Ideas on Europe Blog

The first duty of all MPs is to put the safety of the country first.

Contrary to popular belief, MPs are not beholden to follow the opinions of their constituents.

• That means that MPs in constituencies that voted for Leave are not under any legal or constitutional duty to support Leave if they believe that is not in the best interests of Britain.
• Conversely, that also applies to MPs in constituencies that voted for Remain. That in itself does not mean those MPs must also support Remain, if they don’t believe it’s in Britain’s interests.

Also contrary to popular belief, MPs are not beholden to follow the result of the 2016 EU referendum.

That referendum was advisory only, not legally binding, and Parliamentarians were (and are) under no legal or constitutional obligation to ‘obey’ that referendum.

MPs are not the delegates of their constituents. They are representatives. MPs are free to act in whatever way they believe to be in the interests of the country.

Indeed, they have a solemn duty to do so. The country comes first. Their constituents and their party come second and third.

Before the referendum, Parliamentarians by a huge majority – around 70% – would have voted for the UK to remain in the EU, because they believed that was in the best interests of our country.

None of the facts have changed since then, except that a highly divisive referendum offered a different point of view, by the slimmest of margins, and by a minority of the electorate.

For complicated reasons, MPs felt bound to ‘respect’ the result of the advisory referendum, even though in the heads and hearts of most of them, they didn’t believe that Brexit was in Britain’s interests.

It’s now crunch time.

Britain is facing the worst constitutional crisis in generations. We are due to leave the EU within a few weeks, either with a deal that most MPs don’t support, or without any deal, that most MPs don’t want.

And the decision must be made next week.

Or MPs could push to give ‘the people’ a new democratic opportunity to reconsider Brexit, now we know so much more than we did in 2016. Or they could vote to revoke Article 50 and to bring an end to Brexit.

It’s time for all Parliamentarians to examine closely the onerous responsibility they must now confront.

Should they act in the narrow interests of their parties; in the fear of losing their seats if they upset their constituents, or in the overwhelming interests and safety of the UK?

There is no doubt about the first and foremost duty of MPs, overwhelmingly agreed by Parliamentary precedent and practice.

As published by our Parliament the role and duty of MPs is clearly stated by two leading authorities on the subject, the 18th Century Parliamentarian Edmund Burke, and Britain’s greatest 19th Century war leader, Winston Churchill.

In Edmund Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol on 3 November 1774 he said:

“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion …

“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.

“You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.”

And on 26 March 1955, a few days before he tendered to Her Majesty his resignation from the office of Prime Minster, Sir Winston Churchill spoke about the duties of a Member of Parliament:

He said:

“The first duty of a member of Parliament is to do what he thinks in his faithful and disinterested judgement is right and necessary for the honour and safety of Great Britain.

“His second duty is to his constituents, of whom he is the representative but not the delegate.

“Burke’s famous declaration on this subject is well known.

“It is only in the third place that his duty to party organization or programme takes rank.

“All these three loyalties should be observed, but there in no doubt of the order in which they stand under any healthy manifestation of democracy.”

We have heard that a number of MPs have received death threats by people who disagree with the way they are speaking and voting. That is reprehensible, and entirely unacceptable.

As the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow made clear  yesterday:

“The sole duty of every Member of Parliament is to do what he or she thinks is right.”

Please support your MP to do what they believe is right for the country. That’s their first and foremost duty, regardless of your opinion, or mine.

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For younger readers, Millwall FC garnered much public interest in the 1980s for their forthright style of football and their supporters, whose chant of “nobody likes us, but we don’t care” resounded around stadiums (and punch-ups). Yes, things have moved on, but still the label has hung around.

Theresa May hasn’t yet got into any fist-fights, but she does seem to have adopted the F-Troop motto in these dying days of Article 50.

And they are dying days. With scarcely a week left, there is much talk of an extension, but the EU27 have been clear that re-negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement remains off the table, so this is essentially about whether the UK signs up or shoves off.

May’s strategy of “my deal or no-deal” has led her inexorably to the current place and as last night’s televised statement showed, she has now reached a point of not even trying to sell the Agreement on its merits, but rather as the only way out of the impasse she has had a large part in creating.

Impressively, she appears to have turned some MPs that might have come round to supporting her in a Meaningful Vote 3 into much more vociferous opponents than before. The entire structure of her statement was that it was the Commons’ fault that delays had occurred and were to blame for it all: an odd strategy ahead of a vote early next week that would unlock the short Art.50 extension she had asked for just earlier that day.

And it’s not only the Commons that May doesn’t appear to be trying to charm. The EU too has been deeply unimpressed by her management of the extension request itself.

It has been clear for several weeks that an extension was necessary, and it’s always been clear that European Councils can’t make decisions there and then – especially if, as here, there’s been no prior discussion of positions – so to leave a request until 24 hours ahead of the meeting was always a recipe for further delay. Further complicate that by, a) not clearly asking for one particular length of extension, and b) more importantly, offering no justification for the extension other than a vague hope that “this time it’ll be different” on the Meaningful Vote, and it’s no surprise that the Commission and EU27 are spitting feathers.

This is all the odder for May’s approach hitherto of asking the EU to do her a favour in Art.50: this is such a slap in the face to them and makes granting an extension all the more difficult that one has to wonder what’s going on in Number 10.

As ever, I resist the “she’s stupid” explanation, because that neither helps us very much nor does it actually fit the evidence.

Instead, this all speaks to two general ideas.

The first is that May hasn’t got a Plan B. In keeping with the rest of her political career, she has set on a course and she will stick to that come hell or high water, unless and until she absolutely is forced to abandon it. And remember, that was an approach that didn’t always work, but did work enough to get her into Number 10, so the chances of her changing that model now are minimal.

The second is that nobody else has a viable plan. As much as it’s bad politics for May to tell everyone that they have no choice to do do as she wishes, it’s also apparent that everyone else is struggling to build up an alternative path through all this that might command broad support.

Yes, the choices still remain the same: revocation, deal or no-deal, with a side order of extension to delay having to choose among these. But none those combinations is the clear challenger to May’s approach.

The EU can’t do much more than set out conditions for an extension and hope the UK complies; Parliament can’t decide if it wants to take control of the process and, even if it does, where it might go; Tories talk a lot about removing May, but don’t do it; Cabinet is unhappy, but passive.

All of which brings us back to Millwall’s latest signing.

The post The Millwallisation of May’s Brexit strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Over the weekend, I had a twitter conversation about who is a climate researcher. Twitter is obviously not the place for deeper and complex conversations. Thus, this blog post explains my argument that it is not helpful to debate who is or is not a climate researcher, instead climate research requires interdisciplinary dialogue and cooperation in order to solve the multiple crises we are facing.

Let me start by outlining the argument I met this weekend. A climate researcher is someone who research the physical and chemical processes in the atmosphere!

I do not disagree that such a person is a climate researcher. My point is that climate research and climate change is much broader because it affects all elements of life on Earth. The changes in the atmosphere affect our ecological systems and socio-economic structures. Thus, everything is connected and to be able to understand these connections we need to talk across disciplines to find ways of breaking the current structures that are causing climate change.

It is not helpful that natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, engineering etc. are standing in our own corner looking at the big climate elephant in the middle of the room whilst trying to understand it from our own perspective. By focusing on disciplinary research alone, we only understand parts of the climate elephant. What we need is for natural scientists and social scientists to talk together. For example, natural scientists show how climate change affects our ecological systems, whilst social scientists identify how socio-economic structures contribute to climate change. Similar, engineering develops technological solutions to mitigate climate change. In short, we need each other to develop successful climate mitigations at all levels and across all areas.

Importantly, many of us are already work with colleagues in other fields on shared climate change problems, which we only can solve through shared research.  Similarly, research grants increasingly require us to develop interdisciplinary research proposals, which often end up with different fields of social sciences, e.g. politics, sociology and geography, working together. Indeed, we need to think wider in terms of our research partners and we have to start talking with colleagues in other fields, who are looking at similar climate change issues. It is only through interdisciplinary research that we can change the projections in the IPCC reports and achieve a low carbon society in 2050.

Does it matter how we define ourselves? Of course, but limiting the definition of a climate researcher to someone studying the atmosphere is not useful when all research from all fields show that climate change is affecting us all in many different ways. Thus, let us move on from this debate over definitions, and instead talk about how we together can solve the climate crises. After all, that is what all the students striking last Friday 15th March, were asking us grownups to do.

The post Climate change: We need more interdisciplinary dialogue and research appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

At the end of 2018, the UACES  Gendering EU Studies Research Network and the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) brought together a group of academics, civil society, policy makers, practitioners and military officials who work on gender to consider the integration of gender into peace and security from a European perspective. The resulting discussions shed light on some of the current challenges and future opportunities to realising an inclusive vision of peace and security and the transformative potential of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Despite the different backgrounds and perspectives of participants, some key issues emerged which we consider further here. They related to ownership, advocacy, insider-outside coalitions and ensuring the change we pursue is the ‘right’ change.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is encapsulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the seven follow-up resolutions (UNSCR 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242). It calls for women’s inclusion in peace and security, but also highlights their particular needs in conflict and post-conflict situations. It calls on the UN and member states to integrate gender into their peace and security apparatus. As the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) highlight, the WPS agenda has transformative potential or ‘the potential to escape cycles of conflict, to create inclusive and more democratic peacemaking and to turn from gender inequality to gender justice’.

Who can claim ownership of the Women, Peace and Security agenda? The UN, many member states and regional organisations including the EU, NATO, African Union (AU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) all claim the relevance of WPS to their own work through their respective policies on the issue. This is in many respects a positive development, yet, it also requires reflection. WPS did not originate out of thin air with the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the UN Security Council in 2000. Indeed, the Resolution built on decades of feminist organising inside and outside of the UN. From The International Women’s Congress in The Hague in 1915 to the UN Conference on Women in 1995. This knowledge building created the space to consider a reconceptualisation of what ‘peace’ and ‘security’ mean for those whose needs are often marginalised or excluded from such policy considerations. It is crucial that academia, civil society and those working within institutions on WPS acknowledge this, as well as the global nature of the WPS agenda.

At a European level, much scholarship has emerged to examine regional engagement with WPS by actors such as the EU and NATO. While this is welcome, it also bears reflection that Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (which has been the focus of much of this research) is not the only EU policy area for which gender is relevant. If, as we claim, the EU and EU Studies are co-constitutive – meaning that the way we study the EU ‘shapes the way we understand it and determines which elements take center stage’ – then feminist scholars need to be cognisant not to reify a narrow militaristic definition of security, and relatedly the relevance of WPS, in their own work. They need to heed the warning of their civil society counterparts.

As we approach the 20th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 we can see that there has been much progress. Yet, in many countries, including within Europe, we see pushback and regression on gender equality. Gender and gender studies are under attack and often branded as ‘gender ideology’. We are then at a critical juncture for the WPS agenda, will it go forward or will it go backwards? And will we know what distinguishes these two trajectories? In order to ensure we are pursuing the ‘right’ change gender advocates need to be reflective. This means considering whose security are we talking about? How do we make sure it is as inclusive as possible? And, who do we involve in addressing these security concerns?

Within our own fields (be it the military, policymaking, civil society or academia) we also face push back. Be it day-to-day microaggressions because of our work as gender advocates or the still all too common assumption that ‘gender’ = ‘women’. Something only reinforced by the title of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (even if it does encompass gender mainstreaming and provisions for men and boys). This speaks to one of the compromises made to ensure the UN Security Council would adopt the WPS agenda, ‘gender’ was felt to be too ‘political’ for some members of the Security Council to palate. Naming the agenda Women, Peace and Security also centered women and moved them away from the margins of peace and security. Yet this decision has contributed to reinforcing perceptions that gender is only applicable to women.

Building on this, our discussions also drew attention to the fact that men’s experiences of ‘doing’ gender are often very different to women. Often their expertise is not questioned in the same way as women’s often is. Men can also face an assumption that it is somehow more noteworthy that they are engaging with gender issues than their women colleagues (again often built on a false premise that gender = women). Practically, men as gender advocates can use their positions to draw attention to the work of women colleagues in this area (who may not be getting credit which is due), they can also refuse to participate in all-male panels which we found to be an issue across all our areas of work.

The symbolic exclusion of women remains pervasive across civil society, policymaking, academia and military circles. Yet women’s inclusion across peace and security issues is a key underlying principle of the WPS agenda. Women’s absence is noticeable in the all-male panels which are still evident in some panels at conferences such as the 2018 Paris Peace Forum and the International Studies Association (UACES has now banned all-male panels). Some of the responses often received by those who call out an all-male panel are nicely summarised in these bingo cards produced by Sam Cook (and free to download). One token women on a panel is just as damaging as an all-male panel, with that women effectively speaking for all women as a homogenous group. Having no women is a visible representation of a silence in the field. How do we ensure the message of representation and inclusion is heard?

For feminist academics within the discipline of Politics and International Relations there are signs of progress, with many Universities now actively appointing gender scholars. And while this is welcome, there is a real danger that these scholars then come to embody the institution’s commitment to gender equality at the expense of real structural change. The same could be said for the appointment of Gender Advisors in militaries or at the EU or NATO, and gender positions within civil society organisations. We need to be careful that this does not let others of the hook for their own responsibilities for ‘knowing’ gender.

The feedback we received from the workshop highlighted the value of conversations across silos. Bringing together academia, civil society, policy makers and military demonstrated some of the commonalities in the challenges we face. It provided a space to share lessons and strategies from our own experiences. So how can ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ better support each other? Part of the answer certainly lies in recognising the value of situated and experiential knowledge of gender as well as that gleamed from scholarship endeavour (see also Aiko Holvikiki’s discussion of this). There are significant experiences in our shared experiences as gender advocates, learning from each other has to be part of pushing for transformative change to the current flawed peace and security architecture.

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The workshop was held on the 26- 27th November 2018 at Quaker House in Brussels under Chatham House rule. It was co-convened by the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) and the Academic Association for European Studies (UACES) Gendering EU Studies Research Network. It also received funding from Newcastle University. We would like to thank all the participants for their contributions.

About QCEA: The Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) works to bring a vision based on the Quaker commitment to peace, justice and equality to Europe and its institutions. It does so through a peace and a human rights programme through its publications, a quiet diplomacy approach and through its networks such as the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office and Human Rights and Democracy Network.   It recently published Building Peace Together, which makes the case for peacebuilding, including through gender inclusiveness.

About the UACES Gendering EU Studies (GES) Research Network: is funded by UACES and brings together a rich and growing body of work in the area of gender and EU politics and policies. The Research Network seeks to explore and challenge the obstacles which curtail feminist influence in EU Studies and leave gender analysis on the periphery.

The authors and conveners of the workshop:

Olivia Caeymaex (QCEA), Katharine A. M. Wright, Newcastle University (GES)
Hanna Muehlenhoff, University of Amsterdam (GES), Toni Haastrup, University of Kent (GES, Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey (GES), Annick Masselot, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (GES)

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The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, this week described the vote by UK MPs to block a no-deal Brexit in any circumstances as, “the Titanic voting for the iceberg to get out of the way.”

It’s worse than that. The entire Brexit fiasco has sunk our democracy, leading the country to disaster.

Yes, Brexit is the iceberg, our Parliament is the Titanic, and we are heading for one almighty crash.

There is no band playing, there is no re-arranging of the deckchairs.

Instead, at the very last minute, MPs have been discussing amendment after amendment, voting on the same déjà vu deal over and again, and traipsing in and out of lobbies, whilst an imminent and crushing Brexit impact is just days away.

The country is now close to a state of emergency, with a government minister admitting that he’s the world’s biggest buyer of fridges, so that vital medicines can be stockpiled as they will be in short supply if we default to a ‘no deal’ Brexit.

Businesses across the country are in a state of panic and distress as the government has suddenly announced new tariffs that will be applied to exports and imports if ‘no deal’ happens.

Dover and other Channel ports are bracing themselves for months of disruption if we leave without a deal.

And really, all that is just the tip of the iceberg.

• How on earth did the country spend three tiresome years navigating itself to this?
• And is there now any quick and easy emergency escape from the chaos that now confronts us?

The answer to the first question is complicated, but in a nutshell, the journey to where we are now started off as being entirely undemocratic.

If democratic principles and safeguards had been applied from the start, we would not now be in such a calamitous situation.

And the answer to the second question is yes, there is a quick and easy way out of this. (But you’ll have to read on to find out what it is).

The assault on our democracy began when, in 2015, Parliament approved a referendum on EU membership which, because it was advisory only, did not have the same checks and balances of a legally binding vote.

Then the government responded to the referendum result as if it was a legally binding decision, but at the same time, not allowing our Parliament the usual scrutiny and oversight that should have followed an advisory-only referendum.

If the referendum had been legally binding, then Parliament would have set a minimum threshold for Leave winning – just as Parliament did for the 1979 referendum on whether Scotland should have its own assembly.

On that occasion, ‘Yes’ won 52% to 48% – just like the EU referendum.

But ‘Yes’ didn’t win, because Parliament had set a minimum threshold of 40% of the electorate having to vote for an assembly before Scotland could have one.

Less than 40% of the Scottish electorate voted for an assembly, so on that occasion the ‘Yes’ vote failed.

Only 37% of the electorate voted for Leave in the EU referendum. So, if the same rules had applied as the 1979 referendum, Leave would not have won.

In any event, Leave should not have won with only 37% of the electorate voting for it.

Most democratic countries across the world that have referendums would not allow such a minority vote to win such a major referendum.

Indeed, even your local golf club would not allow 37% of its members to change their constitution.

But there’s worse.

We now know that the Leave campaigns only won – by the slimmest of margins – because of lying, cheating and law breaking.

• They overspent what’s allowed under electoral law by a significant margin.
• Masses of stolen personal data were used to target potential voters in illegal ways.
• The Electoral Commission is suspicious that millions of pounds given to the Leave.eu campaign originated from a foreign source – which would be illegal.
• There are now several ongoing criminal investigations into Leave campaigns and campaigners (none against Remain).

And here’s the rub.

If the referendum had been a legally binding vote, then under UK law, such illegalities and irregularities of such magnitude would have resulted in the referendum result being annulled by the courts.

But as the referendum was an advisory exercise only, it escaped such legal scrutiny – even though the referendum result was treated as if it was legally binding.

The courts cannot annul an advisory vote in the same way that a legally-binding vote can be annulled when serious irregularities may have affected the result.

It could all have been so different.

Following the referendum, the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, could have appointed a Royal Commission to explore and decide which form of Brexit was viable and then asked Parliament if it wanted to do that Brexit.

Instead, Mrs May was in a hurry to trigger the Article 50 notice by bypassing Parliament, using the ancient and arcane ‘Royal Prerogative’.

Gina Miller’s legal challenge stopped that.

The Supreme Court confirmed that the referendum was only an advisory exercise and that the decision to leave the EU had to be taken by Parliament.

However, Parliament wasn’t given an opportunity to decide whether the UK should leave the EU.

The then Brexit Secretary, David Davis, erroneously advised Parliament that such a Parliamentary decision wasn’t necessary, as ‘the decision’ to leave had already been taken by the referendum.

A ‘decision’ that the Supreme Court had already ruled that the referendum wasn’t capable of making.

Mr Davis told Parliament that, since the ‘decision’ to leave the EU was already made, all that Parliament was required to do was to give the Prime Minister authority to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave.

Parliament was presented with one of the shortest bills ever, ‘The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill’.

When Parliament passed this Act to give power to Theresa May to notify the EU of a decision that had yet to be made, the world was led to believe that Parliament had voted to leave the EU.

Nothing of the sort had happened.

Parliament has never actually debated and voted on the specific question of whether the UK should leave the EU.

• So, since the referendum couldn’t make a decision to leave the EU, and Parliament didn’t make the decision, who did?

That mystery was unravelled in June last year, at a ‘permission hearing’ in the High Court regarding the validity of Article 50.

That hearing established that the Prime Minister, Theresa May, exclusively and individually made the executive decision for the UK to leave the EU.

Lord Justice Gross and Mr Justice Green unusually made their judgment citable and ruled that the decision to leave the EU was contained in the Prime Minister’s Article 50 notification letter of 29 March 2017, to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council.

[∞ Link to judgement]

In that letter, the Prime Minister stated that ‘the people of the United Kingdom’ had made ‘the decision’ to leave the EU, even though the Supreme Court had ruled that the referendum was advisory only and not legally entitled or capable of making any decision.

She then erroneously advised Mr Tusk that ‘the decision’ to leave the EU had been ‘confirmed’ by the United Kingdom Parliament.

Parliament had only given the Prime Minister permission to give notice to the EU of an ‘intention’ to withdraw from the EU. That’s not at all the same as a specific decision to leave.

Had Parliament been asked following the advisory referendum to debate and specifically vote on whether the UK should leave the EU, a bill to this effect would have required a plan, impact assessments and evidence from all the Brexit committees.

Parliament has recently been asked twice if it wants to leave the EU on the terms negotiated by the Prime Minister.

The House of Commons has twice voted NO with historic majorities.

Parliament is deadlocked because the executive tricked us all by asking Parliament the wrong question following the referendum.

The question put to Parliament following the referendum should have been the same one that the UK electorate was asked:

‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’

Asking Parliament instead if it will give permission for the Prime Minister to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave is not at all the same as a debate and vote on whether we should remain or leave.

Now, Parliament is alarmed that we are just days from crashing out of the EU without any deal, which almost all politicians – and businesses – agree will cause chaos.

At the last minute, this week Parliament voted by a large majority that the UK must not leave the EU without a deal.

But the Dutch Prime Minister, who compared that to, “the Titanic voting for the iceberg to get out of the way,” was depressingly right.

Parliament has no power to stop the UK leaving without a deal.

Our Parliamentarians have been led into a cul-de-sac by a cunning government, which has acted dictatorially rather than democratically, and in their own narrow interests, rather than that of the country.

The only way to avoid a ‘no deal’ exit is for Parliament to either ratify Theresa May’s deal, or revoke Article 50.

Extending Article 50 will merely push back the impact of the iceberg, and doesn’t take away the potential danger.

(Although a delay would give time for a new referendum on Brexit, so ‘the people’ could decide whether they accept ‘the only deal on the table’ or to remain in the EU after all. However, so far, Parliament has voted against having another referendum).

• So, what’s the easy way out of Brexit that was promised at the start of this article?

Since it’s been demonstrated in the High Court that it was the Prime Minister alone who made ‘the decision’ to leave the EU, she also has the power to undo what she has done.

The most sensible and honourable course for the Prime Minister to take now would be to revoke her Article 50 notice and order a Brexit Inquiry.

She can do this entirely on her own without any statute or Parliamentary approval.

The Inquiry would have to explore how our country:

• was taken on an undemocratic course to calamity;
• on the ‘decision’ of a minority of the electorate;
• in a non-binding vote, that was only won by illegalities and irregularities;
• of such breath-taking proportions, that had the referendum been a legally binding vote, it would have been annulled.

Yes, Brexit is a titanic sham.

 

• Thanks to Liz Webster for her assistance on this article.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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Participants of the Madrid meeting, December 2018. Photo credits: S4D4C

Including science and technology as key dimensions of foreign policy and international relationships at different political levels is one of the calls backed by a group of scientists, research administrators, officials and policy makers. They see a confluence of interests in the benefit of both the scientific endeavour as well as legitimate broader political and societal objectives.

After a meeting in Madrid ‘EU Science Diplomacy beyond 2020’, organized by S4D4C, a Horizon 2020 funded initiative coordinated by Austria’s Centre for Social Innovation, a group developed the “Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy” which aims to foster agreement and raise awareness about the need to strengthen science diplomacy strategies and practices world-wide.

Science diplomacy is often not fully exploited at all levels of governance, and especially at supranational levels: A greater scientific voice would add value to bi- and multilateral discussions and decisions about global challenges and directly or indirectly serving to advance diplomatic goals. More explicit science diplomacy strategies would allow for a more effective alignment of interests and a more efficient coordination of resources. It is an extremely useful tool for addressing global challenges and for improving international relationships as long as it is not distorted by ideological goals compromising the independence of science. Thus, science diplomacy should be given a greater role in efforts to solve global challenges and promote sustainable development.

The Madrid Science Diplomacy declaration sees science diplomacy as a multi-actor effort in which diplomats, scientists and science managers as well as other non- state actors can have a role and can contribute to its deployment. This applies at the local, regional, national and international level. This innovative model brings new governance and coordination mechanisms that need to be managed in dialogue with all stakeholders.

The reach of the declaration is truly global, the declaration features signatories from India, the United States, Latin America and Korea as well as several international scientific institutions.

This blog post has been prepared by the representatives of the S4D4C consortium.

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As we move into the final weeks of the original Article 50 time period, it is useful to try and round up several aspects of the EU27’s positions, insofar as they impinge on the UK’s decisions (which is to say, a lot). As much as Parliament is caught up in working out what it might accept, it is essential that this is done in the context of understanding the EU side, given that this is a negotiation.

Renegotiation and the backstop

The first stopping point on this has to be the question of renegotiation.

The EU, both collectively and in its member states, has been very firm that it will not consider renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement itself, although that does not preclude discussions on the Political Declaration or another document to provide elaboration of position.

However, those discussions will not include the kinds of changes still being discussed in Westminster, such as an end-date to the backstop or an unilateral exit clause.

This is best understood as a function of three elements that have reinforced the firmness of the EU’s stance.

Firstly, the Irish border issue has long been framed in terms that make it very hard indeed for the EU to move on its requirements. The Irish government was very successful in its lobbying of the Union and other member states that the border issue was an fundamental one for Ireland, that also threatened several core EU values, not least the peace project on the island that the Union has long supported and promoted. Moreover, other small member states have recognised that leaving Ireland exposed on this at any point much cause problems should they themselves need help on something in future.

Secondly, the EU view the backstop as something that they have already made major compromises on: the temporary customs arrangement was a concession to the UK and causes substantial concern in several member states, on the grounds that it gives the UK unfair access to the EU, including for smuggling. To be told that it is the UK that has given all the ground has not made a positive impression in Brussels or elsewhere.

Thirdly, the British approach to date has been to offer problems, rather than solutions. Dislike of the backstop is well-understood, but the repeated request on the EU side is for detailed proposals on how to address this, to which very little has been forthcoming. The EU sees it as the UK’s responsibility to take the lead, given that it is the one that will be leaving and since it should know better what is likely to be acceptable to Parliament.

Extension

Of increased importance is the matter of an extension to Article, 50 since even the most problem-free path to approving the Withdrawal Agreement seems to be taking the UK past 29 March.

The EU’s position is cautiously framed at present, but the main thrust appears to be that it is willing to consider and agreed to an extension. However, this comes with several caveats.

Procedurally, it must be remembered that the EU27 have to give unanimous approval to an extension. This leaves open the possibility of one or more states pressing from side-payments, especially if they are not so exposed to the direct effects of a no-deal Brexit: this possibility would only grow if there were to be future requests for further extensions.

Politically, the EU has long-underlined that extension must be for a purpose: it cannot be given simply in the hope that something might pop up. Thus a short extension to allow the UK to complete ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement and/or enabling legislation would be acceptable, as would a longer extension for a general election or referendum that would have a material impact on British government policy.

The European elections will be one major issue in all this.

Recall that that European Parliament has to approve the Withdrawal Agreement too: its last sitting is 18 April, so it cannot give that approval between then and 2 July, when it first sits post-election.

Legal advice to both the UK and EU suggests that an extension to the end of June would be unproblematic, since while the UK would not participate in the elections, MEPs would not be sitting. However, that bumps up against the need for approval of the Agreement, not to mention that the Court of Justice – if asked – might come to a different view on the need for elections on 23 May.

If the UK remains a member states past the end of June without MEPs, then this would be an infringement of Art.223 TFEU, which requires direct elections: proposals to second or appoint MEPs have been floated, but without any great support to date.

However, if the UK does hold elections and/or appoints MEPs, then this is also problematic. The Parliament forms its groups on the basis of minimum numbers of MEPs from a minimum number of member states: currently two groups would not meet the threshold without UK MEPs. Groups matter because they also determine the allocation of Parliament’s officers, speaking time and funding, even before it gets to the matter of voting for the new Commission in the late summer. Those member states that are due to receive additional seats post-Brexit would also have to work out whether to elect to these seats pre-Brexit.

No-Deal

Behind all of this is the concern over a no-deal Brexit, something that is a clear and substantial concern for all EU member states and its institutions.

While the primary effort has been directed to secured a Withdrawal Agreement, there has also been very substantial work (especially in the past year) on preparing for a no-deal outcome. The consistent advice from many national agencies in the EU27 has been that until there is a signed and ratified Withdrawal Agreement, there is nothing and business and individuals would be sensible to prepare as such.

The extent of resources available can be gauged from the websites available from the Commission and the governments of Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark (to take just the immediate neighbourhood): each provides a lot of information on the impact of no-deal for assorted groups and individuals. These also highlight the substantive funding that has gone into place already, including 580 new customs officials in France and 400 in Ireland.

However, despite the very substantial range of work, it is also evident that very major gaps remain. As the Institute for Government notes, only Germany, Cyprus and Malta will have full legislation in place to protect UK citizens’ rights by 29 March: Spain will only have arrangements ready in relation to voting, rather than residence or access to services. Likewise, reports from various member states report very incomplete preparation by businesses (especially smaller ones), which will make the impact of the uncertainty generated by a no-deal even more substantial.

Finally, it should be noted that a no-deal would also strongly condition how member states and the EU approach any subsequent negotiations. The first priorities will be any life-critical systems not already addressed, but then the focus will be on securing the resolution of the content of the Withdrawal Agreement – that is citizens’ rights, financial liabilities and the Irish backstop – before any discussion of future trading arrangements. Given that the UK would no longer be a member state at that point, there is no indication that there would be any immediate reason to offer more generous terms on these points than are already embodied in the Agreement.

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Outside the EU, we’ll only have a say in our country, and there will be barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world.

But inside the EU, we have a say in our country AND our continent, and enjoy NO barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world (by far).

Brexiters say we must have full sovereignty over Britain. Why would that be a good thing?

The definition of sovereignty is ‘supreme power or authority’. Only one country in the world has that. North Korea.

But whilst North Korea has cast iron sovereignty over its nation and people, in the outside world it has very little power, authority or influence.

Indeed, North Korea is considered to be a pariah state, shunned and excluded by the outside world, and with tough sanctions imposed upon it.

In the modern, rational, democratic world, countries recognise that sharing some sovereignty actually increases their power and strength….and sovereignty.

NATO countries realise that in their promise to come to the immediate aid of another NATO country under attack. That’s a classic example of sharing power and sovereignty.

Brexiters say that Britain was misled into thinking that the European Community was only ever about free trade. That, of course, is nonsense – which any cursory study of history will reveal.

The European Economic Community (now called the European Union) was always about a Union of countries sharing some of their power, sovereignty and strength for the common good.

Back in 1961, when Britain first applied to join the European Community, there was much talk about what impact joining would have on Britain’s sovereignty.

The then Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, explained to the British people:

“Accession to the Treaty of Rome would not involve a one-sided surrender of ‘sovereignty’ on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty by all concerned, mainly in economic and social fields.

“In renouncing some of our own sovereignty we would receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by other members.”

Mr Macmillan added:

“The talk about loss of sovereignty becomes all the more meaningless when one remembers that practically every nation, including our own, has already been forced by the pressures of the modern world to abandon large areas of sovereignty and to realise that we are now all inter-dependent.

“No country today, not even the giants of America or Russia, can pursue purely independent policies in defence, foreign affairs, or the economic sphere.

“Britain herself has freely made surrenders of sovereignty in NATO and in many other international fields on bigger issues than those involved in the pooling of sovereignty required under the Treaty of Rome.”

Almost 60 years later, one might have thought these issues would have been settled and agreed by now.

But it seems some British people (actually, they most often refer to themselves as ‘English’ rather than British) do not accept this idea of sharing some sovereignty for the common good.

They want England to have ‘supreme power’, meaning complete sovereign rule over its nation and its people, presumably just like in the ‘good old days’ when England had supreme power over its nation, its citizens and its Empire.

For those of us who belong to the modern world, we can see this makes no sense.

Britain is part of a planet that increasingly needs to work together with other nations, and working together, means sharing some power and agreeing some rules.

That’s our road to more civilisation, safely and prosperity.

That, of course, is the great strength of the European Union. 28 neighbouring countries coming together to share power and influence for the common good. It’s a huge success.

The EU is the world’s most successful economic, trade and political union of countries. No one can deny that the EU is the world’s biggest, richest trading bloc, and that it has considerable influence in the world.

Brexit means less sovereignty. In the EU, we gain sovereignty over our continent. In the EU, we have MORE control, not less.

Let’s not throw that away by retreating into an island mentality. Having 100% sovereignty – like North Korea – will not make Britain Great. It will make us small.

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Being a member of the EU costs us only around 34p a day each. That’s a bargain, especially as the value of EU benefits far outweigh the cost.

The Confederation of British Industry has estimated that EU membership is worth around £3,000 a year to every British family — a return of nearly £10 for each £1 we pay in.

So, in reality, EU membership costs nothing – it makes Britain, and Britons, better off.

(Source: CBI)

Article continues after one-minute video:

The calculations for our annual EU membership fee have been published by the UK’s Office of National Statistics.

(Source: ONS)

When deducting from the EU membership fee all the money we get back from the EU, including our £5 billion rebate that’s never actually sent to the EU, the net cost of EU membership in 2016 was only £8.1 billion – or £156 million a week, or just 34p per person per day

That’s far short of the claim made on Boris Johnson’s campaign bus that we send £350m a week to the EU. That was entirely incorrect.

But after the referendum, the Vote Leave campaign director, Dominic Cummings wrote:

“Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests no.”

(Source: Spectator)

So, we are leaving the EU based on a whopper of a lie (actually, lots of whopping lies).

Ok, if Mr Johnson had instead put ‘£156m a week’ on his bus, it would still have seemed a lot of money. But something Brexiters never like to do is reveal how much we get back in return for the membership fee.

Back in 2011, this was estimated by the government to be between £30 billion and £90 billion a year – a return of between 800% and 2370%.

(Source: UK government)

Can anyone name any other government expenditure that gives a return of over 800%?

Let’s put this in another context.

In 2016, the government spent £814.6 billion on all aspects of public spending. This means that the net annual EU membership fee represented only 1% of all UK government expenditure. (A miniscule amount).

Furthermore, the EU funds many thousands of projects in the UK every year, that our national government would be unlikely to finance. Such as Liverpool’s John Lennon Airport, or superfast broadband in Cornwall.

(Source: European Commission)

In addition, across Europe, our annual membership fee helps to fund projects that benefit our continent and its people as a whole – such as Galileo, to give Europe its own satellite navigation system.

And the Horizon 2020 project – the world’s biggest multinational research programme, funding leading-edge research in all aspects of science and innovation that will directly benefit all EU citizens.

Individual European countries could not afford to take on the projects that the EU helps to fund for the welfare and prosperity of its half-a-billion citizens.

The advantages of EU membership considerably outweigh the cost of membership. So, why are we leaving?

I cannot find one valid or validated benefit for Brexit. Not even one.

Indeed, by NOT paying the annual EU membership fee, we will all be poorer, according to the UK government’s own impact assessment reports.

(Source: The Guardian)

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Britain’s vote to leave the EU has produced a wealth of books, which should come as no surprise given the unprecedented challenges and debates it has led to in the UK, the rest of Europe and around the world. Recently published in International Politics Review, ‘Brexitology: delving into the books on Brexit’ covers almost 60 books. It looks at the full range of books published in the run-up to and after the referendum, ending with books published in late 2018.

It offers a way of breaking down the literature into seven manageable topics: how to study Brexit; the history of UK–EU relations; the referendum campaign; explaining the result, Britain’s Brexit; Europe’s Brexit; and Global Brexit. The review identifies some common themes in the books so far published and looks at what the future holds for this topic.’

Full article – Brexitology: Delving into the books on Brexit – can be found here– https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-018-0069-1

Books reviewed or referenced in the review—

• Adonis, A. (2018). Half in, half out: Prime ministers on europe. London: Biteback.
• Armour, J., & Eidenmüller, H. (Eds.). (2017). Negotiating Brexit. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
• Armstrong, K. (2017). Brexit time: Leaving the EU—Why, how and when?. Cambridge: CUP.
• Ashcroft, M., & Culwick, K. (2016). Well, you did ask… why the UK voted to leave the EU. London: Biteback.
• Bailey, D., & Budd, L. (2017). The political economy of Brexit. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Banks, A. (2016). The bad boys of Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Barnett, A. (2017). The lure of greatness: England’s Brexit and America’s Trump. Kansas City: Unbound.
• Bennett, O. (2016). The Brexit club. London: Biteback.
• Bickerton, C. (2016). The European Union: A citizens guide. London: Penguin.
• Booker, C., & North, R. (2005). The great deception: Can the European Union survive?. New York City: Continuum.
• Buckledee, S. (2018). The language of Brexit: How Britain talked its way out of the European Union. London: Bloomsbury.
• Cato the Younger. (2017). Guilty men: Brexit edition. London: Biteback.
• Clarke, H., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Brexit: Why Britain voted to leave the European Union. Cambridge: CUP.
• Clegg, N. (2017). In his how to stop Brexit (and make Britain great again). New York City: Vintage.
• Connelly, T. (2017). Brexit and Ireland: The dangers, the opportunities, and the inside story of the Irish response. London: Penguin.
• Diamond, P., Nedergaard, P., & Rosamond’s, B. (2018). The Routledge handbook of the politics of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Dinan, D., Nugent, N., & Paterson’s, E. W. (Eds.). (2017). The European Union in crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Drozdiak, W. (2017). Fractured continent: Europe’s crises and the fate of the west. New York City: W.W. Norton.
• Dunt, I. (2016 and updated in 2018). Brexit: What the hell happens now? Kingston upon Thames: Canbury Press.
• Fossum, J. E., & Graver’s, H. P. (2018). Squaring the circle on Brexit: Could the Norway model work?. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Gamble, A. (2003). Between Europe and America: The future of British politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• George, S. (1998). An awkward partner: Britain in the European community. Oxford: OUP.
• Gibbon, G. (2017). His breaking point: The UK referendum on the EU and its aftermath. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Glencross, A. (2016). Why the UK voted for Brexit. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Green, D. A. (2017). Brexit: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: OUP.
• Hannan, D., & Next, W. (2016). How to get the best from Brexit. London: Head of Zeus.
• Hassan, G., & Gunson’s, R. (Eds.). (2017). Scotland and the UK after Brexit. A guide to the future. Edinburgh: Luath Press.
• Hillman, J., & Horlick, G. (Eds.) (2017). Legal Aspects of Brexit: Implications of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the EU. Washington: Institute of International Economic Law.
• Humphreys, R. (2018). Beyond the border: The Good Friday agreement and irish unity after Brexit. Kildare: Merrion Press.
• Kearns, I. (2018). Collapse: Europe after the European Union. London: Biteback.
• Lyons, G., & Halligan, L. (2017). Their clean Brexit: Why leaving the EU still makes sense—Building a post-Brexit economy for all. London: Biteback.
• MacShane, D. (2015). Brexit: How Britain will leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2016). Brexit: How Britain left Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2017). Brexit, no exit: Why Britain won’t leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• McGowan’s, L. (2017). Preparing for Brexit: Actors, negotiators and consequences. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Melchior, A. (2018). Free trade agreements and globalisation: In the shadow of Brexit and Trump. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Menon, A., & Evans, G. (2017). Brexit and British politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Mindus’s, P. (2017). European citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of movement and rights of residence. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Morphet, J., & Brexit, B. (2017). How to assess the UK’s future. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Morris, D., & Thomson, J. (2018). Can you Brexit?: Without breaking Britain?. Avening: Spark Furnace.
• Mount, H., & Madness, S. (2017). How Brexit split the Tories, destroyed Labour and divided the country. London: Biteback.
• Oliver, T. (Ed.). (2018). Europe’s Brexit: EU Perspectives on Britain’s vote to leave. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Oliver, T., (2018). Understanding Brexit: A concise introduction. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
• Oliver, C., & Demons, U. (2016). The inside story of Brexit. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Outhwaite, W. (2017). Brexit: Sociological responses. Cambridge: Anthem Press.
• Owen, D., & Ludlow, D. (2017). British foreign policy after Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Peston, R. (2017). WTF. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Rohac, D. (2016). Towards an imperfect Union: A conservative case for the European Union. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Sanders, D., & Houghton, D. P. (2016). Losing an empire, finding a role. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Shipman, T. (2016). All out war: The full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Shipman, T. (2018). Fall out: A year of political mayhem. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Simms, B. (2016). Britain’s Europe: A thousand years of conflict and cooperation. London: Allen Lane.
• Smith, J. (2017). The UK’s journey into and out of the EU: Destinations Unknown. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Staiger, U., & Martill’s, B. (Eds.). (2018). Brexit and beyond: Rethinking the futures of Europe. London: UCL.
• Tannam, E. (Ed.). (2018). Beyond the Good Friday agreement: In the midst of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Wall, S. (2012). The official history of Britain and the European community, volume II: From rejection to referendum, 1963–1975. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Welfens, P. (2017). An accidental Brexit: New EU and transatlantic economic perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Young, H. (1998). This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. New York: Overlook.

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It might not be the first question on your mind when you think about Brexit, but should French SMEs be better prepared for a no deal scenario?

Pierre Séjourné

Pierre Séjourné certainly thinks so. As the head of the international mission at DIRECCTE, a French trans-ministerial agency for economic development, he politely but very firmly has been pressing business leaders across the country to start realising that ‘no deal’ has become the most likely option, and that there is an urgent need to prepare for the unpleasant consequences that the UK’s messy departure will inevitably have for their activities.

No public comment he makes lacks a reference to the government’s virtual helpdesk brexit.gouv.fr which provides assistance to smaller firms with the necessary risk assessment and mitigation.

As a recent public event held on 7 February at ESSCA School of Management in Angers – dedicated to the impact Brexit on Western France’s Pays-de-la-Loire region – showed, Monsieur Séjourné is not alone in having growing concerns with the relative ‘unpreparedness’ of French business.

The public authorities, regional councils or larger conurbations known as ‘métropoles’ in the French provinces are also increasingly worried, as every single regional policy maker pointed out in the various round-tables of the event

The key word is, of course, uncertainty. Since nobody is capable of providing any clarity on what scenario will prevail at the end of March, SMEs are caught like rabbits in the Brexit headlights.

Brexit is destabilising in many ways: this is the first time in most business leaders’ lifetime that intra-European trade has not led to fewer barriers, and it turns back the clock in order to reinstall long-forgotten ones. It is also deeply unsettling on a cultural level.

In France, with its long-standing tradition of high principles often thwarted by practical earthly details and regularly resulting in collective frustration, there has always been a strong belief that pragmatism and phlegmatic down-to-earth problems-solving were the very essence of Britishness.

Giving priority to concrete business interests rather than indulge in grandstanding philosophical dogma was a collective aptitude attributed to the British, despised and envied at the same time.

And now France and the rest of Europe are witnessing how pragmatism is drowned in a sea of collective hysteria, and how clear business interests have been sacrificed on the altar of irrational politics.

This irrationality, to which Hervé Jouanjean, former DG at the European Commission, pointed in his keynote, simply does not fit century-old cultural patterns. There are many business leaders who are convinced that reason will prevail in the very last minute and a sensible solution will be found that will keep consequences down to a perfectly manageable minimum.

As Gérald Darmanin, the French budget minister, recently pointed out, this was the first time in his political career where the public authorities seemed to be better prepared than the corporate world.

At the Angers conference his assessment was indirectly corroborated by the panel dedicated to the transport sector.

Pierre Rideau, director of the customs office for Western France, explained very clearly how they had already been preparing for the worst case for several months and what resources (both human and material) were being mobilised to mitigate the forthcoming problems of cross-border trade.

What they would be unable to avoid, though, was the expected increase in transport costs, which he had no doubt would drive many French SMEs out of the British market.

On each of the round-tables, experts from The UK in a Changing Europe (Raquel Ortega-Argilés, Carmen Hubbard, Christopher Huggins, John-Paul Salter, Ignazio Cabras, and Simon Usherwood) shared their own understandings about the likely disruptions in the different sectors that were addressed by the panels composed of policy-makers, business representatives and researchers.

The agrifood round-table, with Fabrice Sciumbata (Brioches Pasquier), Lydie Bernard (Regional Council Pays-de-la-Loire), Joao Pacheco (Farm Europe), and Carmen Hubbard (UK in a Changing Europe).

One of the major takeaways of the event was the perceived need to give more consideration to regional perspectives.

Just as Scotland feels – understandably – left out of a debate that circles around Westminster issues, so too the French regions, across which the impact of Brexit will vary considerably, have not been helped by a national approach either.

As one the regional councillors, Lydie Bernard, complained, even in a sector as essential to the French economy as the agrifood business, the available data is hardly ever broken down on a regional level.

Beyond the business data and economic prospects, however, the event concluded in a surprisingly humanistic profession of faith in transnational cooperation.

The Pays-de-la-Loire, as provincial as they may seem on a map, have their Brussels representation right on Rond-Point Schuman. Their policy makers and high civil servants are embedded in European networks, the British counterparts they regularly meet with are highly appreciated.

Vanessa Charbonneau

As Vanessa Charbonneau, Vice-President of the Regional Council, repeatedly insisted, they would – ‘of course!’ – be willing to continue to work together with their British neighbours in order to make the best of whatever would be going to happen.

Rather than shoulder-shrugging at the unforced self-destruction of a former premium nation, the overall attitude that seems to prevail in this part of France is one of compassion with a trusted partner whom you would like to help out of an impasse, but are unable to.

 

This post was initially published
on “The UK in a Changing Europe”

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So here we are. In little more than one month, Britain is due to crash out of the EU without an agreement as the single outcome a strong majority MPs abhor because of the damage it would do to jobs, tax receipts and relations to European and international partners. The agreement actually negotiated by the government was strongly rejected by two thirds. Instead, a fragile majority of MPs demand ill-defined ‘alternative arrangements’ to the Irish backstop, or want it gone completely. Labour insists on a permanent customs union that is a matter for the future relationship and is perfectly compatible with the withdrawal agreement, while the party’s ‘six tests’ can realistically only be met by staying in the single market with all the obligations this brings or remaining.

Those who know how the EU works such as the former UK permanent representative in Brussels, Ivan Rogers, are tearing their hair out over the level of ignorance and his sense of frustration is widely shared among the community of people who study the EU professionally. I don’t wish to rehash the critique of the government approach to the negotiations, but want to explore why so many MPs, both Tories and Labour, misjudged the degree of the EU’s unity, what the core interests of EU member states are, the asymmetry of power in the negotiation, and how to best influence it. If we consider insights from research into foreign policy and intelligence failures, four main reasons stand out:

Firstly, the EU-related knowledge basis and professional connections have been eroding over years, because of declining priority and associated career incentives of being successful in Brussels. During the Blair years the government was keen to and proud of setting the policy agenda in the EU in economic strategy, counter-terrorism and security and defence policy. This started to change already under Gordon Brown who showed little interest in or appreciation of Brussels politics.

Labour’s loss of knowledge continued the longer it stayed out of power, but also because those MPs with experience of governing under Blair were being side-lined by the new front-bench under Jeremy Corbyn. Mr Corbyn himself, a lifelong Eurosceptic as well as his key advisors and some on the front bench, tend to see the EU as an unreformable neoliberal project and, erroneously, think that delivering the 2017 Labour manifesto requires freedom from EU state-aid rules. From this perspective, there is no need for coalition building with the socialist parties in Europe who called to stay and reform.

The Conservatives’ understanding of the EU suffered from Cameron’s early decision to withdraw his party from the conservative grouping in the European parliament in exchange for Brexiteer support for his leadership. This cut off the Conservatives from the European mainstream, damaged relations to sister parties such as the German CDU, and disrupted information flow and influence. As a result, British MPs overestimated both Germany’s capacity as well as its willingness to help accommodate British demands, which were increasingly about stopping things rather than setting the agenda for new policies. The 2011 watershed failure of the government to block the Fiscal Compact designed to save the Eurozone was the first sign of misreading EU partners, closely followed in 2015 by futile efforts to block Jean-Claude Juncker becoming Commission President after his party grouping won the European Parliament elections.

The second explanation for the misjudgement is confirmation bias. This is a problem affecting not just MPs but many commentators and members of the public with the most passionately held political beliefs. Confirmation bias involves seeking and accepting information, because it supports actions that are in line with ones’ beliefs and disregard evidence that contradicts them, regardless of reliability, relevance or track-record of the source. One can always find some “expert opinion” from an ideologically compatible “think-tank” that supports ones’ view and avoid or discard those that jar or contradict it.

One of the benefits of confirmation bias for true believers is that you can never be disproven by real world events. If the EU did not blink and yield as David Davis and other Brexiteers argue it must have been because it was intransigent, arrogant and out to “punish” Britain – not because the UK harboured unrealistic ideas. If the deal was somehow approved at the last second and negotiations about a post-Brexit trade-deal turned out not to be “the easiest in history” it was because the Commons had lost its nerve to fight for a better deal. If the EU did not respond positively to a new approach from a potential Corbyn-led government it was because the Tories had destroyed trust through the negotiating tactics, rather than Labour engaging in wishful thinking.

The third problem is mirror-imaging whereby uncertainty about the intentions of the other side is filled by imagining what is rational from ones’ own point of view. From the perspective of many British MPs the EU insisting on the backstop even if it risks a no deal is an irrational strategy given the economic damage a no-deal would incur. Many also do not understand why Britain could not enjoy the same kind of access to the Single Market as before as it creates new barriers to European businesses. This reflects a strong tendency in British political discourse to see evaluate policies and the EU in particular from a narrow “bottom-line”, cost-benefits perspective.

In contrast, EU institutions and the overwhelming majority of its members see Brexit not just on its own terms, but as precedence creating and future credibility-defining. Cutting an economically favourable deal with a country wanting to be politically more distant would come at an unacceptable price of weakening the Union at a time when populist parties in government attempt hard-ball tactics. The integrity of the Single Market is at stake if Northern Ireland was outside the customs union without border controls or by allowing Britain to undercut standards to gain competitive advantage whilst enjoyed good access to the Single Market. The EU is determined to defend the Treaties as its quasi constitution, which is something difficult to understand in a country without a written constitution. The difficulty of arriving at a legally-binding text among 27 member states also helps to explain why such texts, once agreed, become very difficult to change and why the EU says it will not reopen the withdrawal agreement shaped around and agreed by the British government and the EU 27 at the end of last year.

Beyond the immediate issue of the Brexit negotiations, many British MPs struggle to understand the compromise-nature of EU politics. They see Brussels through the lens of their own confrontational system with strongly whipped parties and underpinned by first past the post elections. Many continental European countries are run by coalition governments and problem-solving-focused parliaments, making it easier for them understand the give and take in Brussels. The EU is a compromise-making machine geared towards building the broadest possible support even when majority votes are allowed. This works only because members agree on informal rules on how to act and share a minimum level of trust not abuse their rights. Casting vetoes, going into battle with publicly announced red-lines and reneging on agreements made has lost the UK trust and good-will even among the most Anglophile countries. The lack of trust has now become a major obstacle for negotiation success.

Finally, assumption drag helps to explain why many MPs still do not realise that their perceived understanding of how Brussels works does no longer apply. Not just MPs, but also many journalists remember long EU summit negotiations and the late-night compromises that typically enable a deal to made. Indeed, in the now distant past, Britain won some special concessions at these negotiations over new Treaty texts. However, this is not a normal EU summit over a new treaty or a major agreement where everyone needs to have prizes to sell at home. By voicing its intention to leave Britain has placed itself in a fundamentally different position of a prospective “third country” against which the remaining EU members defend their interests. While the EU is keen to get Brexit over with and passed and will show flexibility, particularly on the political declaration, it is not going to let either Ireland or its mandated negotiator, the European Commission, stand in the rain on such a high-stakes issue. Smaller member states in particular will watch this closely as a test-case.

The need to address these misunderstandings rises whatever the outcome of Brexit. It will be central to making a success of the coming negotiations about future relations if May’s deal passed. Remain will require a change of attitude. And even if Britain crashed out, it will still remain strongly connected to and impacted by the European Union by virtue of geography, economic links, law, security cooperation and, indeed people. As long as the EU exists and confounds Brexiteers predictions of its imminent demise, Britain without a seat at the table and voting rights will have an even greater need to understand how the EU works in order to influence it from the outside.

 

*Christoph Meyer is Professor of European and International Politics at King’s College London. An abbreviated version of this text was published under the title ‘Brexit turmoil: five ways British MPs misunderstand the European Union’, in The Conservation and Uk in a Changing Europe, on 7 February 2019.

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What is Communicating Europe?

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License, created by Niaz.

Communicating Europe really started as an idea, or rather a reflection, after watching the BBC Great Debate in June 2016 between representatives of different UK-based political parties regarding whether to leave the EU, or to stay inside and make it stronger.  The reflection I had at the time was that, for all the importance of the issues being discussed and indeed the importance of EU membership more generally, here were several politicians speaking past each other on these issues, all with very different understandings of what the EU is, how it functions, what it does, and why it does it.  What is the EU?  What are its values?  Is it an oppressive, distant bureaucracy, crushing the sovereignty of its composite members?  Is it a neoliberal economic project, seeking instead to extract whatever financial value there may be from its workers, to the detriment of their welfare, quality of life and happiness?  Is it instead a compromise between states, flawed or otherwise, that nevertheless stands for certain fundamental principles such as the rule of law, equality, human rights and social democracy?  Is it none of these things?  Or perhaps is it a complex amalgamation of all these things?

Communicating about the EU

The EU fundamentally changes, depending on who you speak to, and what they say.  The same individuals may even speak differently about the EU depending on their audience.  We are all familiar with the political actors who support the EU and its project in Brussels, taking full part in its activities and policy-making, who then decry it in domestic politics.  The trade unionist who talks of making stands against the onslaught on workers’ rights by a removed technocracy in public speeches to delegates, who realises the importance of compromise and shared responsibilities when attending closed stakeholder meetings.  We know of traditional media, becoming increasingly balkanized in their communications to their target audience, dividing themselves into camps that could almost be considered ‘EUrophiles’ and ‘EUrophobes’.  So too are we aware of new ways of communicating about Europe, far from the language and rules traditional media.  Online citizen campaigning about Europe, academics engaging in ‘public intellectualism’ through short YouTube videos or symposiums, and somewhat more shady, unknown entities going beyond expressing views or opinions on the EU based on the facts as they see them, instead seeking to deliberately mislead through the creation of extreme narratives and ‘false facts’.  The various ways and means of talking about the EU and its actions, policies, values and value are becoming increasingly complex, emotive, and yet, incorporating a greater number of actors than ever before.  How can we understand what is happening?

About the Research Group

Communicating Europe is the attempt to explore these fascinating interactions between different actors and audiences in far more detail.  Coordinated by Dr Benjamin Farrand at Newcastle University, Dr Isabel Camisão at the University of Coimbra, Dr Katjana Gattermann at the University of Amsterdam, and Professor Catherine de Vries at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, this UACES Research Network seeks to bring an interdisciplinary perspective to bear on the questions of who talks about the EU; how; why; and with what effect, bringing insights from international relations, law, sociology, politics and communication.  Through its activities in workshops and panels at international conferences, Communicating Europe will create a larger network of researchers considering how the EU is communicated, what influences the mode and content of communications, how it relates to broader trends, and how, if at all, these communications should be regulated by legal systems.  This first blog post, as the reader is no doubt aware, does not shed any particular light on any of the issues raised – it instead constitutes a statement of intent, a beginning of a conversation, and perhaps, a call to action.  Communicating Europe welcomes any and all academics, whether established Professors or Early Career Researchers just beginning a PhD to become involved.  We will be publishing information shortly regarding our initial UACES conference panels on these topics, and a call for papers for an opening event to take place in late May or early June 2019.  We look forward to working with all of you.  If you are interested in finding out more, do not hesitate to contact uacescommunicatingeurope@gmail.com to be added to our mailing list.

Benjamin Farrand, on behalf of Communicating Europe.

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University of Tartu. Photo from www.ut.ee

Teele Tõnismann

In my paper “Paths of Baltic States’ public research funding 1989–2010: Between institutional heritage and internationalization” (Tõnismann, 2018) I analyse transformations in public research funding of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The paper is part of my PhD thesis where the topic is further explored with the example of research funding practices in the discipline of sociology.

 

Divergent impact of European Union politics in the Baltics

The paper focuses on the international competition in research funding policy. In research policy literature, competition is mostly seen to accompany “project-based” funding systems, which spread in the Western world since 1960 as a counter to so-called “institutional” or “basic” funding models. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, project-based funding systems were also established in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As with the other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the EU accession is considered to have played significant roles in actualising these developments (Radosevic, Lepori, 2009). The overall transformation in these three countries encompassed the establishment of independent funding bodies, the introduction of project-based funding instruments, and the linking of institutional evaluation with research funding as was taking place in Western European countries.

 

However, against theoretical assumptions developed by neo-institutionalist authors (see below), these changes entailed significant differences. First, all three countries ended up with different shares of funding instruments. In a fashion similar to the ‘US system’, Estonia and Latvia rely mostly on project-based funding instruments while Lithuania’s public funding is built on a combination of core and project funding; this is typical of the ‘continental European funding systems’. Secondly, international dimensions of competitiveness in these systems occurred at various times: In Estonia before, in Latvia during, and in Lithuania after EU accession. Finally, policy changes gave different outputs, meaning that the research performances of the three Baltic States differ, with one country of the three—Estonia—surpassing the others. Consequently, the aim of this article was to better understand the factors that influenced the divergence in these three countries.

 

Limits of historical neo-institutionalism in explaining the impact of internationalisation

The Baltic case allows the discussion of works that have addressed similar questions using neo-institutional approaches. Although traditionally the external context is seen to have an impact on national institutional arrangements only through major ruptures or changes in an institutional environment, some recent historical neo-institutional authors have claimed this view. They claim that besides external factors, such as the restoration of national independence or accession to the EU, endogenous factors such as local political context and actors’ ability to interpret institutional rules play a crucial explanatory role in delineating the different change trajectories (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

 

In the article, I have applied the approach to the Baltics case and found that it raises at least two questions. First, if the political veto power could indeed explain the differences between the late Lithuanian reforms and those of its two northern neighbours, then how can we explain the Estonian reformers’ decision to move towards criteria favouring international competitiveness in a project-based funding system, while Latvian reformers did not? Secondly, if Latvian reform could be explained by political pressure coming from the EU, then how can we explain Lithuanian change agents’ motivation to delay change until 2009 even when political context would have allowed the change in the early 2000s? And although Latvia’s first changes were implemented in 2005, why has no substantial change occurred since?

 

These questions are showing the limits of the historical neo-institutionalism approach for understanding change in the Baltics. Instead, for a better understanding of the Baltic case, we drew on the works of recent historical neo-institutionalist authors and supplemented them with an analysis of change actors’ knowledge resources acquired from different international contexts.

 

Internationalisation as an endogenous factor of change?

In sum, the paper proposes the following hypothesis: to better understand the Baltic States’ divergent policy trajectories, internationalisation should be conceptualised as an endogenous factor of change, instead of perceiving it as an exogenous factor, as is theorised by historical institutionalist authors. The “endogenous” factor of change denotes here the “resource”  that change actors might engage for undertaking national policy reforms (Knoepfel et al. 2007) and that they have collected through their educational, professional, administrative, associative and political life trajectories.

 

Indeed, we found that the higher level of Western international knowledge resources with Estonian reform actors, compared to their Latvian counterparts at the beginning of the 1990s, and coupled with the political and institutional context, could explain the Estonian reformers’ decision to move towards integrating criteria favouring international competitiveness in a project-based funding system while Latvian reformers did not introduce these criteria. Similarly, a higher level of Western international knowledge resources with Lithuanian reformers compared to their Latvian counterparts can explain Lithuanian change actors’ motivation to undertake substantial changes in 2009 at the moment of national political change. At the same time, in Latvia, the changes were implemented incrementally and in a top-down method since 2005, as there has not been the emergence of a strong group of reformers with relevant knowledge resources.

 

It seems that actors’ knowledge resources gathered from different international contexts influence their intervention capacities in political processes and hence allow them to shape the institutional paths in given national contexts. Also, political and institutional contexts offer opportunities for change actors to use their resources to enact these changes. Hence, both the knowledge resources that actors have gathered from international environments and the motivation for their utilisation in national contexts need to be analysed in the context of the historical neo-institutionalism framework.

 

The results provide further understanding about the factors that have had a role in forming the differences in the Baltics’ research funding policy systems, and the given analysis can also contribute to better understanding the more general transformation in CEE innovation policies. The focus on the groups of reforms actors’ trajectories and their coalitions could better explain why some strongly pushed EU R&D policy objectives (such as private sector R&D specialisation or a socio-economically relevant public R&D system) are not fully implemented in the Baltics. Lastly, relative to long-term transformation in CEE policies, the Baltic cases expose the need to shift the focus from “eurocentrism” and to take multiple international change factors into account when explaining international impacts on local policy trajectories. The utilisation of different international contexts by change actors can explain the repertoire of solutions that are within the actors’ grasp.

 

Teele Tõnismann is, since 2014, a PhD student under the joint supervision of Sciences-Po Toulouse LaSSP and Tallinn University of Technology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance. She currently holds a prominent Estonian Government research scholarship: Kristjan Jaak.

 

References

Knoepfel, P., Corinne, L., Varone, F. et al. (2007) Public Policy Analysis. Bristol: Policy Press.

Mahoney, J. and Kathleen, T. (2010) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: CUP.

Radosevic, S., Lepori B. (2009) “Public research funding systems in Central and Eastern Europe: between excellence and relevance: Introduction to special section”, Science and Public Policy, 36/9: 659-666.

Tõnismann, T. (2018) “Paths of Baltic States public research funding 1989–2010: Between institutional heritage and internationalisation”, Science and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scy066

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Britain may be an island, but we are part of a continent and a planet. And it’s only by countries working closely together that urgent issues such as climate change can be effectively tackled.

What’s the alternative? That Britain retreats into an island mentality, thinking we can go it alone as if we were the only country in the world, the only nation of our continent?

That cannot be the way forward for Britain.

Working closely with other countries means agreeing democratic structures to reach decisions that affect us all, regardless of national boundaries. That can’t be done in isolation. That cannot be achieved unless we are a part of that democratic structure, and not apart from it.

The EU has evolved over the past six decades to provide European countries with a powerful and effective way to reach democratic decisions to enhance and protect all our lives. It’s been a remarkable achievement, of which the UK has been at its forefront for over 40 years.

As far as our continent is concerned, there is no other structure that enables Britain to have a say on the running and future of Europe. Outside the EU, we will only be able to look on as decisions that affect us are made without us.

And for what benefit? None that anyone can say. Not one.

If it’s right to leave the EU and ‘go it alone’ then why stop at the EU?

On the same basis, why don’t we leave the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the European Convention on Human Rights, Interpol, the Commonwealth, and over 14,000 international treaties that the UK has signed up to?

Leaving makes no sense. Britain cannot go it alone. Turning our back on the world and our continent will just leave us isolated, alone, vulnerable and without friends and allies just when we need them.

International issues need an international approach. And climate change is the biggest international issue facing all of us right now.

No single organisation on the planet is doing more than the EU to tackle climate change.

Climate change is threatening Europe’s water resources – and Britain is not excluded from that threat. We are affected just as much as any other country on our continent.

(Article continues after this one-minute video)

The European Parliament – one of the world’s largest democratic assemblies – wants to safeguard our continent’s freshwater sources by promoting the re-use of water wherever possible.

The Parliament is making democratic decisions to push for urban wastewater to be used for irrigation, offsetting the environmental and economic costs of droughts and other extreme weather conditions.

Does Britain really want to be on the side lines of our continent, looking on, as these plans and more are made without us?

Britain is due to leave the EU next month, without any plans in place. That’s just daft. Actually, it’s more than daft. It’s a dereliction of common sense.

Walking out of the door, into the unknown, will not solve anything.

It’s not too late to stop the madness of Brexit. Parliament, in its wisdom, could revoke Article 50 right now, and we could keep our place in the EU on exactly the same beneficial terms as we have enjoyed for decades.

Please, write to your MP today and tell him or her that’s what you want. Over 60 polls since 2017 also confirm that’s what Britain wants.

Tell your MP to act on ‘the will of the people’ and arrange for a U-turn on Brexit. It’s urgent. In just a few weeks time, it will be too late. 

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Let me put my hands up on this one right at the start: I’m writing about this because it’s a more familiar case to me than many others. I know and work with several people at the European University Institute, even though I’ve not had any formal link with the place.

For those unfamiliar with the EUI, it’s a postgraduate and post-doctoral research centre, established in the early 1970s, specialising on various aspects of European governance and law and based in a charming village in the hills above Florence. It’s a world-class institution, both in terms of the work it produces and the reputation it holds among academics and various EU circles: scarcely a week goes by without someone very important giving a speech there.

In short, it’s an excellent example of what can come from international collaboration on research.

So today’s question is then, why is the UK leaving it?

Yesterday the government published a statutory instrument to the effect that the UK would no longer be a signatory to the Convention establishing the EUI come the end of EU membership, so needed to remove any implications of that Convention from UK law.

The memorandum attached notes that “The European Communities (Definition of Treaties) Order 1975 (SI 1975/408) designates the Convention as an “EU Treaty” as defined in section 1 of the European Communities Act 1972” and as such it falls when the UK is no longer an EU member state.

But let’s explore this further.

As the memorandum also notes “The Convention Setting up a European University Institute is an international agreement”, so let’s go read that Convention.

Article 1 starts with “By this Convention, the Member States of the European Communities (hereinafter called the “Contracting States”) jointly set up the European University Institute (hereinafter called the “Institute”).” This is probably the root of the issue, since it links the EC (as it was at the time of signing) with membership. Article 32(1) might seem to underline that point by noting “Any Member State of the European Communities besides the Contracting States may accede to this Convention”, which they all have.

However, let’s compare this with the other case you’ve heard about, namely the EEA.

In that treaty, membership of the UK is very clearly a function of being a member of the EU (see Article 2): the activity of the EEA can only happen with EU membership for non-EFTA members.

But the EUI Convention isn’t like that. The very limited function of the Institute requires nothing of signatories that springs from their EU membership: states could sign up as EU members, but not because of it.

Put differently, while the Convention requires signatories to be EU members when they join, it does not require them to leave when they stop.

So what, you ask: it’s just a bunch of academics swanning about in Tuscany.

Well, no, it’s not (and they don’t). Three key reasons stand out.

Firstly, the government (and Leavers) have repeatedly stressed that the UK is leaving the EU, not Europe. If there is a concern that other links should be maintained post-withdrawal, then it seems odd to take the position that any more than the bare minimum of ties be cut. In this case, the Convention carries minimal financial liabilities or freedom of movement implications. Indeed, this particular case represents a cutting off of what could potentially be a key avenue for informal discussions with key people from across Europe.

Secondly, the government has consistently claimed that it wants to keep close ties on research and education. After the whole Galileo saga and the on-going refusal to remove students from immigration figures, the move to end involvement in the EUI looks more like a revealed preference for less cooperation, somewhat perversely after the UK’s concerns about the CEU in Budapest. As my timeline yesterday highlighted, that will feed (and has fed) back into the UK HE sector.

Finally, this whole case shows the difficulties of managing a massive change in public policy. The statutory instrument makes no mention of what happens to existing UK nationals studying or working at the EUI, nor of how to handle any liabilities. As one of several hundred SIs that the UK needs to put into effect by the day of withdrawal, it will get minimal scrutiny, even as it has assorted effects that look unnecessary or even pernicious.

And there we have it: another small example of how Brexit is going to have effects far beyond the immediate circle of impacts that we usually discuss.

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Not the curry in question, just a stock photo of someone who eats off chopping boards…

Like the rest of you, I spent much of Christmas trying hard not to think too hard about Brexit, and for the most part I succeeded.

Right up until about 0100 on 1 January, when I lay awake in bed like some modern-day Scrooge, thinking about Brexits to come.

Experience told me that then wasn’t the time to share with loved ones, so I’ve saved it up for you lot instead.

You’re welcome.

The curry

For reasons that needn’t bother us here, we stayed in on New Year’s Eve: this became the plan relatively late in the day, but we put into effect some options. a contingency, if you will.

That contingency centred on ordering a curry from our regular provider. For context, they deliver super-fast (current record is 20 minutes and the mean is only about 10 minutes more), the food is always really good, and we’ve never had problems before.

Of course, we knew that NYE was likely to be a bit different, as others might have had the same idea as us, so we called at 6.30 to order early: we’d cover the gap to midnight with movies and family board games (it’s non-stop fun round ours).

In the spirit of the season, the adults consumed some alcohol and everyone consumed some nibbles, while we chatted and waited.

Time passed.

After an hour-and-a-half, I tried calling the curry house for an indication of when the curry might arrive. Both numbers were engaged, and remained engaged every one of the times we tried for the next hour or more.

Initially, this wasn’t a problem, but by the time 9 o’clock was heaving into view, we were talking about further contingencies: trying to piece together something from the (rather bare) cupboard, basically, since no one was in a condition to drive anywhere, and shops and restaurants would be closed.

Just as we were about to get going on cooking some plain pasta, the doorbell rang. The curry was there, delivered by an apologetic guy who explained that he’d been drafted in at 8 o’clock to help with the backlog of deliveries.

Obviously, our frustration was tempered by the smell of the food, so down we sat to eat. Whereupon it become apparent that the curry had been prepared with its usual speed and efficiency. At 6.30.

Fun through it was to observe the younger members of the family compete on how far they could bend their poppadoms (very far, BTW), it did rob the meal of something (enjoyable poppadoms, mainly), as did the missing bits of the order.

So middle-class, so what?

You don’t care about my curry, and nor should you: we eventually got a meal that still tasted good for the very large majority of its parts, plus we made the getting-to-midnight bit of NYE quite a bit simpler.

But for me, laying there some hours later, it underlined some key points about contingency planning (because that’s the crazy-fun kind of guy I am).

Most obviously, contingencies need preparation: the more critical the situation, the less scope there is for making things up as you go, there and then. We’d not planned for no-curry, but we had some food in the house: if we’d been dealing with something involving a system critical to life, then we’d have made absolutely sure we had everything in place, plus back-ups.

But the evening also highlights another key part of contingency planning: the interconnectedness of processes. Put differently, there’s stuff you can control and stuff you can’t, so you either need to bring enough under your control to make your contingency work or you need to get others to also prepare for the contingency.

In the case of the curry, we’d assumed the curry place would have enough experience of NYE demand to maintain their usual service provision. And they mostly did: the food was prepared promptly and largely correctly. But there was a bottle-neck in the deliveries: the reason could have been any of  of several factors, but the capacity to unblock the problem was evidently limited. In addition, the general nature of the problem exacerbated the problem, as lots of people were obviously trying to phone in and find out what was happening with their orders, making it harder to provide that information to others.

Thus, our contingency – staying in – relied on the curry house’s contingency – ramping-up for NYE – which in turn relied on the delivery team’s situation. Our own choices – a couple of drinks – meant we’d closed down some contingencies to our contingency – driving over to the curry place, or to find a corner-shop still open.

All of which is to say that planning for even the mundane can be difficult.

And Brexit is not mundane at all: it’s systemic, it’s profound in its effects and it contains a high degree of uncertainty.

This was all thrown into some relief over Christmas by the story of the plans for cross-Channel ferries.

The government had spent £100m on securing extra capacity on routes beyond Dover-Calais, to try and reduce some of the bottle-necking that will likely ensue in a no-deal scenario. Most of that money went to established providers, but £14m went to a ‘start-up’, planning to run Ramsgate-Oostende services, but not actually yet in possession of a vessel.

Quite aside for the process issues involved – the government bypassed tendering for all this – we can see the same problems as with my curry.

The government relies on the start-up to be able to provide the service, but the start-up relies on someone else to provide it with a vessel or two; on Ramsgate harbour to dredge sufficiently-deep channels for the ferries to be able to navigate the port; and on the British and Belgian governments to provide the necessary customs and border control infrastructure in both ports to allow goods to access the ferry.

At the most mundane level, the company will need suitably skilled personnel to sail, dock and load the ferries.

Modern economic, social and political systems are characterised by these kinds of networks of different individuals and organisations, working with and across each other. To expect that any one of these – even a government – to be able (let alone willing) to cover all the risk and all the possible contingencies is at best misguided, and at worse highly problematic.

As we roll towards March, we’re going to see many more cases like the ferries, where the systemic issues and bottle-necks become apparent, alongside the limited capacity of anyone to address them.

That doesn’t mean we’re helpless, but the more there is an understanding of what is and isn’t realistic to expect, the better everyone can manage their expectations and work towards finding resolutions.

The post A story about a curry and no-deal planning appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s been confirmed by both the Prime Minister, Theresa May, and the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, that the choice now is either ‘the deal’, ‘no deal ‘or ‘no Brexit’.

‘The deal’ negotiated between the EU and Theresa May is the best Brexit deal available, according to both sides. In any event, the EU is adamant: the negotiations are over, and ‘the deal’ cannot be amended or debated any more.

On or around 14 January, our Parliament will vote on whether or not it accepts ‘the deal’.

If Parliament does accept it, then sadly, that’s the end of the Remain campaign and Reasons2Remain. The long and tortuous Brexit process will have reached its conclusion, and the UK really will be leaving the EU on 29 March.

We cannot campaign to remain after we’ve left, although we are confident that new campaigns will emerge to rejoin the EU in the future.

But by all accounts, it is more than likely that Parliament will reject ‘the deal’ when it’s put to the vote in a couple of weeks time.

Then, who should choose what happens next?

(Article continues after one-minute video)

If Parliament cannot resolve the impasse on Brexit, then the choice should be put back to us, the people, by way of a new advisory referendum.

Theresa May keeps saying she’s determined to deliver on ‘the will of the people’. But before she can do that, she should find out what it is.

Yes, she needs to ascertain what the ‘people’s will’ is today, and not what it might have been over two years ago, when no one knew the fuller details of Brexit that we now know.

We now know from the government’s own reports that all versions of Brexit will cause Britain considerable damage. There is no good Brexit.

We also now know that a ‘no deal’ Brexit would be the worst option of all.

Two independent bodies – our Civil Service and the Bank of England – have completed in-depth analysis and calculations. They both conclude that leaving the EU without any deal would be catastrophic for Britain. We should not even contemplate that.

Multiple assessments, including the opinion of the vast majority of economists, confirm that Britain will be better-off, safer and with greater influence by remaining a member of the EU.

Maybe, then, it’s no surprise that over 50 polls since last year’s general election all show that a majority in the country considers that Brexit is a mistake.

But the only poll that will count is new national ballot on Brexit. If that’s the next step, Parliament will be wise to exclude ‘no deal’ from the ballot paper.

If there is a new referendum, the choice – which has to be agreed by Parliament – is likely to be ‘the deal’ or ‘no Brexit’.

IF ‘THE DEAL’ WINS, SO BE IT.

We will leave the EU on the government’s agreed terms. It will be the end of the Remain campaign, but new campaigns will emerge to rejoin.

IF ‘NO BREXIT’ WINS – MEANING WE STAY IN THE EU – SO BE IT.

The European Court of Justice has already ruled that the UK can cancel Brexit, and rescind the Article 50 notice, and stay in the EU on our current good terms.

As Mrs May keeps saying: ‘Let’s get on with it.’

The sooner the better, so that we can wrap this up and all move on from three years of Brexit chaos and calamity.

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My path into political science as a profession was never planned. It started rather accidentally, quite exactly 10 years ago, without me knowing that I would end up where I am today. This year, in 2019, I will try to regularly blog about this profession, my own research, and the research of others – even if this promise may end up one of those New Year’s resolutions that never really materialise.

Why do I want to start with such a series of blog posts? Mainly because I see, in online and offline conversations, with friends and family, with colleagues, and with strangers, that academic life in general and the work of a political scientist in particular need a bit more public explaining and a little more public reflection. I also get asked quite often whether what I, what we, do is relevant for society at large. So, I feel that I should explain more, and better.

When I say “I”, what does the I stands for?

It stands for the perspective of a white, male, fully mobile, German scholar (to highlight just a few dimensions of who I am) who is working on a full-time, multi-year contract at a major German university. Currently, I am an advanced postdoc, employed in a research project at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute at LMU Munich. When I’m asked what I’m an expert on, I’d probably say that I focus on United Nations and European Union institutions and finances.

I also come from a family that values and encourages education: my parents have university degrees and have always supported my path(s), whether I wanted to become a diplomat (in my late teens and early 20s), be a PhD student in political science after realising that diplomacy wasn’t for me (in my mid-20s), turn to professional activism close to my PhD topic (in my late 20s) or start the life of a university-based political scientist (in my 30s).

Why is this relevant? Because I have learnt to know my privileges, and because my path into academia shapes how I see the world and this profession.

First, I work in an environment that under-represents women and that also lacks diversity with regard to other dimensions of social and individual personal backgrounds. On most of these dimensions, I score clearly towards traditional individual privilege. And even though the individual is pretty important in academic life, the academic system also favours well-known, rich, and Western institutions. As I work at such an institution, I have additional institutional privilege.

Second, although I am not tenured, my personal background and professional situation as well as my path into academia make that I feel less pressured by the precarious life situations that most of my peers face, in various combinations. These precarious situations include short term contracts; unwanted part-time contracts; implicit and explicit pressures to be highly mobile across countries, continents or world-wide, independent of family and relationship situations; being required to do research-unrelated teaching and to deliver on requests related to university administration while being mainly evaluated on research output and fundraising success for career advancement; etc. Although I face some of these pressures (some increasingly), my personal and professional situation eases my ability to deal with them (for now).

Third, when I study the United Nations and the European Union institutions and finances, I look at the world through the eyes of a Western European scholar, despite some East European socialisation and despite my urge to better include different perspectives into my work. So far, I focus mainly on the powerful in my research, not the powerless. I build on the notions of democracy, bureaucracy, culture, politics, etc. that I have grown up with, perspectives that my own, mostly male, mostly Western, exclusively white professors and academic supervisors have rarely questioned, at least not fundamentally. So my perspective is well enough into the current mainstream to not feel marginalised academically, even when I work on so far unexplored issues.

In light of this, my goal for this year is not to explain “how political science works” as if this was an objective perspective where personal and institutional factors don’t matter. I simply would like to share more often what I do, whether it’s researching, teaching, publishing or communicating science; to share more frequently what I learn, whether it ends up in academic publications or not; and to publish one or the other commentary on academic life as I experience it, without having to go through the lengths of the traditional academic publication process.

PS: If I blogged at least weekly, something between 500 and 1000 words per article, I’d end up with around 25,000 to 50,000 words, that is 4-6 academic articles or about half an academic book. If academia stays the way it is, this will not be counted as academic publishing and it will not be considered by search committees. Because it’s on social media.

It means what I write here is not registered on Google Scholar or in the Social Science Citation Index, and it therefore does not count in academic terms. That’s fine for me. It’s fine because the only blog post that I managed to write in 2018 – I was much more prolific in previous years – already has about as many views as the first peer reviewed academic article I ever published (paywalled, published more than two years earlier in 2016). My only blog post last year was in German [Google translation]), about why major academic conferences and political science as a profession are not as bad as reported in a major German newspaper. I take this as an encouragement to write more about my job and my profession, whether it counts or not.

The post 2019 in Political Science – A Personal Account (1) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

…whatever be cause or effect, the disintegration of culture is the most serious and the most difficult to repair.

T S Elliot, Notes Toward a Definition of Culture, 1948

What words can be used to portray the present state of European and Western culture?  Diluted, fragmented, anchorless, drifting, and increasingly meaningless? Are we living in the mere afterglow of the brightest moments of a civilization now dimming?  Or, are these false notions?  Does Europe remain a coherent whole, its culture, traditions and heritage intact and unthreatened?

To pull back, to ‘zoom out’ in an attempt to discern the process of a declining civilization, to assess the state of health of a culture comprising centuries of shared recognition is no small intellectual task.  Nevertheless it was undertaken by the  Anglo-American poet and critic T. S. Elliot in his famous post-war essay, Notes Toward a Definition of Culture.  Elliot, the Nobel Prize for Literature winner for that same year, was convinced that Europe as a historic focus for our common values and beliefs was indeed in trouble.  Writing  three years after the close of the Second War, he laid the groundwork for his observations by first arguing that ‘culture’ and religion were inseparable, the opposite sides of the same coin:

The first important assertion is that no culture has appeared or developed except together with a religion: according to the point of view of the observer, the culture will appear to be the product of the religion, or the religion the product of the culture.

By culture, Elliot meant the aggregate of human excellence and achievement in every sphere, and not just the more modern and narrower notion of art, literature and music.  As for religion, it was the accumulated and shared recognition of our Judaeo-Greek heritage.  And, it is the linking of these two – culture and religion, that Elliot sought to underscore and emphasize.

. . . we may ask whether any culture could come into being, or maintain itself, without a religious basis. We may go further and ask whether what we call the culture, and what we call the religion, of a people are not different aspects of the same thing: the culture being, essentially, the incarnation (so to speak) of the religion of a people.

The decline of religious belief and practice in western society is well documented.  The impact of that decline less so.  If Elliot is right, might it mean a concomitant decline in western culture as well? Can there be a Europe, a Western civilization without the foundation of Christianity and its precursors?  Or, is the very essence of two millennia of the ethics derived from our Judaeo-Greek heritage so ingrained that even a thin vestige remains a permanent basis for our day-to-day functioning as a society, informing virtually everything from law to art?  Put another way, can we successfully cling to long-recognised beliefs without believing?

For the culture we know, for its evolved system of values to survive, Eliot thought three conditions must be met:

The first of these is organic (not merely planned, but growing) structure, such as will foster the hereditary transmission of culture within a culture: and this requires the persistence of social classes. The second is the necessity that a culture should be analysable, geographically, into local cultures: this raises the problem of ‘regionalism’. The third is the balance of unity and diversity in religion — that is, universality of doctrine with particularity of cult and devotion.

To take the most contentious, why ‘social classes’?  In an era of mass democratization, the smoothing out, flattening and blurring of racial, ethnic and even sexual distinctions, now inflamed and driven by social media, may be the first hint that trouble lies ahead.

In her 1961 book, The Crisis in Culture: It’s Social and It’s Political Significance, German-American political scientist Hannah Arendt traced the origin of class to the second half of the 19th century:

Society began to monopolize “culture” for its own purposes, such as social position and status. This had much to do with the socially inferior position of Europe’s middle classes, which found themselves as soon as they acquired the necessary wealth and leisure in an uphill fight against the aristocracy and its contempt for the vulgarity of sheer moneymaking. In this fight for social position, culture began to play an enormous role as one of the weapons, if not the best-suited one, to advance oneself socially, and to “educate oneself” out of the lower regions, where supposedly reality was located, up into the higher, non-real regions, where beauty and the spirit supposedly were at home.

This evidently is Elliot’s ‘transmission of a culture within a culture’ at work.  It clearly would not have worked had there been no ‘upper class’ to envy, admire and imitate.  The trouble Elliot foresaw was also predicted by Hannah Arendt, albeit more than a decade later.  For both it was a fragmentation of the social classes and the uses they put to culture which was at the root of the problem.

Instead of enriching life, thought Arendt, culture was increasingly becoming utilitarian, a method of social advancement, and not an end in itself.  This, of course, is what is behind the rise of mass culture, a culture to be bought and sold.  For Elliot that meant fragmentation and decline:

If I am not mistaken, some disintegration of the classes in which culture is, or should be, most highly developed, has already taken place in western society — as well as some cultural separation between one level of society and another. Religious thought and practice, philosophy and art, all tend to become isolated areas cultivated by groups in no communication with each other.

What neither could have known or even anticipated was the re-emergence of another totally different culture, one that had swept much of the then known world in the middle ages – including significant parts of Europe.  It is, of course, Islam, and today it is happening as Christian culture falters and stumbles, unsure of itself, questioning its relevance to modern life and hence its very future.

In an ironic echo of early Christian and Jewish values, the religion of Mohammed is demanding and uncompromising.  To step aside invites harsh punishment.  It is disciplined, organised and above all, rising in influence within Europe.  The overwhelmingly Muslims migrants causing so much political turmoil in Europe are a  growing in every respect – in numbers, and in economic and even in political power.  Abandoning much of what is taken for granted by Muslims as their religious duty, Christians have made their ‘deal’ with God.  ‘Render onto Caesar’ has become manifest, best seen in the West’s insistence on the strict separation of church and state.  In Islam there is no such concept.

We must turn to Roman history to see what could be the outcome of what the late American historian Samuel Huntingdon thought would become a ‘clash of civilizations.’  Gibbon in his Decline and Fall, saw the incursion of Christianity into Rome as fundamental to the Roman collapse. In his autobiography Gibbon says “…I believed, and as I still believe, that the propagation of the Gospel, and the triumph of the church, are inseparably connected with the decline of the Roman monarchy…”

Modern scholarship on the relationship between Christianity and the fall of Rome is more nuanced, as was Elliot himself in his essay, noting that “. . . the culture with which primitive Christianity came into contact (as well as that of the environment in which Christianity took its origins) was itself a religious culture in decline.”

Whatever is happening, whatever will be its outcome, this conclusion by Elliot seems indisputable:

… the one thing that time is ever sure to bring about is the loss: gain or compensation is almost always conceivable but never certain. 

If there is neither heaven nor hell; neither saints nor sinners, what will we tell the children?

 

Mike Ungersma

Christmas, 2018, Benicassim, Spain

 

 

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