Agrégateur de flux

Hungary’s dilatory approval of Sweden’s bid to join NATO brought much relief and high-fiving at alliance headquarters in Brussels. It took much diplomatic bribing of the pro-Russian Viktor Orban government in Hungary (as it did the ambivalent Recep Tayyip Erdogan government in Turkey) to get the unanimous vote of alliance countries to bring in another new member. To close the deal, Swedish prime minister Ulf Kristersson had to make a pilgrimage to Budapest bearing gifts—four Swedish-made Gripen fighter jets and a promise by Saab, the aircraft producer, to open an artificial intelligence research center in Hungary. The New York Times concluded that Hungary’s approval of Sweden’s accession sealed “a major shift in the balance of power between the West and Russia set off by war in Ukraine.” And the strutting and flexing within the alliance already seems to have started.

Sweden’s geography does provide several advantages for NATO vis-à-vis Russia. Swedish territory includes Gotland Island, which helps control entry to and exit from the Baltic Sea. With Finland and Sweden in the alliance, it will be easier to bottle up the Russian Navy inside the Baltic and prevent its breakout into the Atlantic Ocean. Because Russia’s nearby Kola Peninsula is home to two-thirds of Russia’s second-strike nuclear deterrent, Swedish territory also makes a great outpost to spy on developments. Finally, in any NATO conflict with Russia, reinforcing NATO’s Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia would be more accessible from Sweden. 

Of course, because of its essential geography, Stockholm had received quiet defense guarantees from Washington even before accession. However, the perception that the formal accession of Finland and Sweden into the alliance alters the balance of power in Europe vis-à-vis Russia has a significant downside, starting almost immediately. 

A significant disadvantage of alliances—outside of the potential for freeriding —is that with the security guarantee of the leader, less powerful countries gain confidence to pursue riskier strategies. The danger of this phenomenon is illustrated by the recent loose talk from some of Europe’s leaders, who met in Paris about sending their troops to Ukraine. French president Emmanuel Macron has always been more favorable to European-driven military action. He publicly announced last month that he would not rule out the dangerously escalatory step of deploying European troops to Ukraine. Although he emphasized that no consensus was reached among the European countries—“in an official, approved, and endorsed way”—he also asserted that “anything is possible if it is useful to reach our goal,” which he argued was to guarantee that “Russia cannot win this war.”

The Biden administration should temper any indications of a growing resolve among European nations to intervene directly in Ukraine. To date, although the United States military aid to Ukraine vastly exceeds the combined sum provided by the Europeans, the Biden administration has exercised appropriate caution on actions that could escalate the war into a direct conflict with nuclear-armed Russia. 

As the eruption of World War I teaches us, alliances can drag countries into catastrophic wars that nobody wants. Today, this caution is especially required given NATO’s Article V security guarantee, which considers an attack on one member as an attack on all. As the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates:

...[A]n armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Smaller alliance members spooked about Russia’s recent limited gains in the Ukraine war and encouraged by the perceived positive shift in the NATO-Russia balance with Sweden’s entry could very well entangle the United States in an escalation with the United States and Russian nuclear forces squaring off. Thus, President Biden needs to squash such brash and unwise talk among its ever-growing number of security clients in Europe.

Ivan R. Eland is a Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty. Dr. Eland graduated from Iowa State University with an M.B.A. in applied economics and a Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University.

Image: Anette Holmberg / Shutterstock.com.

Halkuló fegyverek?

Szíria, ez a máig megoldatlannak tűnő problémákkal küszködő ország, úgy tűnik, hogy lassan a stabilitás útjára lép, amit több elemző is a gázai háború miatti meggyengült amerikai behatásnak is betud. A változás szeleként is igazán jól érzékelhető, hogy az Öböl menti arab nemzetek lassan újra elkezdték felújítani kétoldali kapcsolataikat Szíriával, és ami méginkább hatalmas változást hozhat pozitív irányban Szíria státuszának növekedésében és erősödésében, hisz az Arab Liga vissza vette soraiba az országot. A kapcsolatok robbanásszerű fejlődésben a legátütőbb esemény az elemzők szerint -Arábia Szaúd-Arábia külügyminiszterének damaszkuszi hivatalos látogatása jelentette, ahol többek között a két ország közötti repülőjáratok újraindításáról is megállapodtak. Szaúd-Arábia volt a már 2011 óta zajló polgárháborúban az Aszadellenes felkelők legnagyobb támogatója, így mostani fordulata jelzésértékű az arab világ számára.

Moszkvában, a Kreml kezdeményezésére Szergej Kuzsugetovics Sojgu orosz, , a török Hulusi Akar és a szíriai Ali Mahmúd Abbász védelmi miniszter közös találkozót tartott a kölcsönös együttműködés jegyében,  ami itt a szírek arab világban elfoglalt helyének javulását jelzi, az a török oldal részvétele volt a találkozón. Ez nem mellesleg megmutatja azt is, hogy Törökország kulcs szereplőnek számít a Közel-Keleten, hiszen megkerülhetetlenek a konfliktus rendezésében. Ezt alátámasztja az asztanai találkozó is.

A Közel-Keleten úgy tűnik, hogy  Szíria helyzete fokozatosan stabilizálódik és erősebb alapokon nyugszik, mivel kisebb jelek arra utalnak, hogy szinte minden régióbeli országban felismerik, hogy a szíriai polgárháború lényegében, bár formálisan még nem, de gyakorlatilag közelít a végéhez, és az Aszad-féle vezetőség, kormányzat az ország területének túlnyomó részére kiterjesztette és megtartja befolyását, és hatalmi primátusát.

Az elmúlt időszak véres tapasztalatai után a fegyverek csendesedni látszanak. Észrevehetően egy egyfajta békeszerző keretrendszer jött létre, melynek keretében különböző társadalmi csoportok, akik ellentétes vagy részben eltérő érdekeket képviselnek, gyakorlati megfontolásokból, saját érdekeiket is szem előtt tartva ugyan, kompromisszumok által kialakított viszonyokat tartanak fenn a kurdok által lakott és ellenőrzött autonóm területekkel. Szíria hihetetlenül súlyos veszteségeket szenved és szenvedett el, de képes volt megőrizni nemzetközileg is elismert államhatárin belüli egységét, az ISIS által kikiáltott kalifátus (melynek területét az Egyesült Államok vezette koalíció segítségével 2017re sikerült felszámolni, 2019. március 23-án az amerikai támogatású kurd-arab fegyveres koalíció, a Szíriai Demokratikus Erők (SDF Syrian Democratic Forces) teljes katonai győzelmet hirdetett ki az Iszlám Állam felett.) és más terrorcsoportok tevékenységének ellenére is túlélte a belső konfliktust, és még a nyugati és arab világ együttes szankciói és katonai beavatkozásai sem döntötték meg a rezsimet.

A kezdet

A napjainkban regnáló szíriai elnök Bassár el-Aszad édesapja, Háfez el-Aszad 1971-ben ragadta magához a hatalmat, s lett a későbbiekben Szíria teljhatalmú vezetője. Az Aszadok azóta is gyakorolják az országban a hatalmat. A Közel-Keleten sajnos a stabilitás nem számít hétköznapi jelenségnek, és Szíria elkerülve végzetét, átment a nemzeti legitimitás vizsgáján.

Az országot a hetvenes évektől a szocialista irányzatú Ba’ath Párt irányította világi, szekuláris rendszerben. A kemény politikai elnyomással párhuzamosan viszonylag jó volt az oktatás és az egészségügy, a háború előtt a születéskor várható élettartam hasonló volt a magyarországihoz.

A rendszer stabilitását a szegényebb rétegeknek juttatott, rendszeres dotációk biztosították. Az országra erőltetett piacpárti reformok, a szociális támogatások csökkenése volt talán az Arab Tavasz mellett az egyik kirobbantó oka az azt követő eseményeknek.

A polgárháború viharában

2011. március 15-e óta Szíriában dúló konfliktussorozat eleinte kormányellenes demonstrációkkal indult el a Tunéziában történt eseménysorozatok, illetve az Arab Tavasz által indukált politikai folyamatok hatására, amelyek 2011 márciusában érték utol Szíriát. A szíriai válság közvetlen előzményeként megemlítendő, hogy az eleinte Londonban or-vosnak készülő Bassár el-Aszad mindössze 34 éves volt, amikor apja halálát követően 2000-ben átvette Szíria vezetését a korábban egy balesetben váratlanul elhunyt testvére helyett.

A kivonuló tüntetők az uralkodó politikai körök autoriter hatalomgyakorlása ellen tiltakoztak, de a demonstrálók kezdetben csak reformokat követeltek, nem pedig a rezsim leváltását. A rendfenntartók a helyzetnek nem megfelelően kezelő erőszakos beavatkozása következtében a tüntetések zavargássá fajultak, majd a rendőrség éles lőszerrel lőtt a tiltakozó tömegbe, a lázongások gyorsabb elfojtása érdekében pedig harckocsikat is bevetettek.

Az elmúlt évek alatt egy államon belüli, fegyveres  konfliktus nemzetközi fegyveres erők jelenléte közben zajló konfliktussá fejlődött ki, amelyben a Bassár el-Aszad vezette szíriai rezsimhez hű kormányerők és szövetségesei állnak szemben a szíriai demokratikus ellenzéki erőkkel és szövetségeseivel.

Emellett több belső és külső szereplő is részt vesz a konfliktusban a rezsimmel és a felkelőkkel is szemben állva, ami nehezen átláthatóvá teszi az egész szíriai helyzetet, olykor még a szakértők számára is.

A Szíriai Arab Fegyveres Erők (Syrian Arab Armed Forces) és a főként szunnita ellenzéki csoportok mellett többek között szalafista dzsihadista fegyveresek (mint például az an-Núszra Front), a kurdokból és arabokból álló Szíriai Demokratikus Erők (SDF) és a gyakorlatilag mindenki számára ellenségnek számító Iszlám Állam harcosai állnak szemben egymással. A válság összetettségét pedig tovább fokozza az a tény, hogy az immár hosszú évek óta húzódó polgárháborúnak már több külső állami szereplője is van, amelyek közvetetten proxyk támogatásával vagy akár közvetlenül katonai intervencióval avatkoztak be a konfliktusba, például Irán, Oroszország, Törökország és az Egyesült Államok.

A közkeletű magyarázat szerint az orosz hadsereg billenti a szíriai polgárháborút Aszad javára. Az orosz hadsereg és a Wagner-csoport valóban komoly segítséget jelentett a szír hadseregnek.

Az elmúlt évek váltakozó sikerű harcait követően viszont a helyzet stabilizálódni látszik. A háború mérhetetlen szenvedéssel párosult, ráadásul az egész térség biztonságát veszélyezteti a következményeivel. Lehet, hogy Szíria Bassár el-Aszad győzelmével „csúnya ország” marad, de a harcok csendesedésével, és a kormányon lévő Aszad-rezsim vezető jellegét hallgatólagosan kezdi valamennyi fél elismerni, s az esetleges fegyvernyugvással visszanyerheti stabilitását a Közel-Kelet egyik legforróbb pontja. Környezete számára ez minden bizonnyal megnyugtatóbb, mint ha iszlám terroristák és elszabadult hadurak anarchiája tombolna a romokban heverő ország helyén.

A békéhez egyetértés kell – a vallási kérdés kulcsszerepe

Egy esetleges, hosszanti alapokra helyezendő béke viszonylatában nagyon fontos tényező lehet a vallási türelem kérdése. A szekuláris értelemben vett demokrácia vizsgálata mellett a muszlim többségű országokban a vallásszabadság lényegesebb a politikai pluralizmusnál.

A klerikális diktatúrákban a kisebbségi vallások hívei állandó üldöztetésnek vannak kitéve, a visszatérő pogromok tíz- és százezrek halálával járnak. Szíriában viszont vallásszabadság volt, és a kisebbségek szabadon gyakorolhatták a hitüket. Az ország lakosságának mintegy tíz százaléka keresztény, és szinte a teljes, kétezer éves keresztény egyháztörténet képviselve van az országban. A szír katolikusok és ortodoxok mellett a káld, asszír, örmény egyház is jelen van, és az ókori egyházszakadás idején elkülönült nesztoriánusok közösségei is megmaradtak. Kisebb keresztény közösségek ma is az evangélium korának köznyelvét, az arámit beszélik. Damaszkusz keresztény virágzott a háború kitörése előtt.

Másik jelentős vallási kisebbségként vannak még jelen az országban a keresztények mellett az alaviták. A dogmatikai alapjait tekintve síita jegyekkel rendelkező, de keresztény elemeket is mutató vallási irányzatot a szunniták egy hányada nem tartja az iszlám részének, és az alaviták még a közel-keleti keresztényeknél is több üldöztetésnek voltak kitéve. Nyilván ez is hozzájárult ahhoz, hogy a szír alavita kisebbség tudatosan fonódott bele a biztonsági erők és a hadsereg kötelékébe. Ráadásul, hogy a súlyuk mértékére méginkább rámutassunk, ki kell emelnünk azt a tényt, hogy a politikai elit döntő többsége, őt, az Aszadok is ehhez az irányzathoz tartoznak.

Tisztában vannak azzal, hogy vallási meggyőződésüket nem erőltethetik rá a szunnita többségre, ezért hagyományosan a vallási türelmet, a szekuláris államot támogatják. Ebben a szíriai keresztények a legfontosabb szövetségeseik, akik számára a polgárháború különösen kemény kihívást jelentett.

Nagyhatalmak árnyékában

Az oroszok számára fontos szempont volt a beavatkozás szempontjából a szíriai orosz hadikikötő megmentése, az iszlamista terjeszkedés megállítása és az a lélektani üzenet, hogy Moszkva Washingtonnal szemben nem hagyja cserben a szövetségeseit. Ám a sikeres beavatkozás lehetséges módon az orosz vezetés elhamarkodott hozzáállásához vezethetett a későbbiekben Belaruszban és Kazahsztánban zajló események mellett az ukránokkal szemben.

Ez súlyos tévedés volt, a hazájukért küzdő ukránok harcértéke nem hasonlítható az iszlám milíciákéhoz. Oroszország mellett Irán is küldött fegyveres egységeket Szíriába, és diszkrétebb eszközökkel, de Kína is igyekezett megmenteni az Aszad-rendszert. India pedig a kívülről vezényelt rendszerbuktatást ellenezve tartott fel korrekt kapcsolatokat Damaszkusszal.

A szír rendszer hatalma megvédése közben nagyon súlyos bűnöket követett el a civilek ellen is, hasonlóan persze az ellenfeleihez.

A 2020-as év azért is tűnik fordulópontnak Szíria vonatkozásában, mert az elemzők szerint az Aszad-rezsim, ha nem is megnyerte, de „túlélte” a polgárháborút, amelynek az ország számára és a régió számára is komoly következményei lesznek

A globális aktorok közül az Amerikai Egyesült Államok a korábbi évek során világossá tette ugyan, hogy nem kíván mélyrehatóan foglalkozni a szíriai politikai rendezés és újjáépítés kérdéseivel, és azt lényegében átengedte Oroszországnak, ám az orosz-ukrán háború kitörésével, illetve Kína és Oroszország egymáshoz való közeledtével változhat ez a fajta közel-keleti politika, amely az országban csendesedni vágyó konfliktus újra fellángolásával fenyegethet. Nyilván, ha és  amennyiben a  rezsim Moszkva támogatásával felszámolja a  felkelők által ellenőrzött területet, akkor a török befolyás alatt álló rész, és az észak-szíriai Rodzsava autonóm tartomány kivételével valamennyi terület az  Aszad-rezsim szuverenitása alá tartozik majd. Észak-Szíriában a napjainkban is hajt végre légicsapásokat a török légierő a kurd lázadók ellen. Valójában ebből a szempontból a kulcsfontosságú Szíria nyugati tartományai, a Damaszkusz–Homsz–Hama–Aleppó-vonal feletti ellenőrzés, hiszen a lakosság nagy része itt összpontosul. Ez a terület pedig, Idlib tartományt leszámítva, visszakerült az Aszad-rezsim ellenőrzése alá.

Mi lehet a vége?

Az Aszad-rezsim hatalma megszilárdulni látszik. Viszont, amennyiben végleg pontot tesznek a háború végére, hatalmas felelősség fogja nyomni a damaszkuszi kormányzat vállát, mint az ország stabilitásának és biztonságának helyreállítása, valamint a humanitárius segítségnyújtás szervezése a szenvedő lakosságnak.

Az újjáépítés időszakban kiemelten fontos lenne a menekültek visszatérésének támogatása és az ország újjáépítésének kezdeményezése. Ehhez szükség lenne nemzetközi segítségre és támogatásra, beleértve a pénzügyi és technikai erőforrások biztosítását.

Azonban a fenntartható béke és stabilitás elérése érdekében ezek a lépések szükségesek lennének a szíriai nép és az egész régió jövője szempontjából.

Az Európai Unió felelőssége is hatalmas a kérdésben, ha megkezdi a szankciók szakaszos feloldását és az újjáépítési segélyek adagolását a menekültek visszatelepítéséhez, a békés átmenethez szükséges ellenőrizhető reformok bevezetéséhez, az állami erőszak megszüntetéséhez köthetné azokat.

A megbékélés folyamata szintén kulcsfontosságú lenne a tartós béke eléréséhez. Ez magában foglalná az igazságszolgáltatást és a felelősségre vonást a háborús bűnösökkel szemben, valamint a különböző etnikai és vallási csoportok közötti párbeszéd előmozdítását a közösségek közötti feszültségek csökkentése érdekében.

Ám az országon belüli feszültségek az Aszad kormány által irányított területeken megint növekednek az Izrael és az Egyesült Államok által az iráni titkosszolgálat és más terrorista szervezetek ellen irányított légicsapások miatt, melynek kiváltó okai, hogy Irán titkosszolgálatának jelenléte az országban, hisz amaz támogatja a  jemeni húti lázadókat és a Hesbollahot egyaránt fegyverekkel és pénzügyileg. A lázadók támadásainak oka a napjainkban is zajló Gázai háború, melyet Izrael vív a Hamasz terrorszervezettel szemben. A harcokban ugyan Szíria nem vesz részt, de elítéli Izrael túlzónak ítélt katonai fellépését, illetve egyre erősebben ad hangot a területén végrehajtott légicsapásokkal szemben. Illetve robbantások rázták meg Damaszkuszt, ami a feszültségek további növekedéséhez vezet.

A politikai reformok elengedhetetlenek lennének a demokratikus intézmények megerősítése és az emberi jogok tiszteletben tartása érdekében. Az állampolgári részvétel előmozdítása és a korrupció elleni küzdelem szintén fontos elemek lennének a stabilitás és a fejlődés elősegítésében, aminek egyik legszembetűnőbb eleme, hogy 2019-ben létrejött a Szíriai Alkotmányozó Bizottság, aminek célja a kormánypárti és az ellenzéki erők közötti közös nevező kialakítása.

Összességében a szíriai polgárháború lezárása hosszú és bonyolult folyamat, amely nemzetközi együttműködést és kompromisszumkészséget igényelne minden érintett eddig egymással szemben álló felett.

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A borítókép Aladdin Hammami fényképe az Unsplash-ről.

A Szíria: Megoldódik a megoldhatatlan helyzet? bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Summary: Despite being larger and more heavily armed, the Montana-class would likely be ineffective in modern conflicts, particularly against a technologically advanced adversary like China. The advancements in naval warfare, emphasizing speed and stealth over sheer firepower, render the concept of battleships outdated. Even if built, the Montana-class ships, now would be 80 years old, making them ill-suited for current strategic military needs, underscoring the evolution of naval priorities towards aircraft carriers and smaller, faster vessels.

The mighty Iowa was the last class of battleship the U.S. ever produced – but not the last it planned. Montana-class battleships were authorized for construction, intended to succeed the Iowa. But as the U.S. Navy began to appreciate the importance of naval aviation – and of the aircraft carrier – the Montana­ was deprioritized, and the class was ultimately canned.

Decades later, tensions with China are rising, and pundits wonder whether the U.S. naval fleet is adequately prepared for great-power conflict. Would the existence of something like the Montana class help the U.S. in a conflict with China? Short answer: probably not. 

“In the late 1930s,  the U.S. government, recognizing the deteriorating world situation, sought to rebuild US. Naval power,” Kyle Mizokami wrote for The National Interest. “The crash of the stock market in October 1939, as well as the Washington and London naval treaties, had slowed the growth of the U.S. Navy and reduced its tempo of peacetime operations. By 1940, however with fighting raging in Asia and Europe, it was clear the United States needed to beef up its defensive capability to deter attack – or to prosecute a war if it were dragged into conflict.”

The result? The authorization of the “Two Ocean Navy,” which included five Montana-class battleships meant to supplement the Iowa-class vessels.

A variety of designs were proposed for the Montana, all of which had one factor in common: The Montana would be significantly bigger. 

Now, the Iowa was not exactly small. Measuring 860 feet long and displacing 58,000 tons, the Iowa carried considerable heft. One design for the Montana, though, proposed an 860-foot-long vessel with a 64,500-ton displacement. The Montana also would have featured more firepower than the Iowa, with twelve 16-inch/50-caliber guns, relative to the Iowa’s nine. 

The Montana, while larger and more powerful than the Iowa, would also have been slower, and hence more vulnerable. 

China is increasingly well equipped to harm American surface vessels. Chinese President Xi Jinping, having stockpiled attack submarines, quick surface vessels, aircraft carriers, advanced aircraft, and intermediate-range and hypersonic missiles, is well equipped to challenge American naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Large, slow vessels like the Montana would be at particular risk in such an environment. Certainly, the Montana class would contribute offensively – even by modern standards, she would pack a considerable punch. But the question is: Would she be able to survive?

Had the Montana class actually been built, the ships would all be 80 years old at this point – the oldest in the Navy. Eighty-year-old ships are, for a variety of reasons, unlikely to be big contributors in a 21st-century great-power conflict. 

So while the Montana represents capabilities that the U.S. Navy left on the table, unrealized, in preparation for World War II, those capabilities have long become outdated and would be ill-suited to conflict with China. 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy. 

Summary: U.S. aircraft carriers, formidable and nearly invulnerable since WWII, face new survivability concerns against modern adversaries like China. China's military expansion, including shipbuilding and missile stockpiles aimed at American vessels, highlights these threats. While carriers benefit from advanced missile defense systems and a robust support network aimed at evading detection and countering attacks, reliance on such defenses is seen as a last resort. The challenge of tracking and targeting these moving behemoths across vast ocean spaces has been mitigated by technological advancements, yet the potential vulnerability of these naval giants in conflict scenarios remains a pressing issue.

Can missile defense systems keep U.S. aircraft carriers safe in a conflict with an advanced adversary like China or Russia? Missile defense systems are a useful tool, and they increase a carrier’s survivability. But hopefully, preservation of the U.S. carrier fleet won’t come to rely on missile defense systems.

U.S. aircraft carriers have operated with relative impunity since the end of World War II. Nuclear-powered behemoths surrounded with an entire carrier strike group, America’s 11 operational supercarriers are hard to kill. 

But concerns have grown about the survivability of the aircraft carrier in a modern conflict environment. Enhancements to China’s military capabilities are especially worrying. China is in the midst of one of history’s most ambitious shipbuilding sprees, adding attack submarines, lithe surface vessels, and even aircraft carriers of their own. 

More concerning still, China has stockpiled intermediate-range missiles, hypersonic missiles, and anti-ship missiles – undoubtedly with American vessels in mind.

Hopefully, U.S. carriers would only rely on missile defense systems as a last resort.

“The first step in attacking a carrier is to find it,” the Lexington Institute wrote in 2001. “Most adversaries would have difficulty doing this as long as the carrier remains in the open sea, takes prudent evasive actions, and actively counters efforts at detection.”

China would need to monitor millions of square miles of ocean in any conflict with the U.S.. “For instance,” Forbes reported, “the South China Sea, comprising a fraction of the area that China would need to monitor in a conflict, consists of over 1.4 million square miles of ocean.”

If an adversary can find an aircraft carrier, the adversary must then continuously track it, “because a carrier is likely to be far from the location where it was first detected by the time weapons arrive there.”

Two decades ago, “few if any nations” had “an assured capacity to track carriers continuously,” the Lexington Institute wrote. “All of the relevant methods – radar, electronic eavesdropping, electro-optical and acoustic sensors – have major drawbacks such as high cost, vulnerability to pre-emption, and inability to precisely discriminate.”

China has worked to augment its carrier-tracking abilities in recent years, launching “half a dozen electronic intelligence satellites into low earth orbit,”Forbes reported. But “the U.S. could degrade such satellites using both kinetic and non-kinetic means.”

And should an adversary find and track a carrier, the ship may still depend on an integrated defensive network.

“The carrier commanding a carrier can expect to have diverse defensive assets stationed within reach of his or her constantly moving vessel – Aegis air-defense destroyers, Virginia-class attack subs, overhead assets, etc. – all networked together into a layered defensive system that detects any approaching threats,” Forbes reported. “Once identified, each threat is assigned the optimum sensors and weapons to assure early interception, even if they are on different warships scattered across the ocean.”

The defensive measures surrounding an aircraft carrier are layered and redundant. “The architecture of the defensive perimeter dictates that if an enemy penetrates one layer of protection, it will then face another, and another,” Forbes reported. “So even if the adversary can find a carrier in the vastness of the Western Pacific, the likelihood its weapons will reach the carrier and do serious damage is not great.”

Still, given the time, money, and human capital invested in each aircraft carrier, the mere hint of vulnerability is concerning. 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Aircraft Carriers in the Age of Near-Peer Warfare: The U.S. Navy's Strategic Pivot: The U.S. military in recent decades fought against weaker states such as Iraq, or against non-state groups like al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State, and the Taliban. The U.S. Navy used its aircraft carriers for ground support missions during these operations. Carrier battle groups didn’t have to worry about enemy long-range munitions, sabotage, submarines, or air attacks. 

Now that the Global War on Terror is largely over and near-peer conflict is back on the menu, carriers will have a harder job on the battlefield. But would the U.S. military really risk its aircraft carriers in a war with Russia or China?

Aircraft carriers are mighty expensive. The latest carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, cost American taxpayers $13 billion. Although subsequent ships of the class will cost less, their price tag will still hover in the several billions. 

The total fleet of U.S. aircraft carriers cost nearly $60 billion. This number covers only the carriers themselves. It does not include the expensive fighter jets they carry, such as the F-35B/C Lighting II, F/A-18 Super Hornet, and EG-18 Growler, or the supporting warships of the carrier battle group. 

Meanwhile, near-peer adversaries have developed advanced capabilities that pose a significant threat to these invaluable assets. China in particular has been investing heavily in missile technology. It is also creating a robust anti-access/aerial denial bubble in strategic areas in the Indo-Pacific in an attempt to prevent U.S. aircraft carriers from entering a potential conflict. 

In sum, aircraft carriers are very expensive, and U.S. adversaries have more powerful options than they did in the past to destroy, sink, or restrict them. 

Considering this combination of factors, a logical question that comes up is whether U.S. aircraft carriers are now relegated to fighting wars only against those who can’t fight back.

The answer is no. 

The Pentagon spends so much money on aircraft carriers because they are still the ships that can determine a naval battle and influence the course of a war. Advances in technology might mean that carriers are once more vulnerable to enemy fire – much like they were in World War Two – but there hasn’t been a “Midway moment” to turn the carrier battle group obsolete. 

The Navy should adjust its fire and invest more in light aircraft carriers to complement its supercarriers. More ships would divide adversary resources and increase overall survivability, providing the time and resources necessary to prevail. 

The “Lightning Carrier” concept that pairs amphibious assault ships – essentially small aircraft carriers – with advanced fighter jets like the F-35B Lightning II can still achieve a lot on the battlefield and help determine a naval clash. More of these ships, coupled with investment in anti-missile technologies such as directed-energy weapons and hypersonic munitions, could be decisive factors in the next near-peer conflict.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

The war in Gaza has not only resulted in a ghastly loss of life for Israelis and Palestinians, but it has also added to the burdens the United States faces in a world it no longer dominates. Conflicts rage in Ukraine, Gaza, Myanmar, the Sahel, Sudan, and potentially in Taiwan and Iran. Right-wing populism is rising in rich and poor countries, dividing societies into militant camps of the people versus the elite. Three decades after the Cold War ended, the envisioned community of nations linked together by a rules-based system of international relations modeled on America’s liberal-democratic values now seems like a gossamer dream.

The convergence of regional crises and far-right populism presents a formidable challenge for the United States and the stewardship of President Joe Biden. As explained in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, global peace and prosperity require containing countries that combine authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy, strengthening alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and building partnerships in developing regions.

Alas, the Biden administration is seeing the trees but not the forest. Like every administration that has preceded it since the end of the Cold War, it is stovepiping the world into a discrete set of regional problems that it seeks to manage with rhetorical exhortation and technocratic ingenuity. What elected officials from the Left to the Right fail to see is that the turbulence we are experiencing is part of a panoramic upheaval on the part of emerging and developing states that seek a redistribution of global power. They may favor a rules-based order, as Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has said, so long as it does not compromise their interests. A “world order that is still very, very deeply Western,” he bluntly put it, is giving way to a multipolar world.

Although it is unclear what framework will emerge from the current geopolitical disorder, the United States must prepare for a world in which power politics rather than liberal ideals will prevail. To preserve international stability, the United States and the West will need to devise new rules of the road in concert with autocracies such as China and the middle powers so that they will become stakeholders in the global order they helped create.

