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Die EU-Kommission hat im Streit um den Mindestlohn für ausländische Lkw-Fahrer ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Deutschland eingeleitet. Auch wenn Brüssel grundsätzlich die Einführung von Mindestlöhnen in der EU unterstütze, bewirke die deutsche Regelung "eine unverhältnismäßige Einschränkung der Dienstleistungsfreiheit und des freien Warenverkehrs".

En Turquie, une jeune chanteuse candidate à un concours télévisé de chanson a été grièvement blessée d'une balle dans la tête lundi, dans le sud-est du pays à majorité kurde où il n'est guère apprécié que les femmes se montrent en public. Plusieurs suspects ont été arrêtés.

Die EU sucht nach neuen Energielieferanten, um von russischem Gas unabhängiger zu werden. Die Balkan-Länder und die Ukraine investieren stark in umweltverschmutzende Kohlekraftwerke, um die Nachfrage nach billigem Strom zu bedienen - mit möglicherweise fatalen Folgen für die Umwelt und die öffentliche Gesundheit. EurActiv Brüssel berichtet.

The United Nations has strongly condemned the escalation of hostilities in the past ten days between Government and opposition forces in Unity and Upper Nile States in South Sudan.

Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Ban Ki-moon, a fermement condamné mercredi l'escalade du conflit au Soudan du Sud au cours des dix derniers jours et a exhorté les parties à mettre fin aux violations du cessez-le-feu.

La Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA) a condamné mercredi une attaque qui a visé durant la nuit une résidence où sont logés des Casques bleus dans la capitale malienne Bamako.

Deux soldats russes capturés dans l’est de l’Ukraine et hospitalisés à Kiev ont été montrés, mardi, à la presse, ainsi qu’aux représentants de l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE), de l’Union européenne et d’Amnesty International. La démonstration visait à prouver l’implication directe de l’armée russe dans le conflit, ce que Moscou continue de nier.

Primorsky Territory Governor Vladimir Miklushevsky has announced that Russia's southeastern Primorye region now has runways able to accommodate the Airbus A380 aircraft.

A párkányi városi múzeumban hamarosan látható lesz Nyáry Éva festőművésznő Egyiptom c. kiállítása. Ennek apropóján beszélgetünk a csodálatos képek festőjével.

Az Egerben székelő Heves Megyei Kereskedelmi és Iparkamaránál tett látogatást a nagykaposi önkormányzat képviseletében Petrikán Péter polgármester és Mihók Gábor, az önkormányzat Határon Átnyúló Együttműködés Bizottságának elnöke.

In addition, to the plenary session, there were two panels at this year’s MCIS conference. The second, on the role of military and political instruments in ensuring regional and global stability was the more interesting of the two. The main speaker was Andrey Kartopolov, the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian military’s General Staff. Kartapolov focused on the threats posed to Russia by NATO.

He started by reminding the audience that NATO was founded to stop the spread of Communism in Europe. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the new Russia sought to become close to the West. The Russian government made unprecedented concessions to the West, including removing its troops from Europe and handing over its military bases to the countries of Eastern Europe. The west took this as a demonstration of Russian weakness, rather than an offer of peace and partnership. The US wanted to be the sole superpower and chose to ignore Russian interests. Washington saw Russia as a source of cheap resources that it would like to control. In order to achieve these goals, the US has consistently sought to weaken Russia’s influence in the international system and in the post-Soviet space.

NATO has brought its military infrastructure up to Russia’s borders. As a result, the entire territory of European Russia is under the threat of NATO air attack, with the time it would take NATO assets to reach critical Russian infrastructure having been cut in half. This is why a number of military facilities in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria have been modernized to NATO standard since 2008. Furthermore, NATO is organizing military equipment storage bases on the territory of a number of East European states. This will allow NATO to rapidly deploy its first response forces near our borders and also decrease the amount of time it will take for additional forces to be transferred from the continental US and from Britain. Support agreements signed with Finland and Sweden have legitimized the presence of NATO forces on the territory of these countries and will allow the use of their infrastructure for the transfer of coalition forces to northern Europe.

NATO has increased its military strength in recent years, as the US has provided modern arms to its East European allies, including JASSM LRCMs. This will allow NATO to attack targets deep in Russian territory while avoiding Russian air defenses.

At the same time, the US is still trying to convince Russia that its strategic missile defense systems do not present a threat to Russia while refusing to take into account that Standard-3 missiles could in the future be capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs. Furthermore, the vertical launchers used by missile defense systems could also be used to launch Tomahawk missiles.

Since the start of the crisis in Ukraine, NATO activity has become strongly anti-Russian in its nature. Under the banner of countering Russian expansion, the alliance has systematically expanded its military presence on Russia’s borders. At the present time, NATO has instituted a constant rotational presence of military forces in Eastern Europe, including up to 30 combat aircraft, at least 300 pieces of armor, and more than 1500 US military personnel. US and other NATO navies have almost constant ship presence in the Black Sea, while the frequency of reconnaissance aircraft flights have doubled compared to 2013. Since January 2015, there have been regular flights by Global Hawk UAVs over the Black Sea and in March they were expanded to include flights over Ukrainian airspace.

NATO exercise activity increased by 80% in 2014. Exercises such as Baltops and Sabre Strike were carried out next to Russia’s borders and were openly anti-Russian in their nature. During these exercises, the NATO forces group in the Baltic region included 10,000 personnel, 1500 pieces of armor, up to 80 aircraft, and around 50 combat ships. Five US strategic bombers were also involved, deploying from airfields in the UK.

In the aftermath of the Wales summit, NATO is planning additional increases in force structure for next year, including a rapid response force of 30,000 personnel and a spearhead force of 5,000 personnel that can be ready to deploy in 2-7 days. AThe deployment of these forces will be organized by six command centers that will be established in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Kartapolov’s conclusions regarding NATO’s activity and intentions highlighted US efforts to turn NATO into an instrument designed to contain Russia and ensure US global dominance. He also highlighted that bringing NATO infrastructure to Russia’s borders will allow its air attack forces to penetrate deep into Russian territory, while reducing their response time, and in the future may allow the US to counter Russian strategic deterrence forces.

Kartapolov noted that Russia will have to take measures in response and argued that instead of mindlessly expanding NATO to include new members that were not ready for membership and placing members’ armed forces next to Russia’s borders, NATO should have been focusing on more significant threats (such as Islamic extremism and terrorism).

In good Soviet tradition, Kartapolov concluded his speech with a slide showing a citation from a speech by President Putin, in which he states that “Russia is not looking to start a military standoff with the West or to threaten anyone. But we will not allow anyone to use the language of force against us and will stand up for our national interests using all of the means at our disposal.”

In addition to General Kartapolov, there were several other speakers on the panel. Here are highlights from some of their remarks:

Jean Pierre Chevenement — French Special Representative on relations with Russia

• The crisis in Ukraine could have been avoided. Maintaining a frozen conflict is not in anyone’s interest, but will only help extremists.
• Need to declare Ukraine’s neutrality.
• Need to follow UNSC rules in order to avoid a new Cold War.

General Rivera — Head of Cuban military intelligence

• Color revolutions and hybrid warfare have become state policy for some countries.
• The US is still fighting against Cuba through subversion.
• Other Latin American states don’t interfere in each other’s affairs.

General Yao Yunzhu — Director of China-US Defense Relations Center

• Cold War legacies are still with us.
• New security mechanisms are needed to maintain stability in the world.
• US alliance networks in Asia-Pacific have become a de facto security architecture in the region.
• Asia needs a security architecture that includes China. China wants an inclusive security partnership, rather than alliances.
• The balance of nuclear forces prevented an active war during the Cold War period.
• The desire for absolute security on the part of any state will upset strategic stability.
• Missile defense upsets the balance of deterrence and could lead to future arms races.

Americas

• The Marine Corps has begun testing its F-35Bs aboard USS Wasp (LHD-1), with these tests set to last two weeks. Six of the aircraft are being tested for specific abilities as part of Operational Testing (OT-1); these include digital interoperability between aircraft and ship systems, something particularly sensitive given the aircraft’s recent software problems. The USMC decided to push ahead regardless of 2B software issues, with the intention of hitting IOC in July.

• Raytheon has further complicated the Air Force’s $1 billion 3DERLL radar program by appealing a federal judge’s decision last week to allow the Air Force to re-evaluate bids. The company previously filed a lawsuit when the Air Force tried to re-open the competition as a result of challenges by competitors Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin.

• The Air Force is planning on launching two X-37B Orbital Test Vehicles into orbit on Wednesday, which will see the testing of a plasma-based propulsion system previously reported here. This will be the fourth X-37 mission, with the mission also testing materials for NASA. The the third mission lasted 674 days, with no information on how long this latest will last.

• The Navy has laid down the keel of SSN 789 at Huntington Ingalls Industries. The Virginia-class fast attack sub is the newest of the class, following on the tails of the Colorado, which was laid-down in March. This new boat – the sixteenth – will be named the Indiana. Navy leader have been pushing for the Virginia-class to possess more firepower.

• On Tuesday the Army awarded LockheedMartin a $30 million modification to convert 200 ATM-114Q-6 Hellfire training missiles to ground-attack missiles (AGM-114R-9B-1), with the work set to last two years. Also on Tuesday the Navy awarded Whiting Turner Contract Co a $30.3 million contract to construct a power and propulsion high bay test facility at Philadelphia Navy Yard. The work is expected to run until November next year.

• The aircraft of the Navy’s Naval Air Arm in one graphic.

Europe

• Airbus has ordered software checks on the A400M aircraft following the crash of one of the aircraft earlier this month during a test flight. The company announced that it has released a notice to A400M customers asking them to inspect the aircraft’s Electronic Control Unit, which help control its Europrop International TP400-D6 turboprop engines. Europe’s largest defense project, the aircraft has been grounded by many users following the crash which killed four people. The aircraft has been ordered by eight nations.

• Russia will close [Russian] NATO’s supply line through its territory to Afghanistan. The rationale given is the end of provisions given under UN Security Council Resolution 1386, which cleared international troops to operate in the country, with this resolution expiring at the end of 2014. Although the number of NATO troops operating in the country is reduced from the number at the peak of the conflict and the use of Russia’s Ulyanovsk as a transit hub has subsided considerably, this closure will complicate the logistical resupply of the thousands of troops and support personnel remaining. The principle supply line is now through Pakistan. Russia threatened to close the supply line before in 2011, in an attempt to pressure NATO to limit its missile defense coverage.

Asia

• On Tuesday the Australian Defense Ministry announced a $61.4 million contract with Harris Corporation’s Australian subsidiary for tactical radio support, which will see the company maintaining 15,000 radios previously sold through various follow-on contracts in addition to an original 2010, $112 million contract.

• India is planning on deploying its SU-30MKI fighters to Britain later year, with a potential deployment to the US pencilled in for next year. The fighters will be accompanied by Il-78 refuelers, with the jets scheduled to take part in joint exercises with the Royal Air Force in July and August. If they head to the US, the Flankers may take part in the Air Force’s Red Flag exercise.

• However, one of the Indian Air Force’s Flanker fleet went down on Tuesday, with the pilots ejecting safely. The Indian fleet of SU-30MKIs has been plagued with reliability issues, with the entire fleet grounded in October last year following a similar crash.

Today’s Video

• Jumping out of a CH-47…

F-35B: off probation
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The $382 billion F-35 Joint Strike fighter program may well be the largest single global defense program in history. This major multinational program is intended to produce an “affordably stealthy” multi-role fighter that will have 3 variants: the F-35A conventional version for the US Air Force et. al.; the F-35B Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing for the US Marines, British Royal Navy, et. al.; and the F-35C conventional carrier-launched version for the US Navy. The aircraft is named after Lockheed’s famous WW2 P-38 Lightning, and the Mach 2, stacked-engine English Electric (now BAE) Lightning jet. Lightning II system development partners included The USA & Britain (Tier 1), Italy and the Netherlands (Tier 2), and Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey (Tier 3), with Singapore and Israel as “Security Cooperation Partners,” and Japan as the 1st export customer.

The big question for Lockheed Martin is whether, and when, many of these partner countries will begin placing purchase orders. This updated article has expanded to feature more detail regarding the F-35 program, including contracts, sub-contracts, and notable events and reports during 2012-2013.

The F-35 Lightning II Fighter Family F-35 Family Variants: Door A, B, or C? Figure 1: F-35 Variants.

The above table illustrates the key differences between the baseline F-35A, the Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) capable F-35B, and the catapult-launched F-35C naval variant. Additional explanations follow.

The F-35A CTOL F-35A, doors open
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The F-35A is sometimes called the CTOL (Conventional Take-Off and Landing) version. It’s the USAF’s version, and is expected to make up most of the plane’s export orders. It’s also expected to be the least expensive F-35, in part because it will have the largest production run. The USAF currently estimates its average flyaway cost after 2017 at $108.3 million, but early production models ordered in FY 2012 will cost over $150 million.

Its main difference from other versions is its wider 9g maneuverability limits, though its air-air combat flight benchmarks are only on par with the F-16. Canard equipped “4+ generation” adversaries like the Eurofighter, and thrust-vectored fighters like the F-22A, MiG-35, SU-35, etc., will still enjoy certain kinetic advantages. The F-35 hopes to mitigate them using its improved stealth to shrink detection ranges, the lack of drag from weapons in its internal bays, and its current electronic superiority.

The second major physical difference between the F-35A and the rest of the Lightning family is its internal 25mm cannon, instead of using a weapons station for a semi-stealthy gun pod option. The USAF removed guns from some of its planes back in the 1960s, and didn’t enjoy the resulting experiences in Vietnam. It has kept guns on all of its fighters ever since, including the stealthy F-22 and F-35. Many allies wanted the 27mm Mauser cannon installed instead, as it’s widely believed to offer the world’s best combination of firing rate and hitting power. In the end, however, ammunition standardization benefits involving 25mm land and sea platforms trumped pure performance.

The 3rd difference is that the F-35A uses a dorsal refueling receptacle that is refueled using an aerial tanker boom, instead of the probe-and-drogue method favored by the US Navy and many American allies.

The F-35A was the first variant to fly, in 2009. Unfortunately, it looks like it won’t reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) until 2017 or 2018.

The F-35B STOVL (Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing) F-35B features
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The F-35B is expected to be the most expensive Lightning II fighter variant. According to US Navy documents, even planes bought after 2017 are expected to have an average flyaway cost of $135 million each. It will serve the US Marines, Royal Navy, other navies with ski-ramp equipped LHDs or small carriers, and militaries looking for an “expeditionary airplane” that can take off in short distances and land vertically. To accomplish this, the F-35B has a large fan behind the cockpit, and nozzles that go out to the wing undersides. Unlike the F-35A, it will use a retractable mid-air refueling probe, which is standard for the US Navy and for many American allies.

Those capabilities gives the plane a unique niche, but a unique niche also means unique challenges, and the responses to those challenges have changed the aircraft. In 2005, the JSF program took a 1-year delay because the design was deemed overweight by about 3,000 pounds. The program decided to reduce weight rather than run the engine hotter, because the latter choice would have sharply reduced the durability of engine components and driven life cycle costs higher. Weight cutting became a focus of various engineering teams, with especial focus on the F-35B because the weight was most critical to that design. Those efforts pushed the F-35B’s design, and changed its airframe. The F-35B gives up some range, some bomb load (it cannot carry 2,000 pound weapons internally, and the shape of its bay may make some weapons a challenge to carry), some structural strength (7g maneuvers design maximum), and the 25mm internal gun.

The F-35B completed its Critical Design Review in October 2006, and the 2nd production F-35 was a STOVL variant. Per the revised Sept 16/10 program plan, the USMC’s VMA-332 in Yuma, AZ must have 10 F-35Bs equipped with Block IIB software, with 6 aircraft capable of austere and/or ship-based operations, and all aircraft meeting the 7g and 50-degree angle of attack specifications, in order to declare Initial Operational Capability.

Flight testing began in 2009, and IOC was expected by December 2012, but flight testing fell way behind thanks to a series of technical delays. By 2013, the first operational planes were fielded to the USMC at Yuma, AZ. The USMC is currently aiming for a 2015 IOC, but it would involve just Block 2B software loads that will limit the F-35B’s combat capability. Even then, the Pentagon’s 2012 DOT&E report isn’t grounds for software schedule optimism. Planes with full Block 3 initial combat capability are unlikely to be fielded before 2018.

The F-35C carrier-based fighter USN F-35C
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The F-35C is instantly recognizable. It features 30% more wing area than other designs, with larger tails and control surfaces, plus wingtip ailerons. These changes provide the precise slow-speed handling required for carrier approaches, and extend range a bit. The F-35C’s internal structure is strengthened to withstand the punishment dished out by the catapult launches and controlled crashes of carrier launch and recovery, an arrester hook is added to the airframe, and the fighter gets a retractable refueling probe. According to US Navy documents, average flyaway costs for F-35Cs bought after 2017 will be $125.9 million each.

The US Navy gave up the internal gun, and the aircraft will be restricted to 7.5g maneuvers. That’s only slightly lower than the existing F/A-18E Super Hornet’s 7.6g, but significantly lower than the 9g limit for Dassault’s carrier-capable Rafale-M.

The F-35C is expected to be the US Navy’s high-end fighter, as well as its high-end strike aircraft. This means that any performance or survivability issues will have a disproportionate effect on the US Navy’s future ability to project power around the world.

The F-35C will be the last variant designed; it passed its Critical Design Review in June 2007, and the first production version was scheduled to fly in January 2009. The F-35C’s rollout did not take place until July 2009, however, and first flight didn’t take place until June 2010. Initial Operational Capability was scheduled for 2014, but looks set to slip to 2019.

F-35s: Key Features F-35 Variants
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Stealth. The F-35 is designed as an ‘affordable stealth’ counterpart to the F-22 Raptor air dominance fighter, one that can share “first day of the war” duties against defended targets but can’t perform air-air or air-ground missions to the same standard. The F-35 has a larger single engine instead of the Raptor’s twin thrust-vectoring F119s, removing both supercruise (sustained flight above Mach 1) and super-maneuverability options. The F-22A is also a much stealthier aircraft from all angles, and independent analysis & modeling has concluded that the F-35’s stealth will be weaker from the sides and the rear. Even so, the F-35 is an improvement over existing ‘teen series’ fighters and even beats Generation 4+ options like the Eurofighter, Rafale, and JAS-39 Gripen.

Engine. The F-35 was set to offer interchangeable engine options. That has been an important feature for global F-16 and F-15 customers, improving both costs and performance, and providing added readiness insurance for dual-engine fleets. Pratt & Whitney’s lobbying eventually forced GE & Rolls-Royce’s F136 out of the F-35 program, and made their F135-PW-100 engine the only choice for global F-35 fleets. A special F-135-PW-600 version with Rolls Royce’s LiftFan add-on, and a nozzle that can rotate to point down, will power the vertical-landing F-35B.

The US military had better hope that an engine design problem never grounds all of their fighters. While they’re at it, they should hope that maintenance contracts somehow remain reasonable in the absence of any competitive alternative.

F-35’s APG-81
AESA Radar
click to play video

Sensors. The Lightning II will equipped to levels that would once have defined a high-end reconnaissance aircraft. Its advanced APG-81 AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar is smaller and less powerful than the F-22A’s APG-77v1; but still offers the strong AESA advantages of simultaneous air-air and air-ground capabilities, major maintenance & availability improvements, and secure, high-bandwidth communications benefits. The F-35 also shares a “sensor fusion” design advance with the F-22, based on sensors of various types embedded all around the airframe. This sensor set is even more extensive than the F-22’s. Both planes will be able to perform as reconnaissance aircraft, though the F-35 will have superior infrared and ground-looking sensors. Both aircraft will also have the potential to act as electronic warfare aircraft.

These sensors are connected to a lot of computing power, in order to create single-picture view that lets the pilot see everything on one big 20″ LCD screen and just fly the plane, rather than pushing buttons to switch from one view to another and trying to figure it all out. As part of that sensor fusion, the F-35 will be the first plane is several decades to fly without a heads-up display. Instead, pilots will wear Elbit/Rockwell’s JHMDS helmet or BAE’s HMSS, and have all of that information projected wherever they look.

Maintenance. The F-35 has a large number of design features that aim to simplify maintenance and keep life cycle costs down. Since operations and maintenance are usually about 65% or more of a fighter’s lifetime cost, this is one the most important and overlooked aspects of fighter selection.

Stealth aircraft have always had much higher maintenance costs, but the F-35’s designers hope that new measures can reverse that trend. Some of the plane’s stealth coatings are being baked into composite airplane parts, for instance, in the hope that customers will need fewer “Martians” (Materials Application and Repair Specialists) around to apply stealth tapes and putties before each mission. Technical innovations like self-diagnosing aircraft wiring aim to eliminate one of the toughest problems for any mechanic, and the fleet-wide ALIS information and diagnostic system is designed to shift the fleet from scheduled maintenance to maintenance only as needed.

Despite these measure, March 2012 operations and maintenance projections have the F-35 at 142% O&M cost, relative to any F-16s they’ll replace. It remains to be seen if the advantages of F-35 innovations manage to fulfill their promise, or if projections that they’ll be outweighed in the end by increased internal complexity, and by the proliferation of fault-prone electronics, come true. That has certainly been the general trend over the last 50 years of fighter development, with a very few notable exceptions like the F-16, A-10, and JAS-39.

Pimp My Ride: Weapons & Accessories Initial hopes – changed
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The F-35’s internal weapon bay gives it the ability to carry larger bombs and missiles, but the price is that F-35s can carry just 2 internal air-to-air weapons, instead of a maximum of 8 on the F-22A. As the F-35 variant table (Fig. 1) shows, development, testing, and software issues have also combined to give initial F-35 fleets a very narrow set of weapons. The initial operational set that comes with Block III software has about the same weapon options as the single-role F-22A.

That’s expected to change, eventually. A large order base, and a wide international client base, will provide considerable incentive for manufacturers to qualify their weapons for the F-35. MBDA has already pledged a compatible version of its long-range Meteor air-air missile, for instance, and Britain wants to add MBDA’s SPEAR medium-range strike missile as soon as possible. Other manufacturers can be expected to follow. Norway is already developing its stealthy Joint Strike Missile with the F-35 as its explicit target, including the ability to fit the missile into the plane’s internal bays. Denmark’s Terma has turned their 25mm gun pod into a multi-mission pod that can accept a variety of sensors and equipment. Lockheed Martin’s Israeli customer is already incorporating its own electronic counter-measures systems in their F-35i, and they are certain to push for a range of Israeli weapons, including the Python-5 SRAAM(Short Range Air-to-Air Missile) and various other smart bombs and missiles.

The bottlenecks will be two-fold.

The 1st bottleneck is American insistence on retaining all source codes, and having Lockheed Martin perform all modifications at their reprogramming facility. Unless Lockheed produces a full development environment workaround, dealing with the growing queue of requests can easily become a problem. The firm’s new Universal Armament Interface could offer the foundation for a way forward, if they decide to take it. The other question involves conflict-of-interest issues, in which Lockheed Martin or the US government decides to use the bottleneck as a way of shutting competitors out of a potential export market. These kinds of concerns have already led to pushback in Australia, Britain, and Israel.

The 2nd bottleneck involves testing resources. The F-35 testing program has fallen significantly behind schedule, and IOCs for some versions have already slipped by 5-6 years. Test time required to qualify new equipment is going to be a very secondary priority until 2018-2019, and even the few customers buying their own Initial Operational Testing & Evaluation (IOT&E) fighters are going to need them for their assigned training roles.

The F-35 Family: Controversies and Competitions See me, hear me?
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The program’s biggest controversies revolve around 3 issues: effectiveness, affordability, and control. A 4th issue, noise, isn’t significant yet, but could become so.

Effectiveness: When the F-35 Lightning II is compared with the larger and more expensive F-22A, the Raptor is a much stealthier aircraft, and its stealth is more uniform. The F-35’s design is optimized for “low-observable” stealth when viewed from the front, with less stealth to radars looking at it from the sides, and less still when targeted from the rear. It also lacks the Raptor’s supercruise (sustained flight above Mach 1) and super-maneuverability thrust-vectoring options, which work with stealth to help the F-22 engage and disengage from combat at will. Lockheed Martin claims that the F-35 design is optimized for trans-sonic acceleration, but testing results question those claims, and the Raptor can cruise without afterburners at the F-35’s theoretical maximum speed. That’s important, because fuel usage skyrockets with afterburners on, limiting total supersonic time for fighters like the F-35.

These relative drawbacks have led to questions about the F-35’s continued suitability against the most modern current air defense threats, and against the evolved threats it can expect to face over a service lifetime that’s expected to stretch until 2050 at least.

F-35 EO DAS
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Where the F-35 does come out ahead is internal carriage space. F-35A/C variants will offer larger capacity internal bays for weapons, allowing a wider selection of stealth-preserving internal ordnance. The price is that slight bulges were added to the production F-35’s underside profile in order to accommodate that space, making them less stealthy from the side than the original X-35 designs.

Sensors are another F-35 advantage. All F-35s also boast more embedded sensors than the F-22, with an especial advantage in infrared and ground-looking sensors. Though this feature has yet to be tested in combat, the F-35’s all-aspect Distributed Aperture Sensors (DAS) reportedly allow 360-degree targeting of aircraft around the F-35. If that works, the inertial guidance and datalink features of modern infrared missiles like the AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-132 ASRAAM can already take full advantage of it.

Which customers can live with these relative disadvantages as an acceptable trade-off, and which will be badly hurt by them? Will the F-35 be a fighter that’s unable to handle high-end scenarios, while also being far too expensive to field and operate in low-end scenarios? Even if that’s true, could countries who want one type of multi-role fighter still be best served by the F-35, as opposed to other options? That will depend, in part, on…

F-35 commonality
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Affordability: The F-35 family was designed to be much more affordable than the F-22, but a number of factors are narrowing that gap.

One is cost growth in the program. This has been documented by the GAO, and statements and reports from the US DoD are beginning to follow the same kind of “rising spiral of admissions” pattern seen in past programs.

The 2nd is loss of parts commonality between the 3 models, which the GAO has cited as falling below the level required to produce significant savings. In March 2013, the JSF PEO placed the figure at just 25-30%.

A 3rd is production policy. The US GAO in particular believes that the program’s policy of beginning production several years before testing is complete, only adds to the risks of future price hikes and operating cost shocks. It also forces a lot of expensive rewaork to jets that are bought before problems are found. Part of the rationale for accepting concurrency risks and costs involves…

The 4th factor: lateness. The program as a whole is about 5-7 years behind its ideal point, relative to the replacement cycle for fighters around the globe. F-35 program customers thus find themselves in the unenviable position of having to commit to a fighter that hasn’t completed testing, and doesn’t have reliable future purchase or operating costs, while buying the expensive way from early production batches. The program office hopes to drop the flyaway price of an F-35A to $90 million by 2020, but current Pentagon budget documents list an average production cost of $105-120 million per F-35A-C, from 2017 to the end of the program.

Control: This has been a big issue in the past for customers like Britain and Australia, and has now become an issue for Israel as well. Without control over software source codes, integration of new weapons and algorithms can be controlled by the whims and interests of American politicians and defense contractors. On the other hand, America sees wider access to those fundamental building blocks as a security risk. Arrangements with Britain and Australia appear to have finessed this debate, without removing it.

Noise: The F135 engine’s size and power are unprecedented in a fighter, but that has a corollary. Environmental impact studies in Florida showed that the F-35A is approximately twice as noisy as the larger, twin-engine F-15 fighter, and over 3.5 times as noisy as the F-16s they’re scheduled to replace. That has led to noise complaints from local communities in the USA and abroad, and seems likely to create a broad swathe of local political issues as customers deploy them. In some countries, it may add costs, as governments are forced to compensate or even to buy out nearby homeowners affected by the noise.

Each customer must weigh the issues above against its own defense and industrial needs, and come to a decision. In-depth, updated DID articles that address some of these issues in more detail include:

• The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy. A comprehensive look at the issue, and its consequences.

• F-35: I am Fighter, Hear Me Roar. Noise could become a serious political issue for the F-35.

• The Great Engine War II The Pentagon finally canceled GE/RR’s F136 alternative engine project to rely entirely on Pratt & Whitney’s F135, over the objections of its GAO auditors.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: The Program 1st British F-35B
(click to view full)

Is the F-35 an industrial program for a fighter, or a fighter with an industrial program? Beyond the initial competition between Lockheed Martin’s X-35 and Boeing’s X-32, the Joint Strike Fighter was envisioned from the outset as a program that would make sense using either interpretation. A wide set of consortium partners and national government investments would form an interlocking set of commitments, drawing on a wide range of global industrial expertise and making the program very difficult for any one party to back out of or cancel.

The JSF program is ‘tiered,’ with 4 possible levels of participation based on admission levels and funding commitments for the System Design & Development (SDD) phase. All Tier 1-3 nations have also signed MoUs for the Production Phase. This is not a commitment to buy, just the phase in which production arrangements are hammered out – subject to revision, of course, if that country decides not to buy F-35s. Consortium partners and customers to date include:

• Tier 1 Partners: The USA (majority commitment), Britain
  
• Tier 2 Partners: Italy; The Netherlands
  
• Tier 3 Partners: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Turkey
  
• Security Cooperative Participants status: Israel (20-75), Singapore.
  
• Exports: Japan (42).

Italy has expressed an interest in a Lockheed-Martin Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) plant for European orders, and Fellow Tier 1 partner Britain is examining a FACO of its own for BAE. The Netherlands, meanwhile, wants to be a center for engine sustainment and heavy maintenance. The Dutch have signed an agreement with Italy to help each country get what it wants; Norway was added to that agreement in June 2007.

Lightning II official rollout
(click to view full)

The first test aircraft, an F-35A model AA-1, had its formal rollout on July 7/06. The F-35’s forced redesign for weight reasons has led to F-35 AA-1 being a unique airframe used to validate design, manufacturing, assembly and test processes. A total of 23 test aircraft will be built for various purposes (15 flight, 7 non-flight, 1 radar signature), but the exact order of build for the variants involved has shifted several times.

The testing phase was originally supposed to end in 2013, but is now officially scheduled to continue until 2018. Funding for the first sets of production-model aircraft is approved, parts fabrication began in June 2007, and component assembly began later in 2007. F-35As have already been delivered to the USAF – a sore point with the US Congress’ Government Accountability Office, which believes this dual-track approach overlapping testing with production increases project risks. Production will continue to ramp up year-to-year, and by the time the F-35 is expected to reach Full-Rate Production, the program intends to build 240 F-35s per year.

To do that, they’ll need orders. So far, only the USA, Israel, and Japan have placed orders for production F-35s that go beyond training & test aircraft.

Delays in fielding the initial set of test aircraft, fewer than expected flights, and questions about that ambitious ramp up schedule have reportedly led the Pentagon to re-examine these schedules. Development is now expected to last into FY 2019 or later.

Industrial Innovation F-35B JSF Cutaway
by John Batchelor
(click to view full)

At present, F-35 production is led by Lockheed Martin, with BAE and Northrop-Grumman playing major supporting roles, and many subcontractors below that.

BAE Systems is deriving substantial benefits from Britain’s Tier 1 partner status, and Northrop Grumman is responsible for the F-35’s important ‘center barrel’ section, where the wings attach to the fuselage, and also provides many of the aircraft’s key sensors.

F-35 main production and final assembly is currently slated to take place in Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, TX plant. To cut F-35 production cycle time, the team produces major sections of the aircraft at different feeder plants, and “mates” the assemblies at Fort Worth. This is normal in the auto industry, but it’s a departure from the usual fighter-building process.

AF-1 center barrel
(click to view full)

The precise tolerances required for a stealthy fighter, however, are much more exacting than even high-end autos. In order to avoid subtly mismatched seams, which become radar reflection points, parts need to fit together so precisely that some machines are compensating for the phases of the moon!

Even the best machines won’t do any good if the various components aren’t already an excellent fit. To cope, Manufacturing Business Technology reports that the JSF manufacturing team has turned to an integrated back-end IT system. It begins with 3D engineering models (Dassault Systemes CATIA CAD), and extends into production management, where the company has rolled out a manufacturing execution system to handle electronic work instructions, workflow and process modeling, serialized parts data, quality records tracking, etc. (Visiprise).

This combination has enabled greater use of techniques like automated drilling, even as other software (Siemens PLM, TeamCenter) enables product record management and electronic collaboration around designs. On the back-end, the team uses a custom system it calls Production & Inventory Optimization System (PIOS) for manufacturing resources planning and supply chain management; it began using ERP software (SAP) in January 2008 for financials, and may eventually use it to handle supply-chain functions too.

This ‘digital thread’ has been very successful for the team, with part fits showing incredible precision, and successful coordination of plants around the end schedule for key events like the Dec 18/07 F-35B rollout. The system’s ultimate goal is to cut a plane’s production cycle time from the usual 27-30 months to about 12 months, and shrink a 15-20 day cycle to just 6-8 days from order creation to printed & matched manufacturing orders.

Testing, Testing F-35C weapon carriage
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The F-35’s development and testing program was originally supposed to end in 2013. Current estimates involve a 2018 finish for all 3 models, with Block 3F software installed and a smaller set of integrated weapons than initially planned.

The F-35’s development schedule has steadily slipped, and a combination of development and production difficulties left Lockheed Martin significantly behind their planned testing schedule. The company has made a point of highlighting testing progress in 2012, as they finally got ahead of the annual curve:

F-35 JSF family: Testing statistics
(click to view full) Excel
download

Staying ahead of planned testing points and flights is laudable, but it doesn’t guarantee that the fighter itself is ahead of where it should be on the development curve. Bringing test points forward from future years can keep the numbers even. It won’t solve issues like late software delivery, which is preventing F-35s from fulfilling a number of planned testing points, and makes any combat related testing useless. The F-35s will also need changes in a number of areas, from their horizontal stabilizers to the F-35B’s complex system of lift fans and doors. Those changes will require further testing afterward, adding more test points to the program each time an issue is found. The table below outlines key issues as of 2012, and both of these testing-related datasets are available for download by subscribers:

F-35 JSF family: DOT&E’s key 2012 findings
(click to view full) F-35 JSF: Programs by Country Joint Strike Fighter
(click to view full)

The F-35 is a multinational program, and one of its challenges involves keeping all of the program’s partners moving forward. Each partner has its own issues, and increasingly, its own timeline.

Since early-production fighters can add 50-100% to the cost of full-rate production planes, most of these timelines are determined by how cost-sensitive each customer is.

Home Base: The American Program

In many ways, the American F-35 program sets the tone for all others. Countries that want the F-35, like Japan, are already seeing price hikes because of American decisions to slow initial F-35 production. Current per-plane costs are over $120 million, with initial spares and training infrastructure added on top of that. That price is expected to come down, but it requires volume orders. That means someone has to spend the money, and right now, that someone is the USA.

This leaves the United States on the horns of a dilemma.

One nightmare scenario is a fate similar to the high-end F-22A Raptor, which was initially supposed to field 1,000 fighters, but ended up producing just 183 thanks to spiraling development costs, unexpected upgrade costs, and production costs that never benefited from full economies of scale. Cuts led to continued high prices, which led to more cuts. That scenario would spell disaster for other F-35 customers, who would end up paying far more per plane than they had expected. Some would then defect, driving up prices again for the countries who remained.

The other nightmare scenario for the USA involves significant problems discovered in testing, which then require costly and extensive retrofits to the 400+ F-35 fighters that will be produced before the test program ends. This parallel test/production model has been the subject of heavy criticism from the US government’s GAO auditors. It’s a form of “political engineering” designed to make cancellation too expensive for politicians, even if it leads to sharply higher final costs, or hurts the future fleet.

F-35A
(click to view full)

American purchase decisions can be described as a balancing act between these nightmares. If they spend too much money ramping up production, other countries are more likely to buy as prices drop, but the USAF could be on the hook for a huge retrofit bill that it can’t afford. If they throttle their efforts back too far in order to avoid retrofit risk, it makes defections by existing JSF partners more likely, and hurts the fighter’s chances of landing export sales.

Lockheed Martin has tried to thread this needle by getting multiple JSF consortium members to commit to a joint buy, in order to create a big enough pool of secure orders to drive down purchase costs for everyone. So far, they’ve been unable to get the signatures they need.

Excel
download

Meanwhile, past and planned American F-35 budgets for all variants are graphed below, with an Excel download as a bonus. Note that R&D forecasts aren’t yet published as a single figure beyond FY 2013:

USAF: F-35A
(click to view full) USN: F-35B & F-35C
(click to view full) Australia (Tier 3) The legacy roster
(click to view full)

Australia was originally going to replace its long-range F-111 fighter-bomber and F/A-18 AM/BM Hornet fighter fleets with a single fleet of 100 F-35A aircraft. Current plans for the F-35 are less clear. A change of governing parties hasn’t shifted Australia’s long-term commitment to the F-35A yet, but rising costs could do so.

In November 2009, the Government approved funding for Phase 2A/B (Stage 1) to acquire 14 F-35As, at a cost of about A$ 2.75 billion. In October 2010, they formally submitted a Partner Procurement Request (PPR) to the US Government, and expect a FY 2012 order for 2 initial F-35As, for delivery in 2014-15. Those 2 planes will remain in the United States for testing and pilot training. The next 12 planes would have been based in Australia, and their Year of Decision will now be 2014-15, which may also cover the Stage 2 buy of 58 planes (TL: 72). Deliveries of operational fighters aren’t expected until 2017-2019 now, which means that RAAF F-35As won’t be flying in Australia until around 2020. The AIR 6000 Phase 2C decision to add another 24 F-35s or so, and raise Australia’s total buy to 96+, won’t happen until 2018-19 at the earliest.

As of 2014, The Royal Australian Navy will begin receiving Canberra Class LHD ships that could deploy F-35Bs, but at present there are no plans to host fighters on board. If those plans change, the AIR 6000 Phase 2C decision is the likely inflection point.

The inflection point for a single fighter fleet has already passed. In May 2007, delays to the F-35 program pushed the RAAF to buy 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornets as an interim capability. Those aircraft have all been delivered now, and 12 of them are set to convert to EA-18G Growler tactical jamming fighters. F-35 delays may push Australia to order more Super Hornets, and the hard reality is that each new Super Hornet bought probably subtracts an F-35A from future orders.

Britain (Tier 1) RN CVF Concept
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Britain is the only Tier 1 partner outside the USA, and they have invested about $2 billion equivalent in the F-35’s development. They took delivery of their 1st IOT&E training and test aircraft in July 2012.

Britain’s original plan involved buying 138 F-35B STOVL planes for deployment on land and on their new aircraft carriers, but that will now shrink to an undetermined number.

The UK MoD has also switched back and forth between the F-35B and the catapult-launched F-35C. The F-35C’s range and weapon capacity give it significant time-over-target advantages in a Falkland Islands kind of scenario. On the flip side, the F-35B can fly from forward operating bases in situations like Afghanistan, allowing fewer planes to generate more sorties in the same time frame. The determining factor that switched Britain back to the F-35B was the cost of modifying its aircraft carriers.

Canada (Tier 3) CF-18, 20-year colors
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In July 2010, Canada committed to buy 65 F-35As as its future fighter force, with an envisioned budget up to C$ 9 billion for the fighters, plus C$ 7 billion for 20 years of support. All without a competition. That decision has been beset by controversy ever since, and the Conservative Party government claims that they aren’t committed to buy the F-35A yet. On the other hand, they haven’t made any substantive concessions, or meaningful changes to their plans, aside from promising that if F-35 costs continue to rise, Canada will just buy fewer planes within its budget.

Canada will probably sign a contract by 2015, which would make it too expensive for any successor governments to cancel the program. If the Conservative Party government doesn’t sign a contract before the next election, they had better win again. Otherwise, the conduct of this acquisition program has so antagonized the opposition Liberal and NDP parties that the F-35 buy will be a priority target for cancellation.

In November 2012, the first cracks appeared in the government’s stone wall. The Public Works ministry took over the lead role from DND, and said that the military’s original statement of requirements would be suspended while the government reviewed fighter options. Read full coverage, including industrial participants, over at “Canada Preparing to Replace its CF-18 Hornets.”

Denmark (Tier 3) Danish F-16 MLU
(click to view full)

Denmark is a consortium member, but they threw their F-16 fighter replacement order open to competition in 2007. The F-35A was competing against Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet and Sweden’s JAS-39E/F Gripen, but an April 2010 decision delayed the competition. The Danes reportedly have about 30 operational F-16s in 2013, with another 15 stored in reserve.

The F-16 replacement process has started again as promised, with EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon added to the mix of invitees. A decision to buy 24-32 fighters is now expected by June 2015.

Italy (Tier 2) CVH Cavour
(click to view full)

Italy has made significant investments in JSF development, and the country intends to host a European Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) production line in Cameri, near Milan.

The navy’s ITS Cavour aircraft carrier will need at least 22 F-35Bs to replace its AV-8 Harrier fighters, but Europe and Italy’s slow-motion fiscal calamity makes the rest of its buy far less certain. The original plan involved 131 F-35s for the Army and Navy, but a February 2012 decision has scaled plans back to 90 fighters. The Italians are still discussing whether to buy a mix of F-35As and F-35Bs for the air force, but cost pressures are likely to push the Aeronautica Militare toward F-35As.

Given Italy’s rising borrowing costs, and the air force’s modern fleet of 96 Eurofighter Typhoons, further cuts in Aeronautica Militare F-35 purchases would be a reasonable expectation.

The Netherlands (Tier 2) Dutch F-16s,
Afghanistan
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The F-35 is the Ministerie van Defensie’s choice, but instability in successive Dutch governments has prevented a clear decision. The Netherlands plans to buy up to 85 fighters, and as one of the two JSF Tier 2 partners, they want to place a European maintenance hub in the Netherlands. Industry benefits figure heavily in their decision, and participation in the JSF program was structured as a payback scheme. That has sometimes created a strained relationship between the government and participating firms.

Cost is a serious issue. A September 2009 media report revealed that Saab submitted a bid for 85 ready-to-fly JAS-39NL Gripen fighters, at a reported cost of EUR 4.8 billion. In contrast, a December 2010 report to the Dutch Parliament placed the expected purchase cost of 85 F-35As at EUR 7.6 billion, and the government has said that if costs continue to rise, the only change will be fewer fighters bought.

Costs have risen, even as budgets shrank. A 2012 Rekenkamer report revealed that the MvD was admitting a ceiling of just 56 F-35As, given their EUR 4.05 billion budget. That isn’t enough for their current responsibilities, and their notional EUR 68.6 million/ $89 million per plane figure is significantly less than the Pentagon’s post-2017 average cost projection of $108 million – which allows just 48 Dutch F-35As. Throw in the 21% Dutch Value Added Tax, and the real number could be as low as 33-38 F-35As.

Keeping its F-16s flying until the required 2027 date is expected to cost another EUR 335 million, and must be figured into the total cost, even if it comes from a separate budget item. A slip to 2029, or another fighter option that took that much more time, brings that total added cost to EUR 515 million.

Finally, F-35 maintenance and operating costs are expected to be higher than either the current F-16s (+42% American projection), or the Gripen. That affects the number that can be kept flying under future budgets. The 2012 Rekenkamer report says that estimates for 30 years of F-35A operations & maintenance, exclusive of fuel, have risen from EUR 2.9 billion for 85 planes in 2001, to EUR 14.2 billion. Buying 68 aircraft only drops this estimate to EUR 13.2 billion, and that non-linear drop makes it likely that O&M costs for a fleet of 42-48 F-35As, over 30 years, would be well over EUR 200 million per-plane.

A final decision is scheduled for 2015, but successive coalition governments have been pushing through contracts for initial F-35 test aircraft, as a way of entrenching their country’s commitment. A July 2012 vote left only the center-right VVD and Christian Democrats supporting an F-35 buy, and after the elections, a coalition with the opposition PvdA Labour party changed the process for reaching that 2015 decision. Whether it will change anything else remains to be seen.

Norway (Tier 3) RNoAF F-16,
off to Libya
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Norway picked the F-35A in November 2008, after a competition that Wikileaks documents suggest was a sham. Parliamentary opposition finally caved in July 2011, and purchases began in 2012. They will buy 46-52 F-35s, with an initial 4 training aircraft slated to begin delivery in 2015. Another 42-48 planned fighters are slated to begin turning into contracts as of 2017, and the program’s official overall cost currently lists as NOK 60 billion/ $FY12 10 billion. Basing will be at Orland AB, with a satellite forward operating base up north at Evenes.

As part of their program, Norway’s Kongsberg is developing a stealthy, sub-sonic Joint Strike Missile (JSM/NSM) that will be able to hit ships or land targets, and can be carried inside the F-35A/C weapons bay. Its positioning as an internally-carried cruise missile will be unique, and Australia has already indicated interest. At present, however, there’s no firm date for integration.

Read “F-35 Lightning II Wins Norway’s (Fake) Competition” for full coverage.

Turkey (Tier 3) TuAF F-16s
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Turkey had talked about ordering up to 100 F-35A fighters, as the long-term replacement for its 240-plane F-16 fleet. beyond the program’s industrial benefits, they also have a geopolitical rationale. Turkey’s main rival, Greece, has been crippled by its fiscal situation, and is not an F-35 program participant. They’re unlikely to field any fighters with technology beyond their existing F-16s for quite some time, and Turkey wants an edge. The Turks are also beginning to project influence into Central Asia, have neighbors in Syria, Iraq and Iran that bear watching, and are stoking a growing level of friction with Israel, an F-35 customer.

In the near term, a combination of new buys and upgrades will ensure a long life for Turkey’s F-16s. Current plans still involve 100 F-35s, and 2012 saw the first contract – but by January 2013, Turkey was postponing its purchase of 2 training and test aircraft. The overall program is expected to cost around $16 billion.

Israel (Security Cooperation Partner) Israeli F-16C
(click to view full)

With 326 F-16s in the IAF (224 F-16A-D, 102 F-16i), Israel is the largest F-16 operator outside of the United States. Their commitment to regional superiority made them the first country outside the USA to commit to a production F-35 buy in October 2010, with a contract for 20 “F-35is” and options to raise that number to 75 planes. The F-22 Raptor had been their preferred choice, but America refused to export it.

The Israelis got some concessions from Lockheed Martin and the US government, including the ability to insert their own ECM(Electronic Counter Measures) defensive equipment. Their F-35i will also carry compatible communications equipment and some avionics, and the Israelis are expected to push for early integration of their own weapons, like RAFAEL’s Python 5 short-range air-to-air missile and Spice GPS/IIR guided smart bomb. F-35i system development contracts began in August 2012.

Read “Israeli Plans to Buy F-35s Moving Forward” for full coverage.

Singapore (Security Cooperation Partner) RSAF F-16D
(click to view full)

Singapore expects to replace its 74-plane F-16 fleet with F-35s, but they have a lot of timing flexibility. A program of significant fleet upgrades to F-16V status is expected to begin within the next year, giving them a plane that’s more advanced than USAF F-16s. Their new fleet of 20 high-end F-15SGs are already more advanced than the USAF’s Strike Eagles, and their combined fleet size and quality is expected to keep them comfortably ahead of their neighbors for a while.

In the nearer term, their fleet of about 34 upgraded F-5S/T fighters will need replacement. Singapore is reported to be about to announce an order for 12 F-35Bs, as part of a larger export approval request that could go as high as 75 planes. Their alternative would be to order more F-15SGs as F-5 replacements, and wait until it was time to begin replacing their F-16s. An order of 12 Strike Eagles would cost less, and would offer a much wider array of capabilities until about 2025 or later. F-35Bs would offer more risk, and would enter service much later, in exchange for stealth and the ability to take off and land from damaged runways.

Exports: Beyond the Program Team

Japan F-4EJ “Kai(zen)”
(click to view full)

The F-22 Raptor had been Japan’s preferred choice, but America refused to export it. In December 2011, therefore, Japan picked the F-35A over Boeing’s F/A-18E Super Hornet International, and the Eurofighter Typhoon. The F-35A was said to have the best capabilities, based only on mathematical analysis of the paper submissions Japan received. It eked out a narrow “Gilligan win” on overall cost by offering dorsal aerial refueling and finishing 2nd in both sub-categories, and was even with the others in terms of maintenance contracts offered. The only major category it lost was domestic industrial participation, but the winning Eurofighter bid had cost issues with that aspect of its submission.

The JASDF has an approved Foreign Military Sale request for 42 F-35As, and has committed to 4 so far. This set of 42 F-35As will replace its fleet of 91 upgraded F-4 “Phantom Kai” fighters. Eventually, Japan will also need to replace about 213 F-15J Eagle air superiority fighters with at least 100 new planes, but the F-35 will have to compete for that.

Past fighter orders from Japan have involved extensive license production. So far, reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. will be involved in work on F-35 aircraft bodies, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on F135 engines.

Read “Japan’s Next Fighters: F-35 Wins The F-X Competition” for full coverage.

Future Sales Opportunities F-15 Silent Eagles
Boeing concept
(click to view full)

Lockheed Martin continues to promote the F-35 in the international market, but its priority is securing production orders from the countries that are already part of the JSF consortium.

South Korea’s F-X-III fighter competition is probably the F-35’s biggest near-term export opportunity. The F-35 is competing against Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle and the Eurofighter Typhoon for that 60-plane order.

A number of Middle Eastern countries are shopping for fighter jets, including the UAE, Oman, and Qatar. Kuwait is expected to join them soon. So far, the F-35 hasn’t featured prominently in reporting about these competitions. It isn’t a contender in Oman, and the UAE’s focus appears to be fixed on either France’s Rafale or the Eurofighter Typhoon.

In Europe, Belgium and Portugal will need to replace their F-16s pretty soon, but political and fiscal woes make such buys unlikely. Eastern European countries either have medium-to-long term commitments in place, or are too small and poor to be likely F-35 customers. Lockheed Martin’s brightest hope beyond its existing consortium partners is probably Spain. Like Italy, Spain will eventually need to either buy the F-35B as its only real option to replace the AV-8 Matadors (Harriers) on the Juan Carlos I, or downgrade the ship to a helicopter and UAV carrier. Europe’s slow-motion collapse has pushed its fiscal difficulties close to their limit, however, and there are no Spanish plans at present for an F-35 buy.

The F-35 has been promoted to India, especially as a naval fighter option for its new carriers. It was not a contender for India’s M-MRCA buy, however, and prospects for a future sale seem dim due to competition from a range of existing naval (MiG-29K, Tejas naval) and air force (SU-30MKI, SU-50i FGFA) program commitments.

F-35 Contracts & Decisions

LRIP = Low Rate Initial Production. Unless otherwise noted, US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, MD manages these contracts.

FY 2013 – 2015

F-35A & F-22A,
Eglin AFB
(click to view full)

May 20/15: The Marine Corps has begun testing its F-35Bs aboard USS Wasp (LHD-1), with these tests set to last two weeks. Six of the aircraft are being tested for specific abilities as part of Operational Testing (OT-1); these include digital interoperability between aircraft and ship systems, something particularly sensitive given the aircraft’s recent software problems. The USMC decided to push ahead regardless of 2B software issues, with the intention of hitting IOC in July.

March 26/13: Singapore. AOL Defense is reporting that Singapore will order 12 F-35Bs within 10 days, while others take a more measured tone. Agence France-Presse cite Singaporean sources as saying they’re in the final stages of evaluating the F-35, which tracks with statements by Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng Hen. Even so, the plane’s very incomplete capabilities mean that part of Singapore’s evaluation is just paper and promises at this point. Singapore’s RSIS points out that the country has traditionally been cautious in its defense buys, restricting themselves to proven platforms.

Singapore’s fleet of about 34 upgraded F-5S/T fighters were bought in the 1970s, and they do need replacement. The RSAF’s alternative would be to order more F-15SG Strike Eagles as F-5 replacements, and wait several years before ordering F-35s. The Strike Eagles would cost less at present, and would offer a much wider array of weapons until about 2025 or later. F-35Bs would offer more risk, and would enter service much later than F-15SGs, in exchange for better stealth, and the ability to take off and land from damaged runways. Either way, a DSCA-approved export request would be required before any order can be placed. The most we can expect within 10 days is a State Department announcement. AOL Defence | AFP | Reuters | Eurasia Review.

March 26/13: UK. The Ministry of Defence announces that RAF Marham, which had hosted Tornados until the fighters were retired to save on support costs, will become Britain’s main base for F-35s. It will also act as a support center, performing depth maintenance. RAF | BBC.

March 25/13: Engine. Bloomberg reports that Rolls-Royce was an average of 160 days late with its F135-PW-600 LiftFan engine parts deliveries in 2012. Subcontractor errors were part of the problem:

“There have been issues such as corrosion on some of the gears and some undersized holes,” Jacqueline Noble, a spokeswoman for the defense agency, said in the [emailed] statement [to Bloomberg]. While London-based Rolls-Royce and its subcontractors have made progress, the need to fix fan parts that don’t meet specifications “is still a concern,” she said.”

March 25/13: Japan LRIP-8. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $40.2 million fixed-price-incentive (firm-target), contract to provide long lead-time parts, materials and components required for the delivery of 4 Japanese F-35As, as part of Low Rate Initial Production Lot 8. See also June 29/12 entry.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. All funds are committed immediately, and this contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD, who is acting as Japan’s agent through the FMS process (N00019-13-C-0014).

March 21/13: Netherlands. The 2 Dutch IOT&E F-35As are already slated to go into storage until 2015, because the jets aren’t fit for purpose yet (q.v. Feb 11/13). Now Reuters reports that the Dutch are looking to cut their planned order of 85 F-35As by 17-33 planes. On the surface, this isn’t exactly news, as the MvD was known to be looking at a 56 plane order (-29 aircraft) when the Oct 24/12 Rekenkamer report came out. Reuters gives a figure of 52-68 planes and a budget of EUR 4.5 billion, but full replacement of the RNLAF’s reduced fleet of 68 F-16s with F-35As doesn’t square with that budget. A “defense source close to the talks” is quoted as saying that an F-35A order could drop as low as 33-35 planes (-50 or more aircraft), based on Rekenkamer estimates.

That can’t be welcome news to the F-35 program, which expects to have foreign orders making up half of production after LRIP Lot 8 in 2014 (q.v. March 12/13). For the RNLAF, Defense Aerospace cites Dutch Parliamentary documents which size their operational F-16 fleet at just 24 / 68 planes, due to maintenance issues and lack of spare parts. That’s a bit of a crisis; meanwhile, the larger question is whether 24-35 fighters is even close to adequate for future needs.

The new coalition, sworn into office in November 2012, expects to finalize a new defense policy and fighter purchase plans later in 2013. Defense Aerospace reports that the Dutch Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence has already scheduled presentations from Boeing (F/A-18 Super Hornet family) and Saab (JAS-39E/F Gripen), and the Eurofighter consortium has told the publication that they’re keeping an eye on developments. Reuters | Defense Aerospace.

March 20/13: Australia. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives an unfinalized, not-to-exceed $9.8 million modification for Australian-specific non-recurring support activities. It includes ALIS equipment and sustainment and logistics support, and will be bought under the LRIP Lot 6 contract. $4.9 million is committed immediately.

Australia was set to buy 2 F-35As for IOT&E preparation under LRIP Lot 6. The timing of their follow-on buy of 12 F-35As may be uncertain, but this contract seems to indicate that they’ll buy the 2 IOT&E jets (see also March 5/13). Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in January 2019. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-11-C-0083).

March 13/13: Denmark. The Danes pick up their fighter competition as promised, following their announced hiatus in April 2010. Invited bidders include the same set of Lockheed Martin (F-35A), Boeing (Super Hornet), and Saab (JAS-39E/F) – plus EADS (Eurofighter), who had withdrawn from the Danish competition in 2007. The goal of a 2014 F-16 replacement decision has been moved a bit farther back, and now involves a recommendation by the end of 2014, and a selection by June 2015.

The Flyvevabnet are reported to have 30 operational F-16s, with 15 more in reserve, out of an original order of 58. Past statements indicate that they’re looking to buy around 25 fighters as replacements, but there are reports of a range from 24-32, depending on price. Danish Forsvarsministeriet [in Danish] | Eurofighter GmbH | Saab | JSF Nieuws.

March 12/13: Issues & allies. JSF PEO Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF, offers a number of important pieces of information at the Credit Suisse/McAleese defense programs conference in Washington, DC. One is that he hopes to have unit cost, including the engine, down to $90 million by 2020 – about 10% lower than current Pentagon estimates beyond 2017. Allies “need to know where their money is going”, especially since orders after LRIP-8 (2014) are expected to be about 50% allied buys. Unfortunately there’s an issue with IOT&E processes, which has been left unaddressed until the issue became a source of buying uncertainty:

“Adding insult to injury, the JSF program office classified all documents as “U.S. only,” which upset partner nations. Even if they are all buying the same aircraft, each country has its own air-worthiness qualification processes and other administrative procedures that require they have access to the aircraft’s technical data. JSF officials are working to re-classify the documentation, Bogdan said.”

Regarding Operations & Support costs, which are over 2/3 of a weapon system’s lifetime cost: “If we don’t start doing things today to bring down O&S now, there will be a point when the services will see this aircraft as unaffordable.”

Most of those costs trace back to design, so changes at this point are possible, but difficult. One design and support issue is that the 80% commonality between variants envisaged at the program’s outset is now closer to 25-30%. That means more expensive non-common parts due to lower production runs, larger inventories for support of multiple types in places like the USA and Italy, more custom work for future changes, etc. Information Dissemination | National Defense.

March 11/13: GAO Report. The GAO releases its annual F-35 program report: “Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability Is a Major Concern“. Some manufacturing indices like labor hours per jet delivery rate are getting better, but operations and maintenance costs are a serious problem, and F-35 acquisition funding requirements average $12.6 billion annually through 2037.

There’s much, much more. It’s difficult to summarize this report, and worth reading it in full.

March 9/13: Cost sensitivity. Reuters gets their hands on an advance draft of a GAO report, which looks at the F-35’s sustainment and purchase costs. The GAO’s estimate to refurbish produced F-35s to incorporate fixes required by discoveries during testing? $1.7 billion. That’s a lot, but it’s a decision that touches on the next area they examine: what happens if some countries don’t buy, or the USA buys fewer?

Current American plans will average $10.6 billion per year until 2037 [DID: it turns out to be $12.6 billion]. Average costs have already climbed from $69 million to $137 million, and would rise by another 9% if the USA dropped its orders from 2,443 – 1,500 (to $150 million). They would rise by 6% (to $145 million) if all 8 foreign partners cut their planned 697 orders, but the USA kept its own. The combination? More than additive, at 19% (to $163 million).

Here’s the thing. The GAO is calculating averages, but all F-35 partners including the USA, have a limited window of safe remaining life for their fighter fleets. That forces them to place earlier orders, which can cost a lot more than “average over all production” estimates. They’re also more price sensitive to production cuts, since fewer planes per year are being built at this stage. A design that isn’t done testing adds another disincentive, and the combination of unready planes and spiraling costs for near-term buys can force quite a few cancellations and reductions. Each cancellation may be minor in the long term, but it’s a larger cost hike in the short term, which ensures that the long term production figure never arrives.

One response just starts production earlier, and lets the main partner eat most of the concurrency costs. So, was the $1.7 billion concurrency cost worth it, in order to speed up the purchase schedule and production ramp-up by 5-6 years? That’s an individual judgement. Reuters | IBT.

March 6/13: DOT&E OUE. The POGO NGO gets its hands on a copy of the Pentagon’s Operational Utility Evaluation for initial F-35A training, dated Feb 15/13. While DOT&E cautions that you can’t draw any meaningful conclusions from a system this immature, some of their observations and trends are relevant and concerning.

Not training ready. To begin at the beginning, current F-35s aren’t even close to suitable for new-pilot training, and are very marginal even for experienced pilot training. This situation, and the long list of accompanying flight restrictions, is normal for an aircraft mid-way through its testing phase. What’s different is that continued program delays would leave the US military unable to stream new pilots to its production aircraft.

Touch screens. A notable but less urgent design deficiency involves the touch screen display, which may need to be used less. Using it to control radios, for instance, is a bad idea, especially at high Gs and under stress. To duplicate this feeling, have a jumpy 3-year old grab and flail at your arm while you’re trying to operate a computer mouse. MIL-STD-1472G already prohibits this sort of thing as a sole option, and voice recognition is intended to fix the problem. Until it’s ready, of course, we won’t know if it has its own issues.

Visibility. The most serious deficiency remains technical problems with the pilot’s ambitious Helmet-Mounted Display, coupled with a designed-in lack of rear visibility that HMDS needs to overcome using the plane’s embedded sensors. The visibility is poor in order to improve stealth vs. a full bubble canopy; and also to keep design commonality with the STOVL F-35B, which mounts its lift fan and doors behind the pilot. The OUE’s experienced F-16 and A-10 pilots were universal in their criticism, saying that poor to no rear visibility made basic tasks like keeping formation more challenging, and was a deficiency in combat situations.

It’s also a maintenance risk, of course, since all associated systems must be working or the planes will be at a large combat disadvantage. The likely result? Either lower readiness rates, higher maintenance costs, or both. Those are both areas where the F-35 remains behind the curve, with potentially dire fiscal consequences. POGO summary | Full Report [PDF]

March 5/13: LRIP-6. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $72.2 million unfinalized LRIP Lot 6 contract modification. It buys F-35A support equipment for Luke AFB’s Pilot Training Center 1. It also covers associated Data Quality Integration Management supplier support tasks, and all other sustainment data products for the USAF and the governments of Italy and Australia. The contract is split-funded by the USAF ($55.0M/ 76.2%); Italy ($10.3M/ 14.3%); and Australia ($6.9/ 9.5%).

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in August 2014. $36.1 million is committed immediately (N00019-11-C-0083). This brings total LRIP-6 contracts to $5.674 billion.

March 1/13: Return to flight. The Pentagon lifts the grounding order on its F-35 fleets, after inspecting fleet engines. The engine in question belonged to a plane used for flight envelope expansion testing, and had been operated for an extended time at high temperatures.

“Prolonged exposure to high levels of heat and other operational stressors on this specific engine were determined to be the cause of the crack [as opposed to high-cycle fatigue, which would force a redesign].”

The engineers believe no redesign is needed. Pentagon | Reuters.

Grounding lifted

Feb 28/13: Block 8 long-lead. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $333.8 million fixed-price-incentive (firm-target), advance acquisition contract, covering early equipment buys for 35 LRIP Lot 8 planes: 19 USAF F-35As ($155.2M/ 46%), 6 USMC F-35Bs ($85.4M/ 26%), and 4 USN F-35Cs ($27.5M/ 8%); plus 4 F-35B STOVLs for Britain ($45M/ 14%), and 2 F-35As for Norway ($20.7M/ 6%). All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-13-C-0008).

Feb 27/13: Unhappy relationship. F-35 PEO Executive Officer Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan criticizes some important decisions, such as concurrent testing and production, and he’s also unhappy with the vendors. There’s some back-and-forth in the news reports regarding production cost, which he pegs at about $120 million for a Lot 5 F-35A with engine, and whether cost reductions per lot have been adequate. His AuBC interview also includes this remark, which got less attention but is more important:

“The real big elephant is how much it costs over the life of this plane to maintain it, and sustain it…. I think today, looking at what we have, the cost to maintain and sustain this plane is too high…. What I’ve told Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney is “you have yet to earn the right to become the product support integrator for the life of this program.” So what I’ve done is, I’ve tried to take pieces of the life cycle, and I’ve tried to introduce some competition [from domestic and foreign companies]….”

The decision to use only 1 engine also comes into play, as he describes the 6 month negotiations to finalize the F135 engine LRIP Lot 5 contract (vid. Feb 6/13 entry), which began shortly after their F136 competitor had been eliminated:

“Now, you would think a company like Pratt & Whitney that was just given the greatest Christmas gift you could ever, ever get for a company would act a little differently…”

In truth, the full tone of Gen. Bogdan’s remarks isn’t fully captured in written reports. He’s adopting classic crisis management recommendations, acknowledging known problems rather than being dishonest, placing them in context when he can, then promising to fix what’s left and deliver a successful jet. The comments in Australia were made shortly after the DOT&E report (vid. Jan 13/13). They’re aired a month or so later in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s “Reach for the Sky” documentary on the program, just before Australia submits a formal request to buy another 24 Boeing Super Hornet family fighters. Center for Public Integrity | Fox News | TIME | AuBC’s Reach for the Sky.

Feb 22/13: Engine. A crack in an F135-PW-100 engine blade grounds the entire F-35 fleet. The fault was found in an F-35A, but this part of the engine is common to all 3 variants. No one wants to have a blade break off inside and destroy the engine or the plane on its way out the back, hence the grounding.

These kinds of problems aren’t unheard of during testing, but the incident raises 2 big questions. One is the Pentagon’s flawed policy of ordering operational planes during the testing phase, which multiplies the cost of fixes during a fiscal crunch. The other involves the DoD’s decision to have just 1 engine manufacturer for the F-35, unlike its existing fighter fleets. Imagine exactly this sort of fleet-wide grounding, when the F-35 is the main fighter of all 3 armed services. DoD | Reuters.

Engine problems ground the whole fleet

Feb 13/13: Australia. Australian MP Dennis Jensen [Lib-Tangney, near Perth] chronicles the key assertions, decisions, and official reassurances made in Australia concerning the F-35, most of which have turned out to be somewhere between inaccurate and untrue. It’s a sobering account of how far program timelines and costs have gone awry, and effectively eviscerates the credibility of official ADF and DoD analysis.

The former defense research scientist also has the brass to point out that while the military has been busy missing the mark, independent analysts like Air Power Australia laid down key cost and performance markers that are now being vindicated by official reports.

Jensen is a long-time critic of the F-35. His 2009 guest article for DID focused on the F-22 as a better solution for Australia, and one wonders if he still has that view in light of recent events. His skepticism concerning the F-35 has remained, as evidenced by his March 2012 release, “Joint Strike Fighter lemon“. That release goes a step beyond most political releases, whose authors aren’t likely to confront a senior air force officer with step by step analysis of hypothetical 8 vs. 8 air combat engagements. Australian parliamentary transcript | JSF Nieuws has added sub-headers for easier reading.

Feb 13/13: Lot 6 Engines. United Technologies’ Pratt and Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives a $65 million cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to a previously awarded advance acquisition contract for ongoing sustainment, operations, and maintenance to LRIP Lot 6’s F135 engines. This contract combines purchases for the USMC ($43.8M / 69%); the USAF ($17.8M / 26%); and the US Navy ($3.3M / 5%). $55.3 million in FY 2012 and 2013 contract funds are committed immediately, and $11.8 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13.

Efforts include labor and materials required to maintain and repair F135 propulsion systems; sustainment labor consisting of fleet and material management, sustaining engineering, and joint services technical data updates; and material required to support fielded propulsion systems and support equipment after unit and depot activations at production, training, and operational locations.

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (54%); Indianapolis, IN (31%); and Bristol, United Kingdom (15%), and is expected to be complete in December 2013 (N00019-12-C-0090).

Feb 12/13: F-35B flying. The Joint Strike Fighter Program Office clears the F-35B variant to resume flight operations. Within the fleet, all affected hoses have been inspected, and the ones that are out of tolerance will be replaced beginning in about a week. F-35Bs with properly crimped hoses can resume flying now. Yuma Sun.

F-35B cleared to fly

Feb 11/13: Dutch IOT&E. Minister of Defence Mrs. JA Hennis-Plasschaert sends a written brief to Parliament, covering recent developments with the F-35. It outlines the recent American DOT&E report, and also discusses developments in Canada, where the F-35 decision is under review. With respect to their own order, the first Dutch F-35 is ready, and the 2nd will arrive in summer 2013, but the project’s lateness has started to affect the RNLAF.

The original plan was to use their IOT&E jets with Block 3 software for testing and tactics development from April 2012 – August 2014, and pay EUR 27.1 million. Because the program is so far behind on Block 3 software delivery, per DOT&E, the Dutch will have to store their jets in the USA at their own expense until 2015, run their IOT&E from 2015-2018, and pay EUR 47 – 55 million. All on top of buying their jets several years earlier than they needed to, which raised their cost by many millions of euros.

Turkey was probably thinking of these kinds of issues when they postponed their planned IOT&E buy in January. JSF Nieuws has excerpts from the letter, which has not yet been published on the government’s web sites, and also showed us the full copy.

Dutch IOT&E

Feb 6/13: The Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office and Pratt & Whitney announce an agreement in principle regarding the final engine contract for LRIP Lot 5’s planes.

An unfinalized version of that contract was announced on Dec 28/11, and the new contract is reportedly about $20 million lower than the $1.122 billion quoted at that time. Even with that reduction, adding the engine contract to other fighter-related Lot 5 announcements would give an average Lot V flyaway cost across all types of around $170 million per plane. It’s important to note that the engine contract includes things besides fighter engines, but even with no engines at all, Lot V announcements sum to a cost per fighter of $137.5 million.

Final engine figures and divisions won’t be forthcoming until the official Pentagon announcement. Note that some media reports don’t match up with the 32 planes known to be in Lot V (vid. Dec 14/12 entry). American Machinist | Reuters.

Feb 5/13: Britain’s switch costs. The British House of Commons Defence Committee says that the government’s shift from the F-35B STOVL to the F-35C and back cost the country GBP 100 million (vid. section 2, #14 & 15). Most of that money was spent on budgets related to Britain’s new carriers, and the committee faults the government for rushed work on the October 2010 SDSR.

That is quite a lot of money to waste, and it’s true that after the Conservative/ Lib-Dem coalition took power, there was a strong push to get the SDSR out the door in a short period of time. These kinds of decisions are very complex, and the committee faults the Ministry for going along with this recommendation, without really understanding the changes involved.

The Ministry’s defense is that their CVF/ Queen Elizabeth Class carriers had been touted as “future proof”, able to include catapults if that became necessary during the ships’ lifetimes. That proposition was put to the test early with the F-35C switch. The Ministry’s retrospective conclusion is blunt, and discomfiting on its own terms: “It is not my belief that [the carriers] were genuinely designed for conversion, or that the contract allowed them to be designed for conversion.” One wonders, then, why they were touted that way. UK Commons Defence Committee Acquisitions Report | Flight International.

Britain’s type-
switching costs

Feb 2/13: A USAF presentation to Congress says that if sequestration takes effect, F-35 order will be reduced (duh). They add that the program may need to be restructured, too, along with the KC-46A aerial tanker and MQ-9 Reaper Block 5. That would make a few allies grumpy. Flight International.

Jan 31/13: Personnel. AviationWeek reports that Tom Burbage, the executive vice president and general manager of program integration for the F-35, will retire in March 2013, after 32 years at the firm. He had been appointed in that position in 2000.

Jan 30/13: DOT&E – Pilot views. Flight International interviews both experienced pilots and Lockheed Martin personnel, in the wake of the turning & acceleration performance downgrades announced by DOT&E’s 2012 report. One experienced pilot flatly says that those performance figures put the F-35 Lightning in the same class as the 1960s-era F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber, rather than modern high-performance fighters. The Lightning does retain some kinetic strengths, but the overall picture isn’t encouraging when examined closely.

Then a Lockheed test pilot with broad experience takes up the gauntlet, to say that the F-35 is actually kinetically better than other 4+ generation fighters. Some of his fellow test pilots question those claims. Read “The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy” for in-depth coverage of this issue.

Jan 30/13: Japan problem. If Japan wants to make parts for all F-35s, they’re going to have to do something about one of their “3 principles” on arms exports. Those restrictions won’t allow exports to communist countries, countries subject to arms export embargoes under U.N. Security Council resolutions, or countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. Unfortunately, many potential F-35 customers, especially in the Middle East, fall into the 3rd category.

We’re sure Israel would be perfectly happy to simply have all of the affected parts made in Israel instead, but this is going to be a wider issue. The program could always go to a “second supplier” arrangement for all Japanese parts, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said maintaining consistency with the ban is “under discussion within the government.” Asashi Shimbun.

Jan 30/13: Industrial. Lockheed Martin says that there are 88 F-35s of all versions in various stages of completion on the program’s production lines. When it’s delivered, AF-41 (a USAF F-35A) will become delivery #100.

Jan 28/13: Fueldraulic fault found. Flight International reports that the failure of an F-35B’s Stratoflex fueldraulic line has been traced to a failure to properly crimp it. The F-35 Program Office says that Stratoflex, Rolls-Royce and Pratt &Whitney, have “instituted corrective actions to improve their quality control processes and ensure part integrity.”

The same problem was found on 6 other aircraft, and all 7 will need to be fixed. Until a Return to Flight plan is approved, however, all 25 F-35Bs will remain grounded.

Jan 18/13: F-35B grounded. The F-35B fleet is grounded, after a fueldraulic line (q.v. DOT&E report) fails and forces the pilot to abort a takeoff. There was no danger, and the pilot simply moved his airplane off of the flight line after it happened.

The F-35A and F-35C fleets are unaffected. Bloomberg | Defense News | Flight International.

F-35B Grounded

Jan 13/13: DOT&E Report. The Pentagon’s Department of Operational Test & Evaluation submits its 2012 report, which includes 18 pages covering the F-35. The fleet continues to work through significant technical challenges, which isn’t unusual. What is unusual is the steady stream of deliveries that will have to be fixed later, in order to address mechanical and structural problems found during testing. A summary of the key statistics & challenges can be found above, in the Testing section, but 2 issues deserve special mention.

One issue is software, which may be more important to the F-35 than it is to any other fighter aircraft. Unfortunately, the software development program is late, and is straining to fix and test issues across several developmental versions. Block 1.0 software capability is only 80% delivered, and the Block 2A software for training is under 50%. Block 2B, which adds rudimentary combat capabilities for serious training, was under 10% as of August 2012. Test resources and personnel are both limited, so this problem is likely to get worse.

The other issue is weight. The F-35 was designed with little margin for weight growth, but new capabilities and fixes for testing issues often add weight. One frequent consequence is higher costs, as very expensive but lightweight materials are used to save an extra pound here and there. Another consequence reduced performance, as seen in the F-35B’s drop to 7.0 maximum Gs after its aggressive weight reduction effort. A third consequence involves ruggedness and survivability. The F-35B faced a suspension of structural fatigue life stress testing in 2012, after cracking was discovered in several places. Even this pales in comparison, however, to the fleet-wide problem created by saving just 11 pounds in all variants. Without fuelstatic flow fuses and Polyalphaolefin (PAO) coolant shutoff valves, DOT&E estimates that these flammable substances make the F-35 25% less likely to survive enemy fire. DOT&E report [PDF] | Lockheed Martin re: 2012 testing | Reuters | TIME magazine. | Washington Post.

Jan 5/13: Turkey. The Turkish SSM procurement agency decides to postpone its initial buy of 2 training and test aircraft, which were supposed to be part of the Lot 7 order (q.v. Sept 27/12 entry). The SSM cites capabilities that are behind scheduled expectations and not ready for full training, and cost concerns, while reaffirming Turkey’s long-term commitment to 100 F-35As.

The Pentagon DOT&E report is quite specific about the plane’s delivered software being unsuitable for any combat-related training or test. Block 2B software would be required for that at least, but the program has yet to deliver parts of Block 1, and the Block 2A software on current planes is also just a partial implementation. In light of that information alone, Turkey’s decision to wait seems prudent. Why incur higher costs from an earlier production lot, if the plane isn’t going to be fully useful in its intended test and training role? Turkish SSM [in Turkish, PDF] | AFP | Washington’s The Hill magazine | Turkish Weekly.

Turkey postpones planned IOT&E buy

Dec 28/12: LRIP-6. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $3.678 billion unfinalized modification to the low rate initial production lot 6 advance acquisition contract. It covers 29 American planes: 18 F-35As, 6 F-35Bs, and 7 USN F-35Cs, plus “all associated ancillary mission equipment.” LRIP-6 contracts total $5,729.6 million, and include:

• March 20/13: $9.8 (support for Australia)
  
• March 5/13: $72.2 (support infrastructure for USA, Australia, Italy)
  
• Feb 14/13: $65.0 (engine maintenance)
  
• Dec 28/12: $3,677.9 (USA 29: 18 F-35A, 6 F-35B, 7 F-35C)
  
• Dec 28/12: $735.4 (support, unfinalized)
  
• Dec 6/12: $386.7 (long-lead)
  
• March 12/12: $38.6 (F-35A long-lead)
  
• Feb 9/12: $14.6 (F-35B long-lead)
  
• Jan 6/12: $194.1 (engines)
  
• Aug 8/11: $535.3 (38 long-lead: USA 19 F-35A, 6 F-35B, 7 F-35C; Italy 4 F-35A, Australia 2 F-35A)

Long-lead items contracts can include JSF partner and foreign buys, since the material buys are basically the same. Main contracts for customers outside America are often announced separately, which explains why some are missing from the Dec 28/12 announcement. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in February 2015. $1.839 billion is committed immediately (N00019-11-C-0083).

LRIP Lot 6 main

Dec 28/12: LRIP-6 support. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $753.4 million unfinalized modification to the LRIP-6 advance acquisition contract, for one-time sustainment and logistics support. This modification also includes site stand-up and depot activation activities, Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) hardware and software, training systems, support equipment, and spares.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in December 2015. $375.2 million is committed immediately (N00019-11-C-0083).

Dec 28/12: LRIP-6 & 7 support. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $374.5 million unfinalized modification to the LRIP-6 advance acquisition contract. It covers initial spares in support of 60 F-35s from LRIP Lot 6 and LRIP Lot 7: 37 F-35As, 12 F-35B STOVL, and 11 F-35Cs.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in November 2015. Contract funds in the amount of $374,495,232 is committed immediately (N00019-11-C-0083).

Dec 28/12: Studies. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $48 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to perform engineering, programmatic, and logistics tasks supporting investigations or studies covering various systems in the F-35 Lightning II.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in December 2015. $7.2 million is committed at the time of award. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-13-D-0005).

Dec 28/12: LRIP-5 support. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $17.1 million unfinalized modification the LRIP Lot 5 contract. This modification buys initial air vehicle spares for LRIP-5 F-35As.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in November 2015. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13 (N00019-10-C-0002).

Dec 14/12: LRIP-5. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $127.7 million fixed-price-incentive-fee and cost-plus-incentive-fee modification, finalizing the F-35’s LRIP Lot 5 contract for 32 planes. This contract also includes funds for manufacturing support equipment; 2 program array assemblies; ancillary mission equipment, including pilot flight equipment; preparation for ferrying the aircraft; and redesign to change parts with diminishing manufacturing sources.

Some news reports place the contract’s figures at $3.8 billion, but a review of past contracts, and conversation with Lockheed Martin, show that the entire LRIP-5 is actually $6.459 billion so far. The distribution also differs from Reuters’ report: it’s 21 F-35As, 4 F-35Bs, and 7 F-35Cs. Past awards, in millions, include:

• Dec 14/12: $127.7 (finalize)
  
• Aug 6/12: $209.8 (spares)
  
• Apr 13/12: $258.8 (add 1 F-35B, 1 F-35C for USA)
  
• March 12/12: $56.4 (support of delivery schedule)
  
• Dec 28/11: $1,122.3 (30 engines – unfinalized)
  
• Dec 27/11: $485 (production requirements, incl. some tooling)
  
• Dec 9/11: $4,011.9 (initial 30: 21 F-35A, 3 F-35B, 6 F-35C)
  
• Sept 27/11: $187 (system engineering & sustainment support)

$598.2 million in long-lead time item contracts were omitted ($522.2 million on July 6/10, and $76 million on Dec 8/10); Lockheed Martin informs DID that they were superseded by the Dec 9/11 contract for a different number of planes. So $6.459 billion is the entire LRIP-5 set so far, including planes, spares/support and tooling/ manufacturing investments (PNR). The engines, support, and PNR pieces are still unfinalized and in negotiations. For the planes themselves, the announced figures add up to about $4.398 billion ($4,011.9 + 258.8 + 127.7). That’s an average of $137.45 million per plane without engines.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be completed in October 2014. All contract funds were committed on award, and $112.9 million will expire on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0002).

LRIP Lot 5 finalized

Dec 6/12: LRIP-6 lead-in. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $386.7 million contract modification for the LRIP Lot 6 Advance Acquisition Contract. This will ease some of Lockheed Martin’s cash flow concerns, and funds ground maintenance activities; depot activation activities; ALIS operations and maintenance; reliability, maintainability and health management implementation and support; supply chain management; action request resolution; activities to provide and support pilot and maintainer initial training; and procurement of replenishment spares and depot level repairs in support of flight operations.

Work will be performed in Eglin AFB in Orlando, FL (35%); and in Ft. Worth, TX (25%); El Segundo, CA (8%); Warton, United Kingdom (5%); and various locations throughout the United States (27%); and is expected to be complete in October 2013. $193.3 million is committed immediately, $58,378,517 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-11-C-0083).

Nov 30/12: Reuters reports that the US government and Lockheed Martin have reached a preliminary $3.8 billion deal for 32 F-35s: 22 F-35As, 3 F-35Bs, and 7 F-35Cs. A deal would safeguard that contract from any sequestration cuts, but engines and some other items would still need to be bought separately.

Lockheed spokesman Michael Rein quoted a 14% reduction in labor costs from LRIP Lot 4 to Lot 5, and said that the overall cost would be lower in total. That second assurance is important, because materials costs are subject to inflation. He also said that Lot 5 aircraft would be over 50% less expensive than LRIP-1’s $220.8 million figure, which doesn’t square with the $118.8 million average cost of the reported Lot 6 deal. F-35B/C aircraft will push the price up, however, so Lot 1 vs. Lot 5 isn’t an apples to apples comparison.

Lockheed Martin has delivered 48 F-35s so far (19 development, 29 LRIP), and is pushing to meet its goal of 30 delivered in 2012. Near-term funding for Lot 6 remains a concern, however (q.v. Oct 25/12 entry).

Nov 20/12: 1st Front-Line Squadron. Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 (VFMA-121), formerly an F/A-18 Hornet squadron, is re-designated as the world’s first operational F-35 squadron, of any type. For now, the “squadron” is just 3 F-35Bs, but that will grow. They will be part of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ. MCAS Yuma.

1st F-35 Squadron

Nov 22/12: Canada. Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose tells Canada’s House of Commons that Canada’s “review of options will not be constrained by the previous statement of requirements.” That seems minor, but it isn’t. DND’s requirements had been crafted to make the F-35 the only available choice, per the department’s standard pattern. Breaking that lock opens up other options like the Eurofighter, Super Hornet, etc.

Subsequent reports that Canada has canceled the F-35 are premature. Much will depend on the people picked to conduct the review of options. See “Canada Preparing to Replace its CF-18 Hornets” for full coverage.

Nov 16/12: ALIS. Reuters reports that ALIS is at 94% of final capability, but a changing computing landscape has bitten it. A Navy “Red Team” hacked into the ALIS system. ALIS reportedly includes both classified and unclassified data streams, and the 2001 specifications didn’t require separating them to prevent intrusions. That kind of failure to plan for computer attacks doesn’t reflect especially well on all concerned, and it was reportedly all the Navy team needed.

Lockheed Martin was surprised by the result, but say that they’ve developed a “fairly straightforward fix” that did not require major adjustments to ALIS. The bad news? The political exercise of choosing F-35 suppliers in nearly every U.S. state, and beyond the USA, increases general exposure to cyber attacks.

The latest version of ALIS has been in use at Edwards AFB, CA for several months. It’s also scheduled to be used by the Marines at Yuma, CA this year, and by Nellis AFB, NV when Lockheed delivers 4 F-35s for testing within the next month or 2. Meanwhile, The Pentagon is looking to compete ALIS operation, and F-35 maintenance, beyond Lockheed Martin, in an attempt to drive down rising Operations & Maintenance cost projections. Reuters.

Nov 5/12: Affordability. USN Rear Adm. (ret.) Craig Steidle pens an op-ed in Aviation Week. Steidle was the 2nd director of the JSF Program Office, from August 1995 – August 1997. He writes:

“…as the program moved on, the focus on affordability atrophied. Both the government and contractor were at fault. What began as a core pillar didn’t evolve into a culture… In 2008-10, I had the privilege to chair several Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) assessments of the F-35 program… The kind of cost-avoidance program that should have encompassed lean and producibility initiatives and other affordability improvements did not exist, nor was it asked for. The statements of work that we reviewed did not incorporate cost reduction. Difficulties were to be expected, but resolving development issues had diverted attention from cost control.”

He does say that the current F-35 program leadership has made progress, adding that the F-35 will have “a system performance beyond our initial expectations.” Time will tell.

Oct 30/12: Dutch delay. Instead of trying to gather a majority among the second-tier parties, the Dutch VVD and its largest opponent, the PvdA Labour Party, elect to form a national unity coalition with 79/ 150 seats.

They don’t agree about the F-35, but they do agree that the recent Rekenkamer report requires a full reconsideration of Dutch defense policy and commitments by the end of 2013. Once that’s done, there’s reportedly some language about a “competitive” evaluation of alternatives in 2014, leading to a contract in 2015 as planned. The parties agreed that the 2014 evaluation will include operations and support (O&S) costs, while a 2nd agreement will create a forensic inquiry into why Parliament wasn’t informed of the 390% cost explosion between 2001 and 2012 for 30 years of F-35 O&S (q.v. Oct 24/12 entry).

Depending on the exact wording of the coalition agreement, and on how vigorously the PvdA asserts itself, those agreements may just be a stalling tactic toward lock-in, and a drastically reduced fighter fleet with much smaller responsibilities. There are a number of ways to blunt the accuracy and impact of an O&S assessment, and true competition in 2014 requires a specific procedure. The forensic inquiry will put the MvD in the spotlight, and the VVD party is also at risk, but the VVD would not have accepted a suicide pact. The best bet is an inquiry that mirrors the recent farce in Canada: bureaucratic stonewalling, and refusal of responsibility by all parties. In the meantime, more contracts let to Dutch firms could have the effect of raising termination costs if the country pulls out of the F-35 program. Atlantic Sentinel | defense-aerospace.com

Oct 26/12: EVM penalty. The Pentagon is withholding $46.5 million from Lockheed Martin over Earned Value Management system deficiencies, subtracting 5% of periodic billings against the LRIP-4 and LRIP-5 contracts, and Israel’s F-35i development contract.

Lockheed Martin’s EVM certification at Fort Worth, TX was yanked in October 2010. They have a corrective plan to return to full EVM compliance, but haven’t restored their certification yet. Bloomberg.

Oct 25/12: LMCO 10-Q. Lockheed Martin’s 10-Q filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission says that they are still working to restore the Defense Contracting Management Agency’s (DCMA) earned value management system (EVMS) at the Fort Worth, TX facility. Relations with the US government are actually quite tense overall, and the firm mentions the ongoing failure of contract restructuring negotiations to tie fees to milestones. Not to mention disagreements between contractor and government assessments for the milestones that already exist. Then there’s the issue of payment risk hanging over the program:

“The development portion of the F-35 program is expected to continue into 2017 and currently has approximately $530 million of incentive fees remaining… While our customer has delayed funding for LRIP Lot 6 until the LRIP Lot 5 contract is negotiated, we and our industry team have continued to work in an effort to meet our customer’s desired aircraft delivery dates for the LRIP Lot 6 aircraft. As a result, we have approximately $400 million in potential termination liability exposure as of September 30, 2012. If we are unable to obtain additional funding by year-end, the potential termination liability exposure is estimated to be $1.1 billion and our cash exposure would be approximately $250 million… In the quarter ended September 30, 2012, 12 LRIP Lot 3 aircraft were delivered to the U.S. Government. We have received orders for 95 production aircraft, of which 26 have been delivered through the quarter ended September 30, 2012.”

Lockheed Martin received a $489.5 million contract for Lot 6 long-lead parts on June 15/12. It isn’t clear if those funds have been released, or are being held up over negotiations. See: 10-Q SEC filing | Reuters.

Oct 24/12: Dutch Report. The Dutch Rekenkamer national auditing office releases their report covering the proposed F-35 buy. A decision to buy or reject the F-35A must be made by 2015, per earlier agreements with the US government and Lockheed Martin, but the F-35A IOT&E and arrival of operational Block 3 software will take until 2019, which means another round of testing after 2019. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) would wait until 2022, and it would be at least 2027 (a 6-year slip from 2021) before the Dutch could retire their F-16s.

The bottom line is that even in a study that confined itself to unaudited figures provided by the Dutch government and industry, it’s clear that the planned EUR 4.05 billion Dutch buy won’t be able to afford 68 F-35s, let alone the 85 planned. The MvD is now talking about just 56 planes, and extrapolation using the report’s own charts and Pentagon figures suggests a figure closer to 42-48 F-35As. As the Rekenkamer points out, it isn’t possible to execute the Luchtmacht’s current responsibilities with those numbers. Which means the Netherlands will need to rethink and reduce its long-term defense and alliance commitments. Operations & support (O&S) projections, exclusive of fuel, add even more weight to that conclusion. The 30-year figure has risen from the initial 2001 figure of EUR 2.9 billion for 85, to the 2012 figure of EUR 14.2 billion. It only drops to EUR 13.2 billion at 68 aircraft, and that non-linear drop makes it likely that O&M costs for a fleet of 42-48 F-35As, over 30 years, would be well over EUR 200 million per plane.

Option #2, which involves withdrawing from the testing phase, gets a negative recommendation. The Rekenkamer thinks it wouldn’t make operational or financial sense, since monies “saved” would just create new costs later in the F-16 fleet. They’re almost certainly correct.

Option #3 would involve withdrawing from the F-35 program before 2015, and buying another fighter off the shelf. This could expose the government to termination claims, with Dutch firms filing claims against major F-35 contractors under US Federal Acquisition Regulations, who will go to the US government for payment, who would go to the Dutch government under the JSF program’s 2010 MoU (pp. 28, 117). The Rekenkamer believes that taking this option would also require a reconsideration of the Luchtmacht’s medium-term responsibilities, since it would require operating the F-16 fleet for longer.

That last conclusion may not be correct. The most likely alternative that could offer more fighters, the JAS-39E/F Gripen, isn’t scheduled to enter Swedish service until 2023. Which would push full retirement of the Dutch F-16s beyond 2027. The Swiss are getting leased JAS-39C/Ds as a bridge to their 22 JAS-39Es, however, and Saab could conceivably make the Dutch a similar offer that let them retire the Luchtmacht F-16s in 2027 as planned. The Eurofighter or Rafale would offer similar or greater costs compared to the F-35A, but either aircraft could be delivered and operational several years earlier than the F-35A or the JAS-39E/F. DID’s estimate is that a 2015 contract signing could give the Dutch a Rafale/ Typhoon IOC of 2018, and full retirement of Dutch F-16s by 2022-23. “Uitstapkosten Joint Strike Fighter,” incl. links to full reports [all in Dutch] | JSF Nieuws [in Dutch] | DID thanks VNC Communication for their assistance.

Dutch F-35 report

Oct 19/12: Engines. United Technologies’ Pratt and Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT wins an $81.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for services and materials for the preliminary design, detailed design, and engine performance testing in support of the F135 Fuel Burn Reduction Program. The objective of the program is to demonstrate a 5% mission weighted fuel burn reduction in a F135 experimental engine configuration.

Competition can produce the same kinds of benefits, of course, but the Pentagon has chosen not to do that.

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT, and is expected to be complete in July 2016. This contract was competitively procured via Broad Agency Announcement, and 3 offers were received by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ (N68335-13-C-0005).

Oct 9/12: Italy. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX received a $28.6 million advance acquisition contract modification, buying long lead-time parts, material and components required to protect the delivery schedule of Italy’s 4 F-35As in LRIP Lot 7 (FY 2013).

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be completed in June 2013. Note that El Segundo is Northrop Grumman’s work, and Warton is BAE’s (N00019-12-C-0004).

Sept 27/12: LRIP-7 Engine lead-in. United Technologies’ Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives an estimated $89.2 million for long-lead components, parts and materials associated with the 37 engines in LRIP Lot 7. The rest of the contract will follow, but initial purchases involve:

• USAF: 19 F135-PW-100 base model ($38 million, 43%)
  
• Italy: 3 F135 CTOL ($6 million, 7%)
  
• Norway: 2 F135 CTOL ($4 million, 4.5%)
  
• Turkey: 2 F135 CTOL ($4 million, 4.5%)
  
• US Navy: 4 F135-PW-100 Carrier Variant ($35.2 million, 39% for US/ USMC)
  
• USMC: 6 F-135-PW-600 Short Take-off and Vertical Landing with Roll Royce’s LiftFan
  
• Britain: 1 F135 STOVL ($2 million, 2%)

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (67%); Bristol, United Kingdom (16.5%); and Indianapolis, IN (16.5%), and is expected to be complete in September 2013. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-12-C-0060).

FY 2012

F-35A armed test
(click to view full)

Sept 26/12: LRIP-3 changes. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $25.9 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to add authorized concurrency changes for USAF F-35As in LRIP Lot 3. Many concurrency changes are going to involve software, but they can also involve mechanical changes. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to span multiple years (N00019-08-C-0028).

Sept 26/12: Simulators & RCS. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $79.9 million advance acquisition contract modification to buy 6 F-35 Lightening II Full Mission Simulators, and a radar upgrade at Hill AFB, UT to support of F-35 radar cross section testing.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in April 2015. $716,700 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0002).

Sept 20/12: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman Corporation enters into a long-term agreement (LTA) with Denmark’s Terma A/S, worth more than $95 million through 2019. The LTA covers production of 34 unique F-35 Lightning II composite components, including doors, panels, skin assembly, and straps through 2019.

This is actually an extension of a partnership that began in 2006. Terma A/S has been producing F-35 components since the LRIP-1 order in 2007. NGC.

Sept 12/12: Dutch Elections. Elections leave the pro-JSF coalition slightly ahead in some respects, but the VVD (+10 seats) and CDA (-8 seats) end up needing 22 more votes to have a 76-vote majority in favor of the F-35. Support from Geert Wilders’ PVV, plus the Christian Democratic leaning CU and SGP, could get them to 77. Wikipedia.

Sept 6/12: Japan’s 4, for much more. More cost hikes for Japan, as Defense Ministry officials cite “lower production efficiency” as the reason its first 4 F-35As will soar again to YEN 15.4 billion (about $195 million) per plane. As a result, the ministry is looking to find the full YEN 30.8 billion, in order to cover the 2 fighters planned for the FY 2013 budget request. The Japan Times.

Aug 28/12: Israel. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Ft. Worth, TX receives a $206.8 million cost-reimbursement contract modification to pay for Phase I Increment 1, of Israel’s F-35i System Development and Demonstration. This modification includes the development of hardware and software, from the initial requirements development to the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). In addition, a hardware-only post PDR will continue through finalized requirements, layouts, and build to prints, including production planning data.

Note that Pentagon contract announcements are often for the 40-50% of the total expected costs, in order to get work underway. As such, previous figures of $450 million to add Israeli radio, datalink, and electronic warfare systems could still be true. Work will be performed at Fort Worth, TX (60%); Los Angeles, CA (20%); Nashua, NH (15%); and San Diego, CA (5%), and is expected to be complete in May 2016. US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD will manage this effort, on behalf of its Israeli Foreign Military Sale client (N00019-12-C-0070).

F-35i SDD begins

Aug 7/12: LRIP-5. United Technologies subsidiary Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives a $9.6 million contract modification to LRIP Lot 5/ FY 2011 fixed-price incentive and cost-plus-incentive contract line items. It funds part of the cost of 2 F135 engines, plus associated engineering assistance to production, a mock-up engine, slave modules for engine depot test cells at Tinker Air Force Base, initial stand-up repair capabilities at Hill Air Force Base; and additional contractor logistics support. Support will take place at the Fort Worth, TX, and Palmdale, CA, production sites, and at Eglin AFB, Yuma AFB, Nellis AFB, and Edwards AFB.

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (67%); Bristol, United Kingdom (17%); and Indianapolis, IN (16%), and is expected to be complete in February 2014.Funding will be released as needed (N00019-10-C-0005).

Aug 6/12: LRIP-5. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a not-to-exceed $209.8 million contract modification for initial spares to support 32 F-35 LRIP Lot 5/ FY 2011 fighters.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%), and is expected to be complete in June 2015 (N00019-10-C-0002).

June 20/12: LRIP-7 Norway. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $20.1 million advance acquisition contract to provide long lead-time parts, material and components required for Norway’s 2 F-35As ordered in LRIP-7/ FY 2013.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%). Work is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-12-C-0004).

July 2-5/12: Netherlands. A parliamentary majority opposed to buying the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter has emerged in the Netherlands. Despite lobbying from the MvD, and 2 planes ordered already, the issue came to a vote, and the motion to withdraw from the program was upheld.

Because the government has technically dissolved, this vote doesn’t pull the Netherlands out yet. What it does say is that unless the VVD and SDA parties can form a majority in the next election, the Dutch F-35 buy is in serious danger. The cost of ending the country’s Tier 2 participation in the program could hit EUR 1 billion. Then again, if reported figures regarding Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen offer are true, Dutch government budgets could still come out ahead. Industry may be less happy.

June 29/12: Japan. Buy 4, for more. Officials from Japan’s defense ministry say that they have agreed to terms for their first 4 F-35As. Delayed American orders for 179 planes mean that Japan’s planes will reportedly cost 9.6 billion yen (about $120 million) each, up from the original plan of $110 million. That makes the Japanese contract a good bellwether for the real base cost of an F-35A in the near future.

Fortunately for the Japanese, the overall contract remained at the expected YEN 60 billion (about $752.4 million). The cost of the 2 simulators and other equipment dropped to YEN 19.1 billion ($240.83 million) from the expected YEN 20.5 billion. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters: F-35 Wins The F-X Competition” for full coverage.

Japan: 4 of 42

June 15/12: LRIP-6. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $489.5 million advance acquisition contract to provide long lead-time parts, material and components required for the delivery of 35 LRIP-6 fighters. The order involves 19 USAF F-35As, 3 F-35As for the government of Italy, 2 F-35As for the government of Turkey, 6 USMC F-35B STOVL(Short Take-Off Vertical Landing) fighters, 1 F-35B for Britain, and 4 F-35Cs for the US Navy.

This contract also funds long lead-time efforts required for the addition of a drag chute to Norway’s F-35As, which will be ordered as part of LRIP-7 in 2013. Drag chutes are especially useful when landing in cold climates, where runways and tires may fail to provide the same level of traction.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%); and is expected to be complete in June 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to US FAR 6.302-1, by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-12-C-0004).

June 15/12: Norway OK. Norway takes the next step, and formally authorizes the purchase of 2 F-35A fighters, which are intended for delivery in 2015. They will be based in the United States as part of a joint partner training center, which almost certainly means Eglin AFB, FL. The 2 aircraft authorized today are expected to be joined by a second pair in 2016. They are to be followed by up to 48 additional aircraft orders from 2017, which will be based at Orland AB and Evenes FOB in Norway.

This is not a contract yet, but one can be expected in FY 2013. Meanwhile, American support for internal F-35 integration of the JSM strike missile allows Norway to begin preparing it for deployment.

The overall cost of Norway’s F-35’s procurement phase is estimated at NOK 60 billion/ $FY12 10 billion in real terms. This is very good news for Lockheed Martin, which is working through a 2-month long extended strike by its machinists, and a harsh US GAO report concerning the F-35’s progress. Norwegian MoD | Business Insider | Fort Worth Star-Telegram | WFAA Dallas.

Norwegian go-ahead

June 14/12: Norway. Norway’s Storting (parliament) approves a significant increase in defense spending, with the F-35 purchase playing a central role. The country will also be making investments in modernizing and adding CV90 tracked armored vehicles, and purchasing UAVs.

Overall, Norway will see a budget increase of 7% by 2016. Monies spent of the Afghan deployment will be continued and redirected, while “significant” supplementary funds will be added for the F-35 purchase. Source.

June 14/12: US GAO Report. Congress’ Government Accountability Office delivers a report on the F-35 program. Key excerpts from GAO-12-437: “Joint Strike Fighter – DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks” :

“The new program baseline projects total acquisition costs of $395.7 billion, an increase of $117.2 billion (42%) from the prior 2007 baseline. Full rate production is now planned for 2019, a delay of 6 years from the 2007 baseline. Unit costs per aircraft have doubled since start of development in 2001… Since 2002, the total quantity through 2017 has been reduced by three-fourths, from 1,591 to 365. Affordability is a key challenge… Overall performance in 2011 was mixed as the program achieved 6 of 11 important objectives… Late software releases and concurrent work on multiple software blocks have delayed testing and training. Development of critical mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky… Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities. Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts total more than $1 billion and aircraft deliveries are on average more than 1 year late. Program officials said the government’s share of the cost growth is $672 million; this adds about $11 million to the price of each of the 63 aircraft under those contract.”

June 13/12: Infrastructure. R.L. Reed, Inc. in Las Vegas, NV wins an $11.1 million firm-fixed-price contract, to build an F-35A aerospace ground equipment facility at Nellis AFB, NV. Work is expected to finish by Dec 10/13. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 15 bids received by The US Army Corps of Engineers in Los Angles, CA (W912PL-12-C-0010).

June 4/12: Support. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives an $111.6 million cost reimbursement contract modification, which adds more funding for recurring support activities such as initial training, aircraft maintenance operations, stand-up of sustainment capability at specified locations, technical data management, and sustaining engineering for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

Work will be performed at Eglin AFB, FL (60%); and in Fort Worth, TX (15%); El Segundo, CA (5%); Warton, United Kingdom (5%); Orlando, FL (5%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%). Work is expected to be complete in October 2012, but $45.2 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0002).

May 31/12: Norway JSM. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $19.8 million contract modification, funding a Joint Strike Missile (JSM) Risk Reduction Study for the Norway Ministry of Defence. Efforts include physical fit checks, wind tunnel tests, engineering analysis, and designing and building of an emulator and adapter to determine next steps in integrating the JSM into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

These monies will be applied to the fixed-price-incentive-fee, firm target F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter LRIP-4/ FY 2010 contract. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (70%); Arnold AFB in Tullahoma, TN (20%); and Kongsberg, Norway (10%); and is expected to be complete in May 2014 (N00019-09-C-0010).

May 7/12: LRIP-4 Concurrency. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $237,740,000 fixed-price-incentive-fee, firm target contract modification to the LRIP-4/ FY 2010 contract, in order to raise the limit for government-authorized changes to the plane’s configuration baseline hardware or software. This modification increases the concurrency cap for the USAF’s and Netherlands’ F-35As; USMC’s and Britain’s F-35Bs; and US Navy F-35Cs.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to span multiple years, but $222.6 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. This contract modification combines purchases for the Navy ($153.2M/ 64.5%); USAF ($69.4M/ 29%); the United Kingdom ($8.2M/ 3.5%); and the Netherlands ($6.9M/ 3%), under contract N00019-09-C-0010.

May 10/12: Britain. Britain’s government confirms long-standing rumors that it would abandon the F-35C and its associated catapult modifications to 1 carrier, returning to the ski-jump deck and F-35B STOVL variant. That will mean reversions and changes to the carriers’ evolved design and lighting, some of which were described in the Jan 25/12 entry. Aircraft are less affected. The UK had already ordered and paid for an F-35B test plane, before the switch to the F-35C. Those flights will now continue, and F-35B flight trials are scheduled to begin from a British carrier in 2018.

A DSTL report has explained some of the capabilities Britain would lose by abandoning the F-35C, but the government justifies their decision by saying that the F-35C’s improved capabilities and compatibility with American and French carriers would come at too steep a cost. Staying with the F-35C, they say, would delay Britain’s return to carrier capability from 2020 – 2023 or later, cost nearly GBP 2 billion to modify 1 of their 2 carriers, and leave the Royal Navy with no carrier capability if their converted ship needs maintenance. In contrast, the F-35B will be compatible with the US Marines and with Italy, and gives Britain the option of taking its 2nd CVF carrier out of strategic reserve, and using it when the primary carrier is out of service for long refits or maintenance dockings. UK MoD.

Britain back to F-35B

May 3-9/12: Australia. Australia’s Defense Force will delay buying 12 new F-35As by 2 years (Project AIR 6000, Phase 2A/B, Stage 2), and delay the 4th Australian squadron (Phase 2C) by one more year, under the Labor Party government’s deficit-reduction plan.

They’ve committed to buy 2 initial F-35As for delivery in 2014-15, but those 2 will remain in the United States for testing and pilot training. The next 12 planes would have been based in Australia. Their Year of Decision will now be 2014-15 for the next 12, which may also cover the Phase 2B buy of 58. Delivery of those planes isn’t expected until 2017-2019 now, which means that RAAF F-35As won’t be flying in Australia until around 2020. The AIR 6000 Phase 2C decision to add another 24 F-35s, and raise Australia’s total buy to 96, won’t happen until 2018-19. Australian DMO Project page | Australian Aviation | Australian Aviation follow-up | The Australian | Bloomberg | Canada’s Globe & Mail.

Australia delays

May 1/12: Japan. May 1/12: The US DSCA formally announces Japan’s official request for an initial set of 4 Lockheed Martin F-35As, with an option to buy another 38 and bring the deal to 42 aircraft. “The Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s F-4 aircraft will be decommissioned as F-35’s [sic] are added to the inventory.”

The estimated cost is $10 billion, which works out to $238.1 million per plane. Until a set of contracts are signed, it’s hard to split that accurately between purchase and support costs, and long support deals can add a lot to costs. Japan is also interested in considerably more local assembly than most of F-35 buyers, which is likely to add a number of unique costs of its own. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters: F-35 Wins The F-X Competition” for full coverage.

Japan request

April 24/12: LRIP-2 Concurrency. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $68.3 million modification to the previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) LRIP-2/ FY 2008 contract, to raise the limit for government-authorized changes to the plane’s configuration baseline hardware or software. This contract combines purchases for the USAF ($37.7M/ 55.2%) and the US Navy ($30.6M/ 44.8%)

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to span multiple years. (N00019-07-C-0097)

April 24/12: LRIP-3 Concurrency. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $45.9 million modification to the previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee LRIP-3 contract, to raise the limit for government-authorized changes to the plane’s configuration baseline hardware or software. This contract combines purchases for the US Navy ($37.5M/ 77.8%) and the United Kingdom ($10.2M/ 22.2%).

At this point, both navies were still committed to the F-35C. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX and is expected to span multiple years (N00019-08-C-0028)

April 13/12: LRIP-5. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $258.8 million not-to-exceed undefinitized modification to the LRIP-5/ FY 2011 contract adding 1 USAF F-35A and 1 USN F-35C. The modification includes undefinitized line items, which will be finalized as fixed-price-incentive-firm contract line items.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%); and is expected to be complete in February 2014. Funds will be released as needed (N00019-10-C-0002).

April 3/12: F-35 schedule & costs. Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman takes a deep look into the Pentagon’s latest Selected Acquisition Reports, which was released on March 30/12. Excerpts:

“Another three-year slip to initial operational test and evaluation, the culmination of system development and demonstration, which now is due to be complete in 2019 – the target date is February but the threshold date is October… it appears that the main culprit is software and hardware, mainly in terms of… sensor fusion and emission control – that take place in the fighter’s main processor banks… In what follows, I’m going to use average procurement unit cost (APUC)… recurring flyaway is the lowest cost, but neither the US nor anyone else can put an aircraft on the ramp for that money. And all numbers are base-2012… The APUC for the F-35A in 2013-14 is $184-$188 million, versus $177m (2009 dollars) for the last F-22s. And that is at a much higher production rate.”

Most ominously for the F-35’s future cost structure:

“Although the basis of the numbers has been changed, the SAR still compares the F-35A with the F-16, and shows that the estimated CPFH [DID: Cost Per Flight Hour] for the F-35A has gone from 1.22 F-16s in the 2010 SAR to 1.42 today – versus 0.8 F-16s, which was being claimed a few years ago. Where is that operations and support money going to come from?”

SAR: dates slip, O&M rises

April 2/12: The Future of Stealth? A Japan Today article goes straight to the main military point at stake: the future effectiveness of stealth technologies:

“As more nations develop stealth fighters, then the use of radar as the main target acquisition device will be taken over by infrared, wake tracking, electro-optics, and radio/electronic chatter detection – thereby side-stepping radar stealth features – in short order.”

It’s a bit more complex than that, especially given the fact that stealth tends to be optimized for certain frequencies, so radars will still play a role. Still, the falling cost of high-bandwidth networking, and the need for a counter to stealth technologies, does suggest a range of countermeasures over the coming decades.

March 30/12: Infrastructure. Small business qualifier Head, Inc. in Columbus, OH receives a $17 million firm-fixed-price contract to build 5 vertical landing pads and associated supporting taxiways at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC, which will base F-35Bs.

Work is expected to be complete by August 2013. This contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online website, with 12 proposals received by Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast in Jacksonville, FL (N69450-12-C-1758).

March 20/12: Infrastructure. Harper Construction Co., Inc., San Diego, CA wins a pair of firm-fixed-price task order under a multiple award construction contract, to build the 2-story aircraft maintenance hangars at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ. The buildings will include a high bay space for F-35Bs, crew and equipment space, administrative space and Special Access Program Facility areas for the Automatic Logistics Information System (ALIS) fleet maintenance program.

Task order 003 for the south hangar is $33.2 million, and a planned modification could increase the contract to $35 million (N62473-10-D-5406, 0004).

Task order 004 for the north hangar is $36.7 million, and a planned modification could increase the contract to $38.6 million (N62473-10-D-5406, 0004).

Work is expected to be complete by May 2014, and 9 proposals were received for each task order by US Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA

March 12/12: LRIP-5. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $56.4 million cost reimbursement contract modification, adding funding for support efforts necessary to meet F-35 LRIP Lot 5’s requirements and delivery schedule.

Work will be performed in Eglin Air Force Base, FL (60%); Fort Worth, TX (15%); El Segundo, CA (5%); Warton, United Kingdom (5%); Orlando, FL (5%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%); and is expected to be complete in May 2012. $18.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0002).

March 12/12: LRIP-6. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $38.6 million modification to the previously awarded low rate initial production Lot 6 advance acquisition contract to provide additional funding for the procurement of long lead items for F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter low rate initial production conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft for the USAF, and for the governments of Italy and Australia.

Work, which will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, is necessary to protect the delivery schedules of CTOL aircraft planned for delivery through January 2015 (N00019-11-C-0083).

March 9/12: Reprogramming Lab. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $24.1 million cost-reimbursement contract modification to develop a data farm for the Joint Strike Fighter US Reprogramming Laboratory at Eglin AFB, FL. It will take feeds from the lab’s existing equipment, and store software and data from the F-35’s mission data testing.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (95%), and Orlando, FL (5%), and is expected to be complete in November 2014. Contract funds will be released as needed (N00019-02-C-3002).

Feb 23/12: Turkey. Turkish Defence Minister Ismet Yilmaz says that they’re sticking to plans to buy 100 of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jets for $16 billion, but could change those numbers or the timing of their orders, depending on how negotiations go.

Turkey’s development phase payments have reportedly hit $315 million so far. Reuters.

Feb 15/12: Italian cuts. Italian Defense Minister Giampaolo Di Paola tells a joint defense committee of both houses of parliament that Italy is cutting its planned F-35 purchases from 131 to 90, as part of a range of military austerity measures. A review had indicated 1/3 fewer planes would do, but given Italy’s needs all of those cuts are almost certain to be air force jets.

Di Paola said that Italy had spent EUR 2.5 billion/ $3.3 billion on the program so far. Bloomberg.

Italy cuts

Feb 9/12: LRIP-6. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $14.8 million contract modification, to buy long lead items for the USMC’s LRIP-6/ FY 2012 buy of F-35B fighters. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is necessary to protect the delivery schedules of STOVL aircraft planned for delivery through December 2014 (N00019-11-C-0083)

Jan 6/12: LRIP-6 engines. United Technologies subsidiary Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives a $194.1 million advance acquisition contract with fixed-price line items for long lead components, parts, and materials required for the delivery of 37 LRIP Lot 6 engines. They will equip the USMC (6 F-135-600s with LiftFan, $84.7M/ 43.6%); USAF (18 F135-100s, $54.9M/ 28.3%); USN (7 F135-100 naval, $37.1M/ 19.1%); Italian Air Force (4 F135-100s, $11.6M/ 6%); and Royal Australian Air Force (2 F135-100s, $5.8M/ 3%); and associated spares.

Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (64%); Bristol, UK (25%); and Indianapolis, IN (11%), and is expected to be complete in September 2012. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 USC. 2304c1 (N00019-11-C-0082).

USN F-35C & F/A-18E,
jet blast testing
(click to view full)

Dec 28/11: LRIP-5 engines. Pratt & Whitney Military Engines in East Hartford, CT receives a $1.122 billion unfinalized, not-to-exceed contract modification for LRIP Lot V’s engines. The contract includes both fixed price incentive and cost plus incentive contract line items, and covers 21 F135 engines for the USAF’s F-35As ($520.7M / 46.3%), 3 F135 LiftFan engines for the USMC’s F-35Bs ($387.1M / 34.5% is the figure given), 6 F135s for the Navy’s F-35Cs ($166.7M/ 14.9%), plus the usual support and spares for the US and F-35 Co-operative Partners ($47.8M Co-operative Partner Participants/ 4.3%). A total of $358.6 million is committed immediately.

One wonders if the USN & USMC figures were transposed, but the finalized contract will offer more clarity. Work will be performed in East Hartford, CT (67%); Bristol, United Kingdom (16.5%); and Indianapolis, IN (16.5%), and is expected to be complete in February 2014 (N00019-10-C-0005).

Dec 27/11: LRIP-5. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $485 million not-to-exceed cost-plus-fixed-fee unfinalized contract modification, with $131.5 million obligated at time of award. The contract covers LRIP Lot 5 production requirements, including special tooling/special test equipment, and subcontractor technical assistance. This contract combines purchases for the USAF ($186.7M/ 38.5%); the US Navy ($186.7M/ 38.5%); and JSF Cooperative Partner participants ($111.5M/ 23%).

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (30%); El Segundo, CA (20%); Wharton, United Kingdom (20%); Turin, Italy (15%); Nashua, NH (8%); and Baltimore, MD (7%); and is expected to be complete in December 2013 (N00019-10-C-0002)

Dec 27/11: LRIP-4. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $253 million cost-plus-incentive-fee and cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to finalize the previous LRIP-4/ FY 2010 support contract. This contract covers the US Navy ($140.3M/ 55.5%), the USAF (89.1M/ 35.2%), and the JSF “Cooperative Program participants” ($23.6M/ 9.3%).

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (35%); El Segundo, CA (25%); Warton, United Kingdom (20%); Orlando, FL (10%); Nashua, NH (5%); and Baltimore, MD (5%); and is expected to be complete in May 2014. $169.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-09-C-0010).

Dec 20/11: Japan win. Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces that Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II has won the F-X competitive bid process for 42 planes. The initial contract will be for 4 F-35A jets in Japan Fiscal Year 2012, which begins April 1/12. Deliveries are expected to begin in 2016. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters: F-35 Wins The F-X Competition” for full coverage.

Japan win

Dec 9/11: LRIP-5. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $4.0119 billion fixed-price-incentive, firm target, FPIF contract modification for 30 LRIP Lot 5 fighters for the USAF (21 F-35As, $2.644 b/ 65.9%); the US Navy (6 F-35Cs, $937.3M/ 23.3%) and the US Marine Corps (3 F-35Bs, $426.2M/ 10.6%). In addition, this modification funds associated ancillary mission equipment and flight test instrumentation for those aircraft, and flight test instrumentation for the United Kingdom ($4.1M/ 0.1%). All efforts will be contracted for on a FPIF basis, with the exception of work scope for the incorporation of certain specified concurrency changes that will be contracted for on a cost-sharing/no-fee basis.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (67%); El Segundo, CA (14%); Warton, United Kingdom (9%); Orlando, FL (4%); Nashua, NH (3%); and Baltimore, MD (3%), and is expected to be complete in January 2014 (N00019-10-C-0002).

LRIP Lot 5 main

Additional Readings & Sources Aircraft Background

• DID FOCUS Article – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: 2009-2010. At present, there is no coverage for 2011.

• DID FOCUS Article – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Events & Contracts 2007-08

• DID FOCUS Article – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: SDD Contracts & Events FY 2006.

• F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program site. For other news that includes testing results and other areas not covered by contracts, see the news section.

• JSF Program Office – JSF Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development MoU [PDF], update 4.

• Lockheed Martin – F-35 Lightning II. Includes sections covering topics such as Earned Value Management, testing, partnerships, manufacturing, etc.

• Air Force Technology – JSF (F35) Joint Strike Fighter, International

• Aerospaceweb – F-35 JSF Weapon Carriage Capacity. Good discussion of the 3 versions and their specific limiting factors.

• JSF UK Industry Team site.

• UK Parliamentary Defence Committee. An important source of information re: Tier 1 partner Britain’s future participation in the F-35 program.

• Pratt & Whitney – F135. The F-35’s current engine.

• DID – The F136 alternative engine was eventually terminated, over the objections of the government’s GAO auditors.

• Lockheed Martin Code One Magazine (May 15/08) – X to F: F-35 Lightning II And Its X-35 Predecessors.

Aircraft Ancillaries

• DID – You Can Track Your F-35s, At ALIS’ Maintenance Hub. Possibly the F-35’s most important ancillary system.

• Martin Baker – US16E – JSF. The plane’s ejection seat. See the “F-35 Program: Ancillary and Sub-contracts” section’s Nov 12/07 entry for further details that explain why this was such a challenging design.

• Lockheed Martin Code One magazine (Q2 2006) – The New Front Office: A Whole New View For Joint Strike Fighter Pilots. Describes the new cockpit and its related technologies.

• Vision Systems International – F-35 Gen II HMDS. Helmet Mounted Display System.

• Siemens – F-35 Case Study. Involves their FiberSim product, which helps with the design & coordination of composite parts.

• Fighter Country – Hundreds of F-35 aircraft suppliers coordinate with Teamcenter

Official Reports

• US GAO (March 11/13, #GAO-13-309) – Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability Is a Major Concern.

• Pentagon OT&E (Feb 15/13) – F-35A Joint Strike Fighter: Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation [PDF]

• Pentagon OT&E (Jan 17/13) – FY2012 Annual Report: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter [PDF].

• Dutch Rekenkamer Audit Agency (Oct 24/12) – Uitstapkosten Joint Strike Fighter,” incl. links to full reports [all in Dutch].

Other Perspectives

• War Is Boring (Jan 1/14) – Is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter the New F-4?

• Vanity Fair (Sept 16/13) Will It Fly? A long look at the F-35 program, and at issues with key components.

• ELP (July 19/13) – UPDATE – F-35 Gun Concerns. Links back to USAF Col. Charles Moore’s 2007 essay “The Need for a Permanent Gun System On the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter” [PDF], which includes analysis of front-line fighter gun use. An email from POGO’s Winslow Wheeler reiterates that the F-35A’s 25mm cannon has just 180 rounds, compared to the F-16’s 510 x 20mm or the A-10’s 1,174 x 30mm rounds, and references inherent gun pod accuracy issues from in Vietnam and Desert Storm.

• Offiziere.ch (March 6/13) – Jet Fighter Influence: How Lockheed’s Public Relations Efforts Keep the F-35 Sold. Offers a glimpse at Lockheed Martin’s lobbying beyond Washington, including mutually-referencing paid-for groups.

• US National Public Radio (Jan 3/13) – The F-35 Fighter Jet: The Cost And Controversy

• AOL Defense (Nov 27/12) – Will Stealth Survive As Sensors Improve? F-35, Jammers At Stake

• Aviation Week Ares (April 3/12) – JSF – SAR Discloses Another Three-Year Slip.

AN/TPS-75
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The US Air Force’s AN/TPS-75 radar has been in service since 1968. Threats have evolved, and they want to replace it as their main long-range, ground-based radar for detecting, identifying and tracking aircraft and missiles, then reporting them through the Ground Theater Air Control System. The US Marines are considering a similar move, to replace their own AN/TPS-59s. Hence the USA’s Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR, pron. “Three Dealer”).

3DELRR is intended to provide up to 35 radars for long-range surveillance, air traffic control, and theater ballistic missile detection. It will correct AN/TPS-75 shortfalls by being easier to maintain, thanks to AESA technology, and by detecting and reporting highly maneuverable and/or stealthy targets. Its improved resolution may even allow it to classify and determine the type of non-cooperative aircraft that cannot or do not identify themselves – a trait that allows faster engagement of hostile planes, and reduces the odds of friendly fire incidents. As long as the program itself can avoid friendly fire from the USA’s budget wars.

3DELRR: Mission & Program

The FBO.gov solicitation for 3DELRR defines its purpose as follows:

“The primary mission of the 3DELRR will be to provide long-range surveillance, control of aircraft, and theater ballistic missile detection. The 3DELRR will provide air controllers with a precise, real-time air picture of sufficient quality to conduct close control of individual aircraft under a wide range of environmental and operational conditions. In the case of theater missile defense operations, the new radar will have the capability to detect, track, and disseminate target information to respective command and control nodes such as the USAF Control and Reporting Center to disseminate for warning and engagement. Similarly, the joint targeting process will benefit from trajectory information provided by the 3DELRR, which will include launch and impact location. The 3DELRR will correct current radar system shortfalls by providing the capability to detect and report highly maneuverable, small radar cross section targets as well as discriminate the type of a non-cooperative aircraft. It will also mitigate most of the sustainability and maintainability concerns which plague the current system.”

Once the Technical Development Phase was complete, the USAF initially intended to award the System Design & Development (SDD) to the winning team around 2011, but a combination of budget cuts and new procurement philosophies forced a shift.

(click to view full)

By September 2011, that shift had become pronounced. By March 2012, the entire acquisition plan had changed, all the way through development of the operational system (EMD), and initial production & fielding (LRIP). The design and development award didn’t take place until 2014.

2012: A Change in Plans Old Plan, New Plan

Click here for the full-size graphic of plan changes.

Instead of awarding a Technology Development (TD) Phase 2 contract to either Sensis or Lockheed Martin, with built-in options to take the radar all the way into production, a contract around the end of FY 2012 threw the competition open again, awarding 3 fixed-price TD contracts worth $106 million in total.

That fixed-price type contract approach continued in the next 2 phases, then a single contractor was chosen in the project’s 3rd competition, and given a contract to take the project beyond Milestone B into production and fielding. That winning choice was based on “lowest price technically acceptable” criteria, rather than “best value.”

In sync with that shift, one of the TD Phase’s goals was to understand the cost/capability tradeoffs. Most cost is always tied up in design, which is to say in specifications. The Requirements Analysis in SOW Para 1.9.19 tried to reorder or change specifications, in order to eliminate requirements that drive high costs but don’t change the radar’s capabilities enough. The Army saw the cost drivers as “Mobility, Accuracy, False Alarms, Surveillance Volume, and Range,” but they were prepared to be surprised by industry offerings.

That decision pushed the competition toward existing designs and technologies, given the need for assured costs inherent in a fixed-price bid. Northrop Grumman certainly hoped so, as they believe that their existing USMC G/ATOR battlefield radar solution could be upgraded to handle 3DELRR as well. The Marines could then take advantage of the program, replacing existing AN/TPS-59 radars with the same technology used by their shorter-range G/ATOR companion.

Once this new “TD Review E” was done, a final specification allowed final Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase bids to be solicited from any qualified source, not just the TD Phase 2 winners.

These decisions were significant, because they opened the door for Raytheon to win.

The Milestone B decision to begin EMD development of the final 3DELRR system didn’t take place until Q1 FY 2015, and was delayed by a GAO protest. The Critical Design Review is expected in after a winner has been picked, instead of at the end of a single-contractor TD Phase.

The single EMD winner is expected to continue development into the end of 2017 (Q1 FY 2018), and the fall Milestone C decision that authorizes Low-Rate Initial Production. A new twist was introduced in early 2013 as the program office went beyond the EMD-LRIP scope of its RFP, and added a full rate production option that could raise the program’s value to $1.3 billion in total sales over the next 10 years.

Initial Operational Capability with the USAF is now tagged at fall 2019 (Q1 FY 2020).

Contracts and Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, contracts for the 3DELRR program are awarded by the Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom Air Force Base, MA.

2014 – 2015

Raytheon Wins; GAO challenge.

May 13/15: Raytheon has further complicated the Air Force’s $1 billion 3DERLL radar program by appealing a federal judge’s decision last week to allow the Air Force to re-evaluate bids. The company previously filed a lawsuit when the Air Force tried to re-open the competition as a result of challenges by competitors Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin.

May 13/15: Raytheon suffered a setback this week, with a federal judge freeing the Air Force to re-evaluate bids for the 3D Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DERLL), with the company initially winning the lucrative contract in October last year. Raytheon filed a lawsuit against the Air Force when it tried to open up the competition through re-evaluating its original decision, with competitors Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman protesting the initial contract award. The value of the program could reach $1 billion, with the Air Force planning to buy sixty of the new radar systems.

Jan 21/15: Air Force Reconsiders.
Reuters quoted a source indicating that the Air Force was to take some form of corrective action in a renewed consideration.

Oct 21-22/14: GAO Protests. The USAF confirms that Northrop Grumman has formally issued a protest against the USAF’s 3DELRR award to Raytheon. The next day, Lockheed Martin confirms that they are also filing a protest.

That halts the program until the challenge receives a ruling, which could take up to 100 days. In order to succeed, the challengers need to show that either Raytheon’s radar isn’t technically acceptable, that it wasn’t the lowest priced – or that something in the process went awry, ensuring that that competitors were treated differently or criteria weren’t applied fairly. Sources: See DID’s GAO Primer | Defense News, “Northrop Challenges 3DELRR Contract Award” | Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Lockheed Martin challenges contract to Raytheon”.

Oct 6/14: Raytheon wins. Raytheon is on quite the radar streak lately, adding the USAF’s 3DELRR to its naval AMDR win. Raytheon IDS in Sudbury, MA receives a $19.5 million fixed-price-incentive-firm contract for 3DELRR’s initial EMD (engineering, manufacturing and development) phase. This base contract includes the purchase of 3 radar systems, and $11 million in FY 2014 USAF RDT&E budgets are committed immediately. Options could bring the total initial EMD contract to $71.8 million for 6 radars, plus product support.

Production orders for the other 29 can follow after that, but it’s also worth noting that 3DELRR is one of the first programs under the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiative to be designed for exportability.

Raytheon’s 3DELRR solution is a C-band radar that builds on their investments in gallium nitride (GaN) electronics, which offer better performance than conventional GaAs circuits at similar power levels. While radars like UHF/VHF are emphasized for detection of stealthy targets within the atmosphere, Raytheon says that they picked the C-band for “increased flexibility because that portion of the spectrum is relatively uncongested.” It should work fine against ballistic missiles, and the ability to avoid spectrum frequency conflicts with potential export customers may also become a selling point.

Work will be performed at Sudbury, MA and Andover, MA and the current contract award is expected to be complete by Oct 31/18. Their sub-contractor Saab Defense (formerly Sensis) will also benefit, and will add about 100 jobs at its DeWitt, NY facility. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition, with 3 offers received by the USAF Life Cycle Management Center’s Theater Battle Control Division at Hanscom AFB, MA (FA8730-15-C-0004). See also Raytheon, “Raytheon awarded contract to build new U.S. Air Force radar” | Syracuse.com, “Raytheon, Saab Defense of DeWitt win U.S. Air Force radar contract worth up to $1.3 billion”.

Raytheon wins EMD

FY 2012-2013

TD Phase 2. EMD-LRIP-FRP RFP; Demonstrations by Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. ATREX Twilight zone…
(click to view full)

Aug 26/13: NGC. Northrop Grumman announces that they completed their 3DELRR demonstration back in July. They refer to it as “The U.S. Air Force system variant of the Department of Defense AN/TPS-80 radar…” but unlike the USMC’s current G/ATORs, this S-band radar uses Gallium Nitride transmit/receive modules. That technology is in the USMC’s plans, and the development work may pay off for the Marines, just as all the work on the USMC’s TPS-80 G/ATOR would offer dividends to the USAF.

As one might expect, given their design’s lineage, Northrop Grumman also touts “successful system ambient air cooling under extremely hot operating conditions,” as well as the radar’s well-developed system self-test and calibration capabilities. Sources: Northrop Grumman Aug 26/13 release.

July 29-30/13: Lockheed & Raytheon. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon announce that they’ve completed their 3DELRR radar demonstrations.

Lockheed Martin’s radar detected required targets of opportunity launched from the Syracuse airport and surrounding areas. They even hired additional test aircraft, in order to perform more advanced performance detection and tracking scenarios.

Raytheon’s C-band offering with GaN-based electronics was put through the same basic tests, and also demonstrated integration into the Air Force’s next-generation Command and Control system. Gallium Nitride electronics can get more performance from the same power inputs, which is an exceptionally helpful feature for radars. The flip side is that they cost more than conventional Gallium Arsenide electronics. Raytheon has made significant investments in GaN, and hopes to reap a competitive advantage by moving farther down the cost curve and higher up the performance curve than its rivals. Sources: Lockheed Martin July 29/13 release | Raytheon July 30/13 release.

March 29/13: Iterating through drafts. The program office is requesting participating contractors to review draft Revision F of their Technical Requirements Document (TRD), which supports Revision B of the draft RFP introduced in January. Sections L and M of this latest revision, reflecting instructions to offerors and evaluation factors for award, respectively, will be posted later. The TRD is available for parties under a Militarily Critical Technical Data Agreement. So far, this looks in line with the plan they announced 2 months ago. FBO.gov.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2013. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish.

For 3DELRR, the GAO estimates the total program cost at $FY13 2.1131 billion: $771.1 million RDT&E, plus $1.3421 billion for 35 systems and associated gear. The program still hopes to start system development by December 2013 (Q1 FY 2014), with Full Operational Capability still scheduled for late 2019 (Q1 FY 2020).

Cost & schedule estimates

March 27/13: NGC. Northrop Grumman touts a recent demonstration, in which a G/ATOR radar with some software modifications tracks 5 NASA ATREX suborbital rockets fired from Wallops Island, VA. The rockets release chemical tracer clouds into the high altitude jet stream, in order to exercise mind control through tinfoil hats help scientists study the jet stream’s flow 60-65 miles above the earth.

Northrop Grumman is touting G/ATOR’s ability to evolve into 3DELRR’s requirements (q.v. Readings), and this announcement is part of that campaign. The question that Northrop Grumman wouldn’t/ couldn’t answer for us involves whether the radar tracked the rockets as they were launched and boosting (easier technical problem, classic counterfire/ air defense, and Wallops is also a major radar test site), or picked up the rockets in mid-flight at high altitude (harder/ higher-power problem, classic BMD). NGC | NASA.

Jan 24/13: Draft RFP reshaped. In Industry Day briefing materials [PDF], program manager Lt. Col. Brian McDonalds explains that the scope of RFP R2278 (first released in June 2012) now includes Full Rate Production. With this new approach, the EMD+FRP RFP is expected to be finalized by July 2013, with an award in March 2014.

This resets the counter on draft revisions, with the most current material again dubbed Revision A. FRP would be contracted as Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) with 6 priced options. 3 radars would be delivered during EMD, 3 others during LRIP (FY18-FY20), and 29 at the full rate pace (FY19-FY24). Requirements are expressed in TRD Rev E, another iteration to Ref F is expected by the time the request is final.

The program office acknowledges that funding remains uncertain, and that there’s a lot of work ahead in order to finalize the new RFP terms without blowing the schedule.

August 20/12: TD Phase 2. All 3 firms receive firm-fixed-price contracts for continued 3DELRR technology development, and a Preliminary Design Review and Capability Demonstration for their radar prototypes. The contracts run until Nov 20/13.

Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Liverpool, NY receives $36 million (FA8707-12-C-0018).

Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems Division in Linthicum Heights, MD receives $34.8 million (FA8707-12-C-0019). NGC release.

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives $35.2 million (FA8707-12-C-0020).

Sensis is no longer part of the competition as a lead, but Raytheon had been producing their AESA, so they could be included in the Raytheon team.

TD Phase 2

June 20/12: EMD-LRIP RFP. Air Force Materiel Command posts solicitation R2278 for the next stage of the program.

March 6/12: New approach. At an Industry Day, the 3DELRR program lays out its new program approach. It’s driven by $80 million in budget cuts over the next 5 years and, they say, by the readiness of current technologies. The 3DELRR Program Office is planning for a Defense Acquisition Board in late April 2012, and an initial set of contracts to develop AESA radars with Gallium Nitride transistors is expected by the end of FY 2012.

The 3DELRR program has also been selected as a “designated system” to participate in the Defense Exportability Features Pilot Program. Focusing on exportability tends to keep costs down, and successful exports will produce both economic and military benefits. See details, above. FBO.gov, incl. Presentation [PDF] | USAF.

New plan

FY 2009-2011

Technology Development; Review is positive. Sensis prototype
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April 2011: Tech review. An independent review team reports that 3DELRR successfully demonstrated its 8 critical technologies in a relevant environment during its initial prototyping effort. That’s a good sign; many Pentagon weapons programs don’t get to this point until late in System Design & Development/ EMD. Source: GAO.

Jan 6/11: Sensis. Sensis Corp. announces that its 3DELRR full-scale prototype have successfully completed testing, achieving all TD phase milestones after a development period of 19 months.

Sensis founder and CEO Jud Gostin was the principal system architect for the Marines’ AN/TPS-59. Raytheon IDS is responsible for the development and production of the team’s Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA). Moog Inc.’s Space and Defense Group, a leader in precision motion control solutions, is producing, testing and integrating the team’s 3DELRR’s motion control subsystems.

Jan 21/11: The USAF offers a program update:

“The Air Force plans to buy 35 new radars to replace the existing TPS-75s. As the 3DELRR is intended to be a joint materiel solution, the Marine Corps is also contributing to its development and looking at the system for future production buys. In fact, the earliest origins of the 3DELRR program can be traced back to the Marine Corps-led Highly Expeditionary Long Range Air Surveillance Radar (HELRASR) that was discontinued in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget cycle.

In February, two 20-month contracts for the initial technology development phase of the 3DELRR, which were awarded to Lockheed Martin Corp. and Sensis Corp., will conclude…. “We anticipate release of the RFP to occur at or near the end of March 2011,” said Major McDonald. “It will be a full and open competition with a single contract award…. if the government elects to exercise all options, the value could approach $740 million.”

Sources: USAF, “Long-range radar program moving forward”.

Dec 16-17/10: LMCO. Lockheed Martin completes the 2nd and final demonstration under its May 2009 3DELRR contract, following an initial demonstration of critical technology elements in March 2010, and a Preliminary Design Review in October 2010.

During the demonstration, Lockheed Martin unveils a functioning system prototype to USAF and Marine Corps officials, to prove the radar’s maturity. The firm says that their radar “addresses 100 percent of 3DELRR requirements, including critical extended air surveillance reach for early warning from threats, such as aircraft and ballistic missiles.” Lockheed Martin.

Dec 21/09: Sensis. Sensis announces that it has completed the System Requirements Review (SRR) for the US Air Force’s 3DELRR program. During SRR, the U.S. Air Force, along with industry organizations, conducted a comprehensive review of the Sensis 3DELRR systems engineering, integration and test processes against overall systems requirements to ensure that the program meets U.S. Air Force requirements.

Oct 29/09: RFP. The Air Force launches the THREE-DIMENSIONAL EXPEDITIONARY LONG-RANGE RADAR Solicitation Number: R2278 formal solicitation for 3DELRR.

3DELRR: LMCO concept
(click to view full)

May 12/09: The US Air Force awards [PDF] a firm-fixed-price $24.9 contract to Lockheed Martin in Liverpool, NY to provide radar engineering and design support to the government during the technology development phase of 3DELRR program. The Lockheed Martin team includes BAE Systems, Computer Sciences Corp., and ManTech. At this time, $9.9 million has been obligated (FA8722-09-C-0003). See also Lockheed Martin release.

May 12/09: The US Air Force awards [PDF] a $21.9 million firm-fixed-price contract to Sensis Corp. in East Syracuse NY to provide radar engineering and design support to the government during the technology development phase of 3DELRR program. The Sensis team includes Raytheon and Moog. At this time, $9.9 million has been obligated (FA8722-09-C-0001). See also: Sensis news release.

TD contracts

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

• US FBO.gov (Oct 29/09, #R2278) – Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar. Very long-running solicitation, last update was March 2013. See esp. the March 2012 Industry Day slide presentation [PDF].

• USAF Electronic Systems Center – Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar [dead link].

• GlobalSecurity.org – Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar.

• Lockheed Martin – Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR).

• Northrop Grumman – Three-Dimensional Long-Range Radar (3DELRR) See also this 2012 snapshot re: G/ATOR for 3DELRR.

• Raytheon – Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR).

• Microwave Journal (July 2009) – Lockheed Martin to Develop Long-range Radar for US Air Force.

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