Agrégateur de flux

Les deux joueurs franco-algériens, Yacine Adli et Rayan Cherki, ont été zappés par les équipes de France. En effet, ils n’ont pas été retenus tous […]

L’article Equipes de France : Adli et Cherki zappés par Deschamps et Thierry Henry est apparu en premier sur .

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

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L’article Programme TV – Ramadan : l’ARAV lance un avertissement aux chaines de télévision est apparu en premier sur .

In the last week of February, top UAE diplomat Dr. Anwar Gargash spoke to a packed room in New Delhi, arguing for Indian representation at the United Nations Security Council. One week before, the Prime Minister of Greece attended the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi as its chief guest. On the sidelines of the gathering, Indian and Greek government officials explored ways to accelerate the IMEC corridor that was announced at the G20 summit last year. While this corridor was inaugurated with the United States, the U.S. approach to multilateral initiatives with India has been different. For instance, earlier in the year, President Joe Biden missed the Indian Republic Day celebrations.

What set this celebration apart was its chief guest. Despite the fact that it was not even his first Indian Republic Day celebration, the chief guest, French president Emmanuel Macron, made a mark on the bilateral relationship between India and France and left a few lessons for the U.S.-India partnership.

Each year, the Indian government invites chief guests to commemorate the anniversary. For the 2024 celebration, it had initially invited President Biden and planned a Quad-like gathering with the leaders of Australia and Japan. However, President Biden excused himself from the event, citing “scheduling demands.” Therein collapsed the idea of showcasing the unity among the Quad nations.

Interestingly, there was widespread speculation that Biden’s last-minute (less than a month) withdrawal could not be explained by boilerplate excuses. A few analysts, such as Bruno Macaes, even used the American president’s withdrawal as a supposed sign of isolation of India on the world stage after its alleged involvement in the killing of a Sikh separatist in Canada and an alleged attempt on the life of another on American soil.

Macron accepted the state invitation without much hesitation. He responded publicly on the social media platform X, “Thank you for your invitation, my dear friend @NarendraModi. India, on your Republic Day, I’ll be here to celebrate with you!”

For New Delhi, this was another instance of Paris having its back as Washington stonewalls.

The lesson to draw here is the difference in foreign policy and diplomatic approaches between Paris, Abu Dhabi, Athens, Tel Aviv, and Washington. Excluding the United States, all four have remained non-interventionist—excusing themselves from the domestic tribulations of New Delhi—with a focus on finding synergies for expanded cooperation to capitalize on shared interests.

On the other hand, Washington continues to stick to its often hypocritical values-evangelism and, as a result, an increasingly interventionist approach.  In this paradigm of values versus interests, values would gain salience when interests rest on a solid foundation. In the case of the four nations and India, defense, trade, increasing connectivity, securing sea lanes, and the shared vision for a multipolar world lay the foundation for stable ties.

While Washington and New Delhi share some of those values and interests, the divergence in understanding of the values and interests continues to render the partnership difficult. Of note, there are three avenues where these nations get it right and Washington wrong. 

Firstly, as a postcolonial society, India is particularly resistant to any intervention by a Western power that challenges its hallowed self-determination and autonomy. The four nations understand New Delhi’s instincts and do not lose sight of India’s larger relevance to their larger geopolitical goals. Washington, on the other hand, simply does not understand or endorse India’s strategic autonomy. 

Secondly and more broadly, Washington fails to accurately understand India’s deep cultural, religious, and civilizational history and its renewed relevance today. Experts in both New Delhi and Washington covering the respective regions often view Indian affairs through the lens of liberal internationalist ideology—which seeks to shape the world according to its ideals. This stands in contrast to realism, wherein people, nations, and states are left to act in their own best interests and values. 

For example, the Indian prime minister inaugurated the Ram Temple in Ayodhya with much fanfare in India and the Indian diasporic community after a struggle of over 500 years to recover the ancient Hindu site destroyed by the Mughal invader Babur in the sixteenth century. Modi even gifted a replica of the Ram Temple to Macron. To many Indians, the Ram Temple is their Notre Dame Cathedral—not only a religious site but also a cultural monument closely tied to their civilizational identity. As reductionist as it would be to call Notre Dame in Paris solely a cathedral for Catholics, so would it be to categorize the Ram Temple as merely a Hindu temple.

Yet, most English language media and other institutions remained silent in response to overtly Christian state events in secular democracies, such as the White House National Prayer Breakfast or Royal Coronation in the UK, while decrying the inauguration of the Ram Temple as a symbol of religious supremacy. In doing so, they ignored its significance and misrepresented or ignored the facts. For example, the Indian government is also arranging the construction of what will be one of India’s largest mosques in the same city.

Similarly, the UAE government has supported the Indian diaspora and New Delhi’s cultural ambitions. It gifted twenty-seven acres of land for the construction of the first stone Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi. The Indian prime minister inaugurated the temple in late February with much fanfare.

Lastly, the divergence in understanding of the world order presents itself as an irreconcilable difference. India’s vision for the world as multipolar with the need for increased representation for different regions of the world and a democratized global financial system are antithetical to Washington’s unipolar vision of the world driven largely by its military and financial hegemony.

External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, best articulated this vision recently by noting that, “It’s important today to make a distinction between being non-West and anti-West. I would certainly characterize India as a country which is non-West, but which has an extremely strong relationship with Western countries, getting better by the day.” 

India, like China, Brazil, and South Africa, has championed new systems and vehicles as alternatives to the existing ones, such as the SWIFT payment system, credit rating, and multilateral lending. Through groupings such as BRICS and development banks such as AIIB and NDB, India is not counting on the West to save the day. This autonomy frustrates Washington, which sees itself as setting the course of the post-world war order. However, as some reports suggest, France is capitalizing on India’s proverbial feet in both the West and the Global South. A recent report suggested India was behind the vetoing of Algeria’s application to the expanded BRICS grouping at the request of the French. Even Ukraine, a country that is not a strategic partner of India, leveraged India’s relationship with Russia as an olive branch to raise concerns surrounding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. Washington, however, has not capitalized on India’s position in the Global South but instead has given it a hard time for participation in such alternative groupings.

On balance, the UAE, Greece, Israel, and France accept India for what it is, while the United States decries and prescribes what it should be. Will prescriptive policy work well with a nation-state that simultaneously represents a civilization several thousands of years old, a post-colonial society, the world’s fifth-largest economy (soon to be third), the world’s largest population, and nuclear power? We will soon find out.

Akhil Ramesh is the Director of the India Program and Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Pacific Forum.

Samir Kalra is the Managing Director for Policy and Programs at the Hindu American Foundation.

Editorial credit: Saikat Paul / Shutterstock.com

Alexander Ward. The Internationalists: The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy after Trump (New York, Portfolio/Penguin). 368 pp., $32.00.

As Americans contemplate prolonging the Biden presidency, now is a good time to scrutinize its foreign policy record. Politico reporter Alexander Ward’s new book has made their job easier. The Internationalists, an account of the Biden administration’s first two years, takes us behind the scenes of national security decisionmaking. The story does not reveal much to admire.

The internationalists in question are the people you’d expect: National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. They and their subordinates form the self-styled “A-Team,” the group of aides tasked with righting the ship after Trump supposedly drove it off course. They’re self-assured and credentialed, a new iteration of “the best and the brightest” lauded by the Democratic elite.

Missing from their ranks is their boss. In contrast to the robust foreign policy involvement of past presidents, Biden plays a minor role. The forty-sixth president depicted in this book can be most charitably likened to an affable elder statesman detached from the decisionmaking process around him. Ward includes plenty of vignettes from Biden’s pre-2021 life but relatively few from his time as commander-in-chief. We get a good idea of what Biden’s top officials were thinking during various crises but a poor idea of the president’s thoughts. Ward’s book substantiates what many Americans already know: the octogenarian Biden is not calling the shots. Like Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris is on the sidelines—the book has almost nothing to say about her.

As any good reporter should, Ward keeps his audience rapt. His prose lacks fluff and reads well. Another giveaway that a journalist wrote this book is the musings of anonymous administration officials sprinkled throughout the text. Although it would be nice to know these people’s identities, it’s better to have their off-the-record comments than none at all. The engaging style of The Internationalists is all to the good.

The book takes a decent enough stab at impartiality. A former Vox reporter, Ward doesn’t parrot the Biden administration’s line like others in the left-leaning press. He’s critical when he thinks it erred. Though certainly no conservative, Ward isn’t wholly unfair to Republicans. For instance, he recognizes that Senator Ted Cruz, who assailed the Biden administration’s decision to waive sanctions on Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline in an effort to placate Germany, had opposed the pipeline during Trump’s presidency.

Ward, nonetheless, can’t check all his views at the door. A comical example comes in his portrayal of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley. Milley was “controversial,” Ward submits because he walked with Trump during the Lafayette Square photo-op in 2020. “He cared deeply about keeping the military away from politics but often failed to do that,” Ward elaborates while mentioning Milley’s uniformed appearances in the streets during the riots that year. An unwitting reader might think that Milley was some right-wing hack. Far from it: Milley gushed about the Pentagon’s DEI programming and reportedly undermined civilian control of the military by going around Trump’s back to tell his Chinese counterpart there would be no American nuclear strike.

Ward’s blinders are also hard at work in the book’s first chapter, which covers the lead-up to Biden’s presidency. In it, he deploys all the explanations for Trump’s 2016 victory that have become articles of faith on the Left. Yet Ward can’t make them without undermining them. “Factory workers, mainly in white-majority counties, feared that foreigners were taking their hard-earned jobs,” writes Ward. But in the very next sentence, he notes that America had lost almost five million manufacturing jobs since 1997. Were these prejudiced fears harbored by Trump supporters or rather fact-based observations?

Ward is more even-handed in subsequent chapters. Russia, Ukraine, Israel, and, of course, Afghanistan figure prominently. What ties them together is the Biden administration’s efforts to work with allies and partners in defense of the liberal democratic order. Ward persuasively shows that these efforts were well-intentioned. As for whether they were successful, he leaves that determination to readers. The results, not least the abominable Afghanistan withdrawal and the outbreak of war in Europe, speak for themselves.

Of Team Biden’s many mandarins, John Kerry comes across as the most insufferable. Tapped as the president’s special climate envoy, Kerry set about trying to conclude a deal with China to curb carbon emissions despite the skepticism of every other official in touch with reality. Only he and his prodigious talents could get the job done, the failed 2004 presidential candidate told himself. “[I]f anyone believed he could pull off the difficult balancing act, it was John Kerry,” Ward notes in what very well may be a mocking tone. To the surprise of no one, Kerry’s talks with Beijing have led nowhere.

Rivaling Kerry in the naïveté department is Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken has long been soft on America’s enemies. While a Harvard undergraduate, Ward informs us, Blinken wrote in the Crimson that instead of toppling the left-wing Sandinistas of Nicaragua, Washington should give them aid on the condition that the Marxist revolutionaries “liberalize their rule and schedule elections for the near future.” Let the record show that the viciously anti-American President Daniel Ortega, whose Sandinistas Blinken advocated supporting, has presided over Nicaragua’s decline and slide toward authoritarianism over the past seventeen years.

If only his Crimson article were just a youthful indiscretion. Blinken shed none of his poor judgment during his government service. As soon as he became secretary of state, he eagerly pushed to have the U.S.-Russia New START arms control treaty extended. This was pursued despite receiving no concessions from Moscow for doing so. Blinken would rather have a bad deal than no deal.

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan is the primus inter pares of this story. A foreign policy wunderkind in Democratic circles, Sullivan was tasked with “reimagining national security” under Biden. The 2016 election shook Sullivan to his core, and he concluded that Washington insiders had lost touch with the rest of the country. As national security adviser, he made a concerted attempt to implement foreign policy for the sake of ordinary Americans. Sullivan deserves some credit here—other officials often seem ignorant of the people they serve.

There’s a reason why the book’s opening and closing anecdotes are about Sullivan. He drives much of the action. He favored a hawkish stance toward China and Russia and closer ties with American allies. We get the sense that he made many of the decisions for which the Biden administration has come to be known. If Ward’s book were adapted into a screenplay, Sullivan would be the lead role.

Sullivan and his peers were at their worst during the Afghanistan withdrawal. Ward’s portrait of them is damning. While the White House and the Department of State readied for a September 11, 2021, withdrawal date, Pentagon officials who rightly predicted that the country would soon fall to the Taliban were ignored. “We at the State Department have a much higher risk tolerance than you guys,” Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Brian McKeon told Milley and Austin.

Although the decision to leave Afghanistan was a defensible position, the administration’s execution of the withdrawal remains indefensible. Sullivan, Blinken, and the rest did not do nearly enough to prepare for a safe, orderly evacuation. Their incompetence led to the fiasco that unfolded at Hamid Karzai International Airport—now burned into our collective memory. General Frank McKenzie, commander of United States Central Command, had to beg the Taliban not to enter Kabul while Americans were leaving. “If you don’t interfere with the evacuation, we won’t strike,” McKenzie told the Taliban’s co-founder. The most powerful country the world has ever seen was reduced to pleading at the feet of terrorist savages.

The killing of thirteen American servicemembers in a suicide bombing was the lowest point, a searing indictment of the whole withdrawal. What was supposed to be a triumphant homecoming ended in calamity. One expects accountability for those who fail so spectacularly. Not so in the Biden administration. Sullivan and Blinken inexplicably kept their jobs to keep up their failures.

The two of them moved from denouement in Afghanistan to the war in Ukraine, the subject of the last third of the book. They fared little better. After the bungled withdrawal, the administration was in no position to convince Vladimir Putin not to invade Ukraine. Their threats of hell to pay fell on deaf ears in Moscow. The United States then threw its support behind the Ukrainians following Putin’s invasion. Two years on, it’s too soon to tell how the war will end. Although the Biden administration has helped prevent Ukraine from being swallowed whole by Moscow, the conflict is locked in a costly stalemate.

Ward acknowledges he could have expounded more on other issues. Those interested in China, North Korea, cyber warfare, the southern border, and even climate change will encounter little about those topics. But there’s much worth reading about critical moments of the last few years. However, voters inclined to give the internationalists another four years may think twice after reading Ward’s book.

Daniel J. Samet is an America in the World Consortium Pre-Doctoral Fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS and a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Texas at Austin.

Editorial Credit: Matt Smith Photographer / Shutterstock.com

The European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) signed a bilateral agreement on 14 March 2024 to initiate a new phase of cooperation within MARSUR, the maritime surveillance information exchange system crafted by EDA. 

Launched in 2005 as a network for sharing open-source maritime information, MARSUR has since matured into a multi-faceted information exchange platform. The multinational initiative resulting from this effort now encompasses 22 European navies. Out of this pool, under the EDA framework, 16 EU navies are developing a capability for the automatic exchange of maritime surveillance information and decision-making support. 

MARSUR’s wide scope of services allow for information exchange, coordination and support to decision-making, aiming to improve the common ‘Recognised Maritime Picture’. The network plays an important role as a defence layer of the EU framework for exchanging information and maritime situation awareness, known as the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE). 

Now in its third stage of development, which is known as MARSUR III, the project is upgrading its technology and capabilities. That will soon include the exchange of classified information.  The bilateral agreement will provide the operational basis for the exchange of relevant data between SatCen and the MARSUR community through a secure network. 

“This bilateral agreement is a unique mechanism introduced under the MARSUR III project to involve SatCen in EDA ad hoc activities under the control and funding of the contributing Member States,” said EDA Chief Executive Jiří Šedivý. “I am pleased to sign it today on behalf of the MARSUR III contributing members,” he said. 

SatCen has aligned its efforts with EDA to define requirements and support maritime situational awareness with satellite data and analysis. SatCen joined the initiative in 2017 and in May 2021 signed the MARSUR III project arrangement for 2021-2026 and the way ahead. 

SatCen Director, Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, said: “I look forward to intensifying the excellent inter-agency collaboration by concluding this agreement, which will solidify the SatCen collaboration within MARSUR over the long term, and I would like to thank all actors involved, in particular the Member States as well as the teams of SatCen and EDA.”  

MARSUR III will now benefit from SatCen’s expertise, particularly in terms of governance, as it takes a role as permanent chair of the Technical Advisory Board, in training of operators and technicians, exchanging information and products, and connecting to CISE with its bridging node. 

SatCen will in turn connect its resources to the information held by European navies. SatCen will also welcome two MARSUR maritime surveillance experts, funded by the MARSUR community.

During the signing ceremony, Commander Joachim Weidmann, Chairperson of the MARSUR Management Group and representing the participating nations, said: “The bilateral agreement between EDA and SatCen is a milestone, and it is important that both organisations show the willingness to succeed in ensuring that relevant operational maritime information is shared in the required time.” 

EDA's wider role   

EDA supports its 27 Member States in improving their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for Ministries of Defence willing to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency has become the hub for European defence cooperation with expertise and networks allowing it to the whole spectrum of defence capabilities.   
  
Member States use EDA as an intergovernmental expert platform where their collaborative projects are supported, facilitated, and implemented. For more details, please see here.                             

Many countries’ skepticism of a recently announced deal that gives Ethiopia naval basing rights in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence is misguided. While the pact has stirred consternation, especially in Somalia (which claims Somaliland as part of its territory), it has the potential to benefit the entire Horn of Africa region, Egypt, and the security of the Red Sea.

With about 130 million people, Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked nation. Throughout its 2000-year history, it has struggled for access to the Red Sea—at times holding ports, at other times contending with the Ottoman Empire and European powers for control of the coast. After World War II, the Italian colony of Eritrea, with its two ports, was reincorporated into Ethiopia. However, the nation again lost direct sea access when Eritrea split and became independent in 1993. Since then, Ethiopia has depended on the tiny country of Djibouti as its single port with one road and railroad to move imports and exports. Besides Eritrea and Djibouti, Ethiopia also borders four other coastal polities: Sudan (currently engulfed in a civil conflict), Kenya (whose ports are too distant), Somalia, and Somaliland.

Somaliland is an Oklahoma-sized autonomous region of about 7 million people with over 500 miles of coast on the Red Sea. A former British colony, it gained independence in June 1960. It voluntarily joined with the former Italian Somaliland when that territory became independent in 1960, and the two formed the Somali Republic. The union was a disaster, as Somalia came under the rule of the brutal General Siad Barre, who tried to destroy the independence-minded Somalilanders, including inflicting thousands of deaths by bombing Hargeisa, its largest city.

In 1991, during the chaos that followed the Somali Civil War, Somaliland split from the federation. A decade later, Somalilanders voted in a referendum and overwhelmingly approved a constitution reaffirming Somaliland’s independence. Since then, Somaliland has built an imperfect but tenacious democracy, a comparatively free society, and an open, free-market economy, while most citizens have remained adamant about protecting their independence. And they have done it on their own, with minimal international assistance.

Conversely, next door, Somalia has been an international burden for decades, absorbing billions of dollars of assistance—including $500 million in security assistance from the United States—but achieving minimal progress with economic viability, democracy, governance, or even controlling its territory. It has hosted thousands of international troops under multiple peacekeeping missions to help it defeat al-Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-linked extremist movement, with limited success. It has also failed to hold a single “one person-one vote” election, opting instead to select its leaders through non-transparent, corrupt conclaves of elites and elders.

However, what Somalia has that Somaliland doesn’t have is international recognition, which accrued after the 1991 disintegration of the joint Somali Republic. This results in the bizarre situation of a “de facto” Somaliland that functions more effectively as a nation than does the “de jure” Somalia.

The reasons Somaliland hasn’t gained international recognition are varied. The African Union (AU) and Somalia are major stumbling blocks. The AU fears that granting Somaliland legitimacy may fracture other member states with separatist movements, despite its 2005 fact-finding mission determining that Somaliland’s recognition quest was “historically unique and self-justified.” Meanwhile, a solid nationalist trend that includes irredentist claims on Somali-inhabited areas of East Africa prevails within elements of Somalia, making it impossible for Mogadishu to accept the reality of Somaliland’s independence.

Even though Mogadishu has virtually no practical control over Somaliland, the United States defers to Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims by maintaining a nonsensical “One Somalia” policy. This, despite parts of the U.S. Government—such as the Pentagon—being eager to engage closely with Somaliland. Even more absurdly, the United States’s Ambassador to Somalia is, in effect, the Ambassador to Mogadishu airport—unable to circulate in the country or even the city. Meanwhile, many countries maintain consulates in Hargeisa and do regular business with Somaliland.

A Potentially Monumental MoU

The announcement of the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal drew strong criticism from the AU and Somalia. At the same time, Egypt, the United States, the European Union, and the Arab League voiced support for Somalia’s “sovereignty.” In a bit of over-the-top drama, Somalia even threatened war with Ethiopia. Egypt, meanwhile, opposes Ethiopian initiatives because of its dispute with Ethiopia over the massive Blue Nile dam project.

While the proposed port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland is still at the aspirational Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stage with many details to be defined, the general framework will benefit both. Ethiopia will lease a twelve-mile strip of Somaliland’s coast for fifty years while Somaliland will gain formal diplomatic recognition from Ethiopia and a stake in Ethiopia’s national air carrier. Somaliland has a modern port at Berbera, recently upgraded through a major investment by the UAE’s DP World, but the location for Ethiopia’s concession is still uncertain. In addition to a port for Ethiopian imports and exports, Ethiopia will establish a base—for a navy that hasn’t floated a ship since 1991. While Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland is significant, it will also likely open the door to other countries to follow suit since several have stated discretely that while they could not be the first to offer recognition, they could be second.

If the project is realized, it would have far-reaching benefits. The return of a professional Ethiopian navy to the Red Sea would improve stability in a critically important waterway menaced by piracy and other disruptions. Even Egypt, bitterly opposed to the deal, would benefit economically if more shipping transits the Suez Canal. Adding another port and an efficient transit corridor would be a significant economic boost to the region and offer additional ways to bring relief supplies into countries that frequently suffer from humanitarian disasters.

The deal could also release some pressure building in East Africa ever since Abiy declared that sea access was an existential issue last year. Many believed his remarks were a prelude to war with Eritrea, a catastrophic scenario. Given that Ethiopia could secure strictly commercial maritime access through other means, Abiy appears to believe that a naval base is indispensable to his cherished ambition of being the leader who restored Ethiopia’s status as an unassailable great African power. If the MoU with Somaliland fails, Abiy will likely continue his quest in a far more destabilizing way.

Possibilities of Choppy Water

There are complications, to be sure. Despite its great potential and high economic growth, Ethiopia faces a difficult financial situation thanks in part to the recent devastating war in Tigray and ongoing insecurity in other regions. Addis Ababa must be creative in funding an expensive project like building a base and navy.

Furthermore, Mogadishu may stop cooperating with Ethiopia on countering al-Shabaab in response to what it views as Ethiopia’s violations of its sovereignty (notwithstanding al-Shabaab’s long control of chunks of Somalia about which Somalia’s governing elites have often demonstrated a curious lack of focus). It may also try to stir clan trouble in areas of Ethiopia inhabited by ethnic Somalis or try to inflame an ongoing clan insurgency in Somaliland’s east.

Nonetheless, provoking clan trouble elsewhere risks exacerbating Somalia’s profound and often violent rivalries. The countries that provide the most funding for Somalia’s armed forces and government would also disapprove of such a campaign. There would be more evidence that Mogadishu is not sufficiently serious about fighting al-Shabaab to merit strong international support.

Similarly, there is little reason to believe that the Somaliland-Ethiopia deal will empower al-Shabaab. The terror group rose to prominence as an anti-Ethiopian insurgency and has always fused irredentist and nationalist sentiment with radical Salafism. It is propagandizing about the deal and vowing to resist Ethiopia. Yet thousands of troops, including many Ethiopians, have been inside Somalia for well over a decade. It is unlikely that an agreement implemented far to the north of where most Somalians live would boost al-Shabaab recruitment more than that reality.

Regional powers opposed to Ethiopia, such as Egypt and, increasingly, Eritrea, may seize the opportunity to work with Somalia to undermine Ethiopia. However, while Eritrea may not cherish the prospect of an eventual Ethiopian navy operating in the neighborhood, the port deal would resolve Ethiopia’s landlocked status and, therefore, remove a perennial source of friction in the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship. Egypt is strongly motivated to oppose Ethiopia but still has the same problem that has stymied its efforts to stop Ethiopia’s Blue Nile dam, namely its incapacity to do much about it.

Finally, a recently signed economic and military agreement between Somalia and Turkey has stirred hopes among Somalian partisans that Turkiye will confront Ethiopia on Somalia’s behalf. However, there is little to fear that the agreement portends such a destabilizing development. In addition to Somalia’s president acknowledging that the deal is unrelated to Ethiopia, Ankara has no reason to involve itself in the dispute, not least because of its strong military and economic ties with Ethiopia.

