Agrégateur de flux

Rising debt has sparked a new battle for national sovereignty. 

Le Ministère de la Décentralisation et de la Gouvernance locale disposera d'un budget de 55,29 milliards de FCFA en 2026. Le ministre Raphaël Akotègnon a présenté le projet devant la Commission budgétaire de l'Assemblée nationale la semaine dernière. L'enveloppe progresse de 1,30% par rapport à 2025.

Le budget 2026 du Ministère de la Décentralisation et de la Gouvernance locale s'établit à 55,29 milliards de FCFA. Il est prévu 30,67 milliards FCFA pour les dépenses ordinaires. Dans ce volet, 22,61 milliards FCFA, soit 73,72%, iront au FADeC-fonctionnement. Cette dotation doit couvrir les charges courantes des communes et assurer la continuité des services publics locaux.

Les dépenses en capital atteignent 24,63 milliards FCFA. Là encore, la priorité va aux communes : 21,17 milliards FCFA, soit 85,95%, sont réservés au FADeC-investissement.

Au total, le FADeC représente 82,81% du budget du ministère, hors salaires et ressources extérieures. Le gouvernement confirme ainsi que le développement communal reste au cœur de son action.

L'évolution du budget 2026 tient surtout au dynamisme de l'investissement local. Le FADeC-investissement bondit de 44,74%, passant de 14,62 milliards FCFA en 2025 à 21,17 milliards FCFA en 2026. L'État dit vouloir intensifier les projets structurants dans les communes.

Le budget prévoit aussi 3,20 milliards FCFA pour lancer la construction du Centre de Formation pour l'Administration Locale (CeFAL). Cette structure doit renforcer les compétences des cadres communaux et professionnaliser la gestion locale.
M. M.

The French luxury giant LVMH is clearly not done with intelligence fishing in murky waters. Business intelligence firms have in recent months [...]

Written by Marie Lecerf.

The EU and its Member States have signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and use its definition of disability as a common reference at EU level. There is no other harmonised definition of disability in the EU.

The introduction of the Global Activity Limitation Instrument indicator (GALI) in most of Eurostat’s social and economic surveys offers the opportunity to have a clearer assessment of disability in the EU than before. It confirms that in 2024 the prevalence of disability was higher among female, older and less educated respondents.

The EU combats all forms of discrimination alongside and in support of its Member States. To improve the situation of people with disabilities, it has introduced a series of initiatives, programmes and strategies over a number of decades. The European Parliament has been highly active in the bid to end all forms of discrimination against people with disabilities, since the early 1980s.

In 1997, Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the human right not to suffer discrimination on grounds, in particular, of disability, paved the way for a genuine disability policy. The first step in this regard was the adoption of a 2001-2006 action programme to combat discrimination. Later, the 2010-2020 European disability strategy sought to enable people with disabilities to exercise their rights and participate fully in society and the economy.

The 2021-2030 strategy, incorporating lessons learned from its predecessor, seeks to ensure that all persons with disabilities in the EU, regardless of their sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation: enjoy their human rights; have equal access to participation in society and the economy; can decide where, how and with whom they live; can move freely in the EU regardless of their support needs; and no longer experience discrimination.

This is a further update of a briefing, the first edition of which was published in November 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU policies for people with disabilities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Military technologies used to address climate threats are often the same ones used for more nefarious purposes.

History-making African cyclist Biniam Girmay signs for NSN Cycling - the new team co-owned by World Cup winner Andres Iniesta.

Deux semaines après son dernier passage à Paris, le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky s'est de nouveau entretenu avec Emmanuel Macron ce lundi 1er décembre à l’Élysée. Le plan de paix en cours de négociation pour l'Ukraine n'est pour l'heure « pas finalisé », notamment en ce qui concerne les questions territoriales, des garanties de sécurité et de l'utilisation des actifs russes gelés, a dit lundi le président Emmanuel Macron.

La Police républicaine a renforcé les connaissances des journalistes et acteurs culturels sur la police communautaire, la prévention de l'extrémisme violent et la lutte contre la désinformation. L'atelier s'est tenu les 26 et 27 novembre 2025 à Dassa-Zoumè.

25 journalistes et acteurs culturels ont été outillés pour une pratique médiatique plus responsable. L'objectif de la formation de deux journées, organisée par la Police républicaine avec l'appui de la coopération belge Enabel, est de faire des participants des relais d'information fiables et des acteurs de cohésion sociale.

Les échanges tenus les 26 et 27 novembre 2025 à Dassa-Zoumè ont tourné autour de quatre communications.

