Ideas on Europe Blog

Introduction

Previously, I introduced my ideas of reforming the pillars of the European political system – in accordance with the principles discussed in other articles too (see Debut, Suffrage) – in four volumes: European electoral system, European Parliament, European Government, and the European Presidential Council and the President of the Republic of the United Europe. In this last volume, I intend to summarise the coexistence of the aforesaid European institutions, presenting a general overview of their roles and function in the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE).

 

The institutions of the European Union versus of the Republic of the United Europe

Originally, the institutional structure of the EU was designed to serve a small group of states in a very different era and international context. Overgrown and obsolete, this political system is unable to serve a Union of 27 member states in a world that is full of new global challenges. In order to triumph over the difficulties Europe faces, the member states of the European Union must step forward together by forming a proper political alliance, creating a new political system, which is both legitimate and efficient. Encouraged by historic examples (e.g. the Republic of Rome) and contemporary alternatives (e.g. the US), whilst using the EU’s current structure as a base, the Republic of the United Europe has every tool to succeed in this quest.

Arguably, the member states of the RUE need to transfer some of their sovereign powers to a more efficient decision-making mechanism on a European level to ensure efficiency, security, and prosperity. In return, the member states must receive guarantees that they and their interests are not to be bypassed in policy-making.

After introducing an enlightened electoral system, the composition of the European Parliament (or EP) will be different, as the role of national parties and national interests will be neutralised. Instead, pan-Europarties along European interests are going to enjoy a wider range of authority, of which one is the formation of the European Government (or EG). The EG and its ministries (led by the Prime Minister of the RUE) will replace both the European Commission (and its Directorates-Generals) and the Council of the European Union to be the executive branch of the RUE, outranking the national governments in the legal hierarchy. Its members are not going to be appointed by the national governments anymore, but by and from the directly elected MEPs, meaning more legitimacy and transparency.

This might seem as the European institutions’ rule over the member states, which authority comes from the necessary pro-European nature of the political system. However, upgrading the European Council to a European Presidential Council (or EPC), and introducing a single representative person, is an efficient way to counterbalance the EP and the EG with a pro-nation-state European institution. The elected heads of state and government of the EPC will directly and exclusively select the President of the Republic of the United Europe (or President) from their own members, and are going to be responsible for setting the general political direction of Europe by proposing, encouraging, or blocking certain policies of the EP and the EG through the President.

 

Authority, responsibility, and function

Certificated voters (who earned the right to vote) are going to determine the composition of their national and European parliaments. As the national elections are going to remain the subject of national regulations, it does not have to be discussed here. The seat allocation in the European Parliament is going to be determined by the pan-Europarties’ overall election results based on a transnational party-list proportional representative system. The national branches of the pan-Europarties are going to get seats allocated along a certain distribution mechanism (based on the figures of turnout and election result), forming the European Parliament, which is going to have an exclusive supranational legislative authority, meaning that its rule of law is effective in every member state of the Republic of the United Europe. The EP is accountable to the European citizens and will be responsible for approving the budget – and monitoring its implementation –, and for forming and supervising the European Government.

The lead candidate of the winning pan-Europarty is going to be promoted by the EP to be the Prime Minister of the Republic of the United Europe, and will be tasked to form the government (and its ministries). Being the executive branch of the RUE, the EG is going to be responsible for legislation proposal (and execution), budget preparation, and administration. As a supranational government, the EG will set the frames and directives of policy-making, which must be applied by the national governments, ensuring that the ship of Europe is steered in the same direction, but leaving plenty of room to the national governments to implement their own policies within the frames. The EG is accountable to the EP.

Both the European Government (led by the Prime Minister of the RUE) and the European Parliament will have a natural pro-European affiliation – latter being the bastion of Europe. In order to guarantee the sovereignty and interests of the member states, the European political system necessitates a strong counterbalance in the form of the European Presidential Council (formed by the heads of state or government, or their envoys). Apart from proposing the President of the EP and appointing the President of the Central Bank of Europe (as it will be called in the RUE), it is in the EPC’s exclusive authority to select the President of the Republic of the United Europe from its own members, and to form his or her political advisory body. As indicated by its membership and powers, the EPC can rightly be called the bastion of nation-states.

The President is the highest executive authority in the united Europe (outranking the PM of the RUE): commander-in-chief of the common European army, head of intelligence, and in charge of all matters related to foreign affairs. Besides, the President has legislative initiative and the right to veto any legislation (including the budget proposal) or the appointment of the PM once. The President serves an unlimited term, which is necessary to ensure political stability and efficiency. In order to avoid tyranny, the President can be removed from office on a political or legal basis. Former could be initiated by referendum, by the EP, and by the EPC; whereas the latter can be set in motion by the European Court of Justice. The President should be immune to political impeachment in the first three years in office to ensure stability, and could be initiated afterwards once in half a year or once in a year (by the same branch). At any stage of either political or legal impeachment, the European Accountability Committee’s involvement as preparing an independent expert report is important and necessary.

Whilst the European Parliament is going to be in the centre of the European political system – due to its ratification powers, appointment of PM, control over the EG, role in impeaching the President, etc. –, the European Government will have an essential role in proposing legislation to the EP and in executing them on the level of member states. The duty of the President of the RUE is to ensure that national interests are considered and national sovereignty is guaranteed in the European political system, thus, together with the European Presidential Council, having a pro-nation-state affiliation. By having a wide selection of political tools via strong powers, the President can either significantly block the initiatives of the EG or EP, or boost them enormously, providing a very efficient and powerful, but also safe and legitimate decision-making mechanism. It is going to be of key importance that the Prime Minister and the President have a good working relationship.

It is essential that in crucial matters none of the institutions can be bypassed. For instance, the budgetary process is initiated by the EG by drafting the proposal and putting it forward to the EP, which should approve or reject it, whilst the President has the right to veto the proposal at any stage. However, in foreign affairs, the President has the right to set certain policies and sanction crucial decisions (the PM of the RUE has no functions abroad), but these should be discussed and approved by the relevant ministries of the EG, and could be blocked by a certain majority of the EP. Regarding the amendment of the European constitution, the two-third of the MEPs and the three-quarter of the EPC members must agree, ensuring that any changes are supported by a general consensus between both representative bodies.

 

Conclusion

Efficiency, legitimacy, and balance are the three most important features of the reformed European political system. It is efficient, because it is expert and decisive compared to the current one. It is legitimate, because both the members of the European Parliament and of the European Presidential Council are directly elected either on a European or on a national election; therefore, the members of the European Government and the figure of the President of the RUE are promoted lawfully. It is balanced, because it maintains the equilibrium of the collective interests of Europe and the individual interests of the nation-states, whilst guaranteeing the sovereignty of the latter in a potentially fragile relationship.

The political system of the Republic of the United Europe is going to empower the leaders of Europe to succeed in reforming the economy, the social system, and the armed forces, whilst setting a bald new foreign policy, elevating Europe to be the leading global power.

The post Reform #2: Political system (vol. 5) – Overview appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The most emblematic example of how sport is used as an icebreaker in international relations is no doubt the visit, between 10 and 17 April 1971, of nine American table tennis players to the People’s Republic of China, an event known worldwide as ‘ping pong diplomacy’.

(Screenshot from History Pod)

A lot has been said and written about this remarkable initiative that prudently paved the way for the opening on diplomatic relations between the USA and the PRC and allowed to envisage the presidential visit of Richard Nixon, who travelled to China less than a year later.

As Stuart Murray puts it in his 2018 theory of Sports Diplomacy, this landmark case study perfectly illustrates ‘the power of sport to transcend diplomatic estrangement’ (p. 74). He is right: sport can celebrate humanistic values in a highly accessible, immediately understandable message, while keeping ideological divisions below the carpet.

50 years later: diplomatic estrangement 2.0

Almost ironically, the fiftieth anniversary of this masterpiece of diplomatic craftsmanship happens to fall into a period of a new ‘diplomatic estrangement’ , unexpected in both its suddenness and intensity, and following a period of three decades of consistent deepening of economic and political ties between China and what must well be called ‘the West’.

The bipolar configuration that seems to emerge has prompted a lot of talk in the media about a new ‘Cold War’, but the metaphor is misleading. If my memory serves me well, there was not the slightest hint at economic interdependence between the two opposing sides at the time when I was stationed as a Bundeswehr Cold War soldier in Bavaria in the early eighties, guarding a forest full of Pershing missiles pointing east. And there was a solid conviction that the West simply was stronger than its ideological opponent, simply because it had universal values of democracy, human rights, or the rule of law on its side.

Today, both on the economic and ideological level, China is setting the agenda. As leading sinologists have shown, China has successfully entered the competition about semantics in an effort to re-define key concepts of politics and diplomacy. As a result, there is no such thing anymore as universal values, but only Western concepts of neo-colonial intent that the rest of world would do well to reject. And as leading economists never tire of reminding us, China will overtake the US as the world’s leading economy (in GDP, at least) by 2030 at the latest.

In 2021, the tensions, the rhetoric, and the susceptibilities on either side are such that the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, signed in a hurry at the end of the German Council presidency in December (and deemed insufficient in terms of reciprocity, sustainability, and human rights) has good chances of not being ratified. Which in turn would no doubt further deepen the rift.

Could a new sport diplomacy help?

While many in Europe feel it’s time to stand firm and push back the PRC’s current aggressive ‘wolf-warrior’ approach to international relations, there are also good reasons to argue in favour of a pacification of EU/US-China relations. Sooner or later, there will be a need of a face-saving area in which careful rapprochement is imaginable again. I would not be surprised if culture in general, and sport in particular, were floated as non-conflictual communication channels capable of highlighting commonalities rather than antagonisms.

Alas, this time around, sport diplomacy does not seem to be in a position to do its soothing work.

This is paradoxical, since, if anything, it has significantly grown in importance over recent decades. A number of nation-states (including the US, China and EU member states) are implementing full-fledged sport diplomacy strategies in support of their foreign policy objectives.

Even a non-state actor as the European Union has discovered sport’s potential for its external relations since article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty kindly granted it a competence in the field. The ERASMUS+ programme allows to reach neighbouring countries in numerous grassroots projects, involving a flurry of civil society organisations. And under the previous Commission, sport was explicitly added to the “high-level EU-China people-to-people dialogue”, with the aim of reinforcing (much needed) mutual understanding and trust.

At the same time, rather than an icebreaker, sport seems to work like a freezer in relations with the PRC. As episodes likes Mesut Özil’s removal from social media and video games in China or the temporary fallout between the NBA and Chinese television have illustrated, sport has itself become a political minefield.

In Germany, following a wish expressed by Angela Merkel and Xi Jinping, the football association arranged for the Chinese under-20 national team to be integrated into a regular regional championship (comparable to League Two in England), with the aim to help them progress in contact with European football. But the first fixture in November 2017 ended in a diplomatic scandal because of the presence of six peaceful pro-Tibet activists among the four hundred spectators in a Mainz neighbourhood. And since the German FA did not want to apologise for a harmless, spontaneous use of the freedom of expression, the project was stopped.

Instead of calls for a new ping pong diplomacy, what can be heard are calls for boycotting the Winter Olympics in Beijing next February. They are not likely to be followed by any of the national sports delegations, but their very existence and audibility are a good reminder of sport diplomacy’s flip side, where the refusal to engage in sporting encounters becomes a negative diplomatic tool in its own right (as Simon Rofe’s edited volume on Sport and Diplomacy illustrates in several case studies in it’s third part).

The ping pong diplomacy of 1971 deserves to be celebrated as a landmark of China’s long march back into the international diplomatic community. In the 21st century, sport diplomacy, despite being a helpful foreign policy tool in many configurations, will hardly be able to do the trick again in the West’s relations with the PRC.

 

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Introduction

In my previous articles, I covered the reformation of the European electoral system (see Reform #2 vol. 1) and the European Parliament (or EP, see Reform #2 vol. 2), and the introduction of the European Government (or EG, see Reform #2 vol. 3) as crucial elements of reforming the European political system, in which both the EP and the EG are predestined to enhance the principle of “more Europe less nation-state” in order to serve the general interests of all European. Despite the necessity of power transition from the member states to Europe, it is imperative to counterbalance the pro-European institutions with powerful pro-nation-state institutions, guaranteeing the proper representation and the sovereignty of the member states within the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE). In this volume, I intend to introduce the European Presidential Council led by the President of the Republic of the United Europe as the guarantors and protectors of the nation-states’ European interests – superseding the European Council.

 

The European Council

The European Council (or EUCO) is a fully recognised European institution (since the Lisbon Treaty), which’s main role is setting the general political direction of the EU by adopting so-called conclusions (the identification of issues and solutions). Although, the EUCO does not act as a legislating institution, it defines the principles of and decides on common foreign and security policy (e.g. international terrorism, relations with Russia, enlargement of the EU). The EUCO is formed by the heads of state or government of the member states and by the non-voting President of the European Commission. The President of the European Council (the office currently held by Charles Michel) has a mandate for two and a half years, which is renewable once.

It is in the EUCO’s authority to appoint its own President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the President of the European Central Bank; moreover, to propose a candidate for President of the European Commission, and to informally and indirectly influence police and justice planning, the composition of the EC, the suspension of membership rights, etc.

As far as I am aware, the only suggestions made so far related to the improvement of the European Council would degrade the role of the institution by turning it into a sort of upper house of the European Parliament (as discussed in volumes 2 and 3). That would be a huge mistake and could never be agreed on amongst the member states, as it would most certainly result in the nation-states’ total loss of political control on a European level. Therefore, I reject these theories, proposing a new one instead.

 

The European Presidential Council and the President of the Republic of the United Europe

In my proposal, the European Presidential Council (or EPC) is still going to be formed by the heads of state or government of the member states, but in the new formation, they can delegate envoys instead of themselves. The envoy has to be an elected representative in his or her member state as a precondition, and will enjoy the same rights and equality in the EPC (e.g. voting rights), except that he or she cannot be appointed to be President. Similarly to the EUCO, the EPC would remain rather informal, when it comes to legislation or decision-making (apart from proposing the President of the EP and appointing the Executive Board of the Central Bank of Europe), continuing to serve its duty of general political encouragement. As an important addition to that function, the most important and distinct role of the EPC is the selection of the President of the Republic of the United Europe (or President) from its own members, and forming the political advisory body to the President. In other words, the national leaders keep the President under a slight political pressure and control. By becoming the EPC, the EUCO might lose its current political weight as a collective body, but it also gains multiplied rights and powers by vesting its full potency into one person, whom it selects itself from its own ranks. It is essential to highlight that the role of the EPC can be fully understood only in unison with the function of the President of the RUE.

Referring to the values of democracy and legitimacy, many are eager to have a European president directly elected by the citizens of Europe. However, I find this theory rather unfair and even dangerous. Should the President of the RUE be elected directly, candidates of more populous, larger, and more advanced member states would almost certainly dominate the elections. Besides, all sorts of radicalism could find its way to the highest executive power of Europe with ease, unleashing mountains of disasters potentially. Therefore, I find it wiser to trust the EPC, whose members are elected officials with experience and expertise, to appoint one of their own.

Self-evidently, the President of the Republic of the United Europe must be a head of state or government in order to be an electable member of the European Presidential Council (as envoys do not count), meaning that the President elect is an elected official in his or her member state already – ensuring legitimacy. Should one of the candidates get the majority of the votes, the selection is over; if none of the candidates is trusted with a qualified majority, a second vote must be held, at which the members of the EPC must decide between those two aspirants, who received most of the votes in the first round. The selection of the President of the RUE is the exclusive right and main responsibility of the EPC, meaning that neither the EP nor the EG has a say in the process. Should the President-elect accept the office of Presidency, the resignation of his or her current office is absolutely mandatory.

The President of the Republic of the United Europe is the highest executive authority in the European superstate, whilst he or she is the commander-in-chief of the common European army and intelligence services, the most significant representative of the RUE abroad (outranking the Minister of Foreign Affairs), and the agenda-setter of European foreign policy. Every serious decision regarding foreign affairs must be approved and sanctioned by the President (e.g. declaration of war, entering or quitting a contract, diplomatic agreements). Additionally, the President has legislative initiative, approves the budget in every three years (proposed by the EG and accepted by the EP first), and can be granted with exclusive rights (power of attorney). In case of emergency (e.g. epidemic, state of war, natural disaster, economic crisis), the solutions of normalcy do not function. Extraordinary times demand a different type of leadership, but only as long as it is absolutely necessary (e.g. the institution of dictator in the Republic of Rome). For instance, in times of peace and prosperity, the member states and the EP enjoy extensive liberties, but in a state of emergency, these liberties shrink in favour of security. Should the three-quarter of the MEPs see it necessary, the EP has the rights to declare a state of emergency, granting the President absolute powers for a certain period of at least one, but of maximum twelve months.

The President of the Republic of the United Europe represents both the national and European interests, whilst co-ordinating them. The President and the Prime Minister have a tight working relationship, and are both authorised with executive powers. In legal hierarchy, the President outranks the Prime Minister, as the former can veto the decisions of the latter – once. The President of the RUE is a de facto branch of the nation-states within the executive branch of the European political system, whereas the PM of the RUE is the de facto branch of Europe. They shall work together as the Roman consuls did in the Republic of Rome; the President as Consul Maior and the Prime Minister as Consul Minor. The PM of the RUE is also the Vice President of the RUE at the same time, meaning that he or she is the acting President until the next President is selected, should the office be vacated unexpectedly.

It is crucial that the President of the RUE does not serve a limited term of office, meaning that he or she remains in office until his physical and mental medical conditions allow it or gets impeached (similarly to the Chief of Justice in the US). At first glance, it might seem to be the hotbed of tyranny, threatening the usurpation of ultimate executive power for unlimited time for one person. However, the President has no legislative power, as he can only start a debate, propose a law, and use its right to veto. It is my explicit opinion that the role and function of the office of Presidency – under sufficient parliamentary control – is the key to a successful, acting, and efficient European superstate. In terms of decisiveness, the undeniable success is to be seen in China and the US, with a significant difference that the President of the RUE is under a much stronger democratic control.

In the new European political system, the President is a legitimately elected figure, who passed several filters in order to be trusted with a wide-ranging executive power, whilst the office would not violate the principle of constitutionality or rule of law. This extraordinarily broad means of power will appear the most characteristically in issues related to foreign and defence affairs; in the means of domestic, economic, and financial areas will not be so remarkable. However, the most important tool to curb the President’s power is the right to call a motion of no-confidence (or political impeachment), which permits the EP and the EPC to force the President to resign.

Despite the broad executive power the President of the RUE enjoys, the European Parliament keeps the President in check as he or she can be impeached on a political basis, which is debated and decided by the EP. There are several ways to initiate it: via a referendum or petition (quarter of the citizens eligible to vote, from half of the member states), via the EP (third of the MEPs from three pan-Europarties), or via the EPC (half of the members). Should one of these methods be successful, the EP is obliged to hold a debate, and vote on removing the President from office (political impeachment). During the debate, the European Accountability Committee (or EAC, see in volume 2) has to prepare an official and professional legal report on the matter, which must be taken into account at the MEPs’ vote. Should the number of those, who support the removal of the President, not reach 50%, he or she can stay in office. Should the number of those, who support the removal of the President, reach more than 50%, but less than 67%, the EP can oblige the EPC to hold an open vote within their ranks, and decide on the President’s removal by absolute majority. Should the number of those, who support the removal of the President, reach 67% in the EP, he or she must resign, and the procedure of new selection must start. The President of the RUE enjoys political immunity in the first three years of the Presidency, ensuring political stability, but after that, the procedure of political impeachment can be initiated once a year from the same branch or in every half a year from different branches. In case of legal offence, the procedure of legal impeachment could be initiated, meaning the European Court of Justice – working together with the EAC – would investigate matters, present it to the EP, and then the MEPs would decide on the case.

 

Conclusion

The fact that political clashes do not happen only between different parties with different ideologies, but also between European and national institutions, make it necessary to establish a powerful executive authority, which is able and willing to guarantee that the nation-states cannot be bypassed in the European political system. It is important not to reduce the powers of European institutions (EP and EG), but to counterbalance them, meaning that both branches and levels can work to their best efficiency, whilst none of them gets uncontrollably powerful. The European Parliament and the European Government must be allowed to be powerful enough to work for the greater good of all European, being the bastions of Europe. On the other hand, the European Presidential Council and the President of the Republic of the United Europe must ensure that this work does not get derailed into the submission of nation-states, whilst also channelling and guiding the European superstate’s general direction of politics, being the bastions of nation-states. This is an enormous guarantee the nation-states can find in the EPC and the President.

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Why would one want to understand the conditions that have allowed for the establishment of the European Union’s (EU) external higher education policy? Because these insights help to get one’s head around the externalisation trends in other fields of EU supporting and shared competence, from energy to health and migration. They also have relevant, practical implications for policy-makers desirous of extending EU external action.

The EU’s external action portfolio has been continuously broadening over the past decades, including in unlikely, originally internal policy areas of limited legal competence. The question of how and – especially – why the EU engages externally in these areas has however only recently made it onto the agenda of EU scholars. A 2020 article by Schunz and Damro, for instance, examined the emergence of EU external action on culture, an area of supporting competence. As another key example of a (sub-)national prerogative, the case of higher education policy is particularly puzzling. In this blog post, we summarise the empirical insights and the explanatory framework – drawing on the concepts of ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘policy entrepreneurship’ – that we develop in our recent JCMS article.

The emergence and development of the external dimensions of EU higher education policy have been dynamic processes, as the below graph shows. Beyond the peculiar Bologna process, which started outside of, but was gradually integrated into the EU framework, the EU’s core activities in the realm of higher education have – since 2014 – been integrated in the Erasmus+ programme. While this new framework has systematised the ongoing internationalisation of higher education policies, the initial steps towards EU external engagement in this field were taken well before. They came, predominantly, in the form of tailored programmes targeting institutions and students outside the Union’s borders. Two key examples are the TEMPUS (1990) and the Erasmus Mundus (2003/04) programmes. Understanding which circumstances, intentions and actors enabled the establishment of these programmes provides the basis for reflecting on their implications in the final part of the blog post.

 

Graph: Key developments in the ‘externalisation’ of EU Higher Education Policy
Source: Authors’ compilation

 

The case of TEMPUS

The university support and cooperation scheme TEMPUS was established in 1989/1990 as a part of the European Community’s comprehensive response to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensuing democratization of the Central and Eastern European countries. Action in the realm of higher education was seen as essential to foster open societies in states like Poland or Czechoslovakia. This thinking was, most notably, informed by the successful start of the Erasmus exchange programme.

During that period, a relatively small group of policy entrepreneurs, spearheaded by the head of the Taskforce’s COMETT unit, David O’Sullivan, and driven by their idea(l)s, used the experience of the Erasmus exchange programme to react to the opportunity provided by the fall of the Wall by proposing TEMPUS. They were able to get their proposal adopted by building an inter-institutional coalition around their project and securing the broad political support – in the Commission, among the member states, and in the European Parliament – necessary for earmarking the additional financial resources.

 

The case of Erasmus Mundus

Ten years after TEMPUS, it was the 2000 Lisbon Strategy that encapsulated the EU’s new ambition in the field of higher education in response to the global discourses on ‘knowledge economies’, promoted among others by the OECD. Interestingly, it was the ‘TEMPUS unit’ of the newly established Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) that was able to synthesise the zeitgeist in developing Erasmus Mundus. Inspired by the ‘Fulbright Program’ , Erasmus Mundus meant to improve the Union’s position in the worldwide ‘race for brains’ by – among others – attracting non-EU students with scholarships for joint study programmes.

Tracing the activities of Martin Westlake and Augusto Gonzalez, head and deputy head of the TEMPUS unit, between 2001 and 2003, when Erasmus Mundus was adopted, represents a prime example of successful policy entrepreneurship by Commission officials that capitalised on the expertise built up with Tempus and their convening power within the Commission and across EU institutions and member states. Their efforts benefitted from the eager support of external stakeholders (e.g. the European University Association) to foster an externalisation agenda on EU higher education policy.

 

The pattern

The comparison of the processes leading to the creation of these two landmark external higher education programmes suggests a clear-cut pattern regarding the emergence of EU external action in originally internal policy domains: for one, specific ‘policy windows’ open when external events and global discourses (‘opportunity’) coincide and resonate with EU internal structures and policy experiences (‘presence’); it then takes agency: policy entrepreneurs that address these policy windows by using their expertise and networks in order to build broad coalitions in favour of an ‘externalisation agenda’. These policy-makers are regularly driven by their normative convictions – in the case of higher education they believed in the value of responding to internationalisation trends and using higher education as a means of enhancing cooperation with third countries –, but also broader prospects for economic growth as well as their personal career ambitions.

 

The academic and practical implications

This pattern has both scholarly and policy implications that transcend the case of EU higher education policy. Academically, the co-existence of a ‘policy window’ and strong policy entrepreneurship seem to be able to explain how and why the EU engages externally even in the unlikely cases of EU policy fields of supporting/shared competence. This pattern can currently be observed in the way EU policy-makers are in the process of expanding EU external action in health policy, a supporting competence, in the context of the policy window provided by the Covid-19 pandemic.

From a policy perspective, our insights show that the trend towards an ever-broader EU external policy portfolio may well continue. What it takes are policy entrepreneurs capable of framing their externalisation proposals in ways that resonate with (interpretations of) external trends and are strongly informed by previous EU policy experiences. If they get this framing right, these entrepreneurs can capitalise on their knowledge of the EU’s internal policy process to gradually co-opt additional actors into a pro-external action coalition in a specific field. While not specifically analysed in this study, the relevance of personal networks converging around certain ideas around the need for such a policy expansion –inside and outside the institutions – strongly suggests itself in both case studies.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Opportunity, presence and entrepreneurship: why the European Union acts externally on higher education”.

 

 

Carsten Gerards is Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University (Institute of Security and Global Affairs) and Senior Academic Assistant in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges).

 

 

 

Simon Schunz is Professor in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges).

 

 

 

 

Chad Damro is Senior Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, Dean International – Europe and Co-Director of the Europa Institute at the University of Edinburgh.

 

 

 

 

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On 25 November 2020, in a surprising move away from its previous positions, the European Parliament voted in favour of making European Union (EU) aid conditional to developing countries’ compliance with migration management measures. This is only the most recent episode in a decade-long process whereby European policy-makers link migration and development policies. As part of a special issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies on the politicization of European development, we analyzed the migration-development nexus through parliamentary discussions around the EU Migration Trust Fund.

Migration has become a highly contested policy issue across Europe. Populist and radical right parties have played a key role in the politicization of the so-called refugee crisis. In contrast, development policy remains a largely technocratic area. To be sure, European aid has clearly become more ‘political’ in the sense of being subordinated to foreign and security policy goals. However, it has barely been ‘politicized’ defined as being a matter of public discussion and polarized opinions.

Then, what happens when both policy domains become intertwined? Following the logic of ‘horizontal politicization’ that the special issue advances, we had expected that the hotly debated domain of migration would contaminate the hitherto shielded discussions on foreign aid. In other words, we thought that the migration-development nexus would spur the politicization of development policy.

However, our research shows that the opposite has happened, and that development policy has instead served as a useful de-politicization device for mainstream political parties in Europe. The study also points to some nuances regarding the extent to which and the way in which the migration-development nexus has been politicized.

Empirically, we focus on debates the Migration Trust Fund – officially the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – in eight European parliaments. The EUTF constitutes the most ambitious and comprehensive EU initiative that links migration and development. It was established at the 2015 Valetta Summit to address the ‘root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration’ and has since then pooled 4.5 billion Euro of pledged contributions from EU institutions and member states.

First, there is significant variation in the extent to which the EUTF was politicized in European parliaments. Employing a two-dimensional framework that includes issue salience (i.e. the relative number of actors intervening) and the polarization of opinions (i.e. the scope of conflict), we can discern different degrees of politicization. Whereas the EUTF has been debated considerably in the Swedish and Dutch parliaments, politicization was only medium in Germany and Denmark, and even low in Italy, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom.

These differences between member states might be explained by various factors including variation in their financial contribution to the Migration Trust fund, in their identities as aid donors, and in their parliamentary debating culture. While this remains to be researched further, it seems that politicization has overall been limited compared to other domains of EU (external) policies such as migration and trade. Even in Sweden and the Netherlands, it would be vastly exaggerated to say that the EUTF debates have dominated the parliamentary agenda. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that parliamentarians in these countries not only had more discussions on the EUTF (‘salience’) but also and more importantly that they displayed more diverse views (‘polarization’) on the nexus than in the other countries of our study.

Second, there are indeed various understandings in Europe on how migration and development policy should be related. In the article we elaborate a framework with five views – discursive constructions or ‘argumentation lines’ – on the nexus. First, the ‘preventive development-oriented’ view stresses that underdevelopment leads to migration and advocates more ‘traditional’ aid. Second, the ‘restrictive migration-oriented’ view emphasizes that (irregular) migration leads to underdevelopment, thereby justifying restrictive migration and migration-oriented development policies. Third, the ‘dominance of national interests’ view problematizes both immigration and development policy, arguing for restrictive national migration governance and abolishment of development aid respectively. Fourth, the ‘development against migration’ view also argues for restrictive national migration governance although development policy can be continued if it becomes migration-oriented. Fifth, and final, the ‘migration as a catalyst for development’ view rejects restrictive migration policies and the use of aid for this purpose.

Interestingly, only the first and second view construct the nexus. At first sight these seem to represent opposing perspectives. Existing studies have indeed depicted ‘preventive’ versus ‘restrictive’ views as two extremes on a continuum. However, our findings suggest that they could constitute a coin with two sides. While the former is ambiguous on how restrictive migration policy should be, the latter allows for continuation of aid as long as it becomes encapsulated in restrictive migration governance. The former’s point that migration is caused by underdevelopment is not incompatible with the latter’s argument that migration causes underdevelopment.

These discursive ambiguities basically allow for the compromise that respectively centre-left and centre-right European parties in government have forged through initiatives such as the Migration Trust Fund: development aid combined with restrictive migration. Meanwhile, our analysis also shows that challenging parties at the right (third view, e.g. Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands and Swedish Democrats in Sweden; and fourth view, e.g. Vlaams Belang in Belgium, AfD in Germany and Lega Nord in Italy) and left (fifth view, e.g. GroenLinks in the Netherlands and Vänsterpartiet in Sweden) put less effort in constructing a nexus. To the extent that their members of parliament do politicize these matters, they rather seek to politicize both development and migration policies as separate policy domains, without spending too many efforts in spinning stories on how these should be interlinked.

Going back to the original puzzle, the nexus potentially de-politicizes debates on restrictive migration policies, thereby preventing the ‘horizontal politicization’ logic to occur. It remains to be researched under which conditions the de-politicization impact of nexus building takes place and how successful challenger parties’ attempts to politicize development policy may be in the long run.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article ‘The Politicization of the Migration–Development Nexus: Parliamentary Discourse on the European Union Trust Fund on Migration’.

 

 

Nathan Lauwers is a PhD Fellow at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium). His research interests focus on EU external relations, in particular on the ‘nexuses’ between migration, security and development policies.Twitter handle: @Nathanlauwers

 

 

Jan Orbie is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium). His research and teaching activities focus on EU external relations, in particular external trade, development, humanitarian aid, democracy, social and human rights promotion from critical and normative perspectives.

Twitter handle: @janorbie

 

Sarah Delputte is Assistant Professor at the Centre for EU Studies (CEUS) at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University. Her teaching and research interests concern the European Union’s policies and politics towards the so-called ‘Global South’, focusing in particular on  ‘development’ policy and the various ‘nexuses’ with other policy domains (e.g. migration, climate change, fisheries, …).

Twitter handle: @SarahDelputte
Twitter handle of institution: @UGent

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Introduction

In my previous articles, I introduced my ideas on reforming the European electoral system (see Reform #2 vol. 1) and the European Parliament (or EP, see Reform #2 vol. 2) as the first steps of the reformation of the European political system. As previously discussed, pan-Europarties are going to be elected to the EP, where seat allocation is going to be defined by the overall election results of the pan-Europarties and by voter turnout and election results of the national branches in the member states. Then, the pan-Europarties of the EP are going to form the European Government (or EG) by appointing the lead candidate of the triumphant pan-Europarty to be the Prime Minister (or PM) of the EG.

In this volume, I intend to introduce the European Government, which would be tasked to govern the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE), co-operating with both the national and the European institutions. In order to make this co-operation as smooth and as prosperous as possible, the EG has to have a broad European authority and a strong national counterbalance at the same time, whilst replacing the European Commission and the Council of the European Union as a natural result.

 

The European Commission of the European Union

The European Commission (or EC) is the executive body of the European Union (since 1965). Originally, the EC was predestined to act as the government of the EU, but it does not own such authority. However, the EC is the only institution that possesses legislative initiative and strong powers regarding competition and external trade policies. The EC is formed by a college of members (or Commissioners) delegated by the member states along the principle of one Commissioner per member state (since the Lisbon Treaty), whose terms of office is limited to five years, which is – since the Maastricht Treaty – renewable. Complete independence is required from every Commissioner in order to serve general European interests, meaning that they can neither seek nor take instructions from any external EU bodies or national governments. Also, they cannot be engaged in any other occupation.

The European Commission holds the powers of full initiative (legislative, budgetary, relations with non-member countries) and limited initiative (recommendation, opinion), of which the latter applies to the Commission’s role regarding the Economic and Monetary Union and to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The President of the European Commission (the office currently held by Ursula von der Leyen) decides on the internal organisation of the body, which consists of 33 Directorates-Generals. Generally, they are responsible for developing strategies, for drafting legislation, for mediating in the legislative process, for representing the EU in trade negotiations, for making regulations (e.g. competition policy), for preparing the budget of the EU, and for scrutinising the implementation of the treaties and legislation. The EC, as an institution, is collectively accountable to the EP.

The election of the President of the European Commission involves both the EP and the European Council. In accordance with the European election results and consulting with the EP, the majority of the European Council has the right to appoint a candidate for the position. Afterwards, the EP has to vote and decide with a majority of its component members over the candidate. At least, this was the case until 2019, when the Spitzenkandidaten system failed, as the European Council refused to appoint Manfred Weber (President of the winning EPP) to the position, nominating von der Leyen instead – whom the EP accepted.

The fact that the Commissioners are proposed by the Council of the European Union on the basis of suggestions made by the national governments, and then appointed by the European Council after the approval of the EP, affects the nature of the EU’s executive branch to be heavily national. Other complaints regarding the EC’s shortcomings are lack of transparency, unclear lobbyist relations, conflicts of interests, and excessive spending – all were highlighted in a number of reports made by internal and independent auditing organisations. Sadly, these issues were not yet addressed comprehensively in any proposals. Any recommendations regarding the improvement of the EC revolve around its authority, ignoring other aspects.

According to a popular idea, the European Commission could be further developed into a European government – meaning that the national governments would have a great influence on forming a European government, using the EC’s current structure as a first base – and somebody could run for presidency on a direct election, where the voters would decide on the figure of the President of Europe. However, this theory would only broaden the EC’s authority, failing to address its structural failures, thus leaving it unreformed. It is obvious that the EC could not be inserted into the political system of the Republic of the United Europe, as it is not compatible with the new European Parliament, which’s directly elected MEPs are going to determine the consistence of the European executive branch. Therefore, both the European Commission and the Council of the European Union must be replaced by a European government, which would take over most of their responsibilities, whilst taking more tasks and authority to govern the united Europe.

 

The European Government of the Republic of the United Europe

Most importantly, the European Government must be formed by the elected pan-Europarties of the European Parliament. The lead candidate of the winning pan-Europarty could be automatically appointed as Prime Minister of the Republic of the United Europe by the EP – and approved by the President of the RUE. It is in the duties and authorities of the PM of the RUE to appoint ministers, thus forming the European Government, which is going to propose and execute legislation. The EG should have a mandate for five years.

The responsibilities of the ministries of the European Government must be designed along European issues and context. Based on this, the following ministries could operate on a European scale: Climate Protection (including environment and nature protection), Consumer Protection, Culture, Defence (including security policy), Economic Co-operation and Development (including cohesion), Economy and Energy (including competition and trade), Education and Research, Finance, Food and Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Health, Home Affairs, Immigration, Justice, Labour and Social Affairs (including demography), Regions, and Transportation and Digital Infrastructure. The EC’s current responsibilities could be transferred to the EG. The EG will also be located in Brussels, whilst its procedural languages will be English, French, and German, to which Latin could be added.

In the legal hierarchy, the European Government is superior to the national governments and ministries, meaning that the executive branch of the RUE sets frames and directives regarding policy-making, but the national governments enjoy considerable liberties to accomplish the goals within these frames. The EG is also an administrative institution, which manages the state apparatus of the Republic of the United Europe, ensuring the implementation of law. The PM of the RUE will co-ordinate the functioning of the ministries, and will have a close working relationship with the President of the RUE. At the same time, the PM of the RUE will be the deputy of the President of the RUE, occupying the office of the Vice President of the RUE. The European Government is accountable to the European Parliament.

Amongst the ministries listed above, three of them might need some more explanation or clarification: the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Immigration, and the Ministry of Regions. Many states have ministries that are responsible for taking care of the culture of their communities. The European Ministry of Culture is going to be responsible for preserving the cultural heritage of Europe, focusing on general European elements, but also on the cultural expression of nation-states and subnational regions. The authority of the Ministry of Culture covers a wide range of areas, such as arts (e.g. architectural, cinematographic, literary, musical, theatrical, visual), historic sites (e.g. archaeological sites), national archives of cultural work (e.g. galleries, libraries, public museums), etc. The ultimate goal is to rediscover, maintain, and actively promote our unique European identity and rich European cultural heritage in the entirety of the Republic of the United Europe.

The Ministry of Immigration is going to be responsible for the issues related to immigration and integration in the whole of the RUE. Due to the lack of proper family support in the past, some member states lack labour force today. The real and lasting solution to this problem is the strong political support of families (e.g. in Hungary), but it is not going to bear fruits in the next two decades or so. Therefore, Europe needs a short- and mid-term answer to this urgent demographic challenge. The primary remedy is the potential redistribution of European unemployed from member states that struggle with high unemployment to those that grapple with labour shortage. Only as a secondary solution and only temporarily might Europe need professional labour force from outside of Europe as well. The Ministry of Immigration is going to be responsible to find a legal way to attract youth, who already speak the language of the welcoming member state, educated, and have a clean record. Should these criteria be fulfilled, and the welcoming member state is taking them voluntarily, the immigration is approved and the immigrant is permitted to have a temporary visa. Any sort of illegality (e.g. illegal immigration, committing crimes) results in an immediate expulsion. In order to promote legal immigration, the Republic of the United Europe could set up agencies (Bureau) in those countries, where it is willing to take immigrants from. The potential immigrants can proceed with their application in these agencies, which are going to make the decisions. These agencies would belong to the Ministry of Immigration, which could provide only a temporary working visa, and only then, if the applicant fulfils a job vacancy, what a European citizen cannot. Permanent residence permit and citizenship can be granted only by the welcoming member state (former needs to be approved by the relevant European institution as well). The member states could set up agencies under the leadership of the RUE (Ministry of Immigration) in those safe countries, where the demand is high (e.g. Bureau of Germany in Thailand of the Republic of the United Europe). These agencies could run various programs, such as language courses, culture educational courses, job adverts, relevant training, etc. in order to prepare the immigrant for the European way of life. The current form of illegal immigration – especially in masses and uncontrolled – is madness, which benefits neither the Europeans nor the arrivals.

The Ministry of Regions is going to be the official and direct link between the European and national ministries, co-ordinating the functioning of the various ministries between the EG of the RUE and the nation-states – similarly to the Council of the European Union. This method helps to discover and clarify every legal issue and complaint. Should it be required by a member state, the RUE’s relevant ministry could settle issues in the related area via an expert delegate of the Ministry of Regions working together with the relevant minister of the given member state (e.g. the RUE’s Minister of Finance sends a delegate to Austria to work with Austria’s Minister of Finance). The Ministry of Regions could legitimise the decisions of the EG by working together with the national institutions, whilst it could also prepare a forum for professional debates between the relevant ministries of the EG and the member states at the same time. Therefore, the Ministry of Regions could enhance quick and effective communication between the European Government and national governments, whilst increasing and ensuring professionalism and legitimacy.

 

Conclusion

The responsibilities and authorities of the European Government are going to be similar to the ones of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, but going to be put into a broader context, gaining control over the national governments to some extent by setting frames and directives based on common and general European interests. The provision of official channels and forums will ensure that complaints are heard and dealt with, highlighting legitimacy and fairness (e.g. Ministry of Regions). The most significant improvement of creating the EG is the fact that its members are not going to be nominated by the national governments of the member states, but formed by the MEPs directly (via a new enlightened electoral system). The creation of the European Government (and its ministries) is going to supersede the European Commission (and its portfolio system) and the Council of the European Union automatically – or shady institutions, such as the Eurogroup. The result is a legitimate, efficient, transparent, and truly Europist executive branch, which’s power is far from infinite, as it is accountable to the European Parliament, whilst its decisions could be vetoed thus blocked by the highest institution of the European executive branch: the President of the Republic of the United Europe.

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I know my IR colleagues like nothing better than a strategic review document, since it gives them hours of enjoyment coding for stuff and generally feeling like there’s some interest in their field. And the arrival of the UK’s much-delayed Integrated Review this week has given me some sense of that, even as it almost instantaneously reminded me of why I so heartily dislike such documents. For the benefit of those with more sense than to be into such things, this was the culmination of a rather protracted process of trying to conceptualise the new foreign policy and security environment for the UK. A central part of the delay was the getting-out of the EU, so it’d be not unreasonable to think that EU relations might be an important part of the general picture. Plus, as I’ve endlessly argued, it might also give us some clues about what the broader context for those EU relations might be, given that a central problem has been that the UK doesn’t seem very clear about what it wants to be in the world. You’ll be possibly unsurprised to find that this document does not really provide the answers to such questions. I’ve covered references to the EU in this thread, so I’ll spare you the finer detail:

So how does #IntegratedReview see the EU?

Mainly as a problem that's been solved, and then as base from which to build wider international action by UK

Neither part of this looks that robust

1/https://t.co/S8pg4wKOHJ

— Simon Usherwood (@Usherwood) March 16, 2021 However, the core is worth restating here: the Review treats the EU as a firm ally and one with whom there is much scope to build further collaborations on points of mutual interest. What’s missing is any sense of a problematic relationship that will take – even in the most ludicrously positive scenario – many years to find a mutually-trusting stability. This matters both for itself and more generally. There’s much talk about the value of multilateralism, of regulatory power and of free trade, with no sign of how a closer relationship with the EU might advance those agendas. While it is perfectly understandable to consider that withdrawal is a done deal, and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement with it, that should not mean there has to be a rose-tinted view of how things stand. Instead, a strategic document like this needs to take a much more hard-nosed approach, to allow for the planning of responses to threats and opportunities. If nothing else, some plan to work towards rebuilding trust with EU partners might have been in order. All of which brings us back to the paradox of the EU in British politics. This might not be another example of the deliberate antagonism that seems to colour so much of Johnson’s actions, but it will be an important contributory factor to an unnecessarily fractious environment. As I’ve noted in another thread, the UK’s going to continue to struggle with its European policy as long as it fails to be seen as having credible alternatives:

Thinking again about the UK's European policy and why it doesn't work

tl;dr EU doesn't think UK has a credible alternative to making things work in long-run

1/

— Simon Usherwood (@Usherwood) March 15, 2021 That doesn’t have to mean a closer relationship to the EU, or any programme of working to rejoin the organisation, just a sense of some things being beyond the UK’s power to control or influence, which in turn require finding ways to get along. As the Integrated Review notes, there’s a lot going on out there, so we have to engage with, and work with, others if the international system is to persist. Working out some ideas on how to do that with our neighbours might be a good place to start.

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The Next Generation EU superfoods are on their way. Can they save a starving Italian patient?

Photo: Mauro Scrobogna/LaPresse via AP/NTB

Italy entered the Covid-19 crisis enfeebled by years of anaemic growth, stagnant public and private investment, high unemployment, a heavy debt load and tendentially feverish interest rates. Hopes for its recovery were pinned on the Eurozone’s standard recipe of spending cuts, labour market flexibilization, product market liberalization, and trade surpluses all aimed at reducing the debt to GDP ratio.

Unfortunately, the diet made the patient even weaker and further aggravated its recovery potential. The diagnosis of the liberal doctors was that only a lean and trim patient could hope to absorb shocks and return to health, even as the cure made her economy demand-depressed and starved of investment.

Socioeconomic disparities were boosted by many of the reforms, such as various rounds of labour market flexibilization. Moreover, repeated spending reviews induced cuts to public health – a condition that aggravated the lethality of the Covid-19 pandemic, making it into a veritable syndemic.

Change with the pandemic

The pandemic, however, has prompted a change in the recommended treatment. As stated by the General Secretariat of the Council:

[H]ow quickly Member States’ economies will recover from the crisis … depends on the fiscal space Member States have available to take measures to mitigate the social and economic impact of the crisis, and on the resilience of their economies. Reforms and investments to address structural weaknesses of the economies and strengthen their resilience will therefore be essential to set the economies back on a sustainable recovery path and avoid further widening of the divergences in the Union.

Large doses of analeptics and tonics in the guise of deficit spending to sustain ailing companies and furloughed workers were administered by Italian authorities. The precious stimulants were allowed by the European Commission which temporarily suspended the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) provisions.

The Italian public debt thus spiralled to roughly €2,700 billion. Its debt to GDP ratio soared, further debilitating an already sickly economy, whose GDP has dipped by some 6,7% in 2020 after having declined by 5% between 2009 and 2019. At the end of 2020, the debt to GDP ratio reached the figure of 158% (Banca d’Italia 2021).

Next Generation EU superfoods

The current narrative has it that the Next Generation EU (NGEU) superfoods are on their way. In the guise of investment funds in digital and green technology, education, innovation and research, the nutritious Covid-19 recovery fund vitamins aim for economic, social and territorial cohesion and greater gender equality.

It is impossible to be against such a program, to be achieved through an increase in public and private investment and a few structural reforms.

The Council made interesting references to “diversifying key supply chains [and] thereby strengthening its [the EU’s] strategic autonomy.” In other words, recognizing the need to sustain an internal demand that does not depend on foreign imports for fundamental health and technological supplies.

Perhaps this signals a turn towards a more demand-driven economic model rather than a purely export-driven one. Apparently, for the first time since the Maastricht Treaty, direct financial support to Member States does not simply aim at rebalancing territorial inequalities, but at making the regional economy of the EU more independent from foreign demand.

The extra boost to public and private investment is coming from a dedicated tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). The Facility is partially financed out of the European budget and partially through the issuance of Euro-bonds drawn by Members States, hence adding to their public debt, but guaranteed by the European Central Bank and therefore priming lower interest rates.

Moreover, part of the support from the RRF is “non-repayable”, which means that it takes the form of one-off transfers of resources from the EU budget to the Member States. Some states will receive more and some less than what they contribute to the EU budget, which should manifest solidarity among Member States and particularly towards the weaker ones.

Building resilience

This policy change has been hailed as a veritable transformation in the EU economic discourse. Some of the old approach, however, can still be gleaned beneath the surface.

Let’s start from the notion of resilience. In engineering, resilience is the capacity of materials to withstand shocks and resume their original form once the pressure is released. In economic thinking, as can be surmised from the Council’s documents, it means being able to resume the original growth path once the crisis is withstood.

Unfortunately, the Eurozone has been suffering from secular stagnation in the last decade (2009-2019) so that “resuming the original growth path” does not look like a very promising prospect.

After the storm

A more scathing criticism comes from those who note that the single market structurally favours stronger economies. Accordingly, any form of compensation to weaker economies for their structural disadvantage is really destined to perpetuate disparities and breed continuing suspicion and resentment between the two.

The question then is whether this resolve to show solidarity and build resilience will continue after the Covid-19 syndemic, given that the Commission wants to maintain “the consistency of the proposed recovery and resilience plan with the relevant country-specific challenges and priorities identified in the context of the European Semester, including fiscal aspects thereof, and, where relevant, those identified in the context of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure” [emphasis added].

In other words, the measures financed under the RRF will eventually have to be compatible with the usual reinforced Stability and Growth Pact constraints and do not imply any relenting of the usual budgetary constraints.

More internal, less external

While unlikely, it seems that the only real hope lies in a veritable change of the economic growth model that has been pursued so far. Stronger emphasis should be placed on a model that puts a premium on the support of an internal EU demand – both in investment and in consumption – rather than the exclusive focus on an export-driven, external competitiveness-seeking growth model that has prevailed so far.

 

For further studies, please see Simona Piattoni and Ton Notermans’ special issue of German Politics: Italy and Germany: Incompatible Varieties of Europe?

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On 23rd September 2020, the EU published the ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ that aims to be ‘[a] fresh start on migration in Europe’.  The Pact contains various commitments and timelines for action ranging from proposed reforms on existing asylum procedures rules to a proposed new Screening Regulation and a proposed Asylum and Migration Management Regulation. Since the Pact was published, its contents have received significant criticism from academics, practitioners, and NGOs alike. That criticism has focused on a range of matters, including human rights concerns, and scepticisms about the Pact’s potential to alleviate the burden of member states at the EU’s external borders who receive the most refugees and asylum seekers.

The focus of this blog, however, is on what might be described as a missed opportunity to meaningfully address the issue of human trafficking within the Pact. I highlight the near absence of an explicit focus on addressing trafficking within the catalogue of proposed instruments which make up the Pact and stress the possible negative impacts of proposed measures. Before turning to the Pact itself, I briefly recall how human trafficking is defined, and what obligations EU member states have in this regard.

International law defines human trafficking in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children. The definition, which is replicated almost word for word in the EU Trafficking Directive and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, comprises three elements: an act ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt’; a means, ‘threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person; and a purpose, ‘exploitation’. The relevant international and European instruments oblige EU member states to not only criminalise conduct falling within the scope of the above definition, but also to prevent trafficking, and to provide protection to trafficked persons.

Given the obligations outlined above, the connections between human trafficking and migration, and the fact that addressing human trafficking falls within the EU’s competence, one might expect to see a focus on preventing and tackling trafficking within the various proposed instruments which make up the Pact. This is not the case. Take, for example, the proposed Screening Regulation. The entire draft regulation mentions trafficking only in relation to the involvement of national anti-trafficking Rapporteurs in cases where screening may indicate trafficking.  In the proposed Asylum and Migration Management Regulation, human trafficking is referred to only twice, both in relation to children’s needs. While these connections, along with references to the EU’s Trafficking Directive in the recitals, are certainly welcome, such limited explicit focus is arguably insufficient, given the realities of risk and vulnerability within the asylum context. Questions certainly remain. How, precisely, will action to prevent trafficking be implemented within migration and asylum processes?

Whatever the reason, notwithstanding the limited references mentioned above, the issue of trafficking has apparently not played any meaningful role in the development of the Pact’s normative standards on migration and asylum. Perhaps it might be asserted that a focus on human trafficking is not necessary, given that other international and EU instruments address this issue. Arguably, though, such an approach fails to capture the complex reality which exists in practice: one where action taken to address migration and asylum can have an impact on both the risk and prevalence of human trafficking.

For example, some of the proposed measures, if enacted, may actually work in practice to aggravate trafficking or even re-trafficking risk. Consider the proposed screening regulation which requires accelerated border procedures in cases where asylum seekers are deemed to have originated from ‘safe’ countries. The human rights concerns about these provisions have been documented elsewhere. Specifically related to trafficking concerns, the idea of accelerated border procedures for those deemed to have arrived from so-called ‘safe’ countries is problematic, since signs indictors of trafficking may be missed in the course of such a procedure. Moreover, if such individuals are refused asylum and assistance measures owed to trafficked persons when, in reality, they need protection, they will remain at risk of harm and exploitation. Surely obligations to prevent trafficking require a different approach.

The example outlined above presents just one area in which the opportunity to meaningfully consider anti-trafficking obligations appears to have been missed. At present, the proposed instruments within the Pact have not entered into force. However, given their stage in the legislative process, and the complexities of achieving consensus among Member States, it remains unlikely that any significant substantial change will occur meanwhile. Since the EU member states have obligations not only to prosecute but also to prevent trafficking and protect trafficked individuals, surely this requires at the very least, that legal rules on managing migration and asylum should not have the potential to increase trafficking risk or result in situations where trafficked persons remain unidentified.

Simply put, asylum law, policy, and practice cannot be ignored if efforts to tackle trafficking are to succeed. The challenge, going forward, is to ensure that anti-trafficking obligations are addressed in a more significant way within EU asylum law.

 

[1] This commentary is based upon content provided by the author for a webinar on the EU Pact for Network for Migration Matters.

 

Author

Gillian is a PhD candidate in the School of Law at Queen’s University, Belfast. She holds an LLB in International and European Law, and an LLM in Human Rights Law. Her PhD research investigates the role of international law in preventing and tackling human trafficking among refugees and asylum seekers.

 

Twitter Handle: @gilliankane87

The post The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum: A Missed Opportunity to Strengthen Protection against Human Trafficking? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

As discussed in my previous article (see Reform #2 vol. 1), the European electoral system would go through a radical reformation, which affects the composition and working dynamics of the European Parliament (or EP) profoundly. Based on the figures of turnout and election results, the pan-Europarties and their national branches are going to reshape the face and the purpose of the EP of the Republic of the United Europe, enhancing legitimacy and competence on a European scale.

In this article, I am going to focus on the transformation of the European Parliament as the second volume of the reformation of the European political system. However, before introducing the new EP, I would like to begin with the provision of a brief and general overview of the EP in its current state – highlighting its strengths and weaknesses, whilst proposing solutions.

 

The European Parliament of the European Union

Officially, the European Parliament represents the European citizens, and forms the democratic basis of the European Union. During the last decades, the EP became gradually more powerful, and is considered to be the main agenda-setter of the EU. The first significant step to increase the EP’s authority was granted by the Maastricht Treaty, which provided the institution the power of final approval of the membership of the European Commission (including its President), meaning political control over the institution responsible for being the guardian of European laws. As a second important step on this path, the Amsterdam Treaty extended the co-decision procedure to most areas of legislation, granting the EP the same importance as the European Council has. Most recently, the Nice Treaty and Lisbon Treaty further extended the scope of co-decision – now known as the ordinary legislative procedure –, and became the most widely used decision-making procedure.

The European Parliament has ratification powers, and participates in the legislative process (e.g. ordinary legislative procedure, consultation, assent, initiation). Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP is involved in the budgetary process from the preparation stage (e.g. general guidelines, type of spending), it adopts the budget, and monitors its implementation. Also, the EP keeps the European Commission in check, and has the right to appeal to the Court of Justice. Besides its official powers, the EP has an enormous indirect influence through non-binding resolutions, committee hearings, and the media based in Brussels.

Since 1979, the MEPs are directly elected on European elections. The European Parliament has 705 representatives, distributed amongst the 27 member states as follows: Germany 96; France 79; Italy 76; Spain 59; Poland 52; Romania 33; the Netherlands 29; Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and Sweden 21-21; Austria 19; Bulgaria 17; Denmark, Finland, and Slovakia 14-14; Ireland 13; Croatia 12; Lithuania 11; Latvia and Slovenia 8-8; Estonia 7; Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta 6-6.  The total number of seats is allocated in accordance with the size of population; however, more populous member states agree to be under-represented in order to favour greater representation of less populous member states (degressive proportional apportionment).

The European Parliament’s political bodies comprise the Bureau (the President and fourteen Vice Presidents), the Conference of Presidents (the President and the political group chairs), the five Quaestors (responsible for the members’ administrative and financial business), the Conference of Committee Chairs, and the Conference of Delegation Chairs. The President of the European Parliament – elected for two and a half years – oversees the functioning and work of the EP. The EP has 22 committees and 44 delegations, and also sends a delegation to the Joint Assembly set up under the agreement between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states and the EU. The EP organises its work independently, in accordance with its Rules of Procedure, acting by a majority of its members.

Theoretically, the political groups are defined by political affinities and not by nationalities, which secures the transnationality of the European Parliament. A political group must comprise members elected from at least a quarter of the member states, and must consist of at least 25 members. The European parties in existence (as of 2021) are the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Renew Europe, the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), the Identity and Democracy (ID), the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL), and the independent Non-attached Members (NI). Supranational parties work in close co-operation with the corresponding political groups in the EP.

In my view, the European Parliament of the European Union has numerous shortcomings, of which the strong national tone, the deficiency in legitimacy (e.g. degressive proportionality, low turnout), and the costliness and inconvenience of multiple locations of sessions (Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg) and of multilingualism are the most distressful. The EP of the EU is neither legitimate nor transnational to that extent as it would be desirable and expected; moreover, it is distant from its citizens and unnecessarily expensive. In addition, due to the seat allocation being based on national features (e.g. size of population), and the European parties are pursuing national interests, the competence of the EP as the parliament of Europe is also questionable – not to mention certain representatives, who are executing orders taken from unelected individuals. It would be rather harmful and dangerous, if this EP with its obvious defects would receive further authorities and responsibilities. As the context of the Lisbon Treaty would not allow to reform or further increase the power of the EP anyway, being stuck in a dead end, the solution is to accomplish the reformation of the European Parliament in the frames of the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE).

 

The European Parliament of the Republic of the United Europe

Before I would introduce my own idea, let me bring to attention the most popular theory of reforming the European Parliament. According to this envisage, the federal Europe should consist of two chambers: Lower House and Upper House. The Lower House would include directly elected MEPs, who are the members of their own national parliaments at the same time, aiming to eliminate discrepancies between the EP and the national parliaments, and to reduce potential conflicts between Europe and nation-states. The idea of the Upper House’s structure would be somewhere between the model of the Senate in the US and the Bundesrat in Germany. In the US, every state directly elects two-two senators, whilst in the Bundesrat, the number of the votes varies depending on the size of population. In my opinion, the two-chamber system would make the already stammering European decision-making even more sluggish and indecisive. Also, the European Council would de degraded to the role of forming an Upper House, which could be bypassed and overruled by the directly elected President of the European Commission, who would be the de facto president of the EU at the same time. Besides, this theory would not encourage the formation of true European parties along European issues; on the contrary, pressing issues would stick on the level of nation-states, which are incapable to solve them. Instead of overcoming the challenges of indecision and illegitimacy, the dysfunctional mechanism of the EP – thus the entire Union – would be rather cemented in the two-chamber system. Therefore, I fully reject this idea.

Another theory, which emerged after the failure of the Spitzenkandidaten process after the EP elections in 2019, would allow voters to vote for a preferred candidate for the position of President of the European Commission, enhancing European parties to put forward a joint programme and a single coalition lead candidate. The establishment of a European Electoral Authority is on the table with ideas, such as remote voting, lowering the voting age to 16, common admission, and campaigning and funding rules. This theory argues that transnational lists would increase the transparency of European political parties and movements, whilst supporting the establishment of collective responsibility for the European Commission and the transformation of the European Council into a second EU legislative chamber (also attempting to degrade its current role). This idea has positive elements, but altogether proposes nothing extraordinary or altogether constructive.

In my view, the EP has some features, which are worth to keep, and some require only small adjustments. The European Parliament of the Republic of the United Europe has to be formed along the principles of reformed suffrage and European electoral system, which results in a fundamental transformation. Despite the enormous structural changes, the EP could keep all of its powers it enjoys now, which could be expanded even further by widening its authority and responsibilities.

The new European Parliament would consist of 800 seats, which are allocated based on the new European electoral system (see Reform #2 vol. 1). The MEPs would continue to serve five years terms. For the sake of simplicity and cost effectiveness, the EP’s official languages should be English, French, and German – perhaps Latin in the future (especially in administration) –, whereas the sessions should be held at one location only (e.g. Brussels). The European Parliament – as a fully authorised parliament – has to be in the centre of European decision-making. It shall remain in the EP’s full authority to decide about and accept the budget of the RUE, but for the coming three years – instead of seven. The EP is accountable to the citizens of Europe, and its rule of law should apply to the entirety of the Republic of the United Europe, meaning that it outranks the national parliaments in the legal hierarchy. Should there be a legislation made in the European Parliament, it must not be ignored or contradicted in the member states. It is in the duties and authorities of the EP to propose penalties on any of those member states that breach the constitution of the RUE. The measures of penalty would be decided by the ECJ and executed by the European Government.

As I intend to introduce the European Government of the Republic of the United Europe in the next volume of the reformation of the political system (volume 3), I mention only loosely that it is going to be formed by the pan-Europarties that got elected to the European Parliament. These pan-Europarties would form coalitions and factions as they please in order to increase their influence on legislation, which is going to lead to the formation of a European government ultimately. In this process, the EP appoints the Prime Minister, who is ideally the leading candidate of the winning pan-Europarty. After appointing the PM, the President of the RUE (will be introduced in volume 4) has to approve it as well, as he or she possesses the right to veto the person of the PM once.

The European Parliament would control and supervise the European Government, and would form committees along areas of expertise, helping legislation. Regarding the EP’s current structure and daily working routine, I do not see a reason for fundamental changes (e.g. political bodies). The most important committee I find vital to introduce is the European Accountability Committee (or EAC), which would be a committee independent from the EP, but would work together with it and with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) tightly. The EAC’s duty is to investigate every MEP and minister after their terms of office are over, but also during their terms, if the third of the Parliament agree (at least from four different parties). It is an essential body, which should tackle issues, such as misuse of power, corruption, incompetence, series of wrong decisions, ineffectiveness, inactivity, etc. The members of the EAC would vote and decide unanimously, preparing and sending their report to the ECJ, which would start a legal investigation regarding the case, making its judgement eventually. Should a minister or MEP proved to be guilty, they must get a stricter sentence than an ordinary citizen. It is imperative that only politically inactive and proven experts (e.g. former ministers or representatives) are to be approved to be the members of the EAC.

 

Conclusion

The reformed European Parliament would be significantly more legitimate, focusing on European issues and solutions, and representing the citizens of Europe. The cornerstones of its power should be the oversight of other European and certain national institutions, the supervision of use of the European budget, and the implementation of law. In the complex European political system, the European Parliament is going to be the bastion of Europe, influencing European legislation and its execution – latter through the formation of the European Government.

The post Reform #2: Political system (vol. 2) – European Parliament appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Today is International Women’s Day, and I want to take the opportunity to remember the wise words of Hannah Arendt, a woman who is regarded as one of the most influential political philosophers of the twentieth century.

Born to a German-Jewish family in 1906, she had to flee from the Nazis when Hitler came to power in 1933. She became an expert in dictatorships, and the disturbing tell-tale signs that lead to totalitarianism.

But it’s what she said in an interview, one year before her death in 1975, that I particularly want to draw attention to, because the parallels with what’s happening in Britain today are chilling.

That’s not because I believe the UK is a totalitarian state. No.

It’s because we are on a path that could, if we are not alert, lead us to the wrong place.

Said Hannah in an interview with the French writer Roger Errera in 1974.

“What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed?”

She went on:

“If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer. 

“This is because lies, by their very nature, have to be changed, and a lying government has constantly to rewrite its own history.

“On the receiving end you get not only one lie – a lie which you could go on for the rest of your days – but you get a great number of lies, depending on how the political wind blows. 

“And a people that no longer can believe anything cannot make up its mind.

“It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge. 

“And with such a people you can then do what you please.”

NORMALISED LYING Today, we live under a government, and a Prime Minister, who have normalised lying to ‘the people’.

The country is so misinformed, with so many competing and incompatible versions of events, that nobody is sure what to believe anymore.

And so, passively, so many of us just accept what’s happening, apathetically shrugging our shoulders as the government radically changes the country, with hardly a murmur of miscontent, let alone any signs of rebellion.

Last week a court order confirmed that the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, misled Parliament when he reassured MPs in the House of Commons in February that all Covid-related contracts were “on the record”.

That wasn’t true.

Let me be less polite. It was a lie.

The Judge’s Order stated that:

“the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to publish the contracts”.

The Prime Minister acted unlawfully and misled Parliament.

Why isn’t that front page news? Why is it hardly in the news at all? Why no uproar, not even murmurings, from the masses?

Heck. Why hasn’t the Prime Minister resigned?

It’s because lying to us, misinforming us, cheating on us, have become normal and accepted.

AN UNLAWFUL PRIME MINISTER Remember the autumn of 2019? Boris Johnson decided to close-down Parliament for five weeks, saying that was his right.

But the Supreme Court ruled that his actions were unlawful. The Judges said it was wrong of the Prime Minister to stop MPs carrying out their duties.

The Prime Minister faced calls to resign, but they were muted, and mild. 

In ‘normal times’, wouldn’t an honourable Prime Minister have immediately stepped down, after the country’s highest court judged that he had acted unlawfully?

Not in current times.

A ‘source’ at 10 Downing Street simply told the press that the Supreme Court had “made a serious mistake…” 

Not that the Prime Minister made a mistake. The court had made a mistake.

Less than three months later, in the General Election, Mr Johnson won a landslide victory, having told the country another whopper of a lie – that he had a “fantastic” Brexit deal that was “oven-ready”.

The country voted back into office a man who we all know is a compulsive liar (and I am safe in publishing that without fear of being sued for defamation) and who the country’s highest court confirmed had acted unlawfully.

And once again, a court this month confirmed that the Prime Minister acted unlawfully.

‘So what?’ the country replies in its silence.

IT’S OK TO LIE There’s an old saying. We teach people how to treat us.

And so, it has come to pass. The placid populace has taught the government that it’s ok to lie.

It’s ok to break the law. 

It’s ok to do what they want to the country, because we, the people, are so fed-up, befuddled, and depressed, that we are beyond caring, or fighting back.

And in this ‘perfect storm’ that has seen any misgivings by ‘the people muzzled by lockdowns, to the rescue of the government, that cheats and lies, is an inept and weak Opposition.

An Opposition that facilitates the government, rather than bellows every day with fire and anger, that the Prime Minister has no clothes – he is naked, a nobody, a conman, a cheat, who should not be anywhere near the levers of power.

And so, it goes on.

STATISTICS AND DAMNED LIES Last month The Guardian reported a survey of The Road Haulage Association (RHA) that in January export volumes from the UK to the EU had dropped by a staggering 68%, all because of new Brexit barriers.

But the government hit back, robustly asserting that the RHA survey was wrong.

The Cabinet Office, run by Michael Gove, confidently cited statistics that inbound and outbound volumes were “close to normal”.

The UK Statistics Authority, however, has officially reprimanded the government for using unpublished and unverifiable data, in their attempt to deny that Brexit had caused a massive fall in trade through UK ports.

Does that seem familiar? It does to me.

THE LIE ON THE BUS During the EU referendum campaign, Boris Johnson drove around the country in his battle bus that claimed that the UK sent £350m a week to the EU, that could instead be used to fund the NHS.

It wasn’t true.

The UK Statistics Authority wrote to Mr Johnson to complain that the claim made on his bus was ‘potentially misleading’ as it made no account of what Britain got back from the EU, including the deduction of a hefty rebate.

Sir Andrew Dilnot, then the Chair of the UK Statistics Authority, warned Mr Johnson and his campaign:

‘Given the high level of public interest in this debate it is important that official statistics are used accurately, with important limitations or caveats clearly explained.’

It made no difference. Mr Johnson continued to use the wrong figure on his bus; he continued to lie.

After the referendum, Dominic Cummings, Vote Leave’s Campaign Director, wrote:

‘Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests No.’

• So, a misinformed country voted for Brexit.
• A misinformed country voted for Boris Johnson.
• A misinformed country watches on, with barely a blink, as our nation is dismantled and rearranged, by those who have, indeed, fulfilled their sinister promise to ‘Take back control’.

REMEMBER THESE WORDS Today, remember the wise and prophetic words of Hannah Arendt. Let them shoot shivers up your spine. Let them sear your spleen and spur you into action. “What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed?”

It is imperative that we become informed. That we seek and engage the truth.

That we understand that knowledge is our best defence, and attack, against the creeping totalitarianism that now threatens our country.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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Introduction

Once the reformation of suffrage (see Reform #1) is accomplished – laying down the foundation of enlightened democracy –, the transformation of the united Europe’s (henceforward Republic of the United Europe or RUE) political system is the next priority. As any political system is complex and their institutions are interconnected, I am going to introduce the political system of the Republic of the United Europe in separate volumes, focusing on the European electoral system, the European Parliament, the European Government (and its ministries), and the European Presidential Council (including the President of the RUE).

In my previous article, I argued that the eligibility to vote and to stand for election must be radically redefined along certain principles. This volume is going to focus on the mechanism of how the votes of the enlightened public is going to translate into seats and power in the European institutions, introducing the reformation of the European electoral system – as the first step of the reformation of the European political system.

Principles

The European Parliament election procedures are based on European and national legislation. The common European rules explain the principle of proportional representation and certain incompatibilities with the MEP (Member of the European Parliament) mandate. The exact voting system used and the number of constituencies are governed by national laws, meaning that the electoral system of the European Union is far from unified, as it is in the nation-states’ authority to decide on the regulations – following only two loose European guidelines. The direct result of national control is major dissimilarities in voting age, compulsion in voting, threshold, and apportionment of seats – amongst others. However, the most concerning fact is the dearth of true European parties. Therefore, the European electoral system is in need of numerous fundamental amendments before it could serve as the RUE’s voting system.

The basic requirements to vote on European elections should be citizenship in any of the member states, age of sixteen, and certificate of eligibility (see Reform #1). Regarding the electoral system, most experts prefer the voting systems of mixed-member proportional and single transferable, which normally could be considered the best indeed. However, the Republic of the United Europe is going to be a very unique political entity, which has national and European institutions co-operating in symbiosis; therefore, could not adapt either of those voting systems. In my view, the best and most common electoral procedure is the application of party-list proportional representation in a transnational form (or transnational list), enabling only true European parties (henceforward pan-Europarties) to stand for election.

Regrettably, the current European parties are mere coalitions of national parties without European agendas and programmes, meaning that the national delegates of national parties stand for election, campaigning along national issues and interests. Therefore, only pan-Europarties should be permitted to stand for election, obligating them to nominate candidates (in accordance with Reform #1) in every single member state and to campaign only under the name (and symbols) of the pan-Europarty. The transnational representative system would require national parties to form broader European coalitions, thus creating pan-Europarties, which concentrate on existing universal European issues, seeking to find solutions to problems (e.g. wages, unemployment, illegal immigration, health care) by proposing programmes across Europe.

Another important principle is the abolishment of seat allocation based on population size in the European Parliament (or EP), making 800 seats available for distribution in the EP based on the pan-Europarties’ election results instead. Once these principles are translated into legal regulations, the voters are going to have the new opportunity of voting for a national branch of a pan-Europarty in either of their member state of origin or of residence (voting should take place on the same day in all member states).

Mechanism

In the transnational party-list proportional representative system, the actual number of votes in each member state is going to be irrelevant, as only the rate of election result and turnout are going to decide the final result. The pan-Europarties’ rate of support is determined by the total result in percentage divided by the number of member states, ignoring the actual number of votes. More specifically, at the elections of the Republic of the United Europe (consisting of 27 member states), the European Green Party gets 15% of the votes in nine, 10% in ten, and 5% in seven member states, whereas it does not get a single vote in one of the member states. In this case, the calculation is [(15×9)+(10×10)+(5×7)+(0x1)]/27=10, which means that the Greens gain 10% (80 seats) of the total seats available in the EP. As I find it necessary to introduce a mandatory 5% admission threshold, there would be occasional surplus votes, which must be divided proportionately between the qualified parties in accordance with the votes gained. As even the most powerful national parties would be unable to nominate candidates and launch campaigns in every single member state of the RUE – let alone reach an average of 5% election result –, they will have to unite, forming pan-Europarties on a supranational level.

The first phase of the electoral system determines the number of seats gained by the pan-Europarties in total, but it does not resolve the issue of internal seat allocation to the numerous national branches. In my view, internal seat allocation has to be decided by the rate of supporting voting age population (henceforward SVAP), which indicates the rate of those, who voted for the national branches of the pan-Europarties of all eligible to vote (and registered) in each member state. In order to get the rate of SVAP, the rate of turnout (rate of registered VAP that voted) must be multiplied by the rate of election results in each member state, and then divided by 100. Each pan-Europarty’s average of total rate of SVAP and average of total seats gained must be used to calculate a key figure, which can be applied to calculate the exact seat allocation of each national branch within each pan-Europarty.

In order to present the precise calculation, I am going to use the EPP’s election results from 2019 in the followings (see full table at the bottom). Applying my principles of transnational list, the EPP secured the 26.04% of total votes (national branches’ rate of election results in total, divided by the number of member states), which translates into 208 seats (800×0,2604) in the new European Parliament. The exact seat allocation of these 208 seats is going to be set by two directives: the rate of SVAP and the mandatory minimum MEP.

The higher the turnout, the more representative the election result is, when it is compared to the entire population. Therefore, a strong election result is not going to be enough in itself, unless it is backed by strong turnout figures. For instance, Germany’s CDU-CSU gained 28.90% of the votes, backed by a 61.38% turnout; whereas Luxembourg’s CSV gained only 21.10% of the votes in the 2019 EP election, but the turnout was at an outstanding 84.24%. The current electoral system ignores the figures of turnout completely, rewarding parties purely based on their election results, which deforms the image of real support behind the elected political party. Therefore, I find it vital to integrate turnout into the process of seat allocation, treating it equally important to election results in order to recognise the real support of a political party amongst the population (or the rate of SVAP).

The rate of SVAP is determined by the turnout multiplied by the election results, and divided by 100 – in each member state. In the case of Germany’s CDU-CSU, the calculation is (61.38×28.90)/100=17.74, which means that 17.74% of the population eligible to vote support the coalition. In the case of Luxembourg’s CSV, the calculation is (84.24×21.10)/100=17.77, which is a very similar figure to CDU-CSU’s, meaning that despite of the lower election results, significantly higher turnout in Luxembourg could turn around the overall results. The rate of SVAP is going to be the key figure, which determines the exact seat allocation amongst the national branches of the pan-Europarty. In order to simply, but accurately calculate the exact seat allocation, the figures of average of total rate of SVAP and of theoretical average seats per national branch need to be known – based on the pan-Europarty’s election results.

After the rate of SVAP is calculated in each member state, the total figure has to be divided by 27 (number of member states), which equals to 12.41. As previously mentioned, the EPP’s election results in 2019 would gain them 208 seats (or 208.32 to be precise) in the new EP of 800 seats. The figure of theoretical average seats per national branches can be simply extracted from the 208.32 (total seats gained), dividing it by 27, which equals to 7.71. The average rate of SVAP (12.41) divided by the theoretical average of total seats gained per member state (7.71) equals to the amount of rate of SVAP (1.61) worth one seat in the EP. The master key of 1.61 has to be applied in order to calculate the exact seats gained by each national branch within the pan-Europarty (in this case the EPP). The rate of SVAP divided by 1.61 equals to the exact seats gained by the national branches. In the case of Germany’s CDU-CSU, it is 17.74/1.61=11.02 (11 seats), whereas in the case of Luxembourg’s CSV, it is 17.77/1.61=11.04 (11 seats).

As explained, the second phase resolves the issue of internal seat allocation per national branch within the pan-Europarties, highlighting the importance of turnout coupled with election results; whilst eliminating the large power deficit between more and less populous member states. In the current system, which is based on population size and national interests, CDU-CSU has 29 seats, whereas CSV has only two seats in the EP. Regardless of the number people that turn up voting, parties can still claim chunks of seats based solely on election results, which is unacceptable in my opinion.

I find it important to add one more small legal condition to the mechanism of internal seat allocation: mandatory minimum MEP. The mandatory minimum MEP ensures that every national branch of the pan-Europarty can delegate at least one MEP, meaning that in case of an awful election result the national branch of the member state would not be excluded, thus unrepresented, in the EP (e.g. Estonia). In order to add an additional MEP without gained seat, one of the national branches of the pan-Europarty has to relinquish one seat, which could be decided by the pan-Europarty’s leadership (e.g. the national branch that gained the most seats could transfer one seat).

Conclusion

The reformed European electoral system is not only going to be truly European, introducing regulations related to pan-Europarties, transnational list, and nomination, but also more legitimate due to the inclusion of true representation based on the number of people that attend to vote, not only on the number of votes. In order to enhance legitimacy in the European Parliament, candidates are going to have to mobilise their voters, and make them interested in voting (e.g. comprehensive programmes). The neutralisation of national tone in the agendas, programmes, and campaigns is also essential, which I am going to mention more detailed in the following volume of the reformation of the political system: the European Parliament.

The electoral system of the Republic of the United Europe

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Let’s thank my need to get the car MOT’ed for my chancing upon a very interesting discussion about the OODA loop on the radio. For those not into military tactics, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop was devised by a US fighter pilot in the Cold War to conceptualise ways of (literally and metaphorically) out-manoeuvring your opponent: essentially by trying to get inside their approach you gain an advantage to disrupt and destroy them. All good stuff. If you’re into destroying things. Which was the gist of the radio programme: fundamentally, OODA is about handling situations as you find them, rather than about dealing with root causes. In their reading, one of Dominic Cummings’ basic problems during his time in No.10 was that he treated everything in OODA terms, rather than considering whether other, more cooperative strategies might be more effective. This is all interesting on its own terms, but also because the start of David Frost’s time as point man on the UK’s Brexit work has seen a demonstration of a very similar logic at work. Yesterday, in among all the budget news, the UK announced it would unilaterally extend the grace periods currently in operation in Northern Ireland relating to food. Certainly, there are issues on this that need attention, but to make a unilateral decision is one that smacks of disruption, mainly because any change to the TCA (which this would be) requires mutual approval with the EU. Instead, the UK has merely committed to discussing it with them in the coming weeks. The challenge to the EU is quite what to do. If they accept, then they open the door to similar future UK action, which might cause much bigger problems. If they refuse, then they will be blamed for obstructing efforts to solve the matter. Anything else requires UK buy-in that might not happen. As such, it’s essentially a bouncing operation, and much in line with previous actions by Frost. How it plays out is very unclear right now, but the opening observation of this post still stands: OODA is about fighting, not relation-building. If the UK-EU relationship is ever to find its feet, then it needs some foundation on which to stand. Trying to up-end the legal instruments – be that the Internal Market Bill and the Withdrawal Agreement or this current affair and the TCA – does not speak to that agenda at all. Maybe No.10 has an appetite for permanent conflict with the EU, but that’s a rather different question from one of whether the UK will be able to come out on top as a result.

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In mid-December the European Commission announced two draft laws on the regulation of the IT market. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act are intended to limit the influence of global Internet companies in the EU.

European officials define these initiatives as a tool that can ensure fair competition in the European IT market. The main “do’s” and “don’ts” for digital giants have been developed within these laws. There are some quite interesting positions in the documents:

• companies are prohibited from “mixing” personal data from various platforms and using them for their own purposes without the consent of citizens;
• platforms that refuse to obey and “threaten the lives and safety of people” may be temporarily banned;
• users will be allowed to delete pre-installed software on their devices;
• users can download software not only from official app stores (for example, iPhone owners will be no longer tied to the AppStore);
• IT giant products should be available for users separately without any synchronization (for example, Gmail is not more required to create an Android account);
• companies will have to inform the EU about planned mergers or takeovers.

For violation of the law the European Commission proposes fines up to 10% of the annual turnover of the company. For repeated violations regulators may force the IT giant to sell one of its enterprises or part of it.

The Acts also introduce a new term for large companies that provide access to digital products and services. In the legal language of the EU Google, Apple, Amazon and Facebook will be called «gatekeepers». The list of such companies will be regularly updated: the main criteria is 45 million active users in the EU countries.

The document aims not only to protect business and fair competition. The Acts also regulate the storage of personal data, and other important issues which allows us to consider it as the first timid step of Brussels to disassociate itself from global Internet platforms in favor of digital sovereignty.

What is digital sovereignty?

With no doubts, independence from global IT companies has become one of the most pressing issues on the political agenda of most modern states. Countries define digital sovereignty in different ways and, according to the interpretation, form a set of measures to ensure it. The classic definition looks like this:

Digital (information) sovereignty is the right of the state to formulate information policy independently, manage information flows, and ensure information security regardless of external influence.

In modern conditions the independence of the state in this sphere is determined by the ability to ensure the safety of citizens’ personal data, force transnational IT companies to act within the national legislation and limit the distribution of banned content.

Anyway various governments began to think of strengthening digital sovereignty after the events of the Arab Spring. In 2011 the series of protests and coups in the Middle East was actively coordinated through social networks with offices in the United States while the Arab national governments had absolutely no control over the dissemination of often unsound information.

The discussion escalated in the beginning of the year, due to the storming of the U.S. Capitol when Twitter blocked the account of President Donald Trump. The de-facto private company closed the important communication channel of the current head of the state with the millions of his voters. This event divided American society into supporters and opponents. However, other governments, without any doubts, have concluded that it is necessary to control IT giants on their territory.

The experience of other countries

On October 1, Turkey adopted a law regulating the activities of social networks in the country. According to the new rules, platforms with a number of users of 1 million and more are to open representative offices in Ankara. By the decision of the Turkish court, resources also have to “clean up” illegal content within 48 hours. For violations social networks will be fined up to €4.3 million, advertising may also be blocked or access speed may be limited.

Turkey is also actively promoting its own payment system. The national TROY card was launched in 2016. Through TROY, Turkish citizens can pay for purchases or cash in ATMs. The number of transactions in 2018 amounted to 100 million for a total of $3.3 billion. Turkish leaders also plan to ensure the possibility of using its own system outside the country.

Russia is also taking active actions to implement the concept of digital sovereignty. Moscow is promoting its own payment system «Mir», stimulating the development of domestic IT products (for example, Yandex and Sber), localizing the storage of personal data within the country. Russia has its popular social platforms VKontakte and Odnoklassniki which are able to compete with foreign social networks.

As for foreign IT giants, the Kremlin has not yet found a universal tool for establishing control over them on its own territory. The Russian authorities have repeatedly fined American platforms for distributing objectionable content which social networks refused to remove. According to Russian law, the amount of fines for such violations is from $11 000 to $54 000. However, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are in no hurry to pay the fines.

Poland intensified work on national legislation in the field of digital sovereignty right after ban of Donald Trump’s accounts. The authorities have developed a package of laws. The part of the initiatives is the creation of the Council for the Protection of Freedom of Speech. The Council will monitor the observance of the constitutional rights of users of social networks. It will consider pre-trial cases of blocking content on the Internet and the reasons for deleting a particular publication. The Polish bill provides the possibility of filing a complaint in e-format for the removal of content which should be considered within seven days. The court’s decision must be implemented immediately. Otherwise the platform may be fined from $13 thousand to $13.5 million.

Is there anything like this in Ukraine?

As for now the Ukrainian authorities have not developed either a universal method of control over foreign platforms or a national payment system. In Ukraine there are no analogues of popular American social networks or other IT products of a national scale that could compete with world-famous brands. Ukraine uses regulation in the Internet only to ban Russian platforms. For example, Russian services Yandex, Mail.ru, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki have been banned in 2017. Moreover, relations with other well-known foreign platforms are not regulated at all.

At the same time, there are enough examples of how foreign social networks influenced the social and political processes in Ukraine, in particular, they provoked the growing popularity of neo-Nazi organizations. In January, the «Time» published an article examining the activity of Azov battalion in Facebook.

The authors noted that new members of the organization were recruited via social network. For a long time, the administration of the world’s largest platform turned a blind eye to the spread of radical ideology by Ukrainian users. Only in 2016, Facebook began to take measures against Ukrainian radicals and block accounts for “hate speech”. Despite this, many of them are still active and continue to split the Ukrainian society into “friends” and “foes”.

In mid-February, in the first reading the Verkhovna Rada approved a bill proposing to tax non-resident companies providing electronic services. Experts note the positive impact of the initiative in terms of unification of taxation and increased competition in the digital services market, but for users it can lead to higher subscription cost. Talking about the digital sovereignty, the law cannot be called a step forward. It does not regulate the distribution of content and does not make foreign platforms dependent on the Ukrainian state.

The realization of digital sovereignty is one of the most important question for governments with political will. Otherwise, the “keys” to the largest channels of communication, financial sphere and personal data will remain in foreign hands. And this, as Americans say, is a “threat to national security”. If Ukraine decides to regulate this undoubtedly vital sphere, the leaders of the country have much work to do.

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University of Edinburgh. Photo credits: University of Edinburgh

Justyna Bandola-Gill

The quest for usable science is one of the defining challenges for contemporary universities. One of the key drivers of this change is the rise of the so-called impact agenda, in which research funding is directly linked to the socio-economic value of produced knowledge. This change in research funding – and the financial stakes involved in it – has had important consequences for the incentive systems of universities in the UK. One feature of this change is the upsurge in a new practice – termed in the British context ‘knowledge exchange’. In less than a decade, knowledge exchange has become a commonplace in UK universities – from a newly emerged category of professional services supporting these activities, through dedicated institutional formations, such as Knowledge Exchange and Impact Offices and strategies, and finally to the inclusion of impact in career progression criteria.

 

Yet, despite this expansion of the idea of knowledge exchange across university structures, the concept itself is often undefined and used vaguely. In the paper drawing on my doctoral work which was awarded the 2019 Excellent Paper Award, I addressed this topic by exploring knowledge exchange as a problem of practice: knowledge exchange seen from this perspective is not a set of universal strategies but rather a malleable phenomenon that changes its meaning in different contexts. Building on this insight I empirically explored the practice of knowledge exchange in two large initiatives funded by UK Research Councils – initiatives which, although located at universities, were charged predominantly with mobilising knowledge and working towards research impact. Through qualitative interviews and document analysis I aimed to answer the question: what meanings of knowledge exchange emerge in this context?

 

The key finding here was the fact that knowledge exchange is a multicultural practice which requires navigation, integration and translation between different paradigms of science. Academics who identified more strongly with traditional academic values (such as autonomy, impartiality and intellectually-driven inquiry) saw knowledge exchange as a knowledge-focused practice, the outcome of which could be a new policy framework (the ‘Challenge’ framing of knowledge exchange) or social learning of different actors in deliberative forums (the ‘Facilitation’ framing). Academics who saw themselves as ‘new’ scientists – sometimes referring directly to Mode-2 science – saw knowledge exchange as an engagement-based practice. They perceived knowledge exchange more instrumentally as an action-oriented and utilitarian practice, the effects of which were envisioned as concrete changes in policy. Here, for example, the academics referred to collaborative research (the ‘Co-production’ framing) or promotion of specific solutions (the ‘Advocacy’ framing). Knowledge exchange was therefore an area of intensive boundary work, where the spheres of science and policy were re-drawn across different value-laden lines.

 

Despite drawing on different academic traditions, these framings were malleable and the academics mixed-and-matched different strategies. The choices of strategy depended on multiple factors.

 

Politicisation of the problem

The choice of strategy was shaped by the level of politicisation of an issue. When dealing with contested issues (e.g. DNA testing, genetic databases, health inequalities), academics prioritised knowledge-based strategies (over the engagement-based ones). In particular, when faced with contentious issues, the academics opted for repertoires of knowledge exchange which were aligned more closely with the notions of impartial and autonomous science, as this was perceived to be more effective at broadening the debate.

 

Process characteristics

The interviewees pointed out that some stages of policy development were more conducive to specific repertoires of knowledge exchange. In particular, the early stages of policy formulation were conducive to strategies aimed at expanding the scope of policy options. Nevertheless, the interviewees saw the biggest opportunity for contributing to evidence-informed policymaking at the level of implementation of policies, particularly at the local level. One of the reasons for this focus was a perception that it was easier to develop close relationships and trust between actors at the local level, thus enabling models of co-production based on engagement, such as learning facilitation and co-production models.

 

Changes in the research funding system

With the introduction of Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the UK, academics became incentivised to produce more traceable (and consequently auditable) forms of impact. The interviewed academics reported that, since the introduction of REF, they had seen the system of incentives evolve to support practices resulting in such impact; for example, Co-production or Advocacy (rather than the more conceptual and open-ended practices of Challenging and Facilitating).

 

Overall, my research points to the fact that ‘knowledge exchange’ is in fact an umbrella term, containing a broad – both epistemically and practically – variety and multiple types of interactions between various types of knowledge and their uses. Even though the importance of close relationships for knowledge exchange are central to the effectiveness of the initiatives, this research highlights that some forms of interactions – such as critical or advocacy action – in fact benefit from looser connections to policymakers, instead gaining legitimacy, credibility and usefulness from academic evidence. The four repertoires of knowledge exchange reinforce existing arguments on the variety of roles academics can employ in the policymaking process, ranging from a greater focus on the autonomy of researchers, to closer engagement with the policy process. The forms of engagement were shaped by the variety of contextual factors, supporting claims for the central role of context as both the determinant of knowledge exchange and the key element of the process of evidence uptake in policy.

 

Dr. Justyna Bandola-Gill is a Research Fellow in Social Policy at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. Justyna works at the intersection of Science and Technology Studies and Public Policy. Her research explores the interactions between research and policy, especially the ways in which knowledge is organised, governed and mobilised across different settings in order to achieve political goals. Currently, Justyna is working on an ERC-funded project, METRO, exploring the global rise of metrological fields, where her research focuses on the rise of Sustainable Development Goals.

 

This blog post is based on the paper that won the 2019 Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Knowledge Politics and Policies’. The award was celebrated during the ECPR 2020 General Conference. This was the fourth time this prize was awarded. Previous winners are Emma Sabzalieva, Olivier Provini and Que Anh Dang.

 

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European Union (EU) citizens have become increasingly mobile within the Union. For a long time, free movement as well as cross-border social rights of EU migrants have been extended, especially by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In principle, economically inactive EU migrants, i.e. EU migrants who do not work, have also acquired significant transnational welfare rights. But what are these rights in practice? How do EU Member State administrations apply relevant EU law and handle EU citizens’ access to social assistance? Which impact does the ECJ finally have? Is there “social tourism” (possible) – as often claimed by certain political parties? This blogpost deals with all these questions by presenting the key findings of my article, which analyses local authorities’ practices and the consequences for EU citizens.

I argue that Member States’ local authorities tend to restrict the access to social assistance benefits for economically inactive EU migrants given that they have an incentive to keep both administrative and financial costs low. Still, there may be variation on the ground. As shown in my article, varying application between local authorities cannot, surprisingly, be explained by the party-political environment. Rather, it depends on whether local authorities face a high amount of (similar) requests and resulting professionalization.

Under EU law, economically inactive EU migrants generally enjoy the right to equal treatment after a residence of three months in another Member State. However, in order to be allowed to reside for more than three months, EU citizens need to have “sufficient resources” and a health insurance so that they do not become a “burden” on the social assistance system of the Member State of destination (Article 7 Directive 2004/38). As mentioned above, this field of EU law is highly shaped by the European Court of Justice. The latter ruled in an expansive direction for quite some time and urged Member States to undertake individual assessments of the benefit requests of economically inactive EU citizens. Yet, a characteristic of ECJ judgments is that they are case specific and characterized by underspecified core concepts. Consequently, the implications for the specific case at issue are clear but not its broader implications. Lawful residence seems to be decisive in every case in order to enjoy equal treatment, but apart from that, different factors can be required. For instance, in Bidar (C-209/03), it is decisive that the person has a certain degree of integration into society; in Grzelczyk (C-184/99), the crucial factor is that the financial problems of the applicant are only temporary. Yet, Member States are not provided with a clear, general definition of for instance “burden” or “certain degree of integration”. They do hence not know about the exact limits of equal treatment.

In practice, Member States authorities could make an individual assessment and interpret the numerous and vague factors mentioned in the diverse ECJ rulings – such as “certain degree of integration” – in an expansive direction. This can probably be described as the preferred response by the ECJ. Such a response is, however, unlikely. Namely, in general, authorities need to economize both their administrative and financial costs. An individual assessment implies high administrative costs and the expansive direction of ECJ rulings would lead to increased welfare expenditure. Local authorities therefore rather opt for diverging responses which entail less administrative or/and financial costs: they abandon the individual assessment and generally deny social assistance to economically inactive EU migrants, or they clearly specify the criteria of the individual assessment, such as “burden”. They are, hence, becoming more restrictive and limit the impact of the ECJ.

Local authorities think it is all the more necessary to economize costs if they face many requests of (EU) citizens – as empirical evidence from Austrian welfare authorities’ practices with regard to social assistance claims demonstrates. Local authorities have become routinized and increasingly see the need to tighten the rules and keep financial costs low. As a consequence, they have made the access to benefits more difficult.

Welfare authorities in rural areas are not confronted with many social assistance requests of (EU) citizens. Such less exposed welfare authorities typically apply simplifying strategies: when assessing whether an EU migrant is eligible for social assistance, they only rely upon the (non-)presence of a certain document, the registration certificate. The registration certificate is a purely declaratory certificate documenting legal residence that EU citizens have to apply for with migration authorities when staying longer than four months in Austria. Migration authorities, for their part, have made the access to the registration certificate more difficult over time, interpreting ECJ case law in a more restrictive way. Hence, since economically inactive EU migrants often no longer obtain the registration certificate in the first place, they do not have access to social assistance benefits in the second place.

Still, the division of competences between migration authorities and welfare authorities partly leads to unintended generosity, meaning that economically inactive EU citizens can be granted benefits in some instances: EU citizens can fulfil the conditions for the registration certificate while being economically active and be issued the document. With this certificate, which is rarely revoked, they can draw minimum benefits afterwards when no longer working.

Therefore, welfare authorities in larger cities facing many similar benefit requests finally no longer rely upon the registration certificate. They rather opt for a categorical exclusion of economically inactive EU citizens from social assistance. Hence, they interpret ECJ case law in a more restrictive way. The empirical evidence from Austria thus confirms that exposedness and resulting professionalization matters. At the same time, it finds that, surprisingly, the respective party-political environment cannot account for the application of ECJ case law on “social citizenship”: I identify numerous restrictive practices that occur independently from the party-political context.

The underlying research demonstrates that it is difficult for local authorities to undertake individual assessments without fixed criteria or definitions. It illustrates case workers’ demand for clear rules and confirms that vague ECJ case law is a burden for authorities. Recent case law since Dano (C-333/13) has lightened the burden for administrations: it confirms the restrictive practices and general benefit denials to economically inactive EU migrants. For poor EU migrants, the restrictive practices and recent case law mean that they find themselves in a precarious situation, excluded from the last safety net of social assistance. The findings of the article hence also stand in stark contrast to alleged “social tourism”.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article ‘‘Social Citizenship’ at the Street Level? EU Member State Administrations Setting a Firewall’.

 

 

Author:

Anita Heindlmaier is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Salzburg. She is part of the D-A-CH project “Rebalancing the Enlarged Single Market”, which is funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and the German Research Foundation (DFG) and which deals with atypical labour migration in the European Union. Her research interests include EU free movement of persons, social rights and working conditions – and in particular the implementation of related EU law and policies.

Twitter handles: @heindlmaier @SCEUS_Salzburg

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Irregular migration in the European Union (EU) dominates the current EU political agenda. It is also the top concern of European citizens, according to the latest Standard Eurobarometer (Spring 2019). EU member states, however, are not affected to the same degree, resulting in political friction with regard to how to deal with the challenges of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the EU’s failure to provide an adequate and unitary response to the unprecedented influx of irregular migrants in 2015 exposed the strength of state sovereignty within member states and led to divisions within the EU so far as to threaten the overall functioning of the Schengen Area. As a result, the EU approach to irregular migration shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation, where the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in the driving seat. Nonetheless, there is an apparent paradox: EU institutions and member states are more divided than ever over a common approach to irregular migration, yet at the same time they are increasingly converging towards more restrictive migration policies.

EU Integration and Policy (In)coherence towards Irregular Migration (2020). In: Harwood, M., Moncada, S. and Pace, R., (eds.) The Future of the European Union – Demisting the Debate,  The Institute for European Studies, University of  Malta, pp. 230-241. Available at: https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/52312

Introduction: Contextualisation of the problem

The issue of irregular migration currently dominates the European political agenda. It has been at the heart of recent election campaigns across the continent and has spilled into broader debates concerning the future of Europe. According to the Standard Eurobarometer of Spring 2019 (European Commission, 2019a), the phenomenon is perceived as the most crucial issue facing the EU. It is the top concern in twenty- one EU member states, reaching its highest scores in Malta (63 per cent), the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia (all 53 per cent). Irregular migration, however, has played out differently in the regions of Northwestern, Southern, and Central-Eastern Europe, resulting in different approaches across the EU member states.

Following the unprecedented influx of migrants in 2015, when over 1.8 million irregular migrants arrived in Europe (Frontex 2018, p. 8), the prevention of irregular migration has become one of the top EU policy priorities. Consequently, Europe experienced a ‘race to the bottom’, with most member states introducing a series of restrictive migration policy measures to deter irregular migration. At the same time, the question of how to deal with the phenomenon has become the most divisive issue within the EU, at both national and EU level.

The diverse policy approaches to the unparalleled influx of irregular migrants indeed created a divide among EU member states and institutions, drastically altering the landscape of European politics. In essence, the migration debate brought to the forefront questions concerning the resilience of the European integration project. Given the current situation, therefore, it is uncertain whether the EU will manage to rise to the challenge of irregular migration or risk fragmentation of the European project.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the difficulty in developing coherent migration policies, to deal with the challenge of irregular migration, due to the heterogeneous policy preferences of the EU member states and institutions. Then it examines the impact of the absence of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility among member states on the EU approach to irregular migration. The final section summarises the chapter, and questions whether the EU will succeed in achieving policy coherence in this domain in the future.

Incoherence in the EU approach to irregular migration

Since 1999, the EU has been working to develop a common EU migration policy (Peers et al., 2015). European cooperation in the area of irregular migration, however, has been neither unproblematic nor has it automatically translated into EU integration. This stems primarily from the fact that member states have jealously guarded their sole right to admit or exclude third country nationals from their respective territories.

EU member states’ reluctance to delegate decision-making in this sovereignty- sensitive policy domain beyond the national level has resulted in an ongoing tension over what should be handled at the supranational level, and what should remain in the domain of national governments (Givens, 2010). In consequence, member states have not yet succeeded in agreeing on clear political objectives for a common migration policy. Migration policy in the EU, therefore, remains a largely national endeavour, where member states continue to develop their own migration policies (Calleja Ragonesi, 2014).

In addition to member states’ unwillingness to transfer competences in the field of migration to the supranational level, the EU’s failure to articulate a coherent approach to irregular migration can be attributed to heterogeneous national policy preferences over how to deal with the phenomenon. In practice, varying political cultures and migration traditions, together with the asymmetrical distribution of irregular migrants across EU member states, have shaped differing national preferences in the context of irregular migration (Ruhs, 2017). Hence, they explain the challenge in achieving policy coherence in this domain.

Initially a six-member bloc, by the mid-1990s the Union comprised fifteen member states, which, with the exception of the southern states, were prosperous and of a Northwestern European cultural trope. The accessions from 2004 onwards brought the number of member states to twenty-eight with most of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe with a post-communist past. This has made the Union much more heterogeneous, bringing new preferences and challenges, raising the question of whether it is possible to have a ‘one size fits all’ EU law (Chalmers et al., 2014). The date of EU accession is an important factor shaping member states’ approaches to irregular migration. In essence, while most of the ‘older’ members have had years of experience with irregular migration, those member states that joined from 2004 onwards were faced with a relatively recent phenomenon to which they have had to adapt very rapidly.

Some of these states also became entry points for irregular migration and consequently more dependent on EU support for border control, while concurrently facing the social and political complications that arise from the phenomenon, such as informal employment (Carmel, 2013). EU member states’ approaches to irregular migration also vary in the context of their geographical proximity to zones of instability and conflict. Indeed, one of the principal determinants influencing a member state’s approach to irregular migration concerns geographic location.

Since the different regions of the EU experience different migratory pressures, this has a significant impact on the approaches of individual member states. For instance, the focus of destination states, such as Germany and Sweden, has been on secondary movements of irregular migrants. In contrast, frontline states, such as Italy and Greece, have long called for the abolishment of Dublin’s ‘first country of entry’ rule, which places a burden on such states. This has resulted in a situation where some member states, particularly those staggering under the weight of irregular migration, strive for a common policy governed by solidarity, while others far removed from the issue have little incentive to standardise policy and thus are less interested in pursuing long-term durable solutions.

Another major challenge in achieving policy coherence in this domain concerns the issue of variable geometry, which formally limits the ability of the EU to establish a common policy. More specifically, this relates to those member states that joined in the first enlargement of 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the UK. With the aim of safeguarding national sovereignty, these states have obtained ‘opt-outs’ from the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) to avoid cooperation in the adoption of measures relating to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Adler-Nissen, 2008). The unequal application of the processes of supranationalisation in the field of JHA, therefore, reveals the difficulty in developing a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration.

An additional obstacle, in the above context, concerns the costs attached to the granting of asylum. The possibility that irregular migrants may claim asylum appears to constitute the main barrier to cooperation in this field. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017) estimates, the average cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers within the EU is around 10,000 euro per asylum seeker for the first year. Accordingly, the major challenge stems from the fact that most member states perceive no benefits in cooperating in matters of irregular migration, hence the tendency to ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the frontline states.

In the absence of a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration, member states are increasingly pursuing unilateral measures, such as concluding bilateral agreements with third states, and building walls and fences along their borders to prevent irregular migration. There has also been a visible shift towards the tightening up of national asylum and migration policies in most member states, in an attempt to decrease the attractiveness of the respective member state for irregular migrants (Zanker, 2019). Such measures, however, do not reflect the Union’s fundamental values, namely the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.

Apart from the diverse policy approaches of the EU member states, the objectives of the three main institutions involved in EU legislation also differ, which explains the differences in their respective approaches to irregular migration. Nonetheless, following the unprecedented influx of irregular migrants in 2015, the Commission’s stance changed significantly, from promoting the rights of asylum seekers to satisfying political interest in the Council. Likewise, the European Parliament (EP) appears to be ‘going backwards’ in terms of migrants’ rights (Lopatin, 2013). As co- legislator, Parliament has often emphasised the need for a solidary approach to irregular migration; however, the rise of right-wing populist parties in the EP is influencing EU policy choices as support for mainstream political parties is on the wane (Lutz, 2019).

In recent years, the issue of irregular migration emerged at the centre of the debate in national elections across the EU, particularly since 2015, with right-wing populist parties gaining support in several member states. More importantly, the rise of right- wing populism is transforming member states’ approaches to irregular migration. The case of Germany illustrates such a transformation. Known for its ‘open-door’ policy, enacted in August 2015, which allowed in over a million irregular migrants, it shifted course only the following month with Chancellor Merkel’s U-turn leading to the reinstatement of border controls at the German-Austrian border. Merkel’s change in tone can be seen as a response to increasing public pressure against her ‘open-door’ policy (Dimitriadi et al., 2018).

Right-wing populist parties have made significant electoral gains across Europe, such as in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Italy. Some have taken office, while others have become the main opposition voice. In France, National Front40 leader Marine Le Pen outpaced traditional centre-left and centre-right parties in the presidential elections of 2017, reaching the second and final election round, in which she received about a third of the votes cast. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom (PVV) came in second place in the national election of the same year. Meanwhile, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) shifted from being primarily neoliberal in focus to becoming an outspoken anti-immigrant populist party, receiving 12.6 per cent of the votes in the September 2017 federal elections, and becoming the first right-wing populist party to be represented in the German Bundestag since World War II. At the end of 2017, the coalition government formed by the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) resulted in the first western European state with a governing right- wing populist party (Ehmsen and Scharenberg, 2018). This continental shift towards right-wing populism also includes Italy, where the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) and the League (Lega) scored a major success in the March 2018 general elections, becoming coalition partners in the new government and the first populist government in Western Europe.

The rise of the right-wing populist party, Sweden Democrats, in the 2018 elections in Sweden illustrates that this is Europe’s new normal. Since 2015, Sweden rapidly changed, from promoting one of the EU’s most open immigration policies to embracing one of its most restrictive, although it was thought to be immune from the trend to nationalistic politics (Ekman, 2018). Populist resentment towards irregular migration also played a crucial role in the victory of the pro-Brexit forces in the UK EU membership referendum, which took place on 23 June 2016 (Dinan et al., 2017).

In the aftermath of the mass influx of irregular migrants in 2015, most EU decisions taken to deal with the issue were approved at the meetings of the European Council, and taken in the Council, suggesting a shift towards intergovernmental policymaking as well as the bypassing of supranational institutions, exemplified by the 2016 EU- Turkey Statement. The controversial deal, which in practice closed all borders along the Western Balkan route, was agreed upon by EU leaders without the involvement of Parliament. The EU approach to irregular migration thus shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation, where the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the (JHA) Council in the driving seat.

The manifold approaches within the EU to irregular migration reveal an inherent tension in the development of a common policy. Above all, they reveal the inability of EU member states to act cohesively, particularly in the face of migration pressures. Nevertheless, EU actors all seem to support the same pragmatic strategy; that is, offering benefits, notably money, to third countries, in exchange for a reduction of irregular migration. Indeed, EU member states and institutions, are increasingly converging in the ‘fight against illegal migration’, resulting in a paradigm shift characterised by more restrictive policy prescriptions across Europe, involving strengthening the bloc’s external borders, and the externalisation of migration controls. The words of European Council President Donald Tusk, following the informal meeting in Salzburg in 2018, encapsulate the prevailing focus of the EU vis- à-vis irregular migration:

The migration debate showed that we may not agree on everything, but we agree on the main goal, which is stemming illegal migration to Europe.

An apparent paradox thus emerges. Although the EU is more divided than ever over a common approach to irregular migration, it is united in preventing irregular arrivals. Indeed, Europe is more divided than ever over how to tackle the phenomenon, resulting in deadlocked inter-institutional negotiations on the reform of the Dublin Regulation (since 2016) and prolonged internal border controls (since 2015). However, when it is a question of the goal of preventing irregular migration, the EU tends to be surprisingly ‘united in diversity’. Still, despite convergence in the tightening up of migration policies, EU member states and institutions have not managed to overcome their differences on fundamental aspects of EU integration, in particular concerning the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.

Lack of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the EU approach to irregular migration

An inherent flaw in the EU approach to irregular migration is that it lacks a long- term comprehensive strategy involving sustainable, durable solutions, governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. In practice, the EU approach is characterised by short-term ad hoc initiatives and the absence of intra- EU solidarity. A good example here is the Commission’s 2015 emergency relocation mechanism to assist Italy and Greece (Carrera and Guild, 2015), which even so resulted in most member states failing to fulfil their obligations and relocate the figures they had committed to, revealing a lack of solidarity even in times of crisis

Lack of solidarity in this policy domain has resulted in a political deadlock since 2016 over reform of the Dublin Regulation, largely due to political controversy as regards the inclusion of a corrective allocation mechanism to fairly distribute migrants across EU member states and thus alleviate the pressure on frontline states (Di Filippo, 2016). So far, the only form of solidarity that has been institutionalised concerns the financial aspect, specifically through the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) which consists of a fixed amount per member state, in addition to a variable amount, for those member states requiring emergency assistance in the event of a mass influx of irregular migrants (EP, 2018).

The failure of European solidarity calls into question the resilience of the European integration project. Schengen, one of the major achievements of European integration, has been under huge stress since 2015, following the decision of some member states to ‘temporarily’ reinstate border controls – with the aim to prevent secondary movements of irregular migrants from neighbouring member states. Previously, this measure was primarily used in connection with large sporting events or high-level political meetings and usually carried out for only a few days or weeks. Member states justified the reintroduction of border control at their internal borders on account of the unprecedented and uncontrolled influx of irregular migrants and the risk related to organised crime and terrorist threats (Guild et al., 2015).

Germany was the first member state to implement such border controls, in September 2015, which led to the reintroduction of internal border controls in other member states, such as Austria, Sweden, France and Denmark. Although these measures were authorised by the EU, they were prolonged several times, and thus amount to a major and long-term restriction of the earlier state of integration. Internal border checks are set to expire on 12 November 2019, even though since 2017 the number of irregular arrivals dropped significantly owing to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 (European Commission, 2019b).

The reintroduction of border control, therefore, remains a prerogative of the member states. In addition, Schengen rules are strongly dominated by intergovernmental interests, reflected in the sustained unwillingness to lift internal border controls. This state of affairs raises questions concerning the absence of intra-EU solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the context of irregular migration, where precedence is given to national over common interests, and lack of mutual trust among member states is hindering progress towards a coherent policy. It also highlights that even those member states that were initially more liberal, namely Germany and Sweden, suspended Schengen rules in order to deter irregular migrants from entering their territory and encourage them to search for protection in other states. In addition to the reintroduction of ‘temporary’ border control at the internal borders within the Schengen area, other EU member states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia, erected walls and fences along their internal borders to prevent the arrival of irregular migrants from other member states, resulting in further disunity within the EU.

If there is one conclusion to be drawn with a relatively high level of certainty, it is that the long-term challenge of irregular migration requires more than the present ad hoc solutions based on compensatory economic solidarity. Moreover, as long as the principle of solidarity is voluntary, it will not work and hence will continue to pose a serious challenge in developing a coherent, long-term and comprehensive strategy to tackle the challenge of irregular migration. In the latter’s absence, the risk is that the philosophy of each individual member state will prevail, resulting in the renationalisation of migration policies, permanent controls at the internal borders, and ultimately, the end of Schengen.

Conclusion: towards a coherent approach to irregular migration?

This chapter examined the challenges related to developing a coherent policy towards irregular migration; a goal that has not yet been achieved. The issue of irregular migration dominates the current political agenda in Europe. It has been at the heart of recent election campaigns across the continent, resulting in the rise of right-wing populist parties and a decline in traditional mainstream political parties. It has also become Europe’s most divisive issue due to discordant policy objectives with regard to how to deal with the phenomenon. Although at the time of writing irregular arrivals have dropped to pre-crisis levels, the issue remains highly controversial at both EU and national level. Given the circumstances, it is uncertain whether the EU will succeed in achieving policy coherence in this domain in the future.

The chapter illustrated that although the EU focus is increasingly on the prevention of irregular migration, the policy process in this sovereignty-sensitive field remains fragmented. In addition, it is marked by unilateral measures taken by individual member states to protect their domestic political interests against the perceived threats posed by irregular migration.

One of the major obstacles in formulating a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration concerns the variation in policy preferences across the EU. At the national level, policy approaches are deeply rooted in historical legacies as well as political, economic and social factors, including issues of religion and cultural identity. Moreover, the asymmetrical impact of irregular migration across EU member states, primarily the result of geographic location, has significantly influenced their respective approaches. At the EU level, discordance between the EU institutions’ approaches reflects their respective objectives, even though following the influx of irregular migrants in 2015, the Commission and EP’s stance changed significantly, from promoting the rights of asylum seekers to satisfying political interest in the Council. These powerful cleavages thus make it harder to reach consensus in this policy domain.

Interestingly, since 2015, there has been some form of convergence in the EU approach to irregular migration, as EU member states and institutions are increasingly shifting their focus towards the ‘fight against illegal migration’ and the externalisation of migration controls. In other words, security-oriented measures have dominated, resulting in convergence towards more restrictive migration policies in order to prevent irregular migrants from reaching Europe. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that EU cooperation in this policy domain has not automatically translated into EU integration.

Indeed, despite visible convergence in restrictive migration policies, EU member states and institutions have not yet managed to overcome their differences on fundamental aspects of migration governance, in particular, the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. The key challenge lies in the fact that those member states not located on the EU’s external borders perceive no benefits in cooperating in matters of irregular migration. Hence, the tendency to ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the frontline states rather than cooperate in establishing a permanent burden-sharing mechanism to fairly distribute migrants across EU member states and alleviate the burden from such states. The absence of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility within the EU has become a major barrier to policy coherence. So long as this principle will remain voluntary, it is most unlikely that EU member states will pull together and agree on a long-term solution.

Furthermore, the long-term challenge of irregular migration requires more than the present ad hoc solutions based on compensatory economic solidarity. Policy development has so far proven to be reactive rather than forward-looking. Particularly, since 2015, EU member states and institutions are increasingly opting for ad hoc policy solutions which operate outside legislative frameworks including intergovernmental agreements and soft policy approaches, exemplified by the EU-Turkey Statement, agreed upon by the heads of state or government of the EU member states and their Turkish counterparts. EU policymaking in this field thus shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation where the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the JHA Council in the driving seat.

The direction in which EU policy towards irregular migration will develop hence remains uncertain. Will the EU split further and pursue a policy strategy aimed exclusively at preventing irregular arrivals, or will it manage to find a way out of the current impasse and reform the Dublin Regulation in accordance with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility? Taking into consideration the current political climate, the likelihood is that common positions will not be found in the near future. The development of a long-term comprehensive strategy will require political will, mutual trust, and genuine solidarity. If undertaken successfully, however, these common efforts could re-energise European integration and have positive spillover effects in other policy areas.

 

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The post EU Integration and Policy (In)coherence towards Irregular Migration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Seit Anfang Januar arbeitet das neue Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA) jetzt bereits in Brandenburg. Nach außen hin ist noch nicht viel zu sehen, aber es gibt seit meinen letzten Blogbeiträgen zumindest ein paar Updates zur Struktur der Behörde, zum Gebäudesituation und zur den Stellenprofilen des Amts.

1. Die Struktur der Behörde

Aktuell gibt es auf der BfAA-Webseite und auch auf der gut gewachsenen Wikipedia-Seite zum BfAA noch keinen Link zu einem offiziellen Organigramm, zumindest keinen, den ich finden konnte. Im aktuellen Podcast des Behörden-Spiegel spricht der Leiter des Bundesamts Georg Birgelen aber von fünf Abteilungen, mit einer sechsten (der Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen, ZfA) in Planung, die demnächst noch eingegliedert werden soll.

Auf einem Facebook-Video von Birgelen aus dem Januar kann man noch ein paar weitere Details eines Entwurfs, oder eines damaligen Brainstormings zur Struktur erkennen. Daraus habe ich mal einen Organigramm-“Entwurf” gebastelt, als Platzhalter, bis das offizielle Organigramm da ist. Dort schien es noch, als würde es sieben Abteilungen geben. Daher bite mit Vorsicht genießen, da nur aus zwei Quellen zusammengebaut, aber immerhin ein Start!

Nichtoffizieller Entwurf eines Organigramms des BfAA, zusammengestellt aus unterschiedlichen Quellen. Eigene Darstellung. (NB: Von “Abteilung D” sprach Birgelen im Behörden-Spiegel Podcast nicht eindeutig, sie war aber auf der Tafel im Facebook-Video enthalten.)

2. Die Liegenschaften in Brandenburg an der Havel

Laut Birgelen (Behörden-Spiegel Podcast) hat das BfAA in Brandenburg “zwei Bürogebäude im Auge”, davon sei eines schon im November 2020 bezogen, mit insgesamt 72 Arbeitsplätzen. Davon seien wegen Corona maximal 50% nutzbar. Ein zweites, größeres Bürogebäude mit nochmal 90 Arbeitsplätzen würde gerade renoviert werden. Allerdings sei auch hier nicht klar, wie viele Plätze in Pandemie-Zeiten besetzt werden können, was den Start herausfordernder gestalte.

In einem Podcast des Brandenburger Regionalmediums “Meetingpoint Brandenburg” (auch auf Youtube) gab der Brandenburger Bürgermeister Michael Müller—Erster Beigeordneter für Stadtplanung, Bauen und Umwelt—bekannt, dass das BfAA in der Kirchhofstraße einen Mietvertrag für 10 Jahre habe (ca. Minute 13 im Podcast).

Es gebe außerdem, so Müller, auch die Zusage für einen Standort für einen möglichen Neubau (in Bahnhofsnähe?), wobei aber noch keine genaueren Planungen vorlägen, auch, weil der Bund noch nicht mitgeteilt habe, wie die zukünftige Ausgestaltung des Amts aussehen soll. (ca. Minute 13 im Podcast).

3. Stellenbesetzungen

Über die bislang ausgeschriebenen Stellenprofile hab ich bereits in vorherigen Posts berichtet. Trotzdem gab es auch zuletzt weiter neue Ausschreibungen, für eine Reihe von Profilen, an denen man sehen kann, wie und woran das Amt in Zukunft arbeiten wird:

• eine/n Projektmanager (m/w/div) für das Immobilienmanagement Ausland, die*der unter anderem die “fachliche Beratung der Auslandsvertretungen, der Goethe-Institute, anderer Kultureinrichtungen und Deutscher Auslandsschulen” übernehmen soll. Damit ist klar, dass die Immobilienverwaltung auch über das Auswärtige Amt im engeren Sinne hinaus gehen wird.
• eine/n weiteren Projektmanager wie oben, aber mit der Spezialisierung “Technische Gebäudeausrüstung“, unter anderem mit der Aufgabe der “Weiterentwicklung des technischen Facility Managements“
• Dazu wird gesucht nach einer/einem Volljurist/in (m/w/div) für Arbeits- Tarif- und Beamtenrecht, unter anderem auch zur “Führung von Güteverhandlungen und Gerichtsverfahren bzw. Vorbereitung und Koordination von Anwaltsprozessen in den vorgenannten Rechtsgebieten“, gleichzeitig werden “Kenntnisse bzw. praktische Erfahrungen im Bereich des Gleichstellungs-, Personalvertretungs-, und Schwerbehindertenrechts” verlangt, was möglicherweise auf dein wichtiges Themenspektrum hinweist (wenn auch nicht zentral in der Ausschreibung platziert)
• Dazu eine/n Sachbearbeitenden (m/w/d) für Buchführung und Vermögensrechnung mit SAP-Kenntnissen und als Erstaufgabe die “Steuerung der Buchführung und Rechnungslegung über das im Auswärtigen Amt, seinen Auslandsvertretungen und dem BfAA verwaltete Bundesvermögen“.
• Schon im Januar wurden darüber hinaus mehrere mehrere Sachbearbeitende (m/w/d) im Rechts- und Konsularwesen, von der Ausschreibung her eher im Berufseinsteiger oder Umsteiger-Bereich angesiedelt.

Man sieht an diesen Ausschreibungen, die über das Internet und Plattformen wie LinkedIn laufen, dass das Amt so langsam die oben beschriebenen einzelnen Abteilungen mit Leben füllen will. Gerade auch regional wird ausgeschrieben, und man sieht auch, dass neu eingestellte Menschen z.T. hier aus der Stadt Brandenburg oder der Region kommen.

Alles in allem merkt man, dass es eine Behörde im Aufbau ist: viel ist noch nicht zusehen, aber viel scheint hinter den Kulissen zu passieren. Mal sehen, wann es erste Hinweise auf die inhaltliche Arbeit aber auch über die wachsende Belegschaft geben wird.

Im Podcast des Behörden-Spiegels macht Leiter Birgelen auch deutlich, dass die Rekrutierung wegen der Corona-Pandemie deutlich weniger effizient war als gehofft, aber doch ganz gut über Video-Interviews durch das Auswärtige Amt etc. gelaufen sei.

Wenn nach den Lockdown-Zeiten die ersten 180 Menschen hier in Brandenburg in den beiden ersten Liegenschaften arbeiten können, wird sich vermutlich zeigen, welches Gewicht die Behörde in der Stadt haben wird. Und wenn erstmal die Abteilungen stehen, wird man sehen, welches Gewicht die Behörde insgesamt bekommen soll.

(Änderungen: Nach Veröffentlichung nur kleine sprachliche Korrekturen.)

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Indecision Peak, apparently

Let’s call this the age of Gloomy Dawning Realisation.

Since the start of the year, every day has been filled with examples of How It’s All Going To Be, as various individuals and sectors click that what we have is what we’ve got.

This seems an odd way to put it, especially since those of us working in the field all talk about an era of permanent negotiation: surely this can’t be it?

But that negotiation will be within a framework, that of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement. That framework is here to stay, for the foreseeable future, and it imposes some hefty limits on what is even discussed.

Crucially, the two treaties will persist because they secure – as much as international treaties ever can [cough] – the key interests of the larger party, the EU.

The WA is very clearly about this, providing a schedule for resolving the financials, protecting citizens’ rights and creating a durable (and discrete) mechanism for Northern Ireland.

But the TCA also does something simply, giving legal footing to post-membership arrangements on trade and fish, as well as a single mechanism for future negotiations.

In short, if you want to talk to the EU, then this is how you’ll talk to it.

From a perspective of those days when we might well not have had a deal at all, this is all well and good, but we should remember that this deal still stands a long way closer to Not Much than to the Very Close Friendship that was seen as a viable/desirable outcome in 2016. In many ways it’s the bare minimum given the particularities of the UK’s situation.

But a deal is a deal and how it’s hard to see either side wanting to bin it in a hurry, given the pain of getting to even this.

Which creates something of a problem.

As Jon Worth rightly notes, most of our attention seems to be on the UK these days: lots of thought-pieces and blogs about the challenges that the country faces in making the relationship work (I’ve done just the same BTH). But the same is true, he argues, for the EU.

Having gotten through the crisis phase of Brexit, there’s now a need for a serious discussion about how best to manage relations with the UK, something that Jon discusses better than I will. And it speaks to a bigger point, namely that whatever the institutional arrangements, the EU also needs to consider its policy.

And here the successes (possibly ‘successes’) of the WA/TCA come into play.

The EU might well feel that it has secured its key defensive interests: it’s got legal commitments from the UK, plus enforcement mechanisms, so its back is covered.

But just as the UK has been driven by what it doesn’t want, so too is the EU at risk of simply avoiding the bear-traps. In neither case is there a constructive plan of engagement, or even of management.

And this can’t simply be put down to the UK’s vacillation about what it’s aiming for: the EU seems to be at risk of getting stuck in arch “well, this is the consequence of what you asked for: Brexit means Brexit, no?” rhetoric, rather than anything more.

For all the other priorities that EU leaders have, the absence of open conflict with the UK cannot be the sum total of their policy, not least when the UK can be a useful and significant partner in achieving other objectives. Climate change and security are just the two most obvious examples.

But there is no strategic vision on the EU side, just as there isn’t on the UK’s. No policy papers are circulated, no discussions are held, nothing more than a vague sense of “thank goodness that’s settled”.

If there is one thing that both sides might have learnt from the longer-term experience of EU-UK relations, then it would surely be that benign neglect doesn’t really work.

The UK seems intent on continuing to use the EU as a scapegoat, even as it (the UK) fails to appreciate that it’s now a third country and so much more liable to unfriendly retaliation.

The EU might well have succeeded in getting much of what they wanted in the WA/TCA, but they risk playing into the UK’s narrative of high-handedness and falling into future spirals of tit-for-tat.

In short, with neither side knowing where this is going, the field is clear for others to start plotting a course that neither wants to take, so it’s essential that one, the other, or both start to pick up the reins and lead.

To take back control, if you will.

The post What next? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Immigration Issue

The European Refugee crisis, which began in 2015, has provided significant challenges for political parties across Europe and for the governance of the European Union (EU). In 2015, over one million migrants and refugees arrived into Europe. This wave continued into 2016, with a substantial reduction in 2017 and 2018 taking place. The peak number of refugees entering the EU in 2015 is often referred to as the European Refugee crisis.

As a result of the Refugee crisis, the importance of immigration as a political issue has remained high on the list of issues the public say is important to them. This has created electoral opportunities for far-right parties across Europe to lay claim to the immigration issue and capture disaffected voters.

This crucial electoral period has provided challenges for traditional centre left (Social Democratic) and centre right parties (Conservative) to update their party strategies across Europe. Though far-right parties are often seen as ‘owning’ the immigration issue from other political parties, our recent paper published in JCMS shows that this is not the case.

We tested our theory of strategic positioning using data on party competition in national parliamentary elections across 28 EU member states during the Refugee crisis (2015–2018). We found that centre right parties that adopted more anti-immigrant positions can increase their electoral success at the ballot box.

Most significantly, we found that this such a strategy benefits centre right parties more than it does for far-right parties during the European Refugee crisis period. We refer to this political phenomenon as ‘strategic positioning.’ We also find that centre left parties do not benefit at the ballot box from adopting more anti-immigrant positions.

 

The Refugee Crisis: Strategic Positioning

To illustrate the electoral success of centre right parties on the immigration issue during the Refugee crisis, we examined the cases of Austria and the Netherlands in Western Europe.

 

Western Europe

In Austria’s General Election in 2017, the centre right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)

adopted more anti-immigrant positions. This helped the ÖVP to increase their electoral success and to form a coalition government with the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) after the elections.

In the Dutch General Election in 2017, we found a more complex pattern. Though the governing centre right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) adopted more anti-immigration positions, the party’s vote share decreased and the far-right right party for Freedom (PVV) under Geert Wilders made electoral gains.

Although the VVD performed electorally worse, they still managed to form a coalition government after the election. Adopting ‘tougher’ positions on immigration is likely to have reduced further electoral losses to the far-right PVV. By adopting more restrictive positions on immigration, the centre right in both countries has been able to alleviate the electoral threat that the far-right poses.

 

Central-Eastern Europe

We also identified an additional pattern in our analysis (‘a mainstreaming effect’) that has important implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe. The ‘former’ traditional centre right Conservative Fidesz Party has now become a fully-fledged far-right party, with their focus on anti-immigrant positions.

This same ideological transformation can also be seen recently in Poland, with the Law and Justice (PiS) Party. This pattern paints a more negative picture for the future of European politics, particularly in the context of Central–Eastern Europe and the rightwards shift of a number of political parties.

 

Why do Centre Right Parties perform better?

Why have centre right parties often adopted hard-line positions on immigration? Scholars have noted that centre right parties are often ideologically ‘pragmatic’, governing parties that generally pursue electoral strategies to maintain and consolidate their political power.

The answer may be simple. The rationale for centre right parties is one of political survival. Such ‘strategic positioning’ may ensure that the centre right can remain in power as a governing party despite the opportunity during the Refugee crisis for challenger parties from the far-right to increase their electoral success.

For the duration of the Refugee crisis, a number of centre right parties across Europe have arguably been electorally resilient by adopting anti-immigrant positions to outmanoeuvre the far-right on this issue.

However, by shifting further right on immigration, centre right parties may have opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’ and brought the ideology of the far-right into the political mainstream. We argue that this strategy is a double-edged sword for centre right parties. This strategy may benefit the centre right in the short-term but may aid the far-right more in the long-term. This has worrying implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe.

 

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article, “The Looming Refugee Crisis in the EU: Right-Wing Party Competition and Strategic Positioning.”

 

This blog is also adapted from a previous blog post that was published by LSE EUROPP, “Opening up Pandora’s box? How centre-right parties can outperform the radical right on immigration.”

 

 

James F. Downes is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is also a Senior Fellow and Head of The Populism Research Unit at The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. James is an Associate Research Fellow in the Global Europe Centre at the University of Kent/Brussels School of International Studies and at the Center for Research and Social Progress (Italy). Previously he was a Visiting Scholar (Visiting Scholar) at The European Union Academic Programme Hong Kong (EUAP). He tweets at @DRJamesFDownes

 

Matthew Loveless is an Associate Professor at the University of Bologna (Italy). He is also a Co-Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Social Progress (Italy). He tweets at @cersporg

 

 

 

 

Andrew Lam is a District Council Member in Hong Kong and also an Associate Lecturer at The Open University of Hong Kong.

 

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