Africa

The rugby team's first black captain on his work off the pitch since their World Cup win.

Parents are wrongly being arrested due to the stigma around female genital mutilation, campaigners say.

African leaders meet France's president over how to re-establish security in the Sahel region.

Yahya Jammeh was forced into exile in Equatorial Guinea in 2017 after 22 years of authoritarian rule.

The trial of Lamine Diack, the disgraced former head of athletics' world governing body the IAAF, will get under way in Paris on Monday.

TP Mazembe of DR Congo and South Africa's Mamelodi Sundowns survive scares to become the first teams to reach the African Champions League quarter-finals.

Both sides in Libya announce ceasefires, after pressure from their backers, Russia and Turkey.

Maxence Melo, the online freedom champion in Tanzania is apprehensive of what might happen in an election year

When Sunny's asylum application was refused, he took refuge overnight on London's buses - for two decades.

Zamalek beat Zesco United and JS Kabylie are held to a 0-0 draw by Raja Casablanca in the latest African Champions League group matches.

Grizelda Grootboom was tricked into sex trafficking by a "friend" and has written about her ordeal.

He implied that he saved Ethiopia from war but Ethiopia's leader received the peace prize instead.

The post India and Japan’s MPs Act Quickly to Implement Sexual and Reproductive Health Plans after ICPD25 appeared first on Inter Press Service.

By Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson
WASHINGTON DC, Jan 10 2020 (IPS)

Iran announced its fifth breach of the 2015 nuclear deal Jan. 5, stating that it “discards the last key component of its operational limitations” put in place by agreement.

In the Jan. 5 statement Iran said its nuclear program “no longer faces any operational restrictions,” however Foreign Minister Javad Zarif did say that Iran will still continue to “fully cooperate” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Zarif’s statement implies that Tehran intends to abide by the additional monitoring and verification measures put in place by the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Zarif also reiterated Iran was willing to return to compliance with the accord if its demands on sanctions relief are met.

The extent to which Iran’s breach increases the proliferation risk posed by the country’s nuclear program depends on what specific steps Tehran takes to act on the Jan. 5 announcement. The government’s statement did not provide details but mentioned that the cap on installed centrifuges was the only remaining limitation that Tehran has not breached.

Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran is limited to 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz for enriching uranium and 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow for isotope production and research.

Iran has continued to abide by those limits according to the most recent IAEA report in November, although it did resume uranium enrichment at Fordow in November in violation of the 15-year restriction on uranium activities at that site. Iran has also already breached the limits on the number of advanced centrifuges it is permitted to test.

Before the JCPOA, Iran had installed about 18,000 IR-1 centrifuges, of which about 10,200 were enriching uranium, and about 1,000 advanced IR-2 centrifuges, which were not operational.

Fordow housed about 2,700 of the IR-1 machines, of which 700 were enriching uranium. The remaining machines, including the IR-2s, were installed at Natanz. The JCPOA required Iran to dismantle excess machines and store them at Natanz under IAEA monitoring.

Iran’s statement that its nuclear program will now be guided by “technical needs” provides little insight into how many centrifuges Tehran may choose to install and operate. Iran has no need for enriched uranium at this time.

Its nuclear power reactor at Bushehr is fueled by Russia and the JCPOA ensures that Iran will have access to 20 percent enriched uranium fuel for its research reactor. The Trump administration has continued to waive sanctions allowing fuel transfers.

The ambiguity of the announcement gives Iran considerable latitude to calibrate its actions. Iran could choose to remain on its current trajectory by slowly installing additional IR-1 machines and enriching uranium to less than five percent.

Similar to Iran’s earlier steps, this will slowly and transparently erode the 12 month breakout time, or the time to produce enough nuclear material for one bomb, established by the JCPOA. The action would also be reversible, in line with Iran’s earlier violations, to keep open the option of returning to compliance with the accord.

Alternatively, if Iran wants to increase pressure more quickly, it could quickly install and begin operating its more advanced IR-2s and remaining IR-1s. There is also the possibility of further violating the provisions of the JCPOA that Tehran breached in 2019. Iran exceeded the limit on uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent uranium-235 in July by slightly increasing levels to 4.5 percent.

Resuming enrichment to 20 percent uranium-235, for example, could significantly shorten the breakout time. Iran enriched to the 20 percent level before negotiations on the JCPOA and officials have threatened to return to it.

While Iran’s breach of the deal came just two days after the U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian General and head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qassim Soleimani, Tehran’s Jan. 5 announcement was expected and not a response to Soleimani’s death.

Since Iran announced in May 2019 that it would respond to the U.S. violation and withdrawal from the JCPOA with its own breaches, Tehran has taken steps every 60 days to violate the accord.

Unlike past violations, Tehran did not specify that it will take another step to breach the deal in 60 days and referred to the announced action Jan. 5 as the “final remedial” breach. Iran still could take additional steps to further violate provisions put in place by the deal or reduce compliance with the JCPOA’s monitoring provisions.

The likelihood of further actions may increase if tensions continue to escalate after the death of Soleimani and Iran’s reprisal strike on bases housing U.S. troops in Iraq.

The post Iran Announces New Nuclear Deal Breach appeared first on Inter Press Service.

Excerpt:

Kelsey Davenport is director for nonproliferation policy at Arms Control Association, and Julia Masterson is research assistant

The post Iran Announces New Nuclear Deal Breach appeared first on Inter Press Service.

Niger and its neighbours are struggling to contain an Islamist insurgency in West Africa.

A selection of the week's best photos from across the continent and beyond.

The post Does Africa’s Food Future Really Lie with Young Farmers? appeared first on Inter Press Service.

Seventeen people have died in the country's biggest jail where it is feared another 100 are close to dying.

A girl runs outside a small community school in Korioume, Mali, where children lack basic equipment, including notepads and pens. Parts of the school have been attacked and in 2013 the village was a Jihadist stronghold. Credit: OCHA/Eve Sabbagh

By External Source
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 9 2020 (IPS)

The top UN official in West Africa and the Sahel updated the Security Council on Wednesday, describing an “unprecedented” rise in terrorist violence across the region.

“The region has experienced a devastating surge in terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets,” Mohamed Ibn Chambas, UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), told the Council in its first formal meeting of the year.

“The humanitarian consequences are alarming”, he spelled out.

In presenting his latest report, Chambas painted a picture of relentless attacks on civilian and military targets that he said, have “shaken public confidence”.

A surge in casualties

The UNOWAS chief elaborated on terrorist-attack casualties in Burkina Faso Mali and Niger, which have leapt five-fold since 2016 – with more than 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 alone as compared to some 770 three years earlier.

“Most significantly,” he said, “the geographic focus of terrorist attacks has shifted eastwards from Mali to Burkina Faso and is increasingly threatening West African coastal States”.

He also flagged that the number of deaths in Burkina Faso jumped from about 80 in 2016 to over 1,800 last year.

And displacement has grown ten-fold to about half a million, on top of some 25,000 who have sought refuge in other countries.

Chambas explained that “terrorist attacks are often deliberate efforts by violent extremists” to engage in illicit activities that include capturing weapons and illegal artisanal mining.

Intertwined challenges

Terrorism, organized crime and intercommunal violence are often intertwined, especially in peripheral areas where the State’s presence is weak.

“In those places, extremists provide safety and protection to populations, as well as social services in exchanged for loyalty”, he informed the Council, echoing the Secretary-General in saying that for these reasons, “counter-terrorism responses must focus on gaining the trust and support of local populations”.

“Farmer-herder clashes remain some of the most violent local #conflicts in the region” said SRSG Chambas to the #UNSC

The Special Representative outlined that governments, local actors, regional organizations and the international community are mobilizing across the region to respond to these challenges.

On 21 December, the ECOWAS Heads of State summit “adopted a 2020-2024 action plan to eradicate terrorism in the sub-region”, he said.

Calling “now” the time for action, Chambas drew attention to the importance of supporting regional Governments by prioritizing “a cross-pillar approach at all levels and across all sectors”.

Turning to farmer-herder clashes, which he maintained are “some of the most violent local conflicts in the region”, the UNOWAS chief highlighted that 70 per cent of West Africa’s population depend on agriculture and livestock-rearing for a living, underscoring the importance of peaceful coexistence.

The Special Representative also pointed to climate change, among other factors, as increasingly exacerbating farmer-herder conflicts.

“The impact of climate change on security also spawns a negative relationship between climate change, social cohesion, irregular migration and criminality in some places”, he upheld.

Stemming negative security trends

The UNOWAS chief noted that in the months ahead, Togo, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Niger would be democratically electing their leaders and maintained that “all-too-worrying” security trends must not distract from political developments.

“Unresolved grievance, incomplete national reconciliation processes and sentiments of manipulation of institutions and processes carry risks of tensions and manifestations of political violence”, he warned.

In the months ahead, Chambas stressed that UNOWAS would continue to work with partners on the national and regional levels to promote consensus and inclusiveness in the elections.

“As UNOWAS’ mandate is renewed, we count on the Council’s continued full support”, concluded the Special Representative.

The post ‘Unprecedented Terrorist Violence’ in West Africa, Sahel Region appeared first on Inter Press Service.

Credit: UN Development Programme (UNDP)

By Stephen Browne
GENEVA, Jan 9 2020 (IPS)

Like his predecessors, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has been pushing a reform program to help the organization adjust to the demands of contemporary global governance.

Over nearly 75 years, the UN has innovated and adapted. At first, humanitarian assistance was not envisaged to go beyond the needs of people displaced by global conflict. Yet that program now disburses nearly $30 billion a year through its largest field agencies, growth that has led to some radical changes in the organization.

The UN’s peacekeeping practices also had to be invented and have since adapted to intrastate conflict and global terrorism. Human rights was initially a verbal aspiration only.

But with the Universal Declaration in 1948, they have been enshrined in many covenants and treaties that have been overseen since 1993 by a high commissioner and a well-staffed office in Geneva.

That leaves the fourth pillar of development, where services, training and research are administered by more than 30 separately managed organizations and a similar number of departments, institutes and commissions.

The development system cries out for reform, but progress is continually frustrated by inertia. This sprawling organizational domain originally comprised the first specialized agencies, some predating the creation of the UN itself, and “brought into relation” with the organization in 1945.

Their parallel, independent existence has defied attempts to bring coherence into the UN’s development work, particularly as the “development system” grew.

More specialized agencies joined the family, and many UN funds and programs were established to respond to newly perceived development challenges, dispersing the UN’s development efforts further.

The UN Development Program (UNDP) was intended to act as principal funder and coordinator of the system. But each agency and organization of the system began to supplement its financial needs by going directly to the UN’s main donor governments, as UNDP became its own separately funded implementing agency. As a funding rival, UNDP could no longer be considered a useful coordinator.

What has emerged is an extensive web of patronage underpinning UN development. Northern countries patronize the UN selectively through their preferred organizations and funding patterns, to align with their own agendas.

Today, four-fifths of funding through the UN development system is earmarked by donors, while core funding has shrunk concomitantly.

Credit: FAO/Xavier Bouan

For their part, the governments of the Global South — and individual ministries in them — have also developed preferential relationships with individual UN organizations. So, whether patrons and patronized, member states see advantages in a disjointed UN system that keeps expanding in response to their demands and lacks a central blueprint.

Consequently, member states are largely satisfied with the status quo and reluctant to support more consolidation and coherence and less wasteful duplication and overlap.

More is better than less, and change is not primarily motivated by cost-effectiveness, which would be required for any organizational reform.

The pervasive patronage system goes a long way in explaining why conservatism prevails in intergovernmental discussions on reform. So why pursue reform if many of the member states are opposed?

The answer is that even if cost-effectiveness does not drive change, the fact remains that the UN could do more with less in the development domain, and it is for the UN organizations themselves to strive to be more valuable for “we, the peoples,” particularly in helping countries to achieve their own 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

A high-level panel in 2006 proclaimed the shortcomings of the UN development system as “Ineffective governance . . . policy incoherence, duplication and operational ineffectiveness . . . competition for funding, mission creep and outdated business practices.”

Ten years later, many of the same sentiments were echoed by an independent team of advisers. The latest reforms proposed by Guterres fully acknowledge the problems, but can they be resolved?

Take funding. Unwinding the patronage system will mean first shrinking the preponderance of conditional funding by donor governments. A new “funding compact” has been drawn up that aims to increase core funding from 20 to 30 percent and encourage more pooling of donor resources. It’s a start, although there is not much optimism that even these modest goals will be achieved.

Next, consolidation. The system is too large and unwieldy. The many governing bodies need to acknowledge their common interests and combine their oversight functions, reducing the tendency for the same governments to speak with different voices on different boards.

Again, the prospects for more united governance are not promising. Meanwhile, atomization at the field level has increased, with evermore numbers of representative offices, now over 1,400.

The answer has been to “deliver as one” with closer collaboration within country teams. In the latest reform, the transfer of responsibility for field coordination has been removed from UNDP and given to UN resident coordinators, reporting solely to the deputy secretary-general, Amina Mohammed.

These coordinators will also be given more staff and resources. These are positive steps. However, fewer than half of the developing countries have signed up to the One UN concept, favoring the patronage system.

A larger systemic challenge persists. Each of the main functions of peace operations, human rights, humanitarian relief and development in the UN system are still managed by separate clusters of entities, with separate funding sources and separate lines of vertical communication.

Except for a few crisis-prone countries, these functions are managed in isolation from one another.

So while development is “sustainable,” it does not incorporate considerations of rights inherent in the UN’s own concept of human development. There are humanitarian coordinators in addition to resident coordinators for development. Peace operations are still mainly concerned with mobilizing armed personnel.

Belatedly, there are new attempts at management reform, which is welcome. But here, again, there are flaws, starting with senior appointments. While the current secretary-general was appointed through a more meritocratic process, there has been no departure from the double jeopardy that allows the veto-wielding powers — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to choose both their own top posts and the incumbents in the UN secretariat.

Management comes from the top, and this second form of UN patronage hurts chances for a more effective UN. Considerations of geography and gender cannot take precedence over the “highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity” enshrined in the language of the Charter.

“Reform, that you may preserve,” said Thomas Macaulay, the British politician and essayist, nearly 200 years ago. The continued life of the UN, particularly in development, depends on its ability to change.

*The post Can UN Development Be Reformed? Not at This Rate appeared first on PassBlue.

The post Can UN Development Be Reformed? Not at This Rate appeared first on Inter Press Service.

Excerpt:

Stephen Browne, PassBlue*

The post Can UN Development Be Reformed? Not at This Rate appeared first on Inter Press Service.