The Horn of Africa is an increasingly strategic region, yet the United States’s ability to defend its interests there continues to wane. Washington is partly hampered by incorporating the fiction that Somaliland is functionally part of Somalia into its policies. It is time for a pragmatic American approach that correctly calculates U.S. interests, starting with working to ease the tensions around the proposed Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. If cooler heads prevail, the port deal’s economic and security benefits will be well worth applause.

Tibor Nagy was the previous Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and is currently Professor Emeritus at Texas Tech University. 

Joshua Meservey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute who focuses on great power competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and counterterrorism.

Image: Free Wind 2014 / Shutterstock.com

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Summary: The Russian Navy is considering decommissioning the Pyotr Velikiy, its only nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser from the Kirov-class, due to high maintenance costs and the need for extensive repairs and modernization. These ships, known for being the largest and heaviest surface combatants after aircraft carriers, were developed during the Cold War to counter U.S. submarine and carrier group capabilities. Armed with SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700 Granit) missiles, capable of sharing target information mid-flight, and a host of other advanced weapons including the S-300 air-defense system, Kashtan air-defense missile/gun system, and the 130mm AK-130 gun, the Kirov-class represented formidable maritime power. 

Russia's Naval Dilemma: The Potential Decommissioning of the Kirov-Class Battlecruiser

The Russian Navy might decommission its sole nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser, the Pyotr Velikiy. According to Tass, this Kirov-class ship costs too much to maintain. The vessel’s poor condition, coupled with the repairs and modernization needed to keep it relevant, mean its demise may be approaching. 

The Kirov class was designated by the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan (Sea Eagle). It includes the largest and heaviest surface combatant warships to sail the seas. Second in size only to larger aircraft carriers, these ships have remained an important component of Russia’s naval fleet.

Kirov ships were conceptualized during the Cold War to counter the capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet. Specifically, the USSR desired a battleship class capable of carrying a large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles and later P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles. The Granit long-range anti-ship missile system (designated by NATO as SS-N-19 Shipwreck) was the primary armament of the Kirov class. 

With their multi-variant target engagement program, Granit missiles could share information while in flight. However, these weapons could not be controlled after being launched. The lead missile would always assume a high-level flight trajectory, followed by subsequent missiles at a lower level.

Kirov-Class Battlecruisers Packed a Punch

The Shipwreck missile was designed in the 1970s to replace the Soviets’ shorter-range P-70 Ametist and P-120 Malakhit missiles. Soviet officials strongly desired the missile, seeing it as a better counter to the U.S. Navy’s rapidly advancing carrier battle groups. The Shipwreck was constructed by Chelomei/NPO Mashinostroyenia. By the early 1980s, the weapon was deployed aboard the Kirov cruiser. Granit launchers were also incorporated onto the Soviet’s aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, giving it added primary attack capability.

The -300F air-defense missile complex is also equipped on Russia’s lone remaining Kirov-class ship. As detailed by Naval Technology, “The Osa-MA air defense missile system is supplied by the Znamya Truda Plant based at Saratov. The ship has two double launchers and 40 missiles. The system can operate autonomously or it can be integrated into the ship’s combat systems and download target data from the ship’s sensors. Osa-MA has a range of 1.2 to 10km at an altitude between 25m and 5,000m.”

The addition of the Kashtan air-defense missile/gun system gives the Kirov-class ship an added edge, defending against an array of precision weapons including aircraft, anti-radar missiles and air bombs, and even small naval ships. This system is able to engage up to six targets at the same time, with a gun range of 1.5 km for altitudes up to 4,000 meters. 

Russia’s Ametist Design Bureau, Izumrud JSC, and Tula Engineering Plant supply the Kirov ships’ 130mm AK-130 multipurpose twin-barrel gun. Notably, the gun can be operated remotely under autonomous control, or manually. 

Sputnik provides more detail surrounding the S-300 on the Kirov-class ship, claiming its radar can track multiple aerial targets at altitudes of 30km and ranges out to 300 km. 

“Pyotr Veliky is armed with 48 S-300F Fort and 46 S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) medium-range surface-to-air missiles (with effective range of up to 200 kilometers), 128 3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) short-range SAMs, and six CADS-N-1 Kashtan gun/missile systems,” Sputnik reports.

Initially, the Kirov was also equipped with the RPK-3 Metel (designated by NATO as SSN-N-14 Silex) and the RPK-2 Vyuga (designated by NATO as SSN-N-15 Starfish). 

The majority of these weapons systems are positioned forward, while the ship’s stern is designed to house a below-deck helicopter hangar and other machinery.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

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Summary: During recent military exercises, North Korea showcased a new tank, which was observed by leader Kim Jong-un, Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam, and Chief of the General Staff Ri Yong-gil. Dubbed the "M2020," the new tank, first revealed in a 2020 military parade, appears ready for deployment. Although specific details are scarce, it resembles the Russian T-14 Armata and Iranian Zulfiqar MBTs but shares design features with the older Soviet T-62. Equipped with composite armor and a 125mm main gun, the North Korean state media lauded the tank's combat capabilities, with Kim Jong-un proclaiming it as one of the world's most powerful tanks.

