Agrégateur de flux

A la Une de la revue de presse ce mardi 3 février, l'affaire Epstein éclabousse la famille royale norvégienne. Et aussi : plus de 4 millions de mal-logés en France en 2025, selon un rapport de la Fondation pour le logement. Les métaux précieux : "l'enjeu du siècle". Et un Britannique champion de trampoline à 91 ans !

AMENDMENTS 149 - 156 - Draft opinion Interim report on the proposal for the multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034
Committee on Security and Defence
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

AMENDMENTS 149 - 156 - Draft opinion Interim report on the proposal for the multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034
Committee on Security and Defence
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Les locaux de X ont été perquisitionnés à Paris, mardi, dans le cadre d'une enquête ouverte en janvier 2025 sur les dérives présumées de la plateforme, a déclaré le parquet de Paris. Son propriétaire Elon Musk est convoqué le 20 avril en "audition libre". Le magnat dénonce une "attaque politique" et conseille aux autorités françaises de mener d'autres combats,  comme celui de la lutte contre la délinquance sexuelle.

Au Mali, comme dans l’ensemble du Sahel central, les autorités issues des coups d’État revendiquent une souveraineté retrouvée, symbolisée dans le cas malien par le retrait des forces françaises en 2022 et mise en scène à travers une célébration nationale, le 14 janvier dernier. Cette rupture constitue un tournant politique majeur, sans pour autant signifier l’exercice effectif d’une souveraineté consolidée. Entre instabilité sécuritaire persistante, reconfiguration contrainte des alliances extérieures et retrait volontaire de plusieurs cadres régionaux et internationaux, la souveraineté malienne apparaît comme un processus conflictuel, fortement limité par des dépendances structurelles, comme l’a illustré le blocage des routes d’approvisionnement en carburant en septembre 2025. L’analyse de cette séquence permet d’interroger les marges de manœuvre réelles du Mali et de ses partenaires au sein de l’Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), ainsi que la nature des recompositions induites par l’entrée en scène de nouveaux acteurs non occidentaux.

Quelles sont les circonstances qui ont produit le changement systémique observé actuellement au Mali ?

L’histoire en cours a commencé avec un premier coup d’État, le 18 août 2020, qui a mis fin au régime du président élu Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita. L’événement a été compris comme le point de résolution d’un long conflit entre les oppositions et un pouvoir fortement contesté. Alors que la junte issue de ce coup d’État s’était engagée à une période de transition n’excédant pas une année – à la demande, notamment, de la CEDEAO -, un deuxième putsch est advenu le 24 mai 2021, destiné, selon ses auteurs, à « rectifier » les orientations de l’exécutif militaire. C’est ce « coup d’État dans le coup d’État » qui marquera un tournant décisif pour le pays, en transformant ce qui devait être un régime de transition en une rupture systémique. Le nouveau dirigeant du pays, le colonel Assimi Goïta – il sera promu général d’armée en 2024 – proclame le début d’une « révolution », au nom de la souveraineté, du panafricanisme et de la lutte contre l’impérialisme occidental. Une option inspirée alors d’une conjonction de facteurs : l’enlisement de la lutte contre les Groupes armés terroristes (GAT), la montée des ressentiments à l’égard de la présence militaire française, la convocation de rancœurs non soldées de la colonisation, la décrédibilisation des acteurs politiques civils associés à une crise avancée du processus démocratique… Porté par ces différents constituants, le projet de la junte malienne sera conforté par l’activation, dans cette région, des stratégies d’influence de la Russie.    

Comment distinguer, dans le cas malien, la souveraineté revendiquée par l’État, la souveraineté exercée dans les faits et la souveraineté vécue par les populations, dans un contexte marqué par l’insécurité persistante et le retrait volontaire de cadres régionaux et internationaux (CEDEAO, OIF) ?

Pour faire la démonstration de son projet souverainiste, la junte malienne a engagé des procédures de rupture avec ses partenaires traditionnels peu ou prou associés à ce qui est désigné comme « l’occident ». Ruptures avec la France, les États partenaires européens, les États-Unis, les ONG, la Minusma (Mission de maintien de la paix des Nations unies au Mali) et la CEDEAO, accusée d’être sous influence française. Ces mesures ont favorisé la mise en œuvre d’une coopération exclusive, à la manière d’un huis clos, avec la Russie, dans les domaines de la sécurité, de l’exploitation minière et des stratégies informationnelles. La séquence des ruptures – sur fond d’éléments de langage « révolutionnaires » et de cyber-propagande – aura surtout permis à la junte d’imposer son agenda, à l’instar des juntes du Burkina Faso et du Niger, tous trois réunis au sein de l’Alliance des États du Sahel, après leur retrait de la CEDEAO en 2024. Cinq ans après la prise du pouvoir d’État par le Comité national pour le salut du peuple (CNSP, junte malienne), l’exécutif de transition s’est transmué en un régime non élu, et sans limitation de durée. Pour la population qui a associé la « souveraineté retrouvée » à la fin de l’insécurité, il faudra encore attendre. La coopération avec la Russie, qui s’était un temps cantonnée à la protection de la junte par les mercenaires du Groupe Wagner, n’a pas permis l’éradication promise des GAT. La dégradation continue de la situation sécuritaire a accru le recul du contrôle de l’État sur des pans entiers du territoire. Pour nombre de Maliens, la rupture conflictuelle avec la CEDEAO, avec ses conséquences sur les dynamiques de l’intégration régionale, demeure une énigme, ou une hérésie. Une rupture qui demeure relative, toutefois. Car, les trois pays sahéliens sont toujours présents au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), corollaire monétaire de la CEDEAO pour les États de la Zone franc.

Au Mali, la ruine du tissu entrepreneurial, l’absence d’un programme économique identifié et, plus généralement, les effets collatéraux de l’insécurité sur la vie des populations ont instauré un climat de précarité endémique. Dans ce contexte, les autorités militaires ont exclu l’expression des libertés démocratiques et fondamentales du corpus idéologique souverainiste. Si une partie de la population continue de croire que le « Mali refondé » mérite bien les sacrifices suggérés par le pouvoir, d’autres se demandent si l’on ne s’est pas trompé d’histoire de souveraineté. La question persistante est de savoir si le référentiel souverainiste pourrait indéfiniment résister à l’exigence d’une normalisation du pouvoir d’État, par le rétablissement de l’ordre constitutionnel et du verdict électoral.

La rupture avec les anciennes tutelles européennes, en particulier française, a-t-elle élargi les marges de manœuvre politiques et sécuritaires des États du Sahel central, ou a-t-elle déplacé les contraintes vers d’autres formes de dépendance, de vulnérabilité et de négociation ?

L’objectif initial de ces États était en effet d’amplifier leurs marges de manœuvre, en termes de décision et de détermination politique. En pratique, ils ont mécaniquement provoqué une contraction de leur champ de négociation. En désignant une partie de la communauté internationale – y compris la CEDEAO et l’Union africaine – comme des entités hostiles à leur « révolution », ils ont, de fait, bridé leur capacité de négociation sur la scène régionale et internationale. La rupture conflictuelle avec la CEDEAO a dramatiquement entravé l’indispensable mutualisation des moyens régionaux pour la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le huis clos relationnel avec l’allié politique de Moscou marque ses limites. À telle enseigne que ce dernier a invité, en décembre 2025, l’AES et la CEDEAO à renouer le dialogue, au nom du principe de réalité,afin de produire des solutions communes pour la lutte contre le terrorisme. Déjà, enaoût 2025, le représentant permanent adjoint de la Russie auprès de l’ONU, Dmitri Tchoumakov, avait exprimé l’urgence d’un soutien à l’échelle mondiale en faveur du Sahel central, afin de lutter plus efficacement contre le terrorisme. Des propos relayés par le représentant permanent du Mali auprès de l’ONU, Issa Konfourou, qui a signifié l’entière disposition de l’AES à coopérer avec les pays de la région et l’ensemble des partenaires qui le souhaitent. Cette évolution du discours se manifeste à un moment où les régimes de l’AES se départissent du postulat de la rupture radicale pour énoncer celui d’une diversification des partenariats… au nom de la souveraineté. Une nouvelle phase de diversification qui n’exclut plus de possibles négociations avec les États-Unis ou l’Union européenne.

Quels types de ressources, de soutiens et de contraintes l’intervention croissante d’acteurs extérieurs non occidentaux (Russie, Chine et autres partenaires) introduit-elle dans les configurations politiques, sécuritaires et diplomatiques du Sahel central ?

La Russie, qui n’est pas, traditionnellement, un partenaire au développement, poursuit son assistance sécuritaire, avec le dispositif Wagner rebaptisé Africa Corps. Discrètement, la Chine préserve ses avantages anciens, en ayant symboliquement porté en 2024 les relations sino-maliennes au niveau de « partenariat stratégique ». Dans cette configuration concurrentielle qui déborde du cadre du Sahel central, Pékin applique la continuité d’une coopération dans les domaines de la défense, de la sécurité, du commerce ou des infrastructures. La Turquie, sur la base de protocoles inédits, fournit des services d’assistance sécuritaire par l’intermédiaire de sociétés privées. En contrepartie, elle bénéficie d’avantages spécifiques pour l’accès au secteur minier dans les pays de l’AES. Les Émirats arabes unis (EAU) s’invitent aussi dans le Sahel central, dans le cadre d’une coopération portant sur la défense et les échanges économiques. Moins officiellement, les EAU espèrent consolider une diplomatie d’influence dans un contexte de vives tensions entre les autorités de l’AES et l’Algérie qui, par ailleurs, accuse Abou Dhabi de comportements hostiles à son encontre…

En réalité, la liberté de choix des partenaires ne relève pas de l’innovation. Depuis les années 80, tous les pays du continent ont engagé des politiques souveraines de diversification des partenaires extérieurs. L’enjeu persistant pour tous étant de renforcer, en tout lieu, leur pouvoir de décision, ainsi que la maîtrise pertinente des mécanismes des interdépendances mondiales. Actuellement dans le Sahel central, la question est de savoir le degré de compatibilité entre les agendas de ces partenaires sollicités dans l’urgence, et les défis multisectoriels de la région. Au regard de l’agenda international de certains partenaires – la Russie, notamment –, le risque existe pour ces États sahéliens confrontés à divers facteurs de vulnérabilité, de devenir des variables d’ajustements pour des enjeux géopolitiques échappant au périmètre de négociation de leurs intérêts spécifiques, et ceux de leurs populations.

L’article Mali, Sahel : une « souveraineté retrouvée » ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

En 2026, cinq élections majeures se tiendront en Amérique latine. Au-delà des configurations internes propres à chaque pays concerné, ces élections s’inscrivent dans un contexte commun dans une Amérique latine divisée sur le plan idéologique. Ce dernier est marqué par une poussée des forces de droites conservatrices, religieuses (catholiques et évangéliques) et d’extrême droite au détriment des gauches locales et par le retour agressif des États-Unis dans la région après leur intervention militaire illégale au Venezuela ayant débouché le 3 janvier 2026 sur l’enlèvement du président M. Nicolas Maduro et son épouse. Washington affiche son ambition : reconquérir sa sphère d’influence latino-américaine – par la coercition ou le consentement – pour garantir sa suprématie et sa sécurité futures dans l’« Hémisphère occidental » (l’ensemble du continent américain dans le langage stratégique de Washington, du Groenland à la Terre de Feu) face à ses adversaires et rivaux (Chine et secondairement Russie).

Note d’actualité réalisée par l’IRIS pour le compte de l’Agence française de développement.

À télécharger

• Lire la note d'actualité (PDF)

L’article En Amérique latine, l’expansion des droites est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

– Le Larlé Naba Tigré, les grandes familles TIENDREBEOGO, SOURWEMA, OUEDRAOGO, SANFO, TAPSOBA à Larlé, Kossodo, Dabaré, Monemtenga, Tempèlga et Kologh-Kom.
– Les familles alliées GAMENE, NITIEMA, CONGO, FORO, TAMINI, BARRY, CISSE, SAWADOGO, DAYAMBA TRAORE à Garango, Béré, Toma, Nouna, Ouahigouya, Kongoussi et Ouagadougou,

– Les enfants Melvyne et Miguèl,
Très touchés par les nombreuses marques de compassion, de solidarité et de soutien multiforme qui leur ont été manifestées lors du décès de leur fils, frère, beau-frère, époux et père, TIENDREBEOGO Gaston Noël, survenu le 27 janvier 2026, et de son inhumation le 28 janvier 2026.

Ils expriment leur sincère gratitude et leurs remerciements à :
• Au personnel de la clinique CANDAF ;
• Au Directeur général du CHU Bogodogo et à son personnel ;
• Au Directeur général du Centre national de transfusion sanguine (CNTS) et à son personnel ;
• À la CCB Sainte Thérèse de l'Enfant Jésus de la paroisse Saint François d'Assise ;
• Aux promotionnaires et anciens collaborateurs du défunt ;
• Aux voisins, connaissances et à tous ceux qui, de près ou de loin, ont apporté leur soutien multiforme lors de cette douloureuse épreuve.
Que le Tout-Puissant bénisse chacun et rende au centuple ses bienfaits.

Union de prières.

« Il essuiera toute larme de leurs yeux, et la mort ne sera plus, et il n'y aura plus ni deuil, ni cri, ni douleur » Apocalypse 21,4

Les Grandes familles : Ouattara, Coulibaly, Kam, Palm, Sou, Somda et alliées à Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Diébougou, Dolo, Bondigui

Les Grandes familles : Bondé et Bonou à Ouagadougou, Boni, Bobo-Dioulasso et Vy

Les famille alliées et amies : Mihin, Ymien, Bambio, Ouattara, Bani, Compaoré, Lanou, Gnoumou, Houmboué, Cissé, Koné, Levry, Traoré, Coulibaly, Konaté, Kwendé, Doannio, Liehoun, Botoni, Zoundi et Bado à Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Houndé, Boni, Côte d'Ivoire, Canada et Etats Unis d'Amérique.

Les enfants :
• Seborema Jean Emmanuel dit PV et son épouse Déborah,
• El'Dianwa Janine,
• Daourou Jérémie et son épouse Youma

Les petits enfants : Ariel, Aurelia, Hayden-Loic, James, Aurel, Annaelle, Jordan, Marie-Ange

Ont la profonde douleur de vous annoncer le décès de leur Mère, Epouse, Grand-mère, Belle-mère, Sœur, Tante, Cousine et Amie

Madame Irène Adélaïde H. Bondé,
épouse de Feu Colonel Syé Joseph Ouattara,
Secrétaire de Direction à la retraite,
décès survenu le 29 Janvier au CHU de Bogodogo.

Programme des obsèques
Jeudi 05 février
• 15h 00 : Levée du corps à la morgue du CHU de Bogodogo
• 19h 00 : Veillée de prière a son domicile sis à Zogona

Vendredi 06 février
• 8h 30 : Levée du corps à son domicile
• 9h 00 : Absoute en l'église Paroissiale St Camille suivie de l'inhumation au cimetière municipal de Gounghin.

« J'ai combattu le bon combat, j'ai achevé la course, j'ai gardé la foi »
2 Timothée 4:7

By Anwarul K. Chowdhury
NEW YORK, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

In the month of February 2025, one year ago, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres commenced his briefing of the media by announcing that “I want to start by expressing my deep concern about information received in the last 48 hours by UN agencies — as well as many humanitarian and development NGOs — regarding severe cuts in funding by the United States.” He went on to warn that ““The consequences will be especially devastating for vulnerable people around the world.”

Anwarul K. Chowdhury

UN80 Initiative – Reform or Pressure?

That budgetary crisis was attempted to be put off by launching the anniversary-rationaled and liquidity-crunch-panic-driven, window-dressing reform agenda – the so-called UN80 Initiative. These long overdue structural and programmatic reforms of the UN system have been on the agenda of at least for the last four Secretaries-General but without having much significant impact, except acronym-changing, mandate-creeping and structure-tweaking, and now these days, staff-relocating.

An Alarm Bell for Financial Collapse

End of this January again the Secretary-General said in a letter to all UN Member States that cash for its regular operating budget could run out by July, which could dramatically affect its operations. He also called on the to fundamentally overhaul the UN’s financial rules to prevent an “imminent financial collapse”.

Why now ask the member states to do something concrete? Why not in February 2025 when he sounded the alarm himself?

It reminds me of the somewhat similar Aesop’s fable about boy who cried wolf.

Lamenting Limited Power – No Power, No Money

In the past, Secretary-General Guterres lamented to the media asserting that “… it is absolutely true that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has very limited power, and it’s also absolutely true that he has very little capacity to mobilize financial resources. So, no power and no money.”

That is the reality which every Secretary-General faces and has been aware of. That is also known generally to the people who follow the United Nations regularly and thoroughly understand the functional complexity of the world’s largest multilateral apparatus.

Why then does this reality surfaces and brought to public attention only when the UN leadership fails to carry out the mandated responsibilities?

I believe strongly that this “very limited power”, as worded by SG Guterres, should be highlighted as often as possible to avoid unnecessary and undue expectations of the global community about the UN and its top leadership. No Secretary-General has pointed out these limitations as he campaigned for the post and on assuming the office, as far as I know.

Current SG Guterres is no exception. He would have been realistic and factual if he had pointed out the limitations – better termed as obstacles – to his leadership as he took office in 2017, and not in 2026 after being in office for nearly nine years. This built-in operational weakness and inability of the world’s most important diplomat have always been there.

Controlling Or Quitting?

Some people speculate that the US is using its financial clout and pressure to threaten the collapse of the UN.

The US has always been using its huge power of veto and almost one-fourth of the budgetary contributions to the operations of the UN system. That is a reality which should be kept in mind by the leadership of the UN and its Member States, unless the Charter of the UN is changed to create a more democratic organization in the true sense.

For a long time, the US has used the part payment arrangements for its legally due contributions, with full understanding and acceptance of the Secretary-General, so that it can avoid losing its voting power and get its own pound of flesh each time such instalment payments are made.

I believe the US wants to use the world body in its own way by controlling, not quitting.

A Woman at the Helm for The UN

In this context, let me reiterate that after eight decades of its existence and choosing nine men successively to be the world’s topmost diplomat, it is incumbent on the United Nations to have the sanity and sagacity of electing a woman as the next Secretary-General in 2026 when the incumbent’s successor would be chosen.

There is a need for creative, non-bureaucratic and pro-active leadership initiative for a real change to ensure avoidance of “crying wolf” syndrome disrupting the work and activities of the most universal multilateral body with the mandate for working in the best interest of humanity.

Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury is a former UN Under-Secretary-General, one-time Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, Chairman of the UN General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee (1997-1998), former Senior Special Adviser to UN General Assembly President (2011-2012) and President of the UN Security Council (2000 and 2001) and a two-term Vice Chairman of the all-powerful UN Committee on Programme and Coordination (1984-85).

IPS UN Bureau

 

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La Slovénie est déjà en campagne pour les législatives du 22 mars. La droite menée par le vétéran « trumpiste » Janez Janša accuse le gouvernement de centre-gauche de Robert Golob de mener une expérience « socialiste ». Ce dernier compte sur ses mesures sociales pour emporter un second mandat. Décryptage.

- Articles / Slovénie, Politique, Courrier des Balkans, Jansa

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout

Background

As defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), cancer is a generic term for a large group of diseases that can affect any part of the body. One defining feature of cancer is the rapid creation of abnormal cells that grow beyond their usual boundaries, which can then invade adjoining parts of the body and spread to other organs (metastasis). Cancer arises from the transformation of normal cells into tumour cells in a multistage process that generally progresses from a pre-cancerous lesion to a malignant tumour.

According to the WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), at least 40 % of all cancer cases could be prevented with effective primary prevention measures, meaning that around four in 10 cancers are potentially avoidable by reducing exposure to established modifiable risk factors. The main risk factors for cancer include tobacco use, alcohol consumption, unhealthy diet, obesity, physical inactivity, hormonal factors, environmental and occupational exposures, ultraviolet radiation, and infections such as those caused by hepatitis B and C viruses and some types of human papillomavirus. The burden of cancer can also be reduced through early detection and timely access to appropriate treatment.

World Cancer Day takes place every year on 4 February. It was established on 4 February 2000 at the initiative of the Union for International Cancer Control. The three-year ‘United by unique‘ campaign (2025-2027) aims to raise awareness of the importance of people-centred care.

Facts and figures

According to estimates from the IARC, about one in five people worldwide will develop cancer at some point during their lifetime.

There are no official EU statistics for the total number of people currently living with cancer in the EU. Available Eurostat data focus on deaths from cancer, cancer healthcare and equipment for treatment.

Cancer is currently the second leading cause of mortality in the EU, after cardiovascular diseases (Eurostat). In 2024, around 2.7 million people were diagnosed with cancer in the EU and around 1.27 million died (data published in December 2025 by ECIS, the European Cancer Information System). Compared with 2022, this represents a slight decrease of 1.7 % in new cases and 1.9 % in deaths. Nevertheless, these estimates illustrate the substantial burden of cancer, and projections indicate that these figures are expected to rise further: owing to an ageing population, unhealthy lifestyles, and unequal access to screening and care, by 2040, cancer diagnoses are expected to increase by 19 %, and cancer deaths by 27 %, which would make cancer the leading cause of death in the EU.

According to the EU Country Cancer Profiles Synthesis Report 2025, published jointly by the European Commission and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), between 2023 and 2050 cancer is expected to reduce population life expectancy by 1.9 years on average in the EU compared with a scenario without cancer.

The four most common cancer causes of death for both men and women in the EU are estimated to be lung cancer (19.7 % of all cancer deaths), followed by colorectal (12.2 %), pancreatic (7.5 %) and breast cancer (7.3 %). Among men, the main diagnoses are prostate cancer, followed by lung and colorectal cancer. Among women, the main diagnosis is breast cancer.

As highlighted in the 2024 joint European Commission/OECD report on cancer inequalities, significant inequalities persist across the EU in exposure to risk factors, particularly affecting those with lower levels of education, who show higher rates of smoking, obesity and harmful alcohol consumption, resulting in higher cancer incidence and mortality. In addition, substantial gender-based differences exist in exposure to cancer risk factors, to the detriment of men, particularly with regard to tobacco use, alcohol consumption, unhealthy diets and overweight.

In 2021, the Commission estimated the overall economic impact of cancer to exceed €100 billion annually. In a 2025 report, the OECD estimates that in the EU-27+2 (Iceland and Norway), workforce productivity is reduced by €50 billion each year, with cancer projected to cost €97 billion annually between 2024 and 2050.

EU action

Since the mid-1980s, the EU has worked alongside Member States to combat cancer. Under Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU complements and adds value to national public health actions. EU efforts focus on prevention, research and information (e.g. awareness campaigns), while fostering cooperation between Member States. The EU also adopts legislation tackling cancer risk factors, such as exposure to environmental pollution or hazardous substances and radiation, obesity, alcohol-related harm, tobacco consumption and smoke- and aerosol-free environments. In 2023, the revised Consumer Credit Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/2225) strengthened consumer protection in credit agreement, particularly for cancer survivors (‘right to be forgotten’).

In February 2021, as part of the European health union, the European Commission adopted the Europe’s Beating Cancer plan to address cancer-related inequalities and help improve prevention, treatment and care. A total of €4 billion has been allocated to the plan, drawn from various programmes. The plan is structured around four key action areas (prevention; early detection; diagnosis and treatment; and quality of life for cancer patients, survivors and carers) and supported by 10 flagship initiatives, under implementation. In February 2025, the Commission published a review of the plan from its launch until the end of 2024. It highlights that implementation is well underway (more than 90 % of actions have either been concluded or are ongoing), that the plan is a successful example of a health-in-all-policies-based approach, and that governance of the plan has proved to be efficient so far, with several groups providing expertise (comprising stakeholder representatives, Member State experts and Commission services). However, delays and gaps persist, notably concerning financial and institutional barriers.

The EU has invested continuously in cancer research through successive framework programmes for research and innovation. Under Horizon Europe (2021-2027), the Cancer Mission ensures that new research and innovation developments are effectively translated into concrete solutions to improve cancer control.

European Parliament

In June 2020, the European Parliament set up a Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA), which ended its mandate in December 2021. The committee’s final report was adopted by Parliament in February 2022. Its recommendations focus on cancer prevention, equal access to cancer care across borders, and a European approach addressing medicine shortages.

In its resolution of 13 December 2023 on non-communicable diseases (NCDs), Parliament pointed out that many people living with NCDs (including cancer) are undiagnosed and unaware of their illness, and thus fail to get proper, timely treatment. It invited the Commission to collect examples of best practices regarding screening for and early detection of NCDs. Parliament also stressed the importance of ensuring the collection of comparable, high-quality data on NCDs at EU level.

Since the start of the current legislature, MEPs have submitted a range of written questions to the Commission concerning cancer-related issues. In 2025, these included questions on the funding of the Europe’s Beating Cancer plan (E‑004037/2025) and its inclusion in the next multiannual financial framework (E-004760/2025); the protection of cancer survivors from discrimination (E-001252/2025); the harmful effects of sunbeds (E-001259/2025); measures to reduce cancer risk in children and young people (E-002125/2025 ); and the assessment of the effectiveness of innovative cancer therapies (E-001448/2025).

The Committee on Public Health (SANT) monitors the implementation of the Europe’s Beating Cancer plan. It is preparing an own-initiative report to assess the plan’s implementation, supported by an EPRS study (European implementation assessment) published in October 2025. The study, which assesses the implementation of the plan across EU Member States between 2021 and 2024, focuses on three core areas: gaps and delays in implementation, particularly in prevention, cancer care and quality of life; the plan’s impact on cancer inequalities across the EU; and lessons learned and their relevance for future EU initiatives on NCDs. It also proposes actions to improve cancer prevention and control in the EU.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU action on cancer – State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Game-changing international ocean treaty comes into force. Credit: NOAA
 
Deep-sea corals were among the treasures found during an expedition in the North Marianas Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Source: UN News

By Pietro Bertazzi and Oliver Tanqueray
AMSTERDAN / LONDON, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

“The ocean’s health is humanity’s health”, said UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in September 2025.

He was commenting after the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) [1] finally achieved ratification, going on to call for “a swift, full implementation” from all partners. As of January 17, 2026, the treaty has come into force, meaning the time for implementation is now. What is the High Seas Treaty?

Only 1% of the high seas are currently protected. The new treaty will greatly increase safeguards, with significant implications for activities covering nearly 50% of the Earth’s surface.

The High Seas Treaty establishes, for the first time, a legal mechanism to govern activities affecting biodiversity in the areas of the ocean that lie outside the jurisdiction of any single country (ie their Exclusive Economic Zones, typically 200 miles from their coastline).

The agreement was achieved after nearly 20 years of dialogue, much of which was carried by Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Indigenous peoples and coastal communities. For them, the relationship with the ocean is most direct and the threats to it are most existential.

The entry into force of such a significant legal instrument sends a powerful message on the value of collaboration, and its importance in confronting the environmental risks facing the economy and humanity.

The agreement will change the ways that activities taking place in the High Seas – and those affecting them – will be planned, monitored, managed and reported on. This level of transparency will drive a cycle of accountability and improvement in the relationship between our economy and the natural world on which it depends.

What you need to know

The treaty’s role as an international legal mechanism will have significant effects on companies and financial institutions to respond to.

Key outcomes

1. Increased transparency on ocean-based activities

The agreement sets out monitoring and transparency requirements of countries – including Environment Impact Assessments (EIA) – alongside high seas genetic material, samples and digital sequence data, as well as a publicly accessible database to promote publicly available real economy data and data exchange.

This means that many aspects of companies’ high seas-related projects will be accessible to stakeholders.

Anticipating increased public information on environmental studies and mitigation plans, companies should prepare to report on high seas activities, such as fishing, shipping, energy infrastructure, mining and bioprospecting, as well as potential impacts of new activities such as carbon dioxide removal technologies.

Companies can also further identify opportunities through new publicly available data and recognize the halo benefits that increased coverage of marine-protected areas brings.

2. Increased expectations on corporate disclosure

New EIAs will amplify the need for standardized corporate data on marine impact – coupled with growing investor and policy focus on companies’ high seas activities, strategies and governance.

Financial institutions (FIs) and regulators will expect companies to report on how they comply with treaty obligations such as the number of high seas environmental assessments completed, presence in protected areas, and contributions to capacity building.

Asset owners will ask for metrics on exposure to high seas biodiversity risks. Governments may require reporting from firms to compile national reports and monitor compliance.

Companies should expect new jurisdictional regulations on ocean activities, as Member States take steps to implement the Agreement, via enhanced environmental rules and disclosure obligations.

For FIs, there is increased focus on integrating ocean health into Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) analysis, with risks and opportunities in blue finance and sustainable ocean industries only going to grow.

This creates a need to ensure that portfolio companies are equipped to comply with new regulations and secure relevant permissions to operate in international waters. Failure to do so creates risks to ongoing operations as well as litigation and reputational exposure.

3. Strengthened multilateral collaboration

The agreement creates legal mechanisms for area-based management tools, including Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). For disclosers and financial institutions, this means enhancing readiness to adapt to exclusions or operating conditions on shipping lanes, fishing grounds, mining sites, and cable routes. Industries will need to track MPA designations and adjust operations (for example by rerouting vessels or ceasing extraction) to remain compliant.

CDP stands ready to support the ocean

Working with companies and data users, CDP will integrate and standardize key metrics needed to implement the High Seas Treaty. This ensures that stakeholders have the reliable, comparable data needed to implement collective goals, and companies can demonstrate their leadership on ocean stewardship.

From 2026 onwards, CDP will be expanding its questionnaire to gather ocean-related data. In the first year of disclosure, we will generate insights on processes for identifying, assessing, and managing ocean-related dependencies, impacts, risks, and opportunities.

This work is being done in collaboration with our Capital Markets Signatories – many of which have already shown demand for ocean-related data – and disclosing companies, focusing on those with the most significant ocean impacts and dependencies.

High Seas, higher ambitions

There is still much to do to improve the protection of marine areas and restoration of ocean health. But the BBNJ is a significant step forward in this effort.

In a year where nature is placed on the main stage of the international agenda, companies, FIs and governments alike have an opportunity to embed ocean health into global financial systems.

Countries must also complement the agreement with a drive to protect coastal waters not part of their direct control. Many ocean-impacting activities will not be constrained by the BBNJ. Only 4.2% of fishery production, for example, takes place on the high seas[2]. This means there will be a continued role for Member States to conserve and sustainably use the biological diversity in areas within their jurisdiction.

We must build momentum behind the opportunities enabled by this historic deal – collaboration and transparency will play a vital part in turning this momentum into action.

Footnotes

1. The treaty is formally called the ‘Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, or ‘BBNJ’.
2. By volume, the total catch from the high seas accounts for 4.2% of annual marine capture fisheries production. Schiller L, Bailey M, Jacquet J, Sala E. ‘High seas fisheries play a negligible role in addressing global food security.’

Pietro Bertazzi is Chief Policy and interim Growth Officer, CDP, and Oliver Tanqueray is Head of Ocean, CDP.

Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a global non-profit that runs the world’s only independent environmental disclosure system for companies, capital markets, cities, states and regions to manage their environmental impacts.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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ANALYSE - Dans la 3e circonscription de Haute-Savoie, le candidat de l’UDR, allié au RN, a terrassé le candidat LR, incarnant ainsi dans les urnes une union des droites.

Credit: UN/Monicah Aturinda Kyeyune

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

A sharp cut in funding for “South-South Cooperation” (UNOSSC) has triggered a strong protest from the 134-member Group of 77 (G-77), described as the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries within the United Nations.

The protest has been reinforced by four UN ambassadors, two of them former chairs of the G77—Colombia (1993) and South Africa (2015), along with Brazil and India.

Traditionally, the G77 has been backed by China, the world’s second largest economy, and a veto wielding member of the Security Council

A letter of protest, addressed to Alexander De Croo, Administrator, UN Development Programme (UNDP), which funds and oversees the UNOSSC, says South-South cooperation remains a central pillar of the work of the United Nations and is of particular importance to the Group of 77 and China.

The UNOSSC, established by the UN General Assembly at the initiative of the G-77, “plays a critical role in supporting, coordinating and implementing South-South and triangular cooperation initiatives and projects across the United Nations development system, including in support of the UN development agenda”.

“Against this background, the G-77 and China wish to express its serious concern regarding the significant reduction in resources proposed to be allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the 2026–2029 Strategic Framework,” says Ambassador Laura Dupuy Lasserre, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations and Chair of the Group of 77, in a letter to the UNDP Administrator.

The scale of the proposed reduction is described as “substantial and, if implemented, would severely constrain the Office’s ability to effectively deliver on its mandate.”

The reduction is estimated at 46% of funds allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the proposed 2026-2029 Strategic Framework. And in dollar terms, the proposed allocation amounts to USD 16.6 million, down from the USD 30.7 million under the 2022-2025 Strategic Framework. (the amount actually disbursed was approximately USD 22 million).

Of particular concern is the potential impact of these funding reductions on the management and operational capacity of Trust Funds administered by UNOSSC, including the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund for South-South Cooperation (PGTF) and other financing mechanisms that provide critical support to developing countries.

The G77 Chair has received a démarche from the Chair of the Committee of Experts of the PGTF conveying the concerns that the ability of the PGTF to continue fulfilling its regular operations might be at stake.

“Reduced institutional capacity to manage these Trust Funds would undermine their effectiveness and would have adverse consequences for beneficiary countries that rely on these instruments to advance development priorities”, warns the letter.

The Group of 77 (and China) is of the view that consideration of the proposed Strategic Framework requires further clarification before approval and should therefore be postponed.

Furthermore, the Group underscores the importance of continued transparency and structured dialogue with Member States.

“Any proposals involving the restructuring or reconfiguration of UNOSSC should be submitted for review and approval, in line with the fact that the Office was established by a resolution of the General Assembly and therefore falls under the authority of Member States.”

“In light of the above, the Group of 77 and China respectfully requests that UNDP give due consideration to all available options to substantially increase the allocation of resources to UNOSSC.”

Such action, the letter said, would be essential to safeguard the effective implementation of the Office’s mandate, protect the integrity and functionality of Trust Fund operations, and avoid negative impacts on developing countries.

Meanwhile, the letter from the four ambassadors reads:

• 1.  “South-South cooperation remains a central pillar of the work of the United Nations and is of particular importance to developing countries. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation plays a vital role in supporting, coordinating and implementing South-South cooperation initiatives across the United Nations development system, including in support of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

2. It is, therefore, with grave concern that we note the dramatic reduction (46%) of funds allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the proposed 2026-2029 Strategic Framework: only USD 16.6 million, down from the USD 30.7 million allocated under the 2022-2025 Strategic Framework, the amount actually disbursed having been approximately USD 22 million.

3. While we fully understand the current financial difficulties faced by the UN system as a whole, we believe that the allocation of funds proposed to South-South cooperation imposes losses that are considerably higher than the average reduction experienced by UNDP programs. In addition, given the said current difficulties, it is even more likely that, in 2026-2029, the actual disbursement could be significantly less than the original allocation.

4. In this case, UNOSSC would be left with very modest funding. It is beyond doubt that expected deep cuts in funding will negatively and profoundly impact the Office’s ability to continue providing its invaluable support to developing countries, including in trust fund management. In this particular regard, reduced capacity in UNOSSC to properly support trust funds would be detrimental to the best interests of dozens of developing countries.

5. In light of the foregoing, we kindly request that UNDP promptly consider all means at its disposal to substantially increase allocation to UNOSSC, thus allowing for the effective implementation of the Office’s mandate and avoiding damage to many developing countries.

6. A second concern relates to the proposed shift of the Office toward a more policy-oriented approach, which could aggravate the steep cut in funding mentioned above. While we fully recognize the importance of policy guidance, we strongly believe that an appropriate balance between policy and programming functions must be preserved in UNOSSC, thus ensuring that strategic orientation is underpinned by adequate programmatic capacity.

7. We trust that these considerations will be duly taken into account, acted upon and unambiguously reflected in the final version of the Strategic Framework for 2026-2029.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Le parquet général de la cour d'appel de Paris va prononcer mardi ses réquisitions contre Marine Le Pen et dix cadres de l'ex Front national, dans le cadre du procès en appel pour détournements de fonds publics concernant les assistants parlementaires des eurodéputés.

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- Le fil de l'Info / Vucic, Serbie, Défense, police et justice, Courrier des Balkans, drogues