Ideas on Europe Blog

by Taro Nishikawa This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

After the European Community (EC) launched the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) in 1970, the question of who influences EC/EU positions in international trade negotiations became an important scholarly research topic. On the one hand, greater control by Member states vis-à-vis the European Commission and the limited autonomy of the European Commission are stressed—ex-ante controls (e.g., negotiation mandates) and ex-post controls (e.g., Article 113/133 Committee, current Trade Policy Committee). On the other hand, the European Commission’s multiple sources of autonomy are pointed out—agenda-setting, agency slack, norm repackaging, and rhetoric/cognitive framing.

 

The reality of EC/EU positions in international trade negotiations might be more complicated. As Dür and Zimmermann, and Elsig point out, the influence of the European Commission and Member States can depend on the stages of trade negotiations. When issuing the mandate, the EC/EU position would be directed by Member States’ preferences, especially those with a majority in the Council (cf. a liberal intergovernmentalist approach). However, when negotiating with trading partners, the European Commission would have the ‘reframing ability’ to decide how to achieve the objectives of the Council’s mandate within a win-set of the EC/EU (cf. two-level games model). This article applies this hypothetical model of vertical interplay between the European Commission and Member States to the EC-Japan trade negotiations in the 1980s.

 

In the 1970s, the EC was hugely concerned about trade imbalances due to the ‘torrential’ export of certain manufactured goods from Japan. Many Member States made bilateral agreements with Japan to put voluntary export restraints (VERs) in place. However, in the 1980s, the EC faced new changes and challenges. Firstly, the role of the European Commission in the EC-Japan trade negotiations grew, e.g. the first EC-level voluntary export moderation on ten goods in 1983. Secondly, even though they had been concerns for the EC and the US since the 1970s, market opening and domestic structural impediments became key discussion points in international trade negotiations, especially between Japan and the EC and between Japan and the US.

 

In this context, this article focuses on the trajectory of trade negotiations concerning the EC’s request for a Japanese import target in November 1985. The idea of an import target was first introduced confidentially in the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement in 1986. The request by the EC was the first official request for an import target from foreign countries to Japan, although it did not focus on specific products and was never accepted by the Japanese Government.

 

Since 1982, in response to the US’s and the EC’s continuing concerns, the Japanese Government introduced several market-opening measures, including tariff reductions, easing restrictions on imports, and improving the standards and conformity assessment system. In April 1985, in line with recommendations from the Advisory Committee for External Economic Issues, the Japanese Government decided to set up comprehensive market-opening measures in six areas, ‘the Action Programme for Improved Market Access’.

 

In June 1985, in response to this move, the Foreign Affairs Council stressed the necessity of ‘a clearly verifiable commitment […] to a significant, sustained increase’ in Japanese imports of manufactures and processed agricultural products in the forthcoming action programme. Moreover, according to diplomatic documents (no. 2019-1333) of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DA-MOFAJ), during the EC-Japan summit in July 1985, then-Commissioner Willy De Clercq, in charge of external relations, requested the increase of Japanese import rates on manufactured and processed agricultural products, according to a numerically verifiable method. During a press conference after the summit, Jacques Delors, the then-President of the European Commission, also mentioned the necessity of a concrete import target. This clearly shows that both the Council and the European Commission were already requiring Japan to commit or target its imports.

 

After the Japanese Government’s announcement of ‘the Outlines of the Action Programme’ in July 1985, the European Commission’s Communication to the Council in October emphasised that Japan should set concrete and measurable targets for a significant increase in its imports of manufactured goods. Based on this communication, the Article 113 Committee and the Foreign Affairs Council discussed the EC’s relations with Japan. According to diplomatic documents of the DA-MOFAJ (no. 2016-1088, 2016-1089, 2016-1091), the majority of Member States supported the idea of requesting an import target; the UK, France, and Italy were especially proactive, and only Denmark, the Netherlands were opposed to the idea. West Germany was opposed to the idea but later accepted it reluctantly. As a result, in its conclusion, the Council instructed the European Commission to request Japan to set ‘a quantified target with a timetable for a significant increase in [Japanese] imports of manufactured goods and processed agricultural products, as a complement of its Action Programme’.

 

According to diplomatic documents of the DA-MOFAJ (no. 2016-1089), the European Commission first unofficially requested the Japanese Government to set an import target, by sharing with Japan the Council’s confidential conclusion. Interestingly, after the Japanese Government declined the request, the European Commission ‘reframed’ the Council’s mandate. Although the conclusion mentioned ‘a quantified target with a timetable’, during a meeting with Japanese then-Foreign Minister Abe, prior to the EC-Japan Ministerial Meetings, then-Commissioner De Clercq proposed a ‘complementary proposal’, the introduction of ‘a forecast of the estimated effect on imports’ of the Action Programme and ‘a Long Term Import Vision’. In November 1985, during the Ministerial Meetings, the Japanese Government officially declined this proposal due to the impossibility of a quantitative estimation of the Action Programme.

 

The above case shows that the influence of the European Commission and Member States over the EC/EU position in international trade negotiations can depend on the stage of negotiations. However, considering that the European Commission shared similar preferences with the Council before issuing the mandate, it was empirically difficult to determine the origin of the idea of an import target within the EC. To prove this hypothetical model of vertical interplay between the European Commission and Member States, it is necessary to investigate subsequent international trade negotiation cases, e.g. the EC/EU-Japan trade negotiations in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, and more recent cases such as the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

 

 

 

Photo credit: Rob Stevens

Taro Nishikawa is a PhD candidate at the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES), the Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of Leuven (KU Leuven). His PhD project deals with European Community (EC)-Japan trade conflicts in the 1980s and the Early 1990s from a perspective of International Political Economy (IPE). His wider research interests include IPE of trade and external economic policies of the European Union (EU). As a double degree program student, he has a Master of European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives (M.A., Cum laude) from the University of Leuven (Belgium) in 2018, and a M.A. from Kobe University (Japan) in 2019. After getting a B.A. in Policy Management from Keio University (Japan) in 2013, he worked as an administrative officer at the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan and at the Cabinet Secretariat of Japan until 2016.

Institutional website: https://researchportal.be/en/researcher/taro-nishikawa

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

 

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by Magdalena König This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

Counter-terrorism policy has never been such a prominent policy area in EU enlargement as it currently is. In recent years, the EU has put security policy, and in particular counter-terrorism policy, high on the agenda of the accession processes of the South East European EU membership candidates Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, and the potential candidates Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In this contribution, I sketch out three trends and practices that define the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism, an increasingly important policy area of enlargement: regional cooperation, externalisation of internal policies, and prioritisation of preventive counter-terrorism strategies over hard measures.

 

Not a new, but an increasingly highlighted enlargement topic

Even though counter-terrorism has never been as prominent for EU enlargement as it is currently, it is not a new topic within the field of enlargement. Indeed, counter-terrorism cooperation has previously been relevant to enlargement. For example, during the negotiations with Turkey, Croatia, Bulgaria or Romania, as well as in relations with non-EU states such as Ukraine or Moldova. However, with the ongoing enlargement towards South East Europe, counter-terrorism policy has changed – the scope of engagement on the topic has widened and a variety of levels of governance have become involved.

Since the departure of foreign terrorist fighters from South East Europe to Syria and Iraq as of 2011, the EU has put more emphasis on counter-terrorism in accession negotiations. The Commission’s 2018 Western Balkans strategy puts a particular emphasis on home affairs. Meanwhile, counter-terrorism and the prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) are part of one of six flagship enlargement initiatives. While the Commission’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 2014-2020 had already assigned significant funds to counter-terrorism and P/CVE projects, the new IPA 2021-2027 will reflect the increasing focus on counter-terrorism policy by providing even more funding for related activities. Moreover, the 2018 Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism for the Western Balkans is becoming increasingly part of the enlargement assessment. It is included in chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security, which is a prioritized chapter since a reform in 2012.

 

Three trends and practices

The EU’s priorities and practices regarding counter-terrorism policy in South East Europe show certain trends. Firstly, regional cooperation is a guiding principle of enlargement, beyond the realm of counter-terrorism. In the area of counter-terrorism, regional cooperation is particularly pursued with reference to terrorism being a mobile activity that crosses borders, ethnic lines and political differences. Moreover, the underlying assumption is that the challenges which the South East European states face with regards to terrorism and extremism are comparable. The Commission does not cease to highlight that rather than pursuing progress in counter-terrorism policy bilaterally, it prefers using a regional approach because of the “good neighbourly relations” that should be promoted through the enlargement process. An expression of this approach is the 2018 Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism for the Western Balkans which was developed from several high-level counter-terrorism dialogues between SEE and EU representatives. The Joint Action Plan was negotiated on a regional level between both, SEE and EU representatives. Another important instrument reflecting this approach is the regional network of national Countering Violent Extremism coordinators in South East Europe. The network is chaired by the EU’s regional counter-terrorism advisor who is based in Sarajevo and was appointed specifically for South East Europe. The EU asked the South East European governments to appoint a national Countering Violent Extremism coordinator as a single contact point to participate in this network and to coordinate on policies with states in the region.

Secondly, in relation to counter-terrorism and P/CVE in enlargement, the EU has externalised some of its internal policies in these areas. Not surprisingly given the nature of the enlargement framework, the aim is to introduce EU-minded policies and practices in these policy areas. Therefore, there is a strong coherence between the EU’s internal and external counter-terrorism policies, in particular in relation to South East Europe. A good example of this approach is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), a Commission-led network of practitioners working on (de)radicalisation. It is sought to be replicated in a two-fold way in the region. The Commission aims at integrating the South East European states into the EU-wide RAN as well as, in the long run, implementing a regional version of RAN. This again reflects the preference for regional cooperation in the EU’s strategy.

Thirdly, what is broadly referred to as counter-terrorism cooperation is clearly prioritising P/CVE activities, or so-called soft measures, over hard measures such as police work and law enforcement. While the EU engages in both dimensions of this work in South East Europe, more attention is given to P/CVE than to counter-terrorism activities. This is also underlined by the EU’s current priority topics of counter-terrorism policy: the prevention of radicalisation and the return and de-radicalisation of foreign terrorist fighters and their families. With this focus on P/CVE activities the EU has treated projects employing a so-called whole-of-society approach preferentially. This means that in its activities, the EU supports the use of a P/CVE approach which brings together a broad range of local authorities and institutions, such as doctors, psychologists, social workers, teachers, etc.

Given the relative novelty of enlargement focused on counter-terrorism, it will be crucial to accompany the integration in this policy field with academic analysis. For example, a question that arises from the three patterns sketched above is, what role does counter-terrorism play in the overall political integration of EU enlargement?

 

 

 

Magdalena König is a PhD researcher at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Her research interests include EU enlargement, counter-terrorism politics, and the politics of prevention of radicalization. In her PhD research, she examines the role of preventive approaches to counter-terrorism within the ongoing EU enlargement towards South East Europe. Magdalena has a BA in European Studies from Maastricht University and a MA in Peace Research from the University of Tübingen.

 

Institutional  website: https://www.rug.nl/staff/m.c.koenig/

Twitter: @koenig_mc 

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

 

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by Salvatore FP Barillà This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

In the context of trade policy, economic capacity and market size are often considered central analytical factors. It is assumed that the larger the market size of a state, the more likely it will be to engage in a dispute with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This assumption is especially prominent for disputes between global powers and developing countries.

 

Nonetheless, materialistic theories do not seem to fully address the situation of EU-China trade disputes in the WTO. When considering the EU and China, two of the largest market economies and two global powers, the expectation is that they should both have requested the establishment of a panel in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) on a number of occasions. Nonetheless, when looking at the cases initiated by the two actors, this expectation is not empirically accurate.

 

The EU is the second most prolific user of the DSM after the United States (US) in terms of initiation of disputes with 104 cases as complainant, while China has only 21. Why?

Traditional drivers used to analyse the reasons why states engage in trade disputes in the WTO suggest a more intensive use of the DSM by China. Like the EU, China is one of the world’s largest economies. China has the legal capacity to engage in a dispute, like the EU, so what explains this discrepancy in the available data if traditional materialistic explanations fail to do so?

 

My research aims to prove the causal relationship between domestic ideas and governments’ decisions to request the establishment of a WTO panel. I argue that the EU and China are representative of different ideas, namely programmatic beliefs. My research proposes that if a government whose programmatic beliefs are centred on mediation and arbitration , then the government will follow its programmatic beliefs. On the contrary, if a government whose programmatic beliefs are based on the preference of judicial remedies requests the establishment of a panel, then the government will be following its programmatic beliefs.

The EU is expected to favour the establishment of a panel to mediation. In this sense, the EU will interpret material factors (like economic capacity, or market size) as conducting the decision towards the establishment of a panel. China is expected to prefer mediation over the establishment of a panel. Attempts of mediation in official documents, as well as in media records, will be analysed as evidence.

 

Chinese ideas of dispute settlement are based on the Confucian tradition of win-win relationships, 關係 (guan xi), in which the preservation of the relationship with the other party is essential to the positive outcome of the dispute. The concept of legal tradition is broader than the mere corpus of laws and political acts that are part of a state’s legislation. It embraces principles, traditions and practices of the state. In this sense, it seems fair to claim that legal traditions are part of a state’s culture and might play a role in a government’s behaviour. Furthermore, the administration of conflict resolution was originally given to family elders (heads of families or clans). This type of local conflict resolution served as a way of preventing other conflicts among citizens. There was no procedural law because the public official would decide the outcome of disputes. Public administration was not separated from the judiciary body. This lack of separation of powers in China.

 

European and Western ideas, which have been absorbed by the WTO, are based on a dialectical vision of disputes, in which one party wins and the other loses. This dialectical vision of the dispute is also due to the fact that traditionally in the West, legal institutions have been seen more keenly as the main institutions to turn to in order to solve a conflict. In this sense, it can be argued that the WTO itself was built on the Western idea of judicial remedy.

 

Norms, or, better, programmatic beliefs can guide, inspire, or justify governments’ decisions to act in a specific way.

 

This brief overview shows how the investigation of ideas, or, more specifically, programmatic beliefs can provide explanations for governments’ decisions to request the establishment of a panel in the WTO. In particular, this overview shows how the EU’s programmatic beliefs would suggest a more intensive use of the DSM. On the contrary, Chinese programmatic beliefs would imply a less frequent use of the WTO’s judicial body. My research aims to provide empirical evidence confirming these theoretical propositions by analysing EU-China disputes in the WTO DSM.

 

 

 

Salvatore FP Barillà is a PhD candidate in Politics at the School of Social and Political Science of the University of Edinburgh. He holds a combined bachelor and master’s degree in Law from LUISS university, and a double master’s degree in European Studies and International Relations from LUISS university and China Foreign Affairs University. He is interested in International Political Economy, International Trade and Investment Law, and EU-China studies.

 

Institutional  website: https://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/staff/salvatore-fp-barilla

Twitter: @sfpbarilla

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

The post The study of ideas in EU-China disputes in the WTO appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the breaking of the story about the unexpectedly large size of the UK’s financial liabilities under the Withdrawal Agreement last week was that it generated so little attention.

The consolidated EU accounts for 2020 were published on 9 July, but it took a ‘tip-off‘ to RTE to get them checking the text. Number 10 said it ‘didn’t recognise the figure’, but then that was it.

So little for something that had been flagged in 2016 as one of the hardest issues to crack in the then-upcoming negotiations.

In practice, finances were dealt with relatively early and relatively simply: the WA set out (Arts.135-148) the rules for deciding what was and wasn’t included, plus a schedule for payments.

But no figures. Precisely to avoid getting anyone’s backs up. And because until the money’s spent, no-one actually knew how much it would be.

Which didn’t stop the UK trying to work out the bill.

The graphic below sets out those estimates, as well as highlighting the huge potential for misjudging totals. The Commons Library briefing on all this is excellent as a guide.

The short answer to the mismatch between the UK estimates and the Commission’s first calculation (which is unlikely to move much) is that both the basic calculations on contributions and RAL were shifted by Covid and the associated economic slump, which also affected valuations of other assets and liabilities.

Number 10 might not have recognised the total, but they also haven’t gone hard on rebutting it, which suggests this is one fight that they are not going to push on.

UPDATE: The UK government’s report on the 2020 budget reiterates the March OBR estimate, but doesn’t challenge the more recent Commission valuation.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic87

The post Financial Settlement News appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Preksha Shree Chhetri This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

On 20 May 2021, the European Parliament voted to freeze the ratification of the much-hyped EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) (Reuters, 2021). The bilateral deal had been agreed in principle between the EU and China in December 2020, putting an end to seven long years of negotiation (Europa, 2020). The ratification of the CAI would have been significant in two ways – the first and obvious way would be by providing fresh prospects for economic benefits and opportunities to both sides and second, the ratification would signify the impuissance of the EU’s recent hard-liner approach towards China. However, the freezing of the CAI by a large majority of votes in the European Parliament suggests that the EU’s toughening stance on China is not just mere posturing but a well-backed policy option. Transformations in the EU’s approach towards China over the last few years is the primary focus of this blog.

The EU and China became strategic partners in 2003 and have reached several milestones, mostly on the economic front, in their relationship since. Over the years, many important agreements between them have faced backlash from disillusioned human rights activists from both within and outside Europe, only to wane out after a few days. The ideological differences between the EU and China are well known and so are the many permanent bones of contention between the two strategic partners. Issues related to human rights and the arms embargo in China, and the EU’s refusal to grant Market Economy Status to China (The Bricspost, 2016) have been constant irritants in the partnership. However, none of these irritants interfered with progress in other areas, especially regarding economic engagements. Their economic ambitions have often overshadowed their differences, paving the way for a cordial and strategic partnership. In addition, the EU-China alliance has a very robust institutional architecture. While strong economic relations facilitated cooperation in newer areas, the institutional architecture made sure that dialogue in more difficult areas continued. This system had been working perfectly until recently.

One of the biggest known discords between the EU and China was in 2008, when Beijing cancelled the EU-China summit in retaliation against the meeting between European leaders and Tibet’s exiled political and spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama (Euractive, 2008). Though this was the only time that the annual summit between the two strategic partners suffered a formal fall out, partnership in other fronts remained unchallenged. For instance, on the economic front,  the EU exported €78.4 billion worth of goods to China in 2008, a rise of 9 per cent compared to 2007, and imported €248 billion worth of Chinese goods (Europa, 2009). In fact, during the following annual summit in Prague, the two sides signed important cooperative agreements, such as the Joint Statement on Europe-China Clean Energy Center, the EU-China Science and Technology Partnership Scheme, and the EU-China SMEs Cooperation Point of Consensus (Council of the European Union, 2009).

For many years, the EU-China relations were what Fox and Godement (2009) rightly described as “unconditional engagement” – a policy which gave China access to all the economic and other benefits of cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return. The EU’s response to China’s domestic as well as regional manoeuvres has been highly divisive amongst various stakeholders. While activist and scholars are generally vocal about their criticisms about Beijing’s policy decisions, political leadership and the industrialist community usually opt to stay mum. For instance, in 2019 Volkswagen’s then CEO Herbert Diess feigned ignorance when asked about the detention camps holding thousands of Muslims in Xinjiang in order to protect the company’s investments in the area. (The Washington Post, 2019). In July 2020, amidst pressing crisis in Hong Kong over the New Security Law introduced by Beijing, Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s initial response triggered a lot of criticisms when she insisted on the need to maintain dialogue with China (Business Insider, 2020) and publicly stated that Germany would not involve itself in the Hong Kong issue (DW, 2020).

In the past year, incidents of blindly siding with Beijing have become less frequent and we have seen a considerable rise in the number of critical voices from within both political parties as well as from the business community. In fact, the EU as an institution markedly changed its approach towards China when it termed China a ‘systemic rival’ in the latest policy paper (2020). This along with the European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for a geopolitical Europe (European Parliament, 2020) and French President Emmanuel Macron’s ‘European Awakening’ (France24, 2019), created a lot of stir around the EU’s changing debate on its relationship with China. In addition, owing to China’s wolf warrior diplomacy during the global pandemic and its 5G ventures turning sour in Europe, the change in the EU’s perception of China was rather visible, and for the first time, it was somewhat united. However, just as the scholarly community was forming theories around the EU’s new China policy, the CAI agreement was finalized between the two sides.

Given the EU and China’s thriving trade ties and their highly intermingled economic network, an investment agreement between the two is both, desirable and feasible. However, the deal came at a time when many capitals in Europe were raising growing concerns about Chinese investments ( The Diplomat, 2018) as well as its expansionist tendencies (Hindustan Times, 2020). Moreover, an agreement on a deal as complex and significant as the CAI during a global health crisis sends an indirect message to the world that the EU is only focused on business and has no intentions of transforming its tough dialogue on China into tangible policy change.

Successful ratification of the CAI would have meant that China’s presence in Europe would not only be unassailable, but China would also gain renewed prospects for expansion. However, owing to Beijing’s decision to impose sanctions on ten EU lawmakers, the deal failed to get ratification from the European Parliament (FMPRC, 2021). The European Parliament’s action compels one to question whether the EU is after all quite serious about putting its foot down when necessary and redesigning its China policy.

 

 

Preksha Shree Chhetri is a PhD scholar at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi and a Research Assistant at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. She is also the recipient of the Huayu Enrichment Language Scholarship granted by the Ministry of Education, Taiwan. Her research interests include, EU-China relations, EU-Taiwan relations, EU-India relations, global climate change negotiations, BRI and EU in Central Asia and Africa.

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

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by Solomiya Kharchuk This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

The clash over LGBTQ+ rights between Poland and the European Union has been particularly noticeable in recent years. From this clash, questioning around why Poland and the European Union disagree on the issue of LGBTQ+ rights arises.

I rely on a constructivist approach to social reality, which is based on the idea that the world we dwell in is socially constructed. Accordingly, I build upon the “interpretivist theory of knowledge”. That is to say that I assume interpretation plays a crucial role regarding human action because material items mean nothing on their own. We create meaning through the process of interpretation as well as by using linguistic signs. Hence, another question arises: how do decision-makers from the EU and Poland interpret the issue of LGBTQ+ rights?

As Ronald Holzhacker holds, framing LGBTQ+ rights as a human rights paradigm is necessary in order to achieve a “broader emancipation strategy”. The term “emancipation” is central to the discipline of security studies at Aberystwyth School, and, as stated by Ken Booth, refers to “the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others”. Many actors, including IGOs, NGOs, media and academics, have contributed to the process of framing LGBTQ+ rights in terms of human rights. Their efforts have proven fruitful because the principle of non-discrimination based on sexual orientation is now included in the general framework of human rights. This framework is in turn anchored in ideas of “universality”, “equality” and “non-discrimination”.

In regard to the European Union, with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Charter of Fundamental Rights became an integral part of the EU’s legal framework. In accordance with Article 21 of the Charter, discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited. Furthermore, one of the purposes of the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights is to promote non-discrimination based on sexuality.

However, since 2019, more than 100 municipalities in Poland passed local regulations resulting in their becoming so-called “LGBT-ideology-free zones”. The IGLA Europe reported that in May 2021, Poland received the lowest EU ranking (13,22%) on how the laws and policies of each country impact the lives of LGBTIQ people. Furthermore, the most recent Human Rights Watch Report held that “[t]he government ramped up its attacks on women’s and LGBT rights, part of the government’s increasing hostile rhetoric against what it refers to as “gender ideology””. In 2020, the President of Poland stated the following: “this is just like the Neo-bolshevism (…) they are trying to convince us that these are people, albeit this is nothing else that the ideology (…) if someone has any doubts that it is actually the ideology, examine the pages of history, so you will see how the LGBT movement was being constructed, so you will see how this ideology was being constructed”. In 2021, the chairman of the ruling Law and Justice Party, said the following when asked about the LGBTQ+  community: “as long as we govern [this country], no one will be able to impose anything on us. All the [people] who want to live in a normal world, where a woman is a woman, and a man is a man (…) If we want to live in the society, which refers to obvious things, it is necessary to support our formation”.

In 2020, the President of the European Commission Ursula von den Leyen, stated that “LGBTI-free-zones are humanity-free zones and have no place in our union”. This statement also places an emphasis on a broader issue of human rights in relation to the EU’s external relations. The President of the European Commission also uttered important words about the LGBTQ+ community: “I will not rest when it comes to building a Union of equality. A Union where you can be who you are and love who you want – without fear of recrimination or discrimination. Because being yourself is not your ideology. It’s your identity. And no-one can ever take it away”. Moreover, Ursula von den Leyen unveiled the first-ever European Commission Strategy for LGBTIQ equality (2020-2025) which includes specific goals for the EU, namely, tackling of discrimination against LGBTIQ people, ensuring the community’s safety, building LGBTIQ inclusive societies, and leading the call for LGBTIQ equality around the world. In March, 2021, the European Parliament passed a symbolic resolution, declaring the whole European Union an “LGBTIQ Freedom Zone”.

To summarize, Polish decision makers interpret and represent LGBTQ+ people as a problem and followers of an “ideology” which poses a threat to Polish society. Conversely, European Union decision-makers treat the LGBTQ+ community as people who have the right to their identity. This, in turn, allows one to claim that EU decision-makers represent the LGBTQ+ community following Ken Booth’s explanation of emancipation. In conclusion, the collision between the Polish and EU decision-makers stems from different interpretations and representations of the same people.

 

 

Solomiya Kharchuk is a PhD candidate at the Doctoral College of Political and Administrative Sciences, University of Wroclaw. She holds a Bachelor’s and a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Wroclaw.

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

The post Poland vs. The EU: The “Clash” over LGBTQ+ Rights appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Michał Gulczyński This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

In 2019, Donald Tusk famously said “Europe is a woman,” when arguing for gender parity in top positions in the European Union (EU). Indeed, the EU has been recognized as a leading actor in women’s empowerment and gender equality policy. Gender has been successfully mainstreamed in the communication of the European Commission. In 2018, as many as 14% of the Commission’s press releases mentioned words like gender, women/female or men/male.

Some recent studies suggest that women are more supportive of the EU than men, while opposition to European integration is often linked to the rejection of gender equality and feminism. Therefore, it seems justified to ask whether the EU’s gender equality narratives have the potential of negatively affecting men’s support for the EU.

My analysis of all press releases issued by the Commission since 1985 shows that the Commission mostly talks about men in two situations: when referring to “equality of women and men” or when comparing women to men. Men are very rarely mentioned without reference to women. Every year, around 1-2% of press releases refer to men but not to women. However, in the 1980s, the word “man” was used as a neutral synonym of “human” (“the ordinary man fears that taxes will be too high”), and now, it is often used in the context of “man-made disasters.”

Unfortunately, this change in the image of men is reflected in policies. The latest Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 starts with a chapter on gender-based violence. There, women are presented as victims in need of help, while men are portrayed as perpetrators. As a result, men seem not to deserve any policy  which would have an aim other than that of supporting women.

Men are also portrayed as an uniformly advantaged group, i.e., one with high political power, holding top positions and capital. In contrast, the Gender Equality Strategy underlines women’s struggle for political influence not only in the area of gender equality (within the #MeToo movement), but also in the “push for change” in the field of climate policy.

Importantly, the Gender Equality Strategy mentions intersectionality, but only to state that “[w]omen are a heterogeneous group and may face intersectional discrimination.” Although an intersectional approach might help to discover some dependent groups of men –i.e., men without political power who deserve dedicated public policies, such as less educated single men in rural areas or male refugees– this possibility is discarded by the biased definition. This is in line with the finding that topics such as humanitarian aid and refugees are more frequently found in press releases referring only to women.

It is relatively easy to imagine the consequences of the division between women as a deserving and men as a non-deserving group. Men are not regarded as a potential policy target population.

For example, the Strategy states: “while there are more women university graduates in Europe than men graduates, women remain underrepresented in higher paid professions.” The Commission does not discuss any solutions for the gaps in higher education or digital skills. Those gaps are only mentioned to underline the gaps negatively affecting women. On top of that, and despite realizing that more women than men graduate from university, the Commission denies the existence of the reversed education gender gap: “while the gender gap in education is being closed […].” In the following paragraphs, the Commission proposes targeted programmes only for women. Similarly, the Strategy underlines that “women and men experience gender-specific health risks,” but only reproductive health problems are explicitly mentioned.

In sum, in the last 25 years, gender has become an important part of European Commission’s communication and policies. However, the meaning of gender is limited to the “women-as-victims” frame. The negative image of men as a non-deserving (deviant) and, simultaneously, politically powerful group does not allow any intersectional perspective to be taken in relation to men and their problems. It may also block the possibility of addressing justified needs of the groups of men who have limited political influence. The reversed education gender gap or the life expectancy gender gap are good examples of this. Finally, the perpetuation of such narratives most likely damages the reputation of the European Union among young men who may see it as hostile towards their gender.

 

Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Christian Rauh, who generously shared the dataset of press releases of the European Commission.

 

 

Michał Gulczyński is a PhD student in Public Policy and Administration at the Bocconi University. His main research interest are European integration and the relationships between gender, politics and policies.

Twitter: @gulczynskim

 

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

 

 

The post Europe is a Woman. And What Does She Say about Men? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The past week has seen two important grace periods extended.

These periods have been used in both the TCA and WA to allow the UK and EU enough time to make necessary preparations for full implementation, or that is at least the EU’s line.

The less-remarked of the two has been the granting of data adequacy to the UK’s rules for a four-year period to 28 June 2025, meaning that data can continue to move freely across the border. However, this has come with an unprecedented sunset clause and explicit powers to revoke it should the UK change those rules, which currently remain much as they were during membership.

As such, the discussion about reforming the UK’s regime might well end up bringing adequacy back to the table sooner rather than later.

The more-remarked was yesterday’s confirmation of a three-month extension to the chilled meat products exemption for Northern Ireland (UK declaration and EU response). This is problematic in different ways from data, in that the issue has been a failure by the UK to make conspicuous movement towards full implementation and the concern that this extension might be a prelude to an effort to get a semi-permanent delay to that occurring.

As a result, the EU’s comments on conditions and expectations are worth noting.

In a sense, both cases highlight the difficult road that this relationship is following. The degrading of trust during and following negotiations leads the EU to be very attentive to compliance, even as it makes efforts to avoid looking too inflexible. In that regard, the bundling of the chilled meats extension with other work on flexibility on the Protocol is as important, even if still most promissory.

For the UK, the almost permanently aggravating behaviour of the fist half of 2021 has soften a bit. The decision to ask for the chilled meat extension, rather than just announcing one, counts as a win here. Likewise, the signing of a bilateral agreement with Germany on security points to other paths for showing good faith is possible.

However, this path will be a very long one. There are clear issues with all the remaining grace periods, plus the negotiations and reviews, in the coming six months, not least the operationalising of the new format for fisheries quotas to be completed by New Year.

And that’s not even getting into the end of the application period for EU nationals to acquire Settled Status in the UK and the scope for removals.

One swallow doesn’t make a summer, as they say.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic65

 

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Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage.

Kristin Haugevik and Ole Jacob Sending explain why we still shouldn’t expect to see any profound increase in joint Nordic foreign policy positions and actions – and especially not when it comes to relations with greater powers.

While Nordic officials often speak warmly about more integration and greater unity, they usually prefer individualised – and differentiated – foreign policies in their relations with major powers, most notably the United States. Photo: Stephen Crowley/The New York Times/NTB

In their Vision 2030, the five Nordic states – Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland – aspire to make ‘Norden’ the most integrated region in the world. The vision invokes the longstanding narrative about successful intra-Nordic collaboration, ‘the Nordic peace’ and the Nordic region as a lodestar and role model for other sub-regional groupings.

In recent years, the Nordics have also raised the bar with respect to foreign policy collaboration. ‘The Nordics are a superpower’, claimed Finland’s president in 2016, following a Nordic joint summit with US President Barack Obama. The ensuing year, the Nordic Council published its first international strategy, urging the five governments ‘to exploit the opportunities inherent in Nordic co-operation to a far greater extent’.

The Nordic populations are also supportive: In a 2017 poll, more than 90 percent deemed Nordic cooperation ‘important’ or ‘very important,’ and around two-thirds would like to see increased cooperation.

The recurring message from Nordic officials has been that the five states are stronger when they work together in the international arena. Yet, and as the Nordic states’ largely nationalised management of the Covid-19 pandemic exemplifies, joint visions and ambitions do not necessarily translate into corresponding policies and action.

Nordic repertoire

Why does the ‘Nordic dimension’ not feature more prominently in the everyday foreign policies of the individual Nordic states? Why do we observe that even on seemingly shared objectives – such as on human rights and peace and reconciliation – the Nordics typically pursue distinct foreign policies?

In a recent research article, we address these questions by zooming in on the continued “pull” of the distinctive foreign policy repertoires of each of the five states, and how these repertoires are mobilized as the states seek recognition and support from more powerful states.

Why states go solo when they advocate integration

Following sociologist Charles Tilly’s definition, repertoires can be understood as ‘a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice’.

In the context of foreign policy, repertoires thus summarise the structural constraints, along with self-perceptions, resources, and established routines, which shape what a given state can do, what it knows how to do, and what others expects it to do. Think of it as a foreign policy “culture” or how foreign policy is practiced in a given context.

The explanation is relatively straightforward: In the early Cold War years, the Nordic states’ geopolitical location, war experiences, geographical proximity to and relationship with dominant powers led them to pursue different paths in the formulation of foreign and security policies.

As Arne Olav Brundtland noted in an influential article published more than half a decade ago, the different alliance choices of the five states came to constitute a ‘Nordic balance’, which helped diminish great power tensions in the region as a whole.

In other words: Sweden’s neutrality, Denmark and Norway’s NATO membership and Finland’s Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union served to situate each Nordic state in an institutional setting that balanced between competing concerns.

While the idea of the Nordic balance appeared less relevant as a conceptual lens in the post-Cold War era, we find that it remains important for understanding how, over time, distinct repertoires for how to assess and respond to broader international dynamics emerged in each Nordic state.

Third-order priority

The oft-stated rationale for increased Nordic foreign policy collaboration is that the five states in question share many basic traits and foreign policy objectives. This includes an explicit and steadfast commitment to upholding the ‘rules-based international order’ and its accompanying institutions and belief-systems.

Old barriers to cooperation have also been (partly) removed: Different formal associations with NATO and the EU seem less relevant than before, with Norway and Iceland closely aligned with the EU, and Finland and Sweden entering into formal partnership agreements with NATO.

On the other hand, the individual power repertoires of Nordic states involve not only expertise built up over decades within each foreign service, but also its international networks and reputation in the eyes of other states. This can help to explain why the “Nordic” dimension often remains “a third-order priority” when the individual states manoeuvre their relations with major powers such as the United States, Russia and China.

Standing out from the crowd

But there is also something else going on here: all states – and small states in particular – seek recognition from significant others.

This search for recognition is rational; to be heard and have the ability to influence important decisions, you need to be invited, listened to, and bring something to the table. To succeed in this recognition game and secure access to more powerful states, there is often a premium on differentiating yourself from your neighbour, even when you share the same foreign policy objectives.

While often advocating the Nordic brand, the Nordic states are at the same time competing for attention, visibility, and influence.

In the quest for recognition from significant others, therefore, there is a not insignificant element of the ‘narcissism of small differences’ involved: While often advocating the Nordic brand when they meet on the international scene, the Nordic states are at the same time competing for attention, visibility, and influence.

The best example would perhaps be the Nordic states’ relations with significant other states – and most notably the United States. Seeking access to policymakers in Washington, Denmark has for example foregrounded its ‘super-Atlanticism,’ while Norway has built a brand around its proficiency in peace and reconciliation.

Going informal

Because of these niche strategies of each Nordic state, there are few indications that a discernible or overarching ‘Nordic’ foreign policy is in the making.

While Nordic officials often speak warmly about the potential for more integration and greater unity, the five states usually prefer individualised – and differentiated – foreign policies in their relations with major powers.

To the extent that a ‘common Nordic order’ exists, it is characterised by low-key practices for coordination and information exchange, practical and technical collaboration, rather than by bold foreign policy statements, shared positions and policies.

Faced with a rising China, an assertive Russia or a rapidly evolving global pandemic, the Nordic states will willingly exchange views and information. However, when carving out responses, they will in most cases prefer to draw on their national foreign policy repertoire rather than a joint Nordic one.

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Inga Ulnicane

Science has traditionally been one of the most international activities. Long before political and economic European integration started in the mid-20th century, researchers were collaborating and exchanging knowledge across national and organisational borders. During the past decades, international research collaboration has increased due to a number of processes internal and external to science such as increasing complexity and specialization of research, interdisciplinarity, need to address Grand societal challenges, increasing costs as well as institutional and policy incentives and funding schemes such as the European Union’s (EU) Framework Programme for funding research and innovation.

As international research collaboration has been increasing and more national and EU public funds are being invested to facilitate it, questions of how, when and why such collaborations work and do not work become increasingly relevant. How, why and by whom are collaborators chosen? How the aims and topics of collaborations are defined? And how are collaborations organized? These are some of the topics that I address in my recent publication Self-Organisation and Steering in International Research Collaborations (Ulnicane 2021). My contribution is part of an edited volume Community and Identity in Contemporary Technosciences (Kastenhofer and Molyneux-Hodgson 2021) which benefited from discussions and exchanges at the workshop in Vienna in 2017.

My chapter in this volume builds on my longer term research on international scientific collaborations and extensive empirical research including analysis of scientific publications, organisational, project and CV data as well as 61 interviews and 31 site visits to research institutes in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom (Ulnicane 2015).

 

Arranged marriages & old boys’ networks

While international research collaborations are often seen as something positive and desirable, they can also have more problematic aspects such as those related to power dynamics and funding pressures.

Increased funding and support for collaborations from the EU, national agencies and universities can face some backlash when it comes with instructions with whom and how to collaborate prioritizing certain countries, organizations and topics. Researchers often seen such conditions attached to funding as ‘arranged marriages’ or even ‘forced marriages’ that require them to collaborate with partners who are not scientifically the most interesting and relevant ones. They see it as an interference and argue that it leads to ‘artificial networks’ brought together by funding and institutional requirements rather than intrinsic scientific motivations.

A strong dislike among many researchers towards policies that lead to ‘arranged marriages’ sometimes make them nostalgic about ‘good old times’ which are remembered as providing scientists with a lot of freedom to choose their collaborators as well as topics and modes of collaboration. This nostalgia is characterised by a sentiment that ‘scientists know best’ how to collaborate among themselves, while policy-makers and administrators would do best not to interfere apart from providing unconditional support for such endeavours, in particular if they are scientifically productive.

While this approach might have indeed produced interesting scientific results on many occasions, it has not been unproblematic. One well-known problem is that many scientists prefer to collaborate with partners similar to themselves leading to creation of ‘old boys’ networks’ that exclude women and researchers of other ethnic and racial origin. While supporters of free collaborations claim that they are only interested in most scientifically relevant partners, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that collaborator choice can also be based on stereotypes about who is perceived as competent.

 

Beyond ‘good self-organisation’ and ‘bad steering’

My research on international research collaboration (Ulnicane 2015; 2021) suggests that in productive collaborations self-organisation and steering can interact and even reinforce each other when expansion of self-organised networks is supported by funding which encourages diversity in terms of disciplines, nationalities and gender. Rather than seeing self-organisation as always good for collaboration and steering as counterproductive, both of them have their advantages and disadvantages. Self-organisation can offer a lot of scientific freedom in choosing partners, topics and modes of collaboration but it can also suffer from limited network and resources. Steering can come with conditions and compromises as well as with heavy administration but it can provide resources for growth and opportunities to learn from new and unusual collaborators. It is important how these different factors interact in a way that is reinforcing and productive rather than hampering and hindering for collaborations.

While it is important to understand and observe dynamics of self-organisation and steering and their interaction, there are many other things to consider when examining collaborations. Rather than assuming that collaborations are good and coming up with simple recipes, it is crucial to reflect carefully when and what kind of international research collaboration can achieve certain purposes. And when it might also be necessary to provide a space for individual research that involves closer or looser interactions with relevant scientific communities.

Dr. Inga Ulnicane is working on science, technology and innovation governance, politics and policy. Her publications and commissioned reports focus on topics such as Artificial Intelligence, dual use, Grand societal challenges, and European integration in research and innovation.

 

References:

Kastenhofer K. and Molyneux-Hodgson S. (eds) (2021) Community and Identity in Contemporary Technosciences. Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, vol 31. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61728-8

Ulnicane I. (2021) Self-Organisation and Steering in International Research Collaborations. In: Kastenhofer K., Molyneux-Hodgson S. (eds) Community and Identity in Contemporary Technosciences. Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, vol 31. Springer, Cham. pp.107-125 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61728-8_5

Ulnicane, I. (2015) Why do international research collaborations last? Virtuous circle of feedback loops, continuity and renewal. Science and Public Policy 42(4): 433–447 https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scu060

 

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by Lukas Spielberger This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

The European Central Bank (ECB) is a strange creature. Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it has been a supranational EU institution that is jointly owned by all member states. But when it comes to its policy tasks, it acts mostly as the central bank of the Euro Area. As I show in a , these two roles can conflict with one another and the ECB’s choice of which one to take more seriously is mostly the result of its internal politics.

I compared the ECB’s credit lines to central banks from member states outside the Euro Area (like Denmark or Hungary) during the Global Financial crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. In both instances, several central banks reached out to the ECB and requested support to be able to stabilise their financial markets. Intriguingly, the ECB did not treat all requests the same way and allowed some central banks to borrow at better conditions than others.

A clear economic rationale exists for applying different credit conditions.   lines, the most common instrument, are secured against nothing but trust in the borrower’s ability to repay; repos, by contrast, protect the lender against losses, but are less useful for the borrowers. If the ECB acted as the Euro Area’s central bank, we might expect that it sets lending terms based on the technical merits of both instruments. This would mean that it demands tougher borrowing conditions from member states with weaker sovereign credit ratings to reduce the financial risks to its own balance sheet.

In 2008, sovereign credit risk indeed seemed to have been the ECB’s main consideration. Sweden and Denmark – two member states with perfect credit ratings – received swaps, while Hungary, Latvia, and Poland (all of which had lower ratings) could only borrow under more stringent terms. Additional interview evidence confirms that the ECB rejected the Hungarian request for a swap line primarily due to opposition from its Economics department because of concerns regarding credit risk. As Eastern European members states faced financial meltdowns, the ECB was primarily concerned with limiting its own liability.

But in 2020, the ECB seemed less worried about credit ratings alone. Croatia and Bulgaria received swap lines, even though they had the same weak credit ratings as Hungary and Romania, to which the ECB only provided repos. Why did the ECB seemingly put aside its worries about financial risks for only two countries during the COVID-19 crisis?

To understand this shift I argue that we have to look more closely at the ECB in its role as supranational EU institution. As such it has a special relationship with that want to enter the Euro Area. Before a member state can adopt the euro as its official currency, it has to spend at least two years in an exchange rate arrangement called the ERM II, where it promises to keep its exchange rate relatively fixed to the euro. All member states except Denmark are legally obliged to adopt the euro eventually. But several Eastern European member states have delayed this process by not joining the ERM II.

What set Croatia and Bulgaria apart in 2020 was that they were on the cusp of joining the ERM II and had solid macroeconomic records to back up their decisions. Nevertheless during the overall financial market panic, their currencies were suddenly attacked by speculators and failure to defend their exchange rates would have delayed their ERM II entry. By backing up both central banks through swap lines, the ECB, however, sent an unequivocal sign that speculation was futile. Consequently, the market pressures dissipated immediately after the credit lines were announced. In the summer of 2020, the entry of Croatia and Bulgaria into the ERM II was fast-tracked and now both countries are one step closer to Euro Area membership. By contrast, Romania’s ERM II entry is not anticipated before 2024 and it remains doubtful that Hungary will ever want to follow.

The ECB’s proactive and informal support for Euro Area aspirants contrasts with its disciplinarian stance during the 2008 financial crisis in Latvia. Back then, Latvia participated in the ERM II and wanted to adopt the euro rapidly but found itself so close to devaluing its currency that it had to request a sovereign bailout from the EU and the IMF. Although the ECB was also opposed to devaluation, it explicitly prohibited the Latvian central bank from using its credit line to prop up the exchange rate. As an ERM II participant, Latvia supposedly had to show that it could withstand such shocks on its own. An internal document (which the ECB disclosed after a public access request) spells out its rationale back in November 2008: “the ECB’s policy line has always been that […] unilateral pegs by third countries are not backed in any way by policy commitments from the ECB”.

The ECB’s policy towards Euro Area outsiders, clearly, has come a long way over the past twelve years. In 2008, its overarching goal was to protect its own balance sheet, while choosing a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the ERM II. Last year, the ECB acted more flexibly by supporting aspiring EMU members against currency speculators, apparently irrespective of their credit ratings or institutional obligations. It seems that  the ECB has widened its focus from monetary policy considerations of the Euro Area to a more political logic related to its role as a supranational institution.

To understand the ECB’s reinterpretation of its role as an EU institution and international currency issuer, I rely on literature about international organisations that stresses  changes in leadership are drivers of policy change. Back in 2008, the ECB paid little attention to developments in EU member states outside the Euro Area . Its Executive Board back then was stuffed with career central bankers who held orthodox views on how politically central banks should operate. One Board Member summed up this thinking at the height of the crisis in January 2009 by asserting that “[t]he ECB cannot be a small god for everyone or everything”.

Since then, the ECB has developed its awareness of the political significance of its actions. The current Governor, Christine Lagarde is not just the first female ECB Governor, but also the first one to never have worked in a central bank before. But as a former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, she brings a wealth of experience in dealing with the politics of international organizations during financial crises. For instance, when the crisis called for it, Lagarde knew that a widely with the Bulgarian prime minister would send a strong sign of confidence.

The question whether the ECB is acting too independently from its original mission is currently of concern to many scholars of European integration. A recent piece argues that by taking decisions based on political, rather than technical considerations, the ECB is overstepping its mandate and becoming politicised. But in the realm of international cooperation, it is difficult to point to an easy way out because the ECB may have to balance conflicting imperatives as EU institution and Euro Area central bank. Though its policy in 2008 has been severely criticised, its more politically considerate course of action in 2020 likewise highlights potential legitimacy problems. The ECB seems to be stuck in a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ situation.

I conclude that future scholarship should pay closer attention to the ECB’s internal politics in order to understand its policy decisions in such ambiguous situations. After all, the ECB was originally made independent to shield it from political pressures. If its role as an EU institution requires it to also take into account political considerations, a new rationale might be needed.

 

Lukas Spielberger is a third-year PhD candidate at Leiden University and a UACES Scholar 2021. In his doctoral research, he studies the cooperation between central banks across Europe during the financial crisis in 2008/09. His wider interests concern EU macroeconomic governance, international central bank cooperation, and the role of the financial sector in national growth models.

 

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

The post What can ECB credit lines to central banks tell us about European Integration? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

by Carles Ferreira Torres This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

In 2017, the parliament of Catalonia (Spain) unsuccessfully declared the region’s independence after several years of intense secessionist politics. Three years before the Catalan bid for independence, the Scottish people had voted to remain in the UK in a referendum on the constitution. After Brexit, however, this issue is far from settled. Movements of sovereignty are also found in Flanders (Belgium) or the Basque Country (Spain). Although some authors had held that nationalism was a phenomenon of the past that would disappear with globalisation, Europe is living instead an “age of secession” or, at least, an age of secessionist politics.

In democracies, due to the importance of persuading voters for movements to achieve their goals, discourse emerges as a crucial variable with enough potential to trigger radical constitutional change. This post contributes to our understanding of secessionist discourse by outlining how minority nationalist parties frame secession, namely, how they describe and justify independence. In my research, I have identified four main frames that are always present in pro-independence parties’ propaganda: the sense of acting on behalf of a distinct community or nation (communitarian component), the mobilisation around perceived grievances against the host state (remedial component), the desirability of being ruled by themselves (self-government component) and the achievement of sovereignty as means of accomplishing several policy goals such as improving people’s lives (instrumental component).

Regarding the former, secessionist parties always claim to act on behalf of a distinct human group that lives in a perceived Homeland, namely, a nation. This group is allegedly different from the rest of the population of the host state. An example of this situation would be the case of the Scots in the UK or the Catalans in Spain. Therefore, the minority nation they claim to represent is the “imagined community” around which the case for independence is built, that is to say, Scotland or Catalonia – following the same example. Hence, the first strand of discourse stresses nationhood or the existence of a group with an “encompassing culture” as the source that legitimates secession: “we are a nation; therefore, we deserve independence”. Following this rationale, independence is the “normal” state for nations in the world.

However, this distinct human group would have few reasons to undertake the risks of creating its own polity if its current situation were satisfactory. To put it in other words: if the union were positive for the minority group, there would be no need for them to secede. Therefore, a discourse around constructed or perceived grievances is also always present: nationalist entrepreneurs try to mobilise the population through a “distancing rhetoric” from the host state. Achieving statehood would remedy the mistreatment exerted by the central authorities against the minority group. In European democracies, secessionist parties tend to advance “soft” remedial arguments for independence based on an unequal distribution of power, resources, and/or status. it is typical for nationalist parties to complain about the “fiscal plundering” against their region, the inadequate protection of the local language and culture or the central government’s encroachment on regional powers.

Thirdly, the desirability of achieving sovereignty or self-government as opposed to foreign or alien rule also underlies all the movements seeking self-determination. This discourse is the pure “independentist” argument for secession: it will always be preferable to be ruled by ourselves than to be ruled by others. Pro-independence parties state that their group is a permanent minority within the established polity, leading to a feeling of statelessness. In this regard, the minority will never control the state’s apparatus, and thus the majority-alien group owns the tools for ruling the secessionist community. As opposed to this, pro-independence activists argue that the policy decisions over the targeted group – including the decisions around its constitutional future – must be taken by this group, and not by the alien larger community.

Finally, all secessionist movements give their targeted population instrumental reasons to convince them to support independence. Therefore, attaining statehood is a means of obtaining particular goals in one or more policy areas: preserving the group’s culture, boosting the economy, improving the welfare system, etc. From this point of view, sovereignty would simply be the means of building a better country and improve people’s lives – thus, not simply a way to address grievances. As the Scottish government stated before the 2014 referendum campaign, “Scotland is not oppressed, and we have no need to be liberated. Independence matters because we do not have to powers to reach our potential”.

To summarise, we have seen that secessionist parties advance four main arguments to persuade people of the benefits of independence – based on identity and nationhood, grievances, self-government, and policy goals. The next question surrounds the combination of these arguments in independence parties’ propaganda platforms. Preliminary research shows that, maybe counter-intuitively, secessionist parties increasingly focus on the “material” benefits of independence by providing arguments based on improving people’s lives. Conversely, identity and nationhood, although present, are less prevalent in their discourse. Further research should explore why “ethnic entrepreneurs” such as minority nationalist parties do not stress identity-based arguments when making the case for constitutional change. The next developments in places such as Catalonia or Scotland will provide more clues to understand how these actors behave. What we know for sure is that, in Europe, secessionist politics is here to stay.

 

Carles Ferreira Torres is a Political Scientist, Assistant Lecturer and PhD Candidate in Comparative Politics at the University of Kent. He studies Territorial Politics, Nationalism and Political Parties.

Twitter: @carlesferreira

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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For me, it was the morning after that I remember most vividly.

An early train to London left me wandering into Parliament Square at too-early-o’clock to hunt down the Radio5Live tent on College Green, to sit with Adrian Chiles for a few hours while he interviewed some of the many passing politicians about the result of the referendum.

I remember it a bit because Adrian was very generous in sharing his biscuits, but much more because of what I saw unfolding around me.

Almost to a person, everyone looked as if there had been an explosion and they were now staggering through the dust, trying to work out what had happened. Leavers as much as Remainers carried a look of those who weren’t entirely sure what whether this was real or not, a figment of their fevered imaginations.

And more than this.

There was a vague sense in the air that if this was so, then what else might be possible? For a while, everything seemed uncertain, nothing was fixed. As a good Gen Xer, I was put in mind of Ice Magic: the hard shell of our political institutions being lifted off to reveal a rapidly-melting polity.

No, I hadn’t slept much.

Throughout the 24th, I kept coming back to this strange place, simultaneously fearing that no-one else knew what came next and hoping that no-one did, that they might come up with something calamitous.

But no one did. Just a trail of resignations, of sheepish press conferences, of hours, then days, of drift. Very soon it became clear that no one had really, truly, properly prepared for this.

And this has been the leitmotif of the past five years: an aftermath, a picking up of the pieces, with no sense of whether to whip out the superglue or to stick the mess in the bin.

Ultimately, the referendum was a decision without a rationale or a reason. That’s not wrong – unlike some, I’m not here to call out the quality of the debate beforehand – but it is problematic.

Whatever relationship the UK wants with the EU, it will not be secured in the way that it has been pursued since 2016. The British approach has been driven by what is not wanted, rather than by any coherent sense of what should be, and why it should be so.

My hope in 2013 had been that Cameron’s offer of an in-out referendum might trigger a careful national discussion about such things, although I’ll profess to being dubious it would happen until that offer came good.

My hope in 2015, after the general election, was that now would be the time.

My hope in 2016, after the referendum, was that this was now essential, ahead of any negotiations.

And my hope now, after all my previous hopes have been dashed, is that one positive consequence of the tortured process we’ve undergone is that the case of trying to build an inclusive project for the UK is now easier to make.

Maybe I’m too optimistic on that front, but I do know that I’ll keep on trying to help people make sense of the issues and the options, so that we can work towards a new, stable and resilient relationship with the EU.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic84

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Analyses of EU transparency traditionally focus on its legal development with little attention to informality. In such accounts, the Council of the EU is routinely understood as an obstructionist force blocking the expansion of transparency, only to be strong-armed into concessions by external pressure. However, in the Environment Council, a formation of the Council of the EU, transparency policy developed quite differently. Here, the Council actively promoted the expansion of rule-based transparency, while NGOs hardly made use of these legal transparency rights. A close analysis suggests that informality –often dismissed as anomalous or overlooked outright–  takes a central place in explaining this peculiar development.

EU transparency, when conceived as a formal policy, consists of a framework of rules and their implementation. Among the rules, Regulation 1049/2001 on access to the institutions’ documents counts as the central piece of legislation. In the area of environmental policy, the Environment Council went further, with the EU signing up to the UN-sponsored Aarhus Convention, which eventually led to Regulation 1367/2006. This lex specialis, which created a more expansive EU environmental information regime, was adopted without noticeable member state resistance. Most observers, both inside the Council and outside of it, agree that the Environment Council implements these rules faithfully and without undue restrictions, especially when compared to other Council formations. Yet while environmental NGOs (ENGOs) lobbied hard to expand formal transparency rights, they themselves made limited use of them.

 

Too good to be true?

Based on what we know of the Council’s transparency-sceptical attitude in other policy contexts, as well as ENGOs’ emphasis on transparency, the ‘dormancy’ of a highly developed Environment Council transparency policy is counterintuitive. My recent article argues that the explanation lies in informal norms which the Environment Council and its members mobilise to ‘repair’ elements in the formal transparency framework that they consider either too restrictive or too lenient from the perspective of transparency. As Helmke and Levitsky argue in a seminal publication, to properly understand formal policy frameworks, they must be regarded in light of their interplay with informal solutions. By filling remaining gaps, compensating shortcomings, buffering impacts, or purely contradicting, informal norms can take a structural character that fundamentally alters –or even brackets– the functioning of formal rules. Studying transparency policies without considering the informal norms’ bearing on them will render such policy incomprehensible or provide a grossly distorted picture.

Informality thus serves as a response to certain aspects of transparency rules. In the context of the Environment Council, chiefly three scenarios are imaginable in this respect. First, the Environment Council could perceive a need to balance formal transparency requirements against efficiency needs. This would primarily undermine transparency rules, to the benefit of confidentiality. Second, the Council could subordinate formal transparency duties to functional requirements, tailoring information sharing to its needs at every stage of the decision-making process. This would not result in outright information suppression, but in the strategic timing of disclosure. Third, informal norms could be volatile, as different member states seek to institutionalise informal norms to varying, changing ends. This would translate into informal norm conflict and, for ENGOs, information venue shopping.

 

Playing beyond the rules

A close analysis shows that informal norms indeed have a major impact on the way in which the Environment Council approaches its formal transparency obligations. Informality does not always limit access to information. For instance, several environmental affairs ministries maintain close contacts with their nationally based ENGOs about ongoing Council legislation, while at the European level, a representative has traditionally been invited to participate on behalf of the ENGO community in the half-yearly informal Environment Council meeting. Some member states even go as far as to engage in the unauthorised sharing of documents with stakeholders, or leaking them to the press. All these activities serve to expand access to information beyond, or even against, what the rules allow, although mostly for privileged groups of outsiders, and often for politically strategic, rather than transparency-promoting ends.

At the same time, various informal norms also limit access to Environment Council information. One of these is the so-called ‘limite’ label, an informal document classification which prevents (legislative) documents from being directly disclosed or shared with outsiders, as well as the internal agreement to withholding the identity of member states suggesting amendments when disclosing documents concerning ongoing legislative negotiations. After this latter practice was struck down by the Court of Justice, the Council decided to leave references to member states out of the document altogether. A different situation occurred with respect to so-called trilogue negotiations, which were originally conceived to create an informal legislative negotiating space between the Council and the Parliament beyond the reach of the transparency rules. Ever since the Court of Justice struck also this legal interpretation down, both institutions have de facto been breaking the rules by continuing this secretive practice.

 

Governing informally: a volatile affair

Searching for patterns in the above-described informal norms for regulating access to information in the Environment Council, it soon becomes clear that they do not fully match with the first two of the above-described scenarios. Some balancing informality occurs, but remains relatively rare due to member states’ wide divergence on the question how much informal transparency suppression is acceptable. Informal transparency norms also follow to some extent functional patterns, with different norms applying to different stages of the decision-making process. In this regard however, it is unclear why ENGOs should be involved in Environment Council meetings. Both scenarios moreover fail to explain the very preponderant practice of document leaking. It would seem that document leaks serve as a ‘release valve’ from the information control created by the formal transparency rules and informal norms.

The empirical picture shows most congruence with the volatility scenario. This scenario places the emphasis on change and incoherence in the Environment Council’s informal handling of the transparency question. Developments such as the 2004 EU enlargement, and two transparency court cases that rendered previously ambiguous norms explicitly illegal, did indeed alter interactions within the Environment Council and between member states and ENGOs, leading to revisions in informal responses. Conflicting but simultaneously operating norms such as transparency suppression through the ‘limite’ label and document sharing through member states moreover highlight that such revised norms were underpinned by clashing motives between different actors in the Environment Council.

In sum, the informal aspect of Environment Council transparency policy clearly paints the formal legal access regime in a different light. Various informal norms allow the Environment Council to ‘repair’ transparency rules where the member states consider them difficult to cope with. This helps to explain why the Environment Council has not proved very reluctant to expand formal transparency rights over time. Informal limits on formal transparency rights also explain ENGOs’ limited reliance on these rights: for the purpose of advocacy, they offer too little, too late. Instead, ENGOs walk informal roads in search of useful policy information related to Environment Council decision making. The fact that they often find insiders willing to informally provide them with such information illustrates that contesting notions of ‘repairing the rules’ are prevalent in the Environment Council.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Access to Environmental Information in the EU: A Great Policy No-One Needs?”

Maarten Hillebrandt is postdoctoral researcher at the Eric Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki (@intlaw_eci). His research interests include government transparency policy and governance of the Council of the EU. Maarten is a member of the Standing Committee of Experts on International, Refugee and Criminal Law (@ComMeijers).

Twitter: @mzhill

 

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In current international climate governance many eyes are on the EU and China as two of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Since the Trump administration announced the US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement their relationship in the climate realm has changed considerably. But how do they view their own roles as ‘partners for the planet’? Julia Gurol and Anna Starkmann analyze this question from a role theoretical perspective. They argue that EU-China relations bear a lot of potential for closer collaboration on climate issues.

With the global pandemic ravaging economies worldwide, questions of climate change and how to address it, have slightly got out of focus. Yet, with the upcoming Conference of the Parties (COP) in the UK, the adverse effects of the deteriorating climate are brought back to the table of international negotiations and discussions. In that context, all eyes are on China. As one of the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, a rising power yet also a still developing economy, the People’s Republic plays a crucial role that might determine the failure or success of many international climate measures. Ever since the Trump administration announced the withdrawal of the US from the 2015 Paris Agreement (PA), China’s role in international climate governance has been brought to the fore. Together with the EU, China had been eager to fill the resulting leadership vacuum left by the US in 2017. The two major emitters reaffirmed their commitment to the PA and intensified their cooperation on climate change. Despite prevailing tensions in other policy fields, EU-China climate cooperation has evolved over time from rather technical to high-level political cooperation. In our article, we discuss the complex relationship between the EU and China in international climate governance and seek to answer the question of how they view their own roles and responsibilities to combat climate change. In a nutshell, we argue that none of the two can tackle this issue unilaterally and that therefore, they have become new ‘partners for the planet’ – albeit with a complicated relationship.

 

Role-theory as a useful approach to climate cooperation between the EU and China

Applying role-theory to the analysis of this relationship helps us to identify three things. First, we can shed light on how the EU and China regard themselves as actors in international climate governance. This is called ‘self-conception’. Second, we can identify the external expectations of other actors concerning how the EU and China should navigate in international climate governance. And last but not least, role-theory helps to uncover the changes of these self-conceptions and expectations over time and therefore also to explain the changing relationship between the EU and China. In short: by using this approach, we seek to take into account both external factors as well as the actors’ positions and thoughts.

 

The roles of the EU and China from Copenhagen to the US withdrawal from the PA

EU-China climate relations are heavily influenced by critical events in global climate politics.  Specifically, we identify three events that contributed to the recent increase in climate cooperation and a development from technical towards political cooperation, despite the overall political constraints in EU-China relations: the 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen, the PA in 2015, and the US’ announced withdrawal from the PA in 2017.

How did these events shape the roles of the EU and China in climate governance? The EU has considered itself a leader since the beginning of international climate cooperation. It has asserted its normative power status by a strategy of “leading by example” and advocating for strong international rules and binding agreements. However, the 2009 COP in Copenhagen revealed a discrepancy between the EU’s self-conception as unilateral leader and external role expectations and recognitions. At this conference parties failed to agree on a follow-up agreement for the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU was sidelined in the negotiations. Consequently, the EU had to adapt its role performance. It became a “leadiator”, a combination of a leader and a mediator, actively building bridges between other actors.

China, on the other hand, has long understood its own role as that of a developing country, with the right to economic growth and development, and hence claimed a “right to emit”. Consequently, it placed the responsibility to mitigate climate change and curb emissions exclusively on the historical culprits for climate change, i.e. the US, Europe, and other highly industrialized nations. While China still makes strategic use of this weak power face, China has since the run-up to the PA undergone a tremendous role change, towards a more proactive policy creator, willing to accept responsibility and peak its emissions. This role change was affected by ambiguous internal role conceptions between developing country role and great power aspirations as well as clashing external expectations to play an active role as the world’s largest emitter of CO2 emissions since 2006.

Consequently, the first critical juncture was the 2009 COP, which led to a to a role adaption of the EU role towards a bridge-builder supplementing its leadership claims in international climate governance. The second critical event was the PA, which became possible due to the of role change of China from a policy-taker or even policy-negator towards a policy-maker in climate change. The third critical juncture was the US’s withdrawal from the PA, which created a leadership vacuum, opening a window of opportunity for the EU and China to readjust their positions in the international climate governance system and fostered EU-China cooperation.

 

Conclusion and Outlook

In short, we argue that internal role conceptions influence the behaviour of the EU and China in international negotiations and bilateral cooperation. Also, conflicts between different self-perceptions of actors (the conflict between China’s developing country and major power role) or between internal conceptions and external expectations (the EU’s international leader role conception, which turned out not to be widely shared in Copenhagen and external expectations on China as major emitter that stood in contrast to China’s self-conception as developing country) led to a change in role performance.

Thereby, the roles of the EU and China have become more compatible which led to increased cooperation efforts in the realm of climate change. However, this does not mean there are no disagreements between the two actors. While the 2019 EU Strategic Outlook on China underlines the need for cooperation between the EU and China because the “partnership is essential for the success of global climate action”, there is also criticism of China’s investments in coal energy and a clear call to swiftly peak its emissions. This implies that the EU is unsure whether China lives up to its role as a leader.

What can we expect from EU-China relations in the realm of climate policy looking forward? With the European Green Deal, the EU firmly reaffirmed its role conception as a global leader. The communication also expressed the EU’s ambition to reinforce bilateral cooperation and explicitly pointed to opportunities for strengthening the partnership with China. Thus, much hints at deepening ties in the future despite existing disagreements. Accordingly, the EU and China could indeed be new partners for the planet when it comes to mitigating the adverse effects of climate change. The future will show whether the US under the new Biden administration, who has already announced to re-enter the agreement, will join this partnership or alter the EU-China relationship on climate issues.

 

This blog post draws on JCMS article, “New Partners for the Planet? The European Union and China in International Climate Governance from a Role-Theoretical Perspective.”

Dr Julia Gurol is a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the Chair for International Relations at Freiburg University. Her research focuses on global governance in the Global South, EU-China (security relations), Chinese foreign policy and transregional authoritarian practices.

Twitter: @JuliaGurol

 

Anna Starkmann’s research focuses on international climate and environmental governance, EU external climate policy, regional organizations and comparative regionalism.

Twitter: @anna_starkm

 

 

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Will Berlin finally acknowledge that economics is a social science and not theology?

Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the Bundestag. Photos: Baris Seckin/Abaca/NTB & Gregor Fischer/DPA/NTB 

How to escape the pandemic?

For some – the Italians Mario Draghi and Paolo Gentiloni or the French Emmanuel Macron and Thierry Breton – the pandemic has called into question the previous economic policy equilibria and so they are asking for the promotion of a new fiscal governance model.

For others – the Germans Wolfgang Schäuble and Olaf Scholz or the Latvian Valdis Dombrovskis – the pandemic has produced a headlong (and necessary) rise in public debt which, nonetheless, must be brought back within the confines of the previous fiscal policy model as soon as possible.

The outcome of this stand-off will define the future of the European Union.

Future of the SGP

The pandemic has highlighted the inadequacy of the “Maastricht compromise”. This is based on the centralisation of monetary policy and the decentralisation of fiscal policies which are then subject to the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The limitations of this compromise were already clear in the euro crisis in the last decade, a crisis which led to an unprecedented division among the member states of the Eurozone.

The pandemic has necessitated the suspension of the SGP. To respond to its devastating impact, all the European states had to enact a sharp rise in public spending, with monetary cover guaranteed by the European Central Bank. Above all, the pandemic required the promotion of the Next Generation EU (NG-EU) program financed by European fiscal resources, with which to support recovery in those same states.

These changes inevitably provoked a debate on the future of the SGP. Speaking at question time in the Chamber of Deputies on 11 May, Mario Draghi stated:

I want to be very clear. There is no question that the SGP rules will have to change (…) my position is that the current rules are inadequate, they were already inadequate, and they are even more so as we come out of the pandemic. We will have to focus on strong growth to ensure the sustainability of the public accounts.

A theory of moral hazard

On the other hand, Wolfgang Schäuble, the current President of the Bundestag and former minister for economy and finance, continues to be concerned only about stability. In an article published on 16 April in Project Syndicate (later published by Gavi and others), the German politician firmly stated that “maintaining competitiveness and a sustainable fiscal policy are the responsibility of member states”, adding “I have often spoken about that kind of moral hazard with Mario Draghi…and we always agree” on this point, “given the structure of the Economic and Monetary Union”.

So, the SGP can be temporarily suspended, but must then return to normal operation. Maybe with some addition, according to the Social Democratic Minister Olaf Scholz, such as the current program which helps states combat domestic unemployment.

The compass directing Wolfgang Schäuble’s approach (and that of much of the German traditional establishment) is the theory of “moral hazard”. According to this theory, monetary union among states which differ from each other (in terms of their economic and institutional capacity) will inevitably create negative incentives (if not properly regulated), since some states may spend more than they have available, thus transferring their debts to the other states.

Hamiltonian moment

For Wolfgang Schäuble, this theory even underpins American fiscal federalism. In his article, Schäuble returns to 1792, when the then US Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton set up a federal fund to take over the debt taken on by states (to support the war of independence against Great Britain) on specific conditions:

All 13 US states were required to deposit good collateral, practice budgetary discipline, and reduce their debts. Persistent deficit sinners were put into structured insolvency to prevent moral hazard at the expense of the more frugal states. That external constraint on fiscal policy – and not the mutualization of individual states’ debts, which is occasionally recommended for the EU – was the crux of the oft-cited “Hamiltonian moment”.

Note the use of terms such as “state sinners”, “moral hazard”, “frugal states” to describe the American debate in 1792.

In short, the SGP introduced in Europe at the end of the 20th century is nothing more than a copy of what was done in America at the end of the 18th century.

… or is it?

Unfortunately, that’s not quite right. The “Hamiltonian moment” did not result in the formation of a system of federal rules to bind the budget policies of federated states, but rather it saw the creation of fiscal power that was independent from the federal centre (as argued by Jonathan A. Rodden).

It could not have been otherwise, given that the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which was introduced in 1791, prevents any federal interference in matters which are the responsibility of the states and are not delegated to the federal centre. This is seen also by the fact that the states continued to spend beyond their budgets, with the result that several of them went bankrupt in the 1830s and1840s.

This time, however, the American federal centre did not intervene to take responsibility for their debts but left it to the financial markets to regulate their budget policies. Consequently, many states introduced laws to keep their accounts in balance and therefore to reassure lenders. At the same time, however, the federal centre was driven to intervene indirectly in struggling states, through the federal budget. Starting from the 1930s, this model has been fully institutionalised.

The pandemic has shown that, in a union of states, fiscal policy cannot be an exclusive national responsibility.

Therefore, the American fiscal model is based on a division of responsibility between Washington D.C. and state capitals. The latter are responsible for the use of their fiscal resources (to the extent that they are free to fail), the federal centre has available autonomous fiscal resources to be used anti-cyclically or for support (in struggling states).

The “Hamiltonian moment” started the construction of the federal centre’s fiscal capacity, not some kind of SGP ahead of its time. America has never experienced the fiscal regulation system adopted by Europe. Looking for legitimatisation in Hamilton in order to offer up the SGP once again for post-pandemic Europe highlights German culture’s fixation for stability regardless of time, space and costs.

No saints or sinners

In short, the pandemic has shown that, in a union of states, fiscal policy cannot be an exclusive national responsibility, as claimed by Wolfgang Schäuble, Olaf Scholz and the German traditional establishment. The supranational centre must also have its own fiscal sovereignty to produce European public goods, as argued instead by Mario Draghi, Emmanuel Macron, and important European commissioners such as Paolo Gentiloni and Thierry Breton.

Indeed, NG-EU has the potential to create a limited fiscal capacity for Brussels, independent from financial transfers (with their related conditions) from member states. Through the NG-EU investments it is possible to create the conditions for growth of national economies – especially those economies hardest hit by the pandemic – a necessary condition to make national public debts sustainable in the medium term.

The post-pandemic EU would require a new fiscal governance for accommodating differences between member states, none of which is saint or sinner. Is there anyone in Berlin who is finally willing to acknowledge that economics is a social science and not theology?

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The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Eastern Partnership are key strategic policy frameworks for European Union external action. However, after little effective transformation and many unanticipated consequences, the EU admitted in 2015 that its once prized policy was overly ambitious. In response, it was scaled back to an incentivized reward mechanism for good government behavior, yet unfulfilled promises remain. Now, the Eastern Partnership countries are rethinking the original EU-led partnership framework in favor of a balanced, mutual cooperation that amplifies their voices in their diverse and evolving region.

Ex-Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker with president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. Photo: Etienne Ansotte

Grandiose and unattainable ambitions are (hopefully) left in the past

After unexpected challenges, the European Union (EU) downgraded the Eastern Partnership in 2015. Originally intended as a path towards EU Membership, the policy framework did not perform as anticipated, leading the EU to scale down expectations, and instead refocus it as a reward system for good government behavior. My doctoral research examined the build-up to and fall-out from this decision as it pertains to the critical relationships between the EU and the formerly Soviet Eastern Partnership countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership falls under the EU’s broader European Neighbourhood Policy framework, which is a core responsibility of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, its complex and comprehensive design involves various agencies, policies, interests, and objectives.

The key objective of the Eastern Partnership is to manage the acclimatization of the post-Soviet region to EU integration standards. By the EU’s own account, however, this framework and its objectives proved to be far too ambitious. Involved policymakers and policy experts have criticized the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership for their “one size fits all” regionalism perspective, dependence on conditionality compliance, lack of reciprocity, ineffective democracy promotion, and under-estimation of security threats, among other concerns. These issues were met with promises from the EU to implement a tailor-made approach that differentiates between partner countries. However, such promises remain unrealized, and as a result, the future of the EU’s relations with its Eastern Partners is unspecified and lacking a long-term perspective.

The EU claimed that relegating the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership, to a reward system for good governance in 2015 would assume a less ambitious and more pragmatic, flexible approach moving forward. Yet, merely increasing funding packages as ad-hoc rewards takes on a diminished “payer not a player” role compared to a mutually engaged and beneficial strategic partnership. Consequently, applying this incentivized reward perspective across the board has not worked out as the EEAS intended. The EU’s influence in its Southern Neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa, has continued to decline since 2015. Similarly, despite the EU’s aim to bring its Eastern Partners up to its own standards, the EEAS has not managed to effectively promote democratization or stabilization in its Eastern Neighbourhood that is left vulnerable to longstanding regional tensions.

Unidirectional governance obstructs cooperative partnership

The lack of mutual exchange between the EU and its Eastern Partners substantiates criticism that the Eastern Partnership was not intended as a balanced and equal cooperation. While democratic peace, economic progress, and civilian safety may generally inform EU policy standards regarding societal needs, the inability to provide those needs abroad as promised challenges views of EU external action as merely humanitarian and civilian-oriented. Contrary to claims that the EU is simply a promoter of universal norms, its EEAS objectives and behavior towards its targeted Neighbourhoods do not corroborate merely apolitical intentions. They instead reveal that considerable power would be required to accomplish foreign compliance with the EU’s conditions and standards. As such, the claim to be “one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world” does not communicate a non-hierarchical and mutual cooperative exchange.

The EU’s emphasis on prescribing its own standards and values to its Eastern Neighbourhood confirms that the Eastern Partnership was not designed as a horizontal and equal relationship, especially since the partner countries were meant to acclimate ‘up’ to EU standards. Moreover, this prescriptive, asymmetrical association has communicated to the stronger countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood region, such as Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan, that integration with the EU is not pragmatic and offers little comparative value. Other Eastern Partners’ recent statements of disappointment in the EU suggest similar reservations.

The value of recognition

The 10-year Anniversary Summit of the Eastern Partnership in May 2019 marked an important milestone for the policy framework, as well as for the EU’s relations with the Eastern Partners. From the EU’s side, there was an expectation for all involved parties to sign a Joint Declaration regarding progress made and future goals. However, the Anniversary Summit came and went without the anticipated signing of the Joint Declaration. Azerbaijan’s refusal to acknowledge a statement that did not mention its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh was the most adamant position against the Joint Declaration. Nevertheless, the other Eastern Partners also expressed disappointment with uncertainties and delays, including the lack of EU accession prospects.

Soon after, in December 2019 the Euronest parliamentary assemblies of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia proposed a new partnership agenda called the “Trio Plus Strategy 2030.” This strategy better acknowledges these specific Eastern Partners’ many years of reforms measures in compliance with the EU’s partnership conditions. It also emphasizes these partner countries’ preferences for potential deeper integration with the EU. Rather than including all original six Eastern Partners, the Trio Plus Strategy proposes finally abolishing the EU’s regionalism perspective. It holds the EU to its differentiation promises, and demands greater recognition and reward for their greater compliance.

Conclusion: mutual exchange can support fair and realistic cooperation

The EU should clarify that its objective for future partnerships within its Eastern Neighbourhood is to in fact still have them. In order to save itself – and its Eastern Partners – the trouble of further over-ambitious governance goals or unrealized promises, the EU must show that it does not take its relations in the region for granted. Additionally, it is important to express that it recognizes and appreciates the steps towards positive reforms that have occurred. Most importantly, while EU support may encourage such steps, any meaningful change is expressly the result of the Trio Plus countries’ own diligence and resolve.

Rather than unidirectional, prescriptive governance from a foreign institution, the future iteration of the Eastern Partnership should entail a cooperative and strategic framework that outlines shared interests and goals. The framework should also design mutually beneficial and reciprocal action steps that the EU and its Eastern Partners can take together in order to achieve their common objectives.

The post Trading ambition for cooperation: What’s next for the Eastern Partnership? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

After the referendum, and before Covid, I sat down at one of my favourite eating places to enjoy a vegetarian curry. Hot stuff!

But more heated was the discussion that took place afterwards.

Brexiters to the left of me; Brexiters to the right of me. I was outnumbered, but I put up a good fight. Here’s how it went.

‘The EU isn’t democratic!’

‘Yes it is; laws are democratically passed.’

‘No. You are deluded. The Parliament is full of puppets. They do as they’re told.’

‘Actually, the EU is run by democratically elected politicians.’

‘You’re talking out of your behind! Look, tell me this, if the EU passed a law saying everyone had to wear women’s knickers on their heads, what could you do about it? Well, what could anyone do?’

‘The EU would never pass such a law. What could you do if our Parliament passed such a law?’

‘We could vote at the next general election.’

‘So, we can vote in the next European elections. Did you vote in the European elections?’

‘No. Waste of time. So you see, if the EU told us to wear women’s knickers on our heads, there’s nothing you could do.’

‘So, tell me one law of the EU that you don’t like.’

‘There are thousands, so many.’

‘Well, just tell me one.’

No answer. Conversation moves on…

‘And the EU accounts have never been signed off!’

‘Yes, they have been signed off every year by the independent auditors.’

‘No they haven’t.’

‘Yes they have.’

‘No they haven’t’

Get out mobile phone.

‘Look, here’s the signature of the President of the European Court of Auditors, signing off the EU accounts.’

‘Oh that’s not independent, it’s got European in the name’.

‘Of course it’s independent.’

‘No, I mean when PwC [PriceWaterhouseCoopers] refused to sign off the EU accounts.’

‘PwC has never audited the EU accounts.’

‘So, it must have been one of the other big accountancy firms.’

‘Why would any of them audit the EU accounts when the EU accounts are already signed off by the European Court of Auditors?’

‘Look another thing, it’s a gravy chain for EU bureaucrats. There’s a guy at the EU who gets paid 90,000 a year just to look into the shape of lettuces.’

‘Who are you talking about?’

‘I met him at a party. He told me. Why would he lie to me?’

‘Well, people sometimes embellish things at parties. What’s his name, I’ll contact him to check this out?’

‘I don’t know his name. I just met him at a party, and that’s what he told me. Of course he wouldn’t lie!’

‘Look, this is getting ridiculous. The referendum has split the country in half. There’s a real danger that it could split up the four countries of the UK.’

‘What’s wrong with that? We don’t need Scotland. Let them go.’

‘I think it would be very sad for the UK to split.’

Look, get over it. We’re leaving That’s democracy. We’re leaving.’

‘Yes, but in a democracy, voters can change their minds.’

The exchange went on for another hour. You can guess the rest.

These are all the same comments left on my Facebook pages every day, but this time, in real time, real space, face to face.

I said in passing,

‘The best debates are ones where you can agree the facts, and then discuss what you think about those facts. But the problem with the debate about Brexit is that nobody can agree on the facts.’

We all parted on good company, shook hands, and agreed it was a lively and interesting discussion.

But it’s taken over 40 years for such misinformation about all things EU (and Europe) to become rigidly entrenched in the minds of millions and millions of Britons. 

Where’s the big campaign to enlighten and change minds? There isn’t one.

If there was another referendum next week, all the same immovable myths and misunderstandings would swirl around the country. Just like last time.

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The post “What if the EU ruled that we must all wear knickers on our heads?” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As I noted in an earlier post, if the first priority in establishing the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement was the legal text, then the second has been their implementation.

Part – a very visible part – of that has been the politics of getting that done, from domestic arrangements and infrastructure to supporting affecting individuals and organisations. Indeed, even before the signing and ratification of either Agreement, there has been plenty to consider on both sides.

But there is also a more prosaic element of operationalising an institutionalised relationship. Both Agreements set up a framework of bodies for the EU and UK to meet and discuss.

PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic71

If the graphic looks a bit daunting, then be encouraged by the realisation that all either system (and they are separate) is simply a main body, plus sub-committees dealing with each section of the relevant treaty. The TCA’s Trade Partnership Committee breaks down that work into sub-sections, again mapping onto the legal text.

The ambition of the TCA framework is clearly bigger than that of the WA’s: the latter is a closed arrangement for the limited purposes of the winding-up of liabilities from membership, while the former seeks to create a space in which future discussions and negotiations can occur, up to and including treaty revisions. It’s a similar approach to the one that the EU has been trying to get the Swiss to agree to for some years (not very successfully).

The logic is a simple one: a standing institutional framework can be re-used, rather than having to reinvent the wheel each time, plus it helps embed that framework more firmly if it has a general purpose. Which is part of why the UK was rather resistant to it at the start.

The TCA framework also provides for inputs from parliamentarians and civil society, again underlining the ambition.

But ambition isn’t facts on the ground.

While it’s possible to map the meetings of the WA bodies since March 2020 (below), we still have yet to have any meetings of any TCA bodies. The delay in EU ratification to the end of April this year offers some explanation, but given the pressing nature of many of the implementation issues that have arisen since New Year, there has been a distinct lack of urgency on either side.

PDF version with clickable links: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic78

This week’s European Council did engage in a short discussion and review of relations with the UK, but its conclusions offered little beyond the usual reminders about the costs of non-membership and the need for effective implementation.

While much of this seems – and is – highly technical stuff, it remains important. In the context of a low-trust environment, it will be through constructive and effective interactions at this level that the two parties will start to be able to find a more stable modus vivendi.

I’ll be running regular updates to this meeting tracker for both Agreements on my Twitter feed, so do check on this as we progress.

The post Making the WA/TCA work, institutionally appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

The reforms previously introduced aimed to construct a solid political and fiscal union upon enlightened ideological foundations (see Enlightened Europism), creating strong frames for the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE) to introduce a fair and just social system by redefining the role and authority of the state. The capitalist state – mainly in the global West – is led by democratically elected representatives, governments, or presidents, who serve terms; however, they are not the state. The state is a legal entity that functions to serve the collective interests of its members (i.e. the citizens), shielding the poor and vulnerable from the wealthy and powerful by providing vital public services and equality before the law. Regrettably, the capitalist state and its leaders deliberately ignore their duties to serve general well-being, protecting the interests of wealthy individuals and enterprises instead. Therefore, the ideology of capitalist selfishness must be abolished when designing the social system of the united Europe, replacing it with enlightened ideas that help to reconfigure the means of state.

 

Theory

Today, almost all nation-states construct their economies along the principles of capitalism, in which mass production, steady consumption, ever-increasing economic growth, and the cruel pursuit of self-interest are the key features of success. Capitalism’s negative impact on the society and environment prove that it is not only wasteful and unsustainable, but socially destructive as well. Despite the obvious shortcomings, there are many, who promote the idea of less market-related government regulation, seeking to unleash a laissez-faire stateless capitalism. Opposed to them, there are many – growing in numbers by the day –, who would like to have more regulations and government control over economic planning and policy – often and wrongly labelled as communists.

The argument comes down to the core question of the state’s role as the collective acting entity of the public. When the state was still small and managed by the monarch, the common people had absolutely no protection against the wealthy elite of landlords and clergy. Since the tyranny of the aristocracy and clergy has been overthrown in the French Revolution, the democratic state has gradually expanded and was entrusted with more tasks and responsibilities. By today, the state has become an apparatus, which operates the society by legislation within a certain territory, providing security (e.g. military, police), health care (e.g. hospitals, doctors, nurses), pension, benefits, transportation, and other public services to its people. The state is vital and beneficial for the overwhelming majority of the society, as it is the common people that need the state to provide protection, not the wealthy that can buy enough power to ensure their own well-being.

Sadly, the state’s capacities and potential were abused and distorted numerous times before (e.g. extreme nationalism, Bolshevism), as it is misused today (capitalism). The capitalist state’s sole purpose is to serve the interests of enterprises and the wealthy in a form of representatives of companies and business circles approaching politicians, promising funds for their election campaigns and for personal gains regarding their private businesses; and in exchange, the politicians are expected to promote pro-enterprise legislation. The unelected wealthy do not operate only behind closed doors, setting government policies hand-in-hand with elected government officials, but also openly as honoured guests at the Davos Economic Forum and at the Munich Security Conference, as CEOs that dictate wages and working conditions, as property owners that set renting fees unilaterally, as shop owners that influence prices, etc., throwing only crumbles to the ordinary people. The wealthy and propertied are protected by the capitalist state that does nothing or very little to reduce the soft tyranny of the owners over the propertyless.

Due to the rapidly growing social inequality between some privileged and great many underprivileged, the reformation of the capitalist state is inevitable and necessary. The mindset behind the great achievements of 19th century classical liberals and social democrats, such as enhanced working conditions, regulated working hours, women’s rights, old-age pension, and unemployment benefit could be used as a base for further improvement. The legal protection against the wealthy and the extension of public services are the most important social duties of the enlightened Europe.

The noble task is no smaller than achieving real equality through the orderly redistribution of wealth, ensuring the reasonable flow of money from the wealthy to the poor. The alternative is private capital dismantling the institution of state, exposing the ordinary people to unregulated tyranny and true slavery, thus creating a world that is harsher than feudalism was. The enlightened state’s single aim is to achieve and maintain social equality through legislation. My theory materialises and translates into acts that focus on the topics of public ownership, housing crisis, profit-based salary, and Guaranteed Citizen’s Basic Income as solutions to the most pressing social issues in today’s Europe.

 

Action

It is crucial that the European state – in co-operation with the member states – purchases major industries, utilities, and transportation systems from private enterprises, securing public ownership over strategic services. The expansion of extensive publicly financed state services is also pivotal, whilst launching projects on grand scale could benefit both the public and the economy. Such a project is the construction of homes to ease the ever-growing housing crisis, which exists as the result of property shortages, pumping up the prices to purchase or rent compared to stagnating salaries – especially in the big cities. Renting a property alone is simply unaffordable to the overwhelming majority of people, meaning that many are forced to rent a room in a bigger house, living with strangers and in small places. In addition, harsh conditions, such as high deposit, restriction of children and pets, additional costs, etc. make it impossible for one to find a place that can be called home. The situation is somewhat easier for couples, but not significantly. The alternative to renting is buying an own property, which requires long-term commitment from both parties both emotionally and financially, as they certainly have to take massive loans, paying it for the rest of their lives.

The only long-term solution to the housing crisis is the mass construction of state-owned homes, meaning an increase in supply, which results in a more affordable price and provides a better bargaining position for the tenant, improving the overall conditions for tenants. State ownership is crucial, because the governments can have a direct impact on the real estate sector by reducing renting fees. The system works excellently in Vienna, which is officially the most livable city in the world. In the capital of Austria, most flats belong to the state or to the city, whilst the city’s leadership is promoting a lifelong renting programme called Genossenschaft.

As long as the housing crisis is not addressed properly, the owner-tenant relationship is going to remain imbalanced, allowing the former to dictate the latter. As the process of fund allocation, launching projects, and construction takes many years, an intermediary solution is needed. Applying the proposed Berlin-model of rent freeze and rent cap as a base, my proposal goes further to imposing a temporary profit-maximum on renting fees for properties that are permanently occupied for living, declaring the profit-ceiling based on the real costs of the owner, leaving a marginal profit for the landlords. This would result in cheaper renting fees for the tenant, whilst it still generates a limited profit for the landlord. This might end in hysteria of the propertied, labelling the law as communist; however, let us not forget that the great majority of the people are propertyless, and their interests must be represented. Besides, the owners can still keep their properties and can still generate profit, but only moderately for the time being. In this case, the solidarity of the propertied is required in solving the housing crisis.

Yet another social challenge is to harmonise the complex relationship between employee and employer, protecting the former from the latter. The element I would like to focus on here is the salary. Collective salary categories related to professions and qualifications should be introduced, including a range of salary paid for certain jobs. In addition, all employees would be eligible for profit-shares paid out quarterly – based on the profit made by the enterprise in the last quarter. At least the fifth of the entire profit could be distributed amongst all employees equally (in accordance with the actual working time), regardless of position and salary. This new scheme would erase other bonuses, such as 13-14th month’s salaries, loyalty bonuses, performance bonuses, etc.; but could include an obligatory 20 hours overtime allowance per month (or all-in contracts for managers). The intention is to involve the employees in the success (or failure) of the enterprise they work for, motivating them to work harder and, occasionally, longer, should it be required.

The obligation of sharing the fifth of the profit could be seen as offensive and outrageous to the owners of enterprises, but they have to bear in mind that the tables are turning: the endless exploitation on every front line of life – waging war at home (owner-tenant), at work (owner-employee), and in the shops (owner-customer) – is not going to last forever. The urgency of the redistribution of wealth is more imminent than it might seem.

By recognising the people as de facto shareholders of the European state, the citizens of Europe should be eligible to receive a dividend from state-owned profits in the form of a regularly paid income – in money rather than service. Today’s very poplar idea of introducing a Universal Basic Income (or UBI) acknowledges that fact, but it does not go as far as it should be. In my view, eligibility must be tied to European citizenship, residency in one of the RUE member state and clean criminal record, whilst paid out equally regardless of nationality, country of residence, gender, salary, or occupation. Therefore, my theory intends to express the combination of basic income and the German expression of Bürgergeld (citizen money) completed by the guarantee from the European state; for this reason, henceforward, I am going to use the term of Guaranteed Citizen’s Basic Income (or GCBI).

The allowance is to be paid out individually in accordance with the category of age: 18-21 (I), 22-29 (II), 30-59 (III), 60+ (IV). Category I represents those, who want to continue their studies after finishing school, and those, who would like to start their lives as entering employment. The youth is the least supported age group, meaning that it is important to provide them a financial support that meets their relatively lower needs. Category II represents those, who have finished their studies, and about to enter employment, settle down, and start a family. I propose the transformation of the already existing traditional family support (e.g. tax reduction, discounts) into GCBI payments, guaranteeing at least the same amount as before. The support of families is absolutely imperative for many reasons (e.g. social, demographic, economic), meaning that the state must encourage couples to opt for starting a family. Category III represents the spine of the society and economy, as they are working, paying their contributions to the state, building a career, running the engine of economy, consuming, and raising children. They are also the majority of the society in numbers.

Category IV represents the pensioners, who studied, worked, paid their dues, raised children, and look forward to their well-deserved rest. In the current pension scheme, there is a discrimination in age and in the amount paid, as men are permitted only to retire later than women – in most countries –, and those, who previously earned high salaries can enjoy wealth, whereas those, who were underpaid suffer destitution. Yet another shortcoming of the current system is that in the event of death, the state keeps all contribution paid throughout an entire lifetime, leaving nothing to younger family members. Therefore, I propose the merge of the current pension system into the system of GCBI, meaning the abolishment of pension contribution deducted from the salaries and the introduction of an equal payment of a lower allowance from the age of 60 regardless of gender and salary, meaning that every individual is going to be able to save more during their active working age or to work part-time after reaching the age of 60.

It is extremely difficult to allocate exact amounts for each age category, because it depends on many factors (e.g. types of social expenses merged, living quality across member states, prices, synchronisation of wages, rate of inflation), but setting the ratio of expenses and share of population is a good start. The rate of adult population of the RUE is divided amongst the four categories roughly as 3-10-46-26%, whilst the rate of expense to each category of age could be distributed as 5-25-20-50% of the total available fund for social expenses.

The merge of major social expenses (e.g. unemployed benefit, traditional family support, old-age pension) of the member states into the common European GCBI system is going to simplify and make the social system more transparent, thus reducing the costs of bureaucracy significantly. Restructuring and merging completed by the introduction of capital tax on the wealthy can cover the expenses, even with the loss of pension contribution, which will not have to be paid anymore.

This income should be enough to cover the basic necessities of life, such as a modern shelter and healthy nutrition. In order to avoid laziness, more must not be granted, only achieved through diligent work. The intention is to offer a strong incentive and provide the liberty of choice to the people. For instance, women will not have to be forced to choose between a professional career and motherhood, the youth will not have to be forced to choose between earning money and studying, etc., as working part-time could provide a sufficient income to do both, thus helping to achieve full employment, economic growth, and social justice.

 

Conclusion

Generally speaking, the mindset of prioritising amoral economic interests has to change, placing environmental and human needs in the centre of focus. The state, driven by capitalist dogmas, is corrupt, exploitative, obsolete, and dysfunctional. The ultimate aim of the wealthy is to hijack the legislation through sponsoring political parties, and to dismantle the institution of state eventually, introducing an economic and social structure instead, in which the only simple law is the dynamics of supply and demand. The European Government must overcome the pressure, and protect the propertyless and underprivileged.

The enlightened state, which is neither capitalist nor communist, must act justly and decisively to reverse the ongoing social destruction, abolishing not only poverty, but making the burden of keeping up subsistence disappear. The result is a pioneer concept that enables all to pursue occupations that they do willingly and with pleasure, encouraging creativity and productivity, which would otherwise be lost in an everlasting drudgery, truly liberating one from under the captivity of monotone work.

The post Reform #4: State appeared first on Ideas on Europe.