Show of Strength: North Korea's Latest Tank, the M2020, Joins Military Exercises

Much has been made about South Korea’s K2 Black Panther main battle tank (MBT) in recent years, but on Thursday, North Korean state media first reported that the Hermit Kingdom also rolled out one of its new tanks during military exercises this week. The vehicle was present at an event attended by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam, and Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army Ri Yong-gil.

Kim joined troops training on the tank during the training drills—and it was the third time he had observed his forces engaged in training since the start of the ongoing eleven-day South Korean-U.S. joint exercises, which he views as rehearsals for an invasion.

The North Korean military held demonstrations involving the tanks, after which Kim was spotted sitting in the driver’s seat of one of the six tanks. The vehicles also took part in live fire exercises and a training match—which the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described as a competition.

“The competition took place in a team-to-team mode. The competition was aimed at rigorously checking the practical skills of tank crewmen and practicing ways to conduct combat operations based on various tactical missions. The competition involved distinguished tank crews from major tank formations,” KCNA reported.

The 105th Tank Division was declared the winner of the mock battle—not entirely surprising as it was the unit that occupied the South Korean capital Seoul during the Korean War.

North Korea’s “New” Tank: What Do We Know

Media reports have not identified the North Korean military’s tank by model number or other designation, but according to The Associated Press, it is the same model that was first unveiled during a military parade in 2020. Its presence during Wednesday’s drill may indicate that it’s ready to be deployed, South Korean experts suggested.

Known only by the unofficial moniker “M2020,” there are reports that nine prototypes may have been built—which tracks as six were spotted in the photos released by state media. While it has an appearance that is similar to the Russian T-14 Armata and Iranian Zulfiqar MBTs, it is believed to share some design features with the much older Soviet-designed T-62—which also is to be expected, as Pyongyang has a history of modifying the T-62.

The tank’s hull features armor plates on the sides, with slat armor on the rear of the hull protecting the engine while it is reported to be equipped with composite armor and armed with a Soviet 2A46 125mm main gun.

North Korean state media reported that Kim expressed satisfaction with the new tank and described it as having “shown outstanding combat capacity, powerful strike ability and high maneuverability.” Kim further suggested it was one “of the most powerful tanks in the world” and that was a “strong reason to be proud” of it.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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Summary: The US Navy faces a significant strategic challenge due to the rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, particularly from countries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These systems threaten to render US aircraft carriers and their air wings, including advanced F-35B and F-35C warplanes, obsolete by preventing them from getting close enough to enemy territories to be effective. This issue, highlighted nearly a decade ago, points to a broader problem within the Navy and the US military's procurement strategy, which has continued to invest in legacy systems like aircraft carriers and F-35s without adequately addressing the evolving nature of warfare. 

Beyond the Aircraft Carrier: Reimagining US Naval Strategy Against A2/AD Threats

The US Navy has long prized the power projection capabilities that its wildly expensive, massive aircraft carriers have allowed for.

Yet, the advent of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems has led the US Navy to a dangerous place.

Namely, its aircraft carriers, the Navy’s primary weapon at sea, will be rendered useless before even the first shots in any war with an A2/AD-wielding power (such as China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea) were ever fired. 

And it isn’t just the aircraft carriers that would be made obsolete overnight by sophisticated A2/AD systems, of the kind that China possesses. It is the air wings of advanced warplanes, such as the F-35B and F-35C variants and other warplanes, that depend on the aircraft carrier to nestle in close to a rival’s territory, allowing for the warplanes to do their jobs. 

Should the carriers be kept beyond the range of the warplanes that comprise their carrier air wings, then the entire concept of the aircraft as a warfighting platform is gone.

This is not a new problem. 

The Navy Ignores the Aircraft Carrier Crisis at Its Own Peril

Going back to 2015—almost a decade ago—experts have been cautioning about the rising threat that China’s A2/AD systems pose to US aircraft carriers.

Dr. Jerry Hendrix of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) wrote a treatise in 2015 tracing the moment when the US Navy, in his estimation, “suddenly drifted off-course.” In Hendrix’s view, that sudden drift started around the 1990s, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bloodless American victory in the Cold War. 

According to Hendrix:

"The end of the Cold War—followed by the decision to cancel the replacement aircraft for the A-6 intruder, the A-12 Avenger II—began a precipitous retreat from the range and the deep strike mission that had long characterized the carrier air wing. The rapid successive retirements of the A-6 Intruder, F-14 Tomcat, and the S-3 Viking that followed, and the decision to replace these aircraft with variants of the F/A-18 Hornet—originally designed as a replacement for the short-ranged fighters and light attack aircraft—shrank the average range of the carrier air wing from over 800 [nautical miles] in 1996 to less than 500 nm by 2006. This occurred just when competitor nations, led by China, began to field A2/AD systems with ranges of 1,000 nm or more."

The rot, therefore, has set in deep. 

And the war planners in Beijing saw it (as did their autocratic allies). Today, the Americans project a fantasy of dominance upon the world. But all the major weapons systems that the United States can—and will—deploy at the onset of a great power war are tailored for a bygone age. 

