The National Interest

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force has awarded an $11.7 million contract to Armtec Countermeasures to enhance the F-22 Raptor's radar countermeasure capabilities with the RR-196 chaff.

-This contract, managed by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center at Hill Air Force Base, will support the stealth fighter's combat and training missions.

-Chaff, a longstanding radar countermeasure, disperses small reflective materials to confuse radar systems. Armtec's advanced chaff provides broad-frequency coverage and high radar reflectivity.

-The project, set for completion by September 2027, underscores the ongoing efforts to maintain the F-22's air superiority.

The United States Air Force's Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor remains the best air superiority fighter in service today, but the Pentagon is looking to increase the capabilities of the fifth-generation stealth fighter It awarded an $11.7 million firm-fixed price contract to Armtec Countermeasures, whereby the defense contractor will provide its RR-196 countermeasure chaff for the Raptor. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, at Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah, is the contracting activity for the program.

"This contract provides for the impulse cartridge program and is used by F-22 aircraft for combat and training purposes. Work will be performed in Lillington, North Carolina, and is expected to be completed by Sept. 30, 2027. This contract was a sole source acquisition. Fiscal 2024 ammunition funds in the amount of $11,700,000 are being obligated at the time of award," the United States Department of Defense (DoD) announced on Friday.

In addition to Lillington, Armtec also has facilities in Coachella, California.

The Raptor is known for its stealth capabilities, which are truly a product of the "space age," while the development of chaff actually dates back to the early days of the Second World War. Yet, while it was determined that it was rather effective at countering radar, a concern during the war was that there was no effective "counter-countermeasure," and the British military opted not to use it until late in the war so that Germans couldn't gain a similar advantage.

Fast forward more than 80 years and the latest chaff isn't much than copper foil cut into strips or small pieces – as was the case back in the 1940s! However, there is still a bit more to it.

It can be dispersed to mask a target or just as ideally, present a larger – but false – target on a missile's radar.

Today the size of the chaff is what also matters.

"Chaff has remained a favorite soft-kill countermeasure for AShM radar seekers transmitting in X-band frequencies of 8.5 GHz to 10.68 GHz. X-band dipoles were relatively easy to produce. For chaff to be effective against 8.5-GHz radar seekers, dipoles would need to be between 17.63mm and 8.81mm long. Chaff effective against 10.68-GHz radars would need dipoles between 14mm and 7mm long," Defense and Security Monitor explained.

Armtec hasn't specified exactly what sets its chaff apart from its competitors, but according to the company, "Radar countermeasure chaff is designed to decoy Radars and/or Radar-guided missiles. Our chaff products offer broad-frequency coverage, high Radar reflectivity, and minimal bird-nesting. Armtec chaff is available in S-band thru Ka-band and can be tailored to meet specific customer requirements."

Neither the DoD nor Armtec specified how many Raptors will be equipped with the RR-196 countermeasure chaff, but in addition for use with combat aircraft, the Armtec chaff will be employed for training purposes.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and What You Need to Know: U.S. Air Force Gen. David Allvin recently suggested a potential shift away from the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, hinting at the development of a "Light Fighter" concept.

-This new approach emphasizes adaptability over durability, with a focus on modular design, open systems architecture, and digital engineering.

-The move reflects concerns that multi-billion-dollar platforms like the NGAD could become obsolete quickly. Industry experts expressed surprise at this possible shift, as the NGAD was intended to replace the F-22.

-The Air Force's reconsideration may stem from lessons learned from the costly and time-consuming F-22 and F-35 programs.

Comments from U.S. Air Force Gen. David Allvin suggest the Air Force is considering alternatives to Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), the service’s next air superiority platform. 

During the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference in London, Allvin hinted the Air Force is considering a “light fighter” that is adaptable, modifiable, and upgradeable.

Allvin is not alone in suggesting a move away from NGAD. Other industry executives at the conference in July alluded to a possible shift.

“The conference’s proceedings later published by the RAeS (Royal Aeronautical Society) put this notional design against the background of the decision by the U.S.A.F. to ‘back away from the NGAD’ and ‘evaluate’ its future ‘options,’” The Aviationist reported. “The RAeS quoted unnamed defense industry executives and other attendees who observed a marked shift in the service’s attitude towards the project, which had hit rough weather owing to a host of technical and financial reasons.”

Allvin discussed what he termed a “notional Light Fighter concept,” which would mark a conceptual shift in aircraft development away from the “built to last” philosophy to a “built to adapt” philosophy. 

On paper such a shift makes sense. Technology is improving at exponential rates. Modularity is becoming an expectation, allowing airframes to upgrade incrementally with new software and new avionics as technology becomes available. Making rigid technological commitments to a multi-billion-dollar platform that could become outdated in years rather than decades seems foolhardy. An emphasis on adaptability would ensure any new airframe could stick around for a little while. 

Allvin said deciding to build systems to last “can become an albatross…still functioning but it’s not as effective…The United States Air Force has a large majority of its systems designed and developed with this value proposition.” The Light Fighter would be built on adaptability, not ruggedness.

Allvin envisioned a jet that would rely on open systems architecture, modular design, digital engineering, and 3d-printing/additive manufacturing – techniques and concepts to improve an airframe repeatedly over time.

Still, that the Air Force might back away from the highly touted NGAD program is catching the aerospace community off-guard. Excerpts from the RAeS proceedings referred to the NGAD pause as a “shock decision” while reporting that one senior defense industry executive said that they were “baffled by the decision.”

The NGAD was supposed to replace the F-22. Maybe lessons learned from the F-22 and the F-35 are influencing thinking about the NGAD. The Air Force’s two fifth-generation fighters were both over budget and time-intensive.

The F-22 is still the world’s premier air superiority fighter, but its stealth technology is outdated. The Air Force understandably would prefer their next fighter to stay relevant for as long as possible.   

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Top 3 Points You Need to Know: The SR-71 Blackbird, a symbol of Cold War aeronautical prowess, is approaching the 25th anniversary of its final flight on October 9, 1999.

-Renowned for its distinct design and speed—reaching Mach 3.32 at 85,000 feet—the SR-71 captured the imagination of pilots and aviation enthusiasts alike. However, the end of the Cold War and rising operational costs led to its retirement, as satellite reconnaissance became more viable.

-Despite its decommissioning, the SR-71 retains a cult status, with many of the 32 built now on display across the U.S., serving as a reminder of its groundbreaking achievements.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the SR-71’s final flight is fast approaching. On October 9, 1999, the celebrated Blackbird made its last flight. Although retired since before the turn of the century, the SR-71 still retains a cult-like status amongst aviation enthusiasts who remember fondly the airframe’s distinct aesthetics and distinct speed.

Around the conclusion of the Cold War, the SR-71 was falling out of favor. The shift in attitude was owed in large part to the Soviet decline, which spoiled the SR-71’s most important reconnaissance target. However, the sharp decline was also owed to the change in public sentiments that correlated with the fall of the Soviet Union. No longer were US citizens willing to spend so casually on defense projects. And an airframe like the SR-71, one so egregiously expensive to operate, found itself on the wrong side of public opinion.

The SR-71’s cost became harder to justify too. Alternative reconnaissance platforms such as satellites became available as a cheaper and more effective solution. While the satellite was fine concerning intelligence gathering, the device didn’t quite inspire the imagination in the same way as the SR-71. With a maximum speed of Mach 3.32 (2,200 miles per hour) and a service ceiling of 85,000 feet, the SR-71 was a marvel of aeronautical engineering.

Former Blackbird pilots recount the jet as, “an unforgiving endeavor, demanding total concentration. But pilots were giddy with their complex, adrenaline-fueled responsibilities. At 85,000 feet and Mach 3, it was almost a religious experience. Nothing had prepared me to fly that fast… My God, even now, I get goosebumps remembering.”

Given the emotions that the SR-71 inspired amongst pilots, and an enthusiastic public alike, the airframe’s retirement was especially bittersweet.

On October 9, 1999, at Edwards Air Force Base in southern California, the SR-71 roared away from the runway for the last time. From below, a crowd of onlookers watched, and listened, as the SR-71 went supersonic. To help the onlookers below spot the streaking jet, which had climbed to 80,100 feet and accelerated to Mach 3.2, the pilots initiated a fuel dump, which was visible from the ground. Moments later, the spectators were able to hear two sonic booms – one from each end of the aircraft as it reached supersonic speeds.

Today, many of the 32 SR-71s that were built are on display. Six are in California, while several more are sprinkled from coast to coast. I’ve been fortunate to see the SR-71 (and its A-12 prototype) in person many times. The jet is visually striking, spear-shaped through the fuselage, and finished in black. It’s not hard to imagine the jet streaking through the upper atmosphere at Mach 3.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Top 3 Points You Need to Know: Sweden’s Gotland-class submarines, equipped with advanced air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems, have proven their stealth and effectiveness in naval warfare. During a 2005 war game, the HMS Gotland managed to "sink" the USS Ronald Reagan, showcasing its ability to evade detection by even the most advanced U.S. Navy anti-submarine systems.

-The Gotland’s success stems from its quiet AIP system, reducing the need to surface and increasing its operational stealth.

-With recent upgrades, the Gotland-class remains a formidable underwater threat, raising the question of whether the U.S. Navy should test its capabilities against the improved subs, especially as China adopts similar technology.

Diesel engines aboard submarines used to be considered out of date and something more in line with World War II than today's modern stealthy subs.

Not so with Sweden’s Gotland-class of subs.

These modern diesel-electric boats, now powered by air-independent propulsion (AIP),  are so quiet that the U.S. Navy took an interest and leased one of the models to conduct testing and war games.

The result: a 'dead' US Navy Aircraft Carrier.

There is so much interest in the Gotland-class submarines comes mainly from a war game several years back that went very badly for the U.S. Navy.

The HMS Gotland was able to penetrate the defensive measures of a carrier strike group in 2005. The small sub got so close it produced a photo of the carrier USS Ronald Reagan near San Diego. In a naval war game such as this, it is considered a “sinking.”

The Navy liked the Gotland so much that it leased it for a second year for more simulations. Now the Chinese have the same reduced-noise technology that is proving a challenge for American undersea warfare tactics.

The Gotland-class boats were originally designed by Saab-Kockums and commissioned in the mid-to-late 1990s. These subs can fulfill all kinds of roles - from surface-attack to killing other submarines to dropping off special operations forces personnel. There are three of the boats in the Gotland-class and they are able to sneak up on adversaries and snoop for communications and electronic intelligence.

The U.S. Navy, with some of the best anti-submarine ships and aircraft in the world, just could not find the Gotland in combat simulations. The relatively low-cost $100 million (cheaper than a nuclear-powered model) sub was able to sneak around at will while performing opposing force (OPFOR) maneuvers. The Gotland and the American carrier battle group, consisting of several support ships, ran the simulation over and over and the Gotland still came out on top.

The secret to the Gotland’s low acoustic signature is the quiet Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system of the Stirling engine. This means the Gotland does not have to surface often or use a noisy snorkel like traditional diesel boats. Instead, the Stirling engine has a 75-kilowatt battery that uses liquid oxygen. The Stirling produces speeds of 11-knots on the surface and 20-knots submerged. The Gotland just runs on AIP for weeks at a time. The Swedes were the first to employ this type of propulsion.

It has 27 electromagnets designed to lower its magnetic signature. Its hull is more sonar-resistant, and the tower is made of materials with some stealth characteristics. Equipment inside is covered with rubber acoustic-deadening to reduce sonar detection.

The subs are relatively small at 205-feet long, have a beam of 20-feet, and a draft of 18-feet with a displacement of 1,380 tons. The crew numbers are low and only a maximum of 32 sailors can serve on board.

The Gotland has two 533mm and two 400mm torpedo tubes. The Bofors Type 613 torpedoes are launched from the 533mm tubes. The Type 613 is a muscular torpedo used in surface warfare. It has wire-guidance and homes in on targets, sending a warhead of 529 pounds. The sub can also lay mines.

Gotland-class Gets Upgrades

Since the Gotland was originally produced in the 1990s, the Swedes instituted a 2020 mid-life upgrade During this time 50 systems such as navigation and sensors were newly fitted, and others changed. The next generation of the Blekinge-class will allow the subs to assess their environment with an optronic mast, which will replace the periscope.

If it hasn’t already, the U.S. Navy should work with the Swedish Navy to replicate the 2005 training exercises to see if the Americans can improve their performance against the upgraded Gotland-class. This would be extremely helpful as China now has AIP technology and would surely use such submarines in a naval conflict with the U.S. Navy.

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood. He is presently a Senior Editor for National Security Journal. 

Summary and Top 5 Points: During the recent RIMPAC 24 exercises, the U.S. Navy showcased its new AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) by sinking the decommissioned USS Tarawa.

-Launched from an F/A-18F Super Hornet, the stealth missile is designed to counter high-value maritime targets, such as Chinese aircraft carriers.

-Developed by DARPA and based on the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, the LRASM offers precision and stealth, filling a critical anti-surface warfare capability gap.

-The exercise highlighted the missile's potential in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, where naval and air superiority would be crucial.

-The demonstration also strengthened international partnerships and tactical proficiency among participating nations.

Just recently, the U.S. military sacrificed two old warships at the altar of innovation.

The decommissioned USS Tarawa and USS Dubuque were sunk by friendly aircraft during Exercise Rim of the Pacific 24 or RIMPAC last month.

Responsible for the sinking of the USS Tarawa is a new long-range stealth anti-ship missile designed to take on the Chinese Navy.

A U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet that took off from an aircraft carrier launched the stealth munition against the decommissioned warship and sunk it.

Developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the AGM-158C LRASM is based on the AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER). It is designed to take out enemy surface combatants with stealth and precision. In terms of customers, both the Air Force and Navy are interested in fielding the stealth munition in an operational capacity, as evidenced from the testing. Right now, the AGM-158C LRASM is operational on the F/A-18 Hornet and F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets and the B-1B Lancer strategic bomber.

“We have continued to invest in the design and development of LRASM’s anti-surface warfare capabilities to ensure that warfighters have the 21st century security solutions they need to complete their missions and come home safely,” Lisbeth Vogelpohl, LRASM program director at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, has said about the munition.

“This event was a testament to our commitment to deliver reliable products that work each and every time, ensuring those who serve stay ahead of ready,” Vogelpohl has added.

The Navy plans the AGM-158C LRASM a short-term solution to fill the “offensive anti-surface warfare air-launch capability gap,” according to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). It is intended to be used against high-value maritime targets, such as the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet or Chinese guided-missile cruisers and destroyers.

With the likelihood of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific against China always on the radar, the Navy and Air Force are investing heavily in platforms and munitions that could take on the challenge and win. A conflict in the vast Indo-Pacific would be one predominately between air and naval forces, much like the fighting between the United States and Imperial Japan in World War Two. As such, munitions like the AGM-158C LRASM are of the highest priority since they could given an advantage in naval combat.

RIMPAC 24 is designed to bolster American alliances and partnerships in the region. Dozens of countries with scores of warships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of troops are participating.

“During the SINKEXs, participating units from Australia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and the U.S. Air Force, Army and Navy gained proficiency in tactics, targeting and live firing against surface ships at sea,” the Navy said in a press release.

“Events like live-fire SINKEXs give participating nations the ability to test and conduct training on weapons and systems in a realistic environment that cannot be replicated in simulators. Additionally, these training events refine partner nations’ abilities to plan, communicate and conduct complex maritime operations such as precision and long-range strike capabilities,” the Navy added.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Top 3 Points You Need to Know: The Su-35 "Flanker-E," a Russian fourth-generation fighter jet, was designed as a hybrid between older and newer warplanes, boasting advanced avionics, stealth features, and long-range capabilities. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine has exposed the aircraft's limitations, forcing it to operate in ways it wasn't designed for, such as lower-altitude and closer-range missions.

-Despite being a formidable platform, Ukraine's innovative tactics and advanced anti-aircraft systems have prevented the Su-35 from reaching its full potential.

-Although the Su-35 is not critical to Russia's overall war effort, its mixed performance highlights the challenges of adapting to modern combat environments.

The Su-35 “Flanker-E” was Russia’s attempt to keep pace with their American and Chinese great power rivals. On paper, it’s a powerhouse. In practice, the Su-35 has had a mixed record. This is not because the Russians are incapable of building competitive warplanes. 

They’ve got those. 

It is more likely because the Su-35 is a Russian warbird that incorporates many Western military components, making the production of these birds difficult as well as the fact the Russians have had to use the Su-35 in ways the plane was not designed to be used. 

Here's what we know: the Su-35 is a fourth-generation aircraft. What that means is that it is basically a hybrid between the fourth-generation birds that have existed since the 1970s and the newer, fifth-generation warplanes. This plane is equipped with a state-of-the-art avionics package, it has stealthier capabilities than most fourth-generation warplanes. It can carry a robust suite of weapons into battle. The Su-35 is fast and has a decent range. 

Moscow envisioned using the bird as a long-range combat platform. In the age of advanced anti-aircraft capabilities, Russia’s military wanted a platform that could launch over-the-horizon strikes on distant enemy targets. But war is the ultimate test. The Ukrainians have innovated tactics to deploy against the Russians, degrading Russia’s obvious advantages in the air war. Phased Away Tracking Radar to Intercept Target (PATRIOT) missile batteries and other anti-aircraft systems have been brought to bear in ways that have forced the Russians to deploy the Su-35 in lower-altitude, closer-range ways.

Of course, the Russians are not the only country that has had to adapt to a dynamic combat environment. For example, in the Second World War, despite being designed to fly at higher altitudes, American and British bombers over Europe were made to fly lower and slower to ensure the accuracy of their bombs. While that was eighty years ago and technology has certainly evolved since those gruesome days of world war, the logic of war remains the same as it always has. 

That logic is simple: the enemy always gets a vote.  

Therefore, Ukraine has managed to negate the inherent strengths of the Su-35 as an “over-the-horizon” warplane. That doesn’t mean the Su-35 is a slouch. It just means it cannot—and has not—operate to its fullest capabilities because the kind of war it is fighting is fundamentally different from the kind of war it was designed to fight.

Even the manufacturer of the Flanker-E, Komsomolsk-on-Amur has stated that the warplane is not performing as advertised in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. The Ukrainians have downed multiple variants of this airplane, and they don’t appear to be abating in their aims to destroy these aircraft. 

What’s more, Russia needs to have air support flying in at closer ranges and lower altitudes, meaning that the Su-35 will never perform optimally.

Still, the Russians have many other warplanes at their disposal, and they’ve been able to handle their own against the innovative Ukrainians in combat. Sure, the Ukrainian military has surged into Russia, taking a 621-mile area, but the Ukrainian forces are spread thin. 

The Russians, recovering from the initial shock of the Ukrainian offensive, are likely readying a massive counterattack. Whether the Russian counterattack deploys the Su-35 or not remains to be seen. 

But the Su-35, regardless of what may happen with it, is not such an important system for Russia that not being able to use this bird to its fullest would harm their war effort. And that’s the key here.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: A trio of U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit bombers arrived at Royal Australian Air Force Base Amberley as part of the latest Bomber Task Force (BTF) deployment.

-Accompanied by KC-135R tanker aircraft, the stealth bombers are participating in training and strategic deterrence missions in the Indo-Pacific.

-This marks the first B-2 deployment to Australia since 2022, with the bombers expected to engage in joint exercises with RAAF F-35As.

-The BTF deployment underscores the U.S. commitment to interoperability with allies and maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific amidst growing regional tensions.

A trio of United States Air Force B-2 Spirit bombers headed to the land down under, arriving at Royal Australian Air Force Base Amberley this past weekend, as part of the air service's latest Bomber Task Force (BTF) deployment. The long-range strategic bombers were accompanied in the epic flight by two KC-135R tanker aircraft from the Illinois National Guard.

"A Bomber Task Force deployment of U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, Airmen and support equipment from the 509th Bomb Wing and 131st BW, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, has began at Royal Australian Air Force Base Amberley, Australia, Aug. 16, 2024," the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) announced.

"United States strategic bombers can operate in the Indo-Pacific region from a broad array of overseas and continental U.S. locations with great operational resilience," PACAF added. "This deployment is in support of Pacific Air Forces’ training efforts with allies, partners, and joint forces and strategic deterrence missions to reinforce the rules-based international order. The Pacific Air Forces look for every opportunity to train alongside our allies and partners to demonstrate interoperability and bolster our collective ability to support a free and open Indo-Pacific."
 
Images of the B-2s arriving in Australia were shared by the 509th Bomb Wing (@Whiteman_AFB) on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

Back Down Under

This deployment marks the first rotation of the flying wing bombers to Australia since the summer of 2022, while Spirits were also deployed to Guam earlier this year, the first time in more than five years. It was not announced how long the B-2s will remain in Australia, but according to Air & Space Forces magazine, such BTF deployments last two to three weeks, and include "training events with allies in the area to practice interoperability and secondary deployments to other locations to gain experience operating from airfields unaccustomed to supporting a bomber presence."

The U.S. has increased its interoperability exercises with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The deployment of the B-2s comes just weeks after U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors and RAAF F-35A Lightning IIs took part in a "hot pit" refueling exercise, a key component of the Agile Employment Concept (ACE). That followed the recently concluded Exercise Pitch Black 24, the largest in the military's drill's 43-year history – which drew 20 participating nations and more than 140 aircraft from partner countries.

It is likely that during this BTF deployment, the B-2s will conduct joint operations with the RAAF's F-35As, as such exercises have become increasingly commonplace.

During the July 2022 deployment, the U.S. Air Force flying wing bombers took part in the bilateral "Koolendong 22" exercises, which included drills with the RAAF's F-35As, while Australia's Lightning IIs also participated in the Red Flag exercises for the first time in January at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, flying with the B-2s.

It hasn't just been the U.S. Air Force's B-2s that have been logging the miles this year. In May, four U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bombers from Minot AFB landed at RAF Fairford as part of a routine Bomber Task Force (BTF) deployment, operating with NATO allies under BTF Europe 24-3.

That deployment was part of the air service's ongoing "Large Scale Global Exercise" series.

That same month, B-1 Lancers from the 28th Bomb Wing arrived at Andersen AFB, Guam, for a BTF deployment, integrating and training with allies and regional partners; while in July a pair of B-52s assigned to the 2nd Bomb Wing flew from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, to Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase, Romania, as part of the Bomber Task Force 24-4 mission.

The United States Air Force is the only NATO member, and just one of three nations – along with China and Russia – to operate long-range strategic bombers.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary and Top Points You Need To Know: The Russian Su-57 "Felon" fighter jet, touted as the latest in Russian aerospace technology, has been used sparingly in Ukraine to protect its international reputation, as Moscow aims to sell the aircraft overseas.

-The Su-57 is a twin-engine, single-seat multirole fighter with a variety of munitions, but questions remain about its stealth capabilities compared to U.S. and Chinese jets.

-Despite ongoing conflict, Russia continues to export weapons, though it keeps its most advanced systems like the Su-57 and T-14 Armata away from the battlefield to avoid diminishing their market value.

-The Su-57 “Felon” fighter jet represents the latest in Russian aerospace technology. 

Western intelligence estimates suggest the Russian Aerospace Forces have used the Su-57 Felon in Ukraine, but in a small role with little impact. Moscow holds the Su-57 back from the battlefield to protect its international reputation, since Russia wants to sell the aircraft overseas. 

A twin-engine, single-seat multirole fighter jet, the Su-57 Felon is Russia’s newest fighter jet. As with most new Russian weapons systems and munitions, the Su-57 is riddled with problems, and only a few of the aircraft are combat-ready. The Ukrainian military also very likely destroyed a Su-57 on the ground.

Nonetheless, the Su-57 looks like a capable aircraft. It can carry a combination of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, including R-73 heat-seeking air-to-air missiles and R-27 radar-homing air-to-air missiles, as well as cruise missiles, hypersonic munitions, glide bombs, rockets, and conventional bombs. It also packs a 30 mm Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-30-1 cannon with 150 rounds for dogfights or strafing.

Much debate surrounds the Su-57’s stealth capabilities, which would largely determine whether the aircraft is on par with the latest American and Chinese fighter jets. 

Although the Kremlin claims the Su-57 Felon is a stealth fighter jet, it is likely an advanced 4.5-generation aircraft that cannot defeat radar as effectively as the U.S. F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation fighter jets. Stealth is not an easily defined capability. An aircraft with stealth attributes, like the F-35 Lightning II, is much harder for enemy radars and sensors to pick up. To achieve this feat, stealth aircraft use a combination of design, special paint coatings, and electronic countermeasures.

Russia is one of the largest exporters of weapons systems and munitions in the world. Before its large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin could make up to $15 billion a year selling tanks, fighter jets, warships, missiles, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, infantry fighting vehicles, small arms, and ammunition to foreign countries. Its clientele is mainly African and Middle Eastern countries, as well as India and China. 

Although the Russian military is engaged in its heaviest fighting since the end of World War II, the Kremlin still sells weapons systems abroad, making between $5 billion and $8 billion annually. 

As with most goods, marketing plays an important part in weapons sales. Russian defense officials understand that very well and make sure not to put their newest and potentially most lucrative goods in a position that would diminish their value and marketability. As such, weapon systems like the Su-57 Felon, the T-14 Armata main battle tank, and the S-500 Prometheus air defense system are absent from the fighting in Ukraine – Russian officials don’t want them destroyed by Ukraine’s Western weapons. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Summary and Key Points: The bomber emerged in the twentieth century as one of the most feared weapons in the world, evolving from rudimentary beginnings into a technologically sophisticated display of military might.

-While bombers like the B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit have become legendary, not every bomber design has been a success. Some aircraft, despite high hopes, ended up as failures due to poor design, technical flaws, or simply being ahead of their time.

-Let’s look at some of the worst bombers in history.

The bomber emerged in the twentieth century as one of the most feared weapons in the world. The concept didn’t even exist as the century turned, but by the end of World War II, the bomber was one of the primary offensive weapons for the world’s leading militaries. It inspired earned trepidation in the hearts of civilians and the minds of soldiers.

Capable of delivering conventional or nuclear munitions, the bomber progressed from rudimentary beginnings into a technologically sophisticated display of machines featuring every capability from supersonic speed to stealth. Used as a lynchpin to nuclear deterrence, and as an everyday military workhorse, the bomber is foundational to a military strategy. 

Still, not every bomber design succeeds. For every superlative airframe like the B-52 Stratofortress or B-2 Spirit, others earn far less admiration.

Let’s consider some of the worst bombers of all time.

Only one Kalinin K-7 was ever built, flying for the first time in 1933. The experimental aircraft was designed with twin booms and large underwing pods that housed fixed landing gear and machine gun turrets. The K-7 was meant to be capable of hauling passengers or bombs. One of the largest pre-jet-era airframes ever built, the K-7 required the power of eight engines, and its wingspan extended an eye-popping 173 feet.

The K-7 only completed seven test flights before a structural failure caused a crash, killing 14 people aboard and one on the ground. The design was abandoned and never flown again.   

