible when country ownership is strong and priorities are clearly aligned. This level of leverage reflects deep national commitment, strong engagement from a wide range of stakeholders, and clear links to value chains and local business opportunities. The project’s integrated, landscape-based approach allows it to address multiple challenges at once, making it an attractive platform for partners to invest alongside GEF,” said Ulrich Apel, a senior environmental specialist at the GEF.

The composition of that financing shows that the bulk originates from public agencies and development partners, including multilateral programmes and philanthropic funding. Only about USD 341,000 – less than 1 per cent of the total – is attributable to direct private-sector investment.

Apel explained the figures do not necessarily capture the full extent of commercial activity.

“It is important to understand how co-finance is defined and recorded,” Apel said. “Only capital explicitly committed to a project through formal letters is captured. There can be private sector flows into these value chains that do not show up in the co-financing numbers.”

UNEP officials say the structure is intended to use public funding to reduce land-use risk and attract investment over time.

“The GEF grant was designed to play a catalytic role,” said Nancy Soi, a UNEP official involved in the project.

By funding land-use planning, cooperative structures, and governance systems, she said, the program has helped “derisk” the delta for commercial activity in sectors such as honey, chilli, and aquaculture.

In parallel, other partners are beginning to test that approach in specific value chains.

In aquaculture, the Mastercard Foundation, working with TechnoServe, is supporting a program aimed at about 650 young entrepreneurs in Tana River County.

How that model translates into sustained commercial investment is still being tested on the ground.

In Golbanti, where Hagodana’s hives sit along the riverbanks, one of the emerging value chains is honey production. The work is being developed through a partnership with African Beekeepers Limited (ABL).

Under the model, the company supplies modern hives and technical expertise, manages production, and buys the honey at a fixed price – removing one of the biggest risks in rural markets: price volatility.

Nature Kenya says it has deliberately avoided locking farmers into long-term contracts at this stage, allowing time to assess whether production volumes and pricing can prove viable.

“We managed to pay 76 farmers about KSh700,000 (USD 5,400) from honey harvested in the delta,” said Ernest Simeoni, director of ABL, referring to the project’s first production cycle.

Numbered beehives in a conservation area of Kenya’s Tana Delta. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Not Just Beekeeping, It’s the Business of Beekeeping

Simeoni said the approach differs from many donor-led initiatives, which typically focus on training farmers to manage hives independently.

“There are hundreds of modern hives across Kenya, but they don’t produce honey,” he said. “The missing link is expertise.”

Instead, ABL keeps production under the company’s control, deploying its teams to monitor colonies, harvest honey, and oversee processing.

“We’re not training farmers how to do beekeeping,” he said. “What we’re doing is business – showing how to make money from honey.”

Community groups provide land and security for the hives, while the company manages harvesting and processing. Simeoni said that structure helps maintain consistent production volumes.

Even so, he cautioned that the model remains fragile. Access to affordable finance is limited, and much of the sector still depends on donor-backed projects to absorb early risk.

“If donor funding disappears tomorrow, most of these projects stop,” he said.

Looking beyond small-scale value chains, the county is also trying to attract larger investments through a proposed development plan known as the “Green Heart”.

A 60-hectare site in Minjila has been earmarked for an industrial hub intended to support agroprocessing, logistics and green manufacturing, according to Mwanajuma Hiribae, the Tana River county secretary.

“We are working to establish an investment unit to coordinate engagement with private firms,” she said. Funds have also been allocated to develop a masterplan for the site.

But the project remains at an early stage. The land has yet to be formally transferred to the county’s investment authority, and proposals from potential investors are still under review.

Officials say any future development will need to align with the delta’s land-use plan and environmental safeguards.

For now, however, the flow of private capital to the delta remains limited.

Experiences elsewhere in Kenya suggest the model, while technically replicable, depends heavily on political will, security conditions and sustained public financing – factors that vary widely between regions.

In western Kenya, a similar land-use planning approach has been introduced in Yala Swamp, with mixed results. While Busia county has formally adopted the framework, neighbouring Siaya has yet to approve it, with local officials citing competing political and commercial interests around large-scale agriculture.

“The science is replicable,” said Matiku. “But political interests can slow or block implementation.”

In Golbanti, the idea of a restoration economy is beginning to take shape in small ways.

Beekeepers at the African Beekeepers Limited facility in Kenya’s Tana Delta. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Welcome Income

Income from honey, though modest and still irregular, is starting to filter into daily life.

For Hagodana, it helps pay school fees for her six children, supports a small farm, and contributes to a shared fund used to grow vegetables. Some of the money is spent, some saved, and some reinvested.

She has been keeping bees for two years. Before that, she says, life was harder. Now there is at least something to rely on.

She does not plan to stop. Whether or not outside support continues, she says she will keep the hives and hopes eventually to learn how to process honey into other products.

Back in the apiary, the bees move in and out of the hives in a steady rhythm.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Emmanuel Macron a plaidé jeudi pour que le cessez-le-feu entre le Liban et Israël "soit prolongé", quelques heures avant des négociations entre les deux pays, sous l'égide américaine, à Washington. Il a également demandé qu'elles incluent "tous les pays de la région qui sont pertinents" pour la sécurité du Liban afin d'aboutir à une "paix durable" dans le pays.

Written by Ulrich Jochheim.

Global imbalances have been a major topic in international economic policymaking since at least the 1970s. Although they decreased after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, they have begun to widen again in recent years. As the 2008 crisis demonstrated, the sudden unwinding of current account surpluses and deficits (‘disorderly adjustment’) can have major consequences not only for the countries directly involved but also for many third countries through spillover effects, particularly in financial markets.

Against this background, developments in the Chinese economy have become particularly important for global economic stability: while China played an important stabilising role in overcoming the GFC, its economic model has largely focused on export promotion and, more recently, import substitution. This has led to substantial current account surpluses, both as a percentage of GDP and in nominal terms, given the size of China’s economy.

International organisations have been trying for some time now to convince China’s authorities that the country’s growth model is shifting the burden of adjustment to its trading partners and risks becoming globally unsustainable. Prior to the adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan by the two houses of Parliament (the ‘Two Sessions’) in March 2026, the IMF, in particular, proposed strategies to render China’s economic expansion more sustainable for its partners while reducing the risk of a disorderly adjustment.

However, a more detailed analysis of the new plan suggests a continuation of the current economic policy trajectory. At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the Middle East/Iran seems to have prompted some within China to reconsider priorities, at least in the short term. It remains to be seen, however, whether recent, more accommodating statements by the Chinese side are merely for external consumption, especially in view of the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (currently planned for mid-May 2026).

Read the complete briefing on ‘China’s economic challenge to the world‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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The EU’s tool – branded as a “last resort measure” – is being used for the first time to cut off export of certain high-tech goods to Kyrgyzstan.

L’espace Indo-Pacifique est profondément bouleversé, tant sur le plan économique que diplomatique, par la guerre au Moyen-Orient. Fortement dépendante des routes commerciales et des approvisionnements énergétiques extérieurs, la région fait face à une pression accrue sur ses économies. Cette crise révèle également la complexité des jeux d’alliances dans la région, tiraillés entre intérêts économiques, attachement au respect du droit international et rivalités entre grandes puissances. Elle révèle enfin la perte l’influence américaine dans la région, dont l’implication dans la guerre affecte sa crédibilité auprès de ses partenaires. Dans quelle mesure les économies indopacifiques ont-elles été affectées par la guerre au Moyen-Orient ? Quelles réactions les pays de la région ont-ils adoptées sur le plan diplomatique face à ce conflit ? Enfin, en quoi ces positionnements sont-ils susceptibles de fragiliser l’équilibre des alliances avec les États-Unis dans la région ? Le point avec Marianne Péron-Doise, directrice de recherche à l’IRIS, co-responsable du programme Asie-Pacifique et directrice de l’Observatoire géopolitique de l’Indo-Pacifique.

Dans quelle mesure la guerre au Moyen-Orient a-t-elle affecté les économies des pays asiatiques ? Quelles dispositions ont été prises pour répondre à ce choc exogène ?

Les frappes israélo-américaines sur l’Iran et les ripostes de Téhéran sur Israël et plusieurs pays du Golfe, combinées au blocage du détroit d’Ormuz, se sont traduites par un choc économique exogène important pour les pays de l’ensemble Indo-Pacifique. Les conséquences sociopolitiques de long terme du conflit portent un potentiel de déstabilisation significatif pour de nombreux gouvernements, particulièrement en Asie du Sud-Est et du Sud. Le coût du transport et des denrées alimentaires pèse déjà lourdement sur le quotidien et le bien-être des populations.

On le sait, le détroit d’Ormuz est un point de passage stratégique par lequel transite environ un cinquième de la production mondiale de pétrole, un quart des échanges de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL), et dont dépendent de nombreux pays asiatiques. Le Japon et la Corée du Sud importent plus de 70 % de leur pétrole brut depuis cette région et ont été confrontés à une hausse immédiate des coûts énergétiques, renchérissant la production industrielle et pesant sur la compétitivité des entreprises. L’Inde, également très dépendante des hydrocarbures moyen orientaux a vu son déficit commercial s’aggraver ce qui exerce une forte pression sur la roupie et l’inflation domestique. Dans les pays de l’ASEAN non producteurs (Thaïlande, Philippines), les hausses de prix du carburant ont affecté directement le pouvoir d’achat des ménages et les finances publiques. L’Australie, qui a largement externalisé sa sécurité énergétique et qui est tributaire des voies maritimes internationales, est particulièrement touchée. Les conséquences macroéconomiques immédiates se sont traduites par une accélération de l’inflation importée, le ralentissement de la croissance, la détérioration des balances courantes et la montée de tensions sociales liées à la hausse du coût de la vie.
Les conflits au Moyen Orient impactent également la vaste région Indo-Pacifique via la désorganisation du transport aérien, la hausse du coût du kérosène, et un climat géopolitique anxiogène qui constituent autant de freins à la mobilité et aux échanges régionaux comme aux déplacements internationaux. Des économies très liées au tourisme comme la Thaïlande, l’Indonésie, le Viêtnam ou encore les Maldives subissent une chute des arrivées internationales. Les compagnies aériennes asiatiques font face à une double contrainte : une augmentation des coûts (carburant, assurances) et une baisse de la demande. Les effets économiques sont hétérogènes et se traduisent entre autres par des pertes d’emplois dans les services, l’hôtellerie et la restauration, où le secteur informel (emplois non déclarés et activités ponctuelles) est important et une baisse significative des recettes en devises. Des analystes évoquent un ralentissement de la croissance et les difficultés d’une reprise, même à court terme, semblables aux effets postpandémie enregistrés après le Covid-19 pour certains pays.

Les gouvernements asiatiques ont mis en œuvre plusieurs dispositifs de court et de long termes afin d’atténuer les effets amplificateurs de la flambée des prix. Une première réponse, supposant cependant un minimum de planification, a été la mobilisation des réserves stratégiques : le Japon, la Corée du Sud et l’Inde disposent de stocks qu’ils peuvent libérer temporairement pour lisser les effets des dépenses des carburants et du gaz. Une autre initiative a consisté en des subventions et des aides ciblées pour préserver le pouvoir d’achat comme à Taiwan et en Thaïlande. D’autres économies plus fragiles ont dû recourir à un rationnement strict comme aux Philippines et au Bangladesh. Faute de stock, l’Australie fait face à une pénurie énergétique préoccupante. La situation a relancé les politiques de diversification des approvisionnements afin de réduire la dépendance au Moyen Orient. L’Indonésie et l’Inde se sont rapidement tournées vers la Russie. On note également une accélération de la transition énergétique. Le Japon investit dans l’hydrogène, la Corée du Sud développe les énergies nucléaires et renouvelables, l’Inde accélère son virage vers le solaire et l’éolien domestiques. Quant au secteur touristique, il tente de se réorganiser en s’adaptant à une offre régionale et nationale, notamment en Chine, en Thaïlande ou au Japon.

Quelles réactions la guerre au Moyen-Orient a-t-elle suscité auprès des pays de l’Indo-Pacifique sur le plan diplomatique ?

La guerre au Moyen Orient a provoqué des réactions diplomatiques contrastées de la part des pays de la région. Ceci s’explique par des intérêts géopolitiques divergents, notamment la dépendance énergétique, les alliances stratégiques, le positionnement vis à vis des grandes puissances (Chine, États-Unis) et la volonté de préserver la stabilité régionale et les échanges internationaux.
De façon générale, les réactions diplomatiques se sont révélées prudentes. De nombreux pays ont adopté une attitude attentiste, évitant de prendre parti clairement dans le conflit afin de préserver leurs relations à la fois avec les pays du Moyen Orient et avec leurs alliés occidentaux. L’Inde a appelé à la désescalade et au dialogue, tout en évitant de condamner explicitement certaines parties du conflit. Cette prudence s’explique par ses relations énergétiques avec les pays du Golfe et par sa coopération stratégique avec les États Unis et Israël. Le Sri Lanka entend se tenir à une stricte neutralité. Plusieurs pays de l’ASEAN (Singapour, l’Indonésie, la Malaisie et le Viêtnam) ont insisté sur le respect du droit international et la protection des civils, privilégiant un discours multilatéral et consensuel.

Bien sûr, les positionnements ont été plus ou moins affirmés selon les proximités politico-militaires. Les pays alliés des États Unis dans la région ont généralement exprimé un soutien politique modéré, tout en cherchant à éviter une escalade. Le Japon, qui a toujours privilégié une relation stable avec l’Iran, a largement insisté sur la nécessité de protéger les routes maritimes commerciales et énergétiques, vitales pour son économie. La Corée du Sud s’est alignée sur les appels à la sécurité régionale, mais sans engagement direct, afin de rester concentrée sur la menace nord coréenne. Séoul a notamment vu avec crainte Washington prélever certains équipements de défense antimissiles sur son territoire pour les déployer au Moyen-Orient. Ni Tokyo ni Séoul n’ont d’ailleurs répondu à l’appel de Donald Trump à participer à une opération navale de sécurisation du détroit d’Ormuz. Le Pakistan tire habilement son épingle du jeu en s’imposant comme un médiateur entre l’Iran et les États-Unis. Il renforce ainsi son rôle de garant de la sécurité des monarchies du Golfe (déploiement de troupes au Qatar, mise en place de F16 en Arabie saoudite) avec lesquelles il entretient de nombreuses coopérations de défense. Quant à l’Inde, qui vient de signer un partenariat stratégique spécial avec Israël lors de la visite de Narendra Modi à Tel-Aviv en février 2026, elle reste silencieuse, prise au piège de sa politique de multi-alignement.

Sans surprise, la Chine a dénoncé l’instabilité provoquée par les initiatives militaires américaines et s’est présentée comme un acteur diplomatique alternatif, appelant à des solutions politiques. Pékin cherche ainsi à renforcer son image de puissance médiatrice et à consolider ses relations avec les pays du monde arabe. Cette posture n’est pas sans ambiguïté. Partenaire de l’Iran au sein de l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai que Téhéran a rejoint en 2021, la Chine a régulièrement participé à des manœuvres navales conjointes avec les marines russe et iranienne dans l’océan Indien depuis 2022, participant ainsi au renforcement des capacités de cette dernière.

En tout état de cause, la sécurité des approvisionnements énergétiques et des routes maritimes a fortement influencé les réactions diplomatiques. Plusieurs pays asiatiques, comme la Corée du Sud et le Pakistan, ont renforcé leur coopération diplomatique et sécuritaire avec les États du Golfe. Ils ont également soutenu les initiatives, dont celles de l’Organisation maritime internationale, visant à garantir la liberté de navigation et la sécurité des flux commerciaux internationaux. De fait, la guerre au Moyen Orient pousse les pays asiatiques à adopter une diplomatie économique, centrée sur la stabilité plutôt que sur des considérations idéologiques ou normatives.

L’attaque contre le Venezuela, les crises du Proche-Orient et les frappes israélo-américaines sur l’Iran s’inscrivent dans une dynamique plus large de diplomatie transactionnelle et d’un durcissement de la politique étrangère conduit par un Donald Trump sans retenue. Dans quelle mesure ce positionnement est-il susceptible de fragiliser les alliances et les partenariats stratégiques des États-Unis ?

La dimension conflictuelle de la diplomatie américaine actuelle illustre un retour assumé à une politique de hard power avec un Donald Trump s’exprimant et agissant avant tout comme un « commander in Chief ». Cette ligne belliqueuse tous azimuts, présentée comme la défense de la primauté de l’intérêt national américain immédiat, America First, ne peut que fragiliser la confiance stratégique des alliés traditionnels de l’Indo-Pacifique, région pourtant au cœur de la rivalité systémique entre la Chine et les États-Unis. Confrontés à l’interventionnisme grandissant de la politique étrangère américaine, le Japon, la Corée du Sud et l’Australie se sont sentis marginalisés. Les frappes contre l’Iran ont été décidées sans consultation approfondie avec eux, alors même qu’elles ont des effets directs sur leur sécurité énergétique et économique. Le Japon a exprimé ses préoccupations quant à l’absence de coordination stratégique, tout en soutenant formellement l’alliance avec Washington. La Corée du Sud redoute que l’engagement militaire américain au Moyen-Orient ne détourne des ressources essentielles de la péninsule coréenne, face à la menace nord coréenne. Taïwan s’inquiète de la poursuite des livraisons d’armements américaines à son bénéfice.

Cette situation fragilise les principes fondamentaux de l’alliance : la prévisibilité et la fiabilité du protecteur américain. Sous la nouvelle présidence de Donald Trump, les alliances sont de plus en plus perçues comme des relations conditionnelles, dépendantes des contributions financières ou de l’alignement politique des partenaires. Le discours américain sur le « partage du fardeau » (burden sharing) inquiète fortement Tokyo, Séoul, Manille et Canberra, qui redoutent une protection et un soutien variables selon les priorités de Washington. L’éventuelle réduction ou le redéploiement d’actifs militaires américains vers le Moyen-Orient a ravivé la crainte d’un désengagement progressif de l’Indo-Pacifique.

Cela alimente une logique de doute stratégique chez certains alliés, les incitant à diversifier leurs partenariats et à s’engager davantage dans un processus d’autonomisation stratégique via la hausse conséquente des budgets de défense et des programmes d’acquisitions d’armements. Le Japon renforce ses coopérations avec l’Australie, les États européens (Royaume-Uni, France), l’OTAN tout en accélérant sa montée en puissance militaire. Des débats sur le tabou de l’acquisition de capacités nucléaires militaires se font jour en Corée du Sud. Les pays de l’ASEAN, traditionnellement non alignés, redoublent de prudence et évitent de s’associer ouvertement aux actions américaines au Moyen Orient, privilégiant le dialogue et le multilatéralisme.

On soulignera que ce durcissement américain crée également des opportunités géopolitiques pour Pékin, qui se présente comme une puissance plus prévisible et favorable à la stabilité. La Chine a condamné les frappes israélo-américaines tout en appelant à une solution politique, renforçant son image de médiateur responsable, notamment auprès des pays du Sud global. Certains États asiatiques, sans rompre avec Washington, adoptent une posture d’équilibrage stratégique (hedging) entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Ce qui à terme affaiblit la capacité des États Unis à fédérer un front asiatique uni contre Pékin.

Malgré ces tensions, il serait excessif de parler d’une remise en cause des alliances asiatiques des États-Unis que ce soit par Washington ou ses partenaires. Les garanties de sécurité américaines restent indispensables face au front mouvant que présentent la Chine, la Corée du Nord et la Russie. Les grandes manœuvres et exercices d’entrainements conjoints comme Balikatan, Cobra Gold en Asie du Sud-Est ou Ulchi Freedom Shield en Asie du Nord menés sous l’égide américaine se poursuivent avec la même ampleur. Les forums et dialogues de sécurité dont ceux organisés autour de l’ASEAN et des cadres de coopération comme le Quad, rassemblant les États-Unis, le Japon, l’Inde et l’Australie, continuent d’exister, bien que sur un mode plus pragmatique. Toutefois, la guerre au Moyen-Orient agit comme un révélateur des limites du leadership américain et accélère une évolution vers des partenariats et des formats plus transactionnels, moins idéologiques et plus conditionnels. À terme, la principale menace pour Washington n’est donc pas la fin des alliances, mais leur érosion normative et leur désenchantement stratégique.

L’article L’Indo-Pacifique face à la guerre au Moyen-Orient : entre inquiétude et résignation est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

La présence chinoise et son influence dans la région caraïbe ne datent pas des évolutions géopolitiques récentes, mais s’inscrivent dans un processus continu depuis le XIXe siècle. Tout d’abord l’abolition de l’esclavage a conduit entre 1853 et 1866 à chercher une main-d’œuvre de substitution qui a essaimé dans tous l’espace caribéen à partir de Trinité-et-Tobago, de la Jamaïque, de Cuba et du Guyana, de travailleurs sous contrat. Il en a résulté la création de communautés sino-caraïbéennes structurées, souvent commerçantes. Ces communautés contribuent encore aujourd’hui à la diplomatie d’influence chinoise.

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L’article La Chine dans la Caraïbe : enjeux, risques ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.