Dominance and Decline

Military Might: For some scholars and policy analysts, multipolarity is an oversimplification of reality. Given the competition for primacy between the United States and China, political scientist and former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Joseph S. Nye, Jr argues the world is also bipolar. On a military basis, he maintains, it is unipolar. To be sure, China is developing its nuclear arsenal, Nye points out, but America’s military footprint is unmatched. With 750 bases in eighty nations and a network of alliances and partnerships, the United States fields a technologically innovative fighting force that receives 12 percent of all federal spending.

Even so, the U.S. military might not have inhibited Russia from invading Ukraine or China from threatening to bring Taiwan under its control by force. Indeed, the prospect of a larger war in Europe or a clash with China has understandably prompted caution in Washington. Competition from America’s adversaries is still more worrisome. Despite slowing economic growth, China is steadily chipping away at America’s dominance. It is rapidly modernizing its military, including an expanding nuclear force of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the construction of some 350 new missile silos, longer-range sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and new DF-17 medium-range missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles.

Benefiting from an average of more than 9 percent GDP growth since the late 1990s, China now possesses the world’s largest navy, one that aspires to blue-water capability. Its Jin-class nuclear submarines are equipped with longer-range SLBMs, which can target the northwestern part of the United States as well as Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii. Despite China’s sagging economic growth, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is projected to have 356 battle-ready vessels by 2033, while the United States expects a reduction of its fleet to 290 by the end of this decade. China persists in militarizing atolls and islets in the South China Sea and is expanding its military presence in the Middle East, Africa, and the South Pacific.

Russia’s militarily disastrous invasion of Ukraine aside, Moscow continues to update its nuclear force. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipates economic growth of 2.6 percent in 2024 thanks to continued energy exports. Moreover, Russia will allocate one-third of its budgetary spending to defense this year. It plans to modernize the dual-capable Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile system, which is deployed in Kaliningrad, and develop new delivery vehicles such as the land-based (and dual-capable) 9M729 cruise missile Washington has declared a violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Russia is also developing the Sarmat ICBM, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, and a submersible nuclear-powered drone releasable from submarines to attack carrier groups and potentially cities along the U.S. coast.

Other U.S. adversaries’ military arsenals are also growing. Iran has increased its defense cooperation with Russia since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, including the supply of drones and possibly surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. Iran intends to acquire Russian technology and military equipment to increase the accuracy and lethality of its short- and medium-range ballistic missile forces, naval forces, and air and defense assets. As for its nuclear program, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium up to 60 percent uranium-235, which is close to weapons grade. To sustain combat operations in Ukraine, Russia has also turned to North Korea to supply it with artillery shells and other munitions such as rockers and howitzers. The price Kim Jong-un will likely demand for such assistance is Russian missile and satellite technology. With its successful test of a solid-fueled hypersonic missile, North Korea now has a delivery system with the range, reliability, and maneuverability to strike American territory. Although the size of its nuclear arsenal is unknown, it is estimated that North Korea could have enough fissile material for more than 100 weapons.

Economic Primacy: America is likewise the world’s paramount economic power. U.S. per capita income is 30 percent higher than that of Western Europe and 54 percent higher than that of Japan. At the end of the Cold War, the corresponding figures were 24 percent and 17 percent, respectively. Median wages continue to rise, as does productivity, because of the efficiency of labor and capital inputs. Immigration, the expansion and mobility of the workforce, and a high fertility rate (compared to other wealthy nations) have increased the working-age population by 30 percent over the past three decades, compared to 13 and 7 percent, respectively, for Europe and Japan.

Innovation in the workplace and skill levels have also risen. More American universities and corporations are considered among the world’s best than those of any other country. Six of the world’s ten biggest corporations in terms of sales, profits, and market value are American, according to Forbes magazine, and roughly half of the top twenty. Evaluated by market capitalization alone, eight of the top ten and sixteen of the top twenty are American.

The U.S. share of world GDP has been halved from the statistically aberrant 50 percent it enjoyed after World War II. The United States currently accounts for slightly more than 25 percent of world GDP at market exchange rates, a figure that has remained relatively constant since 1990. China and the European Union (EU) each represent roughly 18 percent, and the Asia-Pacific region’s share is about 37 percent. However, at purchasing power parity rates, America does not fare as well. In contrast to the Asia-Pacific’s share of 45 percent—19 percent of which is contributed by China—the United States, like the EU, represents about 15 percent of the total.

American universities and corporations also no longer enjoy the commanding heights they have in the past. The number of American universities in the top 100 declined from forty-three in the Times Higher Education survey of 2018 to thirty-four in the 2022 compendium. In the London-based Quacqarelli-Symonds study, American universities represented half of the top ten in 2022 as opposed to six in 2010, and ninety-one of the 177 reviewed in 2022 declined in rank. A comparable trend is discernible in the rankings of American corporations. Measured by market capitalization, American firms accounted for eight of the global top ten in 2022 versus six in 2000. Using metrics such as revenues, profits, and assets, however, Forbes ranked only three American corporations in the top ten and five in the top twenty in 2010. In the 2023 global list released by Forbes, China accounts for three of the top ten.

China is not the only rising economic power in the global transition. Although only one of its corporations is ranked in the world’s top fifty by Forbes, India accounts for nearly 7.5 percent of global GDP. It is now the world’s fifth-largest economy at market prices and third-largest in purchasing power parity. With a younger and highly educated labor force and annual economic growth forecasted by the IMF to exceed 6 percent over the next five years, Morgan Stanley expects India to become the third-largest economy by 2027, surpassing Germany and Japan.

China and Europe are also encroaching on America’s technological dominance. In 2020, the United States accounted for about 25 percent of global R&D investment versus 69 percent in 1960. China has increased its share from 4.8 percent of global spending in 2000 to 23 percent in 2020, and Europe accounts for around 22 percent. China is far and away the largest producer of patents, more than double that of the United States. It is also the largest market for electric vehicles. It sold 22 million passenger vehicles in 2022, compared with less than 13 million in Europe and the United States. Fearful of the competition from cheaper and technologically superior Chinese cars, the European Union is threatening to raise tariffs on its imports, which Beijing is countering by opening a factory in Hungary. The Biden administration may follow suit, prodded by pressure from the bipartisan United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party to ban an array of imports.

As growth of 4.9 percent in the third quarter of 2023 attests, the United States has nonetheless continued to demonstrate its economic resilience despite the great recession of 2008-09 and the COVID-19 pandemic. Powered by the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act, and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the United States has created roughly 14 million jobs, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and unemployment has declined to 3.7 percent. China, meanwhile, is stagnating under massive government debt and deflation from an unraveling property market, slowing exports, an aging population, and inflexible leadership.

Still, it may be premature to herald the new American renaissance as New York Times columnist David Brooks has done. The increase in America’s GDP relative to Europe’s is partly a function of the euro’s declining value. And while China’s sputtering economy may replicate the economic crisis in Japan after its asset bubble burst in 1990, regional growth rates historically fluctuate. Asia produced 61 percent of world output in 1820 compared to 25 percent from Europe, only 20 percent in 1950, but 48 percent in 2018 versus Europe’s share of 15 percent.

To be sure, declining energy prices and the apparent end of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate hikes have increased the prospect of a soft landing. Even though inflation fell to 3.1 percent by the end of 2023, the message from the index of leading economic indicators is that a recession may lie ahead, according to the Conference Board. U.S. growth is further likely to be hampered by China’s continuing economic struggles. China is the largest trading partner of some 120 countries, including Japan, South Korea, the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the EU. It is America’s third-largest export market and the largest purchaser of U.S. treasury bonds. While China’s deflationary spiral has benefited countries battling inflation, anemic demand has hurt exporters of industrial goods as well as the tourism industry.

By the same token, the prospect that China will recover from its current malaise should not be dismissed. According to a study by the Australian Strategy Policy Institute, it enjoys a technological lead over the United States in thirty-seven of forty-four fields, from AI to robotics. China graduates 1.4 million engineers annually and dominates the supply chain of rare earth materials, controlling 70 percent of their extraction and 90 percent of the processing.

The threat to American economic primacy presented by China’s trade-distorting subsidies and theft of intellectual property is only one of the reasons the Biden administration has opted for industrial policy. Bidenomics also aims to produce new manufacturing jobs for working- and middle-class Americans. Critical of the inequality produced by unfettered free trade, Biden avers that industrial policy will lead to a more egalitarian and geopolitically secure society.

Both propositions are dubious. China has already responded to Washington’s ban on the export of computer chips by restricting exports of gallium, germanium, and graphite—elements used in semiconductor manufacturing, fiber-optic networks, and military kits—and more recently, graphite, a component of electric vehicle batteries. Expanding supply chains to other producers of rare earths is economically prudent. But even if the United States can find alternative sources in, say, Vietnam, Australia, India, or Peru, it is not likely to erode China’s dominant position or alter the reality that America’s Indo-Pacific partners remain dependent on their economic ties with Beijing. Industrial policy is far more likely to reinforce the tit-for-tat dynamic that is playing out between Washington and Beijing and divide the world into competing blocs.

Industrial policy will also undermine the efficiencies of the international trading system that lowered the cost of goods and raised real incomes during the 1980s and 1990s. While it is true that cheap Chinese imports destroyed manufacturing jobs in the industrialized world, the decline mainly resulted from the labor-cutting efficiency of modern technology and shifting comparative advantage. The cumulative effects of economic nationalism will raise the cost of goods to American consumers and inhibit innovative research on climate change. Industrial policy has already prompted the EU to launch a “Buy Europe” project to incentivize the domestic production of green technology and semiconductors. India, South Korea, Australia, and Canada are acting correspondingly.