The Tupolev Tu-22 was a medium-range supersonic bomber introduced in 1962. The Tu-22 failed to impress, at a time when the Soviet Union was urgently working to keep pace with American aerospace developments. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the Tu-22 lacked the speed and range required and was riddled with design flaws. The original engine, a VD-7M turbojet, proved especially nettlesome. Many of the accidents involving this aircraft resulted from the Tu-22’s high-swept wings, which were effective at supersonic speeds but caused low lift and poor handling at subsonic speeds

Tu-22 pilots required excellent physical strength just to wrangle the Tu-22 under control, especially when the airframe’s skin overheated during supersonic flight and adversely affected the jet’s flight characteristics.

Perhaps the worst bomber the Royal Air Force ever flew, the Blackburn B-26 Botha debuted in 1938 and performed poorly from the jump. The airframe was mired with fundamental flaws, including poor longitudinal stability, poor elevator control, and a high stalling speed. If those issues were not enough, the Botha also tended to spew its exhaust fumes into the cockpit. 

The Botha was severely underpowered. Two 880-horsepower engines were only capable of propelling the Botha to 220 miles per hour, 15,000 feet of altitude, and 1,270 miles of range. 

Designed as a torpedo bomber, the Botha performed so poorly that it was relegated to reconnaissance duty before ever serving a day in its intended role. By the time the Botha was retired, 169 of the airframes had been involved in accidents.

While many of the bombers made this list for their uninspired design and/or poor performance, the Convair B-58 Hustler is an exception. Marking a technological leap, the B-58 came with delta wings, massive engines, and enviable performance ratings. The aggressively swept wings were outfitted with four powerful engines that allowed the B-58 to achieve Mach 2 at high altitude while operating within a range of 3,500 nautical miles.

But the B-58 was notoriously difficult to fly. Relying on specialized systems and complex controls that caused unconventional take-offs, landings, stalls, and spin characteristics, the B-58 was hard to master.

In the 10 years that the U.S. Air Force operated the B-58, 116 airframes were acquired – and 26 were lost to accidents. 

You can’t judge an aircraft on cosmetics alone. But sometimes when you look at an aircraft, you know the thing is going to be wonky. The Douglas TBD Devastator didn’t quite look right. Holding a three-man crew sitting back-to-back-to-back beneath a greenhouse canopy, the airframe looked cumbersome, almost comedic. Although a capable torpedo bomber when introduced in 1937, technology progressed so quickly that by the time the U.S. joined World War II, the Devastator was already woefully outdated. Slow and incapable of defending itself, the Devastator struggled to survive in the Mitsubishi Zero-dominated environment of the Pacific Theater. During the Battle of Midway, the Devastator’s last foray into combat, 41 Devastators were deployed. Only four survived.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), the final Nimitz-class supercarrier, has been equipped with the world's first Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC). This upgrade allows the carrier to operate the Boeing MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial system (UAS), which is set to take over the aerial refueling role from the F/A-18 Super Hornets, thereby extending their service life. Some are now calling this a sort of drone aircraft carrier. 

-The UAWC features the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System (UMCS) MD-5E Ground Control Station, enabling Air Vehicle Pilots to control the MQ-25 directly from the carrier.

-The first sea testing of this system is scheduled for next year. The MQ-25 will initially focus on refueling but may also be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the future. This upgrade represents a significant step toward integrating unmanned systems into the Carrier Air Wing and Carrier Strike Group operations, laying the groundwork for future unmanned capabilities across the U.S. Navy’s carrier fleet.

A United States Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has been upgraded with the "world's first Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC)," which will allow the flattop to operate the future Boeing MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial system (UAS), Naval Air Systems Command announced.

USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), the tenth and final Nimitz-class supercarrier, is the first warship to receive the UAWC, which was installed as a part of a "multi-year effort coordinated across multiple ship availability periods" while accommodating the carrier's "deployment schedule." Now that it has been installed, the UAWC will allow Air Vehicle Pilots (AVPs) – aka drone operators – to control the Boeing-made UAS directly from the warship.

The UAWC is equipped with software and hardware systems that include "the first fully operational and integrated Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System (UMCS) MD-5E Ground Control Station (GCS)," which is "system-of-systems" required to control the MQ-25 Stingray – the first carrier-based UAS employed by the U.S. Navy.

The Stingray was developed to provide aerial refueling to carrier-based aircraft, replacing the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornets that are currently utilized in that role, which accounts for 20 to 30% of their flight time, according to Aero Time. Transferring this role to the UAS will help extend the life of the sea service's Super Hornets.

The first sea testing of the UAWC's operational networks on CVN-77 is scheduled to begin next year, and while the MQ-25 will initially be employed in refueling, the drone could be used in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that enhance capacity and versatility for the Carrier Air Wing (CVW) and Carrier Strike Group (CSG).

"This will be the first time the AVPs from Unmanned Carrier-Launched Multi-Role Squadron (VUQ) ten will operate the MD-5 from an aircraft carrier. They will use the actual GCS hardware and software aboard CVN 77 to communicate with a simulated air vehicle in the lab in Pax River," said Joe Nedeau, Unmanned Carrier Aviation (PMA-268) UMCS lead.

Current U.S. Navy plans call for all Nimitz-class and Gerald R. Ford-class carriers to eventually be MQ-25 capable.

"The MQ-25 brings the right combination of refueling, autonomy, and seamless carrier deck integration to meet the U.S. Navy's goals," Boeing stated.

"CVN 77's UAWC lays the foundation for how the U.S. Navy will operate and control unmanned aircraft, and perhaps other unmanned vehicles, with UMCS," added PMA-268 Program Manager Capt. Daniel Fucito. "These systems will initially support the MQ-25 but also future unmanned systems such as Collaborative Combat Aircraft that comprise the Air Wing of the Future."

Aerial refueling from the MQ-25 T1 test asset has been conducted with three carrier-based aircraft including a F/A-18 Super Hornet, an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and a F-35C Lightning II.

The Boeing-owned MQ-25 T1 test asset served as a predecessor to the engineering development model aircraft being produced under a 2018 contract award.

The refueling drone has a total length of fifty-one feet, and a wingspan of seventy-five feet unfolded/31.3 feet folded. It is powered by a Rolls-Royce AE3700N engine, which provides a range of 500 nautical miles (580 miles) while carrying approximately 16,000 pounds (7,250 kg) of fuel.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: The recent successful demonstration of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) during the RIMPAC military exercises near Hawaii has sent a clear signal to China regarding the U.S. military's capability to counter China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems.

-Developed by Lockheed Martin and DARPA, the LRASM is a stealth missile designed for precision targeting, even in electronically degraded environments.

-With a range of 200 nautical miles, the missile can be launched from various U.S. aircraft, including the F/A-18F Super Hornet and the B-2 Spirit bomber.

The LRASM's advanced features, including GPS navigation, infrared sensors, and the ability to evade countermeasures, make it a crucial tool in restoring naval deterrence against China. Despite its high cost, the missile is seen as a vital asset in the U.S. military's strategy to maintain dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.

A recent successful demonstration of a new stealth missile at the annual RIMPAC military exercises near Hawaii has got the world on notice. 

Fired from an F/A-18F Super Hornet belonging to the U.S. Navy, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a weapon developed by Lockheed Martin and DARPA, is meant to send a clear message to China. 

That message is that despite China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the U.S. military can still threaten Chinese forces – and that threat can come from over the horizon as never before.

DARPA began researching the LRASM capability around 2009. Navy anti-ship missiles such as the Harpoon were getting old – the technological progress of America’s adversaries meant the Harpoon would eventually be outdated. By incorporating stealth technology and adding longer-range capabilities and advanced autonomous targeting, the U.S. military was trying to stay ahead of their adversaries.

America retains considerable (though declining) advantages in the strategic high ground of space. One major asset the Americans have developed over the years has been the Global Positioning System. Indeed, most U.S. military weapons and platforms require access to GPS to function properly. The LRASM leverages this advantage, making the weapon’s targeting more precise. It then fuses GPS navigational capabilities with a multi-modal sensor network. In other words, there’s no way an enemy is getting away from this weapon – unless that enemy first knocks out the GPS satellite constellation.

There’s more going on with this incredible weapon, too. 

The LRASM has an additional infrared sensor system that allows for even greater target acquisition. These weapons can reportedly operate in significantly electronically degraded environments as well. What’s more, this “stealth missile” can evade countermeasures and avoid decoys by making radical course corrections. 

LRASM’s successful tests at the recent RIMPAC exercises show it as the best conventional strike missile the Americans have developed. 

It has been suggested that the LRASM has a range of 200 nautical miles, meaning this weapon can reach deep inside Chinese-held territory in the Indo-Pacific, if need be. The hope among U.S. military planners is that the LRASM system can restore naval deterrence, which has been destabilized by the rapid military advances at sea of American rivals such as China. 

The fact that the Navy tested the LRASM during RIMPAC should tell readers all they need to know about who was the intended recipient of the message sent.

This weapon can be popped off from multiple warplanes in the American fleet – everything from the aforementioned F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the workhorse of the U.S. Navy’s air warfare capability, and the Air Force’s B-2 Spirit long-range stealth bomber. Further, the Navy is working to make the LRASM interoperable with allied militaries. 

