A plastic model of the famous “Ghost of Ukraine”, made of plastics that are based on oil products, a shortage of Persian Gulf oil may greatly affect the plastics industry in Asia.
As fluctuations in the oil and gas markets come from almost daily policy changes in the Middle East, purchasers of Persian Gulf dependant oil exports nervously plan contingencies on how to manage possible outcomes. While allies like Europe, South Korea and Japan try to figure out the intricacies of producing and manufacturing with reduced petroleum production, all industries try to adapt while missing key resources. Ironically, the oil based products used to make simple things like a model kit of some of the planes and ships now fighting as American icons in the Persian Gulf might not be able to be produced as the plastics used to make model kits will become harder to obtain with a reduction in petroleum products in places like Japan. Despite this, the larger effect of these policies is a benefit to Western aligned powers in the Asia-Pacific if it denies China the low cost energy imports it would need to fuel a war with Taiwan. While economic pains are temporary, all allied nations from Japan to India to Australia prefer not having to respond to a PLA attack on Taiwan when current Middle Eastern energy policy could prevent the next Great World War from commencing in Asia.
The source of indirect and direct funds and power for regimes like Cuba and China often came through oil supplies from places like Russia and Venezuela, with Venezuela replacing much of the free oil provided to Cuba by the Soviet Union after the Cold War. China was purchasing upwards of 90% of Iran’s sanctioned oil exports while also depending on Venezuelan and Russian oil and gas imports to run its growing economic boom, with many profits from their modern industrialisation going directly into China’s weapons manufacturing industry. While Russian and Iranian oil was sanctioned, many countries sought out low cost energy being sold by those regimes under sanction. With Western powers during the Ukraine War either denying energy exports to their allies, or simply purchasing Russian oil via third party countries that would send re-branded Russian oil into Europe, policies in Allied countries lead to the indirect funding of Russia’s war efforts. Effecting this dark energy exports market is key to ending adversarial funding for conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and a future conflict in Asia.
Unlike support by many in Russia for its Government’s actions in Ukraine, most of the Iranian population do not support their Government, and it would likely be the case that a conflict between China and most of their neighbouring countries would not be popularly supported by average citizens in China. The current policy approach in challenging Venezuela and Iran is being done in order to establish deterrent control over oil and gas that could tie any aggression to consequences. If China were to take military action against Taiwan or India, give overwhelming support to their allies, or attempt Covid 2.0 or increases in the Fentanyl trade, the West could strain China’s military complex by starving it of energy resources. This might be preferential to one of the largest naval engagements in human history and a massacre of young soldiers on both sides of the line. It is doubtful that many Chinese nationals would wish to die in that unneeded conflict, especially when they currently one of the most stable economic engines in the world economy with little restrictions by foreign powers on local rights issues. While a conflict with India in the mountain regions would be witnessed by few, a conflict with Taiwan would be seen by millions in cities and regions on the coast of China closest to Taiwan, with massive losses of young men being suffered by every family in the region. For most, the cost of a war with Taiwan is simply not worth the gains.
A thought experiment would be useful in a scenario where we consider not the interests of China’s ruling party elites, but that of the people of China itself. In the current conflict, it would be agreed by those on both sides of the fence that no one wants to put Chinese cities or their citizens in the dark, and like with the Iranian people, the conflict is with the regime and not the people who always made up one of the great cultures of humanity. We must consider that if China was a like minded democracy, what would their strategic initiatives be, and would they maintain the same adversaries due to that strategic position? With a current China and a Mirror Universe China, both countries would be able to maintain a strong industrial base, but like many Western economies, would be destined to be stable at around 3%-4% rate of growth. In both cases, the Government would be subject to the will of its people, with the current Government being afraid of its citizens uprising in tough times and the Mirror Universe version being constrained by elected votes and its international reputation. Both China’s would be challenged by competing economies from India, Japan and South Korea, but would also be integrated with those industries with a commonality of commercial entities present in all markets in the region. China would still look to expand its markets, its influence economically and culturally, and seek lost territories from when they were unable to challenge opposing powers. The difference seems to be one of stability through fear as opposed to peace through innovation, stability and strength. As long as the former is appeased and ignored while threats increase internationally, or overtly accepted as a mean to disrupt and dismantle healthy Western democracies, the potential of not only the Persian and Chinese people, but those young and innovative minds in the West will be subjected to an uncertain future. What is apparent is that freedom is a rare gift, coming from a long tradition of development, ideas and ethics, and is not a commonly occurred achievement throughout the history of human civilisation.
Das System internationaler Konfliktbearbeitung befindet sich in einer tiefen Krise. Entsprechende Instrumente wie UN-Friedensmissionen werden abgezogen, normative und machtpolitische Voraussetzungen wie eine US-garantierte internationale Ordnung gelten nicht mehr, und bisherige Abkommen haben zu oft eine Vertiefung gewaltsamer autoritärer Systeme statt deren Transformation bewirkt. Am Horn von Afrika zeigt sich diese Krise besonders deutlich. Stabilität brachten dort weder international erzwungene Friedensabkommen wie in Südsudan noch solche, die wie in Sudan 2020 praktisch ohne Mediation zwischen bewaffneten Akteuren ausgehandelt wurden. Regierungen wie die äthiopische haben Friedensprozesse vielmehr regelmäßig instrumentalisiert, um die eigene Herrschaft zu sichern. Jüngere Vermittlungsprozesse sind primär eine Funktion regionaler Rivalitäten und diplomatischer Interessen von beteiligten externen Akteuren, wie in Sudan seit Kriegsbeginn im April 2023. Ist wie hier ausländische Unterstützung verfügbar, haben Konfliktparteien weniger Anreize, sich auf Kompromisse einzulassen. Weil Mechanismen zur Umsetzung von Abkommen nur schwach ausgestattet sind und politisch wenig unterstützt werden, gibt es nach Waffenstillständen keinen inklusiven politischen Prozess, um die Konfliktursachen anzugehen. Erneute Waffengänge sind früher oder später die Folge. Für europäische Beiträge zur Konfliktbewältigung am Horn von Afrika sollten Lehren aus dieser Krise gezogen werden. Es gilt weder nostalgisch auf die weitgehend untergegangene Art der Konfliktbearbeitung zu blicken noch frustriert rein sicherheitsdominierten Ansätzen zu folgen. Vielmehr sollte Europa zivile Friedensinitiativen unterstützen, politische Gewaltökonomien auszutrocknen helfen und die eigene Zusammenarbeit mit konfliktverschärfenden Regierungen wie den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) überdenken.