The United States and other wealthy nations’ gravitation toward protectionism and deglobalization will further create hardships for low-income countries, which lack the ability to provide lavish subsidies to domestic producers. Worse, it will erode the economic progress they have made since 1990 in raising the incomes of the world’s poorest populations. Protectionism will constrict participation in global value chains, deprive poor countries reliant on farming of export income needed to pay for imports and cover debt service for loans and create more failed states, thereby sabotaging economic development and intensifying global instability.

Political Authority: In confronting the geostrategic challenges posed by Russian revanchism and Chinese militancy, the United States remains the keystone of its alliances in Europe and Asia. However, the uncontested political power that it wielded during the Cold War and in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet empire is fading. Shifting geopolitical interests and alignments among emerging regional powers who demand a voice in global governance is a major reason. Dissention between the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia on a host of global threats is another.

Intent on asserting their views, countries in the rich and developing world have increasingly impugned Washington’s policy preferences. In some cases, dissent has been broad-based; in others, powerful voices have stymied the United States. Undeterred by President Bill Clinton’s opposition, Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy challenged the world to ban landmines, which produced 164 signatures to the Ottawa Treaty in 1997. Though many countries joined the “coalition of the willing” in the second Gulf War in 2003, U.S. military action was publicly opposed by France, Germany, Russia, and the European Parliament, as well as by Latin America, the Arab League, and the African Union.

The collapse of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2008, on the other hand, resulted from Sino-Indian insistence on agricultural subsidies over U.S. objections. In 2010, Brazil and Turkey defied President Barack Obama’s decision to ratchet up sanctions on Iran, reviving earlier proposals for a fuel swap deal. Although the Obama administration proceeded with its sanctions resolution, Turkey and Brazil had both contested Washington’s authority and elevated their international status.

Continuing criticism of the West for its quasi-colonial dominance of the international economic and political order further reflects the Global South’s clamor for a voice in international decision-making. Irritated by the persistent gap in GDP per capita between North and South, developing countries have long sought to curb the de facto veto power the United States and Europe enjoy as respective heads of the World Bank and IMF. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank created by China in 2016, which now numbers 109 countries, and the BRICS Development Bank have emerged as a sort of second Bretton Woods to challenge the West’s dominance.

Thirty-five countries have more recently registered their resentment toward the rich world by abstaining from censuring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations vote in October 2022. Many have chastised the United States for provoking the conflict, deriding the hypocrisy of the rules-based order that sanctions Russia but ignores Israel’s unremitting absorption of Palestinian territory.

Emerging powers are also becoming more transactional in their relationships with global adversaries. Although Indian prime minister Narendra Modi implicitly reproached Russian president Vladimir Putin in the fall of 2022, saying, “Today’s era is not an era of war,” India has expanded its trade ties with Russia. Along with China, Turkey, and Brazil, it has massively purchased discounted Russian oil, which helps Moscow sustain its war. A founding member of the BRICS, India has joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with the United States, Australia, and Japan to counter China’s growing influence in Asia. Yet India remains reliant on China for cheap consumer goods and the critical semiconductor chips and circuit boards on which its industries depend.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is equally keen to give Turkey the global status the Ottoman Empire once held. Defying Washington’s warnings, Erdogan purchased the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. He has denounced Russia for its invasion of Ukraine but abstained from joining the West’s sanctions regime lest it provoke economic reprisals from Moscow. Even so, Turkey and Russia have backed opposing sides in the civil wars in Syria and Libya. Erdogan displayed similar transactional behavior in the summer of 2023 when he agreed to support Sweden’s accession to NATO to ensure the purchase of F-16s from the United States, which followed in January.

Other emerging and developing countries that favor a multipolar world order are similarly inclined to straddle tensions between the West and the China-Russia strategic partnership. Though it is a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States, Brazil has opposed the dominance of the U.S. dollar in international trade. During a visit to China in April 2023, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva called for the de-dollarization of international trade and urged the BRICS group of nations to devise their own currency. Aspiring to a larger role on the world stage, Indonesia, an emerging power in Asia and chair of the 2022 G20 summit, has indirectly chided the United States for its “megaphone diplomacy” on Ukraine and refused to take sides in the Sino-American competition. However, it has criticized China’s claims in the South China Sea, conducted military exercises to safeguard its maritime interests and increased defense spending by 20 percent in November 2023.

Concerns about the impact of U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some countries to settle payments in renminbi, as Singapore and Malaysia have done. However, the main reason for the Global South’s interest in de-dollarization is the growing trade with and aid from China. ASEAN’s trade with China more than doubled in 2022, now accounting for one-fifth of the region’s global trade. Trade between Brazil and China rose to $154 billion in 2022. Not only is China the lender of first and last resort for many developing countries, but it is also the principal supplier of developmental aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Brazil is also increasing its commercial presence in Africa. India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are also involved.

Even smaller countries assert their interests in a world that seems increasingly unmoored. Tiny Qatar, home to a U.S. air base and a haven for exiled Hamas leaders, has assumed a surprising diplomatic presence in the world. It helped to evacuate tens of thousands of people from Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover in 2021 and mediated the release of Israeli hostages and wounded Palestinian fighters in the war in Gaza. At the other end of the spectrum, the Houthis, a militant Shia sect in the failed state of Yemen financed by Iran, have attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea in retaliation for Israel’s offensive in the Gaza war. To protect shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the United States and the United Kingdom have launched airstrikes against Houthi missiles, which could provoke a military response from Iran.

Depending on their outcomes, a raft of global elections in 2024 could exacerbate turbulence in world politics. Though Xi Jinping has thus far exercised restraint, the victory by the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan’s presidential election on January 13 will certainly increase friction between Beijing and Taipei. The U.S. presidential election in November 2024 will likely have a more profound effect on international stability.

A second term for Biden would result in a continuation of policies pursued during the past three years. International turbulence would persist, but sufficient guard rails would be in place to contain it. If Donald Trump regains the White House, however, a winners-versus-losers standard would replace Biden’s democracy-versus-autocracy argument, which would redound to the benefit of Xi, Putin, and other tyrants. Trump’s continued indifference to democratic values would reinforce the Global South’s perception that the rules-based order is a hypocritical contrivance to justify Western dominance. The planned 10 percent tax on all imports Trump has proposed would cripple global trade, provoke beggar-thy-neighbor policies not seen since the interwar period of the twentieth century, and set relations with Beijing on a collision course.

Moreover, America’s support for Ukraine would wither, as would any prospect of negotiations. The prospect of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would end, and the United States would abandon any interest in the Middle East save for drawing closer to Saudi Arabia. America’s alliances in Europe and Asia, which Biden has restored, would languish or cease to exist. Putin would expand westward, probably starting in the Baltic States. The United States would avoid a conflict with China, however, because Trump is likely to concede Taiwan to China.

Toward a More Stable World

The turmoil that engulfs today’s world is the antithesis of the liberal-democratic order that Washington confidently envisioned would reshape the world in America’s image. As it happened, the United States failed to see that resurgent nationalism, historical grievances, and, beginning with the Yugoslav wars, recurring violence were incompatible with a world bounded by America’s values. The current disorder may presage a return to the balance-of-power system that maintained an uneasy equilibrium prior to World War I or succumb to the anarchy of the Hobbesian state of nature. But it could transmute into a stable world order, the emergence and persistence of which will depend on a mutuality of interests to sustain it rather than a vague rules-based order that lacks universal consent and thus validity in international law. Determined by non-Western and Western countries, democracies and autocracies, the rules must be consensual, enforceable by the stakeholders when disruptions of peace occur, and subject to dispute settlement by the principal parties to the dispute and the larger international community.

Restoring America’s commitment to the United Nations as the global forum for reasoned debate and conflict resolution will contribute to stability. The United States should cease its penchant for responding to the collective will of the UN, a body it conceived as an option rather than an obligation. It should further assume a leadership role in extending UN Security Council membership on a permanent and/or rotational basis to countries from the developing world so that every region shares a stake in preserving international stability.

Even though it will no longer be the sole rule-maker, the United States will still play a vital role in ensuring the stability of the evolving world order. Militarily, it will be incumbent on Washington to balance the competing interests of major adversaries such as China and Russia and regional powers. Both to deter countries from unwelcome actions and to respond to threats, it will be important for the United States to maintain a robust and operationally ready military force, restrict access to certain dual-capable technologies, and champion arms control agreements. Strengthening relations with America’s allies in Europe and Asia, as the Biden administration is doing, and, in concert with China, harnessing the power of artificial intelligence to control its destructive power will be critical to preserving U.S. security and geopolitical stability.

Maintaining a dialogue with America’s adversaries is essential. This is especially important with China, where the United States has a codependent relationship in trade and investment. Unfortunately, partly out of ignorance and partly out of fear that U.S. global preeminence is ebbing, Americans on the Right and Left have demonized China as the latest anti-Christ. If its history is any guide, it seems unlikely that Beijing’s ambition is to control the world, its military modernization and power projection in the South China Sea notwithstanding. More plausibly, China wants to be recognized by Washington as a great power with core interests no less important than those of the United States.

The thaw in U.S.-China relations that has followed the Biden-Xi summit last November is a positive sign. But it beckons more than opinion-page cheerleading to evolve substantively. At the very least, the Biden administration should end its industrial policy and unwind trade sanctions against Beijing, which are bad for American business and the public and unlikely to impede Chinese trade with Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Protectionism intensifies bilateral hostilities and elevates the risk of military confrontation.

Restoring free trade will pay economic as well as geopolitical dividends. In an increasingly competitive world, creativity and innovation will be the key to comparative advantage. Instead of raising import barriers to contain China’s rise, the United States should seek to regain its former leadership in science and technology by increasing government R&D spending in semiconductors, robotics, quantum computing, AI, and medical science. The objective should be to increase investment to the level it had reached two decades ago.

Lastly, the United States can remain a powerful force for political and economic liberalism in the world. Liberalism has not outlived its purpose, as Putin self-servingly claimed before the G20 summit in 2019. True, only 8 percent of the world’s population lives in a fully functioning democracy, but more than half of the world’s population will go to the polls in 2024 to voice their individual opinions. Rather than lecture the developing world to practice democracy, like nineteenth-century circuit riders preaching the gospel in rural America, the United States can again become a model for others to emulate. To do so, it must dampen the culture wars that divide the country into hostile camps, reduce crime, resolve the border crisis, increase educational opportunities and skills training for women and minorities, acknowledge the reality of value pluralism, and increase developmental aid to the most vulnerable societies, as China and other countries have done.

Good intentions aside, when all is said and done, cynicism may triumph, and this century will look no different from the previous one. However, the more concretely people everywhere can envision a future of shared responsibility to preserve order in an interdependent world, the more likely the prospect is that the nascent multipolar era will be a stable one.

Hugh De Santis is a former career officer in the Department of State. He also chaired the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College and served as senior advisor for Asian regional integration at the CIA. He is the author most recently of The Right to Rule: American Exceptionalism and the Coming Multipolar World Order. He thanks Stanley Katz and Carolyn Fuller for their constructive comments.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: As the pinnacle of naval power, America's aircraft carrier fleet faces increasing threats from advanced missile technology, particularly from near-peer adversaries like China or Russia. With hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles capable of targeting carriers, the sheer force of numbers poses a significant challenge. However, carriers are not defenseless; equipped with formidable aircraft and supported by carrier battle groups, they create a defensive umbrella to mitigate threats. While adversaries aim to penetrate this defensive bubble, historical precedent shows the resilience of carrier battle groups. Through strategic planning and seamanship, US carriers strive to stay ahead in the ever-evolving landscape of modern warfare.

The American aircraft carrier fleet is the strongest in the world. With 11 supercarriers and hundreds of aircraft, the U.S. Navy can project power to any part of the globe and respond to contingencies as they arise.  

These aircraft carriers would be the central actors in any near-peer war with China or Russia. By containing or destroying them, an adversary would neutralize much of America’s expeditionary firepower. But how would they achieve this?

Today, missiles are the most serious danger to aircraft carriers. 

Advances in missile technology have increased the threat to carriers. Hypersonic, cruise, and even ballistic missiles now have the range, speed, and destructive capability to take out a carrier. Nor is the threat limited to a single well-placed, cutting-edge missile. Indeed, the Navy is concerned that a near-peer adversary like China could launch dozens, if not hundreds, of missiles against American supercarriers and destroy or sink them through the sheer force of numbers. The more advanced the incoming munitions, the greater the odds in favor of the attacker. 

But it isn't just about math. It is also about calculated risks. You will not find an aircraft carrier exposed unless something has gone really wrong. To begin with, a carrier’s first line of defense is its aircraft. They can fly thousands of miles away from the mothership and take out incoming threats. 

In addition, aircraft carriers don't fight alone. Supercarriers lead carrier battle groups that can include guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and support vessels. The smaller warships fan out and create a defensive umbrella around the aircraft carrier, protecting it from aerial, surface, and underwater threats.

During combat, the goal of an adversary is to penetrate that defensive bubble and get to the carrier. If he can damage or sink the leader of the battlegroup and thus restrict or stop its air operations, then the carrier battle group is neutralized. This is easier said than done. 

The last time an aircraft carrier was destroyed or sunk in major combat operations was during World War Two. Since then, the closest a military has come to sinking an enemy carrier was during the Falklands War, when the Argentine Air Force threw dozens of aircraft against a British task force in an attempt to sink two British aircraft carriers and establish air superiority over the battlefield. Although they sank several warships and support ships, the Argentines failed to penetrate the air defense umbrella completely and reach the aircraft carriers. 

The goal of the carrier battle group is to stay out of danger – or limit its exposure to danger as much as possible while it works through the enemy’s capabilities. Numbers might create an advantage, but that advantage can be countered by good seamanship and proper planning. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Last month, rumors that Russia has been developing a space-based nuclear weapon took the media by storm. The technology in question, ominously dubbed a “serious national security threat” by House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner, left many in Washington asking how the United States itself is planning to capitalize on the strategic significance of outer space. 

Russia, however, isn’t the most assertive actor in the space domain. That honor belongs to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has a clear plan to dominate outer space—and which is moving ahead with the full backing of the powers that be in Beijing.

China’s outer space strategy involves many things, from asteroid mining to increasing the number of PRC-fielded satellites to developing a rival to the U.S. GPS navigation system. However, its ultimate objective is clear: to bolster the country’s comprehensive national power. As the PRC itself has asserted, “To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is our eternal dream.”

Consequently, China’s space program has made massive strides in recent years. The PRC’s Tiangong space station, for instance, initially entered Earth’s orbit in April 2021 and has since hosted six separate astronaut crews. Last year, Zhang Qiao, a researcher from the China Academy of Space Technology, announced that the station will double in size in the future to support the over 100 scientific research projects that have or are currently taking place in orbit. In addition, China successfully collected Lunar material in 2020 with its Chang’e-5 mission, landed its Zhurong rover on Mars in 2022, and completed a record sixty-seven targeted launches in 2023.

Most recently, researchers from the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) in northeast China unveiled plans for a manned facility on the Moon. Newly translated video footage from the Third Annual Space Science Conference in October 2023, co-hosted by the Chinese Society of Space Research and Zhejiang Province Science and Technology Association, presents a plan for an expansive Lunar installation. The base features subterranean living quarters, research labs, a greenhouse, a fleet of unmanned vehicles, a photovoltaic system, closed-cycle life support, and more. The purported purpose of the project, led by Chief HIT Engineer Mei Hongyuan, is to study the chemical composition of the Lunar surface.

The proposal in the video draws heavily on research from a 2022 paper published in the Chinese Journal of Deep Space Exploration titled “Research on Building Plans Design for Future China Lunar Base.” The report features several different design possibilities for a Chinese Lunar facility and emphasizes the fact that “the Moon is the Earth’s only natural satellite,” and that “countries must establish Lunar bases in order to take advantage of the Moon’s natural resources.” 

Why should U.S. policymakers care about Chinese plans to build a base on the Moon? First, the plan has a considerable chance of becoming a reality. As many already know, China is no stranger to grand architectural undertakings (The Great Wall, the Grand Canal, Three Gorges Dam, etc.) and is already planning to send its first manned mission to the Moon in 2030, followed by the construction of a permanent base there by 2036. 

Meanwhile, the credentials of the architect of China’s new Lunar Base plan suggest seriousness. Mr. Mei is a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political ties to China’s leadership and has professional experience designing facilities for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, for the PRC State Council, and for the Harbin Institute. As such, his design plans for a Lunar base carry substantial credibility.

Second, a Chinese Moon base represents an economic challenge to U.S. interests. The Lunar surface, for one, is home to a variety of critical materials. More specifically, Helium-3—a non-radioactive isotope found in large quantities on the Moon’s surface—has a wide range of uses, most notable in the operation of nuclear fusion reactors. Aluminum and Silicone are also very abundant on the Lunar surface, meaning Chinese engineers will likely use the Moon’s soil to produce solar panels and 3D printed facilities. As Chinese Moon scientist Ouyang Ziyuan has put it, “the Moon could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources for human beings…This is crucial to sustainable development of human beings on Earth…Whoever first conquers the Moon will benefit first.” 

Underpinning all this is a key recognition: industrializing the Moon would be a key part of what China envisions as a $10 trillion/year Moon-Earth Economic Zone. Ultimately, a Chinese Lunar base would serve as an important resource deposit and a trampoline to catapult the PRC into deep space. 

If the United States does not confront this fact, it will be edged out of both the tangible and symbolic gains that China is aiming to seize. For the moment, the United States is in danger of precisely that. America’s ambitions remain decidedly modest. For instance, the cornerstone of the country’s space plans, the NASA Artemis program, is far less ambitious than China’s proposal and lacks the proper strategic vision to make the country a space-faring nation.

All of this is liable to come at a high cost. As China has eloquently demonstrated with its Lunar plans, the clock is ticking. For America to actually take advantage of the strategic opportunities presented by Lunar development, it will need to start thinking more about how space serves the long-term national interest.  

Aedan Yohannan is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: As Ukraine faces increased pressure from Russian forces, the arrival of F-16 Fighting Falcons offers a significant boost to Kyiv's air defense capabilities. While the process of training Ukrainian pilots on these modern aircraft has been expedited, challenges remain as they adapt to Western tactics and language requirements. Despite Russian efforts to downplay the impact of the F-16s, their deployment marks a strategic move by NATO allies to support Ukraine's defense. With the F-16's combat-proven track record and versatility, its integration into Ukraine's military arsenal could potentially shift the dynamics of the ongoing conflict.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is already a combat-proven fighter, adopted by dozens of nations around the world. The first Fighting Falcons could also be in the skies over Ukraine as early as this summer, The New York Times reported on Monday.

A dozen pilots have been training on the U.S.-made aircraft in Denmark, the UK and the United States.

While 45 aircraft have been pledged to Kyiv, just six F-16s have been delivered. The additional jets can't come fast enough, as Ukraine is desperate for more weapons, as it runs low on artillery rounds and other ammunition while Republican lawmakers in Congress have held up additional U.S. military aid. The F-16s are expected to arrive in Ukraine armed with short- and medium-range missiles and bombs, partially making up for the shortage of ground-based munitions, the paper of record reported.

"This year, new fighter jets will be in our skies, and we have to make this year an effective one in defending ourselves against Russian guided bombs, Russian aircraft and their missiles," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said earlier this month.

The New York Times further noted that the training of Ukraine's pilots on the F-16 has proceeded at "lightning speed, compressing years of classroom learning, simulations and flight exercises into months."

Yet, the progress has been slower going than Kyiv or its allies had hoped – due to the fact that pilots trained on Soviet-era planes and tactics have had to get up to speed on the English language and Western military practices to make effective use of the Fighting Falcons.

The first Ukrainian pilots began training last August at Skrydstrup Air Base in southern Denmark, but their deficiencies in language skills and knowledge of Western flying techniques slowed the progress down considerably and it wasn't until this past January that the Ukrainian pilots were actually ready to fly.

