Agrégateur de flux

This paper discusses the importance of acknowledging power asymmetries in transnational (knowledge) cooperation and exchange. The authors explore different forms of power and the challenges of tackling power imbalances while working in  cooperation between diverse actors. They argue that new and more reflective approaches to transnational (knowledge) cooperation are necessary. The authors then discuss how power inequalities are addressed in the Managing Global Governance  (MGG) Academy and in the Shaping Futures Academy,24 organised by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Both formats are mutual learning and dialogue programmes for early to mid-career professionals from different partner countries around the globe.

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

A hatvanas években három komolyabb, halálos áldozatokat követelő tűzeset történt az amerikai haditengerészet repülőgép-hordozóin. A USS Forrestal fedélzetén 1967. július 29-én és a USS Enterprise-on 1969. január 15-én történt esetek mellett kevésbé ismert az első, amely a USS Oriskany repülőgép-hordozón keletkezett 1966. október 26-án. A helyzet nem indult olyan drámaian, mint a másik két hordozón, és az első pillanatban még kezelhető lett volna, de a pánik hatása alatt hozott hibás döntés végül 44 életet követelt és repülőgépek, helikopterek elvesztését okozta.

Amikor a britekkel vívott függetlenségi háború egyik csatájáról, a mai New York állam területén lévő Oriskanynál 1777-ben lezajlott ütközetről elnevezett Essex osztályú repülőgép-hordozót 1945. október 13-án vízre bocsátották, már véget ért a második világháború. Nem is siettek hadrendbe állítani, végül csak 1950. szeptember 25-én került sor rá. A USS Oriskany járt az európai vizeken, majd „áttette székhelyét” a nyugati partra, Kaliforniába, és már onnan indult el, hogy repülőgépeivel részt vegyen a koreai háborúban. Azt, hogy mit művel egy tűz a hangárfedélzeten, már ekkor megtapasztalhatta a hajó akkori legénysége. 1953. március 6-án egy bevetésről visszatérő légcsavaros Corsair pilótája nem tudta leoldani az egyik bombáját, és azzal szállt le ez Oriskanyn. A fedélzetre érkezés erejétől a bomba leesett, kettőt pattant és felrobbant. A repeszek a fedélzetet átütve kilyukasztották a hangárfedélzeten álló sugárhajtású F9F-3 Panther gépek üzemanyagtartályát és a kiömlő kerozin meggyulladt. A tűzoltóknak akkor sikerült gyorsan úrrá lenniük a lángokon és megfékezni a tüzet.

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