Hamarosan megjelenik az éttermi szektort célzó, 5+1 pontból álló akcióterv részeként egy vissza nem térítendő támogatást és 2,5%-os kedvezményes hitelt tartalamazó konstrukció modernizálásra, beruházásra, és működésre.
By Marius Guderjan (Centre for British Studies, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) and Mario Kölling (Department of Political Science, Spanish National Distance Education University)
Although the COVID-19 pandemic seems something of the past and meanwhile overshadowed by other crises, we should still remember its profound impact on public health, people, employment and businesses. In 2020, the real GDP in the EU fell by more than 6%, which was higher than during the 2008 financial crisis. The management of the crisis was clearly dominated by national as well as by regional and local governments. Nevertheless, the EU also introduced massive economic and fiscal measures and departed from the austerity policy following the 2008 financial crisis. The EU amended its budget, created new loans, activated the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact and expanded the lending capacity of the European Stability Mechanism. Most importantly, the Member States agreed the largest stimulus package in the history of the EU: Next Generation EU (NGEU), which was worth €750 billion financed by joint borrowing. The key instrument of NGEU was the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), providing €672.5 billion in loans and grants to support reforms and investments undertaken by the Member States.
Given the scale and multilevel nature of the EU’s intervention, our recent JCMS article takes a close look at the EU’s socio-economic responses to the COVID-19 crisis. By analysing existing decision-making procedures and democratic practices, principles of good governance and effective performance, we draw conclusions about the political legitimacy of the RRF and we discuss how the legacy of this measure may shape future governance arrangements.
There is a strong rationale for governments to take fast and extraordinary actions during crises, circumventing and even breaking existing conventions, procedures and rules. However, crisis management may not only challenge the political legitimacy of these actions but may also result in permanent changes to a system of governance. Therefore, we considered who took and authorised decisions and whether this was in line with existing democratic practices, and whether the input legitimacy of the EU’s crisis response (as conceptionalised by Schmidt 2022) was compromised. Similar to previous crises (as discussed in the literature on new intergovernmentalism, e.g. Puetter 2016 and Bickerton et al. 2014), decisions were dominated by the European Council and the Commission and negotiated behind closed doors. The latter set the RRF’s policy objectives and governance structure to which the former agreed. During 2021 and 2022, Member States then had to submit national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) with detailed targets, milestones, estimated costs and proposals for structural reforms. The RRPs were designed in close bilateral cooperation with the Commission, which gained the authority to decide together with the Council over their implementation.
As during previous crises (see e.g. White 2022 and Kreuder-Sonnen 2016), the newly introduced EU measures lacked transparency, accountability and judicial scrutiny. To capture these, our article also focuses on the RRF’s so-called throughput legitimacy: namely, on its compliance with rules, efficient governance, public engagement and access to information about decision-making processes, and the inclusion of (territorial) interest groups. The RRF is a performance-based instrument that is assessed and disbursed based on the fulfilment of specific milestones and targets outlined in the RRPs. Various criteria (e.g., population size, GDP per capita and unemployment levels) and formats (e.g., the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard, performance audits by the European Court of Auditors, Recovery and Resilience Dialogues, evaluation reports) were introduced to enhance the accountability and transparency of allocation of RRF funding. Yet, our article traces various issues regarding the transparency of policymaking. Only two thirds of Member States committed to publishing detailed information about the implementation of the RRPs.
It is often suggested (e.g. by Lindgren and Persson 2010) that the EU’s legitimacy relies largely on its output legitimacy, meaning on its ability to deliver effective results to the satisfaction of its Member States and citizens. It is fair to say that the RRF has supported substantial reforms within the Member States, but rather than stimulating new innovations many RRPs have not dealt with structural challenges and only supported outstanding reforms that would have been carried out anyway. The scope of the RRPs has also varied considerably. While RRPs in Italy, Spain and Greece were ambitious targeting structural challenges of labour markets or tax systems, in northern Member States RRF funding is relatively small in comparison to GDP (less than 1%) and reforms played a minor role in their RRPs. Whereas the RRF financed measures to support employment, living standards and social protection, the funding was insufficient and too short-termed to drive a sustainable green and digital transformation. Inflation and supply shortages increased the costs of investment substantially, and the administrative workload undermined the distribution of funding and delayed the delivery of milestones and targets. We conclude in our article that due to the exclusion of subnational governments in the development of the RRPs in many Member States, the delivery of the RRPs was often inefficient and failed to meet local and regional priorities and needs.
Despite some shortcomings, we suggest that the legitimacy of European crisis governance rests on its ability to deal with complex, transnational issues to the satisfaction of the Member States rather than on its democratic credentials. Whereas this may not come as a big surprise, it is particularly significant to highlight that exceptional provisions introduced during crisis are subsequently adopted and normalised within future governance frameworks. While the Commission and Member States have empowered themselves, place-based principles and multilevel partnerships with subnational governments, which were strengthened during previous decades in areas such as Cohesion Policy, are currently under threat. In its proposal for the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, the Commission has adopted the RRF’s approach and seeks to maintain performance-based policy programmes and centralised planning with targets, milestones and structural reforms. This fosters exclusive top-down policymaking at the cost of inclusive bottom-up approaches. Two years of complex negotiations lie ahead, during which adjustments to budget items, the EU’s institutional design and the redistribution of power between the European, national and subnational levels are at stake. We do not know for sure yet what the outcome will be and to what extent it will be the legacy of the crisis.
Marius Guderjan is a Fellow at the Centre for British Studies at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, and used to work at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science at Freie Universität Berlin. His research interests include European integration, multilevel governance, intergovernmental relations and territorial politics; including the book Local Government in the European Union.
Website: https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/polwiss/forschung/systeme/polsystem/Team/Marius-Guderjan.html
Mario Kölling is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Spanish National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, and Senior Researcher at the Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad. His research focuses on methodological issues related to territorial decentralisation and multilevel governance. He has published extensively on the European Union budget.
Website: https://www.uned.es/universidad/docentes/politicas-sociologia/mario-kolling.html
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