NATO member Denmark led the European effort last spring to provide Ukraine with F-16s. The F-16s were on the list of Western-made military hardware requested by Zelensky, along with tanks, air defense systems, and artillery.

The Biden administration only reluctantly gave in to Ukraine's demands, last summer by allowing NATO allies to provide the F-16s to Kyiv. Those jets were being phased out in some European militaries in favor of the newer F-35 Lightning II.

As the paper also reported, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium committed to sending around a combined 45 of the jets to Ukraine, enough for three small squadrons. Denmark is on track to send the first six in the late spring, with 13 more due to arrive over the rest of the year and into 2025.

However, American officials have cautioned that the F-16 Fighting Falcon would not be decisive in the war and that the training would take a considerable amount of time. The latter fact has already been the case, but Ukraine has benefited from downing multiple Russian A-50 reconnaissance aircraft, which could make it harder for the Kremlin's forces to monitor the skies over Ukraine.

As previously reported, Russia has downplayed the threat of the F-16, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has even dismissed claims that the F-16s will be able to flip the course of the war in Ukraine.

Putin suggested the F-16s would be as easily destroyed as the German-made Leopard 2 main battle tanks (MBTs). Moscow has even warned that if the F-16 Fighting Falcons take off from the territory of NATO member countries and are used in the Ukrainian conflict, the Kremlin could regard this as a conscious step toward escalation and "de facto direct participation in the armed confrontation."

Since it first entered service in 1979, the Fighting Falcon has engaged in more than 400,000 combat sorties and has more than a combined 19 million flight hours. Moreover, the F-16 has been adapted to complete several missions, including air-to-air fighting, ground attack, and electronic warfare. It has proven to be highly maneuverable while its combat radius exceeds that of its potential threats.

The F-16 is no longer being acquired by the U.S. Air Force, but Lockheed Martin continues to build the F-16 for foreign customers around the world. It remains the world's most successful, combat-proven multi-role jet fighter ever produced.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The F-35A, Lockheed Martin's advanced stealth fighter, has attained operational certification to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, marking it as the first 5th generation aircraft with nuclear capabilities. With this milestone achieved ahead of schedule, the F-35A becomes a pivotal component of the US and NATO's extended deterrence commitments. This development highlights the aircraft's versatility as a dual-capable platform, capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads. As NATO-operated jets receive initial certification for the deterrence mission, the integration of the B61-12 further enhances the F-35A's combat capability, solidifying its role in modern warfare.

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II has been touted as being the most advanced multirole combat aircraft in service in the world today, and according to a new report – it is now a nuclear-capable warbird.

Breaking Defense first reported on Friday that the F-35A, the conventional takeoff and landing variant, has been operationally certified to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb.

In a statement, F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) spokesman Russ Goemaere told Breaking Defense the certification was achieved on October 12, months ahead of a pledge to NATO allies that the process would wrap by January 2024. An undisclosed number of F-35As will now be capable of carrying the B61-12, officially making the stealth fighter a "dual-capable" aircraft that can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.

"The F-35A is the first 5th generation nuclear-capable aircraft ever, and the first new platform (fighter or bomber) to achieve this status since the early 1990s. This F-35 Nuclear Certification effort culminates 10+ years of intense effort across the nuclear enterprise, which consists of 16 different government and industry stakeholders," said Goemaere. "The F-35A achieved Nuclear Certification ahead of schedule, providing US and NATO with a critical capability that supports US extended deterrence commitments earlier than anticipated. "

As previously reported by Maya Carlin for The National Defense in December, some North Atlantic Treaty Organization-operated jets had received "initial certification for the deterrence mission."

The F-35A is only certified to carry the B61-12 variant, the latest variant of the United States military's B61 family of air-launched nuclear gravity bombs. It is a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. Moreover, the certification additionally does not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C.

The B61-12, which is twelve feet long and weighs approximately 825 pounds, is an air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilized an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target. It was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally. The weapon will also be certified to be carried on the Air Force’s B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Analysis from the Federation of American Scientists reports that as of last summer, there are approximately 100 older variants of the B61 bombs housed by NATO forces in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The first of those nations either currently or plan to operate the fifth-generation stealth fighter.

In 2021, the F-35A became the first fifth-generation platform to near certification as a nuclear-capable airframe. The improvements to the already-advanced F-35 will boost the combat capability of the stealth fighter jet. These improvements will allow it to penetrate hostile airspace without warning and possibly be a part of the United States military's nuclear triad.

Unlike with the other fighters, including the F-15 and F-16, the B61-12 will be carried internally in the F-35.

The B61-12 was first successfully flight-tested to carry the B61-12 nuclear bomb at the Sandia National Laboratories' Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, in late 2020. An F-35A carried a mock warhead, which was used in a strike from an altitude of 10,500 feet, as part of a full-weapons systems demonstration that was designed to increase confidence the bomb would “work when needed.”

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: As tensions rise between the U.S. and China, military strategists analyze the growing threat posed by China's anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like the DF-21D and DF-26B. While the U.S. Navy has successfully countered missile strikes so far, the prospect of facing these advanced weapons in a conflict with China raises concerns about the effectiveness of aircraft carriers, long considered the backbone of U.S. naval power. With both sides possessing formidable arsenals, we must question the role of carriers in modern warfare and whether a potential conflict might escalate beyond conventional naval battles.

Military planning is about considering the numerous hypothetical scenarios – such as how and where an enemy might strike, but more importantly whether and even how a potential foe's weapons systems can be countered. No doubt America's enemies likely have considered how to hit and sink an aircraft carrier – and it is just as likely U.S. Navy officials have been kept up at night worrying about such an unthinkable event.

The sailors of the United States Navy must do everything right absolutely every time, while an enemy only has to get lucky once. That fact is no doubt understood by the sailors who have been serving in the Red Sea, facing missile and drone strikes launched by Houthi rebels operating in Yemen.

So far the United States Navy has a perfect record, countering every missile fired at its warships. Arguably the odds are stacked in favor of the U.S. military, which has the best and most advanced air defense systems in the world operated by highly trained sailors.

In a conflict against China, however, the odds could shift.

As previously reported, three decades ago, China introduced its DF-21D (Dong Feng-21, CSS-5), a medium-range, road-mobile ballistic missile. It has been described as the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) or "carrier killer." Designed to replace the obsolete Dong Feng-2 (CSS-1), it was China's first solid-fuel road-mobile missile to use solid propellant. Able to deploy a 600 kg payload with a minimum range of 500 km (311 miles) and a maximum range of 2,150 km, the DF-21D’s warhead is likely maneuverable and may have an accuracy of 20 m CEP (circular error probable).

Beijing has since developed multiple DF-21 variants, including a dual nuclear/conventional capable version (DF-21C) and another designed as an anti-ship ballistic missile (DF-21D). In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also revealed that it believed a new nuclear variant, the DF-21E CSS-5 Mod 6) was also being produced.

Moreover, while the DF-21D could be used near the "home waters" of China, Beijing has also developed another missile that poses a threat to warships operating throughout much of the Indo-Pacific region.

This is the DF-26B (Dong Feng-26), a road-mobile, two-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that was first unveiled during a military parade in September 2015. It has a reported range of 4,000km (2,485 miles) and it can be used in both conventional and nuclear strikes against ground as well as naval targets.

\The mobile launcher can carry a 1,200 to 1,800 kg nuclear or conventional warhead, and as it could directly strike a target such as the U.S. territory of Guam in the event of war it should be seen as a formidable weapon. More ominously, the DF-26B has been described as a carrier killer due to how it could be used to target the U.S. Navy’s fleet of Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarriers.

Aircraft carriers were vital during the Second World War in defeating Japan in the Pacific, and the flattops have proven vital in confronting aggression during the Cold War and throughout the Global War on Terror (GWoT). Yet, the number of carriers has actually diminished even as the United States Navy operates 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers – more than any other nation in the world.

Instead of having a large fleet of conventionally powered carriers, the United States relies on a smaller number of massive flattops. The question now is whether the United States Navy could risk such vessels in a conflict against a near-peer adversary, notably China.

Losing a single carrier would be devastating as it couldn't be quickly replaced.

Yet, a war against China wouldn't simply be a replay of World War II. Even if the conflict were to be fought in the Indo-Pacific, it wouldn't be an island-hopping campaign. More importantly, U.S. bombers can already strike any spot on the globe thanks to aerial refueling fly CONUS-to-CONUS missions.

Thus, the hypothetical is whether carriers are now the weapons needed for a war against China. It is unlikely that such a conflict would be decided by even a single decisive naval battle. Rather it would likely be one of stealth bombers, missiles and possibly even nuclear weapons should the conflict escalate to that point.

Yet, the point remains that if an enemy has enough missiles, drones, aircraft, submarines, etc. – a carrier is going to be sunk. But that goes both ways. China can ill afford to lose its capital ships any more than the U.S.

Perhaps that realization is enough that cooler heads will prevail again, and keep any potential Cold War 2.0 from turning hot.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Across the world, media outlets and non-governmental organizations are speaking about the plight of Armenian settler colonialists in Karabakh, who left their homes voluntarily.   For example, the International Crisis Group recently published a report, proclaiming: “Armenia is having problems integrating over 100,000 refugees who fled Nagorno-Karabakh when Azerbaijan took control of the enclave in September 2023. Yerevan has tried to be generous, but it lacks funds and a long-term plan, leaving the displaced people exposed and facing an uncertain future.” 

They discussed the difficulties faced by Armenian settler colonists who left their homes voluntarily upon return to Armenia, while remaining deafly silent about the plight of the West Azerbaijanis, who faced similarly difficulties and who unlike these Armenians were the indigenous inhabitants of the land and not settler colonialists, whose presence in Karabakh violated four UN Security Council resolutions.  Similarly, the European Commission just released a statement, proclaiming: “the Commission is allocating an additional €5.5 million in humanitarian aid to support the Armenians displaced from the Nagorno-Karabakh region.”

