European Union

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EU Ministers of Education, Culture, Youth, Sport and Communication meet on 15 February 2018 in Brussels to hold policy debates on how to take forward the education aspects of the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2017, and on the mid-term evaluation of the Erasmus+ programme and future orientations for post-2020.

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Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, co-chairs the International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq. The three-day event aims to mobilise additional international support for Iraq at this crucial time in the history of the country, following the territorial defeat of Da'esh in 2017.

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Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, visits the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, on 13 February 2018, in Vienna.

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The Informal Meeting of Ministers responsible for Tourism takes place on 13 February 2018 in Sofia.

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Geoffrey Van Orden

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

DRAFT REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Libya
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Pier Antonio Panzeri

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

When the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was interviewed in Rome early this week, he refused anything less then a full membership of the European Union. Although this is not the first time either Erdogan or his government’s officials are vociferously rejected a form of privileged partnership with the EU, I believe this is probably the right time for Turks to seriously consider a partnership with the EU, provided the offer still holds.

There are two good reasons for this.

Currently Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU are on hold or it has been in hold for a while. Most people have lost track of what negotiation Chapter is currently open, if any, and which is closed/closed without completion and for what reason. While the EU’s migration deal of 2015 with Turkey was expected to re-energise the relationship between Turkey and the EU, it rather did not change much in the nature of this ever so complicated relationship. However it has been successful in helping the EU member states in stemming the flow of migrants reaching Europe from Sea. Additionally when the EU required the Turkish authorities to make certain changes in its Counter-Terrorism Law so that the EU could introduce visa free travel for Turkish citizens, something the EU promised Turks before approving the Migration deal, the Turkish government is resisting to take those steps.

As a result there is not a constructive or a friendly dialogue between the EU and Turkey that would, as one hoped, re-energise the relationship in some form. I believe if the Turkish government could agree to begin to talks about a Partnership with the EU, this ever slow progressing and complicated relationship could be given another shot.

Furthermore Turkey’s Syrian policy choices have ended up isolating her from the West and the United States of America at the international stage. Not acting in line with neither the EU member states nor with the Americans, it has been questioned whether Turkish government under Erdogan is cozying up to Russia. By seriously considering the option of privileged partnership, the Turkish government could show to the West that it still wants to be part of Europe or the EU. This does not however mean that the Turks would have to give up on full membership forever. Surely if a member state like the United Kingdom can exit the EU, and then hope to form a deep partnership with the EU, Turkey as a privileged partner of the EU could in the future ask to join the EU as a full member.

The post The Case for Partnership with the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

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The European Union has a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. In close coordination with Afghanistan's international partners, the European Union is engaged with the Afghan Government to fight corruption, improve oversight, enable economic growth, reduce poverty and strengthen democratic institutions. This is part of the strategy for Afghanistan, agreed in October 2017 until the end of 2020.

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Bigger than it looks

As a child, I used to like watching a TV programme where a bearded Australian would talk about some cartoons that he was going to show, hurriedly sketching a character in some dynamic pose.

Part of the fun was the way he caught the characters’ essence: distilling them into a single image.

Of course, this is a televisual treat now pushed to one side, for various reasons; but the guy’s catchphrase, which heads this post, sprang to mind the other day in a completely different context.

This week marks the end of the first part of the prep for Phase 2 talks in the Article 50 process. Since December’s European Council, both the UK and the EU have been engaged in internal negotiations.

For the EU, that’s meant agreeing the mandate for Phase 2, including yesterday’s proposal on transition.

For the UK, it’s meant getting caught up in questions about releasing impact assessments and starting to consider the preferred end-state of any future UK-EU relationship post-membership.

This last point – manifesting itself in this week’s Cabinet sub-committee meetings – were the prompt for my childhood memory, for they would seem to represent the logical point at which the UK can address the ever-mounting pressure to provide clarity on its intentions.

Swapshop

This demand comes from all quarters: domestic, EU and internationally. Without knowing where the UK might be trying to head, it’s very hard to plan, whether you’re a business, a citizen or a Commission negotiator: no headline goal means no way of building the more detailed things underneath that. My thoughts on this are long-standing and don’t bear repeating here, other than to recall that the UK’s current position is a set of mutually-inconsistent headlines (in the tabloid sense).

But as we move into Phase 2, where very precisely the future destination of this process is under discussion, it might seem logical that now is the moment to bite the bullet.

However, three big objections stand in the way.

The first is a point first suggested to me by @Sime0nStylites the other day, namely that Theresa May might well believe that she has a settled and suitably agreed plan.

Evidence of this comes from a speech given by her former strategy director, Chris Wilkins, to a UK in a Changing Europe event last week. Wilkins argued that May has always tried to place Brexit within a wider frame of the future of the country and the society we are trying to build. Laudable aims, but not obviously executed in practice. Matters of social justice do not map easily on to models of UK-EU relations and even where they do, Number 10 has not tried to make that case. As much as the tone of Wilkin’s speech might be understood through the lens of his former role, the decided lack of criticality suggests that the consistency of the Brexit agenda has not been seriously challenged on its own terms.

At the same time, my unwillingness to ascribe a lack of reflection to someone who has managed to make their way to the office of Prime Minister means that we have to handle this with a degree of caution. Even with her small circle of advisors, May has had more than enough exposure to critiques of the Lancaster House agenda to know that it is not sufficient to carry negotiations through to October. So there must be something more.

The Muppet Show

This leads nicely to the second objection, namely that there will be no detailing of a UK plan because no consensus is possible.

As the previous months has shown so frequently, the Cabinet – and the Conservatives more generally – remain split in their views. There is a significant group pushing for a hard break – up to and including walking away from the table – but there is also a blocking minority that wants a very soft model. Neither can force the other into a defeat, especially with a Labour party that continues to hedge its bets.

Obfuscation is thus a party management tool for May: by not collapsing her ambiguity she is able to offer treats to all, even as she fails to offer succor. As much as she appears to satisfy no-one, equally no-one can be sure of who might come next, so she remains in office. But that doesn’t mean she has freedom to do as she likes, but rather she has to continue to plot a tricky course between the different interests.

Danger Mouse

This domestic barrier is further aided by the nature of Article 50 itself.

There’s no intrinsic need to detail the final end-state within the Article 50 agreement, largely because it can be left to later. The only necessities are the Phase 1 issues, a framework for negotiating the new relationship and a set of transition arrangements. The first is in progress (albeit with some big issues still outstanding), the second is trivial and the last is close to agreement (since neither side wants to pick that fight).

Yes, once you begin the new relationship negotiations in April 2019, then you need an objective, but if you have a ‘full monty‘ transition, then there’s much less of a problem, since you’ve kept in place all the current policy arrangements.

To go one step further, the absence of a British position on the end-state might makes matters simpler, precisely because it precludes the inclusion of any language about the new relationship in the Article 50 text. Everyone can sign up to ‘deep and special’ (or similar language), but that hardly commits anyone to anything.

And to go another step, if May does fancy a softer Brexit, then this all would help to keep the UK closer to the EU, for lack of a viable alternative plan: going ‘full monty’ becomes an imperative to keep options open until a decision is made. The EU would likely not complain about a continuing stream of budget contributions without the costs of having the UK at the Council table.

Time for bed

As well as the cartoon programme, I also used to watch a Japanese show, about a monkey – made human – on some quest. I can honestly say that I never had the faintest clue what was going on and there never seemed to be a resolution, but it was quite a spectacle.

Importantly, Brexit is not a kid’s TV show. But the fog of confusion surrounding the UK government’s preferences on the future relationship with the EU are likely to hang around us from some time yet. How much of a problem that is – for the government’s longevity, for the conclusion of a deal on Article 50, or for the articulation of an idea of a future British society – remains debatable. However, if the UK is to move from crisis management to strategic planning, then that fog will have to lift.

The post Can you tell what it is yet? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

American Express
Freedom of establishment
A three party card scheme involving a co-branding partner or an agent is subject to the same restrictions as those applicable to four party schemes with respect to interchange fees

Louboutin and Christian Louboutin
Intellectual and industrial property
According to Advocate General Szpunar, a trade mark combining colour and shape may be refused or declared invalid on the grounds set out under EU trade mark law

Altun and Others
Social security for migrant workers
National courts may, in cases of fraud, disregard social security certificates issued to workers posted within the EU

Just ten days before the EU referendum, I wrote an article for Independent Voices​ with the headline, ‘You won’t get your country back if you vote for Brexit. You’ll give it away to the most right-wing government in recent history.’

And so, it has come about. My article was shared by Independent readers a record 67,000 times, but Brexit went ahead.

Today, I am re-publishing my article from 13 June 2016. Not everything I predicted came true – but too much of it has:

“WE WANT OUR COUNTRY BACK!” is the clarion cry of many who want Britain to leave the European Union.

But whose country do they want back exactly? Your country? My country? Or really, just their country?

Before we leave the European Union and possibly change our country forever, we need to have an idea what country we’d leave behind, and what country we’d get instead, if we vote for Brexit on 23rd June.

Look carefully at those Tories who are running the ‘Leave’ campaign and calling for Britain to completely change direction outside the EU.

What could be their real motive?

Those leading Tories – Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Iain Duncan Smith, Chris Grayling, John Whittingdale, Priti Patel, and others – have in this campaign viciously attacked their own government and Prime Minister.

It’s been a nasty and sustained ‘blue on blue’ offensive.

Do they know what they’re doing?

Presumably, yes. The referendum presents for them a possible once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to win power for their style of right-wing Conservatism.

So when they say, “Let’s take back control”, they really mean, “We want to take control”.

When they say “Bring back power from Brussels”, they really mean, “We want that power”.

And when they say, “We want our country back”, they really mean their country. The true-blue right-wing Tory Britain of the past that they sorely miss.

These Conservatives have taken a calculated but clever risk. They know that if the referendum results in Brexit, it will mean the end of David Cameron’s premiership and those now in government who support his Remain campaign.

Then what?

There would be resignations and a new leader of the Conservative Party would be elected by the party’s membership.

According to YouGov, Boris Johnson would be front-runner by far to become Tory Leader. On Brexit, we could have a new brand of Conservative government, with Boris Johnson as Prime Minister.

Another election would not legally be required until 2020.

The country we’d be “getting back” on Brexit would be run by possibly the most right-wing Tory government anyone of us can remember.

Instead of our current alliances with Europe, we could be back to Rule Britannia with orthodox Tory Eurosceptics as our new political masters. They could have uninterrupted power for almost four years.

Opposition? What opposition? Labour and the Lib Dems are in disarray.

If these Tory hopefuls get “their country back” on Brexit, what could Britain become?

For an answer, take a close look at what these right-wing Tory Brexiteers stand for. Here are some brief examples:

• Iain Duncan-Smith: Long-term Eurosceptic and former Tory leader, he was until recently the Secretary of State for Works and Pensions. The social policies he proposed were described by the European Court of Justice as “unfit for a modern democracy” and “verging on frighteningly authoritarian”.

• Michael Gove: He was last year appointed as Secretary of State for Justice, with a mandate to scrap the Human Rights Act – which might only be possible if Britain leaves the European Union. As Education Secretary, Mr Gove was widely criticised for his heavy-handed education reforms and described as having a “blinkered, almost messianic, self-belief.”

• Boris Johnson: He’s the ‘poster boy’ of the Leave campaign and the likely new Prime Minister if Britain backs Brexit. His buffoonery and gaffes delight some, but horrify others. He once joked that women only go to university to find a husband. He has often dithered on big issues, wavering last year on whether to return to the House of Commons while still London Mayor. Some have criticised him for allegedly joining ‘Leave’ only because of the opportunity to become Prime Minister.

• Priti Patel: She’s the Minister for Employment. In a pro-Brexit speech last month she said, “If we could just halve the burdens of the EU social and employment legislation we could deliver a £4.3 billion boost to our economy and 60,000 new jobs.” TUC General Secretary Frances O’Grady responded, “Leave the EU and lose your rights at work – that’s the message that even Leave campaigners like Priti Patel are now giving.”

• Chris Grayling: He’s the Leader of the House of Commons and previously Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. He provoked the first strike by barristers and solicitors for his cuts to legal aid. He backed reforms to curb the power of the European Court of Human Rights. He caused outrage with his comments that Christian owners of bed and breakfasts should have the right to turn away gay couples (he later apologised).

And waiting in the wings is Ukip leader Nigel Farage who said he puts victory in the referendum above loyalty to his party. Farage also said he would back Boris Johnson to be Prime Minister if Britain votes for Brexit – and could see himself working for Boris’s government.

Imagine our current Tory government morphing into a new government consisting only of right-wing Eurosceptic Tories, with the softer pro-EU Conservatives disbanded because they lost the referendum.

A new Conservative government that wouldn’t be subject to the progressive rules and safeguards of the European Union – such as on workers’ rights, free movement and protection of the environment.

Then imagine that we might not have an opportunity to vote out such a new government until 2020.

If you’re one of those who say “We want our country back”, have a think about what country you’d be getting back if we left the EU, and who’d really be in charge of it. Would they represent you?

Is the EU so bad – and the alternative so good – that we’d want to risk exchanging what we’ve got for what we’d get?

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Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan. Image source: Author

Emma Sabzalieva

We live in an era of intense and growing international connections, but also in a world of significant positional differences between localities, states and regions.

In this context, how can the idea of the world-class university be used by states to survive and succeed? What does this idea look like in states that are outside of the European and North American “core”?

 

Out of the frying pan and into the fire

The global legacy of colonialism and imperialism bears a clear imprint on today’s world order. This is highly evident in the politics and policies of contemporary post-Soviet Central Asia, the area I study. Bissenova and Medeuova (2016) have compellingly argued that the Central Asian countries have in effect jumped out of the 20th century “frying pan” of the Marxist-Leninist discourse of development straight into the 21st century “fire” of a globalized capitalist discourse of modernization, in which states outside the West will always be trying to catch up to an ideal they didn’t create.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, public policy in the Central Asian states has looked not just to former centre Russia but globally for influence and ideas. In the sphere of education, all five of the Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – have adopted elements of the European Union’s Bologna Process, and – uniquely so far – Kazakhstan is also a member of the European Higher Education Area.

In my recent article ‘The Policy Challenges of Creating a World-Class University Outside the Global “Core”’ (Sabzalieva 2017), I explored in further depth the public policy challenges and opportunities Kazakhstan faces as it seeks to create a brand new world-class university.

 

The world-class university as public policy tool

The idea of the world-class university has become widespread not only as a seemingly replicable model in higher education, but as a policy pursuit of governments around the world. Public policy in Kazakhstan too has followed this logic.

I believe that the institutionalization of the idea of the world-class university is reinforced by three major dynamics:

 ·         Firstly, the neoliberal logic of efficiency has led to much greater selectivity in the areas that are supported financially by the state, with world-class or excellence policies being one such funding stream;

 ·         Secondly, there is growing convergence around the concept of the knowledge economy, the notion that brain power will bring prosperity and competitiveness to a state. Universities play a key role in this discourse, with the result that governments use policy levers such as world-class university projects to fulfil their objectives;

 ·         Thirdly, despite the impact of intensifying globalising forces that push for greater international engagement with and by higher education, the nation-state persists, using public policy to seek or consolidate national competitive advantage, for example through the creation of world-class universities.

Faced with these dynamics, the rapid spread of the world-class university around the globe can be understood as a policy tool used by states to survive and succeed in the contemporary era.

 

A world-class university for Kazakhstan

In 2006, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev proclaimed that “to establish a unique academic environment in our capital, a prestigious international-standard university needs to be created” (Nazarbayev 2006).

In a stunning feat of planning and construction, that “international-standard university” – now known as Nazarbayev University – has not only been built and populated, but celebrated the graduation of its first cohort of students less than a decade later.

With the opening of Nazarbayev University, opportunities have been created for academically excellent students to pursue high quality programmes and for a strong and highly international faculty to pursue teaching and research, all housed in an extremely well-equipped and generously funded environment. The legally bound commitment to academic freedom and institutional independence gives the university rights and responsibilities in governance that are currently unparalleled in Kazakhstan.

I discuss these three factors of human resources, funding, and governance in more detail in the article. As the Nazarbayev University project is still very new, I also raise a number of policy challenges that warrant further and detailed investigation.

 

Both global and national: a unique example

Global higher education watchers will identify some parallels between the rapid ascent of Nazarbayev University and other institutions also claiming to be world-class, such as Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah University of Science and Technology or the National University of Singapore.

However, I consider Kazakhstan’s journey to a world-class university to be unique in three respects.

Firstly, in Kazakhstani public policy, the role of higher education in the knowledge economy is a critical element of the country’s strategy to reposition itself in the world system as one of the top 30 (the policy goal was originally to be a top 50 global economy, but this has since been raised to the top 30) global economies. Nazarbayev University was founded to act as a figurehead for the reforms that are expected to be adopted and adapted throughout the tertiary sector in Kazakhstan.

Secondly, although some nation-building ventures in Central Asia have been seen as contrived, the Nazarbayev University project, whilst experimental, is nevertheless a credible demonstration of a commitment towards national consolidation and improvement, substantiated by its ‘role model’ status within the national higher education system.

Thirdly, this dual policy commitment to both the national and the global sets Kazakhstan apart from many of the other states similarly investing in select higher education institutions.

 

Where to from here: adopt, adapt, or invent anew?

There seems to be no question that the notion of the ‘world-class university’ is here to stay for the foreseeable future, and that it currently shows a continuing dominance of what is essentially a Western model of higher education.

This suggests another policy challenge for the states that do choose to develop their own world-class university: should they seek to replicate what they have seen elsewhere, or diversify the idea, thus making it a new one?

My case study of Nazarbayev University offers a worked example of the Kazakh government’s openness to aligning with international “best practices”, wherever these may be found (Tamtik and Sabzalieva forthcoming). This reflects a pragmatic ideology, recognizing that the world-class university model has benefits and seeking to build on these by domesticating the concept for a different context.

Continuing to study Nazarbayev University and the public policies of Kazakhstan will be critical to understanding the scope for states such as Kazakhstan to move beyond “frying pans” and “fires”, and innovate in ways that influence and diversify the positioning of a future world order.

  

Emma Sabzalieva is a doctoral candidate and Vanier Scholar at the Centre for the Study of Canadian and International Higher Education (CIHE), University of Toronto, Canada. Her core research interests are the global politics of higher education, social change, and contemporary Central Asia. Her wider research interests span ideas and knowledge creation, public policy, social institutions, university/community engagement, and the history of universities. Her website is http://emmasabzalieva.com. 

 

References

Bissenova, Alina, and Kulshat Medeuova. 2016. “O problemakh regionalnikh issledovanii v/po Tsentralnoi Azii [Issues of regional research in/on Central Asia].” Antropologicheskii Forum [Forum for Anthropology and Culture] 28:35–39.

Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 2006. “Poslaniye Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbayev Narodu Kazakhstana. Strategiya Vkhozhdeniya Kazakhstana v Chislo 50-Ti Naibolee Konkurentosposobnikh Stran Mira: Kazakhstan Na Poroge Novovo Ryvka Vpered v Svoem Razvitiyi [Address by President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbayev to the People of Kazakhstan. A Strategy to Include Kazakhstan in the List of the 50 Most Competitive Countries in the World: Kazakhstan on the Threshold of a New Leap Forward in Its Development].” Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. March 1, 2006. http://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana-mart-2006-g_1343986805.

Sabzalieva, Emma. 2017. “The Policy Challenges of Creating a World-Class University Outside the Global ‘core.’” European Journal of Higher Education 7 (4): 424–439. https://doi.org/10.1080/21568235.2017.1292856.

Tamtik, Merli, and Emma Sabzalieva. forthcoming. “Emerging Global Players? Building International Legitimacy in Universities in Estonia and Kazakhstan.” In Comparing Post-Socialist Transformations: Education in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, edited by Iveta Silova and Maia Chankseliani. Oxford: Symposium Books.

 

The post Shaping the idea of the world-class university from outside the global “core” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DRAFT REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the negotiations on the modernisation of the EU-Chile Association Agreement
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Charles Tannock

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, of a Protocol to the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tokia Saïfi

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Five more years: the old and new President of the Czech Republic.

Half of the country satisfied, approximately the same part suffering from a severe hangover. That is, in a nutshell, the main outcome of the Czech presidential elections whose final took place in the last weekend of January. The reason behind this division of Czech society lies in the approximately 3 percentage points that made the difference between the winner, incumbent president Miloš Zeman, and the unlucky loser, Jiří Drahoš. Apart from confirming Miloš Zeman in the office for the next five years, the vote put a stamp on conflicts and differences hidden in the heart of Europe.

The second round of the elections was held two weeks after the first clash, which could be described as ‘an audition for a challenger’. Here’s a brief recall: Mr Zeman almost did not participate in the campaign as he was sure that he would qualify for the run-off. The first round thus had to answer just one question – who would be the challenger for the real battle? Among 8 contenders, Mr Drahoš achieved a clear victory. Even though the difference between him and Mr Zeman was around 10 percentage points, the support for him expressed by a majority of losers gave him a solid chance to turn the run-off into a dramatic event.

Not very sophisticated, but very efficient campaign posters.

