Ideas on Europe Blog

Center – Security

Derrida emphasized that the main ‘structurality of structure’ is shadowed by giving it a perfect center, and it has been deemed mandatory that everything work along that center. The center enables a closed totality, and it will be unimaginable if anyone brings out a notion of a structure without a center.

A center is essentially always defined in system to authoritatively forbid any play of meaning, Derrida exclaimed. The concept of structure with a center has been enunciated to keep everything flowing in one certain way. The purpose of implying certainty by giving a center is to nullify the probability of problems or different ideas and practices other than those certified. Similarly a presence of a center eradicates anxiety and the main goal of West has always been to find a ‘center’, which is dubbed the most secure and imperceptible place.

Terry Eagleton elaborated this notion arguing that western metaphysics have always clung to a word, a supposed truth etc. for security and basis for their learning. Notions like the “God, the idea, the world spirit, the self,” accomplish the very task of attaining a center. Derrida highlighted that there have been an innate desire to stick to some ideals or center and this is the reason western metaphysics have created a system of standards.

Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger – attempts of decentering

Derrida proclaimed that “the center is not the center,” in the Structure, Sign and Play he announced that a rupture has occurred in the conceptual framework of western metaphysics. The assumed center is not there.  He then furthered it by mentioning the antecedents to such rupture, which are Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger.

Nietzsche questioned the long standing precedence of truth and being and substituted it with notions of play and interpretation. Freud critiqued the ascendancy of mind which had been hailed all autonomous in pre-Freudian times. And lastly but importantly Heidegger demanded dismantling of metaphysics and to quit ‘determination of Being as presence.’ Derrida emphasized that these attempts to subvert the center nevertheless contend to the same jargon of metaphysics. Although, confirming to the jargon of metaphysics, Derrida asserted that there has been a displacement of center. The center does not fulfill its duty that is to magnetize everything towards it; instead it denotes to other signs and those signs lead to other signs, the attainment of meaning becomes a vicious circle.

The Rupture in Western Metaphysics

Peter Barry explicated such rupture or decentering more clearly. He reminded us that before Nietzsche and Freud etc. there had been an order of things. Man was epicenter of everything, there were codes of how to dress, class of architecture, a pattern of intellectual paradigmatic growth. But certain events changed it. Derrida call them rupture while Peter Barry more specifically mentioned those ruptures. World War I obliterated any development that was going on, holocaust dismantled Europe as the center of human cooperation and respect. Even the empirical findings on relativity changed our thinking about time and space, as they are no longer considered fixed centers. The end result is a world with no center and authority.

Decentering Europe

Husserl and Heidegger evaluated Europe philosophically on the notions of identity of Europe, “spiritual unity of Europe,” and European Spirit. Derrida has also worked on those two philosophers’ footsteps and similar to them did not consider Europe as merely a geographical division on world. Ultimately, he took some of Husserl and Heidegger’s ideas, postulated some and created grounds to make news for decentered Europe.

For Husserl, Europe is a transcendental philosophical idea born in seventh century Greece. Derrida questioned such notions, in such a manner that he tried to subvert Husserl’s own argument, asking if Europe is a pure idea then place of this idea could easily be replaced with Asia or Africa.  And Husserl should not have a problem but still it is not possible. The phenomenological idealism does not specify a date and place to the distinctive character of cognition of European race. But despite that, Husserl saw idea of Europe as an ephemeral idea actually conceived in the mind of philosophers of Greece.

Derrida debated this single source of Europe and emphasized that knowledge coming down to us about truth and being is not fundamentally Greek. Because Europe is fundamentally influenced by the interconnecting varied integration of other traditions, notions and languages like Arabic, Jewish, Christian, Roman and Germanic which have their own integral position and are not some tertiary additions. Derrida insisted that this is all because Europe has not unfurled only Greek deal but is equally affected by all factors passing through Europe, and these factors should be taken stock of.

In ascertaining the identity of Europe, Derrida established a prerequisite to look at what was moved through and interpreted and translated by Europeans from Arabic of before Quran times and after Quran and also from Rome. As well as when Husserl debarred Indians, Gypsies and Eskimos from his European humanity; Derrida saw this concept as hampering any prospect of openness to other, to openness to anything other than European.

Not only Derrida drew a European identity bisected by different origins, he created doubt about the assumption that philosophy has Greek basis. He also tallied with the idea that Greek thought might be substituted with Chinese or even African thought. He added that although not new, the importance of such question remains intact, that is philosophy being only European and exactly Greek.

By supplicating the idea of Chinese or African philosophy instead of European, Derrida was trying to show the ambiguity inherent in it and henceforth in idea of Europe. If we take western philosophy founding basis of Europe we should take in stock that the Greek philosopher considering themselves European is highly debatable.

Derrida, in The Other Heading, queried about defining boundaries of Europe and ultimately giving it a center. He said that this is not possible because there are no fixed borders of Europe either spiritually, politically or geographically. Its geographic borders get blurred everywhere be it to the east or west, north or south. Spiritually if we take it as the hybrid of European Christianity, then is it catholic, protestant or orthodox? This is as confusing as the concept that Europe’s unity is due to its philosophy or reason, its Jewish linkages or Greek heritage. Moreover, if we take Jerusalem as epicenter, how can we rip apart Islamic memories associated with Jerusalem or forget the fact that Jerusalem is itself dispersed in Athens, Rome, Moscow and even Paris.

 

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Greenhouse gas monitoring – and increasingly climate policy monitoring, meaning the continuous tracking of policies with indicators – has existed since the early 1990s – and is thus a long-standing practice. For a long time, most people thought it to be a very technical exercise of low politics, but our new work demonstrates that this is no longer the case.

The EU’s 2050 ‘net zero’ greenhouse gas emissions target means that substantial emissions reductions will have to happen in every policy sector, be it energy, agriculture or transport. We argue in a new open access paper in the Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning that the EU must continue to enhance its capacity for policy monitoring to be able to verify continuous progress in each sector.

Especially in the wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement, policy monitoring and review has become the core way in which the international community seeks to reach climate targets. Building on this approach, there are now new efforts to supplement the reporting on individual climate policies through the EU’s Monitoring Mechanism with ‘harder’ elements.

‘Harder’ elements may be understood as efforts to enhance the policy steering capacity of ‘softer’ policy monitoring. In our paper, we demonstrate that recent legislative revisions of the monitoring mechanism have introduced several of these ‘harder’ elements. These include making the monitoring more specific (by, for example requiring the EU Member States to report on their low-carbon development strategies and on climate adaptation), enhancing the publicity of monitoring data and thus its visibility, and linking the monitoring more closely with effort sharing mechanisms and the emerging Energy Union. See Table 1.

These harder elements emerged from an entrepreneurial Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Environment Agency, all of which preferred enhanced climate policy monitoring. Member State support for these efforts proved more ambivalent, leading to some compromises in for example not making all aspects of climate policy monitoring legally binding.

The underlying idea is that transparency, coupled with pressure from national peers and potentially the public (the hardening elements), will push the Member States onto a policy path that is consistent with net zero emissions by 2050. Furthermore, focusing on policy monitoring rather than on prescribing particular policies may also allow for greater flexibility in experimenting with different solutions, and help identify the most effective approaches.

It appears that the European Green Deal, as well as the proposed European Climate Law also build on the presence of monitoring provisions. However, the ultimate effects of seeking to enhance policy effectiveness with monitoring remain uncertain, because in spite of some analysis of policy monitoring efforts – to which our work contributes – researchers are only just beginning to assess the capacity of policy monitoring in delivering policy outcomes that contribute to a stable climate.

References:

Schoenefeld, J.J. & Jordan, A. (2020). Towards Harder Soft Governance? Monitoring Climate Policy in the EU. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2020.1792861 [OPEN ACCESS]

Schoenefeld, J. J., Schulze, K., Hildén, M., & Jordan, A. J. (2019). Policy Monitoring in the EU: The Impact of Institutions, Implementation, and Quality. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 60(4), 719-741. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-019-00209-2 [OPEN ACCESS]

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The coronavirus measures implemented by the EU and member states have had differentiating effects, which ultimately may lead to further fragmentation of the European political system, argues EU3D researcher Filippa Chatzistavrou.

The banner ‘Recovery Plan for Europe’ on the front of the Berlaymont building (Photo: European Commission)

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a global health and economic crisis. According to the World Bank, it has caused the worst economic recession with the highest drop in GDP since 1871. Besides the common features of the pandemic and the striking similarities in the tools chosen by EU member states for tackling the coronavirus, new patterns of differentiation are emerging. These differentiating effects are associated with member states’ systemic resilience and structural ability to tackle the health crisis and its socio-economic effects; and with member states’ capacity to benefit from EU measures to mitigate the social and economic impact of COVID-19.

Differing capacities and resources

The first trend of (internal) territorial differentiation refers to the COVID-19 measures taken by individual countries in relation to their differing capacities and resources. The socio-economic impact on economies and societies varies across European countries depending on the harshness and extent of government containment measures. In the old West, countries with strong public finances and solid health care systems, (more or less) sufficient capacity for vital medical supplies and equipment, and good level of public health emergency preparedness, had to choose between two alternatives. Either adopt strict emergency lock-down measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 while offering generous economic compensations, thus succeeding in keeping the number of deaths down (Denmark, Finland), or adopt milder lock-down measures while experiencing low or quite low death rates (Germany, Austria, Netherlands). Countries with vulnerable or weak public finances and health care systems, low capacity for vital medical supplies and equipment and low level of public health emergency preparedness, due at least partly to austerity policies, were forced to impose severe quarantine measures (Italy, Greece, France, Spain) while experiencing (except Greece) high death rates.

The socio-economic impact on economies and societies varies across European countries depending on the harshness and extent of government containment measures.

While economic compensatory measures varies from one country to another, their distributive effects risk accentuating existing disparities within Southern European countries. As a result, these countries now face a far worse economic downturn and deep social changes. Unless this is resolved, the lock-down generation will be condemned to youth unemployment and salary dumping. The dramatic increase of temporary, part-time or short-term jobs could further worsen working conditions, especially in countries whose economies depends on a product or resource for economic growth (mono-cultural economies) – and/or their industrial development depends on other EU and non-EU countries. In Southern Europe, deindustrialisation processes has made some countries highly dependent on their tourism sector, which has been heavily affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.

Differing effects of EU measures

The second trend of differentiating effects is associated with the (temporary) derogations from monetary, fiscal policy and single market rules initiated by the EU (i.e. the lifting of the 33% threshold for the purchase of government bonds, the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact terms, and the relaxation of cohesion programmes and state aid rules). The EU initiated these measures in order to mitigate the economic impacts of the COVID-19 measures and to provide flexibility to member states. The EU’s most competitive and dynamic economies benefited to a much greater extent from these measures than the more vulnerable and/or (heavily) indebted economies. Germany granted four times as many state aids as France and even more compared with other EU member states. Corporate bailouts are being discussed without calling into question the problems of corporate governance (e.g. unfair ‘competition’ practices, paying dividends during the pandemic crisis as well as dividend policy in general, casino economy etc.). At EU level, the European Central Bank (ECB) has asked banks not to pay dividends. At national level, however, whether to freeze the payment of dividends has largely been left up to the discretion of companies. Following the EU framework for the screening of foreign direct investments that officially entered into force on April 2019, protectionist government measures are also high on the post-COVID agenda in many EU member states. France announced a public investment program of 1.2 billion euros in order to prevent high-tech start-ups acquisition by US and Chinese companies. Τhere is now increased pressure to develop policies of ‘préférence nationale’ in order to maintain employment in the national territory. Furthermore, 18 EU countries are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the pandemic crisis has reinforced Serbia’s ties with China. Belgrade could become a key country in China’s regional plans.

Possible fragmentation of the European political system

Corona differentiation reveals how the politics of ‘clubs’ – the proliferation of competitive coalitions of EU member states becoming more diverse in their preferences – may further nurture forms of politico-economic dominance as well as cultivate oppressive forms of corporate power-lobbies and consequently further accelerate the fragmentation of the political order at the EU level. In the post-COVID-19 age, we have already witnessed examples of the fragmentation of the European system of rule. Faced with a serious post-corona labour market crisis, some member states will be able to provide social safety net measures against labour market dislocation and social dumping, while others, like Southern countries struggling with indebtedness, will not. The EU made efforts to mobilise public funds through complementary financial instruments in order to protect employment during the COVID-19 period, such as European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII), the SURE instrument, while the European Investment Bank provided a financing package for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

A new dividing line is emerging between the countries that state their intent to boost their national ‘industrial sovereignty’, according to Macron’s terms, through public investment, and the countries that will continue to pursue radical restrictive fiscal policies.

However, there is a risk of misappropriation of these funds by some member states, thus increasing their margins of administrative and political discretion. The implementation of the SURE instrument in Greece has raised a lot of concern about the risk of misusing these loans in order to cut wages in the private sector and/or to proceed in contractual hiring in the public sector with lower wages. Therefore, a new dividing line is emerging between the countries that state their intent to boost their national ‘industrial sovereignty’, according to Macron’s terms, through public investment, and the countries that will continue to pursue radical restrictive fiscal policies through non-redistributive forms of taxation and privatisations.

Recent debates on the COVID-19 rescue deal remind us of the extent of political-economic distortions between EU member states. Northern countries that benefited the most from the single market are strongly opposed to debt mutualisation (i.e. the equal share of costs and profits among EU member states). The example of the Netherlands as a free rider is notable since the country can promise capital and higher profits by initiating fiscal dumping practices while showing aversion for effective European tax instruments.

The proposal for the next generation EU recovery plan, despite its ‘all EU member states inclusive’ nature, may also produce asymmetric effects in the member states, as was the case with EU policy responses to the previous economic and financial crisis, thus creating new dependencies and new channels of intrusion. The bail out policies of the single market come in various forms, i.e. medium-term softening of fiscal rules as well as temporary grants and loans through joint borrowing without debt mutualisation. This rescue scheme could enable non-Eurozone member states to benefit from the rate and credibility of the euro. But Eurozone member states, especially those who are faced with an emergency and need to inject resources, will have to accept top-down allocation of financial aid based on conditionality and top-down structural reforms.

A new constitutional moment?

This could be a new ‘constitutional moment’, which is about deciding who gets funding, and which enterprises are going to fall. This is the reason why, among other agenda items, current discussions focus on the crucial question of surveillance. In order to channel money to where the needs are, regulatory surveillance could be established ex ante so that funds will be allocated after national reform programmes are approved at the EU level. In such a case, other member states via the European Council or the European Parliament could have a right of veto and suspend the funding if a reform programme is considered not to have been properly implemented at the national level. In such a context, the issue of the role of the European Parliament and of national parliaments is central, as, from a surveillance perspective, there is an increased risk of diversion from the parliamentary function. Instead of exercising oversight over other European institutions/national governments and looking into violations of EU/national law, parliamentary actors risk becoming evaluators of the progress of structural reforms, thus being co-opted to support the European Council and Commission rather than holding them accountable.

If the modus operandi of the EU continues to be based on the politics of ‘clubs’, differentiation policies will reinforce the idea of multiple Europe(s) perpetuating the role of supranational institutions as (regulatory) facilitators of the European integration process.

The post The differentiating effects of COVID-19 in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

An opinion by Jolyon Gumbrell

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have so far been successful in getting their message across, when it comes to fighting Covid-19. Each of the three devolved nations of the United Kingdom has its own spokesperson to update the public on measures that need to be followed to stop the spread of the virus, while England the fourth nation of the United Kingdom is left to be told what to do by a spokesperson from the UK Government. This situation illustrates the problem that devolution was never completed by Tony Blair’s government between 1997 and 2007, meaning England was deprived of its own dedicated assembly or parliament and government separate from Westminster and Whitehall.

If the constitutional situation in the United Kingdom is to be tidied up, then the Westminster Parliament in London should become the federal parliament for the whole of the United Kingdom and nothing else, while England should be allowed and required to form its own parliament preferably outside of London in a geographically central city such as Birmingham. Likewise the UK Government would become the federal government of the United Kingdom, while England like the other nations of the Union would have its own government formed by members of its own dedicated parliament. This would alleviate the inbalance and democratic deficit of the English not having their own parliament.

A future historian may one day write that if the English had been allowed their own parliament within the United Kingdom, then Brexit would not have happened. Although such an argument would not explain Welsh support for leaving the European Union in the referendum of 2016, it would help explain the direction English nationalism had taken at the time of the EU referendum.

Fintan O’Toole, the author of ‘Heroic Failure Brexit and the politics of pain’ used the term “sublimation of Englishness into Britishness” to explain how at one time the English dominated the other nations of the British Isles, by the imposition of an English cultural identity on all parts of the Union. This may explain why politicians behind devolution in the late 1990s never planned for England to be devolved from the United Kingdom unlike the other three nations, because England had always been the most powerful nation of the Union. However without English devolution the situation has reversed itself, turning England into a zone more subordinate to Westminster and Whitehall than the other three nations of the United Kingdom. At the time of the referendum many people in England already felt disenfranchised, and this anger was easily directed against the European Union instead of the failed constitutional framework of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom left the European Union on 31st January 2020, but the public have been distracted away from Brexit by the consequences of Covid-19. However, once the transition period ends on 31st December 2020 the United Kingdom will no longer have access to European markets unless a trade agreement can be arranged. The UK’s negotiating position would be stronger, if the EU negotiators could be confident that British standards matched those of the EU, in areas such as consumer and environmental protection and workers rights. The problem for the UK is it does not have a written constitution which recognises human rights and the rule of law. A written constitution would also clearly state that all four nations of the United Kingdom are equal and recognise all of the democratically elected parliaments and assemblies. But without an English assembly or parliament separate from Westminster this is not possible.

Sources

O’Toole, Fintan; (2019) Heroic Failure Brexit and the politics of pain, Head of Zeus Ltd., London.

Bryant, Chris (ed.) (2007) Towards a new constitutional settlement, The Smith Institute, London.

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2020

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Some people say it was undemocratic for Britain to join the European Community in 1973 because ‘the people’ weren’t asked in a referendum. But that’s not how decisions are made in Britain.

In the UK, referendums are usually nothing more than opinion polls. They are not legally binding and therefore not capable of making decisions.

Indeed, both the 1975 and 2016 referendums on whether the UK should remain a member of the European Community were not binding votes, but simply a ‘poll’ of the country’s ‘opinion’.

A general election has far more democratic legitimacy and legality than a referendum.

In this country, it’s our Parliament that is sovereign and Parliament gains that power through the voting public.

General elections represent legally binding votes that give authority to a party or parties to form a government.

 REFERENDUMS VERSUS PARLIAMENT

Referendums are flimsy affairs compared to general elections.

Parliament had the legal and democratic power to reject the ‘advice’ of the 2016 referendum if it so chose.

Even if we’d had another referendum, it would have been another advisory vote. Only Parliament can make the final decision (a key point confirmed by a ruling of the Supreme Court).

Since it is Parliament in our country that is sovereign, it is clearly the case that a vote to give power to one party or another in a general election is far superior to an ‘advisory’ referendum result.

And there’s another thing: Referendums are lousy ways to make democratic decisions, especially compared to how our representative Parliament works.

• When making a decision, our Parliament has many debates, multiple votes, often over several months, based on full information, with opportunities to consider updated information throughout the process, and with the democratic power to amend or abandon the decision at any stage.
• By contrast, in the referendum on 23 June 2016 we, ‘the people’, only had one vote, on one day, on a simplistic binary choice of only two words, without sufficient information (on the contrary, a lot of misinformation), without any opportunities to consider updated information, and with no democratic opportunity to amend or abandon the decision.

That can hardly be described as a democratic process, let alone a good way to make big decisions.

 MANIFESTO PROMISES

The decision to join the European Economic Community (now called the European Union) was confirmed by ‘the people’ voting for parties that offered that in their manifestos in general elections.

 WHEN IN 1961, Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, applied for the UK to join the then European Economic Community, ‘the people’ had given him a mandate to do so in the 1959 general election.

The Tory manifesto for that election stated:

‘our aim remains an industrial free market embracing all Western Europe’.

 WHEN IN 1967, Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, applied again for the UK to join the European Community, ‘the people’ had given him a mandate to do so in the 1966 general election.

The Labour manifesto for that election stated:

‘Labour believes that Britain, in consultation with her E.F.T.A. partners, should be ready to enter the European Economic Community, provided essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded.’

 WHEN IN 1973, Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, negotiated Britain’s membership of the European Community, ‘the people’ had given him a mandate to do so in the 1970 general election.

The Conservative manifesto for that election stated:

‘If we can negotiate the right terms, we believe that it would be in the long-term interest of the British people for Britain to join the European Economic Community, and that it would make a major contribution to both the prosperity and the security of our country.’

The manifesto added:

‘The opportunities are immense. Economic growth and a higher standard of living would result from having a larger market.’

 PARLIAMENT’S DECISION TO JOIN

Having negotiated the terms of membership, Edward Heath could not then unilaterally make the decision to go ahead and join.

The Tory manifesto promised:

‘As the negotiations proceed, we will report regularly through Parliament to the country.’

Ultimately, it was the decision of Parliament – not Mr Heath – on whether to join the European Community.

Following 300 hours of debate, Parliament voted for the UK to accept the terms of membership as confirmed in the European Communities Act 1972.

Consequently, Britain became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1 January 1973.

Was it a legitimate, democratic decision? Yes, of course.

Decisions in the UK are decided by our representatives in Parliament; a system of democracy that has served this country relatively well for hundreds of years.

After all, we have not had referendums to decide whether to join or leave the United Nations, or NATO, or the European Convention on Human Rights, or to agree to over 14,000 international treaties, including EU treaties.

These were rightly decisions of our democratically elected Parliament and government*. If not, the British public would have to spend almost every week of their lives voting in referendums, and what then would be the point of MPs?

(*Albeit, still using an outmoded voting system of first-past-the-post, which can mean election results that are not representative of the nation as a whole.)

 RECENT MANIFESTOS

What about recent decisions regarding our membership of the European Union? This is where the track record becomes murky.

 WHEN IN 2016, Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, organised an in/out referendum on our EU membership, ‘the people’ had given him a mandate to do so in the general election of 2015.

The Conservative manifesto for that election stated:

‘We will legislate in the first session of the next Parliament for an in-out referendum to be held on Britain’s membership of the EU before the end of 2017…

‘We will honour the result of the referendum, whatever the outcome.’

That 2015 manifesto, however, didn’t specify at all what kind of Brexit Britain would have in the event of Leave winning.

On the contrary, the manifesto promised:

‘We are clear about what we want from Europe. We say: yes to the Single Market.’

The other problem with the 2015 manifesto is that whilst the Tories could make a political pledge to honour the referendum, they could not bind Parliament to agree to the result of an advisory-only referendum.

This became an issue when the next Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May – still acting under the auspices of the 2015 manifesto – tried to treat the EU referendum as if it had made a legally binding decision.

Consequently, Parliament was not given an opportunity to have a specific debate and vote to decide whether to accept the ‘advice’ of the referendum for the UK to leave the EU.

The then Brexit Secretary, David Davis, erroneously advised Parliament that such a Parliamentary decision wasn’t necessary, as ‘the decision’ to leave had already been taken by the referendum. [Source]

Even though the Supreme Court had already ruled that the referendum was not capable of making any ‘decision’.

 WHEN IN 2017, Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, promised to deliver Brexit, it’s a moot point as to whether ‘the people’ had given her a mandate to do so, as in the 2017 general election, the Tories lost their majority entirely.

The Conservative manifesto for that election promised:

‘The best possible deal for Britain as we leave the European Union delivered by a smooth, orderly Brexit.’

The manifesto also pledged:

‘a deep and special partnership with the European Union.’

In that manifesto there was no mandate sought for Britain to leave the EU without a deal, let alone to suffer a ‘disorderly’ Brexit.

It meant that the next Tory Prime Minister, Boris Johnson – whilst still under the auspices of the 2017 manifesto – had no authority from ‘the people’ to state that Britain would leave the EU, ‘do or die, deal or no deal’.

 WHEN IN 2019, Conservative Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, promised to get Brexit done, ‘the people’ had given him a mandate to do so in the general election of that year.

The Conservative manifesto of that election promised on Brexit:

‘a great new deal that is ready to go’.

In that manifesto there was no mandate sought for Britain to leave the EU without a deal.

The ‘great new deal’ – which was passed by Parliament in January – included a political declaration promising close collaboration with the EU and a ‘level playing field’ to enable free and fair trade between the UK and the EU.

Boris Johnson personally signed the agreement.

But now the government has retracted on that deal.

The EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, said last month:

“In all areas, the UK continues to backtrack on the commitments it has undertaken in the political declaration.”

The UK is now rapidly heading towards a no-deal Brexit – an outcome for which there is no mandate from the British electorate.

 WHAT NEXT?

The next general election is to be held on 2 May 2024.

That is the next scheduled democratic event when the Brexit decision could be legitimately challenged, changed, or even overturned by a vote of ‘the people’.

Could a general election reverse Brexit, or at least forge a closer relationship with the EU than the one now being instigated by the Tory government?

Yes, of course.

In less than four years, the course of Brexit could be turned on its head if a political party wins power with a manifesto pledge to do just that.

 Photo: Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, on the steps of 10 Downing Street, after winning the 1970 general election.

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Polish Presidential run-off will take place on the 12 of July, that is tomorrow,  between the incumbent President Andrzej Duda, who won the first round of the presidential election on the 28  of June, and Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, who is the Civic Platform (PO) candidate, finishing second. 

The question is what will be the future of Rule of Law in Poland in light of who gets elected on Sunday’s election.

The current state of Rule of Law in Poland under the Law and Justice Party’s ruling since 2015 is far from offering any hope for the future. The current government through series of measures and legislation has undermined and eroded the Rule of Law in Poland.

V-Dem Democracy Report of 2020 refers to Poland as having autocratised the most over the last ten years among other countries like Hungary and Turkey. The ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS), in power since 2015, is forcing legislation that is not complying with the EU’s Rule of Standards, and ultimately is eroding democratic standards in Poland. On the question of whether it has a independent Judiciary,  Poland scored  1 on the scale of 4 in Freedom House’s annual report of 2020, which is pretty dismal.

In 2017 the Justice Minister was given the power to appoint and dismiss presidents and deputy presidents of courts, instead of them being elected by the Judiciary. Furthermore, lower retirement ages for the Supreme Court came into force, effectively meaning that 27 out of 73 judges had to step down in July 2018.  

Other parts of the new Supreme Court law created powerful new chambers—the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs (responsible for declaring the validity of elections), and the Disciplinary Chamber.   

Furthermore, in 2019, the Supreme Court’s Labor Chamber promptly ruled that the National Council of the Judiciary is not an impartial and independent body, and the Disciplinary Chamber is not a court within the meaning of EU and national law. In response, the PiS rushed legislation through the Sejm, the lower house of the bicameral parliament of Poland, to strengthen and expand disciplinary measures to punish individual judges who questioned the validity of the National Council of the Judiciary.  

In academic circles, as well as at the EU institutional level and among policy analysts, the situation in Poland concerning the independence of Judiciary and other policy choices made by the PiS related to the media and academia, which are not in the remit of this blog, is alarming. ‘Backsliding on democracy’, ‘drift towards illiberal democracy’, and ‘rule of law crisis’ are some of the adjectives used to describe the situation in Poland. 

My first question is if Trzaskowski wins the run-off on Sunday,  can he stop PiS in eroding the independence of Judiciary in Poland?

The short answer is:  Yes. 

The supporting conditions and constitutional powers granted to the President of the Republic of Poland could make Trzaskowski’s significantly strong and effective in ste

Warsaw mayor Rafal Trzaskowski is supported by Civic Platform, a liberal right-of-centre party © Omar Marques/Getty

ering Poland to an opposite direction. To one where fundamental principles of Liberal Democracy are respected and protected, like the Rule of Law.

The paragraphs 3-5 of the Article 122 of the Constitution of Republic of Poland stated: (3)The President of the Republic may, before signing a bill, refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal for an adjudication upon its conformity to the Constitution. The President of the Republic shall not refuse to sign a bill which has been judged by the Constitutional Tribunal as conforming to the Constitution. (4) The President of the Republic shall refuse to sign a bill which the Constitutional Tribunal has judged not to be in conformity to the Constitution. (5)  If the President of the Republic has not made reference to the Constitutional Tribunal in accordance with para. 3, he may refer the bill, with reasons given, to the Sejm for its reconsideration. If the said bill is repassed by the Sejm by a three-fifths majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies” .                  

The above  means that when Trzaskowski receives a bill from the Sejm, he has the power, granted by the Constitution, as shown above, to refer the bill to the Constitutional Court to check it is in conformity with the Constitution. Additionally, because the PiS government does not hold a majority of 3/5 in the Sejm, the President’s veto of the Government’s bills could not be overturned. Thus Trzaskowski could block the PiS’s bills that are not in conformity with the Constitution, as well as those against his liberal values. Ultimately he could protect the fundamental values of liberal democracy; with this assured, optimism about the Rule of Law could be reinstated in Poland.

However, Trzaskowski’s vetoes of the PiS’s bills or legislative initiatives could force Jarosław Aleksander Kaczyński’s hand, Chairman of the PiS, country’s de facto ruler, to call for an early General Election. Dr. Ben Stanley, a political scientist at SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, said that Kaczyński would have little patience for Trzaskowski’s vetoes and predicts escalation of hostilities between Trzaskowski and Kaczyński, if the former is elected on Sunday. By this, a brake on backsliding on Liberal democracy would be achieved. However, conflict, hostility and disunity between the President and the Government would take root in the Polish politics that could produce a dysfunctional government.Â

My second question is if Duda wins, will he stand against the PiS’s policy initiative that is not compliance with the Rule of Law standards of the EU?

My short answer is: No.

Andrzej Duda, incumbent PiS President and seeking re-election © Wojciech Olkusnik/EPA-EFE

If Duda is elected on Sunday, I think the PiS’s administration will first take a deep breath since the neck and neck race between Duda and Trzaskowski made them extremely nervous in that they run a smear campaign against their opponent, something academics will write about for a long time coming.

While one would expect the PiS to moderate their policy plans so that they could accommodate the rest of the country in their ranks, I do not anticipate that to happen. Not only because I feel the sense of deja vu when I am questioning if the PiS would moderate, but because of my expertise in Turkish and Hungarian politics, countries that are not regarded as democracies by the Freedom House anymore. I feel that the PiS would only impose its illiberal legislation proposals on the Poles in many areas of life in the coming 3-5 years to enhance their grip on power, which inevitably result in weaker democracy and the Rule of Law.

The post Should you feel Optimistic or Gloomy about the Rule of Law in Poland in light of Presidential Run-Off appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Brexit is based on blatant mistruths and lies. You may not believe this now, but we will all believe it next year, when Brexit finally arrives, cold, clammy and callous, naked and exposed.

Every reason given to leave was a stinking falsification. When, one day, there is a public inquiry into how our country was conned, there will be gasps into how conniving, cunning politicians managed to get away with it.

Lies, lies and more lies. That’s how Leave won.

In summary:

 MORE SOVEREIGNTY? Nonsense. We’ll get less. In the EU, we gained a share of sovereignty of our continent. Outside the EU, we’ll still live on a planet and have to obey thousands of international laws and treaties.

We share sovereignty with NATO, for example. Is that a reason to leave it?

 FEWER MIGRANTS? Really? Just think about it. Most EU migrants in Britain have been in gainful employment, doing jobs that we simply don’t have enough Britons to do, and making a massive NET contribution to our Treasury and economy.

Migrants come here for jobs – and if there are no jobs, they mostly don’t come, or don’t stay.

 MORE HOUSES, SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS? Think again. Britain has a chronic shortage of skilled workers. Without EU migrants, we’ll have fewer builders, teachers, doctors and nurses.

Migrants are not the cause of our problems. Blaming them just excuses successive UK governments from investing sufficiently in our country.

 GET OUR COUNTRY BACK? We never lost it. If being in the EU means losing your country, why aren’t the 27 other EU member states planning to leave?

(Really, none of them are: support for the EU is the highest it’s been in 35 years).

 OUR OWN LAWS? The vast majority of laws in the UK are our laws and passed by our Parliament in Westminster, otherwise it would have nothing to do.

But in the EU, we benefit from laws and regulations for our continent that no single country alone could ever achieve.

Could our UK government have got mobile phone companies to scrap exorbitant roaming charges across the entire EU? To take Google to task for “abusive practices”? To ensure generous compensation for delayed flights across our continent? Of course not.

It took the might of 28 EU countries working together to achieve that, and so much more.

 THE EU IS RUN BY FACELESS BUREAUCRATS? Another lie. The EU is a democracy, run and ruled by its members, the 27 countries of the EU, along with its democratically elected European Parliament.

The European Commission is the servant of the EU, not its master, and the European Parliament has the power to choose, and dismiss, the entire Commission.

THE CASE FOR BRETURN Before Brexit, no member state had ever left the EU. And no other member state is planning to leave now.

That’s hardly surprising. All the reasons to be an EU member are based on true, tangible and tested benefits over many decades.

In summary:

 PROFITABLE: EU membership is profitable – in real terms it cost Britain nothing to belong to the EU. On the contrary, we got back many times the cost of the annual membership fee. Being in the EU made us better off.

The CBI has calculated that EU membership was worth around £3,000 a year to every British family — a return of nearly £10 for each £1 we paid in.

[Source: CBI Report: Our Global Future, page 11:]

 PEACE: It’s the structure of the EU that has helped to ensure that no shots have ever been fired between member states. That’s an enormous achievement for a continent that was previously used to violence, wars and subjugation as the way to ‘settle’ issues.

In 2012, by a unanimous decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, the EU won the Nobel Peace Prize for advancing the causes of peace, democracy and human rights in Europe for over 60 years.

 FREEDOMS: The EU gives members freedom across much of our continent.

EU citizens enjoy the right to live, work, study or retire in any EU and EEA country – including access to state healthcare and education when working in those countries. That’s a precious right, that took decades to achieve.

The EU also gives members the right to free AND frictionless trade between member states, which has helped to maintain Europe as the planet’s richest continent.

The loss of these freedoms will be increasingly devastating for Britain and Britons.

Almost half of ALL our exports, and just over half of ALL our imports, go to and come from the EU. Nowhere else in the world comes even close.

The EU has an iron tariff wall against non-members. Outside of the EU, we are on the wrong side of that wall.

Even non-European countries that have negotiated ‘free trade’ agreements with the EU don’t enjoy full free trade access to Europe’s internal market, as Britain did as an EU member.

DEMOCRACY: EU members have a democratic say, votes and vetoes on the running and future direction of our continent.

Outside the EU, Britain can only look on as those decisions are made without us – even though those decisions will affect us just as much, whether we’re in the EU or not.

Leaving means losing sovereignty, not gaining it.

 POWER: The EU is the world’s largest and most successful trading bloc, and the world’s biggest exporter and importer of manufactured goods and services.

The EU is one of the world’s top three economies, alongside the USA and China.

The Euro, in record time, has become the world’s most traded and trusted currency, alongside the US dollar.

All that gives the EU huge power, reach and muscle – enabling it to negotiate the best free trade agreements with other countries on behalf of its members.

Outside the EU, Britain is unlikely to get trade deals as good as, let alone better than, the free trade agreements we had as an EU member covering over 70 countries.

In any event, it will take years, maybe decades to find out.

 PROTECTION: EU laws protecting the rights of workers, consumers and travellers across our continent are probably among the most important EU membership benefits.

For example, 4-weeks paid holiday a year; the 48-hour working week; anti-discrimination law; guaranteed rights for agency workers; guaranteed worker consultation – all of these protections largely exist because of the EU.

No single national government can assure safety and protection across our continent. It needs the reach of a pan-European intergovernmental organisation to achieve that (albeit with the democratic consensus of member states).

Britain enjoys cleaner beaches as a direct result of EU directives on protecting the environment. Before those directives, successive British governments were not interested in cleaning up our beaches.

In addition, the EU is leading the world in tackling climate change – something that individual countries alone simply can’t undertake.

The government’s post-Brexit plan is to take away the rights of British citizens to sue them over issues such as workers’ rights, environmental policy and business regulation. This right to sue our government on these issues was something we only enjoyed under EU law.

There will be many other rights lost as a direct result of Brexit.

 STRENGTH: In a world dominated by the USA, China and Russia, Britain is dwarfed on its own. Being part of the EU gives us a bigger say and more strength on the global stage than as a small country out-at-sea and going-it-alone.

We could instead become closer to the USA – but is that what we really want?

……………………………………………..

When Brexit arrives for real, from 1 January 2021 onwards, we will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power.

The case for Breturn – Britain returning to the EU as a full member – is overwhelming.

It may take years to achieve a democratic reversal of Brexit, but it’s a worthwhile fight.

In a democracy, losing doesn’t mean having to give up. Ask Brexiters, they know.

We can win next time. We just have to ensure we get a next time.

 

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• My campaign page on Facebook: Reasons2Rejoin
• And LinkedIn

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The post Breturn versus Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Scary

I was very glad to have attended the EPOW seminar series this week, where one of my longer-standing thoughts about Brexit finally got some more robust grounding than the impressionistic approach I’ve taken to date. Sara Hobolt was presenting her co-authored paper on the impact of attitudes towards Brexit on attitudes towards your own country’s membership of the EU, using the EES in May 2019 to conduct an EU28-wide experimental design. You can watch Sara’s excellent presentation on the link, but essentially if you think Brexit is bad for the UK, then you’ll think your country leaving the EU will also be bad, especially if your country is economically more exposed to the UK. But the team went beyond this with this experimental arm, exposing sub-groups to positive or negative statements about Brexit, to see if that had any effect. Here, the negative messaging – on economic costs – didn’t have a significant impact on attitudes, but the positive messaging – on taking control over laws, including migration – did have a measurable effect, making people more likely to consider that their country would do well from leaving the EU and to vote to Leave in a referendum. The argument for this differential was that respondents have likely been desensitised to negative messages on Brexit – remember that May 2019 was after the second extension of Art.50 and the middle of the ratification arguments in the UK – so only the positive messages would have been novel and surprising. Thus, even if Brexit has been a deterrent so far to further withdrawals, the scope for that to change in the future is clear. And it’s here that Sara’s evidence seems to give substance to the argument I’ve been making about the ‘ice-breaking‘ nature of Brexit. The simple fact of the UK’s withdrawal has opened up a new political potentiality for others to exploit: leaving the EU is no longer a theoretical possibility, but a political reality. And the generally negative framing of that process in other EU member states – by media, by politicians, by publics – leaves open a strong possibility of that potentiality being exploited by eurosceptic and anti-EU political actors. As we know from the UK, the relative unwillingness of political elites to communicate why the balance of costs and benefits tips towards membership doesn’t mean that it’s not an issue, but rather than critical voices tend to make the running in the public debate. To use Hooghe and Marks’ phrase, the constraining dissensus that characterises the past couple of decades of European integration tends to lead to a more defensive positioning by elites, reacting rather than agenda-setting. And so we might expect that in the next phase of Brexit, as the UK moves out of transition, the potential for sceptics to sell a new message about the process to publics across Europe will grow. Even in the most pessimistic economic analyses, the UK will not collapse as an economy or as a state (pace Peter Foster’s thread yesterday on Scotland and the UK internal market). Thrown in the considerable disruption that everyone will experience from Covid, plus all the non-economic dimensions and it’s not that difficult to fashion a narrative that the UK has benefited from leaving. That would serve domestic agendas of eurosceptics in other countries, especially if the EU’s response to Covid is the seeming imposition of more obligations – financial or political – on member states or the weakening of benefits – reduced structural funds, less free movement, etc. If publics are more susceptible to positive messaging, as Sara’s work suggests, then that opens the possibility of a similar outmanoeuvring of elites as too place in the UK in the run-up to the referendum: benign neglect and a belief in the weight of the status quo isn’t a robust basis for those who wish to maintain the system. Marlene Wind makes a similar case in her recent book, arguing that there has to be a much more pro-active promotion of the liberal and democratic values that European integration claims to protect. Whether governments and parties actually follow through with that agenda is rather more in question than you might expect.

The post From deterrent to contagion: Brexit as a cautionary tale? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The referendum question was unbalanced because it pitched a known outcome with an entirely unknown outcome.

The referendum question asked if the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?

 REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION □

 LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION □

We all knew what remaining in the EU meant; we’d had it for over 40 years.

But nobody knew what leaving the EU would mean. It wasn’t defined or explained in the referendum.

Even leading Brexiters couldn’t agree with each other. We still don’t know.

We may as well have had a referendum with the question:

 DO YOU WANT TO STAY WHERE YOU ARE? □

 DO YOU WANT TO GO SOMEWHERE ELSE? □

If you ticked to ‘stay where you are’, you knew what you’d be getting.

But if you ticked to ‘go somewhere else’, you’d have no idea where you’d be going.

If you voted to go somewhere else, wouldn’t you then expect another vote on where precisely you’d be going?

That would make logical sense, wouldn’t it?

But no. That’s not what’s happened.

Slightly more people ticked the box to ‘go somewhere else’, but the government has refused to give us any say on where we’re going.

The government is making the decision, without any referral back to us.

What if we don’t like where we’re going? Too bad.

Some years before the referendum, arch Tory Brexiter MP, Jacob Rees-Mogg explained that it was important to:

“work out how to phrase a referendum – or a series of referendums if necessary – that will be understandable.”

Well, the referendum phrase was NOT understandable.

How could a referendum be understood when one of the options had not been explained?

Mr Rees-Mogg also said then that we could have two referendums. He told Parliament in 2012:

“As it happens, it may be more sense to have the second referendum after the renegotiation is completed.”

Yes, that would make sense.

It would mean that we could then have a more balanced, second referendum; one that compared, for the first time, a fully defined Leave with the already-known status quo of Remain.

But it wasn’t to be. Mr Rees-Mogg has now disowned what he said in 2011.

Despite the pre-election promises by Boris Johnson of an ‘oven-ready deal’, we are now heading towards a no-deal, cliff-edge Brexit, even though nobody voted for that.

Indeed, polls consistently show that Britain most definitely does NOT want a no-deal Brexit.

Tough. We are not being given any choice.

Back in the day, before the referendum campaign, when the then Conservative government was pro-Remain, they presented the three main Brexit alternatives.

[Link: BrexitVersions.Reasons2Rejoin.co.uk]

All of them, said David Cameron’s government, would cause damage to Britain. If you’re a Brexiter, which one did you vote for?

① THE NORWAY OPTION – meaning Britain would leave the EU but still have free and frictionless access to the EU Single Market, by far Britain’s most important and lucrative export and import market.

But this option would mean Britain continuing to pay the EU and obey its rules – including free movement of people – without any say in them.

② THE CANADA OPTION – meaning Britain would have tariff free trade with the EU, but not the highly cherished and valuable frictionless trade.

And there would only be limited access for our services sector, which makes up almost 80% of our economy.

③ THE WTO OPTION – (often referred to as ‘no-deal’ and now ridiculously described by Boris Johnson as the ‘Australia Deal’) meaning relying on World Trade Organisation rules.

But that would mean new tariffs and complicated, costly procedures on UK trade with the EU, hurting British consumers, businesses and employment. It would also suddenly and catastrophically end all EU membership benefits, affecting all our daily lives.

 NONE OF THESE OPTIONS were presented as choices in the referendum that voters could opt for. The only choice was for Remain, or a meaningless and undefined Leave.

The Leave campaign would have struggled to win if they’d had to specifically define the version of Leave they were selling.

 WHICH IS WHY the Leave win was such a con.

It was much easier to sell to the nation a vague and idealistic idea of Brexit, rather than the realistic, down-to-earth details.

The only way to find out what ‘the people’ now want is to have a new referendum comparing the new-deal Boris Johnson negotiates with the EU, with the option of being an EU member.

The government won’t offer that choice because they are not really interested in what ‘the people’ want. They only want what they want.

• Watch this 25-second video of what Jacob Rees-Mogg said about referendums:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• And LinkedIn

________________________________________________________

The post Which version of Brexit did Britain vote for? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This article was first published on The UK in a Changing Europe.

The negotiations between the UK government and the European Union make it
quite clear that neither Boris Johnson nor Michel Barnier would buy a used car
from the other on trust.

That’s not because they differ about whether the driver’s wheel should be on the
right or the left. It is because there is mutual distrust, albeit for different reasons.
The Prime Minister doesn’t want the guarantee that Barnier is offering for
enforcing any agreement about the UK’s future trade relations that they must
meet an autumn deadline in order to avoid having no deal. This is because the
EU would like any guarantee with the UK to be settled by EU law.

Barnier wants an enforceable guarantee because he does not trust Boris
Johnson to keep his word. In order to get Brexit done, Johnson signed a
Withdrawal Agreement that promised a significant customs barrier between
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

This lost him the trust of the Democratic Unionist Party. To assuage their
concerns, Johnson has since said the new policy would be enforced with a light
touch, and this lost him the trust of Barnier.

The normal thing to do when buying a used car is to ask the salesperson if there
is a guarantee if its condition is not as promised. No guarantee means no deal.
By contrast, the normal thing in reaching a political agreement with a group of
countries is to treat their commitments with a light touch, because there is no
guarantee that the terms can be enforced.

The agreement that the UK and EU teams are currently negotiating is intended
to cover a substantial number of commitments. These could include the rights of EU and British citizens living in each other’s jurisdiction, tariffs, state aid, competition and the protection of workers’ rights and the environment.

As with any set of regulations, especially when they are stated in both French
and English, issues can be expected to arise about how each partner
implements the agreement.

The potential for disagreement is high, because the purpose of Brexit, as far as
Downing Street is concerned, is to allow the UK to depart from EU policies and
rules.

In discussions with the EU, British negotiators say new standards will be as high
or higher than EU standards.

In discussions with Conservative MPs, the emphasis is on Britain differing from
EU regulations in ways that give it a competitive advantage.

How British standards affecting trade will differ from the EU in practice is
unclear, because the UK government has yet to spell them out.

This is not so much a Machiavellian strategy of hiding a well-prepared plan of
action, as it is a sign of the UK government not yet having decided what specific
measures will be changed to give substance to the Brexit rhetoric of ‘taking back
control.’

To Europeans who believe in a social market rather than in an unregulated free
market this signals that the UK might engage in social dumping, seeking to
boost exports by adopting lower standards than its EU competitors.

Before buying an agreement with a Prime Minister with a used-car salesman’s
reputation, Michel Barnier wants a guarantee that can be enforced. What he doesn’t want is what is implicit in the rhetoric of British negotiators: enforcement
provisions that the UK can slip out of.

The starting point for enforcement puts the two sides in a position of political
distancing. The EU would like enforcement by the ECJ whereas the UK
government veto this as inconsistent with regaining sovereignty.

Consultation is accepted in principle by both sides. This can reveal whether a
complaint is due to a misunderstanding that can be resolved by discussion or
whether there is a substantive disagreement about what obligations their political
agreement imposes.

There is recognition in principle of the need for arbitration when disagreements
arise about the rules governing future UK-EU resolutions.
Since neither Britain nor the EU is willing to let the other’s courts having the final
say, a special arbitration tribunal will be required to which each side can
nominate one judge and they can agree a tie-breaking third judge.

The first point of disagreement is about the scope of arbitration: the EU wants it
to cover all points in a single general-purpose agreement, while the UK wants it
to leave some matters free of binding arbitration.

The disagreement could be resolved by narrowing the scope of the agreement
by dropping those issues that the UK government wants to leave free of binding
arbitration. Narrowing would be welcomed by hardcore Brexiters and
acceptable to the EU because, by default, all the remaining topics would be
subject to arbitration.

The biggest dispute is about what rules an arbitration panel should follow. The
EU does not want any terms of the agreement to be dismissed as non-binding if
they contradict a hastily adopted Act of Parliament. It wants the arbitration panel
to refer to the interpretation of disputes to the ECJ.

While this is logical from a Brussels perspective, the chief British negotiator,
David Frost, has stated that the superiority of EU to British laws would be
contrary to ‘the fundamentals of what it means to be an independent country’.
To maximize the enforcement of the agreement, EU negotiators are insistent
that if any arbitration finds any one condition violated, then the offended side can
unilaterally suspend the whole agreement.

The British position is that this would be disproportionate punishment. But that is
just the point. If the UK government showed it was untrustworthy, the EU would
be glad to be quit of further disputes by abruptly cancelling the UK’s favoured
access to EU markets and leaving Britain with no deal.

The effect would be relatively small for the EU. However, this would affect not
only British sellers of used and new cars but also all engaged in EU trade, from
the Conservative red-wall constituencies in the north of England to the City of
London.

By Richard Rose, Professor of Public Policy at the University of
Strathclyde. His newest book is: How Referendums Challenge European
Democracy: Brexit and Beyond.

The post Would you buy a used car from one of these men? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Pier Domenico Tortola

The European Central Bank “needs a rocket scientist, not a rock star”, quipped the website Politico shortly after the nomination of Christine Lagarde to succeed Mario Draghi at the helm of the ECB, starting November 2019. The risk, the commentary continued, is that the presidency of Lagarde, a central banking outsider more renowned for her stellar political achievements than for her macroeconomic expertise, will bring about a dangerous “politicization” of the Bank.

That may well be. However, what seems forgotten in analyses like the foregoing is that it does not necessarily take a politician to politicize the ECB. Or at least this is what it would appear from the public debate on the ECB over the past decade or so, in which the (alleged) politicization of the Bank has been a recurrent narrative, particularly under the tenure of Draghi—an MIT trained economist.

Calling the ECB politicized is a strong accusation, which goes directly at the legitimacy and credibility of one of the most consequential European institutions. It is therefore surprising to see how foggy the term politicization remains, for all its use on both the hawkish and dovish side of the Eurozone crisis debate. What is it, exactly, that makes the European Central Bank political?

In an article recently published in the Journal of Common Market Studies I try to put some order and clarity into this issue by, first, reconstructing the ways in which the term politicization is currently employed. Looking at the existing literature and debate, politicization is used (more or less explicitly) in three ways, corresponding to deviations from three types of expected central bank behavior: the ECB is politicized if it violates, respectively, its independence, impartiality, or policy convention.

While each of these three meanings gives us some clues into the question of ECB politicization, none of them offers a solid enough basis for defining the concept, due to logical or empirical shortcomings. Seeing politicization as a loss of independence, for instance, sits uncomfortably with the several policy rifts between the ECB leadership and the German government—arguably the most powerful among the Bank’s principals—in recent years. Nor is defining politicization as a violation of impartiality much more helpful, given that virtually anything the ECB does (including, one could say, inaction) has some distributive effect. The idea of politicization as a departure from convention, finally, is only logically defensible if the latter is interpreted formally as the Bank’s legal mandate. But if that is so, does it really make sense to still speak of ECB politicization after both the Outright Monetary Transactions and quantitative easing, the Bank’s two most controversial non-standard measures, have been certified as lawful by the EU’s Court of Justice?

To exit this conceptual impasse, one then needs an alternative approach to ECB politicization, which can overcome the limits of the three conceptualizations just described, and provide common ground among them—therefore being able to function within and improve on the existing debate. For this, we need to shift the focus to the preferences of central bankers, and define politicization as a deviation from technocratic policy-making.

Like any other technocratic body, the ECB should move within a policy-making space located between zero and full autonomy vis-à-vis its political principals. On the one hand, the Bank needs enough room for manoeuvre to be able to formulate monetary policy based on macroeconomic knowledge and reasoning. On the other, it must bound by a mandate establishing the ultimate goals of monetary policy, which cannot be set but politically due to their inherently normative nature.

It is the violation of either of these boundaries between technocracy and politics that politicizes the ECB. At one end of the spectrum, this violation causes the ECB to make decisions that are no longer guided by expertise but by the desire or necessity to please some of its principals. At the opposite end, it makes the Bank start serving political ends other than the ones defined by its mandate. In both scenarios, the Bank ceases to act technocratically to turn, de facto, into a partisan political actor—whether doing someone else’s bidding or pursuing its own views of the “good society”.

To be sure, interpreting ECB politicization as proposed here poses its own challenges, above all the difficulty to gauge central bankers’ decision-making preferences with precision. The good news is that recent scholarship on (European) central banking has made several advances in this direction. Three methodological avenues, in particular, have already produced results that are directly relevant to the notion of preference-based politicization. The first, and more traditional, relies on elite interview and surveys of central bankers. The second looks at the latter’s professional and intellectual networks. The third, finally, measures preferences by examining the public language of the ECB. Taken together, these three approaches can be viewed as the nucleus of a promising research program on which to expand in the future, so as to study the issue of ECB politicization with the depth and clarity this topic deserves.

 

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article, ‘The Politicization of the European Central Bank: What Is It, and How to Study It?’

 

Dr. Pier Domenico Tortola (@pierotortola)

Assistant professor of European Politics and Society

University of Groningen, the Netherlands

The post Taking central bank politicization seriously appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So, only the 6 months until Brexit is done. Or possibly not. The passing of the deadline for an extension of the transition period at midnight on Tuesday means that on a chilly Thursday night on 31 December, the UK will pass out of that period into, well, something. What that something might be isn’t known yet, but we can make a number of reasonably confident predictions about it. Firstly, it’s not going to be the last word in EU-UK relations. Not only are the minimum requirements of the two sides not overlapping in either scope or detail, but there will be a need for implementation of what is agreed. As the Irish Protocol is showing already, that’s a big block of work in itself and with many difficulties and issues. Secondly, it’s liable to be little more than a staging post for a post-Covid world. The rapid rise of resilience as a core part of the new global economy, with all its attendant requirements for more re-shoring and robust supply lines – not to mention new demands on international coordination of public health management – is bound to change the shape of the external agendas of all states, in ways that will also impact formal links. Quite what that requires, specifically, is not likely to become clear in the next 4 months, so any EU-UK agreement will need to be adapted to the changing realities in the coming years. Thirdly, it’s not going to put the European issue to bed in the UK. As the recent ESS showed, British voters are still well-split on the EU, a continuation of the cleavage so deeply marked by the referendum four years ago. Chuck in the generational drift towards more positive views, an agreement that suits neither the hard Brexiters nor the Remain rump and you have the recipe for a whole new cycle of discontent about EU relations. Of course, that discontent will be much more about wider issues than the EU, but the latter will continue to play its symbolic and totemic role in the debate. Membership (and non-membership) has always been a proxy for other things in the British post-war debate, only rarely being considered on its own terms. To balance all this, I would argue that all three elements listed above would still apply if there had been an extension to the maximum of two years beyond end 2020, but the rush to complete on the original timetable will certainly exacerbate them. Sustainable, durable and resilience public policy requires a number of factors to align. Technical-bureaucratic elements around the efficiency and effectiveness of a policy need to be married to broader societal aspects of legitimacy, including public involvement in formulation and management. At present, none of those elements are in place. Preparation for any outcome in January 2021 is still to ramp up, from completing the domestic legislative programme to commissioning the new IT systems to facilitate the newly-defacilitated flow of trade. And public consultation is absent, hidden behind the slogans of getting Brexit done and exhortations to ‘prepare’ (without saying for what). This all puts much more pressure on the Future Relationship negotiations to deliver some clarity, if only to set out some points of reference for everyone to work to. But however that turns out, it’s important to remember that it will only be through a bigger public debate that the UK will be able to move to some new situation that suits it and its setting. And that’ll need a conscious effort by a government that wants to open itself to a policy outcome that might not be its preferred one.

The post Tick. Tock. (pt. 746) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In Hannover, the Max Planck Institute for Gravitational Physics (Albert Einstein Institute) cooperates closely with the Institute for Gravitational Physics of the Leibniz Universität Hannover. Source: https://www.aei.mpg.de/14026/AEI_Hannover

Jennifer Dusdal

As the world’s third largest producer of scientific knowledge, scientists in Germany publish more articles than those in any other country, except for the U.S. and China. Germany is the birthplace of both the modern research university and the independent extra-university research institute. Germany’s dual-pillar research policy, developed over the twentieth century, we argue, may risk this country’s future in the increasingly competitive global search for new scientific knowledge.[1] Specially, we ask whether the taken-for-granted assumption that the functional differentiation of these two organizational forms[2] is still appropriate: universities with advanced research-based teaching and publishing in all fields versus the research institutes focused on producing leading and often highly specialized research.

 

Examining sustained myths and the actual results of dual-pillar research policy in terms of published articles in leading journals, we ask whether Germany’s higher education and science system would not be (even) more successful with research policy that supports the universities’ capability as key centers of scientific knowledge production and benefits from synergies with advanced education––as in other leading science nations.

 

Research University vs. Research Institute?

This policy has, over many decades, affected both sectors differently. Universities suffer an abiding “legitimation crisis” whereas extra-university research institutes enjoy “favored sponsorship”, including a concentration of financial resources, attraction of scientific talent, and reputational advantages.[3] Our recently-published study shows that the dual-pillar policy sustains the myth that scientists at extra-university research institutes produce the most significant research conducted in Germany. In fact, German universities led the nation’s reestablishment of scientific importance among the highly competitive European and worldwide science systems after World War II. Yet universities receive less research funding per capita, have less optimal research conditions, and bear responsibility for teaching and advancing young researchers in addition to scientific output. Still, they produced two-thirds of the country’s publications in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and health (hereafter STEM+) since at least 1980, increasing publications at a logarithmic rate – higher than the international mean.

 

Despite the dual-pillar research policy, the university sector remains absolutely and relatively successful. It is not eclipsed by the extra-university research institutes in total output. Germany’s small and medium-sized research institutes have made growing and significant contributions to scientific discovery, with their researchers publishing in higher impact journals proportionally more than their size. Indeed, the universities and institutes together bolster Germany’s leading position in science globally, and among other key science producers in Europe like the UK and France.[4]

 

Scientific publications, reputation & funding

Our results show that relative to their size, universities and extra-university research institutes have produced similar amounts of peer-reviewed publications in leading journals. Institutes are very successful, but for every new article they publish, the larger university sector publishes three. Scientists working at extra-university research institutes successfully publish in high-impact journals. Nevertheless, for each article, university-based scientists publish two. Furthermore, they publish on a broader range of topics, started to collaborate internationally earlier and more intensely. Institutes have expanded their scientific portfolio and also collaborate with researchers worldwide.

 

Thus, German universities remain the driving force of the country’s scientific productivity in STEM+. Yet, in scientific reputation, they are overshadowed by the highly-specialized and renowned extra-university research institutes––especially those of the Max Planck Society, Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres, Fraunhofer Society, and Leibniz Association. This, we argue, potentially leads to an underdevelopment of the universities’ research potential. The “favored sponsorship” of research institutes is a factor leading to chronic underfunding and the “legitimation crisis” of universities, which threatens the preservation of this vital research-producing infrastructure.

 

This dual-pillar policy seems to limit Germany’s competitive capacity. Other countries, in contrast, focus their resources on strong universities. In 2018, even though Germany spent the most in the EU on R&D relative to its high GDP (3.1 percent),[5] its universities received only 17 percent of these funds, while a larger amount went to the extra-university research institutes. Even Germany’s Excellence Initiative[6], developed to select and valorize a small number of universities––jointly funded by the Federal government and Länder––provides only limited and temporary support for the chosen organizations after highly-competitive selection processes. By contrast, Germany’s traditional strength derived from broad distribution of scientific capacity among many relatively equal universities instead of a handful of highest-ranked organizations. Globally, between 80 to 90 percent of the over one million peer reviewed research articles in STEM+ have been published by scientists affiliated to universities.

 

Future potential of Germany’s dual-pillar research policy?

Germany’s underfunding of universities jeopardizes their future potential as they must use restricted research funds for research and training of students and young scientists. Funding has not kept pace with steadily-rising student enrollments. Nevertheless, they produce over 70 percent of all articles (and two-thirds of high-scientific impact publications). This contrasts with a prominent hypothesis––that scientists at extra-university research institutes, who have no teaching obligations and less administrative tasks––are far more productive than their university-affiliated counterparts. Their number of publications per scientist should be (far) greater, yet we show that they have only a slight advantages: of one-fourth of an article per year. This result suggests that keeping all other parameters stable, it would require more than double the funding of research institutes and their number of researchers to match the universities’ large scientific output.

 

Many countries worldwide followed the German Humboldtian model of university-based research and the integration of research and teaching, continuously building research capacity of their universities. This is a key reason for the worldwide expansion of scientific knowledge production and increased international collaborations. Ironically, the inventor of this model left its own path.[7] Will this dual-pillar research policy contribute to Germany sustaining its place amongst the other key countries in STEM+ science?[8]

 

Dr. Jennifer Dusdal is Postdoctoral Research Scientist in the Institute of Education & Society at the University of Luxembourg. She is also Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Leibniz Center for Science and Society (LCSS), Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany. Her research expertise lies at the intersection of higher education research, science studies, and bibliometrics. Her specific topics of interest include higher education systems, institutions and organizations, international collaborative networks, science capacity-building and production.

 

References:

[1] In “Research University vs. Research Institute? Legitimation Crisis and Favored Sponsorship in German Science Production, 1950–2010” Minerva, Jennifer Dusdal, Justin J.W. Powell, David P. Baker, Yuan Chih Fu, Yahya Shamekhi, and Manfred Stock analyzed thousands of peer-reviewed scientific journal articles by Germany-based scientists since 1950. https//doi.org/10.1007/s11024-019-09393-2

[2] Dusdal, J. (2018). Welche Organisationsformen produzieren Wissenschaft. Zum Verhältnis von Hochschule und Wissenschaft in Deutschland. Frankfurt/Main, Germany: Campus.

[3] Schimank, U. (1995). Hochschulforschung im Schatten der Lehre. Frankfurt/Main, Germany: Campus.

[4] Powell, J.J.W., and J. Dusdal (2017). The European Center of Science Productivity: Research Universities and Institutes in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In J.J.W. Powell, D.P. Baker, and F. Fernandez (Eds.), The Century of Science: The Global Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series, 33. Bingley, UK, Emerald Publishing, P. 55–84. https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/S1479-367920170000033005

[5] OECD.stat. (2019). Main Science and Technology Indicators. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB.

[6] Leibfried, S. (Ed.) (2010), Die Exzellenzinitiative. Zwischenbilanz und Perspektiven, Frankfurt/Main, Germany: Campus.

[7] Dusdal, J., A. Oberg, and J.J.W. Powell (2019). Das Verhältnis zwischen Hochschule und Wissenschaft in Deutschland: Expansion–Produktion–Kooperation. In Nicole Burzan (Ed.), Komplexe Dynamiken globaler und lokaler Entwicklungen––39. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie. https://publikationen.soziologie.de/index.php/kongressband_2018/article/view/1109/1327

[8] Powell, J.J.W., D.P. Baker, and F. Fernandez (Eds.) (2017). The Century of Science: The Global Triumph of the Research University, International Perspectives on Education and Society Series, 33. Bingley: Emerald Publishing.

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Hospital cleaner, Hassan Akkad, pulled at the nation’s heartstrings when he Tweeted a video this week with an urgent message to the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson.

In the video, shot in his car wearing his NHS hospital scrubs, an emotional Hassan complained to Mr Johnson that he felt “stabbed in the back”.

Why? Because the government had decided to exclude low-paid foreign NHS workers, such as him, from the bereavement scheme.

The scheme ensures that if a migrant NHS staff member dies of Covid-19, their families will still be able to stay in Britain, with ‘indefinite leave to remain’.

Hassan’s video had over 4 million views and caused a media sensation.

Hassan and others – including trade unions, MPs, journalists and members of the public – also protested that NHS migrant staff and their families were expected to pay a ‘surcharge’ to access the NHS whilst they worked for the NHS

The surcharge is rising from £400 to £625 a year each from October.

 VIDEO SUCCESS

Within hours of Hassan’s video being posted, Home Secretary Priti Patel announced a dramatic government U-turn. The NHS bereavement scheme would now be extended to cover cleaners, porters and other low-paid roles, effective immediately and retrospectively.

The next day, the government also announced another major U-turn: at least for the time being, NHS migrant staff and their families would be excluded from the surcharge to use the NHS.

A spokesman for Boris Johnson said he had requested the Home Office and Department for Health to exempt NHS staff and care workers from the surcharge “as soon as possible”.

This was a major U-turn, as only on Wednesday, Mr Johnson had firmly stood by the surcharge, telling MPs he “understood the difficulties faced by our amazing NHS staff”, but said the government “must look at the realities” of funding the NHS.

Hassan Tweeted a new video, saying his faith in Britain has been restored following the U-turns. He said:

“Thanks to all of you who put pressure on the government, they U-turned.”

Overnight, Hassan has become a national hero for his video.

But how many also know that Hassan had to risk his life to get to Britain?

 SYRIAN REFUGEE

Hassan is a Syrian refugee who fled torture and conflict in his country to make a long and arduous journey to Britain, arriving in September 2015.

He was a high school English teacher in Damascus before he was forced to escape in 2012, after being jailed and viciously beaten for taking part in an anti-government protest.

He told CBS News of his ordeal:

“They beat me with iron poles. I always thought I have a lovely face, so I was trying to protect my face, but they ended up smashing my arms.”

Hassan, then 24, was eventually released, reported CBS, but he knew his ‘only choice was to join the human tide of weary refugees making a break for safety in Europe’.

He first stayed in the Middle East, assuming he’d be able to return to Syria, before realising that was impossible. He travelled towards Turkey, hopeful of seeking refuge in Britain, as he spoke fluent English.

Hassan filmed his gruelling travels and the footage was used for a BBC documentary, ‘Exodus: The Journey’ which, thanks to Hassan’s input, won a Bafta award.

From Turkey, he undertook a perilous crossing to Greece in a leaking dingy packed with 68 other refugees, describing it as the “lowest moment of the entire experience”.

Many thousands of refugees – men, women, children and babies – have drowned making exactly the same treacherous journey.

Hassan later spent two months in ‘the Jungle’ in Calais, the makeshift camp for refugees. Each night he says he attempted to swim from the shore onto one of the ferries crossing the Channel.

He paid £3,500 for a fake Czech passport and an EasyJet ticket to England, but was summoned back by border officials.

Eventually, he managed to fly to Heathrow on 27 September 2015, using a counterfeit Belgian passport.

His asylum application in the UK was granted six months later. He said:

“I picked Britain because I could speak English.”

 “ANYONE CAN BECOME A REFUGEE…”

Hassan told the PBS Frontline newsletter:

“Anyone can become a refugee, anyone.

“It’s not something which you choose. It’s something that happens to you.”

He added:

“People are not fleeing because they’re poor, or because they don’t have smartphones. They’re fleeing for their lives.”

Soon after Hassan arrived in the UK, the Evening Standard described his story as a:

‘quiet testament to the spirit of those who seek asylum here.’

Hassan told the Standard:

“I want to pay my tax. I want to make money, I want to learn. That’s the thing about Syrians — we don’t like to do nothing, we want to be part of any society that we’re in.”

He added that he wanted to get a master’s degree in conflict resolution or development.

He said:

“Because at some point we’re going to go back home. We’re not going to be here for ever. We’re going to rebuild a country that has been destroyed.”

 REFUGEES ARE NOT ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Many in the British press and beyond would describe Hassan as an illegal immigrant. But there is no such thing as an illegal asylum seeker. And refugees are NOT migrants.

The term ‘migrant’ means a person who moves from one place to another in order to find work or better living conditions. Migrants voluntarily leave their home countries for another, and can voluntarily return home at any time.

That’s not the case for refugees. The term ‘refugee’ means a person who has been forced to leave their country in order to escape war, persecution or natural disaster.

They have to leave their homes involuntarily and they cannot return.

The vast majority of those risking their lives across the Mediterranean to reach Europe are genuine refugees, fleeing from war, torture, violence and slavery.

Back in 2015, the year Hassan made it to Britain, William Spindler, Senior Communications Officer for UNHCR told me:

“The approximate recognition rates in the EU for Syrian asylum seekers is around 95 percent and for Iraqis and Afghans it’s over 70 percent.

“In other words, the majority of Mediterranean arrivals will be recognized as refugees by EU countries.”

 SAFE COUNTRY

So, let’s be clear: there is no such thing as an illegal refugee, even if they have to use ‘illegal’ means to reach a safe country to seek asylum.

And contrary to popular myth, there is also no such law that says an asylum seeker must seek asylum in the first safe country they reach.

It is truly terrifying to find yourself unsafe and in mortal danger in your own country because your country has turned against you.

Only those who have experienced it first-hand can have any idea how it feels or its colossal impact.

Escape is the first gnawing, grim thought and ordeal – especially as most don’t manage to escape.

But then what? Once you’ve escaped, where do you escape to?

In many so-called safe countries, you might not speak their language – a huge handicap.

In many so-called safe countries, you might not feel welcome or even safe – especially in some European countries, such as Hungary, that blatantly don’t want refugees.

There are good reasons to want to find a country you can, at least for now, call home and feel safe.

 YEARNING FOR HOME

Hassan chose Britain. He was an English teacher and obviously speaks our language fluently. Making it safely to Britain resulted from his great fortitude and having him here is our good luck.

He has risked his life to get here. And now he is risking his life cleaning Covid-19 wards in a London hospital, helping our nation to get through the pandemic.

A humble role for someone clearly so talented.

Let’s thank and welcome him.

But let’s also not forget that refugees don’t flee from their countries out of choice. They do so because their lives are in desperate danger.

And the ones who make it are the minority. The majority get left behind and live terrible lives or suffer terrible deaths.

Those who flee must find deeply within themselves steely determination and courage, not just to successfully escape, but also to make whatever journey it takes to reach a country in which they feel they can call their new safe home and refuge.

What many don’t realise, because they have never been a refugee, is that for most refugees, the country they would most like to call their ‘safe home’ is the one they’ve left behind – where they were born, grew up, have family, their roots, went to school, have friends and often, a professional career.

They miss and yearn for home, their real home; a place that, for many, it may never be safe or possible to return.

 

• Watch 6-minute video which includes Hassan’s message to the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, and a trailer of the documentary, ‘Exodus: Our Journey’ showing Hassan’s treacherous journey in a dingy across the Mediterranean:

• Watch Hassan say thank you to the public for their support:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• And LinkedIn

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Because of Brexit, Britain is rapidly propelling away from Europe, involving the loss of free trade, and free movement of people, with our neighbouring countries. Is that really what Britain wants?

The UK government seems determined to close all possibilities of a successful new relationship with our closest countries on our continent.

Instead, we’re moving away from Europe and getting closer to the USA.

The talks between the UK and EU have so far ended in stalemate – and the prospects of us ending up with a no-deal Brexit now look both plausible and probable.

Does the UK government really believe that they can achieve a satisfactory trade agreement with Trump’s USA to replace our relationship with Europe?

Almost half (around 45%) of ALL UK exports go to EU countries.

By contrast, only around 20% of our exports go to the USA – yes, that’s a lot, but nowhere near the volume of trade we do with the EU.

The irony is that in the EU we could have both – it never needed to be either/or. The EU never stopped us trading with the USA or other countries across the world.

LOSS OF FREE TRADE We didn’t need to leave the EU to have good trade with the USA, or anywhere else.

In fact, leaving the EU means we lose excellent free trade deals covering over 70 countries, successfully negotiated by the EU for its members, with many more on the way.

In addition, according a Financial Times investigation, the EU has secured 759 separate EU international agreements of direct relevance to Britain. These cover trade, regulatory co-operation, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear co-operation and transport co-operation (including aviation) involving 168 countries.

The EU successfully negotiated these international agreements with other countries because it’s is the world’s largest trading bloc and the world’s largest economy, alongside the USA and China.

Furthermore, the EU is the top trading partner for 80 countries. (By comparison the US is the top trading partner for a little over 20 countries.)

So, the EU has the muscle, the reach and the negotiating skills to secure the best deals for its members. Isn’t that just one of the many membership benefits?

If, as now seems likely, we end the transition period with the EU without any ongoing deal, all those trade and international agreements must be torn up, and Britain will have to negotiate them all over again.

It will take many years, without any guarantee that we’ll get new agreements as good as, let alone better than, the agreements we’ve enjoyed as an EU member for decades.

In the EU, we had an equal, democratic say in all trade deals achieved by the EU, and a veto for trade deals directly affecting Britain.

Are we likely to have an equal say and veto with any new free trade agreement with the USA?

As a much smaller economy, we’ll be the junior partner. The UK will be a rule taker, and not a rule maker, in any new deal with the USA.

In any event, if Trump wins the next USA election, he’s already shown that he doesn’t like ‘free trade’ agreements.

It was Trump who halted the free trade agreement, TTIP, between the USA and the EU – that was close to being signed-off before he became President.

The USA cannot replace Europe as our closest and most important trading partner.

And yet, a hard Brexit means we lose free AND frictionless trade with our most valuable customers and suppliers across the EU – by far the MOST lucrative market for Britain in the entire world.

We know for sure that Brexit means we lose frictionless trade with Europe – upon which so many UK businesses, especially our car manufacturers, vitally depend.

But if as now anticipated, we leave the EU Single Market at the end of the transition period this year without any new trade deal between us, we’ll also lose free trade with Europe, with devastating consequences for the UK.

Is that really what you want? Did you ever specifically vote for THAT?

LOSS OF FREE MOVEMENT For decades, Britain has enjoyed free movement of people – both ways – with the EU. But now, the UK government has introduced a new bill to kill it.

Just as the UK is drifting away from Europe – at least politically, at least economically – our government wants to move away from the people of Europe too.

On Monday 18 May, the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill passed its initial stages in the House of Commons by 351 votes to 252.

With the Tory government enjoying a sizeable majority of 80 seats, the bill will almost certainly soon receive Royal Assent.

When it becomes law, it will end EU freedom of movement and introduce new rules, yet to be fully specified, on who can come to Britain in future.

Migration to the UK will be on a complicated points system, and anyone earning less than £25,600 a year will be automatically categorised by the government as ‘unskilled’ and therefore unwelcome.

Nor will migrants be welcome who haven’t already got a job lined up before they arrive.

The new rules would have excluded practically ALL EU citizens who are already here as care workers, refuse collectors, NHS ancillary staff, delivery drivers, transport staff and local government workers – to name but a few.

They arrived on easy-to-understand EU free movement rules and, as key workers, are essential to keeping the country going during the pandemic lockdown. (Some have lost their lives doing so).

Free movement has worked for Britain and for Europe. It’s meant that citizens of our continent can easily move between neighbouring countries, filling job vacancies as needed, here or there.

Free movement has allowed Britons to live, work, study or retire anywhere in the EU, as well as Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

Millions of Britons have made use of these freedoms over the decades.

And under EU free movement, British pensioners have had the right to move to sunnier climes in Europe, and enjoy their FULL UK state pension, and access to FREE STATE HEALTHCARE in their new country, paid for by the NHS.

Free movement was never broken, and it didn’t need fixing.

 Under the rules, EU citizens couldn’t just arrive in another EU country and claim benefits – they had to have sufficient funds to travel and to stay.

 Under the rules, EU citizens could be rejected or ejected if they were considered to pose certain risks to the country.

 Under the rules, EU citizens could enjoy the right to stay in another EU country for up to three months only, so long as they didn’t become a burden to the state.

 Under the rules, EU citizens could only legally stay longer in another EU country if they were jobseekers; workers; self-employed; students; self-sufficient; permanent residents (i.e. legally here for more than five years); or family members of one of the above.

What a brilliant system, that has served our country well – either for citizens coming here, or our citizens going there.

Now to be killed off, because the government interpreted the referendum Brexit vote as meaning the end of ‘free movement’.

Even though, just as for non-EU countries Norway and Switzerland, we could have kept free movement without having to be an EU member.

And even though, the country was never specifically asked if we wanted to end free movement with our continent.

The government just assumed we did.

 But polls show that most Britons would rather retain our freedom of movement with Europe.  Just as polls show that most Britons would rather have a close trading relationship with the EU than the US.

 

• Watch this 2-minute video that outlines what we lose with the end of free movement.

 

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• And LinkedIn

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By Adina Maricut-Akbik, Hertie School, Berlin

Since the euro crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has expanded its powers from monetary policy to banking supervision in the Eurozone. In the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), established in 2013, the ECB became responsible for the direct supervision of the largest banks of Eurozone countries. The goal was to rebuild trust in the European banking system by ensuring consistent supervision and thus increasing the resilience of banks. Smaller banks remained within the purview of national supervisors, under the indirect supervision of the ECB. The expansion of ECB powers in banking supervision was accompanied by the institutionalization of new accountability obligations vis-à-vis the European Parliament (EP), separate from monetary policy. The purpose of the article was to assess the functioning of the new accountability relationship between the ECB and the EP in banking supervision based on the practice of parliamentary questions and answers exchanged between the two institutions in the first years since the establishment of the SSM (2013-18).

 

The idea that parliaments can and should hold central banks accountable is part of the general principles of legislative oversight in democratic settings. This type of political accountability is seen as the counterpart to delegation: if a specialized task (such as banking supervision) needs to be carried out in a specific setting (like the Eurozone), the task is delegated to an actor with the expertise and policy credibility to do so (in this case the ECB). From a democratic perspective, the act of delegation needs to be countered by accountability mechanisms that seek to check whether the actor performs its tasks as intended at the moment of delegation. In the SSM, the EP does not have at its disposal the full toolbox of accountability mechanisms available to national parliaments overseeing specialized agencies. For example, the EP cannot sanction the ECB by changing its legal framework in banking supervision – a competence that belongs to national governments in the Council. However, the EP can use the tool of parliamentary questions to call the ECB to account for its supervisory decisions. Such questions can either be addressed orally in regular public hearings with the ECB’s Chair of the Supervisory Board, or in writing through letters – to which the ECB is obliged to respond within five weeks (SSM Regulation, Article 20).

 

The article shows how an interactionist approach to accountability helps to investigate the exchange of questions and answers between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the ECB. The interactionist approach is premised on the idea that in practice, accountability interactions presuppose a back-and-forth exchange between two parties: the first, known as the forum (here the EP), is legitimized to ask questions and contest the activity of the second (the actor, here the ECB), which in turn is required to engage with the contestation of the forum and justify its conduct. Accordingly, accountability interactions are envisaged in three steps, where: (I) the forum contests the decisions of the actor, (II) the actor silences, rejects or engages with said contestation and (III) the forum follows up on the issue (or not), thus continuing or ending contestation on the matter. Contestation can be weaker, when forums merely request information or justification of decisions from an actor, or stronger, when forums request changes of decision or sanctions to be applied to the actor. The interactionist approach proposes to keep an inventory of the type of questions posed by forums and the type of answers provided by actors in order to evaluate the extent of a forum’s contestation and the degree of an actor’s responsiveness within a given accountability relationship. The dataset behind the article includes 337 written questions and 369 oral questions (and as many corresponding answers) identified during the period November 2013-April 2018.

 

In the case of the EP and the ECB in banking supervision, the analysis identified a frequently-used infrastructure for political accountability that is however limited in ensuring a stronger contestation of ECB supervisory decisions. The vast majority of questions were categorised as ‘weak’ according to the interactionist approach, for various reasons: some were mere requests for policy views about legislative initiatives in the field of banking supervision, others were outside the scope of ECB competence in the SSM, and many more were demanding transparency regarding the situation at specific banks supervised by the ECB. In respect to the latter, the problem comes from the tight confidentiality rules in the SSM, which allow the ECB not to disclose information about supervisory decisions concerning individual banks. And yet these are the questions that feature most often when MEPs contest something about ECB supervisory conduct. Notwithstanding the confidentiality requirements, the ECB is generally open to engage with questions from MEPs – especially when it comes to the internal organization of the SSM or the decision-making process thereof. Moreover, in the few cases where MEPs demanded a change of conduct, the ECB demonstrated willingness to address their requests and subsequently made the required adjustments. So far, it seems that the EP can exercise more accountability when it has evidence – provided by internal parliamentary services – that the ECB acted outside the limits of its mandate in the SSM, as was the case of the 2017 Addendum to the ECB Guidance on non-performing loans.

 

Under the circumstances, the question is what can be done to improve the record of accountability interactions in the SSM. In line with the interactionist approach, what is needed is for MEPs to contest relevant issues regarding ECB conduct in banking supervision and, in turn, for the ECB to engage with contestation and change its decisions under specific circumstances. These two conditions require minimising the asymmetry of information between the two institutions, which is not an easy task. One possible solution is for MEPs to develop in‐house expertise on banking supervision in order to ensure that their questions are addressed to the relevant institution while substantively contesting [something about] the ECB conduct in the SSM. Another avenue of reform is to revise the SSM confidentiality rules by identifying specific conditions under which supervisory decisions can be disclosed, for example after a sufficient period of time has passed or after a bank was declared failing or likely to fail. The idea to completely reform professional secrecy standards applicable in the SSM is not novel, although its feasibility under the current circumstances remains low. Such a reform would require a review of the SSM legal framework, but more importantly a change of approach from the ECB leadership. The political feasibility of this reform will be decided in the years to come.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article,  Contesting the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision: Accountability in Practice at the European Parliament

 

 

Adina Maricut-Akbik is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Hertie School in Berlin. Her current research focuses on political accountability in EU economic governance and EU integration theory. Her interests also include informal politics in the European Council and the Council and inter-institutional decision-making in justice and home affairs.

@MaricutAkbik @thehertieschool

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There are lessons to be learned from the EU’s responses to the Covid-19 crisis. The pandemic reveals the absolute need for further cooperation in the EU if the member states are to manage these types of health crises effectively. Importantly, the crisis has shown that the social and economic costs of not being able to react – or reacting too late – can be enormous for the EU and its member states.

 

What is clear is that Covid-19 is unlikely to be the last of this type of health challenge to EU countries and its citizens. Antimicrobial resistance – AMR – is increasingly seen a problem that will become one of the biggest challenges for global and European public health during the next twenty to thirty years.  Like Covid-19, AMR, knows no borders. Resistant bacteria move across countries along with people, animals and goods.

 

It is estimated that AMR causes around 33,000 deaths per year in the EU, and global AMR deaths are estimated to reach 10 million deaths per year by 2050. More people are expected to die due to AMR in 2050 than due to cancer.

 

In humans, antimicrobials – like antibiotics – are being used to combat various types of bacterial infections (e.g., pneumonia) and for prophylactic purposes in connection with surgery (e.g., heart transplants or hip replacement surgery). In the veterinary sector, antimicrobials are used to combat or prevent bacterial infections among livestock animals (pigs, cattle, chickens, etc.), and even among our pets. Use of antimicrobials is an integral part of modern human medicine and modern livestock production.

 

Approximately one-third of the consumption of antimicrobials in the EU is used within the human sector, while two-thirds is used in the veterinarian sector. However, every time antimicrobials are used to combat bacterial infections, the bacteria tends to become more resistant. Today, most bacterial infections can still be treated with antimicrobials, but in the near future, there is good reason to believe that we will be facing ‘superbugs’ for which antimicrobials will have no effect.

 

Over the past decade, the EU has taken a number of steps to combat AMR at the global and European level. In many ways, the EU is taking the lead in this effort, collaborating with UN organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO). The European Commission has launched two actions plans to combat antimicrobial resistance within the EU countries. The first Action Plan was launched in 2011, and the second in 2017. Both action plans contain a number of initiatives that can help ameliorate the AMR threat.

 

The basic aim of these initiatives has been to reduce overall consumption of antimicrobials in the EU. These include a proposal to increase testing of patients before they are given antimicrobials, increased antimicrobials stewardship systems at hospitals, and limiting the use of antimicrobials in livestock production. There is a close correlation between the level of antimicrobial use and the level of AMR. Countries with high levels of antimicrobial use, such as Italy, have high levels of AMR, while countries with low levels of use of antimicrobials, such as Denmark, also have low levels of AMR. Reducing overuse of antimicrobials is therefore a central goal in the EU Commission’s action plans.

 

A major challenge to the development of a common EU AMR policy is that health policy is primarily an area of national competence. The national control over health policy is explicitly stated in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Art. 168 No. 7 TFEU). This national competence has also been the case for EU policies aimed at reducing the risk of developing AMR.

 

Consequently, the Commission is prevented from initiating regulation on antimicrobial use unless there is clear support from the member states. The Commission has thus based a number of their initiatives in the AMR action plans on ‘soft law’. Hence,  instead of laws and directives, they use ‘recommendations’ and ‘methods of open coordination’ as the regulatory instrument for reducing overuse of antimicrobials among, for example, physicians or  pig farmers. Binding legislation such as EU ‘regulations’ or ‘directives’ are seldom used in the AMR context, unless these can be directly related to the single market. From the Commission’s perspective, the use of soft law within the field of AMR can be seen as a strategic way of dealing with the lack of EU competence in this policy field in situations where there is a clear need for transnational initiatives.

 

The action plans to combat AMR launched by the Commission have definitely increased focus on AMR problems among the EU member states. Most member states have developed their own plans for how to reduce the use (and overuse) of antimicrobials at national level.

 

Yet, the overall consumption of antimicrobials in the EU remains high. One explanation for continued overuse of antimicrobials is probably that the EU actions plans are rather new, and that a number of member states until now have not been so active in the combat against AMR. Another reason could be that the use of soft law reduces the effects of the EU initiatives. Member states might feel a normative pressure to act in line with the Commission’s recommendations, but at the end of the day, they decide for themselves whether they wish to follow the recommendations. In that respect, pressure is on the member states as they have the main responsibility for reducing the consumption of antimicrobials.

 

The Covid-19 crisis has laid bare the interdependence of the EU member states when it comes to vulnerability to different types of transnational health challenges. Both Covid-19 and in the long term the risk of AMR have put pressure on the member states in order to accept a higher degree of EU policy development in relation to health policy.

 

This blog post draws on Carsten Strøby Jensen, ‘While We Are Waiting for the Superbug: Constitutional Asymmetry and EU Governmental Policies to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance,’ published in JCMS.

 

 

 Carsten Strøby Jensen is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen. His work has mainly focused on political sociology, labour market and processes of EU integration. Recently he has increasing worked with different societal aspect of the consequences of antimicrobial resistance.

 

 

 

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In a celebratory Tweet, Home Secretary Priti Patel has announced the end of ‘free movement’.

She wrote:

‘We’re ending free movement to open Britain up to the world. It will ensure people can come to our country based on what they have to offer, not where they come from.’

Her Tweet is an insult to all EU citizens who came to Britain specifically to work and who offer so much to our country.

And that represents most of them.

Because most EU citizens in this country are in gainful employment, doing jobs that we simply don’t have enough Britons to do, and who make a massive NET contribution to our Treasury and our economy.

Your Tweet, Ms Patel, demeans and diminishes them.

Those EU citizens came here because of what they could offer, and they offer so many skills that our country needs.

And yes, it was easier for them to come here because of where they are from. Because it makes sense – economically, environmentally and geographically – to have free movement between neighbouring countries.

Does ending free movement with Europe really ‘open Britain up to the world’?

No.

You are not opening up Britain ‘to the world’. You are simply applying the same rules to EU citizens that have always applied to non-EU citizens.

You are putting up new barriers to Europe, whilst keeping the same old barriers to all other continents.

With your crass Tweet, you are saying to EU citizens:

‘We don’t like where you’re from, and we don’t appreciate what you offer.’

What a slap in the face to the hard-working EU citizens offering so much to hospitals and care homes in service to the country and our citizens, especially at this time, in the middle of a pandemic.

Without EU citizens working in all sectors, trades, professions and industries right across the UK, our country would be poorer and not nearly so enriched.

Do you really know what you are doing to Britain? Or understand the divisiveness of your words and actions?

 

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‘Visit Europe from 1 January 2021’ is the title of the UK government website which ironically tells you how much more difficult visiting ‘Europe’ will be from next year.

Yes, we’re getting our country back (really?) but instead, we’re losing our continent, or at least, easy access to it.

Among some of the key points for travel throughout the EU, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland or Liechtenstein from 1 January 2021:

 You may be refused entry if your passport only has 6 months left

 The guarantee of free mobile phone roaming ends

 Your EHIC health card is only valid until 31 December 2020

 Use separate lanes from EU/EEA arrivals when queuing

 Visa requirements for long stays, business travel, work or study

 Your pet passport will no longer be valid

 Extra documents to drive

 Customs declarations for business goods

Of course, this is just the tip of the iceberg. More restrictions are likely, especially – as anticipated – we don’t get a deal this year covering our new relationship with the EU.

Brexit means ending free movement between us and our continent.

 Oh, how the people of the former Communist countries would have cherished ‘free movement’ instead of being trapped behind their Iron Curtain.  Oh, how Winston Churchill would have been amazed – shocked – that the people of Britain would volunteer to end easy access to the European mainland.

It was he who wrote to his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, on 21 October 1942, after the first British victory of the Second World War at El Alamein:

‘Hard as it is to say now.. I look forward to a United States of Europe, in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible.’

And it was he who said in his famous speech on 5 March 1946 at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri:

“The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast.”

 And yet, it’s Britain that is maximising the barriers between European nations and restricting travel.  And yet, it’s Britain that is shunning unity in Europe by making ourselves a permanent outcast. What have we done?

 

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A no-deal Brexit now looks almost certain, with the latest round of talks between the UK and the EU ending in stalemate, and the negotiations by all accounts turning acrimonious.

It’s almost as if the British government wants a no-deal, even though the non-binding ‘political statement’ of the Withdrawal Agreement, approved by the UK Parliament, called on both sides to achieve:

“a free trade area…underpinned by a level playing field”

Both sides are far away from achieving a ‘level playing field’ – with Britain insisting on retaining some EU benefits, with the EU saying you can’t pick and choose, or enjoy EU benefits without agreeing to our rules.

 Yes, the country voted for Brexit – albeit by the slimmest of margins, and with only a minority of the electorate voting for Leave

(Just 37% of the UK electorate voted for Leave – in all other mature democracies across the world that hold referendums on key issues, that would not have been enough for Leave to have won. A super majority endorsement of at least 50% of the entire electorate, and often at least 60%, would have been required before a big change could go ahead.)

 Yes, Leave was on the ballot paper, and Leave won.

But when did Britain vote for a No-Deal Brexit?

We’ve never been given any say on what type of Brexit we’ll get – and still we don’t know what Brexit we might get.

That’s like saying to the estate agent,

‘We agree to sell the house. But we’ll leave it up to you what our next home will be.’

The current transition period runs until 31 December 2020, during which time the UK continues to follow EU rules.

After that? We don’t know.

The government responded bluntly last month to an online petition requesting a Brexit transition extension:

“The transition period ends on 31 December 2020, as enshrined in UK law. The Prime Minister has made clear he has no intention of changing this. We remain fully committed to negotiations with the EU.”

As reported by The Week magazine:

‘The EU wants the UK to agree to follow its rules on fair and open competition so British companies given tariff-free access to the EU market can’t undercut their European competition.

‘The EU has warned that the UK won’t be allowed a “high-quality” market unless it signs up to EU social and environmental standards.’

If a deal can’t be agreed with the EU, then the UK will default to World Trade Organization (WTO) terms from 1 January 2021.

Every WTO member has a list of tariffs and quotas that they apply to other countries.

As The Week outlined in stark terms:

‘That means the UK would be hit by big taxes when it tried to sell products to the EU market. The bloc’s average WTO tariffs are 11.1% for agricultural goods, 15.7% for animal products and 35.4% for dairy. ‘British car makers would be hit with a 10% tariff on exports to the bloc, which could amount to €5.7bn per year. That would increase the average price of a British car sold in the EU by €3,000. ‘Currently, trade between the UK and EU is tariff-free. But the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) predicts that no-deal would mean that 90% of the UK’s goods exports to the EU would be subjected to tariffs. ‘WTO “most favoured nation” (MFN) rules mean that the UK couldn’t lower its tariffs for any specific country or bloc, such as the EU, without agreeing a trade deal.’

The EU is the UK’s biggest export and import market by far – almost half of ALL our exports go to the EU and just over half of ALL our imports come from the EU.

Even the UK government, in it’s ‘secret’ but leaked Yellowhammer report last year, detailed how a no-deal Brexit would be catastrophic for the UK, including delays at ports and food and medicine shortages.

And that’s before the government knew anything about the Covid-19 pandemic, which is sending the UK into recession, with unemployment predicted to spiral.

Back in the day, before the referendum campaign, when the Conservative government was pro-Remain, they presented the three main Brexit alternatives – all of which, said the government then, would cause damage to Britain.

① THE NORWAY OPTION – means Britain would leave the EU but still have free and frictionless access to the EU Single Market, by far Britain’s most important and lucrative export and import market. But this option would mean Britain continuing to pay the EU and obey its rules – including free movement of people – without any say in them.

② THE CANADA OPTION means Britain would have tariff free trade with the EU, but not the highly cherished and valuable frictionless trade. And there would only be limited access for our services sector, which makes up almost 80% of our economy.

③ THE WTO OPTION (often referred to as ‘no-deal’) means relying on World Trade Organisation rules. But that would mean new tariffs and complicated, costly procedures on UK trade with the EU, hurting British consumers, businesses and employment. It would also suddenly and catastrophically end all EU membership benefits, affecting all our daily lives.

None of these options were presented as choices in the referendum that voters could opt for. The only option was for Remain, or an undefined Leave.

Before the referendum, Jacob Rees-Mogg proposed a second referendum if Leave won. He said in 2011, when he was campaigning for a new referendum on Brexit:

‘We could have two referendums. As it happens, it might make more sense to have the second referendum after the renegotiation is completed.’

It makes sense now to give people a vote on the type of Brexit we want. Of course, the Tories won’t give us that.

But do remember that when, early next year, the country is likely to be in the middle of two catastrophes: Covid-19, and a no-deal Brexit.

One on top of the other will cause us deep pain.

Given a choice, wouldn’t you vote to avoid the second pain, since unlike Covid-19, it is entirely avoidable?

 

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