For decades, American defense contractors and their shameless allies on the Hill (as well as in the Pentagon) have gotten away with bloody murder: overcharging the taxpayer for legacy systems that don’t even come close to meeting America’s strategic needs. 

These systems have been developed without taking into account the growing capabilities and intentions of US rivals, such as China. After decades of investing in these technologies, the United States finds itself at a serious disadvantage. For all the money, time, and resources spent building up these systems, they are worthless if they cannot even get within range of their potential targets, thanks to the advent of A2/AD defenses. 

Long-Range Warfare is the Future, Not the F-35

Warfare today among great powers will be fought at greater distances than ever before. American offensive systems, though, are all predicated on being able to get close to distant targets. The F-35, like the F/A-18 Hornet will be unable to achieve its mission of striking at enemy targets because of A2/AD.

Rather than blow its finite budget on things like the F-35 and more aircraft carriers, then, the US Navy must lead the way in developing long-range strike weapons that can annihilate A2/AD networks. 

Way back in 2015, analysts were urging the Navy (and other branches) to invest in “the areas of unmanned systems, stealth, directed energy, and hypersonics.” Hendrix urged his readers in 2015 to support “experimentation, such as seen with the X-47B [unmanned spaceplane]” in order to burst the A2/AD defensive bubble. 

After all, once A2/AD was overcome, the traditional Navy power projection platforms, notably the aircraft carrier, can become relevant again. Rather than take Hendrix's prescient calls more seriously, though, the Navy spent most of its budget on building the Ford-class aircraft carrier. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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L’article Transport de marchandises vers Marseille : Algérie Ferries annonce une nouvelle mesure est apparu en premier sur .

Summary: The ambitious T-14 Armata program, once hailed as the future of Russian armored warfare, faces significant setbacks and unmet expectations. Initially planned for a massive rollout of 2,300 units from 2015 to 2020, the reality has fallen short, prompting speculation that the program might be abandoned. The Armata's troubles began early, notably with a malfunction during its 2015 debut, mirroring the misfortune of Tesla's Cybertruck. Its subsequent withdrawal from frontline service in Ukraine due to underwhelming performance further eroded confidence in the tank's capabilities.

T-14 Armata: Russia's Tank of the Future Faces Uncertain Fate

The Russians were counting on the T-14 Armata as the tank of the future. Initial procurement plans called for 2,300 T-14s to be delivered between 2015 and 2020.

But it’s 2024 and nothing like 2,300 T-14s have been delivered to the Russian Army.

Indeed, the Armata program may never materialize as envisioned, with Sergio Miller arguing that the “story is over.”

Is the T-14 Armata Story Over?

The T-14 started off on the wrong foot, much like Tesla’s Cybertruck, breaking during its unveiling at the 2015 Victory Day parade, with thousands of witnesses. According to Miller, the breakdown was an “augury,” and that now, almost one decade later, “it can be stated with confidence the Armata story is over.”

So, where did the T-14 program go wrong?

Technically, the Armata is still Putin’s tank of the future. But the program has been consistently hampered, for a long time now. Making matters worse, last September, the Armata was pulled from frontline service in Ukraine, indicating that the new tank’s performance was suboptimal.

“Armored forces from Russia’s southern military district (SMD) were given T-14 “Armata” main battle tanks (MBTs) for combat operations, according to the state news agency Tass, which noted that this was Moscow’s first official confirmation of their use in Ukraine,” Newsweek reported.

According to one military source, the Armata was used in combat operations and several units participated in battle to gauge the tank’s performance. Shortly thereafter, the tanks were pulled from the frontline. The inference of course is that the Armata performed poorly.

Now, the T-14’s withdrawal from Ukraine does not mean conclusively that the program is being canceled. But the fact that Russia was not comfortable using their “tank of the future” in a land-based war of attrition speaks volumes to the (lack of) confidence Putin has in the Armata. (Granted, Russia is suggesting that the tank is too valuable to use in war).

The T-14 was supposed to offer a boost for the beleaguered Russians; the tank was highly anticipated and expected to help the cause. The tank’s 125mm cannon and supposed high survivability features were long awaited. The Russians are undoubtedly keen to improve the survivability of their soldiers.

Russian casualties have been remarkably high. To date, Moscow is believed to have lost 424,060 troops. In the past week alone, Russia lost 7,200 troops, 278 artillery systems, and over 200 armored personnel vehicles. Russia has also lost nearly one hundred tanks in the past week. So, an infusion of fresh tanks is becoming increasingly necessary.

T-14: The Source of the Problem

Miller believes that the Armata’s primary problem lies with the engine, in large part because the tank was designed around an engine rather than the other way around. What happened is that Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) decided to use the A-85-3 engine as the basis for the Armata. However, the A-85-3 was complex and extremely difficult to maintain, causing practical problems. The Russians could have perhaps solved the problem with a swap – the A-85-3 for the proven and more durable V-92S2F engine. Yet, the 92S2F was too big for the T-14, which was built strictly to accommodate the smaller A-85-3.

“The only realistic engineering solution now is to start again,” Miller said.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

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