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The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion. 

Key policy messages:

• Contextualise displacement. In contexts where displacement occurs within a broader history of regional migration, IDPs are not always seen as outsiders in their host communities because many have prior personal connections to host com­munities. The government of Mozambique, develop­ment partners and humanitarian actors need to embed and understand the current displacement within the long history of migration, ethnolinguistic identification and displacement which shapes relations and contributes to social cohesion. 
• Integrate local ethos of solidarity. In the absence of external humanitarian support or prior to the arrival of emergency aid, host communities mobilise themselves through an ethos of solidarity, care and hospitality to help displaced people. External interventions coming into such situations need to be sensitive to this ethos and build on existing inclusive social support mechanisms and locally led initiatives so that they do not disrupt positive relations.
• Build on locally led integration. Locally led efforts are integral to local ownership of the integration of IDPs and its sustainability. When external support builds on local initiatives, this reduces unintended consequences such as resentment and conflicts between IDPs and host communities.

From 25 to 27 May, a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of six MEPs led by the Committee Chair David McAllister (EPP, Germany) visited Cape Town, Pretoria, and Johannesburg, South Africa.
The delegation met South African political leaders and partners to discuss deepening EU-South Africa cooperation. Key topics included international relations in a changing geopolitical landscape, security, political ties, and the Global Gateway, the EU's strategy for global infrastructure investment.
Press release
Mission report
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

From 25 to 27 May, a delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of six MEPs led by the Committee Chair David McAllister (EPP, Germany) visited Cape Town, Pretoria, and Johannesburg, South Africa.
The delegation met South African political leaders and partners to discuss deepening EU-South Africa cooperation. Key topics included international relations in a changing geopolitical landscape, security, political ties, and the Global Gateway, the EU's strategy for global infrastructure investment.
Press release
Mission report
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Excessive groundwater extraction by households and industry is one of the primary reasons for the city's subsidence.

Ma. Theresa Lazaro said that the bloc wants to see more progress on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus for resolving the country's conflict.

Satellite image of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb strait being at the bottom right opening. Credit: Wikimedia/NASA

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 24 2026 (IPS)

With regional friction between Iran and the Gulf monarchies escalating, Houthi leadership in Yemen has proclaimed a total maritime blockade against all vessels linked to Saudi shipping. While this declaration does not constitute a verified military obstruction of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, it significantly heightens the risk of volatility at the Red Sea’s southern gateway, potentially severing the primary arterial link to the Suez Canal.

The embargo is already being framed as more than a simple ban on Saudi-flagged vessels. In messages sent to shipping companies navigating the Strait, the Houthis warned against any activities at Saudi ports, including by non-Saudi-flagged ships, saying that vessels could be targeted “in any location.” This is significant as Saudi Arabia’s maritime infrastructure managed 331 million tonnes of freight in 2024—a volume roughly equal to 12 million fully laden 20-foot containers.

Within days of these threats being made, five ships have been recorded turning around after heading towards the Bab el-Mandeb passage. Among these ships, the Xin Long Yang, a VLCC loaded at Yanbu and bound for Qinzhou, China, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude, initially reversed north towards the Suez Canal. The vessel later reversed course again, choosing to resume its original route heading south towards Bab el-Mandeb.

Additionally, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said that two Saudi oil tankers, named Encelia and Layla, were targeted for their “violation of the blockade decision issued by the armed forces.”

Jeddah Islamic Port, the Kingdom’s principal commercial gateway on the Red Sea, received 3,805 vessel calls in 2024, more than any other Saudi port. Yanbu has become Saudi Arabia’s critical Red Sea oil-export network, where crude is moved from eastern fields using the East–West pipeline before being loaded onto tankers. With the Strait of Hormuz severely disrupted, the Red Sea corridor is no longer simply an alternative route: it is Saudi Arabia’s critical remaining maritime outlet to Asian markets.

Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port was loading approximately 4 million b/d in mid-July, close to 4 percent of daily global oil demand. Disruptions at Bab el-Mandeb would also affect the Suez Canal, which carried approximately 22 percent of global seaborne container trade in 2023 and acts as the link between European and Asian markets. Of the cargo which transits through Bab el-Mandeb, 3.97 million b/d of crude passed through its gates in March, according to Kpler.

If the Houthis can continue to enforce their threat and create enough uncertainty, even selective attacks on some vessels can increase wartime insurance costs and undermine security guarantees, which could push carriers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa.

Credit: Maximilian Malawista

For an Asia–Europe container voyage, rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope can add roughly 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles and approximately seven to ten days of sailing time. This also increases the cost of the voyage, heightening fuel costs, requiring more vessel capacity to maintain scheduled services, and exposing cargo to higher insurance premiums. The World Bank has estimated that the additional fuel bill alone could reach USD 1 million for a round trip. Analysis by the OECD put the wider cost increase at USD 1.7 million for a medium-sized container ship on an Asia–Europe round trip—roughly an increase of USD 272, or 19 percent, for one standard 40-foot container.

In late 2023, similar Houthi threats, which led to selective attacks against commercial vessels, led major carriers to avoid the Red Sea passage and use the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope. In just three months, by mid-February 2024, UNCTAD had recorded 586 container vessels taking the longer route around Africa, while container tonnage moving through the Suez Canal had simultaneously fallen 82 percent. Spot rates—the price of booking a container on short notice—also rose by 256 percent during the same period on voyages from Shanghai to Europe.

The Suez Canal in Egypt. Credit: Unsplash/Samuel Hanna

For Yemen, the consequences could be especially severe. The country relies on imports for more than 90 percent of its staple foods, including about 90 percent of its wheat and all of its rice requirements. Much of that supply enters through the ports of Aden and Hodeidah. The World Food Programme estimates that 18.2 million people in Yemen require humanitarian aid, being in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection services.

Even considering that the Houthis formally exempt humanitarian cargo from the embargo, an escalation of insecurity can delay vessels and raise freight and insurance costs, deterring commercial shipping lines from calling at Yemeni ports. Humanitarian aid will not be nearly enough to replace the normal commercial flow of food and fuel, which affects Yemeni civilians first, who are already facing hunger and economic collapse.

The central question is not whether the Houthis can permanently seal Bab el-Mandeb. It is whether they can make the route risky enough that insurers, carriers, and oil traders abandon it themselves.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Investments in jobs, basic services and community infrastructure can reduce the pressures that drive displacement in Myanmar. Credit: UNDP Myanmar

By Norimasa Shimomura
YANGON, Myanmar, Jul 24 2026 (IPS)

When asked what development looks like today, a community leader in Kalaw township points to these fields. Once destroyed by a typhoon, they are now productive again. What began as emergency food assistance in the first month was followed by UNDP support in the community—seeds, training, debris removal, support to microbusinesses and small infrastructure—backed by the Republic of Korea, Norway and Switzerland. One year on, the fields sustain three annual production cycles—rice and flowers—with more resilient practices and higher yields. “This is what development looks like to us,” he says.

Communities in Myanmar today are not facing a single crisis. They are facing many, and layered on top of one another, recurring over time. Conflict, insecurity, economic uncertainty, market volatility and climate- and disaster-related shocks do not occur in isolation. Global crises are placing added pressure on already-stretched humanitarian and development financing. Together, these dynamics reinforce one another, creating a cycle that is harder to break. These protracted, compounding crises are reshaping the country’s social and economic fabric and putting communities under enormous stress.

Myanmar shows why separating humanitarian action from development no longer fits reality. Relief keeps people alive, but it will not on its own restart livelihoods, steady local services, increase risk preparedness or reduce the pressures that drive displacement. The smarter play is to link emergency support to a continuum of recovery, stabilization and longer-term development, backing community systems and local markets so today’s spending also buys a more durable future.

A crisis that feeds on itself

Myanmar is fragmented: conflict in too many areas, economic freefall in others, and climate shocks across the country—from floods and droughts to rising temperatures and environmental loss. But these pressures are connected. When livelihoods collapse, people move. When insecurity rises, local economies contract. When disasters hit, already-fragile services give way. Families then face hard trade-offs; taking on high-interest debt, moving to precarious urban fringes, attempting risky migration, or turning to illicit markets.

For many, participation in informal, and sometimes criminal economies is less a choice than a last resort. Others flee, often towards cities such as Yangon. But urban areas are already under strain. In peri-urban Yangon, poverty rates are estimated to be around 50 percent, and new arrivals stretch housing, services and jobs further, deepening vulnerability and inequality. Women shoulder this burden most heavily, with women-headed households in peri-urban areas more likely to have lower incomes, depend on precarious and poorly paid employment, and facing heightened safety concerns.

This is how the crisis sustains itself. Conflict and violence breed insecurity; insecurity forces people from their homes and pushes some into illicit economies; displacement fractures livelihoods and the resulting economic hardship reinforces instability. And so the cycle continues.

The limits of a humanitarian-only response

Myanmar has received humanitarian aid for decades. It remains essential. People need immediate support for food, shelter and protection. But the challenges Myanmar faces today are not only humanitarian. They are structural and long-term. When support can only be planned and financed in short cycles, it can help people survive, but without enabling them to rebuild livelihoods, restore services or reduce future risk. This can create dependence on humanitarian aid without a clear exit.

The question is no longer whether humanitarian support is needed—it clearly is—but whether it is sufficient on its own, and how development can help build resilience. To break the cycle, investments must also focus on recovery, livelihoods, risk preparedness, access to finance and local systems. The bridge between humanitarian action and development must be deliberately built. UNDP in Myanmar has designed a new phase of its Community First Programme backing community-led solutions that can absorb shocks now while laying foundations for medium- and longer-term development.

Where the bridge matters most

There are three areas where this bridge is critical.

By combining community-based approaches with more targeted economic interventions, it is possible to offer a more comprehensive response in a protracted crisis. Credit: UNDP Myanmar

First, livelihoods and early recovery. Investments in jobs, basic services and community infrastructure can reduce the pressures that drive displacement. When people have viable ways to earn a living, they are less likely to move out of necessity. This also reduces the burden on humanitarian systems and can be an immediate stabilizing factor.

Second, local systems and community capacity. Even in constrained contexts, support to community-level structures can have a powerful effect. It enables people to manage their own recovery, strengthens local decision-making and builds a sense of ownership. It helps communities to think longer term and create some community wealth. These are the building blocks of future governance.

Third, economic alternatives to illicit activity. When large parts of local economies in some regions operate in grey or black markets, the implications go beyond livelihoods, they affect national and regional security. Creating alternatives—through job creation, support to small businesses and financing—gives people options. It reduces reliance on illicit networks, lowers risks of exploitation and opens pathways for more sustainable economic activity. These directly affect stability within Myanmar and across its borders.

Navigating a complex funding landscape

Despite the clear need to bridge humanitarian and development approaches, funding structures often work against it. In Myanmar, much of the available funding is still categorized as humanitarian. This creates challenges for organizations with strong development expertise, which must adapt their language and delivery models to fit short-term funding criteria.

At the same time, partner expectations are evolving, but not always consistently. Some continue to fund purely humanitarian outputs. Others expect development impact from humanitarian interventions. Still others fund development but want to demonstrate humanitarian impact.

This creates a fragmented landscape: humanitarian funding for humanitarian results, humanitarian funding seeking development impact, development funding framed as humanitarian and, more rarely, development funding investing directly in long-term results.

Navigating this requires flexibility and clarity of purpose. Development actors must be able to articulate the longer-term impact of their work, even when operating in a humanitarian context. The value lies precisely in that distinction: connecting immediate interventions to sustained recovery and future stability.

A window of opportunity

There are signs of change. Some partners are beginning to recognize that continued investment in short-term relief, without parallel investments in recovery and livelihoods, is not sustainable.

This creates an opportunity. By combining community-based approaches with more targeted economic interventions—jobs, enterprise development, access to finance, climate and energy solutions—it is possible to offer a more comprehensive response in a protracted crisis context, one that addresses both immediate needs and underlying drivers of crisis. But this window may not remain open indefinitely. As other actors reposition and global priorities shift, the space for shaping this agenda could narrow.

Looking ahead

Myanmar’s challenges are complex but the direction of response is clear. Humanitarian aid remains indispensable. But on its own, it cannot break cycles of crisis that are structural and self-reinforcing.

Bridging humanitarian action and development is how people regain agency. It is how communities stabilize. And ultimately, it is how countries begin to move beyond crisis—not just survive it.

Norimasa Shimomura is UNDP Resident Representative in Myanmar.
Source: UNDP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Der ETH-Glaziologe Matthias Huss dokumentiert seit Jahren den Eisverlust in den Schweizer Alpen. Im Gespräch erklärt er, warum er trotz immer neuen «Hiobsbotschaften» weitermacht, seinen Kindern aber andere Berufe empfiehlt.

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Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the rapid battlefield adaptation that it has led to, defence innovation and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are being seen as key contributors to Europe’s industrial preparedness, production scalability and security of supply. To this end, recent European Union (EU) policy and financial initiatives have specifically targeted SMEs in the defence sector, to address the financial, regulatory and industrial bottlenecks facing SMEs in Europe. However, SMEs still face considerable challenges and barriers. This Study examines the evolving role of SMEs within the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). It specifically analyses the persistent barriers preventing SMEs from entering the defence market in Europe, and, once present, from scaling their innovation, services and products. The Study argues that, despite the growing political recognition of SMEs as sources of technological and disruptive innovation, SMEs still face considerable financial, regulatory and political barriers to access the EDTIB.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Against the backdrop of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the rapid battlefield adaptation that it has led to, defence innovation and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are being seen as key contributors to Europe’s industrial preparedness, production scalability and security of supply. To this end, recent European Union (EU) policy and financial initiatives have specifically targeted SMEs in the defence sector, to address the financial, regulatory and industrial bottlenecks facing SMEs in Europe. However, SMEs still face considerable challenges and barriers. This Study examines the evolving role of SMEs within the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). It specifically analyses the persistent barriers preventing SMEs from entering the defence market in Europe, and, once present, from scaling their innovation, services and products. The Study argues that, despite the growing political recognition of SMEs as sources of technological and disruptive innovation, SMEs still face considerable financial, regulatory and political barriers to access the EDTIB.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP