Africa

A group of domestic workers gather at their union headquarters in Rio de Janeiro for a class on the law that sets out the rights and obligations of domestic work in Brazil. Learning about the law helps these women defend their rights and combat the vulnerability many of them of them face in the solitude of their employers’ homes. CREDIT: Courtesy of STDRJ

By Mario Osava
RIO DE JANEIRO, Apr 20 2022 (IPS)

The Theater of the Oppressed helped her become aware of the triple discrimination suffered by black women in Brazil and the means to confront it, such as the Rio de Janeiro Domestic Workers Union, which she has chaired since 2018.

Maria Izabel Monteiro, 55, came to work in Rio de Janeiro when she was still a teenager, from Campos dos Goitacazes, a city of half a million inhabitants located 280 kilometers away. She has had jobs in commerce and industry, but for most of her life she has worked in other people’s homes.

She began by taking care of a sick elderly woman in Ipanema, an affluent neighborhood next to the beach of the same name. She replaced a white nurse who ate breakfast with the family. But she, the new black caregiver, did not have a place at her employers’ table.

Monteiro believes that all the prejudices of Brazilian society are concentrated in their most acute form against domestic workers, especially if they are black women. They suffer triple discrimination, for being poor black women.

This reality is often addressed by the group Marias do Brasil, created by domestic workers, which adopted the techniques of the Theater of the Oppressed, a method created by Brazilian playwright Augusto Boal (1931-2009), which turns spectators into actors to act out everyday situations and raise awareness.

“It’s pedagogical theater, not therapeutic,” said the trade unionist and actress, who works miracles to juggle her weekly shift at the union, the theater and her work as a domestic.

Monteiro lives in Duque de Caxias, a town of 930,000 near Rio de Janeiro, from where she spoke to IPS. It takes her about an hour by train and subway to get to the house where she works and to the union headquarters, near the city center, and transportation costs her about 10 dollars a day.

Sometimes she and the union directors sleep in the organization’s office to save time and the cost of transportation.

The union has 2,000 registered members, although a smaller number are active. Even though the members are women, the name of the union still uses the masculine form of the word “domesticos” rather than the feminine “domesticas” because it was founded in 1989 before gender-inclusive language came into use in Portuguese. However, the women are thinking of changing the name, as similar unions have done in other parts of the country.

Roseli Gomes do Nascimento suffers frequent acts of discrimination for being a black woman who lives in a poor neighborhood, the Rocinha favela, which sits on a hill between two of Rio de Janeiro’s wealthiest neighborhoods. CREDIT: Courtesy of RG Nascimento

Racist and anti-poor violence

Roseli Gomes do Nascimento, 60, frequently suffers acts of racism and anti-poor discrimination living in Rocinha, the largest favela or shantytown in Rio de Janeiro, which sits on a hill between two wealthy neighborhoods: São Conrado and Gávea.

A taxi driver, for example, once refused to take her from São Conrado to Copacabana, a middle-class neighborhood known for its famous beach. “He said he didn’t drive that route, but he clearly expressed his prejudice that the poor can’t afford to use cabs,” Gomes told IPS, to illustrate the aporophobia – rejection of the poor – with which she lives on a daily basis.

Being followed around by security guards in shops or being denied entry to the buildings where her employers live, until someone talks to the doormen, are other forms of hostility and prejudice faced by Gomes, who currently works as a nanny taking care of a child three days a week.

Her neighbors in Rocinha, whose population is estimated at 70,000 to 150,000, are victims of constant racist violence, “but few complain to the police,” lamented Gomes, who is now determined to speak out against the discrimination she suffers.

Racism has been a crime under Brazilian law for more than 70 years, but the law is almost never enforced.

However, several scandals involving black people tortured and killed apparently because of their skin color, and anti-racist campaigns, have made more people question the impunity surrounding racism.

The Theater of the Oppressed, a method that turns ordinary people into actors to dramatize and comprehend their own situations, helped Maria Izabel Monteiro become a social activist and president of the Domestic Workers Union of Rio de Janeiro. CREDIT: Courtesy of MI Monteiro

Unfair labor relations

Monteiro says labor relations are the greatest reflection of the oppression of black women, a lingering legacy of slavery, which was not abolished in Brazil until 1888.

The Consolidation of Labor Laws, approved in 1942 and containing many of the rights still in force today in Brazil, excluded domestic and rural workers, the very sectors where female labor is abundant.

Women account for 92 percent of domestic workers in Brazil, and black women account for two thirds. A total of 6.3 million people were employed in domestic work in 2019, prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to official data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.

More than two thirds of female domestic workers are informally employed, which facilitated massive layoffs during the pandemic. They lost 1.5 million jobs, according to Hildete Pereira de Melo, a specialist in gender and economics and professor at the Fluminense Federal University, located in a city near Rio.

As a result, the overall unemployment rate in late 2021 stood at 11.1 percent, compared to 16.8 percent for women and 19.8 percent for black women, according to the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies.

In 1972, a new law recognized some labor rights for women, which were consolidated and expanded by the constitution adopted in 1988. But the real breakthrough only occurred in 2013, with the approval of a constitutional amendment that established rights for domestic workers such as minimum wage, Christmas bonus, vacation days, maximum working day of eight hours and maternity leave.

In other words, they were granted almost the entire list of rights in effect under the labor legislation at the time.

But part of these conquests were lost in 2017, when Congress made labor laws more flexible, for example making it possible to pay domestic workers strictly according to the hours worked, under a new “intermittent work” contract treating them as casual workers, effectively cutting their pay, although it did maintain their rights, Monteiro said.

The Domestic Workers’ Union of Rio de Janeiro organizes talks with specialists and debates on labor rights issues with interested women. On this occasion, they were given orientation on the specific regulations for domestic work. CREDIT: Courtesy of STDRJ

Harassment and violence

Her union assists many women workers, most frequently helping them report rights violations. “But the first part of the complaint is emotional, not labor-related. We offer psychological support, and that’s where my experience in the theater has helped me out,” she said.

Harassment is the most frequent problem reported. Employers pressure domestics to get them to resign, instead of firing them, to avoid paying greater social benefits.

“Things disappear and suspicion is raised about the domestic worker, money is left lying around in visible places, as a trap to accuse them of theft, doubts are cast on what the employees say, with insistent questions such as ‘are you sure?’” Monteiro described.

The domestics feel unprotected, “they are on their own, facing their employers,” generally the husband and wife, and sometimes other family members, she said. For this reason, the union provides a lawyer and seeks a direct dialogue with the employers.

Black women occupy the last rung in terms of remuneration for work, in a ranking in which white men are first, followed by white women and black men. Black men earn more than black women, even though the latter have more schooling on average in Brazil, said researcher Pereira de Melo.

In other words, “the reward for education is higher for men than for women – inequity that rests on policies that Brazilian society should discuss,” she said.

In addition, black women account for 65.9 percent of the victims of obstetric violence and 68.8 percent of all women murdered by men, according to the Patricia Galvão Institute, dedicated to feminist-oriented communication.

This is much higher than the black proportion of the Brazilian population, which is 56 percent of the 214 million inhabitants of this South American country.

Black women comprised 66 percent of the 3,737 women murdered in 2019, according to the Atlas of Violence drawn up by the Brazilian Forum for Public Safety, a non-governmental organization of researchers, police and representatives of the justice system.

The Ethiad Towers

By Jan Lundius
STOCKHOLM, Apr 20 2022 (IPS)

I recently visited Abu Dhabi and my impressions became intermingled with worries about the war in Ukraine. I also happened to read Livy’s The Early History of Rome, written around the beginning of CE, coming across these lines:

The study of history is the best medicine for a sick mind; for in history you have a record of the infinite variety of human experience plainly set out for all to see; and in that record you can find for yourself and your country both examples and warnings; fine things to take as models, base things, rotten through and through, to avoid.

This statement and the fact that Livy highlighted decisions made by specific persons, made me think of Vladimir Putin and his recurrent references to history, while claiming that Ukraine is part of Russia and using this argument for wreaking havoc on an entire nation.

The current situation in Ukraine can be traced back to the aftermath of World War I – the splitting up of eastern Europe along ethnic demarcations, the Soviet Union’s struggle for hegemony over Ukraine, expressed through violent suppression of nationalism, struggle against other nations’ interests in the area, forced collectivization, Stalin’s political repression and several other measures with lingering effects.

Abu Dhabi´s current state of affairs is also a result of World War I, the actions of foreign nations and initiatives of a singular individual. The power exercised by Great Britain over the area that would become Abu Dhabi was however far more peaceful than Soviet Union’s and Germany’s assaults on Ukrainian wellbeing, though nevertheless largely blind and deaf to the needs and wishes of the local population. Abu Dhabi’s history was not influenced by the twisted minds of despots, like Stalin, Hitler and Putin, but impacted by a more enlightened leader – Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

In the early 1800s the British Empire made agreements with rulers of the seven emirates that eventually became the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The main purpose was to protect British-Indian trade routes from pirates. After piracy had been suppressed, other considerations came into play, such as a strategic need to exclude other powers from the region. Following their withdrawal from India in 1947, the British maintained their influence in Abu Dhabi, while their thirst for oil increased.

After World War I, France and Britain divided the vanquished Ottoman Empire along a straight line across the Middle East. Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula ended up within the British” sphere of interest”. After the Suez crisis in 1957 and the Khartoum meeting in 1967, when Arab leaders declared they would never accept the State of Israel, the British announced their intention to withdraw from all territories east of Suez. British dominance had become too expensive and precarious, though Britain still hoped to maintain control of Abu Dhabi’s so far quite unexploited oil, particularly since the Emirate’s ruler, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan, was considered to be opposed to all change, affected as he was” by a noble but untimely nostalgia for the traditional Arab way […] and a reluctance to part with his money.”

Competitors from Japan, France, Germany, Italy and the US swooped in on the British monopoly and consumers moved away from British goods, something that eventually spelled the end of the British/French Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which until the beginning of the 1960s controlled almost all oil production around the Persian Gulf.

In the early 1960’s, Abu Dhabi had no roads, no hospital, no school (except a few boys attending a Quranic school, 98 percent of the population was illiterate). It was an even worse backwater than before since cultivated pearls had put an end to revenues from pearl fishing. The emirate’s capital consisted of a stone building occasionally housing representatives of the British Government and some huts clustered around Qasr Al Hosn, the fort of the emirs of the House of Nahyan.

Abu Dhabi by the end of the 1950s

Before 1971, the Abu-dhabians were not dealing with government bureaucracy, or large organiza-tions. If they had concerns they were aired to their tribal chief when he” sat” in the majlis, commu-nity gathering. The British adventurer Wilfred Thesiger recalled a majlis when a barefooted Sheikh Zayed sat amidst “his men”. Zayed had a “a strong, intelligent face, with steady observant eyes, and his manner was quiet, but masterful […] he wore a dagger and cartridge-belt; his rifle lay on the sand beside him.” The Sheikh was respected for the “force of his character, his shrewdness, and his physical strength”. Thesiger described a world of bandits and emirs with armed retinues, several wives and slaves and a passion for falconry. His first meeting with Sheikh Zayed took place in 1948.

I thought about this while I stood by the panoramic windows of our friends’ apartment at the fifty-second floor of one of the impressive Ethiad Towers, taking in a view of the azure blue waters of the Gulf, and the luxurious Qasr al Watan, the recently constructed royal palace and centre for UAE’s government, which actually is one of the most stunning buildings I have seen. It was hard to believe that this opulent, well organized, extremely clean and very secure nation in just a few years had risen from the sands of a dirt-poor Bedouin realm.

In his five-volume epic Cities of Salt Abdelrahman Munif told how rapid modernization affected poor people in a coastal area of the Arabian peninsula. Munif’s novels are saturated in symbolism, have no heroes, while thousands of names and persons pass by, creating an intricate web of voices and stories. Most stories are concentrated to an imaginary town/state called Harran, which reminds of almost any town in the Arab oil rich peninsula – a world of myths, tales and songs, which gradually turns into a vision of a modern society with all its complications and differences between rich and poor, the powerful and the powerless, folk religion and secularism.

Munif’s stories provide depth and understanding to the transformation of Abu Dhabi; how oil, sud-denly erupted from the barren ground and changed everything. How difficult it was for people to adapt to and benefit from this change, while old ideas linger under the surface.

In the case of Munif, whose books are forbidden in Saudi Arabia, though allowed in the UAE, it is evident that he considered the present rulers of oil rich Arabian countries to be blinded by greed and power. However, my short visit to Abu Dhabi made me assume that this nation’s development differed from Munif´s bleak view and one reason for this might have been the personality of Sheikh Zayed.

In 1966, Thesiger’s friend Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan ousted his brother Sheikh Shakhbut and become the authoritative ruler of Abu Dhabi. He had realized the importance of public backing in return for improvements in living standard, including jobs, homes, health care and education. After the British withdrawal in 1967 Sheikh Zayed opened his country to a massive immigration of skilled workers, though a clause stated that an expatriate could apply for citizenship only after residing in the country for no less than 30 years. Nevertheless, similar rights and obligations were to be applied to all inhabitants of the country.

Obligatory schooling for boys and girls was introduced, universities were founded, freedom of religion established, though state censorship of all media maintained. Roads were constructed and common access to drinkable water and health care secured. Above all, Sheikh Zayed renegotiated oil concession agreements, securing that Abu Dhabi obtained the majority of the shares in all oil production, ending a British monopoly on oil extraction.

Apart from consolidating the wealth and power of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed was also the driving force for uniting the Gulf emirates and on 2 December 1971 the UAE was proclaimed. Currently, the Federation has a yearly GDP of approximately 400 billion USD, with a third emanating from oil revenues, of which Abu Dhabi accounts for nearly 94 percent. Efforts to limit oil dependency are impressive; far-reaching innovations are made to introduce non-fossil fuelled energy, water desalination, and recycling.

Of the 9.9 million people currently living in the UAE, approximately 12 percent are UAE citizens, while the remaining 88 percent are expatriate workers. UAE’s rulers answered to their citizens needs and demands by providing general well-being and security and it appears as if they in a similar manner currently are limiting expats’ political participation, appeasing them by offering a steady income, and security.

However, concerns are voiced that an economy which currently moves from oil dependency to-wards becoming dependent on commerce, financial services, real estate and tourism is attracting money laundering, trafficking and other illegal activities. A situation that might be worsened by the unchecked power of a few wealthy individuals.

The emirs of UAE’s member states continue to be supreme rulers and no political parties are al-lowed. Admittedly, a Majlis functions as legislative body – 40 members are chosen by the Federa-tion’s rulers, while 20 are elected by a hand-picked group constituted by 12 percent of UAE citi-zens. However, the Majlis has only advisory powers.

Abu Dhabi is governed by the Nahyan family, which 200 male members share a wealth of 150 bil-lion USD. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed has for 18 years been the emir of Abu Dhabi and president of the UAE. He is also one of London’s wealthiest landlords, where his property empire is worth £5.5 billion and furthermore owner of Azzam, the world’s largest and most luxurious yacht.

After Sheikh Khalifa in 2014 allegedly suffered a stroke, his thirteen years younger half-brother Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s Armed Forces, became de facto ruler of Abu Dhabi. Among other tasks the prince is in charge UAE’s for-eign relations. UAE is currently an essential member of a Saudi-led coalition that wages war in Yemen.

Putin has called Zayed Al Nahyan, colloquially known as MBZ, an “old friend” and regularly talks with him on the phone. MBZ brokered talks between Russia and the Trump Administration and appears to be an integrated member of a secretive, global world, where big money and friendship are intermingled in a manner that is almost impossible to entangle.

In the greater scheme of things, the UAE is actually operating outside a conventional “liberal, Western-based system” and is increasingly becoming more aligned towards the east. The UAE is China’s largest Arab trade partner and accounts for 28 percent of China’s total non-oil trade with the region, serving as focal point for the re-export of Chinese goods to the wider Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, in recent years the UAE has sided more often with Russia than with the US, including rapprochement with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and Libya’s Khalifa Haftar, both backed by Russia. One reason for seeking Russian support is that the UAE, together with Saudi Arabia and Israel, fears Iran and Shia-backed militia like Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis. The UAE is currently buying arms from Russia and Vladimir Putin and MBZ did less than a month ago discuss ways to ensure stability to the energy market, at the same time as UAE continues to perform its political balancing act between East and West and has for example sent 100 tonnes of humanitarian aid and ambulances to Ukraine.

From being a poor, Bedouin nation Abu Dhabi is now a wealthy and influential player on the global scene. It remains to be seen if its leaders from its unique history, in Livy’s words, have learned to recognize “fine things to take as models, and base things, rotten through and through, to avoid.”

Main sources: Al Fahim, Mohammed A. J. (2013) From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi: Makarem. Maitra, Jyanti and Afra Al-Hajji (2016) Qasr Al Hosn: The History of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi 1793-1966. Abu Dhabi: National Archives. Munif, Abdelrahman (1987) Cities of Salt. New York: Vintage. Thesiger, Wilfred (1991) Arabian Sands. London: Penguin.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A woman uses a three-stone fire. The method consumes a lot of mangrove wood, which is impacting the livelihoods of the local community. By growing fast-growing trees, the pressure on the mangrove is lessened. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

By Joyce Chimbi
Nairobi, Kenya, Apr 20 2022 (IPS)

Despite an abundance of fisheries reserves along Kwale County’s lush coastline located on the south coast of Kenya, fishers can no longer cast a net just past the coral reef and expect an abundant crab or prawn harvest.

Fishing is the community bedrock accounting for at least 80 percent of the economy, and Mwanamvua Kassim Zara, a local fish trader, tells IPS fish stock has declined significantly.

Fish prices are at an all-time high, especially for Dagaa, a tiny silverfish and a household staple food in Vanga Bay Village. Vanga bay is one of 40 boat landing sites in the coastal Kwale County.

“I buy a bucket of fish from the fishermen at 40 to 45 dollars, up from 20 to 25 dollars. The high prices are then transferred to our customers who buy one kilogram of boiled, dried, and salted fish at 3 dollars up from 2 (dollars),” she says.

Experts say these are effects of climate change driven and accelerated by human activity, and the community is feeling the heat.

“The community’s attempts to diversify into maize and rice farming have been unsuccessful because of very high tides from the Indian Ocean and consequent flooding of adjacent paths and rice farms. Another effect of climate change,” says Richard Mwangi from Kenya Forest Services.

More than twenty years ago, this was not the case. The community’s first line of defence against Indian Ocean related catastrophes was intact due to an expansive Vanga Forest spanning over 4,428 hectares, approximately 10,900 acres.

Since then, approximately 18 hectares of mangroves have been lost every year for over 25 years due to over-harvesting of mangroves for fuel and cheap building material, according to the Kenya Forest Service.

“Despite a decline in fish population and scarcity in certain fish species, Vanga is still reliant on fishing, and small-scale fish traders solely use wood fuel to boil dagaa for sale. At least 87 percent of households in this community rely on mangrove wood for energy,” Mwangi tells IPS.

Destruction of the forest has significantly compromised Vanga Bay’s Ocean ecosystems, says Professor Jacinta Kimiti of South Eastern Kenya University’s School of Environment, Water & Natural Resources.

“Coastal ecosystems are extremely important in capturing carbon emissions and supporting livelihoods such as fishing and tourism. Importantly, mangrove forests are a breeding area for fish,” she says.

Left vulnerable and exposed to a myriad of climate change-related challenges, the community is taking the pressure off the mangrove forest by planting at least two hectares of fast-growing tree species to meet the community’s domestic energy needs. These five acres of woodlots will be used by three adjacent villages, Vanga, Jimbo and Kiwegu.

Zara says the community is open to more effective fish preparation technologies to protect mangroves because current methods rely on open three-stone fires that consume a lot of mangrove wood. She indicates that a well-wisher recently donated a large energy-saving stove for communal use.

Mwangi says wood fuel is similarly central to domestic life in Africa, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. He stresses that, as the Vanga community has discovered, current wood energy systems are not sustainable and are a major threat to livelihoods.

According to the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), more than 63 percent of people in Africa have no alternative to wood, relying on wood fuel as their primary energy source. Approximately 90 percent of wood extraction in Africa is used for fuel.

The International Energy Agency’s regional energy outlook warns that wood fuel will remain central to Africa’s future as the primary energy source because cleaner alternatives or sustainable fuels remain out of reach.

Dr Julius Ecuru, Manager at BioInnovate Africa at the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE), tells IPS that sustainable fuel is fuel obtained from biologically based feedstock such as wood, crops like sorghum and sugar cane, or algae, as well as other agricultural waste.

“We can use this feedstock also to produce fuel that has the same chemical composition and quality as the fossil fuel used in jet engines or aeroplanes. If used in this way for jet engines, we refer to it as sustainable aviation fuel. With respect to cooking fuel for household use, sustainable fuels can be prepared or blended in specific ways, but this is yet to gain traction,” he explains.

“Meanwhile, regarding natural wood or wood fuel, households and communities can be encouraged to plant fast-growing or maturing trees, like the Grevilia tree, which has multiple uses. Its regularly pruned branches can, for example, be used as firewood. It also has good soil conserving properties.”

Research by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) finds that, like the Vanga Forest, Miombo Woodland, an African dryland forest ecosystem, is similarly at risk of over-harvesting and destruction of livelihoods.

The forest covers an estimated 2.7 million square kilometres in the south-central part of the continent. It is Africa’s most extensive tropical woodland, forming a broad ecoregion belt across countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

FAO says the magnificent ecoregion belt provides an important source of resilience for an estimated 100 million rural poor and 50 million urban community.

Experts such as Mwangi warn the woodlands are under threat from conversion into smallholder agriculture, livestock keeping, charcoal production and logging.

He stresses that urbanization will only increase the threat due to an over-reliance on charcoal as the primary energy source for urban households.

The Agency finds that cleaner alternatives such as solar or wind energy are not yet viable because most households and governments “cannot afford the price per kilowatt-hour or the hefty cost of the required infrastructure.”

Mwangi urges communities to work with the government to protect and conserve forests and notes that the Vanga community is, for instance, partnering with the Kenya Forest Services through Kenya’s Forest Conservation and Management Act of 2016.

The Act promotes community participation and aims to halt further degradation and consequent destruction of livelihoods.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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By Vani S. Kulkarni and Raghav Gaiha
NEW DELHI, India, Apr 20 2022 (IPS)

A trend of declining trust in governments and politicians can turn into a threat beyond some point.

John Adams, an astute political philosopher and second president of the US, was emphatic: “Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and murders itself.” This has been a subject of intense debate, with recent but mixed evidence. Is this an overly pessimistic view?

The debate, based on big international surveys (such as the World Gallup Poll and Economic Values Surveys) or specific ones, yields conflicting inferences. The key issue is whether loss of political trust (in governments and politicians) is a threat to democracy. A pessimistic view is based on how tax compliance varies with the level of political trust. When citizens believe government is acting for the common good, they see its decisions as legitimate and will be more willing to comply with them. They will pay taxes and obey laws, as this is the ‘right’ thing to do. Conversely, when citizens distrust the government, their willingness to obey its decisions is limited and they are less willing to pay taxes. Given the importance of taxes, a general lack of trust would destabilize the system.

Vani S. Kulkarni

Another and perhaps a more nuanced view (Marien and Hooghe, 2011) is based on an interesting measure of legal permissiveness: whether respondents condone illegal actions. Here too, the key explanatory variable is political trust. Respondents with higher levels of such trust are less likely to have permissive attitudes than those with lower levels. Contrariwise, those who do not express trust in political institutions have a more permissive attitude toward law-breaking behaviour than those with higher trust.

Political trust also impacts the ability of government systems to fulfil their basic tasks for people. Low levels of political trust pose a challenge for the governability of contemporary liberal societies. Indeed, in the worst-case scenario, a vicious cycle emerges for governments and political trust. However, whether this would destabilize democracy is neither stated nor implied.

In India’s context, Vaishnav (2017) develops a model of the electoral market place. He analyses data on politicians, including members of state legislative assemblies (MLAs) and Parliament (MPs), winners and losers in elections, their criminal background, assets, ethnicity, re-election prospects and implications for the sustenance of democracy. In an electoral market, there are buyers (voters) and sellers (parties and politicians). Supply and demand factors are at work. This model is then used to explain the share of politicians with a criminal and wealthy background, their chances of winning an election and re-election and huge financial gains.

Across three recent general elections (2004, 2009 and 2014), a randomly picked candidate had a 6% chance of coming out on top. Compare this with a candidate with at least one criminal case: s/he had a nearly 18% chance of winning. The differences in state elections are slightly smaller but still stark: ‘clean’ candidates (eg, those with no pending criminal cases) have a 9.5% probability of winning, whereas candidates with criminal cases have a roughly 22% chance.

Raghav Gaiha

Vaishnav claims that the market is in a state of equilibrium with a large share of criminal politicians. Even if we accept this characterization (in fact, we don’t), two questions arise: Why is the share of criminal politicians not higher?; Are there forces that tend to limit this share? He believes that there are limits to this share. A large share of respondents (in another survey conducted by the author) were for various reasons not in favour of supporting criminal or tainted politicians, since they cared more about the integrity of politicians than their self- interest. Another is that political parties are averse to nominating more than a certain share of such politicians for fear of reputation and credibility losses.

Our more recent analysis (Kulkarni, et al, 2022) raises a few concerns. Over the period 2004 to 2019, the share of criminal politicians in Lok Sabha elections has sharply risen, especially after 2014; 24% of the winners in the 2004 polls had a criminal background; this share rose to 30% in the 2009 general elections, 34% in 2014 and 43% in 2019. The share of criminal politicians is thus expected to rise further. Another related issue is that India’s two major parties continue to have considerably high shares of criminal politicians. Between the two main national parties, of 303 winners from the Bharatiya Janata Party in 2019, 116 (39%) had a criminal record, as against 29 (56%) of the 52 winners from the Congress party. This contradicts Vaishnav’s view that non-dominant but competitive parties worry more about winning a seat in a closely contested election than dominant parties for which the marginal benefit of winning a seat is relatively small. As both national and state elections have become more competitive, with a rise in the number of political parties in the fray, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that tainted politicians with huge resources will continue to be attractive to dominant parties as well. A more serious concern is that, with rising shares of politicians with criminal records, public trust in politicians first rises and then decreases after a turning point where about 40% of MPs have criminal records and only about a tenth of respondents trust politicians.

In sum, while the erosion of political trust is slow, it is consistent and may turn into distrust at some point, with a real risk of the demise of democracy.

Vani S. Kulkarni & Raghav Gaiha are respectively, lecturer of sociology and research affiliate, Population Aging Centre, University of Pennsylvania, USA.

This opinion editorial was first published in Mint, India.

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Credit: United Nations

By Jacqui Stevenson and Sagri Singh
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Apr 20 2022 (IPS)

As a global pandemic, COVID-19 and its continued impacts are unprecedented. Yet many of the challenges that emerged in public health responses to COVID-19 not only had precedence, but were predictable.

As the international community observes World Immunization Week (April 24-30), it is a critical moment to reflect on what lessons have, and have not, been learned, and how we can accelerate progress towards vaccine equity.

The theme of the 2022 World Immunization Week is “Long Life for All”, a framing which underscores the benefits for every individual of access to and uptake of vaccinations. However, this obscures the significant and persistent barriers that ensure that the reality of vaccination is access and uptake for some, not all.

The development of effective and safe vaccines to protect against severe COVID-19 disease is a huge scientific achievement, which placed a spotlight on vaccine development and deployment and highlighted both successes and challenges. Inequity in vaccine access has been evident between high income versus low and middle-income countries, as well as within regions and nations.

As of 14th April 2022, 65% of the total world population has received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, yet only 15.2% of people in low-income countries have received at least one dose. Even where vaccines are available, access and uptake is impeded by gender-related barriers and inequities, in communities and in health services and settings.

Data on COVID-19 vaccine disaggregated by sex is limited, with the Sex, Gender and COVID-19 Project reporting in its COVID-19 Sex-disaggregated Data Tracker that only 89 countries have ever reported sex-disaggregated data for vaccinations (at least one dose) and 67 countries for fully vaccinated. Only two countries, India and Austria, report on vaccinations for non-binary people.

Senior citizens receive their second dose of the COVID-19 vaccine in Kathmandu in Nepal. Credit: UNICEF/Rabik Upadhayay

Overall, the Data Tracker reports that global data indicates equal numbers of men and women being vaccinated, but that at the country level, there are some significant differences, including Yemen, where 93% of people with one dose are male, and Thailand where 36% are male. In terms of vaccine population coverage, in five countries reporting this data coverage is more than 5% higher in males than females, and in seven countries the reverse is true.

This indicates a critical point in discussions of gender-related barriers – the negative impact of these varies by setting and context, and affect men as well as women and gender diverse people.

As well as vaccination coverage, there are also differences in hesitancy and intention to take up the vaccine when offered or available. A systematic review of gender differences in intention to take up vaccination found that men were “on average 41% more likely to report that they intended to receive a vaccine (rather than being unwilling or undecided) compared with women”.

Gender-related barriers to vaccination exacerbated by COVID-19 have been identified by GAVI as including: limited access to health services, increasing unpaid care responsibilities disproportionately borne by women, increases in gender-based violence, and inequitable access to health information including digital platforms.

Limited ability to travel to attend health facilities, discrimination and harassment in health services, and limited decision-making power, are also significant barriers. Vaccine hesitancy among healthcare workers has also been identified as a challenge, requiring targeted messaging and efforts to work with and learn from their experiences.

Recognising the substantial gender barriers to equitable vaccine access and uptake, the SDG3 Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-Being for All: Gender Equality Working Group and the Gender and Health Hub, United Nations University International Institute for Global Health have developed a Guidance Note and Checklist for Tackling Gender-Related Barriers to Equitable Covid-19 Vaccine Deployment.

The aim of the checklist is to support efforts to ensure that as many people as possible, regardless of their gender identity and the gender norms that prevail in their communities, have equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines. Drawing on evidence of gender-related barriers and what works to address them, it offers practical actions for countries to implement to ensure that COVID-19 vaccine deployment upholds gender equality and equity, contributing to the aim of ‘long life for all’ through leaving no one behind in vaccine access.

If action is not taken to address gender barriers in COVID-19 vaccine access and uptake, we risk significant gaps in vaccination coverage, undermining the achievement of population-level immunity which is essential in curbing the pandemic.

At the individual level, many more people will become sick and die if we fail to realise the full potential of COVID-19 vaccination programmes by failing to ensure equitable access. In turn, these outcomes will lead to delayed economic recovery, exacerbating existing inequities and further marginalising those already marginalised.

The spotlight shone by the COVID-19 pandemic has also created opportunities to do things differently. Progress has been made in some key areas, which can and should now be implemented and accelerated more widely. The importance of sex and gender disaggregated data at all stages of research and development through to delivery has been more widely recognised and must now be adopted across the board.

While some countries are collecting and reporting such data, significant gaps remain, as well as the opportunity for COVID-19 to be a catalyst to act to fill these gaps. Progress has also been made in developing and delivering interventions that engage women and girls and/or marginalised people as co-designers of solutions, rather than simply recipients of interventions.

The checklist provides practical steps for actors involved in vaccine deployment to integrate attention to sex and gender in their core business and approach, to mitigate barriers at each step in COVID-19 National Deployment and Vaccination Plans (NDVPs), ensuring that gender-related barriers are prioritised not an afterthought.

The costs of failure are immeasurably high, yet the gender-related barriers that have emerged in COVID-19 vaccine deployment were anticipated and can be mitigated. The checklist outlines clear, actionable steps to effectively tackle gender-related barriers at each step of vaccine deployment, from making sex and age disaggregated data on pre- and post-market vaccine trials an essential requirement for expedited approval and emergency regulatory approval procedures, to using differentiated vaccine delivery strategies to effectively reach women, men and gender-diverse people.

By implementing the actions in this checklist, identifying and acting on known and context-specific gender-related barriers, prioritizing targeted outreach to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and partnering with women’s organizations and other community-based groups, it is possible to address and mitigate these barriers.

It further supports integration of gender as part of the core business of governments and partnerships engaged in COVID-19 vaccine deployment and delivery, rather than an add-on or afterthought, which is often the case yet seriously undermines potential impact.

The gender-related barriers to equitable vaccine deployment are persistent but not immutable, predictable but not inevitable. We have the vaccines, we have the knowledge to deploy them equitably, what is needed now is the will to get it right.

Dr Jacqui Stevenson is a Research Consultant at the United Nations University International Institute for Global Health (UNU-IIGH). Dr Sagri Singh is the Chief of Gender and Health at UNU-IIGH. They lead the work to generate new evidence on the intersections of gender and health, including COVID-19.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A woman holding a child begs at an intersection in New Delhi. Credit: Ranjit Devraj/IPS.

By Srishty Anand
NEW DELHI, Apr 20 2022 (IPS)

Oxfam’s report ‘Inequality Kills 2022’ and its India supplement (hereafter referred to as the report) revealed some shocking facts about the growing gap between the rich and poor. India, which has the third highest number of billionaires in the world, endured one of the longest-lasting COVID-induced lockdowns in 2020. Yet, the same year, the top 10 percent of India held close to 45 percent of the country’s total national wealth.

Concurrently, the number of billionaires in India rose from 102 to 142, while the bottom 50 percent of the population held a 6 percent share in the nation’s wealth. The unemployment rate (which was at 4.7 percent in 2017–18 and 6.3 percent in 2018–19) became 9.1 and 7.9 percent in December 2020 and 2021 respectively.

 

The myth of development by privatisation

Why does the wealth of a few continue to grow against this backdrop? One reason is privatisation. This article specifically looks at the deteriorating state of basic services and state-owned utilities—including education and healthcare—due to privatisation.  Take for example the Aatmanirbhar Bharat package and the four-year national monetisation pipeline.

While globally the ten richest men doubled their fortunes during the pandemic, the incomes of 99 percent of humanity fell; and the richest 98 Indians own the same wealth as the bottom 552 million Indian citizens. This gap has increased over the last decade, as the bottom 50 percent, that held 8 percent of the wealth in 2012, had a mere 6 percent in 2021

Such policies reduce state ownership and control by selling central public sector enterprises to private sector businesses. This results in the state relinquishing decision-making roles (as it no longer holds majority share), abandoning price control, the social mandate of employing the masses, and operating in areas and sectors in which the private sector is unwilling.

One frequently cited motivation to privatise is efficiency—the quality of services offered and the government’s fiscal resources to expand public expenditure are expected to improve. However, this assumption is flawed on two counts: private services are as much liable to be misapplied as public-funded services, and they’re prone to applying commercial value on social services, leading to exclusion of the ‘have-nots’.

For instance, while globally the ten richest men doubled their fortunes during the pandemic, the incomes of 99 percent of humanity fell; and the richest 98 Indians own the same wealth as the bottom 552 million Indian citizens. This gap has increased over the last decade, as the bottom 50 percent, that held 8 percent of the wealth in 2012, had a mere 6 percent in 2021.

 

Recourse to private healthcare as the ‘last resort’

India has one of the highest levels of out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) on health services in the world and the lowest public health spending. OOPE is a major financial burden on Indian households, which spend 43 percent of their total expenditure on pharmacies, 28 percent on private general hospitals, and 7.42 percent on government hospitals. And the private sector dominates healthcare provision, with around 74 percent of outpatient care and 65 percent of hospitalisation care in urban India.

As we saw during the second wave of COVID-19, India’s public health system fell short due to issues of governance and regulatory failure, such as shutdown of elective and outpatient services or indefinite deferring of routine check-ups. In fact, the public hospital systems in many states were overrun during COVID-19.

Those who turned to private hospitals faced problems ranging from non-treatment to swindling. The private health market also carries the risk of overprescription and unchecked selling of drugs, which promotes unnecessary drug use. In response, the government enforced price capping, allotment of beds and so on, but the issues persisted nevertheless. The inaccessibility to public services caused OOPE to increase further, leaving many people untreated because costs and lack of health insurance rendered both private and public healthcare inaccessible.

 

The quandary of education

India has both private and public education providers. In fact, private schools continue to grow as income levels go up. The pandemic saw private schools impose arbitrary fee hikes and grossly overcharge students, with some enrolling in unrecognised institutions.

The report notes that in tertiary education, private institutions are almost twice that of government institutions, and in higher education, public-funded education sees only 32 percent enrolment whereas its private counterparts see 68 percent enrolment.

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, which encouraged states to incentivise private/philanthropic activity, proved redundant, as it failed to crowd out the private sector. The report iterates that 35 percent children still couldn’t continue their education over non-payment of fees and 57 percent parents paid additional charges that were not part of the official break-up.

Privatisation also results in the exclusion of marginalised communities, Dalits, Adivasis, and girls because private schools are generally established in places that have good public infrastructure. When society is fractured along different social identities of caste, gender, geography, and religion, marketisation of education widens these gaps.

 

Privatising public goods

India’s expenditure on social security schemes for workers is already low at 0.6 percent of the total union budget. These schemes cover a diverse workforce in the organised and informal sectors. The pandemic affected informal and migrant workers most severely, and the absence of social security for them was more glaring than ever.

By privatising public goods such as education, healthcare, social safety, food, and drinking water, the precarities that certain segments face are deepened.

Even as the extent of public crowdsourcing of financial support and information on oxygen, hospitals, and doctors on social media was exemplary during the pandemic, this temporary social vine was born out of the absence and abandonment of state infrastructure.

A significant population of this country undertook medical debt, suffered from loss of loved ones, reported lower intake of food than before the pandemic, walked the length and breadth of the country to feel ‘at home’, and lost their livelihoods. The private sector functions on a rationalising mechanism that demands value for its services, in contrast to well-being and welfare as outcomes.

 

The way forward

As we’ve already emphasised, public financing cannot be supported by increasing privatisation of state enterprises. Here are some ways to pursue more equitable development.

1. Increase state expenditure

With privatisation, the state eventually loses ownership and control, making the question of public interest non-existent. Taking the example of health, the report, following the Economic Survey 2020-21 argues for an increase in public spend from 1 percent (global average of spending is 10 percent) to 2.5–3 percent of GDP, which can decrease the OOPE from 65 percent to 30 percent of overall healthcare spend. In case of basic rights like education, healthcare, and food security, and given the current disparities, the state needs to strengthen its control and simultaneously recalibrate its relation with the private players to integrate social goals. This can be achieved by introducing more regulations so that these services are not delivered for profits alone.

2. A more balanced private–public role in service provision

Following the recommendation made above, the argument remains that for universal and mass literacy state-funded educational facilities need to continue in India. At the same time, the private players can certainly complement the public school system (as in Bangladesh, Chile, and Colombia) in different ways to not just attain literacy but also an education and skill set that improves employability. The agenda of private education or healthcare can work in tandem with or bolster public services to recast their developmental purpose.

3. Progressive taxation

The government needs to change the tax regime such that the incessantly growing rich of the country pay taxes progressively. Progressive taxation ensures that the tax burden is higher for the wealthy. Through taxes and strong state provisioning, a basic standard of living for lower-income families can be ensured, which will take care of fundamental needs such as shelter, food, health, education, and transportation. The rationale for this system of taxation is rooted in an unequal growth rate of income.1

4. Review and update existing schemes

The case for public provisioning can be strengthened by reviewing the status of schemes where access needs to be improved. For example, the vicious cycle of low income and high OOPE will continue to cause a rift in health inequity if left unchecked and unregulated.

The flagship, Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana—dubbed the world’s largest health insurance plan offering financial risk protection against catastrophic health expenditure to approximately 40 percent of the population—hasn’t provided effectively improved access to health care. Similarly, the debate on living wages needs to be revisited to improve human capital rather than support bare sustenance and increase demand-driven growth.

5. Measure inequality

India needs a more rigorous data base to measure incomes and consumptions levels as well as continuous data collection by the income tax department on tax payers and gross and returned income. This transparency will then facilitate a more democratic dialogue on tax structures for the super-rich, such as a wealth tax, instead of burdening the population with indirect taxes such as GST.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal.

Srishty Anand is a research and knowledge specialist on responsible finance at Oxfam India

 

This story was originally published by India Development Review (IDR)

Damaris Muthee Mutua is the second female runner to have been killed in the famous Iten athletics base in a year.

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Viraj from India, in a squat where he has been living for three months near Velika Kladusa, Bosnia. He hopes to join family in Italy. February 2022. Credit: Chiara Luxardo

By Sara Perria
Bihać, Bosnia, Apr 19 2022 (IPS)

Responding to several shouts Viraj emerges from the ruins of his shelter in northwest Bosnia. He is originally from India but is now squatting near Bihać in what remains of a house abandoned since the 1990s Balkans war.

“I was in the bathroom,” says Viraj – although there is no such facility. The building doesn’t even have windows, just gaps exposed to a freezing wind. Collapsing walls are patched with planks. Steps leading up from the road that are not missing shake under the weight of the few people venturing there.

“It’s just us living here now,” adds Sidar, an Iraqi in his late 30s. “We prefer to stay here. People come and go, but we’ll stay until it’s a good moment to cross.”

The two men are among some 2,000 or so migrants waiting for the opportunity to play the so-called ‘game’: the hazardous challenge of evading Croatian police on the nearby border and entering their goal of the European Union, illegally. They often need several attempts to succeed. Many prefer to squat closer to the border for months until spring offers an easier route across mountains.

A long day’s walk away, basic services, health facilities and food are provided in camps for migrants managed by Bosnia and the UN. Yet hundreds like Viraj and Sidar have opted instead for abandoned houses, warehouses and factories fallen into disuse, or skeletons of unfinished buildings surrounded by trash, with open toilets and improvised kitchens. Away from the headlines, they also exist mostly under the radar of humanitarian agencies.

“There are too many migrants in the camps,” says Sidar, citing issues with drug dealers, violence and lack of freedom there. “We can go in and out of this house when we want. In the camps we only have a couple of hours, then we have to go back. There’s more freedom here.”

The kitchen of a squat near Bihać, Bosnia. February 2022. Credit: Chiara Luxardo

Life is a long wait for this migrant population transiting Bosnia. “I get up, eat something and watch a movie,” says Viraj. “Bollywood movies or action movies like Fast and Furious 5.”

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), very few request asylum in Bosnia, aiming instead for countries such as Germany, France or Italy. The Balkan route fell under the spotlight in 2015 during the so-called ‘long summer of migration’ when thousands of asylum seekers from Syria stretched Bosnia’s capacity as a ‘buffer zone’ and the IOM was put in charge of the camps, with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), a humanitarian non-profit organisation, running healthcare.

Seven years later, management is transitioning to Bosnian authorities, against the backdrop of a complex and fragmented local political structure. Numbers of migrants are much lower now, with occupancy in the formal camps around 1,840 against a capacity of over 5,200.

Almost 90% of migrants are single men, mostly from Pakistan and heading to Italy. But there are also growing numbers of Afghans and some Cubans, Iranians and Bangladeshis. They occupy settlements divided along ethnic lines and clashes are not uncommon, with one death registered this month. Threatening scrawls have appeared on the walls of some shelters.

Laura Lungarotti, IOM’s chief of mission in Bosnia, says the situation has evolved “tremendously” over the past year. Numbers are sharply down and camps have more capacity. For this reason, migration in Bosnia now needs “durable solutions, not emergency ones.” Solutions come from the “inclusion of migrants in the health system, with resources dedicated to migrants used for the local population,” she says. But achieving this balance is not easy as long as many stay outside the formal system.

In another abandoned house, empty cans of energy drinks indicates the presence of migrants. Twenty young men — Pakistani and Afghans from the same Pashtun ethnic group — live in this house guarded by a chained dog. It’s a sign that the dog’s owner is a long term inhabitant and might be working as a smuggler for the others, an aid worker explains. Many have scabies after sleeping on bedding infested by the parasite and then returning to the same places after attempting ‘the game’. One also has an infection caused by a bad burn from cooking oil.

In camps such as the newly-rebuilt Lipa or in Sarajevo, they would have access to food, beds and a range of medical services, including a doctor, medicines, mental health facilities and an isolation room for Covid cases.

As migration experts point out, the international community has become effectively complicit in the ‘game’, which also involves human traffickers. Migrants trying to get to the EU treat the formal camps like Lipa as winter ‘pit-stops’, with the average length of stay just 40 days before moving on.

Professor Claudio Minca of the University of Bologna says this is the result of political ambiguities that have left a ‘gray area’ in the governance of these mobile and ephemeral ‘geographies’ based on information about the Balkan route shared through social media. This includes notes on mountains, rivers and fields, as well as smuggling networks, informal and institutional camps, and NGOs offering food and medical care to migrants.

A young Tajik asylum seeker with his 8 month old daughter in a squat near Velika Kladusa, Bosnia. February 2022. Credit: Chiara Luxardo

“It also reflects, to some extent, a sense of pride on the part of the refugees themselves, related to their determination to succeed not only in just crossing, but also in surviving when they are pushed back in preparation for the next attempt,” Minca and Jessica Collins say in their research paper ‘The Making of Migration’.

This grey area is also a source of tension with local Bosnian communities which sometimes perceive migrants as competing for resources, including health care.

Some migrants’ settlements are known and get support from local and international organisations, with food, portable showers and health checks. Only the UN, Red Cross and DRC are allowed by Bosnia to deliver food however. And migrants are banned from using public transport and taxis under a measure justified by ‘Covid restrictions’.

Healthcare: local versus global

Since migrants are extremely mobile, many pass under the radar. Cases of COVID, other airborne respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, scabies, related infections and antibiotic resistance remain difficult to analyse and detect.

The director of Bihać local hospital, Ademir Jusufagic, says that when the wave of migrants arrived in 2015 it was heartbreaking to see how many children were in need of medical assistance. But fast forward several years and a pandemic, the limitations of the local system stand out, despite some investments by the UN and international agencies to provide the hospital with an X-ray machine and ambulances.

The main challenge, he says, is the lack of finances, especially after an earthquake that heavily damaged the hospital. Low wages make it hard to find and retain doctors and nurses. Most of the young staff go abroad.

“Prevention is down to better investments at a state level. You need to provide higher salaries, especially in places like this,” he says.

From a health security perspective, Jusufagic cites cases among migrants of tuberculosis, which was not present locally, and a high percentage of scabies that can get infected. It is difficult to assess the impact of antibiotic resistance in a mobile population hoping to reach better economic and social conditions. Cases of syphilis and HIV are also reported.

“The first challenge was that there was no control of makeshift camps and no place to surely find people, as migrants were constantly on the move,” he said. “The moving is the biggest issue, as many things go uncontrolled, so we didn’t know what would happen in terms of basic epidemiological prevention in an environment that lacked basic hygiene. So the priority was to provide people the means to clean themselves.”

Meeting in a café along the route to the Croatian border, a well known activist explains how the gulf between local and global perspectives illustrates the source of much of the trouble, as well as the solution for managing healthcare.

“International agencies came having no knowledge of what Bosnia is today and its recent history,” says Ines Tanovic, manager of Kompas 071, an organization that supports migrants on their way to the ‘game’. “The humanitarian industry is a machine and it damages us on the ground with a kind of white-saviour syndrome. Here the focus became only on the migrants but not on the local population.”

As she talks, a group of Pakistanis from Peshawar donate the food they have been donated by an international organization and ask to take a shower “before trying the game.” Tanovic gives them the key smiling and continues to chat.

“People were seeing migrants receiving five jackets each, with no coordination. Then you would see these migrants sell the jackets to Bosnian people with an average salary of 400 euros. It was like seeing capitalism turning the poor against the poor.”

The memory of former Yugoslavia, “where everything was provided for”, also plays a role in the competition for health services, with the downsizing of the public sector in favour of the private, just as local poverty increased.

“Even if the international organisations bought ambulances and some machines, much more could have done for the locals,” Tanovic says.

Contradictions

Migrants’ journeys are notoriously long. Just how long can depend on how much money is paid to human smugglers who guide them through war-time minefields, usually in big groups, according to NGOs. It’s rare not to be caught by the police on the first attempt, so migrants return to the shelters they started from. Many are in bad physical condition after long treks.

“But in the end they all manage it, so attempts by the Croatian police to stop them sound like a waste of money that could be spent better,” comments Silvia Maraone, country coordinator of the Italian NGO Ipsia.

In a hill-top ruin occupied mainly by families from Syria and Afghanistan, a young father holds his 18-month-old daughter. An ethnic Tajik, he says he fled Afghanistan because he feared the Taliban would kill him. Caught in the “grey” zone of the “game”, he explains that his wife and other children are already in Germany but it would take nearly two years for his and his baby’s papers to be processed. “I can’t wait that long, I need to go to my family,” he says.

Names of asylum seekers have been changed or omitted to protect their identities. Additional reporting by Asim Beslija.

*Reporting for this article was funded by the European Journalism Centre, through the Global Health Security Call, a programme supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

Supported by the European Journalism Centre*

Student Adewale made his dream of owning a motorbike a reality after converting his own bicycle.

The authorities issue a warning after a video alleged to involve schoolchildren goes viral.

By Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
SINGAPORE, Apr 19 2022 (IPS-Partners)

Pakistan’s impossibly debonair and incredibly urbane cricketing star turned politician, Imran Khan, is a man of a myriad parts. Where English is spoken and cricket is played, he remains a hero. Time was when leading his team in many a Test match he caused blood to rapidly pulsate through Pakistani veins. In a nation buffeted by the vicissitudes of misfortune and thirsting for pride, he had fulfilled his people’s dream by winning them the ultimate prize in cricket, the World Cup. But then he switched games and went into politics. The fates, with him for a while, eventually withdrew their favour. He gambled with a tactic that was no more than a political stunt. Alas it failed, and the Courts in his country refused him relief. But this essay is not so much about him. It about the Courts that finally caused his fall. It is also about the role the judicial organ of the State has played along the inscrutable path of Pakistan’s constitutional and political destiny.

Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury

Since Pakistan’s inception, the higher courts, manned by senior Civil Servants and lawyers schooled in the best of the English legal tradition, have often been politically interventionist, with both liberal and illiberal consequences. An example of the first kind was a judgment (later overturned) of the Sindh High Court in 1954 that at the first instance initially favoured Speaker Tamizuddin Ahmed when he challenged the annulment of the legislature by the Governor General Ghulam Mohammed; of the latter was the rulings of Chief Justice Munir Ahmed, the main propounder of the “doctrine of necessity” a principle that ruled the roost in Pakistan’s constitutional annals for a long time to come.

The doctrine draws upon the writings of a maxim attributed to the medieval jurist Henry de Bracton. It is that, “that which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by necessity”, rooted in the Latin legal dictum Salus Populi Suprema Lex, meaning “the wellbeing of the people is the supreme law”. This is also embodied in the ‘Second Treatise of Government’ of the philosopher John Locke, often viewed as a great champion of democratic pluralism. Incidentally the doctrine has been cited thereafter in several Courts in the British Commonwealth.

Using this liberal interpretation as a justification, Pakistani military rulers starting from Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1958, continued to use the concept as a most useful legal tool (Justice Munir strengthened it to justify Ayub’s martial law in his judgment in the case of Dosso versus State where he ruled that a military take-over assumed sanction if there was public, even tacit). To the Supreme Court’s credit, it has attempted to live it down, initially modifying it circumspectly and thereafter boldly striking it down. In a major challenge to it though belatedly, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, on General Ziaul Huq’s take-over in the 1970s, ruled that no judge can offer any support to the acquisition of power by any unconstitutional functionary through modes other than envisaged in the Constitution. That was a great moral blow to any future unconstitutional change.

The death blow came recently. It happened last week when the Court headed by the newly appointed Chief Justice Umar Ata Bandial took suo moto cognizance of a controversial dismissal of a “no trust” motion by Deputy speaker Qasim Suri in the Pakistan National Assembly. It had been moved by the combined opposition against Imran Khan and required 272 in an Assembly of 372 members to pass. Because the ruling Coalition had broken down, the opposition had the numbers, but just about. But Suri, then acting for the Speaker, who belonged to Imran’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf party disallowed the motion just prior to voting on 3 April, on alleged grounds that some dissenting parliamentarians had been illegally influenced by a “foreign power”, that is, the United States. Thereafter President Arif Alvie dissolved the Assembly upon the Prime Minister’s advice and called for elections within 90 days. In public, Imran continued to insist on the allegations on US interference and trenchantly criticized what he termed as “treasonable actions” on part of his opponents, even though it placed him at odds with the seemingly all-powerful military and the Army Chief, General Qamar Bajwa.

After three days of mulling over the issues involved, the five-member bench headed by Bandial gave its “short order” ruling, upholding the supremacy of the Constitution at all costs. It also underscored the paramount role of the judiciary in protecting the nation’s basic law. The judges declared the Deputy Speakers dismissal of the motion as “unconstitutional”, as also the consequent dissolution of the Assembly by the President on the Prime Minister’s advice. It reinstated the assembly to status quo ante as on 3 April and ordered that nothing – no action of the President, the Prime Minister or the Speaker- could impede the process of voting and the election of the next Prime Minister which would have to happen by 9 April. When the Speaker, apparently influenced by Imran, appeared to demur, Bandial physically went to the Court at dead of night s presumably to prepare for an eventuality in which he might have had to take anti “contempt of court measures” against government supporters! Consequently, the voting was held as per court order, Imran and the Speaker resigned, and despite the turmoil Pakistan went through a democratic political change, albeit after some hiccups.

The “short order” of the judges drove what was possibly the last nail in the coffin of the doctrine of necessity in Pakistan. It was based on the theoretical perception that nothing should necessitate any action contrary to the tenets of the Constitution, in which the “well- being” of the people resided, and which reflected the people’s choice and will. The Court was reaching out to the highest source of law enshrined in the Latin adage Vox Populi Vox Dei, meaning “the voice of the people is the voice of God”. It was supposedly enunciated as an effective political maxim in English common law as early as in1327 AD by Walter Reynolds, Archbishop of Canterbury, who used it in a sermon bringing charges against King Edward 11.

While the judges ruling will help correct a practice that had strayed from the original principles of liberal constitutional law, it will not end the woes of Pakistan. Those had resulted from concatenation of circumstances, political, economic, strategic, and historical. Pakistan has a new Prime Minister in Shahbaz Sharif, an experienced hand in governance. As a mark of protest, Imran took his party out of the Assembly and boycotted the election of his successor. The new government in place will face daunting challenges with the elections due in around a year’s time, a broken economy to fix, and a stubborn opponent to resist in the streets. Imran had lingered on the wicket, a tad too long after he was obviously out, which was not quite cricket. But he has the tenacity of a Robert Bruce and could well return to play another innings. But for now, the people of this nuclear weapon state and their neighbours, are heaving a sigh of relief as the immediate political imbroglio somewhat eases. Also, because from the chaos has emerged a strong institution, a guardian of democracy in a turbulent polity, the judiciary, which has established its authority sufficiently to be able to demonstrate Roma locuta, Causa finita, Rome has spoken, the case is finished!

Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is the Honorary Fellow at the Institute of South Asia Studies, NUS. He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh and President and Distinguished Fellow of Cosmos Foundation. The views addressed in the article are his own. He can be reached at: isasiac @nus.edu.sg

This story was originally published by Dhaka Courier.

Refugees entering Poland from Ukraine at the Medyka border crossing point. March 2022. Credit: UNHCR/Chris Melzer

By Azza Karam
NEW YORK, Apr 19 2022 (IPS)

“The war in Ukraine is a European …and a Christian… matter… It does not require the involvement of a colourful array of religions or people”. These words were uttered and affirmed by some European Protestant men, working in interfaith circles in Europe. The ‘colourful’ encompassed other than European, mostly Christian – and likely mostly male.

Add this perspective to another one from a seasoned Catholic lay male leader, diplomat and academic, echoing representatives working in various Vatican offices, who maintain that if there is to be any religious engagement [e.g. a meeting with the Russian or Ukrainian senior Orthodox Church representatives] around Ukraine or Russia, “it is the Pope who should be doing this [not any other faith leaders or institutions] …and this is the preference of European governments”.

To these people, the fact that the war in Ukraine (and economic sanctions against Russia), have raised the price of oil, gas, and wheat (and therefore basic staples such as bread) for all other inhabitants of our world, is simply irrelevant.

The important fact appears to that Europe is suffering – and losing face in doing so, one might add. The fact that there are religious minorities in Ukraine also suffering, is not meriting as much attention. The supremacy of the Catholic Pope, who is a leader of but 16 percent of the world’s religious populations, is also apparent in the discourse of many esteemed European male leaders.

Were European governments to see value-added to religious involvement in affairs of state, then it would clearly be the Pope who would merit the role, out of the thousands – if not more – of other faith leaders in (the rest of) the world.

Yet so significant is the war in Ukraine, along with the role of Russia (and perhaps after that China) in geopolitics, and the changing political, financial and economic consequences around a world already damaged by the vagaries of Covid lockdowns and declines in tourism (which was the source of basic income for hundreds of millions of people), that it is a staple of many conversations – outside of Europe.

One such perspective of some seasoned diplomats in the USA, is that “religion and religious institutions have nothing to do with this war nor play much of a role in it. This is one politician’s madness”. Someone must have forgotten to send the memo with the words of a Patriarch of the largest Church in Russia, with over 120 million adherents worldwide, justifying the war – and using a homophobic discourse to do so.

Or maybe we erased the other memo where millions of Russians voted for this one “mad” politician (as millions of others voted for other mad politicians elsewhere in the world).

And yet, as we ponder the rampant ignorance about the intersections of politics and religion worldwide, and the arrogance of some European religious and political actors, and as some of us listen to religious leaders from other corners of the world, it would be wise to ponder a couple of questions: are we sure that all religions would have found the Patriarch of Russia’s language, and its subject, quite so distasteful? And, are we sure that it is one man causing all this carnage and hate (and profit to weapons manufacturers, mercenaries, and all who make money from war)?

There are many forms of this kind of arrogance of ignorance, which have coalesced to bring our world to this point where it would seem that almost every corner of it, is blighted. For some it is the blight of many forms of extremism: from launching war against a sovereign nation and killing its people, to horrific gang violence, to desecrating sacred sites and attacking pilgrims and devotees during their prayers, even during times which are holy to both attacked and attackers.

For others, it is the blight of democracy abused and myriad human rights systematically and deeply violated. For yet others the blight is having to live with various forms of hate speech and hate filled actions, including those with distinct anti-Semitic and Islamophobic blows. Holocaust deniers are reemerging out of many layers of rotten woodwork in all corners of the world.

The semantics of Islamophobia are being argued about in some western government circles, even as veiled women are being openly abused in some streets and denied access to jobs in countries claiming respect for religious freedom, and where even turbaned Sikh men continue to face abuse because they are mistaken as Muslims, and/or because their form of dress is deemed injurious to secular sensibilities.

For others the blight is to have to contend with shootings by lone gunmen of innocents in schools or subways or nightclubs or concerts. All this in the middle of a public health epidemic that has claimed the lives of millions – and we are still counting (where it is possible to have reliable data) – and while climate change is contributing to the largest numbers of refugees and forcibly displaced peoples ever in recorded collective human history.

Yet climate change is still being denied. And as for misogyny, it is the new normal in private and public spaces, everywhere in the world – in Europe too.

But it is not all gloom. The same European country which decried the one million Syrian refugees it allowed in (and subsequently quietly offloaded thousands of them to other countries), has announced no limit to the number of Ukrainians needing to enter it, and sometimes ensuring that some of the newer Ukrainian refugees receive access to homes before other refugees (who had waited longer but now must continue their wait). Another European country which let some refugees die of cold on its borders rather than allow them in, is now providing all manner of support to the Ukrainian ones.

The United States, which a few months ago lost significant credibility as a result of a messy exit after a 20 year struggle against the Taliban in Afghanistan (leaving the country largely back in control of the Taliban), is today resonating with righteous indignation, and crowing that “the West is back”. The European Union too, has seen the error of its ways of being overly dependent on cheap Russian gas, and oil, and is now hastening to rid itself of such a dependency.

The war in Ukraine (albeit apparently not the ongoing horrors in Myanmar, Yemen, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, and Ethiopia – to name but a few) is indeed impacting our world. Like Covid-19, the war will doubtless continue to influence political, financial, and socio-cultural frames for decades. But here is another question: are we sure that the rampant and now fully on display discriminatory arrogance of ethnocentrism, and its appendages, will change?

This April 2022, witnesses another form of coalescing. Bahá’ís celebrate Riḍván, a festival of joy and unity which commemorates the beginning of their Faith. For Hindus and many others also, this month marks the celebration of the Spring festival of the harvest, and the Hindu new year. For Sikhs as well, this April celebrates the birth of the religion as a collective faith.

Jews celebrate Pesach, or Passover, commemorating the exodus of the Jewish people escaping the slavery of the Egyptian Pharaoh. Christians (Western and Eastern) – celebrate the resurrection of Christ this Easter. All while Muslims observe the thirty days of fast known as Ramadan. There are more faith traditions celebrating and/or commemorating. Definitely the best time, then, to pray for – or for those of tender anti-religious sensibilities let us say ‘to reflect’ on: the twin birth of humility and mercy.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Excerpt:

The writer is Secretary General, Religions for Peace.

A 14-year-old boy shares his story after being separated from his family in the eastern part of the country.

By Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram
SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Apr 19 2022 (IPS)

Once deemed a basic human needs success story, Sri Lanka (SL) is now in its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948. Nonetheless, SL’s ‘moment of truth’ now offers lessons for other developing countries.

China scapegoat
SL has just defaulted on its foreign debt for the very first time. Attributing its current predicament to a Chinese ‘debt-trap’ is a new Cold War propaganda distraction – which we will undoubtedly hear much more of.

Anis Chowdhury

In this fable, SL is a country caught in a debt trap due to white elephant projects mooted and financed by borrowings from China. Blaming SL’s debt crisis on Chinese loans is not only factually wrong, but also prevents understanding the origins and nature of its current crisis.

Outstanding SL government foreign debt in April 2021 was US$35.1bn. Policy errors have reduced foreign direct investment (FDI), exports and government revenue, changing the composition of its foreign debt for the worst.

Debt to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, China, Japan and other bilateral lenders, including India, came to about a tenth each. Borrowing from capital markets – 47%, or almost half – is mainly responsible for its debt unsustainability.

After all, borrowing from multilateral development banks – mainly the World Bank and ADB – and bilateral lenders are mostly on concessional terms, while debt from commercial sources incurs higher interest rates.

Commercial loans tend to be more short term, and subject to stricter conditions. As sovereign bonds or commercial loans become due, their full value must be repaid. External debt servicing costs surge accordingly.

As of April 2021, about 60% of SL’s debt was for durations of less than ten years. The US dollar denominated debt share rose sharply – from 36% in 2012 to 65% in 2019, as Chinese renminbi denominated loans remained around 2%.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Adding government guaranteed debt to state-owned enterprises, total borrowings from China were 17.2% of SL’s total public foreign debt liabilities in 2019. Meanwhile, commercial borrowings grew rapidly from merely 2.5% of foreign debt in 2004 to 56.8% in 2019.

The effective interest rate on commercial loans in January 2022 was 6.6% – more than double that for Chinese debt. Unsurprisingly, SL’s interest payments alone came to 95.4% of its declining government revenue in 2021!

Deep-rooted problems
Following its 2001 recession, SL recovered, before growth declined again after 2012 and the pandemic contraction in 2020. SL also experienced premature deindustrialization, with manufacturing’s GDP share falling from 22% in 1977 to 15% in 2017.

Government tax revenue declined from 18.4% of GDP (1990-92 average) to 12.7% (2017-19), and a 8.4% pandemic nadir in 2020. Non-tax revenue – mainly dividends and profits from public investments – fell from 2.3% of GDP in 2000 to 0.9% in 2015.

SL’s exports-GDP ratio almost halved from 39% in 2000 to 20% in 2010. This took a big hit during the pandemic, dropping to 17% in 2020. From 2000, FDI inflows into SL were between 1.1% and 1.8% of GDP, before falling to 0.5% in 2020.

During 2012-19, the share of International Monetary Fund (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in SL’s debt stock fell from 28% to 14%, as borrowings ballooned! SL’s debt crisis is clearly due to the policy choices of successive governments since the 1990s.

Crisis-prone
In February 2022, SL had only US$2.31 billion in foreign exchange reserves – too little to cover its import bill and debt repayment obligations of US$4 billion.

Its 22 million people face 12-hour power cuts, and extreme scarcities of food, fuel and other essential items such as medicines. Inflation reached an all-time high of 17.5% in February 2022, with food prices rising 24% in January-February 2022. But economic crisis is not new to SL.

As a commodity producer – mainly exporting tea, coffee, rubber and spices – export earnings have long been volatile, vulnerable to external shocks. Foreign exchange earnings have also come from ready-made garments, tourism and remittances, but their shares have grown little over decades.

Since 1965, SL has obtained 16 IMF loans, typically with onerous conditionalities. The last was in 2016, providing US$1.5 billion over 2016-19. Required austerity measures have squeezed public investment, hurting growth and welfare.

Two recent shocks made things worse. First, bomb blasts in Colombo churches and luxury hotels in April 2019 drastically cut tourist arrivals by 80%, squeezing foreign exchange earnings.

Second, the pandemic has damaged not only economic activity, but also foreign exchange reserves, as it often paid monopoly prices to get COVID-19 tests, treatments, equipment, vaccines and other needs.

Tax cuts galore
The ethno-populist policies of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government – which came to power in 2019 – have added fuel to fire. Successfully mobilizing majority Buddhist Singhala sentiment – against Tamils, Muslims and Christians – he sought political support by cutting taxes on the ‘middle class’.

His government cut taxes across the board, collecting only 12.7% of GDP in revenue in 2017-19 – one of the lowest shares among middle-income countries. Losing about 2% of GDP in revenue, its tax-GDP ratio fell to 8.4% in 2020.

SL’s value-added tax rate was cut from 15% to 8%, while the VAT registration threshold was raised from one to 25 million SL rupees monthly. Other indirect taxes and the ‘pay-as-you-earn’ system were abolished.

The minimum income tax threshold was raised from 500,000 SL rupees annually to three million, with few earning that much! Personal income tax rates were not only reduced, but also became even less progressive.

The corporate income tax rate was cut from 28% to 24%. With a 33.5% drop in registered taxpayers (corporate and individual) between 2019 and 2020, SL’s tax base shrank.

Thus, even more of the population became exempt from direct taxes, increasing government popularity, especially among the middle class. But tax cuts failed to spur investment and growth – despite old claims by Ronald Reagan, Donald Trump and their ‘guru’, Arthur Laffer.

Successive SL governments thus failed to increase tax collection, squeezing government revenue. To finance budget deficits, they increasingly borrowed from international capital markets – at higher commercial rates, with shorter maturities.

As the government cut tax rates and exempted most from paying income tax, government revenue fell. Due to its falling revenue and deteriorating credit rating, the government had to borrow more, at higher interest rates.

Facing fiscal and foreign exchange constraints, the government declared SL a 100% organic farming nation in April 2021. Banning all fertilizer imports – ostensibly to promote ‘agro-ecological’ farming as part of a larger ‘green’ transformation – compounded the looming ‘perfect storm’.

Dropped in November 2021, the policy drastically cut agricultural output, with more food imports becoming necessary. Falling tea and rubber output also reduced export earnings, exacerbating foreign exchange shortfalls.

Evidently, the SL government addressed the economic challenges it faced with ‘populist’ policy choices. Instead of addressing longstanding problems faced, this effectively ‘kicked the can’ down the road, worsening the inevitable meltdown.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Navid Hanif
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 18 2022 (IPS)

As the world is rocked by a confluence of crises, the global economic outlook for 2022 is becoming ever more uncertain and fragile. Prospects for sustainable development for all and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 are bleak, particularly for developing countries.

The war in Ukraine is adding further stresses to a world economy still reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic and under growing strain from climate change. These cascading crises affect all countries, but the impact is not equal for all.

While some, mostly developed countries, had access to cheap financing to cushion the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic and invest in recovery, many others did not.

Massive recovery packages in rich countries contrast sharply with poor countries, which had to juggle essential expenditures. For many, education and development budgets had to be cut to respond to COVID-19.

The UN system’s 2022 Financing for Sustainable Development Report: Bridging the Finance Divide, finds that the ‘finance divide’ between rich and poor countries has become a sustainable development divide.

Navid Hanif

Growth prospects are severely constrained in the developing world – even before taking the war in Ukraine and its repercussions into account, 1 in 5 developing countries are not expected to return to pre-COVID income levels by 2023.

This situation is likely to get worse because the fallout from the war is exacerbating the challenges confronted by developing countries. Food and fuel prices are reaching record highs. This strains the external and fiscal balances of import-dependent countries.

Supply chain disruptions add to inflationary pressures, setting up a very challenging environment for Central Banks – rising prices combined with deteriorating growth prospects. Tighter financial conditions and rising global interest rates will make it increasingly difficult, and no doubt impossible for some, to roll over their existing commercial debt.

Many vulnerable countries will not be able to absorb the combined shocks of a disrupted recovery, rising inflation, and sharply rising borrowing costs. Sri Lanka has just defaulted, and more widespread debt distress may well be on the horizon – which is likely to put the Sustainable Development Goals out of reach.

The lack of adequate and affordable financing for developing countries is making timely realization of the 2030 Agenda increasingly difficult. Their governments often have few avenues to raise funds domestically, due to underdeveloped domestic financial markets. But borrowing from abroad is both risky and expensive, with some African countries paying over 8% on their Eurobond issuances in 2021.

As the 2022 Financing for Sustainable Development Report notes, the only way to achieve a more equitable recovery is to bridge this finance divide. It will take determined action, on several fronts.

First, developing countries will need additional concessional public financing. Bilateral providers and the international financial institutions have stepped up in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but additional funding was not enough to prevent this divergent recovery. The fallout from the war in Ukraine is widening financing gaps and countries will need additional support.

Credit: UN Photo/Cia Pak

A first key test of international solidarity will be on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Additional support for refugees from the conflict in Ukraine, while important, must not come at the expense of cross-border ODA flows to other countries in need.

Development banks should make available more long-term countercyclical finance at affordable rates, easing financing pressures during crises. Donors should ensure that multilateral development banks see their capital increased and concessional windows replenished generously.

One immediate step development banks and official bilateral creditors could take themselves is to use state-contingent clauses more systematically in their own lending. This would mean automating debt repayment standstills, providing breathing space to countries in crises.

Development banks and development finance institutions at all levels could also work to strengthen the ‘development bank system’. National institutions tend to be smaller and fewer in the poorest countries. They would greatly benefit from capacity and financial support.

Multilateral and regional development banks can in turn benefit from national banks’ detailed knowledge of local markets.

Second, we must improve the costs and other terms of borrowing faced by developing countries in international financial markets. Excess returns for investors hint at market inefficiencies. We must close gaps in the international financial architecture – the lack of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism adds uncertainty – and improve transparency by both debtors and creditors.

Transparency and better information for investors can help reduce costs. Short-term credit ratings are also an issue. Rating agencies assess a country’s creditworthiness over a very short horizon, often three years. Meanwhile, many public investments in sustainable development – in infrastructure, education, or innovation – only pay off over a much longer period.

Credit assessments are systematically biased against long-term investments. Thus, they poorly serve those investors that have long investment horizons, such as pension funds. Long-term sovereign ratings that take into account such investments, as well as long-term risks such as climate change, should complement existing assessments. Scenario analysis can help overcome the inherent difficulties of such long-term assessments.

Countries can also exploit growing investor interest in sustainable development and climate action. Sovereign green bonds, which can sometimes be issued at reduced cost (“greenium”), are a fast-growing market segment. A commitment to marine conservation recently helped Belize achieve more favorable terms with private creditors in debt restructuring.

Development finance institutions could also help by providing partial guarantees to sovereign borrowers, lowering interest in exchange for commitments to invest in the SDGs and climate action.

Third, many countries will need debt relief to avoid a protracted and costly debt crisis. Once debt has reached unsustainable levels, providing additional credit, even if at concessional rates, will only delay the reckoning.

The current mechanisms to deal with countries in debt distress are clearly inadequate. The Common Framework set up by the G20 in the fall of 2020 was a step in the right direction, but its shortcomings have become all too apparent.

No restructurings have been completed yet; there is no good answer to treating commercial debt; and many highly indebted developing countries are not eligible to approach the Common Framework at all.

The G20 must step up efforts to implement and deliver on the Common Framework more effectively. But as a more widespread debt crisis becomes a frightening possibility, a more fundamental reform of the sovereign debt architecture must be on the table as well.

The United Nations can provide a neutral venue that brings together creditors and debtors on equal footing to advance such discussions.

We at the UN believe that the SDGs can still be met. But without concerted bold action now on all fronts, the road ahead is looking very bumpy. Timely and bold policy choices will get us there.

Navid Hanif is the Director of the Financing for Sustainable Development Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). He is also the UN sous Sherpa to the G20 finance and main tracks. He joined UNDESA in 2001. He was Senior Policy Adviser in the Division for Sustainable Development and member of the team for the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002. He served as the Chief of Policy Coordination Branch and later Director in the office for Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) support. He was the first head of the DESA Strategic Planning Unit established in 2010.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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