Ideas on Europe Blog

 

Over the past two months, I see that religion is playing a significant role in politics, both domestically and internationally. The UK and Ireland archbishops’ warning of the government’s  Internal Market Bill, ongoing confrontation between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the French President Emmanuel Macron over Islam and Secularism, and the Catholic Church’s success in tightening the abortion laws in Poland are good examples of the intersection of religion and politics. In the case of the UK, we see illegitimate religious actors interfering in political processes, while in the other two examples we note that Erdogan and Kaczynski using their association with religious institutions for their political agendas.

The person on the street knows that in democracies, we elect our representatives to represent our interests and make decisions on our behalf on numerous policy areas at different levels of government. There are also mechanisms through which the public can keep the politicians to account. To put it in simple terms, when and if the electorate is not happy with the politicians’ policy choices, in the next elections, they vote them out.  However, not alone the person on the street, but also the person with a certain level of education, do not have an idea about how much religious institutions and actors are involved both in our everyday life choices (private/public). Beyond that, the relationship between the religious institutions/actors and the elected politicians is not always transparent. The interests of the public in this interaction is the one that raises alarm bells.

Following are the questions that have been occupying my mind:

• Why are religious actors, symbols and expectations are popping up time and again in politics?
• How and why religious actors are given platforms to express their views on the day of the business?
• How can you explain the intersection between religion and politics?
• What is the public’s place in this interaction?
• Is religious politics an outcome of rational calculations of both politician and religious actors?

I do not have answers for all the above listed questions. Instead I have some observations which may address some of those questions.

Internal Market Bill

On 19th October, the five primates of the UK and Ireland have written a joint letter in Financial Times, setting out their grave concerns about the UK’s Internal Market Bill. They said: ‘the UK government is not only preparing to break the protocol but also to breach a fundamental tenet of the agreement: namely by limiting the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights in Northern Ireland law.’  Additionally, they implicitly implored their fellow peers in the House of Lords to take responsibility and stop the democratically elected government in passing the Internal Market Bill by saying: “We wish to highlight the grave responsibility of peers… as they debate the UK Internal Market Bill’.

I like to make a couple of points in relation to the above. First, the UK government’s Internal Market Bill can be criticised on many grounds, and the legitimate institutions and actors, such as the opposition political parties have expressed their position on this bill. At the same time, the European Commission has already started a formal infringement process against the United Kingdom. Whereas the UK and Ireland archbishops’ interference in the democratic process do raise questions about the role of religious institutions and actors’ role in the UK political system and the impact they may have on the political processes.

Second, I know from my observations that the UK archbishops, if not regularly, occasionally do express their views on the political processes, which means there is a culture of religious actors interfering with the political processes in the UK. Whether they succeed in affecting the outcomes of the political processes, and whether seen as a problem in UK politics, I am not sure.

Third, how an illegitimate and unelected body like the Archbishops of the UK and Ireland can openly ask another unelected House of the Westminster Parliament to interfere and block the passage of a bill. It is this level of interference which makes me ask: whose interest the Archbishops of the UK and Ireland do represent, what kind of relationship Archbishops have with the House of Lords, and is there any mechanism to keep to account.

Islam versus Secularism

The tension between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the French President Emmanuel Macron began to intensify, and to this day it is still escalating when in early October Macron said:  “Islam is a religion which is experiencing a crisis today,” and announced stricter oversight of schooling and better control over foreign funding of mosques. Macron’s statement was an open provocation beyond disrespect for Erdogan, who responded:  “Who are you to talk about the structuring of Islam?” What made the relationship between Macron and Erdogan worst was the tragic murder of Samuel Paty, a French history teacher, for showing cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad to his students. Upon this, Macron said that “We will not give up caricatures and drawings, even if others back away”.

I like to offer a couple of points. First, Macron and Erdogan are seating on the opposite side of the seesaw. Macron is an advocate of Secularism, on the other hand, there is Erdogan, who in all his political career fought against ‘French-inspired Turkish version of Secularism’.  Therefore, it is only average for them to disagree and confront each other at this level.

Second, Erdogan, from his first day in politics to this day, has gradually, but consistently, both favoured use of religious symbols in everyday life and allowed involvement of the religious institutions and actors in the political processes in Turkey.  That meant religion continuously have a high impact on the policy decisions and choices made by Erdogan. Having said that when the intersection between politicians and the religious institutions and actors has become constant and persistent in Turkey, ultimately it became harder to work out on who is influencing who, whose interests the government and the religious institutions do represent, and more importantly, where do the public’s interests lie in this interaction.

Third, as far as what motivates Erdogan and Macron in their attack for each other apart from having a different position on the separation of government institutions and persons from religious institutions. I do not think Erdogan is standing up against a secular and Christian leader in the best interests of the Muslims. Erdogan, who earned a name across the globe for his vociferous character and a strong opinion about religion, is using religion to create a smokescreen to cover up the downturn of the economy and rising COVID-19 cases in Turkey. Every news outlet in Turkey has been covering this story, hailing him for his words, used against Macron. While the interest of his loyal voters and Muslim communities is the least of Erdogan’s concern, the problem is that it is difficult to prove to these people that Erdogan is only confronting Macron because it serves well his current political interests. As for Macron, he is representing one of the most secular country  in Europe, but his dispute with Erdogan is not only motivated by Secularism. There is a suggestion that Macron likes Erdogan using this situation in his benefit, as 2022 Presidential Election is looming, and he is head-to-head with far-right leader Marine Le Pen in the opinion polls.

Polish Women versus the Catholic Church

On 22nd of October, the Polish Constitutional Court outlawed abortion in cases where the foetus is severely damaged or malformed; which meant that in practice now means almost all forms of abortion are banned. The tightening Poland’s abortion laws were welcomed by senior church figures, including archbishop Stanislaw Gadecki, head of Poland’s episcopal conference, having pushed for it for a long time. However, the women whom this ruling most concerned took to the streets to protest against the Court’s declaration and have disrupted masses and spray-painted churches. Whereas the Jarosław Kaczynski, who is the leader of ruling Law and Justice political party and Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, regarded demonstrators’ action as an ‘attack to destroy Poland’ and called on for his supporters to turn out on the streets to defend churches at any cost, in a way he permitted violence against the protesters.

First, since 2015 the PiS has been overhauling the Polish Legal system regardless of the EU’s criticism and the Article 7 procedure. Thus the constitutional courts have been going through a reform. I cannot say for sure, but the judges may have been sympathetic to the PiS’s agenda, as well as to the Catholic Church’s demands when declaring the tightening of the abortion law.

Second, Kaczynski’s harsh critique of the protestors and his call on his supporters are an indication of a deeper problem Kaczynski may have. Kaczynski is failing to read the public mood about abortion law, but more so on women’ place in the society. This might cost him women’ vote in the next elections.

Third, the interaction of Catholic Church and the leadership of the PiS, the close connection between them and how out of touch they are with Polish society, but particularly with women who are demanding a voice in political processes and want to decide for themselves, in this case, whether they want to have an abortion or not. I think that women screaming in the face of a local priest for the first time and chanting at them to “go back to church”, is a piece of evidence that Polish women are saying ‘no’ to status quo, pointing to Churches where priests should be based, not interfering with politics and in women’s personal choices.

In conclusion, religion and politics together do not seem to serve in the interests of us all, either religious actors want to see politicians representing their demands in the political processes, or politicians use religion for their political agendas. The losing side in this interaction is us all; but like the Polish Women, we can always stand up to them.

The post Intersection of Religion and Politics– who is on the losing side in this encounter. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The eerie quiet of negotiators, um, negotiating means we’ve seen very little of the Future Relationship process of late: everyone’s too busy trying to work up texts and compromises to brief outsiders. Which makes it a good time to consider an aspect of the ratification problem that’s not been much seen so far: what happens if there’s a deal, but ratification can’t be finished by the end of 31 December? So far, we’ve tended to think about things as a case of there being a deal or not and then sticking to that as a binary. But clearly, this isn’t the case: as we know, a collapse of the Future Relationship process still leaves the door open to future efforts to address each sides’ interests. And it’s also true that if the current talks do produce a treaty that each side wants to ratify, then failure to do so by the end of the year doesn’t kill it. This is because while the transition period – with the UK following all elements of EU membership, bar representation and voting – runs until New Year’s Eve, there is no such time limit on the negotiating mandate of either side. Yes, both are committed to ‘best efforts’ to hit the deadline, for a seamless jump from one arrangement to another, but as we know from earlier discussions about this, it was both practically and legally impossible to make that an obligation. So the possibility of a gap exists. Broadly speaking, we could see this gap in one of two variants. The first is the ‘half a mo’ version, where ratification is underway, but someone just runs out of time to complete their processes (the IfG have a good run-down on this): if we have to go down a route of EU27 national ratifications, this is a distinct possibility, even if Christmas closures do leave some margin for extra sitting days for legislatures (I leave you to ponder how sympathetic parliamentarians might feel to that, especially given everything else on their plate). In this scenario, the gap is likely to be small and everyone’s pretty obviously on board with the programme. This points to a short window when no arrangement would be in legal effect, but the rapid arrival of the new deal would give much leeway to let everyone neglect to enforce the full weight of a no-deal scenario. Given that there’s been much discussion in EU circles about progressive introduction of controls post-January in the latter scenario, this could be an extension of that principle, knowing that things would be on a firmer footing shortly. In brief, here we might see a short period of soft-pedalling, which itself might be used as a way of demonstrating good faith. Which is also why we might think it less likely than the second variant of the gap: the ‘err, hang on chaps’ model. Precisely because the first version is grounded in some genuine procedural problem, we have to imagine that both sides would know this was coming and would seek to avoid it at all: better to have no gap than even a small one, especially if we’re trying to rebuild trust. However, as we’ll recall from 2018-20, ratification is not only about your relationship with the other negotiating party, but also your domestic constituency. To take the obvious case, will Number 10 be able to carry the backbenches on a wave of a ‘world-beating’ deal, at speed and without rebellion? Particularly given that some of the scales might have fallen from their eyes now that they’ve had time to consider whether the Withdrawal Agreement was actually what they thought/said it was? One consequence of that saga is that the EU will be pushing for more explicit language about dispute settlement and governance, which even the less assiduous readers of treaty texts might pick up on. And the sailing might be no easier on the EU side, especially if the concessions made fall too obviously on any one member state (e.g. France and fisheries): clear problems for one might be enough to put the brake on and to send Barnier back to try again. Again, the calculation here might be that the UK needs this more than the EU, so the former will have to cave in. However it goes, big problems on any side are liable to mean that we’re back into that territory of renegotiation, and that would be occurring through the end of transition. Here it would be much harder to sell the gap as brief or underpinned by rebuilding trust, which in turn makes it harder to keep everyone on board. Indeed, if it turns out that the world doesn’t fall apart on 1 January, some in the UK might decide that it’s actually not so bad after all and pack it in (even though that would be partly because of that progressive re-introduction of controls mentioned earlier). At the very least, this kind of gap would be one that contained much more potential to collapse the process of negotiation, and to see the full effects of no-deal occur. Even if a deal could be patched up and pushed through, the experience would do little to improve the quality of the relationship between the EU and UK. All of which might be a long way to say that if you want a deal, you also should really not want a gap.

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According to leading analytical agencies, Ukraine’s sovereign credit rating did not exceed “B” for more than 20 years, but international organizations and foreign countries keep pouring money into the country.

politeka.net

It was announced during the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the UK in October that London will provide Kyiv with an additional £5 million in humanitarian assistance. The amount involved is not much for the state, but financial support of this kind from Europe and the United States has been received by Ukraine regularly since 2014. Dollars and euros help the economy to maintain a precarious balance on the background of general fall in the industry and the global turbulence due to the coronavirus pandemic. Part of the international assistance comes to the country as donations, but significant amounts come to Ukraine in the form of investments or loans.

According to the senior analyst of the Ukrainian Council on Foreign Relations Vladimir Denisyuk, there are no official statistics on how much money and from what sources Kyiv received. Such information is not systematically collected in one particular agency. According to information from the open sources, the main donors of the country are the United States, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, which over the past 6 years have transferred tens of billions of dollars to Kyiv.

Foreign aid from Washington

Since 2014, the US has been annually providing to Ukraine from $306 to $518 million financial assistance. By 2020, the total amount represents more than $2.7 billion. Funds were used to diversify energy, support government institutions and encourage anti-corruption efforts. More than a billion of donations were spent to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces and improve cooperation with NATO. Washington donated equipment, military hardware, lethal and non-lethal weapons to Kyiv, organized courses for retraining officers.

From Brussels with love

According to approximate estimates Ukraine received financial support from Europe totaling €15 billion for the last six years. The European Union’s spokesperson for foreign affairs Maja Kocijancic underlined that the EU’s support to Ukraine in the past years has been “unprecedented and consistent.” European aid was divided into several tranches provided by various institutions, states and organizations.

economics.segodnya.ua

Since 2014, the European Commission has donated four macrofinancial assistance tranches totaling nearly €4 billion to Ukraine. In addition, the EU provided Kyiv with grants for development and humanitarian aid totaling about €1.5 billion. This year, Ukraine received another €190 million from the EU to purchase medical supplies, personal protective equipment and reduce the consequences of COVID-19. Brussels has repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine is the largest recipient of European financial assistance among non-EU countries.

Particular EU member states also supported Ukraine in the form of grants, loans and investments. In 2014-2017, the total amount of tranches had reached €1.5 billion. Germany allocated the most funds – nearly €1 billion. Other important donors were Sweden (€122 million), Poland (€118 million), Great Britain (€106 million) and France (€62 million). Based on open source data, the European Commission and EU member states donated at least $7 billion to Kyiv.

Another part of financial assistance from European countries was grunted in the form of loans. In 2014-2019, the European Investment Bank and its partners in Kyiv signed commitments worth €3.8 billion. The projects involved investments mainly in the public sector (municipal infrastructure, education, transport, etc.).

From June 30, 2014 to June 30, 2019, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development allocated to Ukraine about €3.5 billion as loans and capital investments.

The IMF loans

The main pillar of financial support for Ukraine is the IMF. In just 25 years of cooperation, the Fund provided the country with loans totaling $31.3 billion. Active borrowing occurred right after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. In April 2014, the IMF approved a two-year stand-by (SBA) program for Ukraine costing about $17 billion, under which only $4.5 billion was allocated.

ukraina.ru

In the summer of 2014, it became clear that as a result of the events in Crimea and the conflict in southeastern Ukraine, a large-scale economic crisis has been triggered in the country. The current cooperation program between Kyiv and the IMF has been revised. In March 2015, the IMF replaced it with a new $17.5 billion expanded financing plan. According to it, Ukraine received $6.6 billion in 2015, and $1 billion each in the next two years. In return, the Ukrainian government agreed to take austerity measures: cut social payments, increase the retirement age and gas tariffs.

In December 2018, the IMF Executive Board approved a 14-month SBA program totaling about $3.9 billion, under which Ukraine managed to get only $1.4 billion. The assistance was not paid in full, as Kyiv could not fully meet the requirements of the Fund. Although Ukraine adopted a law creating an anti-corruption court, the stumbling block were slow increase in gas prices and a high budget deficit. However, soon cooperation was resumed.

To date, Ukraine has agreed with the International Monetary Fund on another support amounting to $5.5 billion. The conditions for the provision of financial assistance were the continuation unpopular with the people medical, land, and educational reforms, as well as the growth of utility bills. In June 2020, Kyiv received the first tranche under a new agreement in the amount of $2.1 billion. In general, since 2014, the IMF has provided Ukraine with loans totaling $16.7 billion.

Digging the debt hole

As of February 2020, Ukraine ranks third in the world in terms of debts to the International Monetary Fund. Multibillion-dollar financial injections into Ukraine’s economy over the past six years have driven the country into debt, which constitutes for almost half of GDP. At the end of this summer, Ukraine’s external debt has already crossed the $85 billion mark, which is about $7500 per citizen, while $2000 of them everyone owes exactly the IMF.

glavcom.ua

Servicing such an external debt is expensive for the government. According to experts, new tranches from the IMF go to repay previous loans to the Fund, and not to restart the economy and gradually recover from the debt. Indeed, international aid today is only a refinancing of previous loans. Within 3 years, Ukraine has to return $5.3 billion to the Fund, and the IMF is just allocating $5.5 billion for 3 years under the updated cooperation program. It turns out that the state needs even more money from foreign donors to revive sustained grow of the economy.

Ukraine is a risky asset

Relations with the IMF are considered on a strategic level for Kyiv. Most other organizations, world banks and funds agree to lend to the country only after the decision to open a loan program made by the IMF Executive Board. Cooperation with the IMF is a kind of “investment anchor” for Ukraine. Other international credit organizations, funds and states have invested tens of billions of dollars in Ukraine over the past six years thanks to the Kyiv’s long history of relations with the Fund.

At the same time, the largest analytical agencies have been assigning extremely low credit ratings to Ukraine for more than 20 years. On the Standard & Poor’s, Fitch or Moody’s scale the country needs to overcome at least 5 more steps to become attractive to foreign investors. In 2014-2015 (when foreign states were most actively allocating money), estimates of the Ukrainian economy predicted a default. Current ratings of international experts recommend not to invest in Ukraine due to the significant risks of such investments. In September this year, Fitch left the credit rating of Ukraine unchanged at “B” with a stable forecast. At the same time, a minimum acceptable and attractive for investors rating is «BBB-».

mof.gov.ua

In exchange for risky investments in the Ukrainian economy, foreign donors demand that the government comply with strict austerity measures. In addition to cutting social payments, creditors insist on implementing structural reforms unpopular with the people.

Who pays the piper calls the tune

When agreeing on financing programs with the IMF, Ukraine each time signed a memorandum of cooperation, which was an indispensable condition for receiving funds. In 2014, Kyiv agreed to increase gas tariffs, conduct judicial, anti-corruption reform and reform of state-owned enterprises, including Naftogaz. Among the requirements was also the lifting of the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land and raising the retirement age. When signing a new memorandum in 2015, Ukraine agreed with the IMF to privatize the largest commercial PrivatBank, legalize gambling, even more increase utility tariffs, and again promised to open the land market and continue the fight against corruption. Despite the pressure of creditors, Ukraine never hurried to implement the points of the memorandum. For example, laws on the legalization of gambling and the opening of the land market were adopted only in 2020.

The current program of cooperation with the IMF of December 2019 implies even more serious requirements. Ukraine pledged to continue pension, medical and educational reforms, reduce welfare payments and benefits for age and hazardous employment. The new conditions again prescribe lifting restrictions on utility tariffs, boosting the privatization of large state-owned enterprises, as well as further reforming of land market, allowing foreigners to buy vast Ukrainian lands.

In the following articles we will try to explain what foreign aid to the Ukrainian economy was spent on. We will also try to answer for what purpose Europe and the United States continue to invest taxpayer money in Ukraine, and how do they intend to return these investments.

 

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Although hard to believe now, for most of the UK’s four decades as a member of the European Union, Britain didn’t want to leave. On the contrary, most Brits wanted us to stay.

What’s the proof of that? Well, apart from polling over the years, look at governments and general elections.

• From 1959 to 2016, every UK government and every UK Prime Minister strongly wanted Britain to be a member of the European Community.
• Since we joined the Community in 1973 right up to 2016, at every general election, all the main parties wanted us to stay in the EU, with just one exception.

What was the exception?

It was the general election of 1983, when Labour’s manifesto – described then as ‘the longest suicide note in history’ – pledged to get Britain out of the European Community.

Labour lost that election by a huge landslide. Arch Eurosceptic, Tony Benn, lost his Bristol seat.

Since then, Leaving was a minority call on the far side lines of British politics for most of our decades of membership.

Just two years before the referendum, in 2014, Ipsos Mori polling showed that Britain’s support for wanting to remain in the EU was the highest it had been in 23 years – 56% in favour of remain, just 36% for leave, as reported at the time by The Guardian.

This, despite the apparent rise of UKIP, that the Tories and Labour seemed so scared about.

The Guardian from 22 October 2014

A year later, in 2015, the Ipsos Mori poll showed that support for continued EU membership was even higher – a staggering 61% in support of remaining, with just 27% supporting leave, as reported by The Independent.

Independent from 19 June 2015

What does this all mean?

It means that many, if not most, of those who voted Leave in the 2016 referendum would have voted Remain just a year or two earlier.

Somehow, in the months, weeks and days leading up to the referendum, many of those who previously would have supported Remain were cajoled and convinced to switch to Leave.

Of course, many of them now realise that they were conned with lies and false promises in what was a fundamentally flawed referendum. That is going to become more apparent from 1 January 2021 onwards.

• That’s when Brexit arrives for real.
• That’s when all of us can compare Brexit Britain with Remain Britain.
• And that’s when the truth will trump the lies.

It’s when it will become increasingly, painfully and shockingly obvious that Brexit cannot deliver its promised land, and that Britain – and Britons – were better off remaining in the EU.

Remainers – now Rejoiners – must be ready to say to vast numbers of ex-Leave supporters:

“Welcome back. We missed you.

“Let’s now work together to undo the mess of Brexit; legitimately, democratically and with a huge show of numbers.”

• 8-minute video by Jon Danzig: Why the EU was started and why Britain joined.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• My campaign page on Facebook: Reasons2Rejoin
• And LinkedIn

The post Britain is naturally a pro-EU country appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

ECJ’s interpretation of Community law must be useful to the national court

 It should be noted, at the outset, that Article 234 EC does not empower the Court to apply rules of Community law to a particular case, but only to rule on the interpretation of the EC Treaty and of acts adopted by European Community institutions (see, inter alia, Case 100/63 van der Veen [1964] ECR 565, 572, and Case C‑203/99 Veedfald [2001] ECR I‑3569, paragraph 31). The Court may, however, in the framework of the judicial cooperation provided for by that article and on the basis of the material presented to it, provide the national court with an interpretation of Community law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of one or other of its provisions (Case 20/87 Gauchard [1987] ECR 4879, paragraph 5, and Joined Cases C‑515/99, C‑519/99 to C‑524/99 and C‑526/99 to C‑540/99 Reisch and Others [2002] ECR I‑2157, paragraph 22). (C-54/07, par.19)

Public statements that constitute direct discrimination; an identification of the victim is not required

Nevertheless, it cannot be inferred from (…) that the lack of an identifiable complainant leads to the conclusion that there is no direct discrimination within the meaning of Directive 2000/43. The aim of that directive, as stated in recital 8 of its preamble, is ‘to foster conditions for a socially inclusive labour market’. For that purpose, Article 3(1)(a) states that the directive covers, inter alia, selection criteria and recruitment conditions. (C-54/07, par.23)

 The fact that an employer declares publicly that it will not recruit employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin, something which is clearly likely to strongly dissuade certain candidates from submitting their candidature and, accordingly, to hinder their access to the labour market, constitutes direct discrimination in respect of recruitment within the meaning of Directive 2000/43. The existence of such direct discrimination is not dependant on the identification of a complainant who claims to have been the victim. (C-54/07, par.25)

Distinguishing direct discrimination (the conceptual requirement) from the legal procedures (the practical minimum) implies a space for Member States to introduce higher protection in that regard.

The question of what constitutes direct discrimination within the meaning of Directive 2000/43 must be distinguished from that of the legal procedures provided for in Article 7 of that directive for a finding of failure to comply with the principle of equal treatment and the imposition of sanctions in that regard. Those legal procedures must, in accordance with the provisions of that article, be available to persons who consider that they have suffered discrimination. However, the requirements of Article 7 of Directive 2000/43 are, as stated in Article 6 thereof, only minimum requirements and the Directive does not preclude Member States from introducing or maintaining provisions which are more favourable to the protection of the principle of equal treatment. (C-54/07, par.26)

It is up to the national court to assess according to the national legislation, whether an actio popularis in the name of employment equality is permitted.

Consequently, Article 7 of Directive 2000/43 does not preclude Member States from laying down, in their national legislation, the right for associations with a legitimate interest in ensuring compliance with that directive, or for the body or bodies designated pursuant to Article 13 thereof, to bring legal or administrative proceedings to enforce the obligations resulting therefrom without acting in the name of a specific complainant or in the absence of an identifiable complainant. It is, however, solely for the national court to assess whether national legislation allows such a possibility. (C-54/07, par.27)

The presumption of Discrimination; the defendant carries the burden of proof

Article 8 of Directive 2000/43 states in that regard that, where there are facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it is for the defendant to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. The precondition of the obligation to adduce evidence in rebuttal which thus arises for the alleged perpetrator of the discrimination is a simple finding that A PRESUMPTION OF DISCRIMINATION has arisen on the basis of established facts. (C-54/07, par.30)

Public statements give rise to the presumption

Statements by which an employer publicly lets it be known that, under its recruitment policy, it will not recruit any employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin may constitute facts of such a nature as to give rise to a presumption of a discriminatory recruitment policy. (C-54/07, par.31)

The content of the adduced evidence

It is, thus, for that employer to adduce evidence that it has not breached the principle of equal treatment, which it can do, inter alia, by showing that the actual recruitment practice of the undertaking does not correspond to those statements. (C-54/07, par.32)

The national court will assess the sufficiency of the evidence

It is for the national court to verify that the facts alleged against that employer are established and to assess the sufficiency of the evidence which the employer adduces in support of its contentions that it has not breached the principle of equal treatment. (C-54/07, par.33)

The scope of the sanctions

Article 15 of Directive 2000/43 confers on Member States responsibility for determining the rules on sanctions for breaches of national provisions adopted pursuant to that directive. Article 15 specifies that those sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and that they may comprise the payment of compensation to the victim. (C-54/07, par.36)

The scope of discretion granted to Member States; de minimis EU requirements

Article 15 of Directive 2000/43 thus imposes on Member States the obligation to introduce into their national legal systems measures which are sufficiently effective to achieve the aim of that directive and to ensure that they may be effectively relied upon before the national courts in order that judicial protection will be real and effective. Directive 2000/43 does not, however, prescribe a specific sanction, but leaves Member States free to choose between the different solutions suitable for achieving its objective. (C-54/07, par.37)

The form of the sanctions

If it appears appropriate to the situation at issue in the main proceedings, those sanctions may, where necessary, include a finding of discrimination by the court or the competent administrative authority in conjunction with an adequate level of publicity, the cost of which is to be borne by the defendant. They may also take the form of a prohibitory injunction, in accordance with the rules of national law, ordering the employer to cease the discriminatory practice, and, where appropriate, a fine. They may, moreover, take the form of the award of damages to the body bringing the proceedings. (C-54/07, par.39)

 

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Uneven surface ahead Lots of people have lots of problems with the Maastricht Treaty, and I’m not one to change that. Instead I’ll throw another issue onto the pile: its lopsidedness. If you’ve read the text – and really, you should have – you’ll notice that there’s a huge difference between the sections relating to the first pillar (the European Community) and those for the second and third pillars (Common Foreign & Security Policy and Justice & Home Affairs respectively). The former is full of rich detail, setting out in elaborate detail how things should work. The latter is very brief, with sketchy outlines of what might come. Indeed, it was so brief that there was a commitment to review all of that five years after signature (which became the Treaty of Amsterdam). How so? Well, Maastricht came out of a process that starting in the wake of the Single European Act, with the 1988 Delors Committee on Economic & Monetary Union producing recommendations on a single currency and its management. That resulted in a decision to hold a round of treaty revision. Soon after, we had the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Europe Europe, and there was a hurried bolting on of further treaty revisions to consider political integration. By the time of the end-game at Maastricht in December 1991, EMU had been through a long iterative process of refinement and filling-out to produce that first pillar text, while the political side had ‘only’ had about eighteen months to get to the self-confessed vagaries of CSFP and JHA. You’ll see where I’ve gone with this. The breaking ‘news’ (and I use the word advisedly, given how everyone seems very much less than shocked about it) that Future Relationship talks are resuming from today is connected to this history lesson because we’re currently short on words. Or, rather, we’re short on shared words. We know that until now there has been no joint text in the talks, only separate ones held by each party. And even the announcement yesterday of rolling talks does not fully bridge the gap, as Anton Spisak notes:

A couple of notable points from the agreed choreography for the final phase:

The two sides have now agreed to work on the basis of legal texts. This is the single most important development in mths. It's only by going through the texts line-by-line (1/n)https://t.co/tAv8ysitdu https://t.co/ymUvk616Xo

— Anton Spisak (@AntonSpisak) October 21, 2020 Words matter a lot here because they have legal force. And the more words you have, the more chance there is of some unintended error creeping in. Consider the Withdrawal Agreement, which you’d think had been pretty well pored over by all involved through 2018-20. That had to be revised this year to resolve some infelicities. The Future Relationship treaty – if we get to it – is going to be a very much more difficult proposition. Partly that’s because of time, which is achingly brief, but also because its scope is going to be that much wider than the WA: several hundred articles are likely, plus a long list of annexes that someone (probably the EU) will need to throw in too. Of course, if the aim of the exercise is to get to an in-force treaty by 1 January then legal drafters will have to work to that. But one likely consequence is going to be a pushing of much detail into subsequent rounds of negotiations within a framework established now. In that sense, we’ll be on the pillar 2/3 track: ideas more than actions, coupled to a standing need to negotiate with each other on the numerous loose ends. As Sydney Nash notes, we’ve got a whole lot more banging on about Europe, however this turns out:

Some future gazing regarding #Brexit. Two possible scenarios for consideration, and under both, Brexit just doesn’t go away.

— Sydney Nash (@NashSGC) October 21, 2020

The post It’s all just words appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Could the proper interpretation of an EU Directive be prohibiting a national rule from granting a general authorization?

By its two questions, which can be examined together, the national court is asking whether Directive 78/687 must be interpreted as precluding a national rule that grants a general authorisation to doctors who have not received the training required by Article 1 of that directive to carry out the activities of a dental practitioner and whether the answer to that question depends on the title under which those activities are practised. (C-35/02, par.20)

The Court’s reply

It follows from all the foregoing that the answer to the question referred must be that Directive 78/687, properly construed, precludes a national rule containing a general authorisation for doctors who have not completed the training required by Article 1 of that directive to carry out the activities of a dental practitioner, irrespective of the title under which those activities are carried out. (C-35/02, par.38)

The proper interpretation; should be a grammatical one.

At the outset, it should be recalled that Article 1(1) of Directive 78/687 provides that to be entitled to practice dentistry under one of the titles referred to in Article 1 of Directive 78/686, a dental practitioner must hold a diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal qualifications referred to in Article 3 of Directive 78/686. (C-35/02, par.24)

Only derogations expressly provided for in the EC Treaty or in the relevant directives are allowed (see Case C-40/93 Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 23). In that regard, three types of derogation are provided for, namely, first, the derogation set out in Article 7 of Directive 78/686, second, the one referred to in Articles 19, 19a and 19b of that directive and, finally, the derogation mentioned in Article 1(4) of Directive 78/687 (see Case C-40/93 Commission v Italy, paragraph 21). (C-35/02, par.25)

Article 1(4) of the Directive 78/687 applies only to the recognition of diplomas, certificates or other evidence of formal qualifications obtained in a non-member State (see Case C-40/93 Commission v Italy, paragraph 22). Article 7 of Directive 78/686 is applicable only to nationals who hold diplomas, certificates or other qualifications issued by the Member States before Directive 78/687 came into effect, in other words before 28 January 1980. Articles 19, 19a and 19b of Directive 78/686 concern only the transitional provisions applicable to people who received or embarked on their dental training in Italy, Spain or Austria respectively, under a system prior to the one in place as a result of the entry into force of those directives in those Member States. (C-35/02, par.26)

Paragraph 1(1) of the ZHG, which grants a general authorisation, from 28 January 1980 onwards, for doctors to practice dentistry on a permanent basis without completing the dental training required by Article 1 of Directive 78/687 is therefore not covered by any of the derogations from that provision referred to in paragraph 25 of this order. (C-35/02, par.27)

Moreover, it should be recalled that it is not open to Member States to create a category of dental practitioners which does not correspond to any category provided for by Directives 78/686 and 78/687 (see Case C-40/93 Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 24, and the order of 5 November 2002 in Case C-204/01 Klett [2002] ECR I-10007, paragraph 33). (C-35/02, par.28)

Applying that interpretation of those directives, the Court has ruled that a person may not carry out the activities of a dental practitioner even where he holds a diploma in medicine and has followed a specialised course in dentistry of three years’ duration (see Case C-40/93 Commission v Italy, Case C-202/99 Commission v Italy, and Klett, all cited above). Persons who hold only a diploma in medicine are, a fortiori, precluded from carrying out such activities. (C-35/02, par.29)

It follows that a general authorisation for doctors to practice dentistry on a permanent basis without holding the diplomas, certificates or other qualifications referred to in Article 3 of Directive 78/686, as required by Article 1 of Directive 78/687, is contrary to Community law. (C-35/02, par.30)

In that regard, the title under which those doctors intend to practice dentistry is of no relevance. If German doctors who do not have the training required by Article 1 of Directive 78/687 were authorised to practice dentistry under a title other than ‘Zahnarzt’, that would create a category of dental practitioners which does not correspond to any category provided for by Directives 78/686 and 78/687. (C-35/02, par.31)

The proper interpretation; the teleological one.

However, Mr Vogel submits that neither Directive 93/16 nor Directives 78/686 and 78/687 contain any restriction on the scope of doctors’ activities. In his view, if the Court were to rule that under Directives 78/686 and 78/687 doctors may not practice dentistry, those directives would be incompatible with Directive 93/16, since under that latter directive, doctors are entitled to practice odontostomatology, a discipline in the field of dentistry. (C-35/02, par.32)

In that regard, it need only be noted that Directives 78/686 and 78/687 seek to establish a clear separation of the professions of dental practitioner and doctor (see Case C-202/99 Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 51). Those directives apply to dental practitioners whereas Directive 93/16 applies to doctors and specialist medical practitioners. Even though Article 27 of that directive authorises specialist medical practitioners to practice stomatology, they must have met the training requirements laid down in that directive, namely at least three years of specialist training. (C-35/02, par.33)

The issue about the indirect effect of EU secondary law.

Mr Vogel also submits that the provisions of Directives 78/686 and 78/687 cannot apply to the dispute in the main proceedings because the provisions of a directive do not have direct effect against individuals. (C-35/02, par.34)

In that regard, it should be remembered, first, that the Member States’ obligation under a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive, and their duty under Article 10 EC to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of that obligation, are binding on all the authorities of the Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, paragraph 41, and Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I-6325, paragraph 24). (C-35/02, par.35)

Is there an infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity, if the previous case-law is to be implemented? The demand for ruling in light of the European law.

Mr Vogel submits, inter alia, that Directives 78/686 and 78/687, and the Court’s previous judgments relating to those directives, concern the right to practice dentistry under the title of dentist and not, as is the case at issue here, the right to practice dentistry as a doctor. In any event, those judgments were delivered well after he had embarked on his medical studies, on the basis of which he was expecting to be able to practice dentistry by virtue of Paragraph 1(1) of the ZHG, with the result that were those judgments to apply to his situation they would infringe the principle of non-retroactivity. (C-35/02, par.23)

It follows that, in applying domestic law, regardless of whether the provisions concerned are prior or subsequent to the directive, the national court called upon to interpret that law is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive, in order to achieve the purpose of the directive and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC (Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Marks & Spencer, cited above, paragraph 24). (C-35/02, par.36)

 

 

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Yesterday saw Michael Gove and David Frost, the UK leads for the current negotiations with the EU, give evidence to Parliamentary committees. They were very upbeat about it all, pointing to the increasing chances of a deal and sounding conciliatory about compromises on state aid, even as they acknowledged the continuing problems elsewhere. I noted this on Twitter, but expressed some doubt about it too, since I wasn’t clear whether this was actual “things are going to work out”, or more covering-of-backsides in case it didn’t: the space between ‘it’ll happen’ and ‘it’d have happened if only the other lot had tried as hard as we have’ is relatively small. Which provoked this response:

There's a bit of a dbl standard here. When UK doesn't present a view it is 'not engaging'. When it does, and I thought today's session illuminating, it is accused of blame management. The EU is never accused of same even though, in a sense it is constantly engaged in it too.

— John Rowland (@rowlandreport) October 7, 2020 I take the point, since I’m well aware that I’m much harder on the UK than the EU in this process and that several readers constantly assume I think the UK should just do whatever the EU wants. The second point can be dealt with briefly, since my interest is in the parties finding a mutually-acceptable outcome to these negotiations, because that’s the result that will most likely produce stable and constructive relations between them. Where that outcome lies is for the negotiators to decide, not me, but I certainly don’t think it’ll be possible if either side dictates terms. On the first point, some more consideration is merited. John’s last comment is certainly true: the EU is, and has long been, very aware of the reputational management aspects of Brexit. The process matters in of itself, but also as a marker of the EU’s wider objectives with its external partners: concessions to the UK would potentially mean concessions elsewhere. The difficulties of the period since 2016 have only strengthened the concern not to get played by the UK into becoming the villain of the piece. But the two parties have taken very different approaches to the managing of their image in all this. The UK has consistently had a very tight circle of people around the Prime Minister determining policy, with the bare minimum of engagement with those outside government (and not a huge amount within it). Recall the fights to give Parliament, the courts or any sectoral interest a say in the various stages of creating and developing the British position. By contrast, the EU has gone the opposite route, with a very high level of transparency from the start. Sure, that’s partly because of the terrible experience of TTIP, and partly because the EU is a very leaky organisation anyway, but still the decision to have very public binding of member states and EU institutions to the several mandates is striking. Some of this comes down to the representation of Brexit as an existential threat to the EU, driving all on that side towards both high levels of solidarity and to a clear desire for a negotiated outcome (i.e. a deal). The same isn’t true of the UK, where through either calculation or misunderstanding the scale of Brexit wasn’t fully internalised by the government, resulting in much more contestation of the practice and purpose of the exercise. Put differently, while the EU has taken a line that has been consistent both across time and across its constituent elements, taking actions that reflect that line, the UK has none of that. As yesterday’s evidence underlined, much of the work necessary to give effect in the UK to the things already agreed between the two looks doubtful for their 1 January deadline, be that on the Irish protocol implementation or the measures needed for even the British version of what they want from the Future Relationship talks. Chuck in all the other things, like the Internal Market Bill or the continuing unwillingness of Number 10 to talk to anyone about their plans, and a degree of scepticism about the British ‘position’ is warranted. This comes back to the question of trust, which is going to colour strongly the next few years of EU-UK relations: words are cheap, so they need to be backed up by appropriate action, and durably so, before they can have real weight by themselves. And that’s for the good of both the UK and the EU, if they want to find that mutually-acceptable outcome.

The post Sauce for the goose? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In the last decade, the EU’s foreign policy practices have grown increasingly complex. For instance, despite the centralisation envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, informal groups of member states shaped the Union’s policy on Kosovo and Ukraine.

Former and current EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini and Josep Borrell. Photo: NTB Scanpix/AP/Francisco Seco

Ten years after its ratification, some believe that the Lisbon Treaty failed to strengthen the EU activities in international politics. Others see the multiple crises the EU has faced as an opportunity to revise the Treaty, so the EU can live up to its ambitions on the international arena.

In principle, the Lisbon Treaty should have rationalized the EU’s institutional functioning, and thus increased the effectiveness of the EU external activities. The new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and especially the creation of the European External Action Service, should have ensured consistency in EU foreign policy both within and outside the EU institutional framework.

Still, many believe that the EU foreign policy is marred by a ‘leadership paradox’. Added to this, many dimensions of the crises the EU has faced after the Lisbon Treaty relate to the foreign policy sector. How is this possible?

EU Foreign Policy Governance Post-Lisbon

It might be too early to reach a final, encompassing balance of EU foreign policy post-Lisbon. In the meantime, however, given the qualifying institutional features of the High Representative as both Vice President of the European Commission and chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, an examination of this actor can offer insights into the institutional practices underpinning this policy domain.

What seems clear is that such practices do not reflect the intergovernmental-supranational divide formally envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty. Over the past decade, in fact, member states often engaged in patterns of interaction that went beyond such divide.

In particular, the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation seems to have triggered horizontal, informal dynamics of cooperation among member states. Some of these dynamics occurred within the EU institutional system, particularly in the intergovernmental forums. On these occasions, member states integrated their efforts without necessarily devolving discretionary power to supranational bodies, such as the European Commission. Hence, the label ‘new intergovernmentalism’.

Under certain circumstances, however, member states also engaged in informal, differentiated integration outside the treaty framework. EU foreign policy toward the Eastern neighbourhood can provide crucial insights into these dynamics.

In my recently published article, I demonstrate that this is especially so for the cases of Kosovo and Ukraine.

The case of Kosovo

The occurrence of informal differentiated integration has characterized the EU foreign policy towards Kosovo – and the Western Balkans. Ever since the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, France, Germany, Italy and the UK – alongside the US – coordinated their efforts within an international contact group: the Quint.

While doing so, they essentially shaped the EU approach to Kosovo and the Western Balkans. The members of the Quint have been at the forefront of the Union’s policies on Kosovo in the post-Lisbon era as well.

Simultaneously, German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated the Berlin Process in 2014 – one of the most prominent informal groups in the post-Lisbon era. The Process involves a small number of member states – Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia and the UK – the Western Balkans countries aspiring to EU membership, and EU representatives.

Indeed, the European Council pre-eminence over the High Representative in decision-making processes has characterized EU foreign policy on Kosovo in the post-Lisbon era. This notwithstanding, when member states believed in the need to devise a collective effort, the High Representative could significantly influence EU foreign policy, as it happened during Catherine Ashton’s mandate and the EU-brokered dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. On these occasions, informal groups of member states participating in the Quint and in the Berlin Process, contributed to EU efforts in coordination with EU institutions.

Still, when consensus among member states was not an option, the European Council took the lead. It is against this backdrop that the above-mentioned informal groups of member states frequently determined EU approach to Kosovo. For instance, during the suspension of the EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, Germany prevented the Kosovo–Serbia talks from collapsing through the Berlin Process.

The case of Ukraine

Informal differentiated integration characterized EU foreign policy towards Ukraine as well. The occurrence of the Normandy Format is a clear example of an informal group steering EU approach, without receiving a formal mandate from EU institutions but remaining broadly anchored to the EU framework.

The Normandy Format is composed by the representatives of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia. It was launched in July 2012, shortly after the outbreak of the Maidan protests and the Russian annexation of Crimea, to ensure a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. Notably, it is within this format that France and Germany took the lead in the negotiation of the Minsk Process.

The Central East South Europe Gas Connectivity High Level Group (CESEC) offers another example of how member states integrate their efforts through the formation of ad hoc coalitions in coordination with EU institutions. In the energy domain, including in the Ukrainian policy dossier, the Commission generally conducted its activities in cooperation with an informal group of member states. In February 2015, the Commission decided to establish CESEC alongside Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

The Ukrainian case too shows that the formation of a consensus among member states’ representatives within the European Council is a necessary – albeit not sufficient – condition for the High Representative to influence EU foreign policy. When such consensus existed, the High Representative could benefit from the support of informal groups of member states.

However, when Ashton and Mogherini did not benefit from a consensus among member states on the general approach to adopt, they were unable to act as instigators and enforcers of EU foreign policy. Under these circumstances, as the negotiation of Minsk Process shows, informal groups steered EU response to the Ukrainian crisis instead.

The EU at a crossroad

All this considered, the EU finds itself at a crossroad. The occurrence of informal groupings within EU foreign policy on Kosovo and Ukraine reflect the extent of informal differentiated integration in EU foreign policy governance, despite the centralisation envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty.

Indeed, informal groups steering EU foreign policy might serve short-term purposes, and provide a response to conflicts and crises while the EU intergovernmental forums are deadlocked. Yet these distinctive patterns of interaction point towards a fragmentation of the EU foreign policy post-Lisbon.

By doings so, they inevitably put the spotlight on the urgent need to reform EU governance, especially in the foreign policy domain.

The post The cases of Kosovo and Ukraine suggest a fragmented EU foreign policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Heute Nachmittag (7. Oktober 2020) hatte ich die Freude, zusammen mit fünf Wissenschaftskolleg*innen und UN-Expert*innen (Hannah Birkenkötter, Nicole Deitelhoff, Manuel Fröhlich, Carlo Masala, Hans-Christof von Sponeck) im Unterausschuss Vereinte Nationen des Deutschen Bundestages mit den Abgeordneten über Lehren und Schlussfolgerungen aus 75 Jahren Vereinte Nationen zu diskutieren. Die Debatte ist auf der Bundestags-Webseite  auch schön zusammengefasst.

Da wir nur 7 Minuten für das Eingangsstatement hatten, habe ich meine Gedanken tatsächlich mal in ein auf die Zeit getacktetes Redemanuskript geschrieben, an das ich mich auch einigermaßen gehalten habe.

Der reine Text meines Manuskripts ist unten wiedergegeben. Es gibt auch eine PDF-Fassung mit Fußnoten und Quellenangaben, die ich dem Unterausschuss vorab zur Verfügung gestellt habe. (An English translation of the speech in the UN subcommittee is available here.).

Die Aufzeichnung der ganzen zwei Stunden der Anhörung kann man hier anschauen. Mein gesprochenes Statement kommt ca. bei Minute 39:30.

Hier die Schriftfassung:

Sehr geehrter Herr Vorsitzender, sehr geehrte Abgeordnete, liebe Kollegïnnen,

ich möchte mit Blick auf die Frage, die Sie uns Sachverständigen gestellt haben, vier zentrale Lehren aus der Forschung zu den Vereinten Nationen als System fragmentierten globalen Regierens ziehen und einige Schlussfolgerungen formulieren.

Diese sind durch vielfältige Erkenntnisse gedeckt, die Wissenschafts-Kollegïnnen aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen, national und international, zusammengetragen haben. Die Lehren und Schlussfolgerungen sind für diesen Rahmen etwas zugespitzt. Zentrale Quellen für meine heutigen Aussagen finden sich in der verschriftlichten Stellungnahme.

Meine eigenen Forschungen haben sich dabei in den vergangenen sechs Jahren insbesondere auf die Budgetierung und die Finanzierung des UN-Systems fokussiert, sowie auf die Rolle von UN-Verwaltungen bei der Mittelbeschaffung und bei der Organisation von Haushalts- und Reformprozessen.

Vorweg sei gesagt, dass, wenn ich von den „Vereinten Nationen“ spreche, ich mich vor allem auf das UN-System in seiner Gesamtheit beziehe. Dieses System ist ein historisch gewachsenes, immer stärker fragmentiertes Netzwerk aus mehreren Duzend internationalen Organisationen, zwischenstaatlichen Verhandlungsarenen, Expertïnnen-Gremien, Militär- und nicht-militärischen Operationen, Finanzierungs-Mechanismen und einer Vielzahl internationaler Verwaltungseinheiten. Diese sind teilweise oder vollständig unabhängig aber häufig juristisch, finanziell und/oder personell miteinander verwoben.

Verbindungen zwischen den Teilen des UN-System bestehen auf globaler, auf regionaler und auf nationaler Ebene sowie „im Feld“. Oft ergeben sich diese Verbindungen politikfeldspezifisch, also zum Beispiel im Bereich „Globale Gesundheit“. Diese Mehrebenen-Netzwerke des UN-System haben sich seit den Anfängen der UN entwickelt, zum Teil bestehen sie auch schon länger.

Nicht umsonst spricht der UN-Generalsekretär António Guterres neuerdings in seinen Reden von einem „networked multilateralism“.

Die 1. Lehre für diese Stellungnahme ist daher, dass man die Vereinten Nationen nach 75 Jahren nur versteht, wenn man sie als diplomatisch und administrativ vernetztes und organisch gewachsenes Gesamtsystem betrachtet. 

Die wichtigste Schlussfolgerung aus dieser Erkenntnis ist, dass jeder Versuch, einen Teil des UN-Systems zu verändern immer auch Auswirkungen auf andere Teile hat. Manches Scheitern von einzelnen UN-Organisationen ist deshalb auch systemisch bedingt und hat nur wenig mit Einzel-Organisationsversagen zu tun. Sie sollten das als Politik bei Ihrer Bewertung der Arbeit der UN im Blick behalten.

Zum Teil muss man allerdings bis in den Völkerbund zurückgehen, um die heutigen Strukturen und Prozesse im UN-System zu verstehen, also die Prozesse, die möglicherweise reformiert werden sollen.

Das bringt mich zur 2. Lehre aus der Forschung der letzten Jahre: Die Vereinten Nationen sind nicht erst 75 Jahre alt, sondern einzelne zentrale Bereiche, und auch ihre Verbindungen untereinander, sind bis zu 100 Jahre alt oder sogar älter.

Insbesondere organisatorisch und administrativ sind die UN durch den Völkerbund und, bei den technischen UN-Organisationen (wie ITU, UPU oder WIPO), auch noch durch Strukturen aus dem 19. Jahrhundert vorgeprägt.

So ist zum Beispiel der heutige Haushaltsprozess für den UN-Kernhaushalt im Prinzip noch der gleiche wie schon im Völkerbund — und ähnlich schwierig. Die Völkerbund-Gesundheitsorganisation (LNHO) war schon in den 1920ern für ihre Aktivitäten von privaten Philanthropen aus den USA finanziell abhängig, so wie es die WHO heute wieder ist. Netzwerkstrukturen der „intellektuellen Kooperation“ legten im Kontext des Völkerbunds die Grundlage für die spätere UNESCO. Und selbst das Internationale Nansen-Büro für Flüchtlinge hatte bereits im Völkerbund Organisationsstrukturen, die später auch den UNHCR prägten.

Als etwas unbequeme Schlussfolgerung folgt daraus für Sie als Politikerïnnen, dass viele heutige Reformbemühungen im UN-System aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht eher zum Scheitern verurteilt sind, weil sie auf lange gewachsene Pfadabhängigkeiten sowie stabile und komplex vernetzte Interessenkonstellationen treffen. Es gibt auch bei der Vereinten Nationen die klassische Politikverflechtungsfalle.

Aber, um diese Schlussfolgerung etwas positiver zu formulieren: Für UN-Reformen braucht es vor allem synchronisierte Anstrengungen von einer großen Staatenmehrheit unter Einbindung der betroffenen UN-Bürokratien, um diese gewachsenen Strukturen der UN zu verändern. Minilateralismus in Form von kleinen und exklusiven Reform-Initiativen reicht dafür nicht aus.

Diese Bemerkungen führen mich zur 3. Lehre: Fragmentierung und damit letztendlich Bürokratisierung im UN-System sind häufig Ergebnis von wohlgemeinten minilateralen Vorhaben, durch die nationale Politikerïnnen lieber eigene politische Steckenpferde in die UN hineintragen als in den globalen multilateralen Mühlen nach schwierigen Kompromissen zu suchen.

Ein Grund dafür ist, dass insbesondere die Länder des Globalen Nordens, also die wichtigsten Geldgeber des UN-System, sich bis heute nicht ernsthaft damit abfinden, dass postkolonialer globaler Multilateralismus heißt, dass die Länder des Global Südens (z.T. repräsentiert durch die G77) die Mehrheit der Staaten auf dieser Welt stellen. Viele dieser Länder haben eine Kolonialgeschichte und schauen deshalb auch mit bestimmten Erwartungen auf die Vereinten Nationen. Aber statt Kompromisse zu suchen, die diese Mehrheitsverhältnisse repräsentieren, finanzieren die westlichen Geldgeber lieber minilaterale Sonderprogramme, Nebeninstitutionen, Multi-Donor-Trust-Funds und sonstige pressewirksame Leuchturmprojekte, häufig über eng zweckgebundene Mittel.

Die Schlussfolgerung aus dieser Erkenntnis ist, dass die Zukunft der Vereinten Nationen auch davon abhängt, ob und wann diese minilateralen Reflexe enden. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt werden sich der Globale Süden—also die globale Mehrheitsgesellschaft—und der Global Norden—die Finanzierungsmehrheit—einigermaßen reformunfähig oder -unwillig in der UN gegenüberstehen.

Die gute Nachricht bei all dem ist, und das ist dann die 4. Lehre: Während sich der globale Multilateralismus der Staaten in einer Reihe von Sackgassen zu befinden scheint, machen die meisten UN-Verwaltungen trotzdem ihre Arbeit.

Sie nutzen die Autonomie, die sie haben, um globale Politik zu gestalten und Lösungen für dringende Probleme wie Klimawandel, Flucht und Vertreibung, oder globale Pandemien zu finden oder voranzutreiben.

Sie sind es, die das pathologisch widersprüchliche Verhalten der Staatengemeinschaft in praktisches globales Handeln umsetzen müssen.

Sie machen ihre Arbeit selbst dann, wenn ihnen die Staaten regelmäßig in multilateralen Gremien oder durch zweckgebundene Finanzierungsanreize widersprüchliche Signale senden, und sie tun das in Genf und New York genauso wie in Yarmouk in Syrien oder in der Kivu-Region in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo.

Vielleicht—und das ist meine provokante abschließende Schlussfolgerung—sollten die Mitgliedsstaaten der UN, und insbesondere die großen Geldgeber, die UN-Verwaltungen häufiger einfach ihre Arbeit machen lassen. Damit wäre der UN im 75.  Jahr vielleicht mehr geholfen, als sie mit permanentem kollektivem Micro-Management zu traktieren oder mit neuen minilateralen Initiativen weiter zu fragmentieren.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!

The post 75 Jahre Vereinte Nationen im Bundestag: Mein Redemanuskript appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Eva Saeva, Postgraduate Researcher at Newcastle Law School

The COVID-19 pandemic hit the world hard. While medical researchers are racing to find a vaccine, malicious actors are exploiting the new range of possibilities to interfere with IT devices. Cybersecurity has become a prominent feature of the pandemic, especially in the health sector.

Photo: Virus, Yuri Samoilov via Flickr, yuri.samoilov.online

This blog explores how the European Union has dealt with the impact of the pandemic on the health sector across its Member States and whether the present cybersecurity legislative framework was sufficient to protect it. It examines how existing legislation applies to attacks against this critical infrastructure (CI) sector and will identify key takeaways in terms of the EU’s legal cybersecurity preparedness to act in times of crisis.

The current legal framework for cybersecurity is built upon the three pillars identified in the 2013 ‘EU Cybersecurity Strategy’: law enforcement, network and information security (NIS), and defence. The Directive on Attacks against Information Systems (2013), regulating illegal activities, such as access to information systems or data interference, belongs to the first pillar. The second, NIS, is the most developed pillar and includes legal instruments, such as the NIS Directive (2016, to be reviewed later this year), the Cybersecurity Act (2019) and the proposal for a Regulation establishing a Cybersecurity Competence Centre and Network. The least developed pillar is (cyber) defence and as such the EU has relatively weak powers in this particular field. The most relevant measure here is the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, adopted in 2017. Cybersecurity is also found in various sectorial legislative measures such as the European Electronic Communications Code (2018), the Recommendation on Cybersecurity for 5G networks (2019), the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence (2020), among others.

The measures analysed in this blog will be the NIS Directive and the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox because of their relevance to the COVID-19-related cyberattacks seen across Member States.

The NIS Directive, the first EU overarching cybersecurity law, aims to achieve a high common level of security of network and information systems in the Union. It applies to attacks targeting the CI sectors, including the health sector. It establishes the criteria for identifying operators of essential services (OESs) in each sector. According to article 5(2), these are entities which provide services “essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities”, that the service depends on network and information systems and an incident “would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of that service”. This means not all hospitals or medical centres would qualify as OESs. But, for example, the biggest hospital in a large city would. However, which institutions are the OESs in a given sector, as identified by the Member States, is not publicly accessible information.

The Directive also sets security requirements for the OESs. Article 14 (1) and (2) imposes obligations for OESs to adopt risk management, as well as preventive measures for incidents that could affect the security of their systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the first large-scale cybersecurity-resilience challenge some Member States had to encounter. The correct implementation and enforcement of the NIS Directive was tested. Even though health institutions across various (current and former) Member States were targeted (Italy, the UK, France), the March and April attacks in the Czech Republic provide the most relevant case study.

The March 2020 attack targeted a hospital in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic. It reportedly brought IT systems to a complete halt. Daily work was thus affected, new patients had to be re-routed to different hospitals and operations postponed. At the time of the attack, the hospital was also performing COVID-19 testing. While there is no certainty that this hospital was identified as an OESs under the NIS Directive, it certainly meets the criteria. In which case, Czech officials failed to correctly implement and enforce the security requirements listed above.

A month later, the health sector in the Czech Republic suffered another series of attacks. While “unsuccessful”, and although Czech officials never officially attributed the attack to a foreign state, it was reported Russia might be behind them. The allegations were officially labelled “fake news” by Russian officials. However, if foreign interference indeed took place, this would have additional legal implications as it might have constituted wrongful act under international law. According to the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, the EU has reaffirmed the recommendations for States not to “conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure”, adopted by the UN Group of Governmental Experts’ 2015 report. The Toolbox further states that even though attribution of an attack to a foreign actor is a sole responsibility of the state, there could be a joint EU diplomatic response.

In terms of the EU reaction, in his declaration on 30 April 2020, the High Representative Borell referenced cyberattacks on the health sector, stating that the EU and its Member States condemned “malicious behaviour in cyberspace”. In June, Commission’s President von der Leyen seemingly pointed a finger at China, stating attacks on hospitals “cannot be tolerated”. Neither statement referenced the Czech attacks specifically. No mention was made of the consequences of a failed implementation of the cybersecurity law. No mention of the possibility of a foreign interference within the territory of an EU Member State. No mention of an EU-level response in support of a targeted Member State. And while the Union has remained silent, on 17 April 2020, the US Secretary of State Pompeo explicitly referenced the Czech attacks, declaring that anybody engaging in such activities against allies should “expect consequences”, implicitly undermining the EU’s authority and making it seem unprepared to respond.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the pressure it put on the health sector have exposed the shortcomings of the overall EU approach to cybersecurity. While norms exist, enforcement is key – both at Member State and at EU level. If the EU wants to be a leader in promoting the regulation of cyberspace, including the protection of CI sectors or responsible State behaviour, it needs to be more assertive when its Member States fall victim to cyberattacks. The lack of reaction questions the willingness of the EU to enforce its own measures.

The post Cybersecurity and the EU: lessons from the COVID-19 crisis appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Union (EU) budget is about one percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all Member States amounting to about €240 per annum, per citizen. The EU budget redistributes more than €150 billion annually. These funds are directed towards agriculture and regional policy, which operate to help less developed countries and local communities. Millions of euros are spent on rebuilding roads or hospitals or for the educational and vocational training of thousands of European citizens’. A significant proportion of this money goes towards underdeveloped and economically less well-off regions, especially across Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe (see Figure 1).

European and national politicians, journalists and citizens have often raised questions on how EU funds are used. The media tends to cover this topic whenever it can frame issues of mismanagement or corruption. It rarely addresses the factors that account for the delivery and spending of EU funds across countries and regions or how Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF) are absorbed into local economies.

Against this background, our recent article provides a more refined understanding of what factors are driving the absorption of EU funds. Our research is significant because it provides a rich empirical analysis of the differences in EU funds absorption performance across European Union member countries. We help explain why some countries are better at spending European funding than others. In doing so, we examined how administrative and political indicators play out and affect the wider institutional environments responsible, at the national level, for spending a large part of European taxpayers’ money.

It is rather well-known that newer member states have often faced difficulties in absorbing EU funds into their economies. States such as the ones from Central and Eastern Europe had to comply with several EU laws and procedures before joining the EU. Despite a “learning process” achieved during the pre-accession period, some countries still face considerable challenges in accessing Structural and Cohesion Funds (also as can be seen from Figure 1). Looking at the previous multi-annual financial period of 2007-2013, and with few exceptions, three large groups of countries were identified in terms of Structural and Cohesion funds implementation:

1. most of the new Member States, with a relatively low absorption capacity, especially in the first period of the Cohesion Policy implementation (with notable outliers such as Lithuania, Estonia and Poland);
2. southern periphery Member States such as Italy and Spain which had consistently low absorption rates throughout the period;
3. most other EU-15 countries that had a relatively high performance in the early stages of Structural Funds implementation.

 

Although differences in absorption performance have considerably decreased in the last years, they have generally persisted over the entire programming period of 2007-2013, with significant delays and bottlenecks for several NMS. This is also the case for the current 2014-2020 EU budgetary period.

Figure 1: Allocated Cohesion and Structural Funds (SCF) during the 2007–13 Programming Period and Absorption Rates (2015) in EU‐27 countries. Source: Authors compilation based on DG Regional Policy and Eurostat data, 2007-13

Two core findings stand out in our article. These help provide answers to the above puzzles on why some countries’ are doing better than others when it comes to spending EU funding.

First, the effectiveness of a countries’ government and the latter’s ability to combat corruption are key factors that could boost a country’s absorption of EU funds. What this means is that the more effective a government is and the more it is willing to curb corrupt practices, within its structures, the more likely it is for that country to do better in spending EU money. Apart from ensuring a functional management and institutional system, Member States also need to prevent the distortions of different interest groups as to ease the implementation of Structural Funds. However, political cartels and corruption are still very present in many European countries, which in turn could affect how the returns of EU funds’ investments, and EU money more generally, are managed.

Second, other elements such as the quality of regulations or and the level of political stability in a country, contrary to our initial expectations, do not seem to matter so much. At the same time, other elements such as the level of political centralisation and decentralisation found and the macro-economic financial absorption capacity of a country, are also not important for what countries manage to get from the common European budget.

Why are these findings relevant? In essence, because they confirm the importance of administrative institutions and political governance in how public resources are managed, something already known in the field. European taxpayers’ money is redistributed, through the European budget, with the honourable aim of helping regions and European citizens in need. There needs to be a more specific focus on how domestic institutions and political forces influence the way public resources are spent. In recent years, politicians, academics and citizens have equally become more aware of this. Our research adds to this chorus of voices arguing that government effectiveness and internal corruption practices require further attention. These might be some of the most practical solutions for strengthening the implementation of Cohesion Policy across all EU Member States.

So how could politicians / policy-makers help achieve these aims? Firstly, more steps should be taken to improve the quality of institutions, procedures and human resources managing EU funds. This could be attained through a better use of Technical Assistance funding. Secondly, the question of combating corruption and of greater political support needs to be addressed head-on by all stakeholders. When politicians in the EU Council get together, in the next few months, to decide on the future European budget, these issues should be treated with utmost priority, alongside other technicalities and the increasing dominant discussions regarding the recovery plan needed post-corona.

The idea of a stronger European Union is linked to a common EU budget. Member States need to do more to improve their governmental effectiveness and efficiency, as well as reduce levels of corruption in order to improve spending of EU money. A better use of these resources seems to be highly related to these two factors across almost all EU countries. Advances in these areas might help achieve the wider objectives of European cohesion and solidarity. Eventually, this might also improve citizens’ levels of satisfaction with Europe and their support for the European integration project.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article, ‘Evaluating the Determinants of EU Funds Absorption across Old and New Member States – the Role of Administrative Capacity and Political Governance’

 

Authors

Cristian Incaltarau is a researcher at the Centre for European Studies within Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi (Romania). His recent research focuses on economic resilience, the migration – development nexus, and EU Cohesion Policy.

 

 

 

 

Gabriela Carmen Pascariu is full professor in European economics and policies at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi (Romania). She is the Director of the Centre for European Studies, Jean Monnet professor and Team Europe expert. Her main academic interests include: Economics of integration; Regional Development and European cohesion policy; Cross-border cooperation and ENP.

 

 

Neculai-Cristian Surubaru is a postdoctoral researcher at Maastricht University’s Studio Europa. His research focuses on European Union politics, Central and Eastern Europe and the new East-West divide, EU funds and state/administrative capacity.

The post Do institutions help achieve greater value for spending European taxpayers’ money? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Brexit politicians have sold to the nation that Britain must have 100% sovereignty – a key reason for leaving the European Union.

But wiser politicians know better. Former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was one of them.

In a Parliamentary session back in December 1989, about her latest conference with the 11 other leaders of the European Community nations meeting at the European Council in Strasbourg, Mrs Thatcher explained to MPs:

“When you enter into international treaties you voluntarily give up a certain part of your sovereignty, because perhaps you are pooling it with others, because that is the way it has to be done in a world which is very multinational.”

She added about the meeting of Community leaders:

“What emerged most strongly is the degree to which the Community and the 12 member states can act as the driving force in the development of the whole of Europe, at a turning point in the continent’s history.

“The Community should be an example of how free and democratic nations can work ever more closely together, while remaining open to the outside world.

“That is the way in which Britain wants the Community to develop, and, despite disagreements on some points, the Strasbourg Council encourages us to believe that that is how the Community will develop, with Britain playing a very full part.”

She added:

“The nations of Europe are drawing closer together for economic purposes.

“That will be a considerable force in the world and should give much greater opportunities for employment in this country and for prosperity in general. It will be very good for all our peoples.”

 UNION OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE Other British Prime Ministers have also supported that the pooling of sovereignty, in the right circumstances, can be for the good of the nation.

After all, it was during the Second World War that Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, announced in June 1940 the ‘Declaration of Union’ between Great Britain and France.

With the full backing of his Cabinet, Churchill stated:

“The two governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union.

“Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain; every British subject will become a citizen of France.”

An Anglo-French stamp was even designed to commemorate the proposed Anglo-Franco union, but the Nazi invasion of France scuppered those plans.

The proposals did demonstrate, however, that Churchill was in favour of political union between European countries.

It was also Churchill who, in 1950, called for the creation of a European Army “…under a unified command, and in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part.” (France objected to this plan).

In a debate in Parliament in June 1950 to discuss a united Europe, Churchill explained the circumstances under which the Conservative and Liberal parties would be prepared to part with “any degree of national sovereignty”.

He replied, “without hesitation” that, “we are prepared to consider, and if convinced to accept, the abrogation of national sovereignty, provided that we are satisfied with the conditions and the safeguards.”

He further explained:

“National sovereignty is not inviolable, and that it may be resolutely diminished for the sake of all the men in all the lands finding their way home together.”

 WE ARE ALL INTERDEPENDENT When in 1961 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan applied for Britain to join the European Community – an application that received Churchill’s support – he explained to the nation that it would involve the sharing of some sovereignty.

Mr Macmillan said:

“Accession to the Treaty of Rome would not involve a one-sided surrender of ‘sovereignty’ on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty by all concerned, mainly in economic and social fields.

“In renouncing some of our own sovereignty we would receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by other members.”

He added,

“The talk about loss of sovereignty becomes all the more meaningless when one remembers that practically every nation, including our own, has already been forced by the pressures of the modern world to abandon large areas of sovereignty and to realise that we are now all inter-dependent.

“Britain herself has freely made surrenders of sovereignty in NATO and in many other international fields on bigger issues than those involved in the pooling of sovereignty required under the Treaty of Rome.”

 CLOSE PARTNERSHIP It was another Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who negotiated the terms of our membership of the European Community – terms democratically agreed by our Parliament in Westminster – and he also explained to the nation just before we joined:

“The Community which we are joining is far more than a common market. It is a community in the true sense of the word.“It is concerned not only with the establishment of free trade, economic and monetary union and other major economic issues – important though these are – but also, as the Paris summit meeting has demonstrated, with social issues that affect us all – environmental questions, working conditions in industry, consumer protection, aid to development areas and vocational training.”

He added:

“Above all, the European Community is a community of peoples, and in joining this new association of nations we are committing ourselves not only to a series of policies or institutions but to a close partnership with our western European neighbours in which we will all work together rather than separately.”

 GOING IT ALONE But despite the fact that “close partnership” and “pooling of sovereignty” with our European neighbours were policies strongly supported by EVERY British Prime Minster from 1957 to 2016, the current lot in charge believe it’s better to go it alone, work separately and not closely together.

Outside the EU, of course, Britain will only be able to look on as decisions about the running and future direction of our continent are made without us, even though those decisions will affect us just as much, whether we are a member or not.

That to me doesn’t look like gaining sovereignty. It looks like losing sovereignty.

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The European identity is generally perceived on the notion that it is a pure race. But we are reminded that even Europa –according to the Greek myth –was a Phoenician-Asian woman. Furthermore, the Europeans attach their lineage to the Greece and Greek Philosophers of 400 BC. But those Greeks never considered themselves Europeans and distinguished themselves as Hellenes distinct from Europeans and Asians both. These facts decenter our earlier notion of what Europe is.

In addition to that, Derrida also identified several traits in Europe that might otherwise not be considered European. He asserted that Europe’s identity will always be mingled by whatever non-European passed through Europe; the Arabs of pre-Quran era and after Quran, even the gypsies and Indians Husserl barred.

Derrida in this regard, wanted “a new today of Europe beyond all the exhausted programs of eurocentrism and anti-eurocentrism.” He stressed that Europe needs to acknowledge the inherent hybrid nature of itself. He has also shown how it is important to not to make a program of self/good and other/enemy. Additionally, he has also written extensively on the issue of unconditional hospitality. These articulations of Derrida are very important due to the fact that Europe today is comprised of huge population of non-Europeans (majorly Muslims) due to the mass immigration of 1960’s and later times.

These Muslims present in the Europe are seen as intruders and equally they feel marginalized. The distinct social and religious otherness of Muslims against Europeans is what is creating differences. This is leading to become a growing problem Europe faces today. As the incident mentioned of Charlie Hebdo magazine exemplifies it. And secondly the November 13, 2015 attacks on Paris after eight month of Hebdo attacks intensifies the issue which were coordinated attacks on three different places (cafe, on-going concert, and outside football stadium), killing almost 130 people and leaving 352 injured. Later the attacks were claimed by an Islamic State group in Syria and claimed that France involvement in Syria has led to such attacks. The killings resulted in fierce reaction against Muslims residing in Europe and mass immigration of Muslims due to war-torn situations in neighboring Syria and Iraq.

These events bring forth the need to tackle the growing tensions between immigrant Muslims and Europeans. Samuel P. Huntington’s doctrine of clash of civilizations (1996) is simply a recipe for disaster. For this we need to look towards Derrida, as he has dealt on Algerian Muslim immigrants, the treatment of authorities on them and also on the notion of how hospitality should work.

Derrida wrote that by the end of World War II, the colonized Algerian Muslims were always called French nationals and not French citizens. They could apply for civil services but would remain below the status of citizens. Although there were laws to grant citizenship for Muslim Algerians the administration never encouraged them and Muslims did not pursue it as they thought this will be in exchange of letting go their religious and social identity. In World War II, there were numerous Algerians who fought for France; a law was passed to grant citizenship to the Algerians on basis of equality irrespective of their race, language and religion. But there was discrimination for Algerian Muslims at the heart of the amendment. Only few Muslims who fulfilled certain conditions were granted citizenship. Those were school diplomas, army service with decorations and specifically of the rank of officers.

Derrida added that it is against the notion of hospitality. Unconditional hospitality demands that a foreigner is welcomed without being defined, delimited in specific criteria. Because asking them to abandon their religion and Europeanize them would be a conditional hospitality the guests might be uneasy about.

Derrida emphasized that, hospitality should be unsullied and unrestricted, and such a hospitality does not come up with an invitation like you are invited and welcome in my home on the basis that you fulfill following of my terms. “Pure and unconditional hospitality”, in Derrida’s words will always be directed towards, “who is neither expected nor invited, to whoever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor.” Derrida labels such hospitality as “hospitality of visitation rather than invitation.” Derrida here seems to be critiquing on the situation of scores of Muslim immigrants in France and the policies of authorities towards them which they consider are trying to rip their identity away.

Additionally, Derrida has said that when nations develop a way of policing the borders (for incoming immigrants), the foreign  immigrants  in essence turn inwards to linguistic and nationalistic politics and in return develop a fear of otherness. These policies then become a tool of what they were trying to eradicate i.e. the reaction from the immigrants.

The policies that give rise to nationalism need to be addressed without delay as there are several studies showing how youth of immigrant Muslims will become a larger part of Europe sidelining actual Europeans whose major percentage of population is getting old.

Derrida also hinted on his disgust on the use of “threshold of tolerance” for the amount of immigration France was ready to accept and after that limit it was intolerable to accept any more foreigners. Even Francois Mitterrand tried to justify his rejection of immigrants using this phrase. Derrida said that it showed that after including a particular amount of migrants, other newcomers who are not like the Europeans will definitely face a dismissal. Derrida also wrote an article in a magazine condemning use of such jargon to propel naturalist agenda. Mitterrand later on took back his words but Derrida believed that the use of word tolerance indicate a limit to amount a restriction to certain kind of people.

Derrida wanted to give full option to unconditional hospitality but along that he demanded that there should be an “equality of citizens before the law.” So if the immigrant poses a threat he should be dealt according to the law and be reprimanded. But Derrida’s works mandates that this immigrant should be treated like any other citizen of Europe would for the same crime and is not unjustly treated because of his difference. This is also to bring light to the common perception of Muslims in Europe or US alike that when a white man is caught for a killing he would be deemed as a killer but when a Muslim especially of Asian origin is guilty of same crime he is termed as a terrorist and whole race behind him is condemned.

Derrida has taken Europe as a self on the discourse of self-identification. The European thinkers have always tried to define what Europe’s self is, like Husserl. Derrida endeavored to change and further this discourse by mentioning the problematic of identification of self, that “there is no self-relation, no relation to oneself, no identification with oneself, without culture, but a culture of oneself as a culture of the other, a culture of the double genitive and of the difference to oneself.”

Here, Europe is taken as a self, which will have to differentiate self from other but on the same token accept the otherness of other in self and other. Badredine Arfi also discussed Europe as a self on the continuous project of identification, which need to be aware of self and others.

If we accept the notion that Europe is a decentered entity, question arises how a decentered body will be hospitable to other. If we consider a decentered body more in depth, we can see that it will be more hospitable to the others. This decentered self does not implicate that there is no self, the mere purpose is to eradicate possible negativity and biases which arise from thinking of self as a pure entity. Like that has been a case in Nazi Germany that Hitler on the premise of supposed superiority tortured and killed millions of Jews. So an acceptance of Europe for decentered self may get rid of such possibility.

The world wars have changed the perception that there is a certainty in this world. Similarly recognizing that entities like man or Europe are not that much complete in itself. It will help us lessen the policies of hatred and exclusion that shunned the humanity into world wars. If Europe recognizes a decentering at the heart of it, Europe will become more humble and hospitable towards its others. As there would be no certainty about self, there will be no certainty to define an enemy.

When Derrida asserted that Europe is a decentered entity, it will imply that no one owns it. The legacy of Europeans a supreme race that owned Europe would be over. Being a decentered subject would also implicate that Europe will not be so sure about its role.

But in Derrida’s works we see him assigning Europe a responsibility to act as a “guardian.” He also reminded Europe of its responsibilities towards its former colonies in lieu to the atrocities it brought upon them. This shows an assumption of the Europe’s former self, a centralized idea of Europe that once ruled the world. There seems to be a logical flaw in the propositions Derrida gave about ‘decentering’ and ‘others.’ On one hand he showed Europe to be a decentered entity, on other he took its identity as of an autonomous body with a past that had influence on others.

Despite Derrida’s claims of multiple identities of Europe, Europe is still owned by the Europeans, the natives living there. Even if Derrida is trying to make Europeans realize a decentering in conception of Europe, he was still taking one kind of people as its rightful owners.

Although he championed a decentered Europe, he himself seemed not to fully comprehend it.

This can also be seen through his constant emphasis on others. The decentered subject implicates that the entity cannot be well defined, it is good for any future policies for Europe. But it will also implicate that the others of Europe cannot be defined. When the self is indeterminate so will be the others. But Derrida defined the others of Europe (the Orient and US) as well. And Derrida did so similar to what European supremacist philosophers have always been doing that is defining its others especially the orient (Spivak 1985).

Accepting that the subject of decentered Europe is only in theoretical form and contradicted by Derrida’s own writing. We will like to emphasize that the concept of decentered Europe is most important in today’s political scenario.

Taking us back to the core subject of this section that is the Muslims in Europe, only Derrida’s ideals of decentering can help resolve these matters peacefully. How the Muslims present in Europe needs to be addressed, as Europeans face a threat to their identity. How these Muslims might change the demography of the Europe that used to be including the Muslims who feel unwelcome. Derrida has mentioned how the earlier Muslim immigrants were already being marginalized. In this regard, Derrida’s ideals on hospitality and immigration policies are what the European legislators should look into. Prudence demands that they should streamline policies that will accommodate the immigrants as they cannot be sent back to the mother lands after being present for five decades. It is not to indicate in any way that Muslims involved in terrorist activities should be shown hospitality but it is about the scores of Muslims who associate themselves with France or other European states they were born in or migrated to.

 

The post Decentered Europe: Muslims in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This is the big question of late 2020 in Brexit-land. All summer and into the autumn, we’ve have multiple briefings, this way and that; some setting us on the road to a rapid settlement, others pointing towards whatever euphemism-of-the-day we might have for a no-deal outcome.

So which is it?

Rather than try to list and weigh up all the possible factors, I’ll instead try to focus on the more inflexible and mechanical aspects that might be in play, since these appear to be increasingly important.

Central in these is our old friend, time.

From the very start of the process, before the referendum was even held, it was generally agreed among researchers that this would be a long-term set of interactions to get to a new relationship and that Article 50 would struggle to suffice for all of that.

And so it proved: not only were there the multiple extensions of 2019, but the content of the Withdrawal Agreement was very closely drawn to cover only the bare minimum of issues relating to ending UK membership (as opposed to building a new relationship).

The failure of both sides to extend transition back out to its original 20 month schedule with those Art.50 extensions, plus the refusal of the UK to countenance using the one-off extension mechanism this summer, plus the delays caused by Covid-19, all have contributed to one of the more heroic interpretations of what can be done in short order on a deal.

Right now, three months out, we have not only not got a legal text that can be ratified, we don’t have even a joint draft, or a basic political arrangement to allow any of those things to happen.

PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic44

The simple mechanical requirements for each of those steps take time, time that is increasingly not there: the legal drafting could easily take several weeks, even if everyone agrees with everything (which they won’t).

Which leads to a second key element in the mix, trust.

Just as time has run out, so too has the extent to which each side finds the other credible and constructive. London politicians treat the EU as if everything it does is a trap to entangle the UK and/or reverse the referendum result; those in Brussels and EU27 capitals wonder whether the Internal Market Bill can really be a serious proposition, given that it undermines the entire basis of international agreements.

That trust has been falling for a long time. From the delay in triggering Article 50, to the immediate calling of the 2017 general election; the mess over the joint text and the blowing up of Cabinet over Chequers; the meaningful votes and the extensions; even the popping up of Gibraltar at the last minute: all of this has led EU-UK relations to a pretty bad place.

My personal sense check on this is the Salzburg European Council two years ago. Yes, Theresa May might have made a mess of the attitude/rhetoric, but at least there remained a functioning political negotiation.

So if we know that trust is low, and that trust is very much harder to rebuild than to lose, then we can be confident that this will remain a barrier through the remainder of current talks, whatever they aim for.

And that aim represents a final stable factor: the lack of difference in outcomes.

If we imagine a deal is concluded, and one on UK terms, then we would have to note that there would still be very extensive contraction of UK-EU alignment and a rise in barriers to economic, political and social interactions. The UK government is asking for a very minimal relationship, partly because it wants to limit the ability of the EU to make cross-linkages in the current negotiations.

As much as a no-deal would come with huge costs, so too would a deal be linked with smaller, but still substantial, downsides.

Recall too that this is different from Article 50, when the UK remained a member until the end and neither side had a fall-back to protect its interests. Indeed, that’s precisely why the EU structured the process like this; so that if this current stage failed, at least it would have the legal certainty [sic] of the Withdrawal Agreement.

For the UK, if this is obviously going to hurt either way, and if Number 10 decides that the public might not be too thrilled by the message “we know this hurts, but believe us when we say it could have hurt a lot more”, then the incentive to push for a deal would seem to drop.

Moreover, a deal implies mutual acceptance, which drips the negotiating parties’ hands very firmly into the blood, whereas a no-deal contains the potential to shift blame on to the other lot. Hence, in part, a lot of those briefings I mentioned: we’re trying really hard to make this work, but they’re making it impossible, etc.

Taken together, it’s hard not to be pessimistic about the next months.

Time is running away and there’s no credible mechanism for adding more (even if both sides wanted to), trust is as low as it’s ever been (not helped at by the completion of the Internal Market Bill’s progress through the Commons), and the gains of a deal seem to be now limited to reducing the costs of exit.

Yes, a deal would mean one less headache for both sides, both economically and politically, especially since their asks will not magically disappear as midnight strikes on New Year’s. But as we’ve seen time and again, this is not a rationally-constructed process, but instead one of politics, short-time thinking and the entanglement of many other factors (not least Covid-19).

Put it like this: I never built up some extra food staples in the run-up to the conclusion of Article 50, but I am doing it now.

The post How likely is a Future Relationship deal? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

An opinion by Jolyon Gumbrell.

Photo of CE mark on plug taken by Jolyon Gumbrell.

The CE label that appears on many products shows that a product complies with EU health, safety and environmental standards. Although the United Kingdom left the EU on 31st January 2020 these standards still apply to products sold in the UK until the end of the transition period on 31st December 2020. After that date UK consumers will no longer be protected by European health, safety and environmental standards, unless these protections are written into a future trade agreement between the EU and the UK.

Why is this important? Because once the transition period for the UK ends at the end of 2020, items such as “active implantable medical devices” and “invito diagnostic medical devices” as well as other “medical devices” used by the NHS might be below standard, and thus endanger the lives of patients in the UK. This situation will be exasperated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Concern has already been shown over the accuracy of 90-minute rapid coronavirus tests procured by the UK Government. In an article by Sarah Boseley published in The Guardian on 8th August 2020 entitled: ‘UK’s rapid Covid-19 test not passed by regulator and no data on accuracy’, it said: “The test, from Oxford Nanopore, a young biotech company spun off from Oxford University, has not yet gained a CE mark. Before Covid-19, Oxford Nanopore had been involved only in research, not tests for patients.”

The article went on to mention another company DnaNudge that was granted an “emergency exemption by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency” from having to display the CE mark. According to the article DnaNudge was awarded a £3.2 million contract in April and a £161 million contract on 1st July from the government. If either of these – Oxford Nanopore and DnaNudge – testing systems were unreliable, then it could mean that some people would receive the wrong results for their Covid-19 tests.

What will happen to the people of the UK when they finally lose the protection of European law on 31st December 2020? One of the consequences of this will be the loss of the CE mark for consumer products sold in the UK, so the British public will no longer know how safe or reliable a product – such as an plug on an electrical device, a kettle, light bulb, laptop, mobile phone, or child’s toy – is, that they are purchasing from a retailer or online supplier.

The CE mark does not mean that a product has been manufactured within the European Economic Area (EEA). An electrical device could have been made in China for example and still display a CE label, but when the product was imported into Europe it would have had the CE marking placed on it by the manufacturer’s authorised representative in Europe. The product would have had to comply with European health, safety, and environmental standards before it could legally be distributed for sale to consumers living in the EEA area.

If high standards of protection are to be maintained for consumers living in the UK next year, then the UK will either have to stay in the EEA along with EU and EFTA member states or come to a bilateral relationship with the EU similar to that of Switzerland. Either way no trade deal will take place between the UK and EU unless the UK Government accepts these high standards as recognised with the CE mark.

Sources

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/ce-marking_en

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ce-marking

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:European_Economic_Area_(EEA)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Economic_Area

Boseley, Sarah; (08.08.2020) ‘UK’s rapid Covid-19 test not passed by regulator and no data on accuracy’ The Guardian.

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2020

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The European Union recovery fund could greatly increase the stability of the bloc and its monetary union. But the fund needs clearer objectives, sustainable growth criteria and close monitoring so that spending achieves its goals and is free of corruption. In finalising the fund, the EU should take the time to design a strong governance mechanism.

Ursula von der Leyen during the recovery fund negotiations in July. Photo: Etienne Ansotte / European Union

In late July, the European Council created the European Union recovery fund, a major new policy instrument that could substantially increase the stability of the EU and its monetary union, and under which the bloc will for the first time borrow and pay out large sums as grants. But the Council deal lacks a clear strategy to ensure the money boosts inclusive, sustainable growth and avoids corruption. This gap must be plugged, because the recovery fund will be delegitimised if wasted. The ongoing negotiations between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council (the trialogue) provide an opportunity for improvement and should focus on three crucial points.

First, the goal needs to be more clearly stated: providing a boost to Europe’s sustainable growth potential. The current focus on speedy disbursement suggests policymakers still hope the EU funds can play a countercyclical role, but this will not work. The Council wants to commit 70% of the main instrument, the recovery and resilience fund (RRF), in 2021-2022, but only a quarter of disbursements are planned for these two years. All EU countries can go to the markets to borrow and it is national budgets that can and should be used to support economies reeling under the immediate effects of the pandemic. EU funds, meanwhile, should be part of a medium-term strategy clearly focussed on quality spending. This will provide some protection against the permanent damage to Europe’s growth potential COVID-19 is likely to leave in its wake. The EU funds should thus be about medium-term growth objectives and not countercyclical fiscal policy.

The second question then is how to achieve quality spending that would boost sustainable growth. The European Council conclusions from July include some vague statements about linking EU funds to the European Semester, the EU’s annual process to steer member states towards inclusive and sustainable growth and digital transformation. But the European Semester has proven to be a rather ineffective bureaucratic process that EU countries too often disregard.

It is easy to see how such a bureaucratic process will trigger a bottom-up approach driven by special interests in EU countries in which spending plans are labelled, as requested by the European Commission, “green, social and digital.” Plans will be sent to Brussels and result in large pay-outs with little benefits. While the design of the recovery fund, with its predominant focus on the RRF, puts national governments in charge, clear conditions are still crucial for sustainable growth goals to be achieved. A recent study proposes the use of recovery funds for major structural reforms, such as in the education system, public administration efficiency and climate goals. The new EU funding is a unique opportunity to provide the ‘carrot’ for genuine structural reforms.

Quality spending requires good governance. The third issue is therefore monitoring so that spending achieves its goals and is free of corruption. Unfortunately, EU funding has a mixed record of avoiding corruption. Meanwhile, academic work has confirmed that the vast amounts of common agricultural policy funds do not achieve Europe’s green goals despite repeated claims to the opposite. The current governance of EU funds can be regarded as unsuitable for achieving stated political goals.

The European Parliament rightly insists on a strong say. A better ‘red-card’ procedure to stop pay-outs in case money does not achieve the political ambitions is needed. The currently proposed process foresees the Commission asking for opinions from the Economic and Financial Committee, a group of top finance ministry officials, on whether political targets of the funds have been achieved. The committee shall strive for consensus but if one or more countries disagrees, the matter will be referred to the European Council. But state secretaries discussing a Commission report will not provide the accountability necessary for the EU’s biggest borrowing programme. Even members of the European Council will not challenge their peers unless there are blatant breaches of agreements.

Instead of intergovernmental debate, real political accountability is needed to avoid corruption and the failure to achieve the EU’s political ambitions of green and inclusive growth. This political accountability should also ensure that the interests of the EU as a whole are considered. The European Parliament should therefore insist on receiving regular and detailed reports from the Commission and should hold hearings with the involved Commissioner to bring about transparency and public accountability. Moreover, the Parliament should entrust the European Court of Auditors and the European corruption watchdog OLAF with constant monitoring of the spending.

Negotiators should take the time to design a strong governance mechanism. Europe cannot afford to waste its resources.

This opinion piece is republished with permission from Bruegel.

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Believe it or not, Conservatives used to be the party of Europe.

Indeed, it was:

• The Conservatives that joined the UK to the European Community.
• The Conservatives that advocated and helped to design the EU’s Single Market.
• The Conservatives that encouraged the former Communist countries to join.

It was also one of the Tory party’s greatest leaders, Winston Churchill, who promoted the cause of a united Europe as the antidote to war on our continent.

It was 74 years ago today, on 19 September 1946, that Churchill gave his landmark speech at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, when he called for a united Europe as the way to guarantee peace.

His aim was to eliminate the European ills of nationalism and war-mongering once and for all. He proclaimed his remedy, just one year after the end of the war:

“It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom.

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe.”

The European Economic Community was formed on 25 March 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome by the six founding European nations: France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

Just four months later, at London’s Central Hall, Westminster in July 1957, Churchill gave a speech welcoming the formation of a “common market” and stating:

“We genuinely wish to join…”

From then onwards, every Conservative Prime Minister strongly endorsed Britain being a member of the European Community – with the notable exceptions of the current Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, and his immediate predecessor, Theresa May.

Hardened Eurosceptics were always previously on the far side-lines of the Conservative party. But now, they’re in charge, with Mr Johnson at least pretending to be one of them (he wasn’t always).

This month last year, 21 Conservative MPs were sacked because they rebelled against the UK crashing out of the EU in a catastrophic no-deal Brexit.

Those no longer welcomed included Sir Nicholas Soames, grandson of Sir Winston Churchill.

Sir Nicholas had been a Tory MP for 37 years, and like his granddad, is a passionate supporter of a united Europe.

His sacking shockingly demonstrated that the new Europhobic Tory party could no longer tolerate pro-EU members in their midst.

Although Boris Johnson restored Sir Nicholas to the party a few weeks later, he decided not to stand again as a Conservative candidate.

A few months before the EU referendum, Sir Nicholas gave an impassioned speech in the House of Commons, remembering his grandfather’s address in Zurich, which he described as a speech of “great prescience and great vision.”

Sir Nicholas extolled the European Union’s remarkable achievement in bringing us:

“peace, stability, freedom and security unprecedented in a thousand years of European history.”

He added:

“It is a very great credit to our country that we should have played such a leading role in seeing this through.”

But his message, along with that of his grandfather, Sir Winston Churchill, is now off-message.

Can the Conservative Party ever be the same again? Their pro-Europe legacy has been shattered.

• Related article by Jon Danzig: Winston Churchill: A founder of the European Union
• Watch this extract of Churchill’s speech of 19 September 1946 and his grandson’s tribute to it in the House of Commons.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• My campaign page on Facebook: Reasons2Rejoin
• And LinkedIn

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Given all the recent interest in breaking treaties, I thought it’d be useful to provide you with a quick guide to what is generally accepted to be the international framework for this: pacta sunt servanda. A short Twitter thread puts some words to it, and a PDF version is available here.

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The EU’s legitimacy depends on institutional procedures that respect democratic principles – both in cases of uniform and differentiated integration, Max Heermann argues.  

Photo: European Parliament / Flickr / CC BY 4.0

Crises often reveal the need for closer European cooperation. At the same time, they highlight divisions among the European Union’s member states about the right path forward. The COVID-19 pandemic is no different. The European Council may have, for now, agreed on a financial recovery plan. Nevertheless, demands for new competences on the EU-level are sure to emerge. Healthcare, in which the EU has little power, is a likely candidate.

To free necessary reforms from political gridlock, it is often suggested that the EU should resort to “differentiated integration”, the idea that not all EU member states need to take part in a common policy area for integration to move forward.

Politicians and political theorists have long debated the desirability and legitimacy of differentiated integration as such. Still, they have spent little time on the question of how to govern a differentiated Union.

An increasingly differentiated EU requires normatively defendable procedures that citizens perceive as legitimate. But do institutions which were designed for uniform integration provide sufficient legitimacy for differentiated policies?

Do institutions which were designed for uniform integration provide sufficient legitimacy for differentiated policies?

The upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe, a planned series of debates among and between citizens and political elites from across the Union, should address this question.

Another issue likely to come up during the Conference is the establishment of transnational voting lists for the European Parliament (EP). In fact, from the perspective of institutional design, differentiated integration and the EP’s electoral system are closely related. Dirk Leuffen and I explore this connection in a new study, which asks how the EU’s legislative organs – the Council and the Parliament – should legislate in differentiated policy areas.

Differentiated integration’s challenge to the European Parliament

In the Council, member states that have opted out of a common policy area are excluded from the legislative decision-making in this area. In contrast, the European Parliament allows all its members (MEPs) to cast their vote.

This practice results in a mismatch between the territorial scope of EU policies and the composition of the legislature: MEPs vote on bills that will not apply to their constituents.

From a normative point of view, this mismatch is troubling because it violates two fundamental principles of democracy: autonomy and accountability.

The principle of autonomy, understood as collective self-government and the freedom from domination, demands that those who are subjected to laws should be the ones authorized to make them. In the case of differentiated integration, autonomy is violated when MEPs from opt-out states make laws to which they themselves and the voters they represent are not bound. Moreover, they cannot be held accountable by those voters who live in a member state that does participate in the given policy area and who are therefore directly subjected to their decisions.

Even though the European Treaties stipulate that the EP represents all European citizens, the European elections currently fail to provide an effective mechanism of accountability. Each member state devises its own electoral rules. National parties organise campaigns where domestic issues often dominate. MEPs depend on their national parties for re-elections and future careers.

Therefore, they are more likely to vote with their national party than with their transnational parliamentary group, a fact often masked by high levels of voting cohesion in the parliamentary groups. Participation of their member states in a differentiated policy area may consequently influence the voting behaviour of MEPs. Léa Roger and colleagues found that MEPs from countries outside of the Eurozone, were more likely to vote for new fiscal rules which they knew would not apply to their own home country.

MEPs from countries outside of the Eurozone, were more likely to vote for new fiscal rules which they knew would not apply to their own home country.

Consequently, from the perspective of autonomy and accountability, MEPs whose state does not take part in a differentiated policy area, should not be allowed to vote on these policies.

However, defenders of the current practice evoke another basic democratic principle: the equality of citizens and their representatives. Deirdre Curtin and Cristina Fasone argue that stripping individual MEPs of their voting rights in some areas due to their nationality would violate their equality, turning them into second-class MEPs and their voters into second-class citizens. If MEPs are reduced to mere national delegates, the EP will lose its symbolic function as the Parliament of the European demos, impairing the EU’s legitimacy more generally.

Ensuring democratic legitimacy in a differentiated EU

Differentiated integration thus creates a trade-off between the basic democratic principles of equality, accountability and autonomy that does not exist in the case of uniform integration. As Dirk Leuffen and I discuss in our paper, different reform proposals for decision-making in the EP weigh these principles differently.

The trade-off can be resolved, however, by introducing a unified electoral system with transnational lists. MEPs elected from transnational rather than from national lists will be, in principle, true representatives of the European demos.

MEPs elected from transnational rather than from national lists will be, in principle, true representatives of the European demos.

This will satisfy the autonomy criterion, which demands that MEPs and their constituents are bound by the decisions they take. Voters from across the EU will be able to hold MEPs to account by punishing or rewarding them (or their party list) in the next election.

Advocates of transnational lists have long argued that they lead to behavioural changes of both politicians and voters, resulting in elections focused more on EU rather than on national politics.

Irrespective of such developments, transnational lists would satisfy the minimum criteria of equality, autonomy and accountability for decision-making by all MEPs, even in areas of differentiation.

A unique opportunity

The Conference on the Future of Europe provides a unique opportunity to highlight the connection between electoral rules and the democratic legitimacy of differentiated integration.

Moreover, in conjunction with new survey research, the citizen assemblies to be held as part of the Conference will offer political scientists the opportunity to better understand how citizens evaluate differentiated integration. Lawmakers will gain crucial knowledge for designing a differentiated EU that citizens from all member states perceive as fair and legitimate.

Holding a Conference on the Future of Europe after a decade of crises and incremental reform may lead to the political acknowledgement that differentiation is here to stay, and that the EU therefore needs institutional procedures that respect democratic principles both in cases of uniform and differentiated integration.

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