Specifically, the Australians, who have become a principal partner in the U.S. military’s quest to deter and contain China’s rise, have opted to integrate the LRASM into their forces.

The LRASM is not cheap, however. 

According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, the LRASM is appraised at “$3.24 million per round, while the five-year buy reduces that unit cost slightly to $3.22 million per missile.” 

For a missile system, that is expensive. But with two branches of the U.S. military using this system, and an allied nation jumping into the program as well, costs should come down in the long run. 

The LRASM is one of the solutions to overcoming China’s A2/AD advantages. If a war were to erupt soon, the LRASM is one of only a handful of systems that the U.S. military can reliably deploy to defeat China. 

Instead of blowing limited funds on things like a sixth-generation warplane for the Air Force, or the F/A-XX program for the Navy, maybe the Pentagon should reroute those funds toward building a massive arsenal of LRASM systems. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The Chengdu J-10C "Vigorous Dragon," a Chinese-built multirole combat aircraft, was recently showcased by the People's Liberation Army Air Force's August 1st Aerobatics Team at the Dubai Air Show last year.

-This event marked the J-10C's first public appearance in the Middle East since undergoing significant upgrades, including a more powerful WS-10B engine and advanced electronic warfare systems.

-The J-10C is armed with various air-to-air and surface-attack weapons, and its presence at the air show indicates Beijing's push to sell this fighter jet internationally.

-With countries like Pakistan already purchasing the J-10C, China is now eyeing the Middle Eastern market, potentially selling the aircraft to nations like Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia.

Late last year, Beijing sent seven of its J-10C jet fighters to the Middle East. The aircraft weren't deployed as part of any Chinese military operations – and rather were from the People's Liberation Army Air Force's August 1st Aerobatics Team, which performed during the Dubai Air Show. Named for the date of the founding of the PLAAF – the first of August 1927 – and established in 1962, the elite aviation team has performed at air shows around the world.

This was reportedly its first appearance at the Dubai event since 2017, and it was present to show off the capabilities of the Chengdu J-10C "Vigorous Dragon" (NATO reporting name "Firebird") – China's domestically-design and built medium-weight, single-engine, multirole-combat-aircraft.

Designed primarily to serve as an air superiority fighter for air-to-air combat, it can also perform strike missions. It has been compare to the U.S. F-16 Fighting Falcon, and it is currently produced by the state-owned Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) for the PLAAF and People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF), while it has also been adopted by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

This was the J-10C's first public display in the Middle East since the aircraft underwent a major modernization.

The J-10 made its maiden flight in 1998 and entered service with the PLAAF in 2004. It is configured with a delta wing and canard design that sets the aircraft apart from Russia's MiG-29 or the United States Air Force's F-16, while it is more reminiscent of the French Mirage series of combat fighters.

However, unlike the Mirage, the J-10 features two canards right behind the cockpit – and this provides for greater maneuverability. It also features fly-by-wire controls.

The Vigorous Dragon is well armed, with 11 external hardpoints that include five on the fuselage with one on the centerline, as well as a pair of hardpoints on each side of the fuselage and three on each wing. Those outer wing stations can carry air-to-air missiles such as the Chinese-built Python 3 PL-8, P-11, or PL-12; or the Russian Vympel R-73 (AA-11 Archer) or R-77 (AA-12 Adder).

According to AirForce-Technology, the PL-8 infrared homing short-range air-to-air missile, a variant of the Israeli Python 3 missile, was manufactured in China under a licensed production agreement by the China Academy (formerly the Luoyang Electro-optics Technology Development Centre), while the PL-11 is a licensed-manufactured variant of the MBDA Italy Aspide medium-range air-to-air missile.

For its surface attack role, the J-10 can also carry up to six 500-kg laser-guided bombs, free-fall bombs, or pods with 90 mm unguided rockets. The aircraft also has a single-barrel 23 mm cannon.

The Chinese multirole fighter is also fitted with a forward-looking infrared and laser target designator pod. It was developed to support the deployment of laser and satellite navigation-guided weapons. The aircraft further employs an indigenously designed pulse-doppler fire control radar, which is capable of tracking 10 targets simultaneously and attacking four of them. The estimated maximum detection range is 100 km.

Though the Vigorous Dragon was seen as a great leap forward for China's military aviation capabilities, Beijing lacked the technology to build domestically-designed advanced jet fighter engines.

Instead, the unique air intakes on the J-10 lead to a Russian-built engine, the AL-31. That particular engine was originally designed for the Russian-built Su-27 (NATO reporting name: Flanker) for use in a pair – yet the J-10 actually operates the Russian engine as a single unit.

The J-10C, the newest variant, is reported to be fitted with a more powerful WS-10B engine and PL-15 air-to-air missiles.

The aircraft is also equipped with an advanced electronic warfare system, an infrared tracking target system, and active electronically scanned array radars.

There was a time when China's delegation to air shows such as the one in Dubai would have been looking to purchase fighter aircraft – but the times have changed, and the August 1st Aerobatics Team was part of Beijing's efforts to show the world that it is now looking to become a military hardware supplier.

The presence of the high-flying team was clearly meant to drum up interest for the Vigorous Dragon, notably in the Middle East. It was only in May that the aerobatics unit made the switch from the J-10A to the upgraded model.

It had been previously reported that Egypt had expressed interest in the J-10C, while Algeria and Saudi Arabia have each engaged in talks with China to acquire various platforms including missiles and drones. A jet fighter could be seen as the logical "next step" for China.

It was just three years ago, in 2020, that Pakistan became its first foreign buyer of the jet, with an order of 25 J-10Cs – which was followed by an additional order of 11 aircraft the following year. To date, Islamabad has received 20 of the fighters over the past two years.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

Image Credit: All Images are Creative Commons.

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Army's new armored vehicle, the M10 Booker, is being introduced as a highly mobile, cost-effective support vehicle for light infantry units. While not officially designated as a "tank" by the Army, it shares many characteristics with tanks, including a 105mm cannon and armor protection.

-The Booker is designed to be easily transportable, fitting two units onto a C-17 Globemaster III without disassembly. However, its smaller size and lighter armor raise concerns about its effectiveness in modern combat, particularly against near-peer adversaries.

-Critics argue that while the Booker offers mobility, it may lack the firepower and protection necessary to survive on today's battlefields.

The US Army has a new 'tank'…but don’t you dare call it a tank. And it’s something more than an armored personnel carrier. In fact, like most tanks, the new tank, designated the M10 Booker, does not carry personnel other than the crew at all. What’s more, the Booker appears to be a miniaturized version of the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT). 

According to the US Army the Booker will “add firepower and maneuverability to the Army’s mechanized brigades.”

Its smaller size does not mean it will not pack a punch. The size of the Booker simply helps to keep maintenance costs down (in terms of maintenance costs, size really does matter). Possessing a 105mm cannon (compared to the Abrams’ 120 mm cannon), with lighter armor than the Abrams, the Booker is not just like its older, bigger brother. 

However, the Army is quite pleased with the product and hopeful about its effectiveness in future combat missions.

That, by the way, should give most readers pause. The M10 Booker, unlike the Abrams, was designed to easily fit onto a C-17 Globemaster III transport plane without having to be disassembled. The Abrams can certainly fit on a C-17. Unfortunately, the M1 Abrams is so large only one can fit on a massive C-17 and it must be partly disassembled to fit. The Booker, on the other hand, can fit two units to a C-17 and can be easily rolled-on-and-rolled-off the aircraft intact.

Nonetheless, what should we make of the M10 Booker? Does it make sense to acquire this new 'tank' with so many other budgetary demands coming out of the U.S. military these days? 

The specific purpose of this non-tank-tank is to support light infantry units that are in the midst of combat operations. Rather than having to wait for an M1 Abrams to be reassembled back at an airbase and then deployed to the frontline to support infantry on the move, the M10 Booker can move quickly to targets on the front. The point with these systems would be to ensure mobility while protecting light infantry forces.  

The Army’s leadership has insisted that the M10 Booker is not a “light tank,” as some in the press have described it. US Army General Glenn Dean explained to the Military Times that the M10 Booker is not a light tank because “the historical use of light tanks has been to perform reconnaissance functions. This is not a reconnaissance vehicle. It’s not actually a mission match [for a light tank].”

But, as Davis Winkie of the Military Times opined, “Stop gaslighting us. It’s a damn tank.”

A more interesting query would be to find out what kind of a tank it is. Obviously, it is not an MBT on the order of the M1 Abrams. And the level of armor, plus the fact that it is not designed to do recon missions, indicates that this vehicle is not, in fact, a light tank. It’s more akin to a medium tank. The M551 Sheridan was the Cold War equivalent to the M10 Booker (although the Army classified that vehicle as a light tank). Although, the Sheridans could be parachuted into combat. But as one former Army tanker I chatted with recently claimed, “The Booker is light enough that they’ll probably be able to parachute it into combat eventually.” 

The Army says that the first M10 Booker was scheduled to be deployed by the Army in February of this year. Each unit costs around $12 million, roughly half the cost of the M1 Abrams tank. The Army has spent a total of $257 million on the M10 Booker program. 

The real question is, though, will it be effective in protecting infantry? 

The Army says that they incorporated many lessons learned from the battlefields in Ukraine. Well, one of the lessons learned should have been that light tanks are not very effective in the kind of combat that is occurring in Ukraine. While antiquated, the French flooded the Ukrainian Army with their AMX-10RC light tanks. All these platforms did was get a lot of good Ukrainians killed. They were deemed “unsuitable” for combat by the Ukrainians. Basically, Russian anti-tank weapons and more powerful Russian tanks kept blasting through the French light tanks.

The Booker tanks, like all light or light, or in this case, “medium” tanks (to keep the nitpickers in the Army’s leadership happy) appear to be missing the fundamental point about tanks. The entire purpose is to get firepower to the frontlines and punch through enemy formations. An 105mm gun and light armor will not achieve this, no matter how new or fancy the M10 Booker appears to be. Yes, it is a tank. No, it is not the kind of tank that one fighting a modern war against a near-peer rival would need. 

Part of the problem is that the acquisition system in the United States Department of Defense is completely broken. It’s untethered from reality and reflects political preferences rather than battlefield needs. Infantry needs to be mobile, and they need maneuverable vehicles supporting them. But they also need tanks—which is what the M10 Booker is, no matter how hard the Army wants to say otherwise—that can pack a wallop and that won’t be blasted to smithereens because of weak armor and a small gun.

The Booker tank is the wrong vehicle for the wrong kind of war.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: This article explores five military weapons systems that were canceled but might have had transformative effects if they had survived. These systems, including the AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter, B-70 Valkyrie bomber, A-12 Avenger stealth aircraft, Future Combat Systems (FCS), and Sea Control Ship (SCS), each represented innovative approaches to modern warfare.

-However, they fell victim to various challenges such as budget constraints, technological immaturity, inter-service rivalries, and changing military priorities.

-While their cancellations often made sense at the time, they also left lasting impacts on military strategy and procurement, sometimes leading to missed opportunities for advancements in warfare.

Weapons die for all kinds of different reasons. Sometimes they happen at the wrong time, either in the midst of defense austerity, or with the wrong constellation of personnel. Sometimes they fall victim to the byzantine bureaucracy of the Pentagon, or to turf fights between the services. And sometimes they die because they were a bad idea in the first place. For the same reasons, bad defense systems can often survive the most inept management if they fill a particular niche well enough.

This article concentrates on five systems that died, but that might have had transformative effects if they had survived. These transformations would only rarely have changed the course of wars (countries win and lose wars for many reasons besides technology), but rather would have had ripple effects across the entire defense industrial base, altering how our military organizations approached warfighting and procurement. Not all the changes would have been for the best; sometimes programs are canceled for sound reasons.

In the early 1960s, the Army was just beginning to appreciate the value of helicopter aviation. The Army had used helicopters at the end of World War II, and used them extensively in Korea for reconnaissance and evacuation purposes.  As the sophistication of the machines grew, however, the Army began to see the prospect for much more advanced helicopters that could conduct a wide variety of missions.

The star of the show was supposed to be the AH-56 Cheyenne, a radical design that combined high speed with punching power. The Cheyenne could escort other helicopters in transport mission, or conduct ground support and attack ops independently. In particular, it contained a magnificent propulsion system that could offer speeds of up to 275 miles per hour.

But the Cheyenne fell victim to its own promise. The technologies that made the Cheyenne possible weren’t yet mature, and the early prototypes suffered from teething problems, leading to a fatal crash. The Air Force hated the whole idea of the Cheyenne, believing that the Army was trying to steal close air support and interdiction missions for itself.  The Air Force went so far as to propose a fixed-wing attack aircraft (which would eventually become the A-10) in its effort to kill the program.  Finally, the Vietnam War put enormous pressure on the defense budget, both in terms of making it harder to sell particular programs, and in diverting funds to directly support the war effort.

And so the Cheyenne never happened. Although, a few years later, the Army would push forward with the AH-64 Apache. In this sense, the cancelation of the Cheyenne merely delayed an advanced attack helicopter capability. But the Apache was also a much safer machine than the Cheyenne, and going with the more conventional system has undoubtedly limited the horizons of Army aviation.

The B-70 Valkyrie deserves its own operatic cycle. Envisioned as the replacement for the B-52 Stratofortress and the B-58 Hustler, the B-70 was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace at high altitude, and upwards of Mach 3. Beloved of the “Bomber Mafia,” a generation of senior officers who had cut their teeth in World War II’s Combined Bomber Offensive, the B-70 represented, to many, the future of the Air Force.

And just to show I’m not a hard-hearted guy, and it’s not all dollars and cents, the B-70 was a beautiful aircraft. Long and sleek, the Valkyrie resembles a space ship more than an aircraft. The surviving prototype remains on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio.

But the Valkyrie was enormously expensive, and this expense made it vulnerable. First President Eisenhower, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were less than enchanted with the idea of spending enormous sums on another heavy bomber when ICBMs showed great promise in delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet homeland. Advances in Soviet interceptor and surface-to-air missile technology were also making the B-70’s mission considerably more dangerous than first anticipated.

After constructing only two prototypes (one of which was lost during a PR stunt), the Air Force shut production down. Fifteen years later, the B-1B, with some superficially similar characteristics, would enter service.

The effect of the B-70 on the Air Force would have, on balance, been quite negative. Devoting tremendous resources to the procurement of another strategic bomber would have drawn attention away from both the tactical air force and the missile force. B-70s might (in desperation) have been committed to the bombing of Vietnam during Operations Linebacker I and II, but they would likely have performed no more effectively than the B-52s they were replacing. And both the B-52 and the B-1B have proven remarkably flexible in terms of missions and update technologies, in part because they have space for a larger crew (4 and 5, respectively) than the Valkyrie (2).  McNamara saved the Air Force from itself by preventing a long, deep procurement chasm that would have lasted thirty years.

What if we had a stealthy strike bomber that could take off from aircraft carriers? In the mid-1980s, the Navy needed a replacement for the beloved-but-venerable A-6 Intruder.  Building on expectations about the progress of stealth technology, McDonnell Douglas developed the A-12 Avenger, a subsonic “flying wing” bomber that visually resembled a miniature B-2 Spirit. Combining stealth with the flexibility of carrier ops, the A-12 promised an unparalleled deep strike capability.  Even the Air Force expressed interest in the A-12 as a replacement for the F-111 Aardvark.

But there were problems. Early expectations about the stealth coating proved optimistic, and the fixes substantially increased the Avenger’s weight.  Expenses soared, but the aircraft did not.  The biggest problem, however, was that the Avenger entered the design and production cycle just as the Cold War came to a close.  Facing a tight defense budget, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney decided to kill the A-12 in favor of less risky programs.

The effects of the cancelation remain with us today. Instead of acquiring an advanced stealth bomber, the Navy settled on the Super Hornet, a significant, but conventional, upgrade on the F-18s it already possessed.  Eventually, the continuing need for a stealthy, carrier-borne strike aircraft would manifest in the F-35C, a program that continues to teeter between “disaster” and “epic disaster.” Even if the F-35C somehow works out, the Navy gave up the deep strike mission when it settled on the Super Hornet. The Air Force is now concentrating on the Next Generation Bomber, a project that closely resembles the A-12 in many ways. The death of the A-12, in effect, transformed the nature of the USN carrier wing for a generation or more.

In the early 21st century, the body of theory known as the Revolution in Military Affairs resulted in a major Army procurement plan known as “Future Combat Systems.”  In brief, the application of RMA theory to modern operations suggested that the combination of precision-guided munitions, high processing speeds, real time communications, and all-encompassing sensor capabilities would transform the way in which armies fought.  Future Combat Systems envisioned an integrated system of weapons, vehicles, and sensors that could prove lethal and decisive across the combat spectrum.  The Army expected every element of the system to support the goal of linking sensors to shooters, enhancing killing power while reducing footprint. Army planners also intended FCS to result lighter, more deployable brigades.

But then the Bush administration dropped the Iraq War on the US Army.  Iraq created major problems for the development of the FCS program.  Intellectual energy and material devoted to developing the FCS concept to its fullest went, instead, to fighting the war.  The conflict demanded systems (such as the MRAP) that did not fit into the FCS concept.  Perhaps most important, the course of the war threw RMA theory into question, with guerrilla fighters consistently bloodying the nose of their technologically sophisticated American foes.

And so FCS died a slow death.  The vision of a coherent system-of-systems surrendered to the need to get particular capabilities into the field in piecemeal fashion, regardless of their role in the larger puzzle.  The Army fought the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars with a mix of new and legacy systems, combined with weapons that had no place in its future expectations.  While individual parts of the FCS vision survive, the ideal has yielded to budgetary and military reality.

What if, instead of a few very large carriers, the United States Navy had undertaken to build a large number of small carriers?  In World War II, the Royal Navy and the US Navy (USN) employed large numbers of escort carriers, small flattops that could support anti-submarine and amphibious operations.

In the early 1970s, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt pushed the idea of the Sea Control Ship (SCS), a small carrier that would defend sea-lanes against long-range Soviet strike aircraft and Soviet submarines.  Faced with the growing expense of modern supercarriers (the first Nimitz class carrier would enter service in just a few years) and the impending retirement of the venerable Essex class carriers, Zumwalt sought a low cost option for air operations that did not demand the full capabilities of a major carrier group.  Escort carriers had helped win the Battle of the Atlantic, and Sea Control Ships might make a similar contribution in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The heavy losses of main battle tanks (MBTs) in the Russia-Ukraine conflict have sparked debate over their future viability. While tanks have proven crucial in Ukraine, their vulnerability to advanced anti-tank weapons raises questions about whether they are worth the investment.

-Despite these concerns, the U.S. is developing the AbramsX, a new hybrid-electric MBT designed to be lighter, faster, and more fuel-efficient.

-However, the reliance on large lithium battery packs introduces new vulnerabilities, leading some analysts to question whether the significant costs of developing such advanced tanks are justified, especially given the ease with which tanks can be destroyed in modern combat.

The decimation of main battle tanks in the fighting between Russia and Ukraine has some analysts wondering whether these military systems are still worth the cost. 

Armored vehicles have played pivotal roles in warfare since their introduction to combat more than a century ago. Useful for breaking enemy lines in warfare, transporting troops, and providing unmatched versatility for ground forces, heavy cavalry is a vital component of an armored corps. 

Tanks play a leading role in Ukraine, proving they are not obsolete. But the mounting tank losses on both sides also suggests even the most modern MBTs struggle to survive against advanced anti-tank weaponry. Thousands of tanks have been lost since Russia invaded in February 2022. Despite this performance, the U.S. is determined, to develop a costly new hybrid-electric MBT in the near future.

The U.S. Army is designing its new AbramsX tank series to be lighter, faster, and more fuel-efficient than its predecessors. 

The Abrams tank series has its roots in the Cold War-era MBT-70 program, which sought to develop a replacement for the legendary M60 Patton. 

A number of variants emerged over the years. When the M1A1 Abrams was introduced, perhaps its most significant attribute was its Chobham armor, which was made to perform extremely well against HEAT rounds and other shaped charges. It was equipped with a 120 mm main gun, armor-piercing capabilities, a 1,500 horsepower engine, and sophisticated tracking systems. 

The upcoming AbramsX is designed to outmatch its counterparts in future conflicts. With a reduced weight, the new variant will require half the fuel consumption. The tank will also reportedly feature an embedded artificial intelligence capability and a new lightweight XM360 gun.

While the AbramsX’s hybrid electric power source comes with plenty of advantages, analysts have pointed out potential drawbacks of running on battery power.

As explained by Stephen Bryen for Asia Times, the need for large lithium battery packs to power the new tank series could be consequential: “Battery packs are heavy and expensive and they also are dangerous because they can explode if hit by shrapnel or if a mine blows out the tank’s bottom. While we don’t know the size of the battery the Army will opt for, it will have to be big enough to power a heavy tank – meaning the battery could weigh a few tons. This creates a vulnerability that does not exist today and raises questions on whether it makes sense to go in the hybrid direction.” 

Regardless of the AbramsX model’s performance relative to rival MBTs, the Army may not be able to justify pouring so many funds into a military system, the tank, that can be so easily destroyed in combat.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons Photos. 

Summary and Key Points: The war in Ukraine has underscored the continued relevance of main battle tanks in modern warfare, despite previous predictions of their obsolescence.

-The Russian military's heavy losses have led it to deploy outdated tanks from the 1950s and 1960s.

-Meanwhile, Russia's supposedly advanced T-14 Armata tank has been plagued by development issues and has seen limited deployment in Ukraine, likely due to fears of exposing its vulnerabilities.

-The T-14's future is uncertain, with the possibility that ongoing problems and high costs may lead to its abandonment or a complete redesign.

If the war in Ukraine has taught one lesson above all other, it is that main battle tanks are still very important in modern warfare.

Before Russia invaded in 2022, plenty of observers thought tanks would be irrelevant in a conflict between two states. Indeed, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, a stalwart supporter of Ukraine, opined as recently as November 2021 about the end of the tank era. 

But tanks keep on rolling. Battlefield demand for the steel behemoths is so high that the Russian military is pushing into service ancient vehicles from the 1950s and 1960s to replace its more than 3,000 tanks destroyed thus far. To an outsider, this decision is that much odder given that Moscow has in its arsenal one of the most advanced tanks in the world: the T-14 Armata. 

Or does it? 

The T-14 Armata is a main battle tank weighing approximately 55 tons and equipped with a 125 mm main cannon. It requires a crew of three men (commander, driver, and gunner) and uses an automatic loading system for the main gun, much like other Soviet- and Russian-made tanks. 

In development for over a decade, the T-14 Armata has been plagued by mechanical and technological issues. To date, the Russian military has only received a handful of T-14 tanks. 

The Kremlin has claimed at specific points in the conflict that its forces deployed the T-14 Armata in Ukraine. TASS ran a story about how the new Russian main battle tank was performing in Ukraine, highlighting that it was deployed for the sake of experimentation, to ensure the T-14’s features fit modern operational realities. 

“The Armata tank was used several times in the combat zone in Ukraine. Based on the results of the use in the special operation, the vehicle is now being finalized,” Russian defense officials told TASS. 

But Ukrainian officials and Western intelligence estimates dispute Russian claims about the T-14’s combat experience. Instead of seeing combat against the Ukrainian military’s Western weapons systems, a handful of T-14 Armatas were restricted to areas close to the battlefield. This is in line with how the Kremlin is seen treating other modern weapons like the S-500 Prometheus air defense system and Su-57 Felon fighter jet. Moscow has held these systems back, most likely fearing humiliation. 

With the Russian military mired in Ukraine and no hopes of a quick victory, it is becoming increasingly likely that the T-14 Armata won’t see the end of this decade unless something radically changes. The mounting costs of the Armata and its continuing mechanical and technological issues will likely force the Russian military to ditch the project or order a complete redesign that better matches the capabilities of the Russian defense industry. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Forrestal-class "supercarriers" were a product of the Cold War arms race, representing the U.S. Navy's push for advanced naval capabilities.

-These carriers, including the USS Saratoga, were larger and more capable than their predecessors, the Midway-class.

-Key design improvements included a stronger flight deck, a larger and deeper hull for better stability, and the introduction of an angled deck, allowing simultaneous launch and recovery operations.

-Despite some mishaps, such as collisions and fires, the USS Saratoga served in the Mediterranean and played a role in the Vietnam War before the Forrestal-class was retired in 1998.

During the Cold War, the arms race to develop more advanced and lethal navies was at full force.

From submarines and carriers to airframes and main battle tanks, the U.S. and USSR went head to head to develop cutting-edge technologies like aircraft carriers.

The U.S. Navy’s Forrestal-class “supercarriers” were a product of this effort. The massive ships were named due to their then-extraordinary tonnage.

Comparably, the preceding Midway-class ships were 25% smaller in size. The Forrestal-class remained in service from 1955 to 1998.

Following the Second World War, airframes were beginning to increase in size. Additionally, the military began conceptualizing that airframes could soon carry smaller nuclear weapons. This combination spearheaded the Navy’s prioritization of air-power capabilities.

While designing the Forrestal-class ships, engineers rectified some of the shortcomings associated with the earlier Midway vessels.

Specifically, the Midway carriers were known for their inability to function properly in rough weather due to their low freeboard and heavy flight deck. To combat this, the Forrestal vessels’ flight decks were the strength deck. Each ship in this class possessed a larger and deeper hull, which allowed for a more stable platform with increased height above the water.

Like earlier U.S. Naval vessels, the Midway ships had a gap between the flight deck and the ship's structure up forward.

Engineers incorporated the addition of a hurricane bow to the Forrestal carriers to enclose the forward part of the ships.

Perhaps the most notable design change included on the Forrestal vessels was the modern angled deck. Developed in the early 1950’s by Royal Navy Captain Dennis Campbell, this layout allowed carriers to conduct launch and recovery operations simultaneously.

As explained by the U.S. Naval Institute:

“The incorporation of an angled deck off to port into the Forrestal design obviated any envisioned need for a flush deck. The landing area was remote and directed away from the starboard side such that a structure there would present no safety issue. As built, the island’s centerline was nearly 95 feet to starboard from that of the ship and even farther from the angled deck. Additionally, the island solved the uptake issues by incorporating them into the structure and radar installations could be readily mounted without hindrance to air operations. A further benefit was that the antenna and radar placement high on the island gained greater electronic efficiency.”

During her decades in service, USS Saratoga suffered from a few mishaps. In 1960, she collided with a German freighter off the coast of North Carolina. Shortly after, seven on board were killed when a fire broke out in the carrier’s number two machinery space. Despite these setbacks, Saratoga was deployed to the Mediterranean and subsequently participated in the Vietnam War.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Top Things You Need to Know: The A-10 Warthog, known for its formidable ground-attack capabilities and durability, is a legendary aircraft in the U.S. Air Force.

-However, its future is uncertain as it heads toward retirement. While some suggest that Ukraine could benefit from the remaining A-10s, the idea of adapting the A-10 for aircraft carrier operations is unlikely.

-The Warthog was never designed for carrier landings, and significant modifications would be required to make it suitable for such operations, including adapting it to the narrow runways and adding a tailhook, making this transformation impractical.

Months back, the Air Force dispatched a squadron of A-10 Warthogs to escort an American nuclear ballistic missile submarine near the Strait of Juan de Fuca. 

The legendary A-10 has been instrumental to the service’s aerial tactics for years, but the platform is now headed towards retirement as the Air Force turns to more modern platforms. Some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that Ukraine could be a recipient of the fleet’s remaining A-10 airframes. But the future of this famous platform remains up in the air.

Could A-10 Warthogs be useful aboard aircraft carriers?

The U.S. became more focused on developing tactical aircraft designed to deliver nuclear weapons after the Second World War. As the Cold War got underway, the Air Force gave low priority to new ground-attack platforms. 

While the McDonnell Douglas F-101 Voodoo and the Republic F-105 Thunderchief came about during this era, a more sophisticated ground-attack airframe was not conceptualized, leaving the aging Douglas A-1 Skyraider as the service’s primary attack airframe when the Vietnam War broke out. Although this platform was capable for its era, its key shortcomings led to the destruction of 266 Skyraiders during the conflict.

The A-10 was designed to solve the U.S. military’s ground-attack issues. Fairchild Republic designed the twin-turbofan, subsonic platform in the early 1970s. It immediately earned the nickname “titanium bathtub” from the titanium-reinforced armor all around its cockpit. Thanks to this added protection, the crew can survive direct hits from high-explosive projectiles and armor-piercing rounds at very close ranges.

Perhaps the Warthog’s most critical capability is its hefty armament load. The hydraulically driven GAU-8/A Avenger Gatling gun positioned under the nose of the aircraft can fire at a rate of 3,900 rounds per minute.

As explained by Military.com, “The Avenger fires a mix of 30 mm electrically primed PGU-13/B High Explosive Incendiary (HEI) rounds and PGU-14/B Armor Piercing Incendiary (API) rounds. While the HEI rounds provide the Avenger the ability to destroy light skinned vehicles, the weapon’s real punch is delivered by the API rounds, each of which incorporates over half a pound of super-dense Depleted Uranium.” 

As detailed by Airforce Technology, the A-10 can deliver weapons including “the LDGP Mk82 226kg, 900kg Mk-84 series low/high drag bombs, 226kg general-purpose bombs, BLU-1 and BLU-27/B Rockeye II cluster bombs, cluster bomb unit CBU-52/71, combined effects munitions, and mine dispensing munitions.”

Despite the A-10’s noteworthy capabilities, the platform was never built for carrier landings. Due to the narrowness of carrier runways and the A-10’s lack of a tailhook, among other considerations, it would take a significant overhaul to create a Warthog variant capable of this feat. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The top speed or flank speed of the U.S. Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers remains somewhat of a mystery, with official figures stating they can exceed 30 knots.

-It is believed they can reach up to 31.5 knots, fast enough to cover a large area quickly.

-According to firsthand accounts, it takes around 10 minutes for these massive 97,000-ton warships to reach flank speed, and while no one has officially attempted to water ski behind an aircraft carrier, it would be possible given their impressive speed.

The United States Navy's largest vessels are also among the fastest surface combatants in service today – the question however is exactly how fast the nuclear-powered Nimitz-class super carriers can travel. Officially the United States Navy will only state that its carriers can exceed 30 knots, but how much remains unknown.

It is known that the Nimitz class was designed to produce 260,000 shp, while there is speculation the design speed was 31.5 knots – fast enough to get out of harm's way.

As Forbes.com reported in 2019, "Because they can sustain speeds of 35 miles per hour, the Nimitz-class carriers populating the current fleet can move to anywhere within a 700-square mile area within 30 minutes. After 90 minutes, that area grows to over 6,000 square miles."

However, it should be noted that warships aren't always operating at "flank speed," the vessel's maximum, and it takes time to get a 97,000-ton warship moving. Recently a tactical officer shared some insight on the 'flank speed' of the U.S. Navy's supercarriers on the Quora social messaging platform.

Ross Hall, tactical action officer and anti-submarine officer assigned to a U.S. Navy Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier offered insight on the subject and was quoted by TheAviationGeekClub.com.

"It's hard to imagine what a carrier doing flank speed is like," Hall explained in his post. "During our transit to the North Arabian Sea, we conducted a rendezvous in the Indian Ocean with an amphibious group that was transiting back to the US. That day, the amphib guys showed off their LCACs, and we gave them an impromptu air show, with a couple of fly-bys for good measure."

Hall added, "As we parted company, our skipper announced 'Let's show them what an aircraft carrier can do'. We were barely making way at the time. He ordered us to depart at flank speed," noting, "When flank speed is ordered, power is applied to the shafts to turn the propellers. On the Nimitz class carriers, the four propellers are approximately 25 feet in diameter, and each weighs about 30 tons. When power is applied, torque on the shafts is limited to prevent damage – the shafts can 'twist' up to one and a half times (540 degrees). The longest shafts are 184 feet long.

"When the propellers start to turn, the water behind the ship begins to churn – it looks like the sea is beginning to boil. You can feel the ship vibrating as the engines ramp up and the propellers start to rotate," his comments continued.

The naval officer said it took about 10 minutes for the warship to reach flank speed, and he added, "If you have a long enough cable and a death wish, you could waterski behind the carrier."

While Hall was clearly joking, he may not have known that in 1986, Royal Navy sailors attempted to water ski behind the Type 42 destroyer HMS Nottingham while deployed to the Persian Gulf. However, that vessel was only capable of reaching a top speed of 18 knots – about half that of the U.S. aircraft carrier.

Images have also circulated online that show the Royal Navy's Lieutenant Commander Nigel Williams water skiing from the Type 22 frigate HMS Brave in the 1980s. Yet, to date, there are no reports that any sailors have actually tried to water ski behind a carrier, yet it could be easily done by more experienced water skiers.

The average water skiing speed is about 26 knots, but for the record, according to Guinness World Records, "The fastest water skiing speed recorded is 230.26 km/h (143.08 mph) by Christopher Michael Massey (Australia) on the Hawkesbury River, Windsor, New South Wales, Australia on 6 Mar 1983. His drag boat driver was Stanley Charles Sainty.

Massey could certainly have water skied behind the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), even at flank speed.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Aircraft carriers have long symbolized U.S. naval power, but recent advancements in anti-ship technology, such as drones and missiles, are challenging their future viability.

-These massive vessels are increasingly vulnerable to cheaper, more sophisticated attacks, particularly from adversaries like China.

-In a potential conflict, the loss of a carrier would be a significant strategic and psychological blow. If carriers become obsolete, the U.S. Navy might pivot towards stealthier and more agile vessels, like submarines and destroyers, to maintain maritime dominance.

-While heavily invested in new carrier classes, the Navy could adapt and find new ways to project power if needed.

Aircraft carriers define the power of the U.S. Navy today. But the Navy has existed for 230 years – 248 years if you count the Continental Navy – and for the great majority of that time, the maritime service did not have aircraft carriers at all. If carriers become obsolete, the Navy will probably adapt and endure.

Some pundits question the viability of the aircraft carrier in contemporary combat environments. Thanks to recent advances in anti-ship technologies, relatively cheap and low-tech equipment might be used to contain or even destroy advanced surface vessels. Drones, for example, can be deployed in swarms. They have caused problems for exponentially more expensive and more sophisticated U.S. warships off the coast of Yemen. Anti-ship missiles have become increasingly effective and have the potential to target and destroy aircraft carriers.

Carriers are, of course, massive targets – both in the literal and figurative sense. In the literal sense, aircraft carriers are one-fifth of a mile long. They carry 5,000 sailors and 100 aircraft, and they cost billions of dollars per unit. In the figurative sense, aircraft carriers are the symbol of a nation’s naval might and general fortune. Felling an aircraft carrier in the modern era would be a victory of a significance that is hard to calculate. Accordingly, they make a very attractive target. 

In a potential war against China, the U.S. would depend on carriers to deploy air power throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese undoubtedly would use their stockpile of anti-ship missiles, as well as their growing fleet of submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface vessels, to target American aircraft carriers. The loss of just one carrier would be devastating to any American war effort. Frankly, the American public is probably not conditioned for the casualties that the sinking of an aircraft carrier would entail – potentially double the lives that were lost on 9/11.

If, for some reason, the U.S. Navy had to move past the aircraft carrier, the process would be cumbersome and likely made with great reluctance.

Right now, the Navy has considerable resources invested in its carrier fleet – investment befitting a vessel type that is indeed the cornerstone of the service. But it could move on if necessary, and if the maritime service faces an existential threat, it will adjust accordingly. 

Adjustment could look like a pivot toward stealthier, sleeker, smaller vessels. More submarines, for example, or destroyers – vessels that would be harder for the enemy to target with drones and anti-ship missiles, and harder to locate in the first place. 

The Navy is banking on aircraft carriers being the vessel of the future. That’s why they’re comfortable investing $13 billion per boat in the brand-new Ford-class carrier. But if for some reason the Navy needed to move past the iconic aircraft carrier, it would find a way.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons.