Feed aggregator

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief we argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing.

The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief we argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing.

The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war has produced what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude rose from around $70 at the end of February to a peak of about $140 in early April before settling around $100 as of early June 2026. In a new Brief we argue that the significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but in its timing.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Overcoming political divisions between Pro-France Loyalists and the Pro-Independence movement is a major challenge in ongoing negotiations between the French Government and leaders in New Caledonia to define the territory's future political status. Credit: Catherine Wilson/IPS

By Catherine Wilson
SYDNEY, Jun 17 2026 (IPS)

The French overseas territory of New Caledonia in the Pacific will hold elections on 28 June in the wake of the latest agreement on its political status with France being rejected. The representatives elected in the three provincial assemblies and territorial congress will then determine a new round of negotiations as the mission of achieving consensus on New Caledonia’s future continues.

New Caledonia is one of 17 non-self-governing territories due for decolonisation according to the United Nations. However, its highly divided politics is a major obstacle to reaching a unified agreement on its future. An estimated 41 percent of New Caledonia’s population of about 265,000 people are Kanak islanders, of whom most are Pro-Independence supporters, and about 24 percent are European, predominantly Loyalist voters.

“Our people are entitled to the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination… with a cycle of inclusive dialogues open to all components of our society, including youth, women, customary authorities and economic actors,” Pierre Chanel Tein Tutugoro, President of the Pro-Independence UC (Caledonian Union) Party in the FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) coalition, stated last year.

It is a view that resonates widely across the Pro-Independence movement. “Whatever the outcome [of the election], the state must play a strictly neutral role, working towards the emancipation of the Kanak people,” Maurice Sitrita, an Independence supporter in Noumea, told IPS. And in any future agreement, “the inclusion of Kanak sovereignty in the French constitution must not be called into question so that we can build the country together.”

Doriane Nonmoira of the Union of Francophone Women of Oceania, in New Caledonia, told IPS that there are currently five women candidates vying for primary seats in the June vote, including three Kanak women. “The upcoming elections will be the scene of a significant political transition for the country,” she said, emphasising that “decolonisation from France” was essential.

Meanwhile, the Pro-France Loyalists bloc is campaigning to strengthen security, the economy and unity while defending their place in the French Republic.

New Caledonia is considered a wealthy territory. Its GDP per capita is USD 29,213, compared to USD 6,425 in the nearby Melanesian state of Fiji, according to the World Bank, but there is deep inequality. A high standard of living, most visible in the capital, Nouméa, is supported by major annual funding of about 1.5 billion euros (USD 1.7 billion) by the French Government. Despite efforts to bridge the development gap, the poverty rate is still 30 percent higher in the outer Loyalty Islands, where the population is mostly Kanak, compared to the central Southern Province.

The last pact with France was the Noumea Accord, signed in 1998, following Kanak protests about dispossession and disenfranchisement in the 1980s. It stipulated the right of New Caledonia to hold referendums on its future. And following indigenous opposition to France’s policy of encouraging European migration to the islands, the territory’s electoral roll was restricted to Kanaks and long-term settlers only.

Kanaks are now better represented in the territory’s politics. From 2004 to 2014, the number of Loyalist seats held in the 54 seat New Caledonia Congress diminished from 36 to 29, while those held by Pro-Independence members increased from 18 to 25. And the current representative of New Caledonia in the National Assembly in Paris, Emmanuel Tjibaou, is a Pro-Independence Kanak leader from the rural North Province.

But three referendums on Independence have not led to a political solution. The first vote held in 2018 resulted in Loyalists securing 57 percent of votes, followed by 53 percent in the second 2020 referendum. The third vote in 2021, boycotted during the pandemic by the majority of Kanaks, saw an overwhelming 96.5 percent oppose Independence, an outcome that has never been accepted by the Independence movement.

Today a new strain of activism for self-determination is driven by the younger Kanak generation. They were a major presence in street protests that erupted in May 2024 following the French Government’s plan to expand the territorial electoral roll to include thousands of recent settlers. The electoral reform bill was then suspended after unrest resulted in loss of life, the destruction of homes, infrastructure and a shattered economy.

Last year, Manuel Valls, Minister for Overseas France, led new talks with both political camps to work toward a new pact on relations. The outcome was the Bougival Accord, an agreement of compromises, signed on 12 July 2025. It offered a New Caledonian ‘state’ within the larger nation of France with a further devolution of powers, such as foreign affairs, although France would retain defence and security. However, after further consultations, the UC party rejected the agreement in August. ‘As far as we’re concerned, Bougival, it’s over,’ Mickaël Forrest, UC Vice-President, told local media, claiming that ‘the document is perceived as a project for an agreement to integrate (New Caledonia) into France under the guise of a decolonization.’

France is unwilling to severe ties with New Caledonia, which represents a major strategic asset in the Pacific. It expands France’s exclusive economic zone, provides an important military and naval base in the region and inclusion in Pacific leadership forums.

However, Dr Pierre-Christophe Pantz, a researcher at the University of New Caledonia, told IPS that “the trauma of the events of 2024 has also played an important role [in negotiations], producing a coercive effect on national political leaders, who are often led to seek a rapid stabilisation of the local political system” rather than a sustainable long-term solution. But he added that “it is questionable whether there is any likelihood of an agreement that will have the unanimous support of all New Caledonian political forces.”

Yet the final failure of the Bougival Accord occurred in the French National Assembly, when parties across the political spectrum, legal experts and New Caledonia’s representative rejected the constitutional reform bill on 2 April.

Final preparations are now being made for this month’s election in which, despite protests two years ago, there will be an increased number of voters. In May, the French Constitutional Council approved the voter roll to include an extra 10,500 residents, both Kanak and non-Kanak, who were born in New Caledonia after 1998. French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said the reform was imperative to recognize the democratic rights of all people living in New Caledonia, with the restricted roll now denying 17 percent their right to vote.

The vote “should contribute to reshuffling the cards of the political balance of power in New Caledonia”, Pantz predicted, and “future negotiations will depend very directly on their updated electoral weight, which could strengthen or weaken certain political lines.”

At the same time, Nonmoira stressed there was a need for women’s voices, especially Kanak women’s, to be heard in political discussions, with their current absence leading to their exclusion in the territory’s future. “In a future agreement, France should be committed to legal and institutional decolonisation; New Caledonia should be accountable to CEDAW (Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women) and it should be stated that gender equality is an essential lever for building a peaceful future,” she declared, adding that “there will be no decolonisation without gender justice.”

After the election, all parties have committed to resume talks with France in July. But they will occur in an environment of uncertainty until the outcome of the next French Presidential Election in 2027.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');

 

Related Articles

• What Hungary’s New Pro-Democracy Government Means For Rule of Law
• Pacific Islanders Combat Mercury Poisoning of the Environment

Next ordinary AFET committee meeting will be held on:

Wednesday 24 and Thursday 25 June 2026, room ANTALL 4Q2, Brussels

Meetings are webstreamed with the exception of agenda items held "in camera".

AFET - DROI calendar of meetings 2026
Meeting documents
Webstreaming
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Next ordinary AFET committee meeting will be held on:

Wednesday 24 and Thursday 25 June 2026, room ANTALL 4Q2, Brussels

Meetings are webstreamed with the exception of agenda items held "in camera".

AFET - DROI calendar of meetings 2026
Meeting documents
Webstreaming
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Le président français Emmanuel Macron a reçu mercredi soir son homologue américain au château de Versailles pour un dîner en grande pompe, l'occasion de réchauffer les relations entre les deux hommes et leurs pays respectifs.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Zamponi.

General

The European Council will be preceded by pre-summit meetings of European political parties with their respective affiliated EU leaders. Additionally, a group of ‘like-minded’ countries on migration will also meet prior to the start of the meeting. Following a similar pattern, a new group of 17 leaders, including Germany, Belgium and Italy, met by videoconference on 8 June to discuss competitiveness issues.

As usual, the European Council meeting will start with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. For the first time, the report of the rotating Council Presidency on the follow-up to the previous European Council conclusions will be given in the presence of the European Parliament President. This report by Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides will include an overview of the implementation of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap signed in the margins of the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Cyprus in April 2026.

The membership of the European Council has evolved since the last European Council meeting. With the departure of Viktor Orbán, Emmanuel Macron is now the longest serving European Council member continuously in office (since 2017).

European Council meeting Ukraine

The discussion on Ukraine will start with an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who on 4 June 2026 published an open letter to President Vladimir Putin, proposing to end the war through direct engagement between the two leaders. The proposed meeting would take place in a neutral location ‘with active US and European participation’ and ‘the front line today [as] the line from which diplomacy must begin.’. Three days after the letter, President Zelenskyy issued a joint statement with the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, outlining five conditions for just and lasting peace.Thus, EU leaders may express the EU’s readiness to step up its engagement in peace negotiations.

In his invitation letter to EU leaders, European Council President António Costa underlined the effectiveness of the EU’s ‘two-pronged approach – supporting Ukraine and increasing pressure on Russia’. Concerning support for Ukraine, the European Council is expected to discuss intensifying efforts to rebuild critical energy and civilian infrastructure as well as accelerating the production and delivery of military equipment, notably ammunition, drones and missiles. As regards pressure on Russia, the European Council could reiterate the importance of weakening Russia’s economy and thus its ability to wage war. Following the unveiling of the 21st package of sanctions, which targets heavily the country’s banking system and crypto networks, EU leaders may call for swift adoption of the new package. In parallel, after asking in March 2026 for ‘the potential threat posed to the EU’s internal security by Russian ex-combatants having participated in the aggression against Ukraine to be assessed, the European Council could ask for further work to be carried out to address this threat, and possibly consider banning Russian citizens having served in the country’s armed forces since 2022 from entering EU territory. In addition, the call by 11 Schengen countries for stricter visa rules for all Russian citizens – which follows a surge in visas issued to Russian tourists in 2024 and 2025 – may also be raised.

Although not formally on the agenda, the topic of enlargement could turn out to be the subject of broader discussions. First, because EU leaders are likely to welcome the holding of the Intergovernmental Conference on the accession of Ukraine, and Moldova, to the European Union, and the agreement to open the fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. Second, because EU leaders may wish to underline the ‘new impetus’ given to the enlargement process at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro on 5 June and reiterate their support for the region’s path to EU membership in line with a merit-based approach. Third, because, after the Franco-German initiative of 4 June 2026 suggesting ways of gradually integrating candidate countries into the EU, the European Council may wish to discuss the ‘new ideas to streamline and accelerate the process,’ which, as President Costa stressed, are currently under consideration. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had previously addressed a letter to Presidents Costa, von der Leyen, and Christodoulides, proposing to grant Ukraine ‘associate member status’, while offering ‘observer status’ and access to the single market to Western Balkan countries.

Middle East

The European Council is expected to discuss the constantly evolving situation in Iran and the wider Middle East region. After the announced memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, which envisages an ‘immediate and permanent’ end of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, EU leaders may welcome the peace agreement and the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Due to be signed on 19 June, the agreement plans to ease sanctions and begin negotiations over nuclear issues. In a joint statement, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Cyprus and Greece, as well as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, expressed their readiness also to lift sanctions imposed on Iran and work ‘with the US, Iran and regional partners to … achieve a long-term diplomatic settlement’. Ahead of the G7 summit in Evian, President Costa signalled the EU’s willingness to contribute to a global strategy for a lasting peace in the Middle East. In that context, EU leaders are likely to discuss preparations under way aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in the Strait, and consider a possible reinforcement of the mandate of the EU maritime defensive operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES.

The European Council will also discuss the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. On Gaza, they may touch upon the preparation of restrictive measures against Israelis due to the treatment of activists who were bringing aid to Gaza. A number of Member States have increasingly become critical of Israel following the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters and the mistreatment of those on board, who included a number of EU citizens. As a result of the incident, Italy, which has previously blocked attempts to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement, called for sanctions against the Israeli Minister of National Security, Ben-Gvir. However, it remains unlikely that EU leaders will reach a unanimous agreement on calling for sanctions against a sitting Israeli Minister ahead of upcoming Israeli elections. Additionally, in the context of the EU leaders’ reiterated condemnation of unilateral Israeli action aimed at further expanding illegal settlements, the concerns expressed by several Member States regarding products from illegal Israeli settlements entering the European market may also be raised.

Next multiannual financial framework

Following a first discussion in April 2026, EU leaders will hold an exchange of views on the 2028-2034 MFF based on a new negotiating box with figures drawn up by the current Cyprus Council Presidency.

On the MFF, the dividing lines in the European Council are normally between the net contributors and the net beneficiaries.[1]The former group includes Denmark, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden; some of these Member States are known as the ‘frugals‘. The net beneficiaries meet under the name ‘friends of cohesion’ and include Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy,[2] Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.These two groups meet separately ahead of meetings in the Council, and sometimes the European Council, to coordinate their positions before the main meeting. Cyprus, as the current Council Presidency, and Ireland, which will take over on 1 July, do not formally attend these meetings, in order to remain ‘an honest broker’.

As in negotiations for previous MFFs, the usual dividing lines concern i) the size of the EU budget, ii) the balance between policy areas, iii) the existence and size of rebates, and iv) new own resources. An additional topic is the pace of repayment of the joint debt resulting from the EU recovery plan (i.e. Next Generation EU).

Regarding the size of the EU budget, the European Commission proposed a long-term budget of €1.789 trillion (in commitments over seven years in constant 2025 prices). While the European Parliament suggested in its interim report of 28 April 2026 a nominal increase of €175.11 billion (2025 constant prices) to this proposal, the frugal Member States have demanded to reduce the spending proposed by the Commission. The new negotiating box of the Cyprus Council Presidency, which only suggests an overall reduction of around 2 % of the original Commission MFF proposal, has received substantial criticism by the frugal Member States, the latter even expressing doubt over the Cyprus Presidency’s capacity to act as a ‘true honest broker’.

As regards the balance between policy areas, the friends of cohesion have, in a joint declaration of 25 May 2026, argued that the next MFF needed to provide sufficient resources for the cohesion policy, common agricultural policy and common fisheries policy. While some net contributors like Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have rejected this proposal, others such as France and Ireland were less opposed. In Chancellor Merz’s view, EU spending must be modernised to focus on investment in defence and competitiveness, with cuts to traditional farming and regional subsidies.

On the third point, the budget correction mechanisms – or ‘rebates’ – have been used in the EU’s long-term budget since the 1980s to compensate certain Member States for their financial contributions to the long-term EU budget. The suggestion to abolish these rebates has been put forward in several previous MFF negotiation rounds but has never been followed up on. In their joint declaration, the friends of cohesion have also called for the abolition of rebates, arguing that ‘there is no political or economic rationale for re-introducing them’.

Finally, on new own resources, the Commission submitted a proposal on 16 July 2025 suggesting new own resources on i) a corporate resource for Europe; ii) a tobacco excise duty own resource; iii) a share of the proceeds of the emissions trading system; iv) the carbon border adjustment mechanism; and v) a contribution on non-collected e-waste. At a discussion of EU finance ministers in October 2025, Ireland, Hungary, Finland and Sweden rejected outright any introduction of new own resources, while others such as Czechia and Poland criticised specific new own resources. In April 2026, the European Parliament put forward proposals on future own resources, suggesting to tax digital services, online gambling and crypto-assets. After the April 2026 informal meeting of EU leaders, President Costa signalled openness to considering the suggestions of Parliament, even if concerns have subsequently been expressed over their technical feasibility.

Closely related to discussions on the revenue side of the MFF are ideas put forward by President Macron and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in favour of new common borrowing and a rollover of the pandemic debt to finance the bloc’s shared priorities.

No decisions are expected at this European Council meeting; President Costa’s objective is to give further guidance to the incoming Irish Council Presidency as to the type of new own resources on which a compromise could be achievable. While President Costa has insisted on EU leaders agreeing by the end of 2026 – a timeline expected to be reflected in the conclusions – many Member States have expressed doubts over the feasibility of this timetable.

Global economic challenges

In an extremely challenging geoeconomic environment, EU leaders will hold a strategic debate over dinner on the global macroeconomic imbalances and their impact on EU competitiveness. Previously, in December 2025, they held a similar discussion on ‘Geoeconomy and competitiveness’. However, in six months, the global environment has altered significantly; as President Costa underlined, the discussion will thus aim to ‘develop a common understanding of the challenges and to provide guidance to the Commission on the way forward’. On the one hand, EU leaders will look at ways of strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness, but at the same time emphasise that fair competition at global level needs to be guaranteed.

In that context, without explicitly mentioning the country, Costa may intend to raise the issue of trade relations with China. Ahead of the European Council meeting, the EU foreign ministers discussed the topic in their meeting on 15 June, while ‘global imbalances’ are also likely to feature on the agenda of the G7 meeting in Evian, France on 15-17 June. The EU has defined China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. China is the EU’s third largest trading partner in goods and services after the US and UK, and the EU and China together account for 29.6 % of global trade. There is a long-standing trade deficit between the EU and China; most recently, the EU has been worried about a possible ‘China Shock 2.0‘, i.e. the large influx of state-subsidised exports of Chinese products such as electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels, as well as steel and chemicals. In March, five EU Member States (France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Lithuania) wrote a joint non-paper calling for tougher measures to counter abusive trade practises, without explicitly mentioning China.

Before dinner, EU leaders are expected to review progress made with the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda and the related roadmap, signed on the sidelines of the informal meeting in Cyprus in April. Thus, they will take stock of action aimed at strengthening the single market, enabling Europe’s industrial renewal, simplifying rules, reducing dependencies and encouraging innovation and investment. In the context of ongoing wars in Iran and Ukraine, which have disrupted global supply chains and fundamentally reshaped the EU energy markets, EU leaders envisaged in their March conclusions to return to the issues of affordable energy prices and the Energy Union 2030. They will probably review progress in ‘achieving Europe’s strategic autonomy, strengthening resilience, structurally lowering energy prices, and delivering the clean, abundant and home-grown energy needed to power the economy of the future’.

Although not officially on the agenda, the latest AI models and the challenges they may pose to EU citizens, companies and critical infrastructure may be discussed on the sidelines. US company Anthropic announced in April that it had built a new model, Claude Mythos, which was too powerful to be released to the public due to its extraordinary ability to identify security vulnerabilities in critical software, such as financial and healthcare systems and electricity networks. As a follow-up, the company created Project Glasswing with the aim of securing the most critical software by initially giving some 50 organisations access to the model so that they could identify and fix security problems. The European Commission has been in talks with the company to secure access to EU actors, and especially European banks have been vocal about the topic. On 2 June, the access was expanded to 150 new organisations, including the EU cybersecurity agency ENISA. However, on 12 June, the US administration ordered Anthropic to suspend access to Mythos 5 and Fable 5 models from all foreign nationals, citing national security concerns. This led to Anthropic shutting access to these two models from all customers. Following these developments, there were increasing calls in the EU to speed up the work on technology sovereignty.

European defence and security

Considering ‘Russia’s increasingly reckless and irresponsible behaviour towards EU Member States’, stressed by Costa in his letter to EU leaders, the latter may condemn Russia’s numerous violations of European airspace recently, such as in Romania and Latvia. They are also likely to reiterate the importance of the EU defence readiness agenda, in particular efforts to increase air defence and drone capacity. In that context, EU leaders could welcome the work in the Council on the action plan on drone and counter-drone security.

According to the defence readiness roadmap, the Commission, in cooperation with the lead nations of the capability coalitions, should expand the strategic dialogue with industry, host the first annual Defence Industrial Summit and present an overview of the industrial capacity ramp-up needed to ensure reliable supply for the agreed capability areas by mid-2026. As projects were to be launched in all priority areas within the first half of 2026, EU leaders may evaluate the progress made on these and all other aspects relevant to the defence readiness agenda.

EU leaders may call on the Parliament and Council to make further progress on creating a military mobility area, the AGILE proposal (which seeks to enhance the EU’s capacity to deliver defence innovation more rapidly and effectively), and the defence readiness omnibus.

Migration

Migration has been discussed at every European Council meeting in this institutional cycle, apart from the special European Council on defence in March 2025. EU leaders will again take stock of progress in the implementation of its previous conclusions on migration – this just a few days after the entry into force of the EU migration pact on 12 June. Likewise, EU leaders might welcome the recent provisional agreement of Parliament and Council on changes to EU policy on the return of non-EU nationals staying illegally in the EU.

Fight against illicit drugs

For the first time, the European Council will address challenges linked to the use and trafficking of drugs. While this topic was not mentioned in the European Council’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, it features in the European Commission’s political guidelines. EU leaders are expected to provide guidance for the implementation of the EU drugs strategy and the related EU action plan proposed in December 2025 to respond to the growing health, security and societal challenges posed by drug use and trafficking.The EU drugs strategy is based on five pillars: (1) enhancing preparedness and response; (2) protecting public health; (3) improving security and protecting society; (4) addressing risks and harms; and (5) building strong partnerships. On 5 June 2026, Justice and Home Affairs Ministers endorsed the EU drugs strategy and the action plan, adopting conclusions on jointly operationalising them to deliver on the key priorities aimed at reducing drug use and drug-related harm.

European Semester

As is usual at the June European Council meeting, EU leaders will discuss the country-specific recommendations to allow the conclusion of the European Semester cycle. Published on 3 June, the European Semester spring package includes tailored recommendations to each Member State to improve their economic performance. The Council will proceed to the formal adoption of these recommendations after the European Council has discussed them.

Notes

[1] Net contributors to the EU budget are considered to be the Member States who contribute more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive, and vice versa for net beneficiaries.

[2] While Italy is a net contributing country, it is part of the friends of cohesion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council, 18-19 June‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Wednesday 17 June

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 17 June

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 17 June

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 17 June

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Wednesday 17 June

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In today's edition: Chinese investment, EU leaders' summit, AI

In today's edition: made-in-Europe, China, pre-COP31 talks