Underlining EU’s humanitarian support to Karabakh Armenians, Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič, said: “This is the first winter for thousands of Karabakh Armenians who fled to Armenia last Autumn. In these challenging times, it is our humanitarian duty to provide protection and assistance to the people most in need. With this new €5.5 million funding, we will aim to further strengthen the existing EU humanitarian response to the displaced people in Armenia, by providing them with access to basic services.”

Interestingly, when Israel evacuated 9,000 Jewish settlers from 22 settlements in the Gush Katif community in the Gaza Strip, the European Union did not provide any of the Israelis who were displaced from their home with financial assistance, including in the winter months.  This remained the case, even though decades onward, not everyone who was evacuated from their homes has been able to establish a new home and a new life.  In fact, the Europeans praised Israel’s evacuation from Gaza, even though it led to this grave humanitarian disaster for the residents of Gush Katif and the brutal Hamas terror organization taking over the coastal strip.    So, why the compassion for the Karabakh Armenians and not the Israeli evacuees? Is this not hypocrisy?   Furthermore, why did the Europeans not raise a finger to help the West Azerbaijanis, whom no one ever argued were settler colonialists?   

Chairman of the Management Board of the Western Azerbaijani Community, MP Aziz Alakbarli, recently stated that today the world speaks about the plight of Karabakh Armenians, even though they are settler colonialists, but not the West Azerbaijani community, who are indigenous to the land: “the Western Azerbaijani Community does not accept the injustice committed against the western Azerbaijanis not only in the last 100 years but also in the last two centuries and rejects the consequences of this injustice. Based on the right of return established in the Convention and other important international acts, it declares as its main goal to create conditions for the return of Azerbaijanis expelled from the territory of Armenia to their homeland and to ensure their individual and collective rights after returning there.”         

Summary: The decline of America's "unipolar moment" and the rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems signal a critical juncture for US military strategy. These inexpensive but effective defenses challenge the utility of America's costly offensive platforms, like aircraft carriers, against near-peer adversaries. The proliferation of A2/AD capabilities to smaller states and non-state actors further complicates US power projection globally. As enemies like the Houthis potentially gain access to such technologies through backers like Iran, China, or Russia, the US Navy must innovate or face diminishing operational spheres, highlighting the urgent need for advancements in drone swarms, submarines, and hypersonic weapons to maintain strategic relevance.

It has become trite to say that America’s “unipolar moment” has ended. Sadly, it has ended. Yet, the elites who run US foreign and national security policy have yet to realize this tragic reality. The longer that they continue operating as if it is 1994 as opposed to 2024, the more likely the US military will suffer its greatest defeat since the Battle of Bladensburg during the War of 1812. Understanding the grave threat that relatively inexpensive defensive systems, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), pose to America’s wildly expensive—and complicated—offensive weapons platforms, such as its aircraft carriers, is an important step for US policymakers. 

The longer that US policymakers fail to consider the rise of these A2/AD systems, the more insecure America becomes.

As Steven Stashwick of The Diplomat wrote way back in 2016, “the United States is already paying much more for a proportionally smaller increase in combat performance, a diminishing future operational return on increasing military investments.” Citing both the Ford-class aircraft carrier and the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane as examples of the diminishing operational return on increasing military investments, Stashwick suggested that US war planners abandon the concept of decisively defeating a near-peer rival in combat. Instead, Stashwick believes the Americans should simply seek to deny their rivals from winning.

Interestingly, America’s greatest rivals—notably China—have so thoroughly perfected their A2/AD capabilities that even attempting to deploy expensive systems, such as the aircraft carriers, into areas that are home to these dangerous A2/AD systems would be wasteful. 

So, if the US cannot use its greatest naval power projector against near-peer rivals due to their A2/AD capabilities, when and where could these assets be used? 

Aircraft carriers would be useful, as they have been over the last 79 years since the end of the Second World War, in regions where the enemies of the United States lack these A2/AD capabilities. However, the problem is that both China and Russia are rapidly proliferating these systems to smaller states and transnational terror organizations because they understand that A2/AD stunts the ability of the US military to project power. 

Take, for example, the situation currently plaguing global shipping around the Middle East. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels operating out of Yemen are increasingly threatening the safety of global shipping through regions, such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb.

Despite having been terrorizing the high seas since last October, the US Navy, which has many assets in the region, has stayed its hand in responding to the Houthi threat directly. Because of its hesitancy to respond, the Houthis have only been more encouraged to continue antagonizing the situation, believing the US Navy will not directly respond to their endless provocations. 

In fact, the Houthis have gotten so bold that they just recently launched a massive attack consisting of 21 advanced offensive drones and directed them to attack nearby US Navy warships. 

The Navy warships dispatched the Houthi drones (which were provided by the Iranians, the chief benefactor for the Houthis) with relative ease. But, as a colleague and expert in military affairs quipped to me shortly after that event, all these attacks against US Navy assets are merely data-gathering missions. 

The Houthis are escalating at every engagement with the Navy. With each engagement, they learn invaluable intelligence about the Navy’s defensive capabilities.

It would not be too difficult for this tiny terrorist organization to suddenly be handed A2/AD capabilities by their Iranian, Chinese, or Russian allies. Such systems would only allow for the Houthis to operate with even more impunity than they’ve already been operating under. And the US Navy seems willing to oblige even these tinier threats by not innovating their own effective countermeasures to the growing global A2/AD threat. 

So, until they do, the world will become smaller and smaller for US forces. Specifically, there will be fewer areas in which US carriers and other capital ships could operate with the kind of impunity they’ve become accustomed to since the end of the Cold War. 

Yes, given A2/AD capabilities being fielded by rivals, like China, US carriers will be increasingly relegated to operating in ancillary areas of interest. But China and its autocratic allies will not be content to simply keep US power projection out of their respective regions. 

Instead, they’ll seek to rollback US power everywhere. Even groups like the Houthis will suddenly become important destinations for A2/AD capabilities. 

The Navy needs to take the development of massive drone swarms, the expansion of its submarine fleet, and hypersonic weapons systems much more seriously than it has. Otherwise, even the Houthis will possess the means to sink US carriers—thereby ensuring that those systems could not be deployed to even places like Yemen.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

Summary: China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly expanding its aircraft carrier fleet, aiming for five to six carriers by the 2030s. Despite the global shift towards sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems that challenge naval power projection, China continues to invest heavily in carriers. This strategy underscores China's ambition to dominate the Indo-Pacific, particularly the First Island Chain, leveraging A2/AD systems to create a defensive "bubble" that enables its carriers to operate with impunity. Unlike the US, China’s carriers are not the centerpiece of its maritime power; instead, its A2/AD capabilities are, facilitating regional dominance and deterring US intervention.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been building a fleet of increasingly sophisticated aircraft carriers. What began as the butt of all jokes in the naval community—China’s Russian-built aircraft carrier called the Liaoning—has helped the PLAN develop into a robust (though untested and still limited) carrier force. Possessing three total aircraft carriers, with a fourth on the way, China is churning out their aircraft carriers like sausages (thanks to the mass production capabilities that Wall Street handed over to China during the deindustrialization craze that befell America in the middle of the last century). The fourth carrier in China’s growing fleet is rumored to be nuclear (the other three are non-nuclear).

China’s naval planners desire to have five or six aircraft carriers in their fleet by the 2030s, according to Wang Yunfei, a retired PLAN officer with knowledge about Beijing’s carrier plans. 

This begs the question, though, how many carriers does China really need? 

And that gets us to the underlying problem facing most great powers today, which is that the advent of sophisticated anti-area/access-denial (A2/AD) systems has complicated the ability of navies everywhere to project power beyond their shores. 

At least that’s the case for the US Navy. 

So, if A2/AD has seriously stunted the ability of surface fleets to move their assets within striking range of distant targets—and China’s military has led the way in this revolution—why is Beijing dumping so much money and resources into developing their own aircraft carrier capability? 

It's because, despite their awful human rights record and authoritarian regime, China is led by actual military strategists not politicians. 

For China, they have a multi-step strategy for dominating the Indo-Pacific—starting with the First Island Chain. There are three island chains, each radiating out from the previous one. The First Island Chain runs from Japan through Taiwan all the way down to the Philippines. The Second Island Chain consists of the tiny South Pacific Islands that track from the Japanese island of Okinawa all the way out to U.S.-controlled Guam. The third and final chain comprises Alaska’s Aleutian Islands and jogs down to the Hawaiian Islands. 

For China to dominate the Indo-Pacific it must ultimately come to control all three chains. Their main priority now, however, is to dominate the First Island Chain. That’s where China’s sprawling A2/AD constellation throughout the South China Sea, for instance, comes into play. From these forward-deployed positions, China’s A2/AD systems can rebuff most attempts by US Navy surface warships to come within range of Chinese forces that may be engaged in an invasion—or even a blockade—of Taiwan or some other hostile action against another US ally, such as the Philippines. 

Without the ability to reliably project power against Chinese forces in the First Island Chain, Beijing’s forces suddenly have a strategic freehand in what they view as their sphere of influence.

In essence, A2/AD systems create a nearly impenetrable “bubble” to shield Chinese military forces from American military retaliation. Underneath the protective A2/AD bubble is where Chinese carriers will operate—presumably out of range from American offensive systems. With the US Navy’s biggest power projectors, aircraft carriers, kept away, China’s carriers will have free reign to operate and intimidate. 

This, of course, is the purpose behind China’s robust arsenal of A2/AD systems. 

Unlike the US Navy, China’s aircraft carriers are not the center of gravity for their fleet. These systems are ancillary. The lynchpin of China’s offensive maritime strategy is oddly in their defensive A2/AD systems. 

These systems are specifically tailored to keep the bulk of US naval power back, giving China’s other naval assets—like their less sophisticated aircraft carriers—the room to enhance their national interest in the First Island Chain and keep US power back over-the-horizon. 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.