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BNP Paribas Real Estate Holding GmbH: Frankfurt/Main (ots) - Der deutsche Investmentmarkt ist mit einem Transaktionsvolumen von gut 8,8 Mrd. EUR in das Jahr 2026 gestartet. Damit konnte das Vorjahresergebnis um rund 5 % übertroffen werden. Stärkste Assetklasse bleibt weiterhin das ...

KfW IPEX-Bank: Frankfurt am Main (ots) - - 100 Mio. EUR CAPEX-Fazilität für Bestellung von neuen Lokomotiven - Einsatz eines Förderdarlehens des KfW-Programms 269 (Investitionskredit Nachhaltige Mobilität Individualvariante) - Stärkt nachhaltigen und ...

Sie haben Millionen auf dem Konto. Doch dann beschliessen Eltern und Kinder gemeinsam: Wir geben dieses Geld ab. Und merken bald, dass sie Hilfe brauchen.

Die 10-Millionen-Initiative führe gar nicht zwingend zu einem Bruch mit der EU, betont die SVP. Im Asylwesen und beim Familiennachzug gebe es genügend Hebel, um die Zuwanderung zu drosseln. Doch stimmt das? Die Argumente im Check.

Research Industrial Systems Engineering (RISE) GmbH: Wien/Berlin/Leipzig (ots) - Gemeinsame Realisierung des Einsatzes von HSM-B (kartenlose Institutions-Identität) von RHÖN-KLINIKUM AG, DKTIG, D-Trust & RISE liefert wichtige Erkenntnisse für weiteren Rollout Seit Anfang Dezember 2025 führen ...

Die USA und Israel führen Krieg gegen den Iran. Der Nahe Osten steht unter Beschuss. Im Ticker halten wir dich über die neusten Entwicklungen auf dem Laufenden.

Mfor.hu: Gyengült csütörtök (4. 9.) reggelre a forint a nemzetközi devizapiacon. Az eurót reggel hat órakor 376,96 forinton jegyezték, magasabban az előző délután hat órai 376,10 forintnál. A dollár jegyzése 323,20 forintra emelkedett 321,71 forintról, a svájci franké pedig 408,45 forintra 407,55-ről. (MTI)

L’armée libanaise a annoncé fermer ce pont stratégique dans le sud du pays après avoir reçu une « menace israélienne de le prendre pour cible ». Situé dans la région de Tyr, il s’agit du dernier pont qui relie le nord et le sud du fleuve Litani. Plusieurs milliers de familles sont restées dans la région malgré les…

Shaun Hughes (left), WFP Country Director for Palestine, walks amid massive destruction in Gaza. Credit: WFP/Maxime Le Lijour
 
Excerpts from a statement by Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 2730 (2024) on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and the protection of United Nations and associated personnel.

By Tom Fletcher
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 9 2026 (IPS)

In 2025, at least 326 humanitarians were recorded as killed across 21 countries, bringing the total number of humanitarians killed in three years to over 1,010. We recognise, grieve and honour each of our 326 colleagues, and commit the work ahead to their memory.

Of those over 1,000 deaths, more than 560 were in Gaza and the West Bank, 130 in Sudan, 60 in South Sudan, 25 in Ukraine and 25 in [the Democratic Republic of the Congo].

That number – over 1,000 – compares to 377 recorded as killed globally over the previous three years – so that’s almost tripling the death count. This is not an accidental escalation – it is the collapse of protection.

These humanitarians were killed while distributing food, water, medicine, shelter. They died in clearly marked convoys and on missions coordinated directly with authorities. And, too often, they were killed by Member States of the United Nations.

Credit: WFP/Sayed Asif Mahmud / Source: UN News

Humanitarians know we face risks. It is the nature of our work, the places in which we operate.
These deaths are not because we are reckless with our lives. They are because parties to the conflict are reckless with our lives.

So, on behalf of over a thousand dead humanitarians and their families, we ask: why?

Is it because the world no longer believes in Security Council resolution 2730, in which you spoke with such moral urgency about ending violence against humanitarians?

Is it because international humanitarian law, forged by a generation of wiser political leaders for just such a time as this, is no longer convenient?

Is it because it is more important to protect those designing, selling, supplying and firing lethal weapons – including drones, cyber tools, artificial intelligence – than protecting us?

Is it because those killing us feel no cost for their actions? How many were prosecuted? How many of their leaders resigned? On how many investigations did the UN Security Council insist? Were you ever selective in your outrage?

Or is it because Member States see these numbers as collateral damage, part of the fog of war? Or worse, are we now seen as legitimate targets?

And perhaps the most chilling question: if these deaths were ‘preventable,’ why then were they not prevented?

Over 110 Member States have chosen to act together through the political declaration on the protection of humanitarians. Yet across multiple crises, humanitarians are not just being killed.

Our action is being restricted, penalized, delegitimized. We are told where not to go, whom not to help. We are harassed or arrested for doing our job. And we are lied about – and those lies have these consequences.

And, of course, when humanitarians are harmed, aid often stops. Clinics close, food doesn’t arrive. In Yemen, 73 UN and dozens of NGO personnel remain arbitrarily detained by the Houthis. In Afghanistan and Yemen, women humanitarians are prevented from doing their jobs.

In Gaza, Israel restricts UN agencies and international NGOs. In Myanmar, insecurity and access constraints cut off aid to over 100,000 people in a single month.

And in Ukraine, drone attacks have forced aid groups to pull back from frontline communities.

In all these cases, the results of the deaths of humanitarians are too often the death of hope for millions who rely on them. These trends, alongside the collapse in funding for our lifesaving work, are a symptom of a lawless, bellicose, selfish and violent world. Killing humanitarians is part of the broader attack on the UN Charter and on international humanitarian law.

International humanitarian law was never, and is not now, an academic exercise. In honour of our colleagues killed, and in solidarity with those now risking their lives, we ask you to act with much greater conviction, consistency and courage.

I normally conclude with three asks of this Council. But it seems insulting to over one thousand colleagues killed to echo back to you the commitments of SCR 2730: protection, integrity, accountability.

We come here not to remind you of these commitments, but to challenge you to uphold them.
Because if we cast aside these hard-won principles, then the integrity of this Council, and the laws we are here to protect, die with our colleagues.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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An den Schweizer Ski-Meisterschaften in St. Moritz holt sich Sandro Manser mit einer guten Fahrt den Titel. Im Ziel versucht er, den Ski-Flip von Didier Cuche nachzumachen – und scheitert.

Entre Viktor Orbán et le « boss » des Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine, Milorad Dodik, ce n'est pas de l'amour, c'est de la rage. Les deux hommes partagent tout : le nationalisme, la suspicion envers Bruxelles et l'amitié de Moscou. Et surtout la volonté de peser sur les équilibres des Balkans.

- Articles / RS sécession, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Orban Balkans, Relations internationales, Economie, Courrier des Balkans, Une - Diaporama

Entre Viktor Orbán et le « boss » des Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine, Milorad Dodik, ce n'est pas de l'amour, c'est de la rage. Les deux hommes partagent tout : le nationalisme, la suspicion envers Bruxelles et l'amitié de Moscou. Et surtout la volonté de peser sur les équilibres des Balkans.

- Articles / RS sécession, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Orban Balkans, Relations internationales, Economie, Courrier des Balkans, Une - Diaporama

« Nous avons encore des objectifs à atteindre et nous y arriverons soit par un accord soit en reprenant les combats », a déclaré mercredi le premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou dans une allocution télévisée. Le cessez-le-feu conclu entre Washington et Téhéran « n’est pas la fin de la campagne contre l’Iran (mais) une étape sur la voie qui…

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

Également dans l'édition de jeudi : l'Iran, Frontex, UE-Chine, la Hongrie, du café, l'OTAN

The post Orbán et la fin de l’histoire appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Egy igazán szaftos, melengető fogás, amelyben a puha csirkehús krémes-paradicsomos szószban fő össze, mellé pedig vajas, színes zöldséges rizs kerül. Tökéletes választás hétvégi ebédre vagy egy tartalmas hétköznapi vacsorára.

Print Pálya FőételKonyha Világ Servings 6 fő HozzávalókA csirkéhez:

• 500 g csirkemellfilé vagy csirkecombfilé
• 1 tk só
• ½ tk őrölt fekete bors
• 2 ek olívaolaj
• 1 tk őrölt pirospaprika
• 1 fej vöröshagyma
• 1 fej lilahagyma
• 3 gerezd fokhagyma
• 200 ml paradicsomlé
• 160 ml forró víz
• 10 g vaj
• 160 ml (legalább 20%-os) főzőtejszín
• 1 ek aprított kapor (elhagyható)

A zöldséges rizshez:

• 200 g jázmin- vagy basmati rizs
• 10 g vaj
• 1 tk só
• 400 ml víz
• 1 fej vöröshagyma
• 2 db kaliforniai paprika
• 2 db sárgarépa
• 1 db konzerv csemegekukorica

Utasítás

• A csirkét falatnyi darabokra vágjuk, majd megszórjuk sóval, borssal és pirospaprikával. Ezután meglocsoljuk olívaolajjal, és legalább egy órára állni hagyjuk.
• A vörös- és lilahagymát megpucoljuk, majd félkörre vágjuk. Kevés vajon egy serpenyőben megpirítjuk, hozzáadjuk a paradicsomlevet, a zúzott fokhagymát és ízlés szerint oregánóval, majorannával és bazsalikommal ízesítjük. Amikor kellően besűrűsödött, félretesszük.
• Egy másik, nagyobb serpenyőt felhevítünk, és közepes lángon aranybarnára pirítjuk a húst.
• Ezután hozzáadjuk az elkészült paradicsomos szószt. Majd felöntjük 400 ml tejszínnel.
• Ezután kb. 10-15 percig forraljuk, közben néhányszor megkeverjük.

A zöldséges rizs elkészítése

• A rizst kevés olajon megpirítjuk, majd felöntjük kétszeres mennyiségű vízzel, és kb. 20 perc alatt készre főzzük. Enyhén sózzuk.
• A hagymát, a paprikát és a sárgarépát megpucoljuk, majd apró kockára vágjuk.
• Egy másik serpenyőben kevés olívaolajon megpirítjuk a zöldségeket, amíg puha nem lesz a sárgarépa. Ha szükséges, kevés vizet öntünk alá. Majd hozzáadjuk a kukoricát.
• Végezetül pedig a megfőtt rizst. Jól összekeverjük, még 1-2 percig pirítjuk.

MegjegyzésekA krémes-paradicsomos csirkét bőséges adag zöldséges rizzsel kínáljuk. Friss salátával vagy savanyúsággal még teljesebb élményt nyújt. Jó étvágyat kívánunk!  

Kárpátalja.ma

The post Krémes-paradicsomos csirke illatos zöldséges rizzsel appeared first on Kárpátalja.ma.

Emmanuel Macron, a échangé avec ses homologues états-unien, Donald Trump, et iranien, Massoud Pezeshkian, sur la nécessité que le cessez-le-feu conclu entre les deux pays soit étendu au Liban. Le président français juge que c’est « une condition nécessaire » pour que cette trêve soit « crédible et durable ».

A Focus ügynökség által a 360tka.sk portál számára készített felmérés szerint a politikai vezetők közül Peter Pellegrini államfő bizonyult a legmegbízhatóbbnak, akiben a polgárok 40%-a bízik. A második helyen Branislav Gröhling (SaS) végzett (31%), megelőzve a PS elnökét, Michal Šimečkát, aki harmadik lett.