The campaign before the second round was surprisingly calm. That applies particularly to Mr Zeman´s camp who was expected to trigger some kind of scandal or personal attack targeting Mr. Drahoš. Billboards with slogan ‘This country is ours! Stop immigrants and Drahoš! Vote for Zeman!’ emerged everywhere, but nothing serious compared to the campaign before the 2013 second round, when Mr Zeman’s rival Mr Schwarzenberg had to face fake allegations that his family were Nazis. Mr Drahoš, instead of increasing his presence on billboards, focused on campaigning in regions. He intended to increase his visibility there and to change his perception as the ‘Prague coffee house candidate’.

The main interest was thus focused on the TV debates. Over the weeks before, Mr Zeman had refused to participate in any such debate, claiming that his views were broadly known. But after the first round´s results were announced, he – as he did in many cases before – changed his mind completely. The reason behind this switch was a tactical and strategic one. Mr Zeman is believed to be a very experienced and swift discussant, perhaps one of the best in Czech politics. On the contrary, Mr Drahoš had already demonstrated in the discussions prior to the first round that a sharp tongue is not among his most dangerous weapons. Hence, Mr Zeman´s team announced that the incumbent president was willing to participate in four debates. Mr Drahoš promptly refused this obvious trap disguised as an offer, agreeing to two debates instead. As a result, there were four debates in the end, but just two of them including both gentlemen. The debates broadcast by the most important commercial TV station TV NOVA and by TV Barandov – a minor station very close to Mr Zeman – were attended just by Mr Zeman, featuring empty chairs prepared for Mr. Drahoš.

TV ‘battles’ involving both candidates were broadcast during the last week prior to the voting. The first show run by TV Prima, another influential commercial TV station, resulted in Mr Zeman’s clear victory. With a totally unprepared and invisible anchorman and the support of an aggressive audience clearly hostile to Mr Drahoš, Mr. Zeman did not miss his chance. Even the screenplay favored him, as the main thematic areas – migration policy or smoking ban in pubs – enabled him to widely use his famous witticisms and half-truths tactic. In such an atmosphere Mr Drahoš – most of the time not allowed to complete a single sentence, being interrupted either by Mr Zeman, or by the audience – looked like a poorly prepared student.

The second and last debate, in this case hosted by Ceska televize, the public service broadcaster, offered a completely different picture. Mr Zeman had to face tough questions, conditions for both participants were the same and there were no interventions from the audience. This led to two interesting outputs. First, the result of the debate was much more balanced than in the first debate even though Mr Drahoš did not manage to go beyond his image of a hypercorrect retired scholar. Second, Mr Zeman adopted a completely different style suppressing his vanity and populism. The prevailing interpretation of the debate – it had been broadcast the very evening before the second round started – was that the chances of both candidates were very close.

This, however, turned out not to be the case. From the start of the counting of votes on Saturday afternoon, Mr Zeman had a comfortable lead of around 12 percentage points. When one third of districts was counted, the difference still remained around 10 percentage points suggesting Mr Zeman’s victory. Numbers from larger urban areas – and particularly from Prague, the main bastion of Mr Drahoš – just narrowed the result. At the end of the day, the outcome was 51.36 % of votes for Mr Zeman and 48.63 % for Mr Drahoš. The turnout reached 66.6 % surpassing interest in the first round by more than 5 percentage points.

The jubilation and cheers heard in the victory camp and the visible disappointment among Mr Drahoš’ supporters point to conflicts and cleavages which have emerged in Czech society over the last couple of years. Mr Zeman was heavily supported by less educated, poorer and often frustrated people, whose motivation can be summarized by the slogan ‘against globalization’. On the contrary, Mr Drahoš collected votes among the elites – the more educated citizens from the cities, open to other cultures. In this sense, Czech society follows the trend that has emerged in many European countries in recent years. The presidential vote confirmed that there are two parallel societies living in the heart of Europe – each of them praising their own values, pursuing their goals and hardly listening to the other any more.

The impact of the vote for the future of the Czech Republic is yet unclear, but there a not many reasons to be optimistic. Mr Zeman, right after the result became official, said that this victory was his final one, after which no defeat would follow, adding that he would like to unite Czech society. But hardly anybody expects that his second term will substantially differ from the first one. Further attempts to increase his power and influence as well as to enforce his and his allies´ goals may thus be expected.

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