The Arctic and the Arctic-North Atlantic region are gaining in geopolitical relevance as Arctic shipping routes and resources become more accessible. Germany should step up its political, military and economic engagement in this part of the world. A successful German Arctic policy requires closer cooperation both with Arctic states and with partners in the EU and NATO, Germany’s stronger engagement with security policy and the improved integration of civilian and military capabilities. The Arctic-North Atlantic region is to be regarded as a single strategic space and viewed in the context of European security. For its part, Germany should actively contribute to the stabilisation of this space and help preserve the fragile balance in the Arctic. A German Arctic strategy should not only reaffirm principles such as those of a rules-based order and multilateralism; it should also seek to protect them by means of clearly defined political, economic and security policy instruments. In the long term, a German Arctic strategy must go beyond the 2024 guidelines and identify concrete steps to safeguard German interests in the region. It must also establish clear priorities, outline political and security-policy measures, mobilise resources and both generate and demonstrate overall capacity for action. Germany’s new Arctic policy should be more consistently embedded in a policy framework for Europe as a whole. By ensuring close alignment with EU foreign and security policy and playing an active role in the shaping of the EU Arctic strategy, Germany can represent its own interests more effectively and at the same time contribute to Europe’s capacity to act in the region.
Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud with Raphaël Wainstain.
OverviewOn 16 December 2025, the European Commission published the automotive omnibus as part of a broader automotive package aimed at supporting the sector in the transition to clean mobility. The automotive omnibus is the ninth set of simplification measures (also known as ‘omnibus packages’) that have been published by the Commission since 2025. Its purpose is to simplify the rules governing the EU automotive industry and improve coherence and consistency between different regulatory requirements. The two legislative proposals included in the package would amend the EU rules concerning tachograph obligations for electric light commercial vehicles (electric vans) and motor caravans, as well as those applying to speed limitation devices for electric vans. Additionally, the package would introduce a definition of a small electric car in motor vehicle legislation and authorise the Commission to adopt delegated acts to lay down the technical requirements for vehicle interoperability with charging infrastructure and grid. Furthermore, the proposals would simplify the rules for EU type-approval of new motor vehicles in terms of their sound level; remove some low-temperature laboratory tests from the Euro 7 Regulation; simplify Euro 7 rules for heavy-duty vehicles; and empower the Commission to adopt implementing acts on car data management.
Procedural information (1) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 561/2006, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2019/2144 and (EU) 2024/1257 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the simplification of technical requirements and testing procedures for motor vehicles and repealing Council Directive 70/157/EEC and Regulation No 540/2014Read the complete briefing on ‘EU automotive omnibus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Le gouvernement du Monténégro veut offrir la concession des aéroports de Tivat et de Podgorica à la société sud-coréenne Incheon Airport Consortium pour une durée de 30 ans. Les syndicats dénoncent ce projet alors que les aéroports sont rentables.
- Le fil de l'Info / Monténégro, Economie, Courrier des BalkansLe gouvernement du Monténégro veut offrir la concession des aéroports de Tivat et de Podgorica à la société sud-coréenne Incheon Airport Consortium pour une durée de 30 ans. Les syndicats dénoncent ce projet alors que les aéroports sont rentables.
- Le fil de l'Info / Monténégro, Economie, Courrier des BalkansIl est antivax, a été limogé de la police pour alcoolisme et vient d'être élu président du Parlement, ce qui laisse présager d'un retour au pouvoir de la droite. Lors de l'accession du populiste Zoran Stevanović à la tête de l'Assemblée nationale, ses partisans ont brandi un drapeau russe...
- Articles / Slovénie, Jansa, Politique, Courrier des BalkansRevue de presse du mardi 14 avril 2026
La plupart des journaux parus ce mardi 14 avril 2026 à Kinshasa se focalisent sur la percée financière historique de la RDC sur le marché international et sur les développements diplomatiques majeurs à l’Assemblée nationale ainsi qu’en Suisse.
By Jomo Kwame Sundaram
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)
Trump 2.0 has been marked by the blatantly aggressive exercise of power to secure US interests as defined by him. While many recent trends even predate his first term, his reduced use of ‘soft power’ has exposed his bullying, extortionary use of US power.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Rule of law?The US has illegally weaponised more laws and policies, especially by unilaterally imposing sanctions and tariffs, especially on dissenting regimes.
Often, such threats are not ends in themselves but actually weapons to strengthen the US bargaining position to secure more advantageous deals.
Under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, members are obliged to extend ‘most favoured nation’ status to all other member nations.
On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced supposedly ‘reciprocal tariffs’, ostensibly responding to others having trade surpluses with the US.
Appealing to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is futile, as the US has blocked the appointment of Appellate Body members since the Obama presidency.
Trump 2.0 has also been trying to get rich investors and governments – mainly from Europe, Japan, and the oil-rich Gulf states – to invest in the US.
Most such investments are in financial markets, rather than the real economy. Such portfolio investments have propped up asset prices, even bubbles.
Trump’s bullying is resented but has not been very effective vis-à-vis strong adversaries. Consequently, allies have been most affected and resentful.
Deepening stagflation
Meanwhile, much of the world economy has never really recovered from the COVID-19 slowdown, while Western sanctions and tariffs have raised production costs, worsening inflation.
Recent trends have also deepened the stagnation since 2009. Many governments and the IMF have made things worse by cutting spending when most needed.
Impacts have varied, generally worse in poorer countries, where the IMF limits policy options and credit rating agencies raise borrowing costs.
US Fed chair Powell’s interest rate hikes, ostensibly to address inflation, also reversed ‘quantitative easing’, which had lowered interest rates from 2009.
Trump’s aggression has reduced economic engagement with the US, inadvertently accelerating de-dollarisation, thus undermining the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’.
Central banks worldwide have responded predictably, refusing to be counter-cyclical in the face of economic slowdown, citing inflationary pressures.
Transactional?
Trump’s transactional approach has meant bilateral, one-on-one dealings, further advantaging the world’s dominant power.
Involving one-time asymmetric ‘zero-sum games’, such transactions ensure the US gains, necessarily at the expense of the ‘other’. Transactionalism also enables ‘buying influence’, or corruption.
The resulting uncertainty reduces investments, not only in the US, but everywhere, due to greater perceived risks, exacerbating the stagnation. Thus, Trump 2.0 policies have reduced investment and growth.
The whole world, including the US, has suffered much ‘collateral damage’, but the White House seems content as long as others lose more.
Unipolar sovereigntism
The transitions to unipolar sovereigntism and then to a multipolar world have been much debated.
Three decades ago, the influential US Council on Foreign Relations’ journal, Foreign Affairs, argued that the post-Cold War unipolar world was actually ‘sovereigntist’.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s ‘Daddy’ reference to Trump suggests that the sovereigntist moment is not quite over, as the US ‘No Kings’ mobilisation suggests.
Trump’s ‘America First’ clearly opposes multilateralism, generating broader concerns. He has withdrawn the US from many, but not all, multilateral bodies.
On January 7, the US withdrew from 66 international organisations deemed “wasteful, ineffective, or harmful”, addressing issues it claimed were “contrary” to national interests.
Trump’s continued, selective use of multilateral bodies has served him well, retaining privileges, e.g., permanent membership of the UN Security Council with veto power.
The UN Security Council’s Gaza ceasefire resolution was used to create and legitimise his Board of Peace, now touted by some as an alternative to the UN!
Trump will not withdraw from the WTO as its Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement is key to US tech bros’ trillions from transnational IP.
End of soft power
Some of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 20th remarks at Davos are telling:
“More recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.
“You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination… If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”
Besides exercising overwhelming military superiority, Trump 2.0 has increasingly weaponised rules, agreements and economic relations to its advantage.
The abandonment of ‘soft power’ – accelerated by Elon Musk’s DOGE – has ripped the velvet glove off US ‘hegemony’, exposing the mailed fist beneath.
USAID and other US government-funded agencies and programmes have been crucial for soft power, fostering the illusion of domination with consent. Abandoning soft power may well increase the costs of achieving America First.
IPS UN Bureau
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
Également dans l'édition de mardi : le prêt à l'Ukraine, Meloni contre Salis, le Parquet européen, l'« excellence » budgétaire
The post Le dernier homme d’Orbán à Bruxelles appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Les casques bleus de la MONUSCO ont remis, samedi 11 avril, quatre anciens otages aux autorités coutumières et aux forces de sécurité à Bunia. Il s’agit d’un policier, une femme, son enfant et d’un jeune homme qui avaient été enlevés par les miliciens de la Convention pour la révolution populaire (CRP) et qui ont réussi à s’échapper à la faveur d'opérations militaires.
La rentrée scolaire après les vacances de Pâques est perturbée dans plusieurs zones de l'Ituri en raison de l'insécurité. Dans les territoires de Mambasa et de Djugu, des dizaines d'établissements n'ont pas rouvert leurs portes lundi 13 avril, à la suite des exactions des rebelles ADF et aux opérations militaires en cours.