The National Interest

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program is facing competition from Russia's S-70 Okhotnik-B, a highly autonomous combat UAV developed by Sukhoi. First tasked in 2011 and with prototypes visible by 2017, the S-70 shares components with the Su-57 fighter, including internal weapons bays.

-The UAV can carry 2.8 tons of munitions, reach speeds over 620 mph, and features stealth technologies.

-Initially expected to enter production in 2024, the timeline may be delayed due to the war in Ukraine. The S-70’s capabilities highlight its role in the global race for sixth-generation air dominance.

The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance program, or NGAD, has plenty of competition. It will not be the only sixth-generation fighter platform in the skies. Beijing and Moscow are fielding their own respective next-gen fighters, and the race is on to get there first. 

Like the Air Force’s NGAD, Russia’s planned sixth-generation fighter jet is expected to fly alongside a fleet of highly autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Referred to in the U.S. as “drone wingmen,” these sophisticated airframes provide a lower-cost, unmanned option to accompany the manned aircraft. Russian manufacturer Sukhoi is developing the S-70 Okhotnik-B combat UAV to fulfill this role. 

An Overview of the S-70’s Origins

Russia’s Defense Ministry first tasked engineers at Sukhoi with creating a new UAV system in 2011. The first prototype was seen in 2017, when the drone’s flying wing configuration was showcased. One year later, the S-70 carried out its first series of tests and was reportedly capable of reaching a top speed of 200 kilometers per hour in a speed and stop trial. 

While Moscow refers to the S-70 “Hunter B” UAV as a sixth-generation platform that can penetrate outer space, the aircraft’s exact specs have not been confirmed. The S-70 is partly derived from its Mikoyan Skat predecessor and possesses several key components of the Sukhoi Su-57 fighter. 

Between 2018 and 2022, Russian state-run media outlets reported that Hunter-B prototypes were being constructed at the Novosibirsk Chkalov Aviation Plant. They are believed to feature enhancements to onboard radio-electronic equipment and structural elements. 

The S-70 was supposed to enter serial production in 2024, but the war in Ukraine may have pushed back this timeline.

The S-70 in Its “Wingman” Role

As mentioned previously, the Hunter-B should share several components with Moscow’s Su-57 fighter. Specifically, the aircraft is believed to feature similar internal weapons bays, meaning it will use the same beyond-visual-range weaponry. 

The S-70’s real prowess will come from its armaments. The drone is expected haul a vast array of ordnance, including 250 caliber and 500 caliber bombs. According to Army Recognition, the UAV will also be able to carry unguided bombs weighing up to 1,000 kilograms, in addition to a range of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles. In total, the drone can carry up to 2.8 tons of munitions in its two internal weapons bays. 

Powered by the same AL-21 jet engine that drives the Su-27 fighter jet, the Hunter-B is capable of reaching speeds in excess of 620 miles per hour, according to Army Recognition:

“The drone can autonomously perform complex missions, including takeoff and landing, making it a formidable asset in modern warfare. Its ability to carry various types of munitions, from precision bombs to air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, enhances its versatility on the battlefield. It also features stealth technologies, including a flat nozzle design that improves its radar invisibility, a critical factor in its effectiveness.”

Other Specs and Capabilities

Russia state-media outlets report the S-70 weighs roughly 20 tons, with a wingspan of 14 meters. Although this is smaller than the Su-57, the difference is minimal. 

In 2023, The War Zone published a report analyzing video footage released by Moscow that shows a reporter walking across the wing of a Su-57 positioned next to an S-70 drone.The aircraft appear roughly the same size. 

As detailed by the article, the new drone is “covered in various intakes and exhausts, as well as antennas, and a forward-facing camera system under the central part of the forward fuselage.” The UAV reportedly features electro-optical targeting, as well as radio and other reconnaissance equipment. 

Considering shortages amid Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion, this sophisticated drone might not see combat any time soon. But it is an important entry in the race to field the next generation of aerial combat platforms.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: China has completed the construction of a bridge over Pangong Tso, a high-altitude lake near the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India. The bridge, located at the narrowest part of the lake, will significantly reduce travel time for Chinese forces, potentially facilitating quicker deployment of their Type 15 light tanks to the LAC.

-This development has heightened tensions between the two nuclear powers, especially after a prolonged standoff in the region. In response, India has unveiled its new Zorawar light tank, designed for rapid deployment and high-altitude operations.

-The tank features a 105mm main gun, AI capabilities, and amphibious functions, positioning India to better defend its interests in the rugged terrain of the LAC.

Beijing has more than its fair share of what could rightfully be described as "troubled waters" – and those include the Taiwanese Strait and the South China Sea, each a potential flashpoint for a war with its neighbors. However, far from the Western Pacific is Pangong Tso or Pangong Lake – an endorheic lake in the eastern Ladakh Valley that is near the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India.

Located 13,862 feet above sea level, it is one of the highest-altitude lakes in the world, while it is 134 km (83 miles) long, which also makes among the largest lakes in Asia. Though noted for its scenic beauty, its remoteness means few actually can ever see it – and it doesn't generally receive a lot of international attention.

Yet, it could be a flashpoint for a war between China and India, especially as the former just completed construction on a controversial infrastructure project.

It was reported this week that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has finished construction on a bridge at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso in Khurnak, connecting the north and south banks of the lake.

Construction of the 400-meter-long, 8-meter-wide bridge began in late 2021, following a months-long standoff between Indian and Chinese forces near the LAC. The bridge will allow for PLA forces to move directly north-south and troops coming from the Khurnak Fort could see their travel times cut from 12 hours to three to four hours, while it will cut down a 180 km (111 mile) loop from the Khurnak to the south banks.

"The bridge will also add a new route connecting Khurnak Fort and surrounding facilities with the PLA's largest base in the vicinity, at Rutog," the Center for Strategic & International Studies reported.

The bridge at Pangong could also allow the Chinese military to quickly deploy its Type 15 light tank to the disputed LAC should fighting break out between the two nuclear powers. The tank, which first entered service in 2018, is noted for being armed with a fully stabilized 105mm rifled main gun, a robust armor package, and CRBN (Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) protection typically found in larger MBTs.

Both sides have increasingly fortified their positions along the 2,100-mile-long LAC, while also developing platforms that are well-suited to the rugged, high-altitude terrain.

It was earlier this month that India announced 25-ton Zorawar light tank has entered service. Named after the 19th-century Dogra General Zorawar Singh, who led military operations in Ladakh and Western Tibet, the Zorawar was jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and private vendor Larsen & Toubro (L&T). The quick development and fielding of the tank is noteworthy as the Indian Army only issued a Request for Information (RFI) in 2021 calling for a new tank that weighed less than 25 tonnes, yet had a margin of 10 percent and the same firepower as a regular MBT.

It would appear that the tank more than met the requirements, and arrived just as China has increased its ability to more quickly deploy its forces near the LAC.

The Zorawar is armed with a 105mm main gun, while it is also artificial intelligence-enabled, and further fitted with an active protection system that includes tactical drones to provide situational awareness and loitering munition capability. In addition, the light tank was designed to be air transportable for rapid deployment, but it can also operate from high-altitude areas to island territories. It features amphibious capabilities that could allow it to ford any deep streams and rivers in the region, while it can traverse steep climbs.

The new tank was unveiled to the media for the first time on July 6 at the company's production facility in Hazira, Gujarat. Manu Pubby, senior editor for the Indian-based Economic Times shared photos of the tank on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. It is noted to have a lower profile and lower center of gravity than the far larger 50 to 60-ton T-72s and T-90s.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The USS Massachusetts (BB-2), commissioned in 1896, is often considered the worst battleship in U.S. Navy history due to its numerous design flaws and operational issues. This Indiana-class battleship (as seen below) suffered from severe stability problems, making it difficult for the crew to operate its guns effectively.

-Its propulsion system was unreliable, frequently breaking down and requiring repairs. The ship's armament, including four 13-inch guns, was poorly balanced, causing it to list severely when fired.

-Despite participating in notable actions during the Spanish-American War and the Boxer Rebellion, the USS Massachusetts' fundamental design flaws rendered it largely ineffective in combat, earning it a dubious place in naval history.

For decades, the U.S. Navy billed itself as holding the greatest battleship fleet in the world. Indeed, before the events of the Pacific Theater of the Second World War, the American Navy could lean heavily on its marvelous designs for battleships, as well as its industrial capacity to produce those battleships. 

But even great navies miss their mark every so often. One such missed mark for the U.S. Navy’s battleship design and engineering team was USS Massachusetts (BB-2).

Commissioned in 1896, this Indiana-class battleship stands out as one of the most poorly designed and underperforming battleships in the history of the Navy. The vessel suffered from a series of design flaws and operational issues that left it ineffective in combat. Despite these facts, it had a relatively long history, serving in the Spanish-American War and being a key part of the international fleet that was assembled to respond to the Boxer Rebellion in colonial China. 

One of the most significant problems with USS Massachusetts was its lack of stability. The ship’s hull was not properly balanced. It had a tendency to roll excessively even in moderate seas. Under these conditions, the crew had difficulty operating the ship’s guns effectively, as the constant rolling often made it nearly impossible to aim accurately. 

A battleship that is fundamentally incapable of targeting its enemies seems like a pretty bad battleship, if you ask me!

Another major flaw in the design of Massachusetts was its propulsion system. Equipped with two vertical, triple-expansion steam engines, these systems were prone to breakdowns and malfunctions. This meant that the ship often had difficulty maintaining its top speed, and it was frequently forced to return to port for repairs.

In terms of armaments, USS Massachusetts was equipped with four 13-inch guns, which were the largest guns available at the time of its construction. Again, though, there were balancing issues, this time with the guns themselves. And because these guns were improperly balanced, the weight of these weapons caused the ship to list severely when they were fired. 

Bottom line: Massachusetts was an incredibly unreliable weapons platform in combat.

This boat had a displacement of 10,288 long tons and was not only equipped with 13-inch guns, but also had eight 8-inch guns, four 6-inch guns, twenty 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Massachusetts had a length of 350 feet, 11 inches, and a beam of 69 feet, 3 inches, as well as a draft of 27 feet. She had a top cruising speed of 15 knots, or 17 miles per hour, and carried a complement of 473 officers and men.

The ship saw action during the Spanish-American War that proved to be historic. On May 31, 1898, USS Massachusetts along with USS Iowa (BB-4) and USS New Orleans, bombarded forts at the entrance to Santiago de Cuba. They also engaged the Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon, forcing it to retreat into Santiago’s inner harbor.

On July 4, 1898, Massachusetts returned to Santiago, Cuba, and helped USS Texas force the Spanish cruiser Reina Mercedes to beach and surrender.

These actions were part of larger naval operations during the Spanish-American War that saw the U.S. Navy successfully blockade the Spanish fleet in Santiago and ultimately secure victory in the conflict.

A couple of years later, during the Boxer Rebellion in colonial China, USS Massachusetts was deployed as part of an international naval force to protect foreign interests and to relieve the siege of the Legation Quarter in Beijing. On June 17, 1900, Massachusetts, along with other American ships, was ordered to proceed to Taku, China, to support the international relief expedition. 

Despite this service, Massachusetts stands out as one of the worst-designed and worst-performing battleships in the history of the United States Navy. Its numerous flaws, including its lack of stability, unreliable propulsion system, and poorly balanced armament, rendered it largely ineffective in combat.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The UK’s Vanguard-class submarines, the largest ever built in the country, are set to be replaced after three decades of service. These 16,000-ton ballistic missile submarines, introduced in the early 1990s, have been a crucial part of Britain's sea-based nuclear deterrence, carrying Trident missiles capable of reaching targets up to 4,000 miles away. Outfitted with Rolls-Royce PWR2 nuclear reactors, the Vanguard-class includes four submarines: Vanguard, Victorious, Vigilant, and Vengeance.

-The new Dreadnought-class submarines will replace the aging Vanguard-class. Four Dreadnoughts are planned, with three currently under construction. These new submarines will also carry Trident missiles and are designed for a service life of nearly 40 years.

-Despite delays in the Astute-class submarine program affecting the Dreadnought timeline, the transition marks a significant update to the UK’s naval capabilities. The Dreadnought program, costing £31 billion, reflects the UK's commitment to maintaining a robust sea-based nuclear deterrent.

The British Vanguard-class, a massive ballistic missile submarine, is soon to be replaced after serving for multiple decades. Capable of displacing 16,000 tons (submerged), the Vanguard-class is the largest submarine made in the United Kingdom.

In fact, the Vanguard displaces twice as much as the submarine she replaced, the Resolution-class. But having been introduced thirty years ago, the Vanguard-class submarines are now outdated; The Royal Navy will retire all four – the Vanguard, Victorious, Vigilant, and Vengeance.

As you might expect for a NATO ballistic missile submarine unveiled in 1994, the Vanguard was built to provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear deterrent. And unlike the United States, who relied upon a nuclear triad, which spread nuclear deterrent responsibilities across the land, air, and sea, the British focused primarily on sea-based deterrence – meaning that the Vanguard was of outsized importance. To further enhance the Vanguard’s deterrent abilities, the British purchased Trident missiles from their American allies, a deal that then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher oversaw. The Trident missile can reach targets up to 4,000 miles away and are fired from the Vanguard’s ballistic missile tubes.

The Vanguard also carries four 21-inch torpedo tubes, which can carry up to 16 Spearfish heavyweight torpedoes. The Spearfish torpedo can hit target while traveling at faster than 90 miles per hour, detonating a 660-pound explosive charge. The torpedo gives the Vanguard both anti-submarine and anti-surface abilities.

Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering, which is currently BAE Systems Submarines, built the Vanguard-class, the first of which was commissioned in 1993, and the last of which was commissioned in 1999.

All four Vanguards are outfitted with a Rolls-Royce PWR2 nuclear reactor, which can convert water into steam to drive the engines and generate electricity. The Vanguard can reach speeds in excess of 25 knots – a respectable speed for the nearly 500-foot vessel – for a virtually unlimited range. The PWR2 has twice the service life as previous models, and estimates hold that the Vanguard could circle the globe 40 times before needing to refuel, although this theory is unlikely to have been tested.

The Dreadnought-class is scheduled to replace the aging Vanguard class. The Dreadnought will also use the Trident missiles from the Vanguard, however. At present, three Dreadnoughts are under construction, with four planned total. The Dreadnoughts are expected to be named: Dreadnought, Valiant, Warspite, and King George VI. The Dreadnought will be slightly longer than the Vanguard, measuring 504 feet long, and similarly, will displace about 17,000 tons.

The Dreadnought is expected to have a service life of nearly 40 years, which represents a 50 percent increase over the Vanguard. And the Dreadnought better last awhile, at 31 billion pounds, the program is extremely expensive.

While the Dreadnought will replace the Vanguard, delays to the Astute class submarine construction are in turn causing delays to the Dreadnought class, which may mean the Vanguard gets to stay in service a little while longer.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit is the most expensive aircraft in the U.S. military’s inventory, costing upwards of $2 billion per unit when adjusted for inflation.

-This flying-wing stealth bomber, designed to deploy nuclear weapons undetected, is significantly more expensive than other military aircraft like the F-22 Raptor, C-17 Globemaster, and even Air Force One.

-The B-2 enhances the U.S. nuclear triad by providing a stealthy and precise delivery method for nuclear payloads, adding an element of unpredictability. However, its high cost raises questions about whether its marginal benefits justify the substantial financial investment.

-The most expensive aircraft in the U.S. military’s inventory is the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, and there is no close second. 

The world’s first stealth bomber, the B-2 is a flying-wing aircraft distinctive for its lack of vertical stabilizers, horizontal stabilizers, or traditional fuselage. Painted black, the B-2 looks worthy of a Batman film. 

But despite distinct appearances and world’s-first claims, the B-2’s most notable feature is its cost. When first funded in the early 1990s, the B-2 cost $1 billion per unit. When adjusted for inflation, each B-2 costs upward of $2 billion. For a single aircraft, that is hard to justify.

To put the B-2’s cost in perspective, consider the price tags of other U.S. military aircraft. 

The F-22 Raptor, the world’s first fifth-generation fighter, costs $350 million per unit. The C-17 Globemaster, which can transport tremendous quantities of U.S. military equipment around the world, costs up to $340 million per unit. The P-8 Poseidon costs $290 million per unit, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the interconnected fifth-generation marvel, costs $115 million per unit. 

Air Force One itself, designed to support the head of the entire executive branch in transit, costs $660 million. You could buy four Air Force Ones for the price of one B-2. You could buy six F-22s, or about seventeen F-35s. For the price of one B-2, you could cover about 40% of the cost to build a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that houses about 5,000 sailors and 100 aircraft.

So, were the B-2’s unique costs worthwhile? Did the U.S., at $2 billion per unit, get its money’s worth? Short answer: probably not.

The B-2’s primary selling point is the fusion of stealth technology with the ability to deploy nuclear weapons. In theory, the B-2 allows the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons with pinpoint precision, without the delivery method being detected beforehand. 

Essentially, the B-2’s stealth features were meant to remove predictability from U.S. nuclear deployment tactics, inspiring greater caution from U.S. adversaries who would be forced to assume the U.S. could strike with surprise, anytime and anywhere. In short, the B-2 is designed to enhance the “air” portion of the U.S.’ air-land-and-sea nuclear triad, which in turn enhances Washington’s nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Without question, a stealth bomber enhances the nuclear triad. And while the U.S. has a strategic incentive to maintain nuclear superiority over other nations, at a certain point, systems become somewhat redundant. That’s not to say that another weapons system can reproduce the precise abilities of the B-2, or the operational options it confers. But the U.S. already has first and second nuclear strike options. It has a large and wide-ranging stockpile of nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its nuclear missile-armed submarines lurk stealthily in oceans around the world. And of course, non-stealth bombers like the B-1 and B-52 can deliver nuclear payloads, although they are less likely than the B-2 to survive in contested airspace.

Sure, the U.S. has a more complete nuclear triad with the B-2 stealth bomber. It is, arguably, incrementally safer with the B-2 stealth bomber on call. But at $2 billion per unit, the B-2’s marginal benefits are hard to financially justify.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: A Google Earth image has captured a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber over a Missouri farm near Whiteman Air Force Base, sparking discussions about the stealth capabilities of the U.S. Air Force's most advanced bomber. Critics wonder how such a high-tech aircraft could be seen on a widely accessible platform.

-The B-2, known for its stealth and long-range capabilities, remains critical to U.S. defense, despite being occasionally visible in public and on satellite images.

-This sighting, while notable, does not undermine the B-2's stealth advantages, which have proven crucial in numerous combat missions since its introduction.The plane should be considered 'rare' in that there is only 19 of them. 

-The aircraft is set to remain in service until the 2030s, replaced eventually by the B-21 Raider.

Civilians have pounced on a stilled image of a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber that appeared over a farm in Missouri close to Whiteman Air Force Base years back.

This photo was captured by Google Earth, and it has some critics wondering why the stealth technology on the B-2 didn’t hide it better. The enterprising person who used Google Earth cheekily referred to the B-2 as conducting a “crop dusting mission” and you can see the agricultural scene below the bomber in the video here.

But is there actually a real problem here or not?

Here is a quick rundown of the B-2s history and some very key facts about this one-of-a-kind bomber.

It’s probably not fair to criticize the bomber’s stealth signature based on one incident on Google Earth, but it is alarming that an app available to anyone with Internet service can track the B-2.

This is, after all, the most expensive and advanced bomber in the Air Force’s arsenal. Adversaries have noticed and could possibly use Google Earth to show B-2s taking off from Whiteman AFB in the future. They could count the number of take-offs, for example, and receive an early warning on intercontinental missions as well as training sorties. Of course, we must keep in mind this is entirely dependent on how often Google Earth updates its maps.

The B-2 sometimes makes appearances at air shows and even conducted a fly-over at the Super Bowl over Raymond James Stadium in Tampa, Florida in January of 2021. But sightings are rare because there are only 20 in service.

The Air Force has plans to use the flying wing until 2032 and gradually put them out to pasture after the B-21 Raider comes onto the scene in five or six years.

The B-2 was meant to cruise past enemy air defenses with stealth characteristics. The B-2 has also made some historic, record-setting flights. After 9/11, it ventured all the way to Afghanistan for a bombing run that took 44-hours. Then it landed, made a quick change to a replacement crew, and flew back to Missouri in 34-hours.

How does the crew handle such a long flight? The B-2 actually has a bed, a toilet, and a microwave aboard so creature comforts are covered for pilots who need a break.

But these features come with a price.

The B-2 is the most expensive bomber in history. It takes over $44 million a year just to maintain it. Each airplane set the DOD back $2 billion. The Air Force originally wanted 132, but Congress put the kibosh on that order and only authorized 21 with one lost during a crash in 2008 to make a total of 20 now flying. None have been shot down in combat.

If you can believe it, the flying wing is not new.

Designers have experimented with the style since World War II when they tested the experimental Northrop XB-35 and YB-35. Then the service branch, known as the U.S. Army Air Forces at the time, went to work. They replaced the props with eight turbojet engines, added four vertical stabilizers, and gave it four air dams.

The development wasn’t always smooth. In 1950, one of the experimental airplanes did a nosedive when the landing gear failed, and the prototype busted in two and was a complete loss. By 1953, the entire flying wing program was retired after only 13 flights.

The flying wing design saw no other development until the Air Force figured it would be the best way to get a stealth model into the air. This was 40 years after the experimental flying wings.

Northrop Grumman introduced the B-2 and based it in Whiteman AFB in 1993 because the Russians and Chinese were creating a web of dangerous air defenses with new radars and improved fighter interceptors. It made its combat debut in the War in Kosovo by eliminating Serbian targets without resistance. During that conflict, it destroyed around 33-percent of all targets in the first eight weeks of fighting. Then Afghanistan and Iraq became a rich killing field for the B-2. In 2017, it also removed ISIS terrorists from the battlefield in Libya with GPS-guided bombs.

The B-2 can deploy up to sixteen B-61 or B-83 nuclear gravity bombs on the rotating launchers inside its two weapons bays. In 2018, it carried the upgraded B61-12 nuclear bomb.

It can fly up to 6,000 nautical miles without re-fueling which gives it global reach. The idea is to fly low and use the stealth characteristics to sneak into combat theaters.

Unfortunately, the bomber was not able to sneak past intrepid viewers of Google Earth recently, but that was just a minor hiccup. The B-2, along with the B-1, and B-52 will “deliver the mail” in combat when called upon. And the B-2 will still be able to penetrate deep into enemy airspace.

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood.

All images are Creative Commons and Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: In January 2017, two Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base executed a complex and costly 34-hour nonstop mission to bomb Islamic State targets near Sirte, Libya. This mission, part of President Barack Obama's counterterrorism campaign, marked the B-2's last combat sortie to date.

-The operation required extensive aerial refueling and cost around $8.8 million, excluding additional costs for refueling and munitions.

-Despite the high expenses, the B-2's advanced stealth capabilities ensured the mission's success.

- The Problem, a Numbers Challenge That Can't Be Fixed: Currently, the B-2 fleet, which consists of only 19 aircraft, is set to be equipped with the extended-range GBU-62 JDAM-ER, enhancing its strike capabilities as it remains in service until the B-21 Raider's introduction in the 2030s.

In January 2017, the United States Air Force deployed a pair of Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, to bomb targets in the Libyan desert near the city of Sirte. According to reports from the time, the overnight bombing sortie killed more than 80 suspected Islamic State militants. It marked the first time the bombers had been used in combat since the 2011 air campaign that helped force Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi from power.

The mission was one of the final B-2 deployments made during former President Barack Obama's global counterterrorism campaign, but it was costly and complex. It reportedly required at least five aerial refueling tankers to allow the B-2 stealth bombers to make the 10,000-mile, 34-hour nonstop CONUS-to-CONUS flight to Libya and back. At the time, each of the bomber's operating costs was approximately $130,000 per flight hour. 

The 34 flight hours came out to roughly $4.4 million – or $8.8 million for the pair. That price didn't factor in the cost of the aerial refueling plans, or the 100 GBU-38 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs equipped with GPS guidance carried and deployed on the targets by the two bombers.

The January 2017 mission was also the last B-2 combat sortie to date, but the Spirit remains in the U.S. Air Force's arsenal and will continue to operate into the 2030s when its replacement, the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider enters service.

The B-2s that struck the Islamic State targets more than seven years ago did so with the GBU-38 JDAM, but lawmakers on the House Armed Services Committee have called for the stealth bomber to be able to carry the heavier-hitting GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munitions – Extended Range (JDAM-ER).

"The 500 pound JDAM-ER variant features a modular add-on wing kit, which (utilizes) small diameter bomb glide technology. The wings unfold in flight and triple the range of the weapon from the standard 15 miles (24km) of a conventional JDAM system to more than 45 miles," Airforce-Technology.com explained.

The U.S. began supplying the JDAM-ERs to Ukraine last year.

Seen as the first successful "flying wing" aircraft, the B-2s low-observable, or "stealth," characteristics have provided it the unique ability to penetrate an enemy's most sophisticated defenses and threaten its most valued, and heavily defended, targets. The Spirit's capability to penetrate air defenses and threaten effective retaliation further has provided a strong, effective deterrent and combat force well into the 21st century.

The B-2's low observability was derived from a combination of reduced infrared, acoustic, electromagnetic, visual, and radar signatures. These signatures make it difficult for the sophisticated defensive systems to detect, track, and engage the B-2. Many aspects of the low-observability process remain classified; however, the B-2's composite materials, special coatings, and flying-wing design all contribute to its "stealthiness."

The United States Air Force currently operates 19 B-2 Spirits, following a mishap in December 2022. One of the Air Force's then-20 B-2s made an emergency landing and caught fire at Whiteman AFB. The air service determined it would be too costly to repair the bomber.

However, the remaining fleet of 19 bombers could soon pack an even greater punch than was employed on its last combat sortie seven and a half years ago.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The M1 Abrams has been the backbone of the U.S. Army's armored forces since 1980, renowned for introducing advanced technologies like Chobham composite armor and a multi-fuel turbine engine. Now, General Dynamics is looking to the future with the AbramsX, a new model featuring a hybrid electric diesel engine, artificial intelligence systems, and a reduced crew size. The AbramsX promises to be lighter and more fuel-efficient, addressing some of the criticisms of the current Abrams models.

-However, the Defense Department has expressed reservations about the program, particularly regarding the integration of AI and the relevance of tanks in modern warfare.

-Whether the AbramsX will secure the necessary funding to become the Army’s next primary battle tank remains to be seen.

The tank most commonly associated with the modern U.S. Army is the M1 Abrams. This third-generation battle tank has served as the U.S. cavalry’s backbone since 1980. 

The Abrams was at the forefront of several new technologies, introducing Chobham composite armor, a computer fire control system, a multi-fuel turbine engine, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) protection, and separate ammunition storage to the U.S. Army. Indeed, the Abrams has served admirably for over 40 years. 

Now, a new model designated the AbramsX is likely to introduce the next round of novel technologies. It will keep the Abrams relevant for the foreseeable future – assuming the project can secure funding from the Department of Defense.

Last year, General Dynamics offered a short YouTube clip advertising the AbramsX. The video made a splash. “It’s the biggest upgrade of America’s military tank technology since early in the Cold War, The Washington Post wrote. 

Naturally, the AbramsX will feature updated technology relative to existing Abrams variants. The biggest upgrade is the inclusion of a hybrid electric diesel engine, which is expected to make the AbramsX lighter and improve its fuel economy. 

In keeping with the economic theme, the AbramsX will operate with a smaller crew than its predecessors. And like most weapons systems being developed these days, the tank will also incorporate artificial intelligence systems.

The Defense Department has expressed reservations over investing in the AbramsX program. 

The new tank “faces an uphill climb in the halls of the Pentagon,” according to The Washington Post. “Russia’s war in Ukraine has shown the promise and peril of tank technology in a modern battlefield,” while “military strategists worry how useful tanks might be in a potential war against China.”

Further contributing to the reservations is the inclusion of artificial intelligence. Thankfully, not everyone is willing to sign off on the use of AI in a next-era battle tank. James Cameron’s treatment of the risks associated with artificial intelligence, the Terminator series, may have a hyperbolic tinge, but it speaks to plausible concerns associated with the embedment of artificial intelligence within military technology.

All In all, “it’s going to be hard for the tank community to get resources to do a major upgrade,” Mark Cancian, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said to The Washington Post. 

While the Abrams has served as the Army’s primary battle tank for over forty years, the model is not beyond criticism. Designed to rival the Soviet Union’s impressive tank fleet and drive across the sweeping plains of Eastern Europe, the M1 Abrams is very much a product of the Cold War. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Soviet Union still existed, investing in a new tank made more sense.

But times have changed. And while the Abrams has performed sufficiently well to stay in service, the model has not been perfect. The tank is expensive, gas-guzzling, and clumsy in battle. The AbramsX is General Dynamics’ attempt to solve these problems. 

Some of the results seem encouraging. For example, the AbramsX is ten tons lighter than current models. The hybrid electric diesel engine will be 50% more fuel-efficient than the current engine, which is rated for just one mile per gallon.

Will the DoD get on board, and fund the AbramsX as the Army’s tank of the future? We’ll see.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Akula-class submarines, built by Amur Shipbuilding Plant and Sevmash, are a testament to Russian naval engineering. Featuring a double hull design, these submarines offer greater buoyancy and versatility compared to their Western counterparts. Powered by the OK-650B pressurized water reactor, also used in various other Soviet submarines, the Akula-class submarines are known for their advanced capabilities and reliability.

-The Akula I variants include the Puma, Delphin, Kashalot, Kit, Pantera, Bars, and Narvel, while the improved Akula-class, Project 971U, consists of Volk, Morzh, Leopard, Tigr, and Drakon. The lone Akula II variant, Vepr (K-157), launched in 1994, showcases significant advancements in armament and sensors. India leased an Akula II submarine, renamed INS Chakra, from Russia, though it was returned early due to propulsion issues.

-The Akula-class submarines remain a critical component of the Russian Navy, with the Vepr expected to stay in service for decades.

The Akula-class submarines were constructed by the Amur Shipbuilding Plant Joint Stock Company at Komsomolsk and by Sevmash at the Severodvinsk shipbuilding yard.

Each submarine was designed as a double hull system consisting of an inner pressure hull and an outer hull. This layout enables more freedom in the exterior hull’s shape, allowing the submarine to reserve more buoyancy than its Western counterparts.

Each Akula submarine is powered by one OK-650B pressurized water reactor, the same system incorporated onto many Soviet predecessors.

When the OK-650 was introduced to service in the 1970s, it was considered more advanced and reliable than previous submarine reactors. This reactor has also been installed on the Sierra I, Sierra II, the Oscar I, Oscar II, and Typhoon class submarines.

The first seven boats that make up the Akula I class are the Puma, Delphin, Kashalot, Kit, Pantera, Bars and Narvel. An improved Akula-class variant known as Project 971U includes the Volk, Morzh, Leopard, Tigr and Drakon.

In terms of armament, the Akula class was quite formidable. Each submarine was designed to carry S-10 Granat (designated by the West as SS-N-21 Sampson) cruise attack missiles. The S-10 Granat is comparable to the American-made Tomahawk. Subsequent Akula-class variants were fitted with six additional 533mm external torpedo tubes.

The submarine class also sported more advanced sensors than previous submarines. Specifically, the Akula’s surface search radar is the Snoop Pair or Snoop Half.

As detailed by Naval Technology, “]T]he submarine is fitted with the MGK 540 sonar system which provides automatic target detection in broad and narrow-band modes by active sonar. It gives the range, relative bearing and range rate. The sonar system can also be used in a passive, listening mode for detection of hostile sonars. The sonar signal processor can detect and automatically classify targets as well as reject spurious acoustic noise sources and compensate for variable acoustic conditions.”

Only one Akula II variant was ever completed- the Vepr (K-157).

In 1990, her keel was laid down and she officially launched four years later. In 1995, the Vepr commissioned. Two additional Akula II-class variants were planned in the late 1990s. However, neither boat was completed.

Notably, the hull sections from the Rys (K-333) and the Kuguar (K-337) were later incorporated in the constructions of the Alexander Nevsky and Yury Dolgorukiy. The Akula II submarines measured at 110m long and could displace up to 12,770t.

Each submarine in this class had a top speed of 35 knots submerged and a maximum diving depth of 600m. Although construction of the Akula II began back in 1991, it was suspended for nearly a decade due to a shortage of funds.

A unique leasing opportunity arose when Moscow granted the Indian Navy the ability to “rent” the Akula II submarine.

The SSN, renamed INS Chakra by New Delhi in 2023, was expected to enter service with the Indian Navy in 2007. However, several delays postponed this deadline. At first, issues with installing new systems and technologies onboard set engineers back in schedule. In 2008, a fatal gas leak that broke out on the submarine led to the deaths of 20 civilian crew members, further pushing the submarine’s entry to service back.

Ultimately, New Delhi would sail the INS Chakra for under nine years before returning the submarine to Russia in 2021. Reports suggested that the submarine was returned to Moscow early due to issues with its nuclear propulsion system.

The Akula II SSN was more formidable in armament than its sister variant. Armed with four 533mm torpedo tubes, the submarine could deploy Type 53 torpedoes, RPK-6 or RPK-2 missiles.

Additionally, this vessel could sport naval mines, the RPK-7 missile and four 650mm torpedo tubes.

In 2022, NATO naval forces monitored the Vepr when it transited from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic. The boat is expected to remain in service with the Russian Navy for another few decades.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Navy’s sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, is widely regarded as a carrier in name only due to its persistent technical issues and operational failures. Commissioned during the Cold War, the Kuznetsov has faced numerous problems, from its reliance on low-quality mazut fuel to shoddy construction that prevents its boilers from operating at full capacity.

-Unlike Western carriers, which use advanced catapult systems, Kuznetsov uses a bow ramp that limits its ability to launch heavier aircraft. Its only combat deployment in Syria resulted in the loss of two aircraft due to faulty arresting wires.

-Despite its shortcomings, the Kremlin is unlikely to decommission the carrier amidst the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, using it instead as a propaganda tool to maintain its "carrier capable" -status.

While Russia may technically be an aircraft carrier nation, this title certainly exaggerates the extent of Admiral Kuznetsov’s capabilities. In fact, Moscow’s sole carrier is widely understood to be a carrier in name only.

For decades, the hefty ship has suffered from a myriad of unfortunate events that have effectively rendered its capabilities as an aircraft carrier useless. Amidst Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, however, the Kremlin is unlikely to officially scrap the Kuznetsov. Moscow’s ship fleet has already suffered serious damage at the hands of Ukrainian forces in the Black Sea and the decommissioning of the Kuznetsov would serve as another major blow to the country.

Instead, the Kremlin will continue to use its sole carrier as more of a prop for propaganda purposes.

Kuznetsov was initially commissioned in the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. Named to honor a revered USSR Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, the carrier was designed to support and defend missile-carrying submarines and other aircraft in the Soviet Navy as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser.”

Perhaps Kuznetsov's most distinctive characteristic is its fuel source. Unlike Western ships developed during the Cold War that used nuclear power or gas turbines for energy, the Soviet vessel was conventionally powered by mazut. This smoky, tar-like substance creates a thick viscosity and has therefore been designated as a low quality fuel source. Health-wise, mazut is horrible for the health of sailors. Additionally, the goopy substance is bad for the environment.

In addition to this poor fuel source, Kuznetsov was constructed shoddily at best. Specifically, insufficient piping installed during the carrier’s initial construction prevents its boilers from operating at full capacity simultaneously. This issue has only confounded the mazut’s shortcomings as proper boiler and piping installations are necessary to ensure it can be properly pre heated and pressurized.

The purpose of an aircraft carrier is to serve as a floating airbase for a country’s military. Unlike its Western counterparts which use magnetic-powered catapults and steam-powered catapults to carry out flight operations, the Russian carrier uses a simple bow ramp. The bow ramp is far less effective than the alternatives and prevents Moscow from launching heavier aircraft. In fact, the only time Kuznetsov has deployed to combat, this launch system failed. The carrier deployed to Syria in 2016-2017 and lost two airframes when faulty arresting wires failed to secure their landing.

As detailed by USNI News, “A fighter assigned to the Russian carrier operating in the Eastern Mediterranean crashed during a landing approach on Sunday. The Mikoyan MiG-29K was part of a trio of MiGs that had sortied from Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov headed over Syria. At one point, for unknown reasons, one of the fighters turned back to the carrier and crashed while on approach to the carrier, the official said.”

Today, Kuznetsov remains useless and undeployable. Until Russia develops another aircraft carrier, however, this ship will likely remain intact to ensure the country retains its “carrier capable” status.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Soviet-era Minsk, a Kiev-class hybrid warship, was intended to showcase Soviet naval prowess but fell short of American aircraft carriers.

-Built with a cruiser’s firepower and a limited aircraft deck, the Minsk carried more helicopters than warplanes, notably the subpar Yak-38. Despite its shortcomings, the Minsk marked a shift in Soviet naval strategy towards aircraft carrier operations. After the USSR's collapse, the Minsk was decommissioned and sold to China, where it became a theme park.

-This transformation from a military asset to a tourist attraction underscores the carrier’s mixed legacy and the challenges faced by Soviet naval ambitions.

The Minsk was a Soviet Navy era aircraft carrier that was the second warship of the Kiev-class carriers. To call these platforms aircraft carriers does a disservice to the aircraft carriers that most Americans are used to seeing when they think of flat tops. This was not a large, flat-decked warship that deployed dozens of warplanes and helicopters.

Instead, this was a hybrid of a cruiser and a carrier. It was the spork of an aircraft carrier: it looked like a cruiser with a platform for launching and recovering a limited number of aircraft. 

The Soviet warship Minsk was built at the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev, Ukraine. It was commissioned in 1978. The Soviets were intent on proving to everyone that they could build a big, bad aircraft carrier just like the Americans could. Of course, Moscow wasn’t playing to type. In some cases, that’s a good thing. It’s always helpful to expand one’s horizons by learning new things. 

Then again, however, in the midst of a Cold War, when there is a nuclear competition between two opposing Superpowers, wasting precious time and resources pretending to be something you’re not is usually a mistake.

Such as it was with the Soviet attempts to build an aircraft carrier for their navy. The Soviet, and modern-day Russian, expertise at sea boils down to submarines. Its surface fleet looks more like that of a great regional power rather than a superpower. That’s okay because historically Russia is a continental power. It is one of the largest nations in the world in terms of land area. Russia possesses a limited amount of warm water ports from which to permanently deploy its naval forces.

Nevertheless, in the last half of the Cold War, Moscow became obsessed with matching the Americans, system-for-system. In fact, this commitment to cloning the US military—when the Russians have their own unique culture, history, and way of warfare—is one of the reasons why the Soviet Union ultimately spent itself into oblivion. 

The Minsk was equipped with some serious power, though (as most Soviet surface warships were). These boats had four twin SS-N-12 Sandbox surface-to-surface missile launchers, two twin SA-N-3 Shtorm surface-to-air missile launchers, and two twin SA-N-4 Gecko air defenses missile launchers. It also had a variety of guns, torpedoes, and anti-submarine launchers.

Essentially, this so-called aircraft was built to fire a massive missile farm. 

Minsk was designed to carry up to 30 aircraft. But given its smaller landing deck (compared to American flat tops), the warplanes it carried had to have a vertical-takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability. In this case, the Yak-38 warplane was the primary warplane deployed from the Minsk. And as I’ve noted elsewhere, the Yak-38 was most definitely a subpar warplane. What’s more, only 12 Yak-38s could be carried aboard the Minsk. In fact, the Minsk carried more helicopters (16) than warplanes. 

Russia’s Minsk had a crew capacity between 1,200 and 1,600 sailors. The warship had a range of 13,500 nautical miles (15,535 miles) and could cruise along the surface of the ocean at 18 knots (20 miles per hour). Not bad for such a large ship carrying such a heavy load.

While the Minsk (and its sister Kiev-class warships) were definitely not the cream of the crop when it came to aircraft carriers, the fact is that they represented a real shift in Soviet strategic thinking. 

There was a significant desire on the part of late-stage Soviet leaders to not just make the Red Navy into a real maritime force, but to rival the Americans in terms of aircraft carrier operations and capabilities. The fact that the Minsk and its sister ship were hybrids between a cruiser and aircraft carrier, while inefficient for effective carrier operations, indicated that the Reds were trying make the change and that this was but a transition system.

Indeed, the Soviets would go on to develop a legitimate aircraft carrier—the Admiral Kuznetsov. But that flat top may be the single worst carrier ever designed in the history of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the Reds were clearly committed to becoming an aircraft carrier power and the Minsk and Kiev-class was the pathway forward for them. 

That it went nowhere is less an indication of perennial inability by the Russians and more because the USSR collapsed. Following the collapse, Moscow had to focus on its core capabilities—of which the carrier was not a part. 

On June 30, 1993, the Minsk was decommissioned a couple of years after the collapse of the USSR. It was later sold to China in 1995, where the Chinese turned the old Soviet warship into a theme park called “Minsk World” in Shenzhen, China. Talk about an ignominious end for a once powerful, prized warship belonging to one of the two world’s superpowers!

Bottom line: the Minsk carrier was one of a handful of attempts by the old Soviet Union to build a big, bad carrier to rival that of the Americans. Ultimately, this boat was just bad. Sure, it had some impressive features and armaments. And, in the tighter regions where Russian maritime power could actually be reliably projected—such as the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea—this boat could hold its own. 

But its record of success during the course of its service to Russia was very limited. Once it was decommissioned and sold to a foreign power, rather than being retooled and deployed as part of that foreign power’s navy, it was converted into a theme park.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons.

From The Vault

Did a Russian-Made Missile Hit an F-35?

As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that he would hire “only the best people in the world” to serve in his administration. If only. The truth, of course, is that Trump routinely delivered effusive tributes to his cabinet officials as president, only to turn on them, often within months. He called his former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson “dumb as a rock” and “totally ill prepared and ill equipped to be Secretary of State,” raising the question of why he hired him in the first place. He also branded his national security adviser, John Bolton, “washed up” and a “liar” in June 2020 after his memoir appeared. Turnover on what the Brookings Institution called his “A Team,” which did not include cabinet officials, was over 92 percent during his presidency.

Is JD Vance about to become the latest member of the Trump entourage to suffer defenestration? Reports are now circulating that Trump is having second thoughts about the thirty-nine-year-old Ohio Senator whom Trump tapped to represent the generational change in the GOP. Tim Alberta stated on X that the “Most striking thing I heard from Trump allies yesterday was the second-guessing of JD Vance—a selection, they acknowledged, that was borne of cockiness, meant to run up margins with the base in a blowout rather than persuade swing voters in a nail-biter.”

It’s become increasingly clear that Trump was unprepared for President Joe Biden’s departure from the race, which allowed Vice President Kamala Harris to win the majority of Democratic delegates on Monday. Put otherwise, Trump, who selected Vance at the recommendation of his son, Don Jr., was caught flatfooted.

Vance was supposed to rev up the GOP base for the election, but he will not help with Trump’s appeal to swing voters and suburban moms. Instead, he’s being pilloried for a number of stands, including his support for menstrual tracking by state law enforcement agencies as part of his battle against abortion rights. He has suggested that women in abusive marriages should not leave their husbands: “This is one of the great tricks that the sexual revolution pulled on the American populace. Making it easier for people to shift spouses like they change their underwear.” And, consistent with his admiration for the policies of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, he is a staunch pro-natalist, dismissing women who do not have children as “childless cat ladies.”

Needless to say, none of these sentiments bother Trump in principle. But it’s the prospect of having to go up against Harris at a moment when polls indicate that fewer women will vote for him than in 2020 that may be causing him second thoughts about the Ohioan. As Politico notes, “Women currently comprise 51 percent of the voting-age population in the U.S., and they’ve been making their vote felt since Roe v. Wade was overturned in June 2022.”

It remains unlikely, of course, that Trump would actually dump Vance. It would testify to panic in the campaign and underscore the already existing unease about Trump’s volatility and judgment. But Trump’s feelings about Vance are hardly likely to be soothed by fresh press reports about his repeated denunciations of him in 2016 for engaging in sexual assault.

Still, embarking upon a new quest for a vice president would allow Trump to go on the offensive in shaping the narrative of the race, which he’s currently lost control over. Harris, at least for now, has captured the spotlight that Trump covets. How Trump must miss running against Biden. Now that Harris has entered the race, it has actually become one.

Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of The National Interest and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He has written on both foreign and domestic issues for numerous publications, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Washington Monthly, and The Weekly Standard. He has also written for German publications such as Cicero, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Tagesspiegel. In 2008, his book They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons was published by Doubleday. It was named one of the one hundred notable books of the year by The New York Times. He is the author of America Last: The Right’s Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators.

Image: Consolidated News Photos / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The British military has completed trials for a next-generation body-worn technology aimed at enhancing frontline troops' survivability and situational awareness. The new gear includes a laser detection system to alert soldiers if they are targeted, drone thermal detection for identifying enemy threats, and ground sensors for detecting approaching foes.

-Additional technologies tested include a helmet-mounted strobe alert system, advanced digital day/night optics for weapons, a mesh network to extend radio range, and a smart hub for integrated power and data supply.

-These advancements, developed in collaboration with the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and industry partners, aim to provide UK Armed Forces with superior operational capabilities and battlefield awareness.

The British military is planning a new body-worn kit with impressive new technologies for its soldiers.

The new gear is designed to deal with the new realities of the modern battlefield and help counter drones and laser detection, among other things.

The British military just completed a set of trials to test a next-generation body-worn technology for its frontline troops. The overall goal of the technology is to increase soldiers’ survivability by enhancing their situational awareness and decisionmaking capabilities.

Some of the technologies that were tested and might become operational in the future include a laser detection system to warn a troop if an enemy has located them, a drone thermal detection system to identify enemy soldiers and weapon systems in the area, and ground sensors that can detect approaching enemies and alert allied soldiers.

“This government is clear in our commitment to advancing technology that ensures the safety and superiority of UK Armed Forces. This cutting-edge technology will bolster operational lethality and elevate battlefield awareness. I welcome the continued collaboration between government, industry, and scientists on this innovative programme,” Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry Maria Eagle said.

Other technologies include a helmed-mounted strobe alert system that identifies friend from enemy; advanced digital day/night optics for weapons; a mesh network that connects a troop’s radio with other radios in the vicinity, thus increasing range; and a smart hub that acts as the “brain” of the integrated power and data supply for all digital devices.

The testing was conducted by troops from the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Anglian Regiment and scientists from the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl).

“This technology will protect the lives of our Armed Forces by improving operational capability by giving them the advantage over the enemy,” Jon Russell, a senior principal scientist at Dstl said about the next-generation systems.

“It is great to see the Future Integrated Dismounted Soldier Vision is clearly proving how a soldier system containing multiple knowledge capabilities that are designed to combine crucial data to improve operational advantage,” Russell added.

“Our aim is to develop the most capable armed forces in the world, by merging different technologies to advance battlefield awareness,” he concluded. 

The fighting in Ukraine has shown that militaries need to evolve when facing a superior adversary. Drones, electronic warfare, and guided artillery are dominating the fighting in Ukraine. As such, soldiers need the right countermeasures and defense against these new threats.

“The trial, led by Dstl, was a showcase of future technologies and digital integration. The research has now advanced, bringing together industry to enhance capabilities with Command, Control, Communications, Computing and Information Systems,” the regimental sergeant major of the infantry trials and development unit said about the new gear.

“As the Army’s lead in dismounted close combat trials and development, we are at the forefront of improving operational advantage and look forward to supporting its future development,” he added.

The U.S. military has been working on a similar project to modernize the basic loadout of its infantrymen so that they can be more effective on the modern battlefield.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Summary and Key Points: The Ford-class aircraft carriers, the most advanced in service today, boast several key features that set them apart from previous generations. The electromagnetic-powered aircraft launch system (EMALS) provides more accurate and smoother acceleration for a wider range of aircraft.

-The carriers are powered by two upgraded A1B nuclear reactors, offering significant energy capacity for future defense systems.

-The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system allows for safer and more efficient aircraft recovery. Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) enhance the speed and safety of ordnance movement.

-Additionally, quality of life enhancements for the crew, including improved berthing compartments and better gyms, make these carriers a standout in modern naval aviation.

The Ford-class is larger and offers several features that truly make it the best aircraft carrier in service anywhere today. Here are five of the stand-out features of the Ford-class aircraft carriers:

CVN-78 was the first aircraft carrier in the world to be equipped with an electromagnetic-powered aircraft launch system (EMALS). It offers numerous advantages over the traditional steam-powered catapults of the Nimitz-class carriers, including more accurate end-speed control, with a smoother acceleration at both high and low speeds.

The system also possesses the necessary energy capacity to support an increased launch envelope and a capability of launching both current and future carrier air wing platforms – from the lightest unmanned aerial vehicles to heavy strike fighters.

The EMALS wouldn't be possible without the carriers' two upgraded A1B nuclear reactors. In addition to powering systems like the electromagnetic catapult and multifunction radar, the increased generating capacity could be employed in the future to support new ship defenses utilizing directed-energy weapons (DEWs) and other systems.

Though the actual performance is classified, it is estimated that the thermal power output of each A1B will be around 700 MWth, some 25% more than provided by the A4W on the Nimitz-class supercarriers.

EMALS can help get the aircraft in the sky faster, while the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system provides Ford-class ships with the ability to recover both current and projected carrier-based, tailhook-equipped aircraft. As a follow-on system to the Mark-7 system of the Nimitz-class, AAG can also allow for the recovery of a broader range of aircraft and, through its greater control, reduces the fatigue-impact load on the recovered platforms. The AAG architecture also includes built-in test and diagnostic technologies.

The AAG further requires less maintenance and manpower to operate than the legacy arresting system, while it can help increase the sortie rates. It also offers lower energy consumption and a decreased gross ship weight.

The Ford-class features new pathways that were designed to facilitate the movement of modern munitions. The Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) employs several advanced technologies, including electromagnetic motors and hydraulic systems, which enables fewer sailors to safely move ordnance from weapons magazines to the flight deck with unparalleled speed and agility.

The Ford-class carriers were designed to substitute technology for manpower in many activities, thereby reducing the crew size by as much as 20%. As a result of being less manpower-intensive, the carrier will have extra space for a number of quality of life enhancements that include improved berthing compartments, better gyms, and more ergonomic work spaces.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are from either Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers were designed to replace the aging Nimitz-class, boasting advanced technology and enhanced capabilities.

-However, these carriers, costing $13.3 billion each, may be ill-suited for modern warfare, particularly against anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems deployed by rivals like China. While the Ford-class carriers promise greater lethality and efficiency, their high cost and vulnerability to cheaper A2/AD systems raise concerns.

-As the Navy continues to invest in these carriers for a 50-year service life, there is growing apprehension that they may represent a strategic misstep, tailored for past conflicts rather than future threats.

The Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier came about because the U.S.Navy believed it needed a replacement for its enduring Nimitz-class carriers. There are currently 10 of the aging nuclear-powered Nimitz-class vessels. 

The Navy is stuck in a strategic rut. The maritime branch seems to think it is still 1996, and that U.S. carriers can travel unmolested and dominate any distant target the Navy desires. 

That is not the case. 

The advent of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems complicates the old American view of carriers as the ultimate – and easiest – form of power projection. 

When the Navy was seeking to build a new carrier class, they wanted to catapult carrier designs and capabilities into the next half-century. American planners envisioned a carrier so advanced no other power, notably a rising near-peer power such as China, would ever challenge the might of the U.S. Navy at sea. 

Every advanced system imaginable was thrown into the construction of this boat. Thus, the Gerald R. Ford class costs the taxpayer an astonishing $13.3 billion per ship. (That number is supposed to decrease over time.) It is the most expensive warship ever made.

The Gerald R. Ford class is the largest warship ever built, too.

Built by Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding, the USS Gerald R. Ford has two A1B nuclear reactors and is armed with Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, Rolling Airframe Missiles, and the Close-In Weapons System.

Its air wing comprises 75 aircraft, and the warship itself carries a combined crew of 4,539 souls (the ship crew, airwing, and staff). Interestingly, the new boats are designed to be operated by 700 fewer crew than the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Automation is a big deal, and the airwing on this boat is also designed to operate with 400 fewer personnel.

The first vessel was ordered by the government on Sept. 10, 2008. It was scheduled for delivery eight years later, but because of all the new technologies involved, it could not be deployed on time. 

The Navy claims that the new carrier delivers 20% more lethality than existing platforms. Designers of the CVN-21 Program argue that the warship has greater interoperability across the other U.S. services, as well as with friendly navies, enhancing lethality and cost-sharing on deployments.

The advanced technologies skyrocketed the cost, and these systems also complicated the development and deployment of the boats. Expensive systems meant to make the carrier more lethal in combat and more effective when at sea have not operated as advertised. This is one reason why the USS Gerald R. Ford, the first warship of the class, was significantly delayed in its planned deployment.

Even if the technology onboard the great warship worked exactly as it was supposed to on day one, the cost of the warship itself is a liability. That’s because the A2/AD systems that China has deployed throughout the South China Sea and along its coastline are infinitely cheaper than what the carriers cost. 

What’s more, as a sailor who has spent his career on aircraft carriers remarked to me: No matter how awesome the new carrier class may be, no ship can repel every attack. 

In other words, no matter its own lethality, if this $13.3 billion monstrosity gets too close to those A2/AD systems, it will be destroyed or severely damaged. 

The Navy knew this going into the design and production of the Gerald R. Ford.

Yet, like trying to turn a speeding aircraft carrier on a dime, trying to get the acquisitions office for the Navy to make adjustments to their carefully laid plans was nearly impossible. The bureaucracy didn’t even try. 

The Navy intends for the Gerald R. Ford class to have a 50-year service life. So, as the Nimitz class is decommissioned over the next decade, the Navy may have just invested in a giant boondoggle that is a large, easy target for China’s A2/AD systems. 

This carrier was designed to fight yesterday's wars with tomorrow’s technologies. 

It does not represent the quantum leap that its proponents argue, although it does come with a price tag worthy of the idea. It is the equivalent of a sunk cost, both figuratively and metaphorically, as it could be destroyed by systems that are far less advanced and cheaper.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has reportedly lost around 330 aircraft as of June, with the Su-34 Fullback being particularly affected. This Soviet-era fighter, derived from the Su-27 Flanker, officially entered service in 2014 and has been essential for Russia's air operations.

-However, Ukraine's use of advanced Western-developed weapons, including the U.S.-supplied Patriot air defense missile system, has significantly impacted the Fullback's effectiveness. Ukrainian claims of destroying nine Russian jets in May alone highlight the vulnerability of the Su-34.

-Videos circulating online support these claims, showing the destruction of Russian fighters. As the war continues, the depletion of Russia's Su-34 stockpile is expected to worsen, challenging Moscow's air capabilities.

Since invading Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has reportedly lost some 330 aircraft as of June. Moscow’s fighter airframes have proven vulnerable to Ukraine’s stockpile of advanced Western-developed weapons. 

Ukrainian officials claimed that nine Russian jets were destroyed in May alone. While these numbers cannot be independently verified, the U.S.-delivered Patriot air defense missile system has certainly aided Kyiv’s ability to take down Moscow’s top-tier fighters, including the Su-34. Nicknamed the “Fullback” by NATO, this all-weather supersonic fighter has been an essential asset for Russia for many years.

The Soviet-era Su-34 fighter derived from the Su-27 Flanker during the Cold War. While the Su-34 took its maiden flight before the collapse of the USSR, evolving requirements imposed by the Russian Aerospace Forces pushed back the fighter’s official introduction to service until 2014. 

The Fullback’s several unique characteristics include a platypus nose and side-by-side cockpit. Aside from these external characteristics, the jet retains its predecessor’s basic layout, engine, construction, and wing structure. The jet is powered by a pair of Saturn AL-31FM1 engines, which give it a top speed of Mach 1.8 and a service ceiling of around 56,000 feet.  

The Fullback can lug more than 17,000 pounds of weapons across a dozen hardpoints positioned underwing and beneath the fuselage. The jet can also carry a wide range of precision-guided and unguided bombs and rockets, including KAB-500 laser-guided bombs. As detailed by Airforce Technology, the jet can also carry Vympel R-27, Vympel R-73, and NPO-R-77 missiles used primarily for defense against adversarial aircraft if detected by the rear-facing radar.

Two distinct variants of the Fullback have been produced, both of which Russia exports to foreign client states. The Su-34FN is the maritime strike fighter version of the Fullback, equipped with anti-submarine warfare systems, a Sea Snake radar, a radio sonobuoy system, and other unique attributes. Since this model is designed to elevate the fighter’s naval warfare capabilities, it is highly sought out across the globe.

The Kremlin may claim that its Su-34 fighter is essentially invulnerable, but the platform’s performance in Ukraine suggests otherwise. As explained by Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat, "Our experience suggests that after Russian planes are downed and destroyed, the occupiers do not dare come closer – this is the case across the northern, southern, and eastern fronts. The closer the aircraft armed with guided bombs approach, the farther those bombs can reach into our defenses." 

Countless videos have circulated in recent months purporting to show the destruction of Russian fighters, including Fullbacks. As the war rages on with no end in sight, Moscow’s Su-34 stockpile will surely dwindle further.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Su-34 fighter bomber has become a crucial asset in the Ukraine War, frequently recorded in combat over contested skies. Despite sustaining significant losses, including 26 Su-34s since the war began as of early this year, the aircraft remains the backbone of Russia’s Air Force.

-While the attritional nature of the war means that both sides are suffering heavy losses, Russia’s larger industrial and manpower resources allow it to endure longer than Ukraine. However, the loss of Su-34s, compounded by production challenges, indicates that Russia is struggling to replenish its fleet quickly.

-This ongoing attrition raises questions about the long-term sustainability of Russia's air operations in the conflict.

The Su-34 has become what many observers describe as the “backbone” of Russia’s Air Force in the Ukraine War. Indeed, it is a warbird that is most commonly recorded in combat in the contested skies of Ukraine – and it is a plane that has sustained an astonishing number of losses. 

The question is: What does that data point mean for the overall war effort? 

It’s hard to tell, given the amount of lying from both sides in this interminable, bloody war. 

One thing is clear, though, both sides have suffered an extraordinary amount of losses in terms of personnel and equipment. And there doesn’t appear to be any end in sight of the suffering.

 At least, not anytime in the next few months. 

Many cannot help but to ponder just when these staggering losses will catch up to either side sooner. Even with the Su-34 being decimated by Ukrainian air defenses, the attritional nature of the Ukraine War means that, so long as the combatants can sustain these high losses for a protracted period of time, the losses will not be catastrophic.

Since it is the Russians sustaining these losses, and their industrial base—as well as the country’s manpower and commodities bases—is far greater than that of Ukraine, the loss of the Su-34s in combat will not lead to defeat. 

Writing at Bulgarian Military, Bokyo Nikolov, assessed the delivery of four new Su-34s since January of this year. According to Nikolov, “the production of Su-34s seems to be falling short, with significant loss reports since early 2024. 

Conflicting accounts suggest that on June 14, at least five Su-34 fighter bombers were lost during a Ukrainian drone attack on Morozovsk airport in Russia.” Nikolov continued in his analysis by concluding that, “it’s evident that Russia struggles to compensate for its losses. With five Su-34s lost after June 14 and only four new Su-34s delivered since January, the challenge is clear.”

Just so we’re all on the same page, I find it necessary to remind readers that the Russian Federation still holds the territories in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea – positions that have been hardened over the years – that they held before the war. 

What’s more, it appears the Russian offensive is ramping up against a Ukrainian Army that is increasingly hollow and in need of constant replenishment in terms of money, equipment, and recruits . The Russians, meanwhile, continue to churn out tanks and aircraft like sausages from their factories in the Russian Far East.

It's true that the Ukrainians are crafty fighters. They have utilized NATO-provided air defense systems at the front of their war against Russia in creative and effective ways. That’s why, since February 2022, it is believed that Russia has lost twenty-six Su-34s. (These numbers were collected until February of this year). 

As I have reported in these pages, though, the Russians are adapting to innovative Ukrainian tactics as well. One such adaptation is to deploy longer-range glide bombs with higher yields.

The piece above references the fact that Su-34s are now being loaded with FAB-500M62 homing bombs under their wings. Further, “there has been a noticeable rise in the deployment of cruise bombs” against Ukrainian targets by Russian air assets. Russia has therefore reduced the vulnerability of their warplanes to the Ukrainians. 

In other words, all this fixation by Western analysts on the fact that Russia is producing one less Su-34 compared to the number of Su-34s that were lost over the last six months in Ukraine is ridiculous. At best, it shows how utterly incompetent most analyses of the war from the Western perspective have been. At worst, many Western writers are spreading outright propaganda designed to further distract easily distracted audiences from the fact that the war is going poorly.

A war of attrition is something that most Americans cannot remember. The last serious attritional war the U.S. fought was against Vietnam, and it lost. The Russians, on the other hand, traditionally fight wars of attrition. Admittedly, the Ukraine War was not intended to be a war of attrition. The Putinist regime had a wildly different idea of how the war would be fought and won. They envisaged a quick blitz into Ukraine that would last a few weeks and end with a mighty victory parade through the abandoned streets of a broken and defeated Kyiv. 

The war lasted longer and consumed more resources than Putin intended. But now that they’re in it, the Russians are not going to just quit. They will grind it out and wear their opponent down. Attrition is how the Russians liberated themselves from the Mongols. It’s how they stopped Napoleon. And how the Russians defeated Hitler. 

Regardless of how many Su-34s they lose, the Russians are still winning. 

America should be encouraging their Ukrainian allies to make a deal while they still can with Moscow, not fixating on any single datapoint, such as the fact that Russia has lost a large number of Su-34s. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on aircraft carriers, despite their high costs and growing vulnerability to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, has raised strategic concerns. The $13 billion Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, designed for long-range power projection, face new threats from advanced missile systems that can locate and target them from over 1,000 kilometers away.

-Suggestions to use carriers as tactical distractions draw comparisons to historical naval battles but overlook the potential for significant losses and the current fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base.

-Instead of focusing on carriers, the Navy should prioritize developing hypersonic weapons, unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, and directed-energy weapons to counter the A2/AD threat. This shift is essential to maintain naval superiority and effectively respond to modern strategic challenges.

Outside of nuclear weapons, America’s aircraft carriers are probably the country’s biggest long-term strategic investment. The newest Gerald R. Ford-class carriers cost an astonishing $13 billion per unit, although the Navy insists that costs decrease with each new unit they build. 

Since the Second World War, when aircraft carriers proved their mettle in the Pacific Theater, Washington has made the flattop its primary platform for long-range projection of naval power.

But the world has moved on. 

Specific technologies like the anti-ship ballistic missile pair with comprehensive approaches like China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to negate many of the advantages the aircraft carrier once bestowed. The sheer cost of these platforms means that losing even one in combat – or having one significantly damaged – could punch a hole in the United States’ strategic posture, with horrific cascading effects throughout the rest of the force.

The Navy, of course, understands the changing reality it now faces. 

Yet it has done little to address the A2/AD threat. Instead, Washington continues flooding hard-earned U.S. tax dollars into building more expensive flattops whose utility is in question under present strategic conditions. If the aircraft carrier cannot get within range of a contested battlespace during a crisis, then it cannot launch its airwing. If it cannot launch its airwing, its usefulness as a power projection platform is erased. 

What’s more, these large systems are increasingly easy for rival A2/AD systems to locate, track, and target with extremely long-range weapons that are devastatingly precise.
The threat of A2/AD attacks could keep an American carrier force over the horizon of a contested battlespace. Some of these systems have a range over 1,000 kilometers. 

Trevor Phillips-Levine and Andrew Tenbusch, writing in Maritime Executive, suggest using America’s aircraft carriers as a ruse in any tactical situation. Drawing inspiration from the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the two authors argue the United States should deploy their carriers as a means of distracting a potential rival in a naval battle long enough for non-carrier units to be used more effectively in combat by the Americans. It’s an interesting suggestion.

The Japanese had correctly assumed that American intelligence analysts would detect the mass movement of Japanese warships and fixate on the presence of aircraft carriers. Japanese strategists understood that the Americans placed a high value on their own carriers, and they correctly postulated that the Americans would assume the Japanese similarly valued theirs. 

Japan got one over on the Americans. 

Of course, what the authors fail to mention is that while the Japanese diversion at the Battle of Leyte Gulf was successful in tricking the bulk of the American fleet, it ultimately ended in failure. Not only did the Americans still win the battle, they went on to win the whole war not long after that incident. 

One of the biggest issues facing Japan by the time this specific battle occurred was that the Imperial Japanese Navy, like the rest of the Japanese military, no longer had a healthy industrial base supporting their efforts. The forces deployed against the Americans were basically all that was left of the Japanese military.

Once those Japanese units were stymied, that was it for Tokyo. 

The United States today, while much larger than Japan was, is in a similar predicament. Its shipyards are in shambles. The U.S. Navy is the smallest it has ever been. The military is saddled with massive, complex, and costly systems. Losing one in combat would deal a crippling blow to American morale and to its overall strategic posture. 

The greater defense industrial base is lying prostrate, too, after years of being gutted by short-sighted financial interests, inconclusive Mideast wars, and a wasteful commitment to the lost Ukrainian cause. 

If the United States and China find themselves at war, the Americans will be at a serious disadvantage. 

Further, U.S. carriers are far too costly to risk in a ruse. Even if the maneuver were successful, the U.S. lacks requisite platforms to serve as alternative power projection units in a contested environment. A2/AD is a threat to all surface combatants, and the U.S. fleet is woefully lacking in submarines. 

Sly moves and strategic feints, while always a necessity in combat, will not save the U.S. from its overcommitment to aircraft carriers. Instead, the Americans must develop counter-A2/AD systems and strategies. Once an A2/AD network is removed as a threat, more conventional moves by the Americans, such as deploying aircraft carriers, can be attempted. 

Instead of ruses, the Navy needs to focus on building hypersonic weapons, swarms of unmanned underwater vehicles, more submarines, and directed-energy weapons, for starters. Other services must back up the Navy in these endeavors. 

The overcommitment to expensive, massive flattops has created a severe vulnerability the likes of which have not been since the Royal Navy’s HMS Hood was sunk within the first five minutes of its major engagement with Hitler’s navy. 

Breaking the A2/AD web that China has created throughout the Indo-Pacific is the first, and only, priority of the U.S. Navy. Its carriers are useless until A2/AD can be overcome.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

James Graham Wilson. America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze & National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan (Ithaca, Cornell University Press) 336 pp., $32.95.

Ten years ago, James Graham Wilson, a historian at the U.S. State Department, wrote The Triumph of Improvisation, an insightful account of Reagan, Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War. Mr. Wilson’s America’s Cold Warrior, a biography of Paul Nitze, now reaches back to the Cold War’s origins and the long years of nuclear negotiations that followed. Wilson portrays Nitze, who died in 2004 at age ninety-seven, as the forerunner of the post-World War II generations of American national security professionals.

Nitze may be best known for guiding the preparation in 1950 of NSC-68, allegedly America’s strategic plan for prevailing in the Cold War. By the time the U.S. government declassified NSC-68 in 1975, the seventy-page document had achieved near-mythical status. As Wilson explains, later policy planners—including Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, a protege of Nitze—looked to NSC-68 as a model for rallying Americans to wage long struggles against formidable foes. No doubt today, Washington teems with aspirants who dream of drafting a new NSC-68 strategy to overcome China.

Nitze’s NSC-68 reflected the fearful era of the early Cold War, including the hot Korean conflict, threats to Berlin and Europe, and the new nuclear rivalry. Nitze had visited Hiroshima in 1945 and led surveys of strategic bombing. All his life, he worried about a nuclear showdown. His consistent solution was for the United States to secure a “preponderance of power,” both nuclear and conventional.

Nitze recognized, however, that policy plans had to be translated into actions, which he wanted to direct. Wilson recounts Nitze’s extraordinary experience on the front lines, often amid the risk of escalation to nuclear war: the Berlin and Cuban crises, the early nuclear negotiations, Vietnam, the Nixon- Kissinger treaties to limit strategic arms, and up to Reagan’s elimination of intermediate-range missiles, START negotiations, and strategic missile defense. Given all that experience, Colin Powell later reflected that working with Nitze “was like having Moses at the table.”

Moreover, Nitze was a sharp critic when out of power, so his biography targets the nuclear and arms control policies of Presidents Eisenhower, Carter, and George H.W. Bush, as well. By explaining Nitze’s views over fifty years, Wilson succinctly summarizes the nuclear debates of the Cold War.

The book also treats Nitze as a harbinger of a new technocratic cadre: the national security professional. Indeed, Nitze helped found and fund a new graduate school in Washington to train his successors, the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), now part of Johns Hopkins University. 

Nitze’s experience suggests some cautions for future security pros. He not only demonstrated his political independence by switching parties and working across administrations but also seemed dismissive of public attitudes, political constraints, and Congress. 

Even though Nitze began as a prodigy on Wall Street in the 1930s and later contributed to the Marshall Plan, his definition of strategic power narrowed to nuclear and conventional forces. He dismissed Eisenhower‘s balancing of economic prospects with burdens of defense spending and overlooked the USSR‘s economic weaknesses until the very end.

Nitze also failed to recognize the limits of his intellectual tenacity. According to one of his bosses, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Nitze’s “peevishness“ and “unveiled contempt” for others doomed his appointment to the topmost rank. If Nitze did not receive deference, he could be vengeful.

Wilson’s biography acknowledges that Nitze’s service reflected his wealth, privilege, and formative early experience. After traveling in Europe as a boy in the summer of 1914, Nitze’s later outlook was always shaded by a sense that unexpected tragedy loomed. As a nuclear strategist, Nitze struggled to assure superior strength for the United States while maintaining stability and avoiding Armageddon. This conflict was one of the “tensions between opposites“ that fascinated him.

The author observes that today’s national security professionals still contend, as Nitze did, with issues of deterrence, nuclear threats, and confrontations among powers amidst newer dangers. In Nitze’s last years, he focused on the existential risks of climate change. Wilson has ably shown (in less than 300 pages) how State Department historians can extend their remit from publishing documentary records to enlivening the past—and educating those who seek to navigate the future.

Robert Zoellick served in national security and international economic posts during four U.S. administrations and is the author of America in the World.

Image: Rob Bogaerts / Anefo, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's bomber fleet, once over 400 strong, has dwindled to just 157 airframes, many of which are outdated B-52s. This reduction poses a significant risk as tensions with China, which is developing the advanced H-20 stealth bomber, continue to rise. To maintain air superiority and deterrence, the Air Force is banking on the B-21 Raider, a next-generation stealth bomber born from the Long Range Strike Bomber program.

-However, with only 100 units planned for the next decade, concerns about insufficient production loom. The Raider, featuring a shorter wingspan for enhanced stealth and modular designs for future upgrades, is crucial for replacing the aging B-2 Spirit and ensuring the U.S. stays ahead in aerial warfare capabilities.

-Bottomline: Abandoning the B-21 program would severely compromise national security and America's ability to counter modern threats.

The U.S. Air Force’s bomber fleet is much diminished. Fleet size has fallen to 157 bombers, and most of these aircraft are outdated B-52s. Until the early 1990s, the Air Force’s bomber fleet held more than 400 airframes. The downturn in numbers will be a problem if a full-blown war emerges in the near future. 

While the service is trying to add to its ranks by developing its latest stealth bomber program, only 100 B-21 Raiders are expected to reach the skies over the next decade. Some military experts believe such small production numbers may not match China’s own future bomber program, the Xi’an H-20 subsonic stealth bomber.

Without adequate bomber numbers, the Air Force’s air superiority over China comes under question. And in addition to their role in conventional operations, these airframes are a great deterrent to war. 

But what would make matters worse is nixing the Raider program altogether. If the Air Force does not adequately upgrade its aging bomber fleet, the service will be left unable to compete with its modernizing Chinese aerial counterparts.

The U.S. Air Force currently flies three strategic bombers: the B-52 Stratofortress, the B-1B Lancer, and the B-2 Spirit. All three airframes remain viable, and the Spirit possesses stealth capabilities, but the service must deliver on its next-generation bomber program in order to keep up with its peers. 

The Raider was born out of the service’s Long Range Strike Bomber program in 2011.The Air Force is so committed to the Raider concept now that it seems to be purchasing the platform upfront, before the bomber has been fully vetted. This is a risk. Indeed, the “Fly Before You Buy” concept was perhaps best explained by Senator David Pryor back in the 1990s on the Senate floor: “Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept. It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected…Operational testing is of little or no use if it is conducted after the weapon system has been purchased.”

Specs and capabilities surrounding the new Raider remain highly classified, but some information and images have been shared. The upcoming platform’s wingspan is reportedly at least 15% shorter than its predecessors. This will make the Raider more challenging for enemy radar to detect – a key capability considering China’s modernizing defensive systems. Like the F-35 Lightning II fighter platform, the B-21 will also incorporate modular designs that will facilitate future upgrades as new technologies emerge.

The U.S. must see the Raider program through. The B-2 Spirit is America’s sole operational stealth bomber, and its generation-old stealth technology will probably fall well short of the Chinese H-20’s eventual capabilities. Since the U.S. and its allies rely on the Air Force’s stealth bombers for deterrence, it would be a huge blow to national security if the Raider does not make it to the production line in time to properly replace the Spirit.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.