Agrégateur de flux

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

Summary: The UK's Royal Navy faces challenges with its Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, which have encountered a series of setbacks including mechanical failures and operational limitations. Recently, HMS Queen Elizabeth experienced a minor fire while docked in Scotland, although damage was minimal and no one was hurt. Despite their combined cost of £7 billion, questions arise regarding their defense capabilities and operational independence, as the Royal Navy struggles with logistical support and an unclear mission for these carriers. Issues with HMS Prince of Wales, such as engine room leaks and mechanical breakdowns, underscore concerns about the reliability and effectiveness of these ships amid broader concerns about the UK's military readiness.

UK's Aircraft Carrier Woes: The Troubled Journey of HMS Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales

Much has been written about the Russian Navy's cursed aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov – but the UK's Royal Navy's flattops are proving to be nearly as problem-plagued. The $3.7 billion flagship HMS Queen Elizabeth­, which has already been sidelined due to an issue with her starboard propeller shaft, caught fire over the weekend while docked for repairs at Glen Mallan on Loch Long in Scotland.

The damage was reported to be minimal and there were no fatalities or injuries, while no ordnance was involved in the incident.

"A minor, isolated fire on HMS Queen Elizabeth was quickly brought under control and extinguished," a Royal Navy spokesperson told the UK Defence Journal.

Expensive Aircraft Carrier Mistakes for Royal Navy?

The Royal Navy's two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers were approved in 2007 by then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown. HMS Prince of Wales was almost canceled and scrapped even before it set sail due to concerns over funding, yet, it was determined that axing it would be more expensive than completing it.

HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Queen Elizabeth cost a combined £7 billion, but it is widely accepted the Royal Navy remains unable to adequately defend or operate them independently. The UK's senior service has just one solid stores ship, RFA Fort Victoria, to support the carriers and she is due to be retired in 2028.

As a result, the mission of the Royal Navy's carriers isn't exactly clear – a point made by Tom Sharpe of the UK's Telegraph newspaper, who offered this commentary:

"Our carriers are a great capability but even when they are fully formed, in some faraway time when we have a full complement of UK jets and other aircraft to put on them, they will never rival a US Carrier Strike Group for the breadth of capability and firepower. This doesn't mean they aren’t capable but they aren't as capable as that."

Sharpe further suggested that the Royal Navy's carriers are nowhere near being fully formed and equipped, warning there are gaping holes in the ships' airborne early warning, air-to-air refueling, and solid stores support – which includes food, jet parts, ammunition and ordnance, as well as other goods.

Problems Continue

Though the fire on HMS Queen Elizabeth was minor – and shipboard fires aren't exactly uncommon – it served as a reminder of the problems with the Royal Navy's two carriers.

HMS Prince of Wales languished in a Scottish dockyard – the same one where HMS Queen Elizabeth is headed – after it broke down off the Isle of Wight in August 2022. Since her commissioning in 2019, HMS Prince of Wales has been laid up almost as much time as she's been at sea.

The carrier's problems have been serious and ongoing, putting into question her reliability. The issues began in early 2020, when the carrier suffered a leak in the engine room, followed by the collapse of an accommodation block.

The recent sidelining of the Royal Navy's flagship also comes as UK ministers have warned that the nation isn't sufficiently prepared to fight an all-out war amid stockpile shortages and an armed forces recruitment crisis. The Royal Navy once ruled the waves, now it can barely keep its carriers operational.

Perhaps that is why some in the British government may seek to cut the losses and sell off one of the carriers. The question is who would want to actually buy one?

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary: The U.S. Navy's Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, set to replace the Ohio-class, face delays due to supplier issues, pushing the delivery of the lead vessel, USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826), to Fiscal Year 2028. Challenges include delays in the construction of the bow module at Huntington Ingalls Industries in Virginia and steam turbines by Northrop Grumman. The program, crucial for the U.S. strategic deterrent mission, is one of the Pentagon's most expensive, with an estimated total lifecycle cost of $347 billion. These submarines, the largest ever built by the U.S., feature advanced technology and a life-of-ship reactor.

Behind Schedule: Challenges Rock the Columbia-Class Submarine Program

The United States Navy's future Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines – which are set to replace the aging Ohio-class boats – could arrive later than expected according to reports that circulated late Monday. According to the Capitol Forum, the U.S. Navy is now forecasting at least a year-long delay to the acquisition program due to supplier problems.

USNI News further reported that the lead boat of the program is facing a delay due to supplier issues, and as a result, the future USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826) could be delivered in Fiscal year 2028 (FY28) instead of the previously planned FY27 delivery.

The largest hurdle is the lead boat's bow module, which is now under construction at Huntington Ingall Industry's Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia and is far behind schedule. Moreover, the entire program is further facing delays from the steam turbines that Northrop Grumman is building for the U.S. Navy.

HII has been late in delivering other sections of the boat, which has delayed the timeline for the construction of SSBN-826.

"We're seeing stress across the industrial base and again I think putting this in the context of the Secretary's 45-day review will add additional depth and context to the challenges that we’re seeing across the shipbuilding portfolio and we expect to have that done fairly soon," Under Secretary Erik Raven told USNI News following the U.S. Navy's Fiscal Year 2025 budget briefing on Monday.

Replacing the Ohio-class

Originally known as the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) or SSBN(X), until 2016, it called for replacing the Ohio-class subs with the new Columbia -class SSBNs beginning in the early 2030s.

The program's goal is to build a dozen of the new nuclear-powered submarines, and those boats will continue to support the U.S. strategic deterrent mission.

However, the program now appears to be running behind schedule, and the U.S. Navy may be forced to keep the Ohio-class subs in service longer than expected. The original plan called for the first of the SSBNs to be retired beginning in 2027, with an additional boat leaving the service every year until 2040. The Navy has already determined it would be possible to extend the service life of at least five of its Ohio-class subs by two to three years each so that the force would remain at 12 vessels or more for all but three years between 2024 and 2053.

Expensive Program

Even before the delays were announced – which could raise the price tag – the Columbia -class SSBNs were on track to be one of the most expensive Pentagon programs. It was previously reported that the U.S. Navy would spend around $132 billion for the procurement of the dozen submarines, while the total lifecycle cost for the entire class is estimated at $347 billion.

That figure includes all projected costs to develop, buy, and operate the 12 submarines through 2042.

In its Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19) request, Navy officials asked for $3.7 billion for the Columbia-class program – a 97% increase over 2018, making it the second-most expensive program in the 2019 Pentagon budget request, next to the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is operated by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.

Last October, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) warned that the program risks running at least 20% over, or about $20 billion, due to potential delays.

Large and In Charge

The new SSBNs will be the largest submarines ever built by the United States. Each of the planned dozen boats will be 560 feet in length and have a beam of 43 feet.

The Columbia-class will be equipped with sixteen SLBM tubes, as opposed to twenty-four SLBM tubes on Ohio-class SSBNs. That will also reduce construction, operations, and maintenance costs. In addition, the new boats will utilize the joint American-British developed Common Missile Compartment (CMC), which will also be installed on the Royal Navy's new Dreadnought-class submarines. It was designed to launch the Trident II D5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The joint effort has been reported to save each nation hundreds of millions of dollars.

The new submarines will be longer, heavier, and feature a complex electric drive propulsion system and associated technology.

Unlike the preceding Ohio-class, the new ballistic missile submarines are being constructed with a life-of-ship reactor, which will result in a shorter mid-life maintenance period, and each was designed to serve a 42-year service life.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The Montana-class battleships, planned but never built, represent a bygone era of naval power. With their formidable armament and heavy armor, some suggest bringing them back or such an idea for such a warship amidst concerns over anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats posed by nations like China. However, the efficacy of such behemoths in modern warfare is questioned. A2/AD capabilities, exemplified by China, pose significant risks to surface warships, rendering even the mighty battleships vulnerable. The escalating use of drones in conflicts like the Ukraine War further underscores the challenges faced by large surface vessels. Despite their historical allure, the Montana-class battleships may remain impractical in today's contested maritime domains.

Montana-class Battleships: Reviving an Old Concept in Modern Warfare

During the Second World War, the United States Navy possessed a fleet which had some of the world’s most powerful and most sophisticated (for their time) battleships in the world. These were known as the Iowa-class battleship—and they served the United States on-and-off from the 1940s until 1992, when the last battleship was decommissioned. Today, there are still calls to bring these warships, which are currently museums, back into service. But the US Navy was designing an even larger, more powerful, and sophisticated battleship to succeed the Iowa-class. 

That was the Montana-class battleship. 

While these glorious battlewagons were never built due to the fact that by 1943, it was obvious to most naval planners that the aircraft carrier had displaced the battleship as the Navy’s premier weapon in its arsenal of power projection. 

The Montana-class was Almost Built

For almost 80 years, the carrier has ruled the high seas as the US Navy’s primary capital ship. Yet, America’s enemies have not sad idly by, watching the Americans sail the seven seas aboard their floating airbases. American rivals have judiciously devised strategies for negating the potency of America’s aircraft carrier fleet. This has become known as “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD). 

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are all in possession of advanced A2/AD capabilities (notably China). These systems threaten the very existence of any US surface warship—especially America’s massive and expensive aircraft carriers—that gets within range of these weapons. 

The Navy knows that its warships are vulnerable. 

Chinese A2/AD Threatens Safety of US Navy Warships

No matter how great the ship’s onboard defensive systems are, China’s A2/AD swarms are designed to overwhelm those defenses. They don’t need to sink the US warships. They just need to disable them to such a point that they become wasting assets in a fight. 

Some analysts are looking for ways to retain power projection in a contested, A2/AD environment. This brings us back to those calling for the recommissioning of the four remaining Iowa-class battleships. But what if the US Navy looked to building (and updating) its old design concepts for the Montana-class battleship? 

After all, the Montana-class was originally designed to have 12, powerful 16-inch guns and even heavier armor than what the Iowa-class battleships had. The Navy had more plans to add truly potent 18-inch guns that could fire shells weighing over 2,000 pounds at enemy targets. Coming in at 64,000 tons, the Montana-class battleships would have been the biggest battleships in the US fleet if they’d been commissioned.

Eighteen-inch armor and massive guns sounds pretty good in the age of A2/AD defenses. The Montana-class battleships could take—and dish out—a serious pounding. The only problem is that, even if they were upgraded with modern weapons and equipment, the Montana-class battleship would be out of its proper time. 

Contested Domains Today

Because the problem facing surface warships today is not that some are more capable of fighting—and surviving—in the contested battlespaces of A2/AD-wielding powers than others. The real issue is that the swarming capabilities of A2/AD means that no surface warship can really survive a protracted engagement with these systems.

Modern warfare among near-peer rivals is going to be fought increasingly at greater distances from previous wars. That’s not to say the surface ships are obsolete. But until the A2/AD threats to them are neutralized, they are wasting assets, whether it be America’s current fleet of expensive and large aircraft carriers or the possibly resurrected Montana-class battleship. 

Further, another reason opted to not follow through on its plans to build these battleships was because of the cost involved in maintaining them. They were fuel guzzlers and required much maintenance. 

These systems, therefore, would not be helpful today.

Beyond that, large surface warships are already being shown to be increasingly ineffective. The Ukraine War, which has entered its second grueling year, has demonstrated how surface warships are poorly defended from sophisticated drone attacks. The Russian Black Sea flagship, the Slava-class battlecruiser, the Moskva, was sent to the bottom of the Black Sea by the Ukrainian drones. Similar attacks have been conducted against other Russian surface ships in the Black Sea. 

Learning from the Russian Example

The point is that the mighty Russian battlecruisers cannot hold up against the kinds of systems being referred to in this piece. While American warships are more advanced and their crews better trained than the Russians, it does not negate the fact that US warships operating within an A2/AD “bubble” will likely suffer a similar fate as did the Moskva. 

Sure, a modern variant of the proposed Montana-class battleship might be able to operate in a contested environment—and even open it up—because of its added armor and larger weapons platform. Ultimately, however, the law of numbers will sink those warships as readily as US aircraft carriers will likely be damaged or destroyed by Chinese A2/AD systems.

The Montana-class should stay on the drawing board. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck hat heute das europaweit erste Gebotsverfahren für sogenannte Klimaschutzverträge eröffnet. Die Verträge sollen Anreize setzen, in klimafreundliche Industrien zu investieren. Dazu eine Stellungnahme von Karsten Neuhoff, Leiter der Abteilung Klimapolitik im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Start der Klimaschutzverträge war längst überfällig. Energieintensive Unternehmen in der Stahl-, Zement-, Papier- oder Glasherstellung können den Umstieg auf klimaneutrale Produktionsprozesse nicht aus der Portokasse bezahlen. Ihre Margen sind gering und Unsicherheiten mit Blick auf CO2-neutrale Technologien groß. Die Schwerindustrie steht am Scheideweg: Klimaneutrale Optionen sind noch riskant, aber Investitionen in fossile Technologien auch nicht mehr wirtschaftlich. Klimaschutzverträge sichern jetzt CO2- und Energiepreisrisiken ab und ermöglichen so Investitionen in die grüne Transformation. Sie sind ein modernes Regulierungsinstrument auf dem Weg zur CO2-Neutralität – basierend auf langjähriger Forschung und umgesetzt vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz im intensiven Austausch mit Industrie und europäischen Partner*innen. Damit stellen Klimaschutzverträge einen fairen Deal zwischen Staat und Industrie und damit auch für die Gesellschaft dar.

(B2) C'est une véritable attaque en règle à laquelle ont du faire face samedi (9 mars) les navires des deux coalitions, américaine et européenne, présents en mer Rouge et Golfe d'Aden

En l'espace de quelques heures, entre 4h et 8h30 (local), les navires de guerre et des avions américains et britanniques ont intercepté et abattu 28 drones kamikazes lancés depuis les zones contrôlées par les Houthis du Yémen vers la mer Rouge et le golfe d'Aden, selon une source militaire. Le navire britannique HMS Richmond a ainsi abattu deux drones à l'aide de missiles Sea Ceptor. « La première fois que ce type d'armes est utilisé par un navire britannique au combat » signale le ministère britannique de la Défense.

Quatre drones abattus par une frégate française

Action identique de la frégate française FS Alsace, qui participe à l'opération européenne ASPIDES qui a abattu dans le même temps quatre drones kamikazes. La frégate « qui patrouillait dans le golfe d’Aden a détecté quatre drones de combat progressant vers elle en vol tactique » indique un communiqué du ministère français des Armées. « Ces drones ont été détruits en légitime défense par la frégate et des chasseurs français. » Jeudi (7 mars), déjà un destroyer américain avait abattu trois drones dans le Golfe d'Aden.

Deux autres attaques échouent

Les navires marchands continuent d'être visés. Deux missiles anti-navire ont visé vendredi (8 mars), en milieu d'après-midi (16h14 locales) un navire marchand alors qu'il se trouvait à 50 nautiques au sud-sud-est d'Aden (12°04 Nord et 045°23 Est). Le navire a signalé deux explosions à 200 mètres du tribord du navire. Sans faire de dégâts apparemment. L'équipage est sain et sauf.

Lundi (11 mars), entre 8h50 et 12h50, c'est un navire marchand singapourien, le MV Pinocchio, battant pavillon libérien, qui a été visé. Toujours avec la même technique. Les deux missiles balistiques antinavires tirés par les Houthis « n’ont pas touché le navire et aucun blessé ni dommage n’a été signalé » indique le commandement US CentCom.

Commentaire : des Houthis toujours déterminés et menaçants

La présence militaire comme les frappes menées essentiellement par les Américains sur le sol du Yémen ne semblent en rien avoir ralenti le rythme d'action des rebelles yéménites. Sans doute réapprovisionnés en missiles anti-navires, les attaques des Houthis ne cessent guère. Ce malgré la présence des navires de guerre, des coalitions américano-britannique et européenne. Au contraire. On pourrait même dire qu'un palier, dans l'escalade a été franchi, avec les premiers morts faits parmi un équipage de la marine marchande, la semaine dernière. Lire : [Actualité] Premier tir mortel des Houthis dans le golfe d'Aden. Un navire gravement atteint (v2). Il va sans doute falloir changer de tactique, au moins au plan politique, et négocier...

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

"Violence is the other face of sincerity" and other such aphorisms: the staff of Tracfin, the French finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit, can no longer receive messages of this kind, as set out in the inspection report that officially led

Among the first appointments in the new Pakistani government on 4 March was that of Lieutenant General Muhammad Chiragh Haider

On 13 March, the French National Assembly's Law Committee will examine the draft law "aimed at preventing foreign interference in

Beijing's foreign policy ideologue Yang Jiemian is drawing the contours of the country's new diplomacy, following the path set by

Having signed a contract on 28 February running until the end of the year with US law firm Brown Rudnick,

Jacek Strzelczyk's Polish company SATIM is to take part in Poland's radar constellation project after its Satrec artificial intelligence (AI)

Summary: Since World War II, the US has avoided direct conflict with major powers but engaged with lesser foes. However, as adversaries like China advance their military capabilities, the invincibility of American aircraft carriers is questioned. China's technological advancements pose a significant threat to these carriers, raising concerns about their vulnerability in a potential conflict. The geographic deployment of carriers may now depend on public sentiment and perceived conflict significance. 

Rethinking US Aircraft Carriers: Vulnerabilities in Great Power Competition

Wisely, the United States has avoided direct conflict with great and middle powers since the conclusion of World War II. The US has, however, during the same period, engaged consistently with less formidable foes, i.e., North Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, the Taliban. The result has been a public and a military leadership inoculated against the hardships and horrors of great power conflict.

Simultaneously, the US has stockpiled the world’s largest fleet of advanced aircraft carriers. Costing many billions of dollars per unit and taking years to construct, the supercarrier has become a symbol of American global dominance and a practical tool for expanding American air power.

But as America built their supercarriers, and avoided conflict with great and middle powers, the subconscious notion of carrier invincibility took place.

The United States has never lost a modern aircraft carrier. Yet, lately, as adversaries (especially China) develop and stockpile weaponry capable of harming US carriers, observers are being forced to reconsider the aircraft carrier’s vulnerability, and relatedly, the aircraft carrier’s deployability.

Understanding the risk to aircraft carriers

An aircraft carrier is a remarkable machine. Running on nuclear power, capable of operating indefinitely, with upwards of 5,000 sailors and 100 aircraft aboard, the aircraft carrier is a modern city and a floating airbase – a key to the international projection of American power.

But, the aircraft is still just a boat with a hull, screws, bow, and stern. And boats, as the designers of the Bismarck or the RMS Titanic could tell you, are sinkable – mainly when targeted with weaponry designed specifically to sink boats.

America’s adversaries, most especially China, has developed technology that is increasingly likely to sink an American aircraft carrier. Xi has overseen one of world history’s most ambitious shipbuilding sprees, under which the Chinese Navy has expanded to include various attack submarines and surface vessels that could potentially harm a US carrier.

China is also expanding its own carrier fleet, which could launch aircraft capable of targeting an American carrier, in the sort of carrier-on-carrier conflict that the US hasn’t experienced since the Pacific Theater of World War II.

And the aircraft that China would launch from that aircraft is increasingly sophisticated, increasingly capable of slipping past defensive lines and landing a blow.

More concerning still, China has stockpiled intermediate-range missiles (which until recently, the US was treaty banned from possessing) and developed hypersonic missiles (which the US cannot yet reproduce or defend against). Either China’s intermediate or hypersonic missile arsenal could be used to target an American carrier with lethal results.

The point is: US carriers would likely be vulnerable in a direct conflict with a great power, i.e., China.

Are US aircraft carriers only deployable to relatively safe regions?

The US has spent several decades deploying their aircraft carriers worldwide, without much concern for the vessel’s safety. Now, however, an aircraft carrier’s safety may be geographically determined.

Would the US deploy their carriers to a region where the carrier is at heightened risk? That would likely depend on public sentiment and on the nature of the conflict.

If the US public is committed to the conflict, as they were during World War II; if the conflict is perceived and approached as if it were existential, then yes, the US would likely deploy their aircraft carriers without reservation for the prospective loss of fiscal treasure, military hardware, or human life.

But if the US public is not fully invested, if the population is divided, or apathetic, or skeptical, (as in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan) then American war planners would be less likely to risk the sinking of an aircraft carrier.

And if the public is not fully supportive of a conflict, the US may want to reevaluate the necessity of participating in the conflict.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

Summary: The US Air Force is shifting its procurement strategy, opting for fewer F-15EX and F-35 aircraft in fiscal year 2025. With a $217.5 billion budget request, the focus is on modernization, readiness, and addressing evolving threats. Secretary of the Air Force, Frank Kendall, stresses the importance of competitive funding amidst global shifts. Core functions remain air superiority, global strike, and space operations. The proposal allocates funds for Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) and space capabilities. Additionally, efforts to combat inflation include improving quality of life and retaining skilled personnel. Despite fewer new jets, the Air Force aims to sustain its operational effectiveness.

Here Comes NGAD, Less Spending on F-15EX Eagle II and F-35 

The United States Air Force is now opting to do more with less, as it was announced on Monday that it will seek to acquire fewer Boeing F-15EX Eagle II and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II aircraft in fiscal year 2025 (FY25). The Department of the Air Force unveiled a $217.5 billion budget request, which put a greater focus on modernizing the Air Force and Space Force while maintaining readiness to respond to current threats, and addressing key capability gaps while investing to manage risks that are increasing with time.

The $217.5 billion proposal that Congress will now consider for fiscal year 2025 includes $188.1 billion for the Air Force and $29.4 billion for the Space Force. If enacted into law, the Department of the Air Force's overall budget would grow by 1.1 percent, $2.4 billion, from last fiscal year's budget.

"I think that 2025, while difficult, is at a level that I think we can accept, and it will still allow us to make progress on the modernization we need," said Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall, who further stressed the importance of adequately funding the military for competitiveness in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

The FY 2025 budget was built for each service's unique mission, the department further suggested.

"The Air Force's core functions remain unchanged: air superiority, global strike, rapid global mobility, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance," added Kristyn Jones, performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. "The Space Force's efforts reflect the indispensable support that underpins all other joint operations and its continued transformation into a warfighting service to secure our interests in, from and to space."

What The U.S. Air Force Budget Request Includes

According to the newly released budget proposal, the service would receive a $14.9 billion investment to enhance competitive capabilities and maintain air domain lethality, along with $24.9 billion to ensure unmatched ability to deliver global strikes around the world. A further $29.4 billion would be spent towards readiness while continuing to make maximum possible investment in modernization, with $4.7 billion to proliferate a multi-orbit missile warning architecture to counter near-peer threats.

The budget would also direct $3.4 billion towards the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Family of Systems to augment current and future platforms in highly contested environments. The NGAD program includes the Air Force's efforts to develop a manned sixth-generation air superiority fighter that would replace the aging F-22 Raptor. In addition, it calls for an unmanned component of so-called loyal wingmen to operate alongside the manned fighter.

In addition, $538 million for Agile Combat Employment was earmarked to build the right mix of capabilities to defend against current and future threats, while $6.2 billion would be spent towards commercial space launches and resilient space data network to deliver capabilities to the Joint Force in, from and to Space. The budget calls for $4.4 billion in funds for integrating satellite communications to increase space superiority by connecting and supporting our allies and partners.

Fighting Inflation

The Department of the Air Force also acknowledged the practicalities of economic factors, and the FY25 budget proposal accommodates inflation and rising fuel costs, and for quality of life and retention of personnel.

This includes $42.9 billion to improve quality of life for Airmen and Guardians including a 4.5 percent pay raise, along with $1.1 billion for bonus and retention programs for 118,000 critically skilled positions.

The United States Air Force continues to struggle to meet recruiting goals and faces an ongoing shortage of pilots, and as a result, has increasingly offered bonuses to trained pilots to extend their service. In December, the latest retention incentives would pay pilots between $15,000 to $50,000 per year to commit to three- to 12-year contracts – up to $600,000 in total.

Fewer New Jets Like F-15EX and F-35

The biggest takeaway from the newly released budget proposal is that the United States Air Force could receive fewer new jets – notably the aforementioned F-15EX and F-35.

As Defense News reported, the service plans to buy 42 Lockheed Martin-made F-35As for $5.9 billion and 18 Boeing F-15EXs for $1.8 billion next year. That would be a reduction from the 48 and 24 fighters, respectively, the service originally expected to buy.

The Air Force had previously announced that it would cease acquiring additional F-15EXs after 2025 concludes, which will cap the entire fleet of Eagle IIs at 98 ­ six fewer than the 104 the service had been planning to buy. However, the Air Force's expected total purchase of 1,763 F-35As remains unchanged.

The F-15EX is a modernized variant of the F-15Eagle, which first entered service in 1979.

The Air Force also called for the culling of its current fleet by 250 aircraft in 2025, including 56 A-10 Warthogs, 65 older F-15 C and D Eagle fighters, 26 F-15E Strike Eagles with less-capable engines, 11 F-16 Fighting Falcons, and 32 Block 20 F-22A Raptors the service said would be prohibitively expensive to ready for combat.

Air Force officials have suggested that those retirements, if approved, would save the service more than $2 billion in fiscal 2025. However, they may face a fight from lawmakers in Washington, who have previously forced the service to retain its aging fighters.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: U.S. Air Force. 

Despite the dramatic headlines, the leaked Russian military documents that discuss the conditions (including a Chinese invasion scenario) a beleaguered Moscow might resort to using nuclear armaments is not surprising. Nor should anyone be puzzled as to why the Russian military has contingency plans to cope with a possible Chinese invasion.

After all, one reason why progress was never achieved on drastically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, despite such proposals being on the table after the success of the 1987 INF Treaty, was that Russia has always seen tactical nuclear weapons as a last-ditch capability to protect the Russian state in the event of the complete collapse or defeat of its conventional military capabilities.

So, do these leaks, particularly about Russian plans to use such weapons to stop a Chinese invasion, change anything?

First, it is the job of military establishments the world over to envision and prepare for any scenario, no matter how unlikely. The United States maintained war plans for an invasion of Canada well into the twentieth century. Part of the calculations that informed the U.S. position on accepting limits on warship construction at the various naval conferences of the 1920s and 1930s was the possibility of a future conflict with Great Britain. Indeed, the very notion of capabilities-based planning (as opposed to scenario-based planning) assumes that the United States must be prepared to overcome capabilities rather than trusting the hands that wield those capabilities will be friendly and will not use them against the United States or its interests.  

While these documents were written between 2008 and 2014 during the Obama administration (in American terms, ancient history), the Russian general staff takes a long-term view. Current partners today—including Turkey and China—have, in the past, been strategic rivals. The Russian national security establishment remains guided by the maxim of Tsar Alexander III, who remarked that Russia's only true and enduring allies are its army and navy. In other words, Russia views its partnerships in fundamentally transactional and situational terms. Ankara and Beijing opposed Moscow in the past but cooperate today precisely because it is in their interests to do so. If that calculus changes, the relationship is also altered.

The founding editor of this journal, Owen Harries, once remarked that the United States “offers alliance on easy terms.” Washington assumes that allies would never have cause to turn against it. In contrast, Moscow believes that if it shows any sign of weakness or debilitation, its current strategic partners will see an opportunity to change the parameters of their relationship to their advantage. 

We have already seen this in the last two years as Russia expends the bulk of its power pursuing its “special military operation” in Ukraine while suffering considerable military losses from Ukrainian resistance plus economic damage imposed by Western sanctions. Under these conditions, both Turkey and China have been able to press for revisions to their partnership with Russia, especially in economic terms. Ankara is vital to the success of the “Eurasian roundabout,” which has enabled Moscow to blunt some of the impact of Western sanctions and shift the balance in both the Caucasus and the Black Sea in Turkey's favor. China has been able to change the terms of trade in getting Russian resources priced in renminbi and for China to receive additional discounts. If Russian power continues to decline, what might come next?

Two decades ago, Rajan Menon, in these pages, raised the prospect of a “reverse Manchurian” scenario where China, even if it did not formally annex formerly Russian territories in Siberia and the Far East (which previously had been part of the Chinese Empire) would be able to exercise de facto control. This feeds into the Kremlin’s long-standing geopolitical nightmare of a weakened Russia subdivided into Western European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese spheres of influence. 

Might these documents have been strategically leaked—at this particular point in time—to not so subtly remind China (and the United States) that Russia is contemplating a lower threshold for nuclear use as a warning against taking advantage of Russian weaknesses? The beauty of the leak is that the Kremlin can formally distance itself from the documents (and even claim that the documents are outdated) while still achieving its purpose. China is reminded that tangling with Russia would be costly, and Beijing’s aims and desires can be better accommodated by continued cooperation within the existing framework of China-Russia relations. Yes, the bear might be sick—but its claws remain sharp.

About the Author 

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the director of the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Image: Shutterstock. 

Mitte Februar fanden in Indonesien die weltweit größten Wahlen statt – und das an einem einzigen Tag. Rund 205 Millionen Wahlberechtigte wurden an die Urnen ge­rufen, um einen neuen Präsidenten, einen neuen Vizepräsidenten sowie fast 20 000 Abgeordnete für das nationale Parlament, die Provinz- und die Bezirksparlamente zu bestimmen. Der Fokus lag vor allem auf der Wahl des Präsidenten, weil dieser im politischen System des Landes eine hervorgehobene Stellung hat. Sieger ist nach Hochrechnungen der ehemalige General Prabowo Subianto. Seine Wahl zum Staatschef wird von einigen Beobachtern als Bedrohung der indonesischen Demokratie oder gar als Rückkehr zur Diktatur gewertet. Viel wahrscheinlicher ist jedoch, dass Prabowo die Politik seines Vorgängers Jokowi fortsetzen wird, die vor allem der wirt­schaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes verpflichtet war. Demokratische Institutionen und Verfahren dürften indes weiter geschwächt werden. Deutschland und die EU sollten sich zugleich darauf einstellen, dass Indonesien unter Prabowo außenpolitisch aktiver und selbstbewusster auftreten wird. Leiten lassen wird sich Jakarta dabei wohl von einem dezidiert transaktional geprägten Verständnis internationaler Kooperation.

Als letzte große klimapolitische Initiative vor den Europawahlen hat die scheidende Europäische Kommission ihre Mitteilung für ein 2040-Ziel veröffentlicht. Mit ihrer Empfehlung eines 90%-Netto-Reduktionsziels im Vergleich zu 1990 schlägt sie erste strategische Pflöcke für die nächste Legislaturperiode ein. Dabei unter­streicht sie die zunehmende Bedeutung industriepolitischer Flankierung der Klima­politik, besonders von Carbon-Management-Technologien. Zwar beginnt die Ausgestaltung der klima­politischen Architektur für die Jahre 2031 bis 2040 erst nach den Europawahlen. Doch die Mitteilung zum 2040-Ziel gibt einen Vorgeschmack auf die politischen Heraus­forderungen, denen sich auch die Bundesregierung stellen muss.