Le commissaire Ambroise Hounhouédo a ouvert les travaux avec un rappel historique et conceptuel sur la police communautaire.

Le commissaire Jérémie Avadji a ensuite présenté les missions de la Police républicaine et ses relations avec la presse.

Deux interventions ont suivi : l'une sur l'intégrité de l'information, assurée par Romuald Vissoh, l'autre sur le rôle des médias dans la prévention de l'extrémisme violent, conduite par le commissaire major Jacques Singbo.

Former pour prévenir

Selon les participants, ces sessions ont permis d'affiner leur compréhension des enjeux sécuritaires et de mieux mesurer leur responsabilité face aux risques de radicalisation. L'initiative a également mis en avant l'importance d'une collaboration étroite entre médias, acteurs culturels et forces de sécurité.

Pour la Police républicaine, cette démarche s'inscrit dans une stratégie plus large de prévention et de rapprochement avec les communautés. L'information fiable et la vigilance citoyenne restent des piliers essentiels pour contenir les menaces d'extrémisme violent au Bénin, selon la Police.
M. M.

La fintech panafricaine Zazu annonce une levée de fonds pré-seed de 1 million de dollars. L'opération réunit plusieurs investisseurs africains et européens.

Zazu accèlère son déploiement en Afrique du Sud et au Maroc avant une expansion continentale en 2026. La startup veut devenir la première plateforme bancaire panafricaine dédiée aux entrepreneurs et aux PME. Elle a annoncé, ce 1er décembre 2025, la levée de fonds pré-seed de 1 million de dollars auprès dʼinvestisseurs africains et européens de premier.

« Nous construisons l'OS financier des entreprises africaines », affirment les fondateurs de Zazu.

La levée rassemble Plug and Play Ventures et un groupe d'anges investisseurs reconnus de l'écosystème fintech. On y retrouve notamment Zachariah George (Launch Africa Ventures), Axel Peyriere (AUTO24.africa), Akshay Patel (Paymentology), Ismael Belkhayat (Chari) ou encore Sophie Guibaud (Fiat Republic). Plusieurs membres fondateurs de Qonto et Solarisbank complètent le tour. Zazu revendique ainsi « l'un des cap tables les plus expérimentés de la fintech africaine ».

Fondée par Germain Bahri et Rinse Jacobs, anciens dirigeants de Solarisbank, Zazu veut offrir une expérience bancaire professionnelle moderne, inspirée de Mercury mais « adaptée aux réalités africaines ». La plateforme est déjà testée par plus de 50 PME, tandis que 1 000 entreprises figurent sur la liste d'attente.

Zazu entend servir les 50 millions de PME sous-bancarisées du continent. Les fondateurs misent sur une combinaison d'expertise européenne et de connaissance fine des marchés locaux.

La solution est déjà opérationnelle en Afrique du Sud et au Maroc. Elle s'appuie sur des intégrations avec Paystack, Shopstar ou Ozow. La startup revendique plus de 20 partenariats avec l'écosystème local. Elle a rejoint le Visa Accelerator Program, été élue KPMG Enterprise Innovator of the Year 2025, et figure dans les PwC Fintechs to Watch 2025.

Le choix de l'Afrique du Sud et du Maroc n'est pas fortuit. Les deux pays disposent de marchés entrepreneuriaux dynamiques et d'infrastructures fintech avancées. Ensemble, ils concentrent plus de 5 millions de PME et un marché B2B de plusieurs dizaines de milliards de dollars. Deux « portes d'entrée naturelles » vers le sud et le nord du continent, selon Zazu.

Forte de ses premiers résultats, la startup prévoit d'ouvrir un Seed Round début 2026, réservé à des investisseurs stratégiques. Ce tour doit permettre d'accélérer l'acquisition clients, d'enrichir la plateforme et d'étendre la solution à d'autres marchés africains.

The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.

Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.

The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.

Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.

The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.

Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Voir en ligne : http://benin.coris.bank

CHRONIQUE. Comment lutter contre le rouleau compresseur du Rassemblement national ? En marchant sur ses platebandes. En jouant les durs a cuire. Est-ce la nouvelle strategie du president ?

A un peu plus d’un mois du coup d’envoi de la Coupe d’Afrique des Nations 2025, les pronostics vont bon train. Lions de l’Atlas marocains, Eléphants de Côte d’Ivoire, Lions du Sénégal, Fennecs d’Algérie et Pharaons d’Egypte partent avec les faveurs des pronostics.

Voir en ligne : www.sgds.bj

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über die EU-Strategie zum Umgang mit neuen demokratiefeindlichen Theorien
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Bernard Guetta

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP