Africa

Thousands of Africans employed as domestic workers are fearing what could happen if war breaks out.

Thousands of Africans employed as domestic workers are fearing what could happen if war breaks out.

Thousands of Africans employed as domestic workers are fearing what could happen if war breaks out.

Indigenous people gathered in Brasilia during the Free Land Camp, which is held every April in the capital, demonstrate against the time frame law, with the National Congress building in the background. Credit: Gustavo Bezerra / IndiBSB

By Mario Osava
RIO DE JANEIRO, Aug 20 2024 (IPS)

A never-ending battle threatens the indigenous rights that seemed clear and secure in Brazil, until the extreme right emerged in 2018 with a force challenging the civilisational advances set out in the Constitution.

After three decades of progress in the demarcation of their territories and other victories, Brazil’s indigenous peoples have suffered setbacks since the administration of former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022). Now that the government is friendly to their demands, they face an insidious enemy: the time frame.

“I see no prospects for a favourable solution,” admits Mauricio Terena, a lawyer and coordinator of the legal department of the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (Apib), formed by the country’s seven main indigenous organisations.“The rights of the indigenous minority are the negotiable part within a larger negotiation to calm the alleged democratic crisis. But granting a snack to mitigate the crisis feeds the monster that the STF wants to devour”: Juliana Batista

“We are worried, our expectations are not good”, agreed Juliana Batista, a lawyer at the Instituto Socioambiental, an indigenous and environmental non-governmental organisation.

Both are referring to the conciliation process convened by the president of the Federal Supreme Court (STF), Gilmar Mendes, in search of an agreement on the indigenous lands, between the indigenous peoples themselves and the legislators who passed a law in the National Congress imposing a time frame.

This time frame, a rule limiting indigenous peoples’ rights only to the lands they had occupied up to 5 October 1988, the day the Constitution was enacted, is the weapon of a far-right offensive that has sown uncertainty and setbacks among indigenous peoples.

On 21 September 2023, the STF deemed this framework unconstitutional, after years in which this notion, embraced by some judges, prevented several demarcations. The Constitution assures indigenous people “original rights over the lands they have traditionally occupied”, which is the opposite of a date.

But Congress rebelled against this ruling and six days later passed a law setting the time frame and amendments that weaken indigenous autonomy and the protection of their territories.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva vetoed most of the measures, including the time frame. But three months later Congress overrode the veto, in an open challenge to the president, the STF and the Constitution.

The makeshift camp where indigenous Guarani-Kaiwoá people live in Douradina, a municipality in the central-western state of Mato Grosso do Sul, awaiting the final demarcation of their territory. In July and early August they were attacked by landowners’ gunmen, who wounded 10 people. Credit: Bruno Peres / Agência Brasil

The risks for indigenous peoples

“Conciliation has no sense on a thesis that the Supreme Court has already deemed unconstitutional. It looks like a move of self-preservation by the Supreme Court in its disputes with Congress,” Terena told IPS, referring to the worsening conflicts between the two branches of government that have been roiling Brazilian politics for the past five years.

The STF’s battles, previously more frequent with the executive branch due to Bolsonaro’s abuses of power and lies, including in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic, are now common with the legislative branch, where the extreme right has grown stronger, despite Bolsonaro being defeated in his 2022 bid for re-election.

Judge Mendes is reportedly trying to flexibilise the dispute, mainly with the “ruralistas”, the agribusiness caucus, the largest in Congress and upset by the STF ruling, which considers it hostile to rural property and a factor of legal uncertainty for the powerful rural sector.

To this end, it has set up a Conciliation Commission, a series of STF hearings when a matter under its consideration is particularly controversial and could become conflictive. In this case, it is made up of 24 members, mostly legislators and government representatives.

Apib has only six members and feels it has been left with a dramatic choice.

Terena belongs to this indigenous group that feels at a disadvantage and has threatened to withdraw from the negotiations at the first hearing, on 5 August, given the adverse rules for indigenous peoples dictated by Mendes, as rapporteur of the time frame processes in the STF.

The judge decided after that hearing to consult the indigenous communities before deciding. The second hearing will be on 28 August.

Indigenous people protest in front of the Supreme Federal Court in Brasilia on 3 March 2024 against the law that reinstated a time frame for the demarcation of indigenous peoples’ lands, which was deemed unconstitutional by the same court but remains in force, fuelling conflict. Credit: Rafa Neddermeyer / Agência Brasil

Contradictions weaken the Supreme Court’s role

Among the proposed rules, one states that if a party walks out from the negotiations these will not be interrupted. Another says that resolutions may be adopted by a majority vote. No conciliation is possible without one of the interested parties, nor is it imposed by a vote, Terena argued in his interview with IPS by telephone from Brasilia.

The decision must be delayed because there are many leaders to be heard and “many risks in withdrawing from or remaining in the commission,” said the member of the Terena people, one of the most numerous in Brazil, who live in the central-western state of Mato Grosso do Sul.

“I think the risks are greater in being present, because it would mean accepting these rules and legitimising a meaningless conciliation process,” the lawyer said.

Moreover, the indigenous people, the most affected party in this issue, are a minority in a commission that can vote on resolutions, Batista added.

The damage to indigenous rights is prolonged and accumulating.

The STF took two years to conclude the trial on the time frame and did not suspend the law’s validity, even though its main precept is unconstitutional according to the country’s highest court, the ISA lawyer pointed out.

“This contradiction weakens the authority of the STF. Mendes adopted a position that was more political than legal, so as not to confront the economic interests of a strong sector”, that of agribusiness, she also said by telephone from Brasilia.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received in Brasilia on 10 August leaders of the Guaraní-Kaiwoá people, who live in territories that are too small or are fighting for the demarcation of their lands, sometimes under armed attack by large landowners. Credit: Ricardo Stuckert / PR

To the detriment of the minority

Batista warned that “the rights of the indigenous minority are the negotiable part, in a larger negotiation to calm the alleged democratic crisis. But granting a snack to mitigate the crisis feeds the monster that the STF wants to devour.”

Terena stressed that since it seems unfeasible to defend the constitutionality of the time frame, “the object of the negotiation” by the ruralists is the compensation to landowners for the land in their possession that they may lose when indigenous rights are restored, and the economic exploitation, be it mining, agricultural or other, of the demarcated territory.

So far, those occupying land recognised as indigenous are only entitled to compensation for the improvements and works they have contributed to the territory, where economic activities are restricted and subject to indigenous acceptance.

Anti-indigenous forces may also benefit by putting obstacles to the demarcation of reserves, to delay the process. Compensation for those with legitimate land titles, a measure already approved by the STF, could make many demarcations unfeasible for a government with severe fiscal constraints, Batista said.

“What happens to indigenous people who do not get the land they need and are entitled to? Forced assimilation by the surrounding society, but also many deaths, including in conflicts over land, suicides of those who are not assimilated,” he warned.

The intended conciliation should prioritise obtaining “land to compensate and resettle occupants of territories under demarcation”, and for the growing indigenous population, said Marcio Santilli, a founding partner of ISA, in an article published by the organisation.

Genocide

The indigenous population, estimated at three to eight million when the Portuguese arrived in Brazil in 1500, fell to 294,131 in the official 1991 census, which for the first time counted those who declared themselves indigenous. Previously they were considered to be mestizos.

Historical genocide flared up during the military dictatorship (1964-1985). But it was precisely during this period that resistance manifested itself in the reaffirmation of indigenous identity and the struggle for rights, recognised in the 1988 Constitution, at least in relation to their land.

Three decades of democracy and constitutional rights prompted a renaissance of indigenous peoples that was reflected in the 2022 census: a total of 1,693,535 declared themselves indigenous, 5.7 times the 1991 population.

The Constitution encouraged the demarcation of 451 indigenous territories, 84.6% of Brazil’s total, in the three decades following the military dictatorship, according to data from ISA, which accumulates an extensive database on indigenous peoples.

But that progress was interrupted during the Bolsonaro government, a representative of the same forces that backed the military. The current administration has resumed demarcations and other indigenist policies, but with the limitations imposed by the power of the far right in Congress and in agricultural and religious sectors.

President Lula promised to ratify the 14 indigenous lands that were already demarcated and ready for final approval at the start of his government in January 2023, but four have yet to be ratified. Brazil has 533 of these territories already formalised, while another 263 are in various stages of demarcation.

The world must act now to ensure vaccines reach the areas most in need, the WHO's Dr Hans Kluge says.

The world must act now to ensure vaccines reach the areas most in need, the WHO's Dr Hans Kluge says.

The interim president says he wants to "immerse" politicians in the realities of ordinary people.

The interim president says he wants to "immerse" politicians in the realities of ordinary people.

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Kenya has activated all 26 public health emergency operations centers countrywide and prepared laboratories for mpox testing to manage and control an mpox outbreak. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

By Joyce Chimbi
NAIROBI, Aug 20 2024 (IPS)

There is a deadly outbreak of a new and graver variant of mpox in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and at least one case has been confirmed in nearly 12 African countries, including those like Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda that were previously unaffected. Suspected mpox cases across these countries have surpassed 17,000, a significant increase from 7,146 cases in 2022 and 14,957 cases in 2023.

Many of these cases are in the DRC, where, for more than a decade, mpox cases have steadily increased as the disease remained neglected as a rare infection confined to far-flung remote rural areas in tropical Africa. But a recent move by the World Health Organization (WHO) strongly suggests that this is no longer the case, as a deadly mpox variant has recently emerged with alarming potential to spread very fast and far.

According to WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Ghebreyesus, the emergence of “a new clade of mpox, its rapid spread in the eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighboring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other mpox clades in the DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives.”

Dr. Onyango Ouma, a Kenyan-based medical researcher, told IPS there are two endemic types of mpox virus: clade I, which causes more severe illness and deaths. Some clade I outbreaks have killed up to 10 percent of the infected and are highly endemic in Central Africa, and clade II, which caused the 2022 global Mpox outbreak, is more endemic in West Africa.

More than 99.9 percent of those with clade II survive the disease. The new variant has been classified as clade Ib and can spread through sexual contact. Recently, on August 15, global health officials confirmed the presence of clade Ib infection in Sweden, signalling that the viral infection had taken on an international dimension.

It is this new and highly contagious clade Ib mpox, more grave than the deadly and endemic clade I, that has spread to other African countries that were previously untouched by the viral infection. Kenya is on high alert and has activated all 26 public health emergency operations centers countrywide, prepared laboratories for mpox testing, and deployed 120 trained personnel to manage any potential outbreak.

More than 250,000 people have already been tested thus far since Kenya intensified mpox screening at the beginning of the month. Two Kenyans, in two different parts of the country are currently undergoing testing for presenting with a skin condition akin to the mpox rash.

Although there is only one confirmed case of clade Ib in Kenya thus far, experts such as Ouma say there are likely to be more cases, especially due to Kenya’s position as a hub for travel within the East African community. The mpox case was of a driver traveling from Uganda to the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa.

Kenya has 35 points of entry and exit or borders with five countries, including Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Indian Ocean international waters. To avert a public health disaster, Kenya is set to receive what has been labelled an Mpox war kitty assembled by donors to the tune of USD 16 million (Kes 2 billion).

Discovered in captive monkeys in 1958, the first case of monkeypox—renamed mpox by WHO in 2022—was identified in 1970 in DRC and in 2022, mpox spread around the world for the first time. Scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention say the virus that causes mpox is of the same family as the one that causes smallpox but is not related to chickenpox. As a zoonotic disease, it can spread between animals and people.

Ouma says while mpox is endemic in forested areas in East, Central and West Africa, it is the ongoing unprecedented spread and reach of the deadly clade Ib variant that has heightened concerns and elevated mpox as a global health concern worthy of attention from the global community of scientists and public health actors.

Stressing that “not even the more than 517 people who died from mpox, primarily in the DRC this year, raised the disease profile. African researchers rung the bell way before the 2022-2023 mpox outbreak, calling for increased investments from the global public health community to help increase diagnosis, prevention, management and control of the disease without much success.”

To put it into perspective, Ouma says the WHO declaration that mpox is now a public health emergency of international concern is raising the profile of the disease to the “highest alert level regarding matters that involve a public health risk to other countries, inviting an internationally coordinated response.”

WHO Regional Director for Africa, Dr. Matshidiso Moeti, said, “Significant efforts are already underway in close collaboration with communities and governments, with our country teams working on the frontlines to help reinforce measures to curb mpox. With the growing spread of the virus, we’re scaling up further through coordinated international action to support countries bring the outbreaks to an end.”

Committee Chair Professor Dimie Ogoina said, “The current upsurge of mpox in parts of Africa, along with the spread of a new sexually transmissible strain of the monkeypox virus, is an emergency, not only for Africa, but for the entire globe. Mpox, originating in Africa, was neglected there, and later caused a global outbreak in 2022. It is time to act decisively to prevent history from repeating itself.”

Ouma says that while this is a step in the right direction, it is further proof that serious health inequalities and inequities prevail in the prevention and response to disease outbreaks. Since mpox was confined to the African continent and in remote rural areas of the DRC, communities have long been left to grapple with the infectious disease without the much-needed investments in diagnostic, therapeutic and infection prevention.

Stressing that there is a pressing issue around “under-testing and under-reporting as we lack the tools to tackle the disease. Clade I and II are endemic in Africa, but now that the deadly clade Ib strain can be sexually transmitted, suggesting that it could spread all over the world, we have a flurry of activities to combat the infectious disease as others outside the continent are at risk. This response has taken too long and it seems lessons from COVID-19 have unfortunately faded with time.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Credit: WHO/Lindsay Mackenzie

By Oritro Karim
NEW YORK, Aug 20 2024 (IPS)

On August 15th, the Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, Farhan Haq, stated at a press briefing at the United Nations Headquarters that the Mpox epidemic continues to surge in the Democratic Republic of Congo and spreads throughout Africa. The alarming frequency of these cases constitutes a global health concern. Mpox, formerly known as monkeypox, is an epidemic that has grown exponentially in severity over the past two years. Originating in Central Africa in 1970, rates of infection have risen significantly since late 2023, with a new variant of the infection, known as clade 1 Mpox, infecting over 17,000 people in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These cases have generated increasing alarm, so much so that the World Health Organization has declared Mpox to be a worldwide public health emergency. Shortly after this declaration, the first case of clade 1 Mpox was reported in Sweden which greatly elevated global concern of a worldwide epidemic.

Mpox, once thought to be a primary concern for solely the Democratic Republic of Congo, has begun to spread to neighboring countries and has been rising in rates of death due to infection. The director-general for the Worldwide Health Organization, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, states, “ The emergence of a new clade of Mpox, its rapid spread in eastern DRC, and the reporting of cases in several neighboring countries are very worrying. On top of outbreaks of other Mpox clades in DRC and other countries in Africa, it’s clear that a coordinated international response is needed to stop these outbreaks and save lives”. It is imperative for the world to understand the graveness of the Mpox epidemic and funnel resources into stopping rates of infection as well as providing widespread access to treatment.

Although most fatalities have remained in the Democratic Republic of Congo, reports of infection have increased dramatically in Burundi, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and the Republic of Congo. There have even been reports of mpox spreading over Asian borders in small quantities, into Taiwan, Pakistan, and the Philippines. It is interesting to note that the World Health Organization had organized an effort in combating the 2022-2023 Mpox outbreak for a different clade, and when that effort had concluded, a different clade had arisen and began to infect people all throughout Africa.

It is apparent from this prior development that a long-term effort is needed to combat Mpox as it is a disease that is resilient to change and will continually evolve. Dr. Tedros states that “stopping these outbreaks will require a tailored and comprehensive response, with communities at the center, as always”. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust for these changes accordingly and continue to treat Mpox with the seriousness it deserves.

Recently, the director-general has authorized for an emergency use vaccine to be distributed in lower income countries. This is a crucial first step as Mpox cases are most prevalent in underdeveloped or developing African countries. Furthermore, it is important to target the countries of highest concern first in order to stop the spread to other parts of the world.

Currently the World Health Organization has set up specific efforts in order to combat Mpox. One such example is that WHO has released 1.4 million dollars from their emergency contingency fund to fight this epidemic, expecting to release more in the coming weeks. Additionally, WHO is working with vaccine manufacturers around the world in order to find the most effective and accessible treatments. Furthermore, there has been a focus put into surveillance of the disease and exactly how many are infected. This will be particularly crucial in the process of fighting Mpox as right now, the number of infected people are approximations as many cases have not been reported. Although the current efforts by WHO are a step in the right direction, there is much more action needed to eradicate the Mpox epidemic. It is important that donors contribute to this effort as WHO estimates that about 15 million dollars will be needed for their multi step plan.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Could the Arab Spring scenario from Egypt repeat in Bangladesh as well?. This is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License. Give attribution to: Rayhan9d

By Randa El Ozeir
TORONTO and DHAKA , Aug 20 2024 (IPS)

“I hope the outcome [of the recent revolution in Bangladesh] would be different. I hope the end result will not be the same”, says Shireen Huq, women’s rights and human rights activist and Founder of Naripokkho organization, to IPS about the many similarities with the Arab Spring.

The recent revolution in Bangladesh that led to dismantling the autocratic ruling of Sheikh Hasina, many hundreds of young lives, including at least 32 children, were lost at the hands of the police and the auxiliary forces. According to a recent report conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission, “There are strong indications, warranting further independent investigation, that the security forces used unnecessary and disproportionate force in their response to the situation.”

The Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood Party) came to power through parliament elections in the Muslim-majority Egypt in 2011 on the heels of the Arab Spring and got an elected president in 2012. The military came back staging a coup and re-seized power in the country in 2013 and put the current president as head of state. Could this scenario repeat in Bangladesh as well?

I spoke with Huq who believes that there is a real issue of religiosity among young people in Bangladesh. However, this would not necessarily lead to supporting fundamentalist forces. “We saw that the fundamentalist forces were active in the protest. It is uncertain at this time to what extent they will be able to navigate the situation and get some advantage out of it. Hopefully, the interim government will be able to maintain their hold on the situation and keep it in the right direction.”

Disappointment with leaving women out of the interim government

However, Huq is disappointed that women have not been represented in the interim government, although some discussions were held initially.

“The garment industry has been led by a majority of the female workforce. During this uprising and these protests, we saw hundreds and thousands of women on the streets. This has been also unprecedented as women will outnumber not only in numbers but also in energy, in force. Two young men have been taken [in the government] from the movement, so this is a little bit worrying. But I am not worried on the whole about women’s rights being further eroded. If anything, I am hopeful that women’s rights will be further advanced”, stated Shireen Huq.

In 2018, Huq and her organization, which consists mainly of feminists, many in their middle ages, developed a women’s manifesto that they are currently sending to all members of the interim government to set the expected priorities for women. “We have to wait and see. We have to give young women space to organize themselves the way they want. They will sort out how they want to build their own space, their own structures and their own organizations.”

Hundreds of thousands of female Bangladeshis took to the street during the recent uprising that dismantled the autocracy in the country. This is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License. Give attribution to: Rayhan9d

In her article titled “Living on Revolution Time”, Anne Alexander, Founder of MENA Solidarity Network, wrote that rulers “will always seek to tip the scales back, to restore their capacity to rule by any means they can. In a very real sense, therefore, “revolution time” is always borrowed time.”

The overthrown Awami league is a big political party in Bangladesh and has plenty of supporters including among the grassroots. They made a failed attempt for a comeback on the 15th of August, the date when the independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated in 1975.

First Reforms then Democracy

What the world saw in Bangladesh embodies the analysis of Martha C. Nussbaum in her book titled Anger and Forgiveness, “Awakening people to the injustice of society’s treatment of them is a necessary first step toward social progress… Sometimes the legal structure is itself unjust and corrupt. What people need to do is not just to secure justice for this or that particular wrong, but, ultimately, to change the legal order.” (p. 211, 212)

Social justice and reforms appear to occupy a primordial place on the youth agenda in Bangladesh, while democracy takes a back seat, for the time being. “Democracy is definitely one of the major goals, but it is not only democracy which is popularly understood as elections,” clarifies Huq. “What is on the agenda right now is ‘reforms’. The slogan from the streets is also ‘Reform of the State’ in every sector. The success of the interim government, to some extent, is to deliver on those reforms. Democracy is equality and justice in the real sense of the term. Social justice and democracy will go hand in hand.”

Student demonstrators held their ground rejecting calls for swift elections and voiced the planning of their own political party. No doubt there is a generational gap when it comes to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was considered as the Father of the Nation. Youth don’t have any memory of previous times. “Hasina has used her father in every possible way,” says Huq. “I think it is my generation who is lamenting the inability of young people to make that separation, so they attacked his statues and his portraits which wasn’t probably necessary. There is a lot of pent up anger, not only about the autocracy of his daughter, but also about the misdeeds during her time.”

We are living in an era of acceleration around the world with the prevalence of technology and the pace of life. New generations seem to have lower inertia compared to previous generations and we are witnessing many youth revolutions. Huq thinks revolutions can be infectious. “I am not saying what is happening in Pakistan is because of Bangladesh, but it is interesting that it is happening in South Asia, and maybe we’ll see something happening in India as well, [it is] much-needed in India.”

Despite the great momentum of the revolution’s energy, Huq worries about India’s intervention and interference. “I think some warnings have been issued about that. If India really wants for Bangladesh to prosper and to do well, then the best thing it can do is to keep its hands off.”

Randa El Ozeir, is a Canadian-Lebanese journalist who writes on health issues, women’s rights and social justice.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Mauritania launches its first inclusive digital ID system. Credit: UNDP Mauritania

By El Hassen Teguedi, Benjamin Bertelsen and Jonas Loetscher
NOUAKCHOTT, Mauritania / UNITED NATIONS, Aug 20 2024 (IPS)

Governments are increasingly adopting the digital public infrastructure (DPI) approach to deliver public services. An essential component of this is digital identity. Digital identities are often designed to provide a seamless experience for users which ought to be secure, user-friendly, and preserve privacy.

Like Mauritania, this is particularly important for countries on their digital transformation journey, where digital legal identity* can be harnessed to catalyze development opportunities. Whilst the opportunities inherent with digital transformation are clear, everything from design to implementation needs to be inclusive to avoid exacerbating existing inequalities.

In Mauritania, forty-four percent of the population live in rural areas where physical infrastructure, connectivity and public services are limited. Given the rural-urban disparities, it is imperative to be inclusive by design when introducing new digital interventions.

UNDP is working with the Government of Mauritania to shape an inclusive and rights-based digital transformation. Whilst Mauritania has had its digital identity system, the government thought it was critical to further assess safeguards and privacy, accessibility for people living in low connectivity areas, as well as the usability of digital identity to authenticate services for the private sector, civil society, and government services.

UNDP is working with the Ministry of Digital Transformation, Innovation and Public Sector Modernization (MTNIMA) in Mauritania to advance the country’s digital identity infrastructure, where the focus has been on developing and piloting an open-source, mobile-based digital identity solution called e-ID Mauritania.

Mauritania’s digital identity application in pilot mode. Credit: UNDP Mauritania

Here are four takeaways from the pilot:

1. Establish a steering body for strategic decision-making

In Mauritania like many other countries, identity management is a sovereign function, linked to issues of security, governance, and protection of people’s rights. Mauritania’s National Agency for People Registry and Secure Documents, under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs, is responsible for issuing identity cards, passports, and residence permits. This agency developed and manages the national biometric system.

Considering the strategic nature of a digital identity project, its intersectoral nature, and related sensitivities, it is important to establish a strategic steering body (for instance at the level of the Prime Minister) that has effective involvement in decision-making, in Mauritania’s case the Ministry of Home Affairs. This body can provide strategic guidance for decision-making, for example regarding the mechanism and governance structure of the e-ID system.

2. Support robust governance

Robust governance of digital legal ID is a must for effective design and implementation. Ideally this is based on agile methodologies and the active participation of various stakeholders, which is necessary for ensuring the independence of the identity provider, as well as establishing safeguards for quality supervision, personal data protection, amongst others.

As the Mauritania’s pilot experience made clear, outlining the roles and responsibilities of all those involved goes a long way to promoting greater transparency and collaboration. This also helps with identifying additional expertise and perspectives. UNDP’s legal digital ID model governance framework provides useful guide rails for navigating a rights-based, multi-stakeholder, governance setup. Similarly, this blueprint is designed to aid the establishment and governance of digital legal ID systems globally.

3. Prioritize stakeholders

The project team thought it paramount to identify and validate the interests of key stakeholders. This included examining various options for a national digital identity system, whilst collecting inputs on their potential strengths and weaknesses. With inclusivity prioritized, the team aimed to develop a solution that would enable the use of multiple digital identities on a single mobile phone, in addition to an identity verification process that works without cellular connectivity.

Designing with the end users in mind helps to ensure that diverse needs and preferences are considered. In this respect, thoughtful steps were taken in Mauritania towards ensuring that the mobile-based solution would serve everyone, regardless of their technological access or level of connectivity. By using design thinking, governments can ensure that several verification options are built in.

4. Explore the benefits of open-source components

The pilot resulted in a highly functional and secure solution that uses some open-source and digital public goods. To navigate existing and future concerns, it is critical to explore different open-source business models and their implications; develop an open-source strategy and institutional setup within the government; manage license compliance for open-source projects to ensure effective governance and continuity.

As the experience in Mauritania highlighted, local governance of any solution built on open-source components necessitates considerable capacity building among national stakeholders. The open-source components used in e-ID Mauritania (accessible on MTNIMA’s GitHub) proved valuable in avoiding licensing fees and made it possible to combine various parts for the solution.

Moving ahead

Ensuring rights-based and inclusive governance of digital legal identity systems is crucial for their alignment with the public good. In essence, the regulations and standards set the ‘rules of the road’. These rules can guide decision-makers on the most suitable technologies for public service delivery, instill confidence in the private sector to invest and innovate, and foster end users’ trust.

UNDP will continue to collaborate with MTNIMA for the next phase of the project, including mobilizing financial resources, developing the system, and facilitating steps to adopt the necessary legislation for its implementation. Follow Mauritania’s digital transformation journey here for the latest updates.

*Legal identity is defined by the UN Legal Identity Task Force as the basic characteristics of an individual’s identity. e.g. name, sex, place and date of birth conferred through registration and the issuance of a certificate by an authorized civil registration authority following the occurrence of birth. In the absence of birth registration, legal identity may be conferred by a legally-recognized identification authority.

The digital legal ID which is referred to in the blog is a physical or digital credential, as well as the enabling process that supports ensuring that the credential is recognized and trusted. Digital legal ID can be ‘foundational’, with multiple applications – such as a birth certificate, passport or national identity card or intended for more ‘functional’ application such as accessing more narrowly defined services or entitlements. A digital identity system is thus the combination of technologies, systems and institutions that enable these processes.

Eight hundred and fifty million people worldwide do not have the means to prove who they are. People with no legal identity are often pushed to the margins of society, unable to secure decent work, acquire a driver’s license, apply for benefits or “exist” in society. They are often exposed to extreme vulnerabilities and have limited access to public goods and services as well as private services.

The United Nations Legal Identity Agenda Task Force, co-chaired by UNDP, UNDESA and UNICEF, is working with Member States to ensure that more than 300 million people acquire a legal identity by 2025. Join us!

The importance of legal identity is an integral part of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). UNDP actively works with open-source software to accelerate inclusive digital transformation in countries and to achieve the SDGs. SDG Target 16.9, which aims to “provide legal identity for all, including birth registration,” underscores the widespread significance of civil registration in societies globally.

UNDP co-leads the Digital Public Goods Alliance (DPGA) and is the official knowledge partner for India’s G20 leadership on DPI. UNDP does extensive work with both DPGs and DPI through our government counterparts and global partners. visit https://www.undp.org/digital and https://www.undp.org/governance/legal-identity.

El Hassen Teguedi is Head of Monitoring and Evaluation and Programme Management Support Unit, UNDP Mauritania; Benjamin Bertelsen is Digital Public Goods Product Specialist, UNDP’s Chief Digital Office; Jonas Loetscher is Digital Transformation Consultant, UNDP.

The authors would like to thank Soraya Habott, Project Lead, Ministry of Digital Transformation, Innovation and Public Sector Modernization, Mauritania for her contribution to this piece.

Source: UNDP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Peter Mutharika is picked to run in next year's presidential election by the main opposition DPP.

The commander was widely criticised after linking the alleged victim of a gang rape to sex work.

CBL's governor speaks of "increasing threats" to the bank's safety after its IT boss was abducted.

Activists from Mexico's Sin Maiz No Hay Pais (Without Corn There Is No Country) announced in June that more than 100,000 Mexicans signed letters to the GM corn trade panelists urging them to respect Mexico's food sovereignty. "100,000 signatures, 100,000 voices, 100,000 seeds"

By Timothy A. Wise
CAMBRIDGE, MA., Aug 19 2024 (IPS)

Closing arguments are in in the U.S. trade complaint against Mexico’s restrictions on genetically modified (GM) corn, with the three-arbitrator tribunal set to rule on the matter in November. The legitimacy of the trade agreement itself hangs in the balance.

In the course of the year-long process Mexico has dismantled U.S. claims, showing that its precautionary measures are permitted under the terms of the trade agreement, that its restrictions barely impact U.S. exports, and that it has a mountain of scientific evidence of risk to justify its precautionary policies.

Will the panel let the U.S. use a trade agreement stop a policy that barely affects trade?

The U.S. government requested this formal dispute-resolution process a year ago under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA) over Mexico’s February 2023 presidential decree that restricted the use of GM corn in tortillas and phased out the use of the herbicide glyphosate, which is applied to 80% of U.S. corn. Mexico cited evidence of both GM corn and glyphosate in tortillas and other common corn preparations and documented the risks from such exposures, particularly for a Mexican population that eats more than ten times the amount of corn consumed per capita in the United States.

Where is the trade restriction?

The U.S. claim has been specious from the start. In its complaint it mischaracterized Mexico’s presidential decree as a “Tortilla Corn Ban” and a “Substitution Instruction” to phase out imports of GM yellow corn for animal feed. Mexico, in its written filings in the case, has repeatedly objected to these terms.

By calling it a “tortilla corn ban” the U.S. is implying that Mexico has banned U.S. exports of white corn, the kind commonly used in tortillas. They haven’t. They only banned the use of GM corn in tortillas and in other foods made from minimally processed (ground) white corn. It is a ban on use, not imports. White corn exports, including GM white corn, still flow from the U.S. to Mexico. They just can’t be used in the tortilla/corn-flour food chain.

Because the vast majority of U.S. corn exports are yellow varieties for animal feed and industrial uses, the restriction barely affects U.S. corn producers. Where is the trade restriction?

Much of the U.S. case rests on its misleading characterization of the “Substitution Instruction” as a trade restriction. It is no such thing.

The U.S. argues that the 2023 decree mandates the eventual phase-out of all GM corn imports, threatening the $5 billion-per-year Mexican market for U.S. yellow corn – 97% of U.S. exports – overwhelmingly GM varieties mainly used as animal feed. Even though Mexico has no current restrictions on such U.S. exports, and none are planned, the U.S. argues that Mexico’s mandate threatens future profits it expected to receive from the trade agreement.

Trade lawyer Ernesto Hernández López took on the U.S. deception, pointing out that there is no mandate (instruction) to stop using GM corn, just to grow more alternative non-GM feed sources and use them as they become available. The original decree uses the term “gradual substitution” (sustitución paulatina) and makes clear that it is based on supplies being available.

As Hernández López points out, the trade panel should not accept a U.S. argument based overwhelmingly on hypothetical future reductions in Mexican imports of GM feed corn. The U.S. case is made all the weaker by data showing that U.S. feed-corn exports to Mexico have gone up significantly since the 2023 decree, a result of weak harvests due to drought.

Consider the facts

The USMCA tribunal should consider the facts:

• Mexico’s GM corn policies have barely impacted U.S. exporters. Yellow corn exports are booming and the border is wide open to white-corn exporters, even for tortillas if U.S. farmers switch to non-GM varieties.
• The USMCA agreement allows for such precautionary policies and even grants special exceptions for policies that support indigenous cultural practices. Mexican courts have repeatedly ruled that Mexicans have a constitutional right to protection of their heritage corn.
• The Mexican government and expert scientists in the case have presented reams of peer-reviewed science documenting the risks to Mexicans from GM corn with glyphosate residues, evidence the U.S. government has largely ignored in its formal rebuttals in the case.
• The U.S. is left with the weak argument that Mexico’s restrictions are a Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) health measure and require a strict risk assessment in advance of enacting the policy. Mexico argues that the policy is more than a health measure because it also protects the environment and indigenous rights. So no such risk assessment is required. Still, Mexico has produced plenty of science to show risk.

The Mexican government has also highlighted how lax and riddled with conflicts of interest the U.S. regulatory process is for GM corn, a charge backed by the U.S. Center for Food Safety. This means that, as a Reuters headline put it in March, “Mexico waiting on US proof that GM corn safe for its people.”

After hundreds of pages of filings and two days of hearings, Mexico is still waiting for that proof. Hopefully the tribunal will weigh the facts, dismiss the U.S. claim, and not allow the U.S. to misuse a trade agreement to stop a policy it doesn’t like.

Timothy A. Wise is a Senior Research Fellow at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute and the author of Eating Tomorrow: Agribusiness, Family Farmers and the Battle for the Future of Food.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Credit: Tomás Cuesta/AFP via Getty Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Aug 19 2024 (IPS)

There was an unusual sense of hope going into Venezuela’s 28 July presidential election. Democracy seemed on the horizon. María Corina Machado, the opposition’s rallying figure, had inspired a rare level of enthusiasm, promising millions of exiles they’d soon be able to return to a new Venezuela.

It seemed voting could bring change. And in a way, it did: the election proved the opposition could win despite an incredibly skewed playing field. But President Nicolás Maduro, in office since 2013, quickly declared himself the winner despite all evidence to the contrary, unleashing repression on the many who took to the streets in protest.

The situation is now at a standstill, and a Maduro-led regime lacking any legitimacy may use ever greater repression to stay in power. Many are deeply disappointed, but longtime Venezuelan activists advise patience alongside ongoing pressure. They knew the election could be the beginning of a much longer process. Now it’s a matter of finding the right mix of protest and international incentives to force negotiations that could lead to an eventual transition to democracy.

Election day

Although there were irregularities during the vote, they didn’t seem major. Most people in Venezuela, unlike Venezuelans abroad, seemed able to vote, and opposition witnesses were mostly allowed to visit polling stations and receive a copy of tallies produced by voting machines, as entitled to by law.

Fraud was hatched elsewhere, in the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) Totalisation Room, where vote tallies from 30,000 polling stations are processed and results calculated. The body responsible for overseeing elections is dominated by government loyalists.

The voting system is technically flawless: it operates on a closed circuit, making it almost impossible to hack, and contains multiple safeguards. This means that on election day, voting data flowed into the CNE as expected, and the count appeared to go smoothly until about 40 per cent of votes cast had been counted. That’s when the authorities apparently realised they were losing by an insurmountable margin and stopped transmitting data. Witnesses for the opposition were denied entry to the Totalisation Room. The CNE website froze and became inaccessible – and has remained so since. Without a shred of evidence, the government blamed ‘massive international hacking’, allegedly by opponents based in North Macedonia.

Throughout the afternoon, senior government officials issued media statements seemingly designed to prepare people for the announcement of a ruling party victory. They circulated exit polls showing Maduro with a lead of over 20 points, supposedly from a polling company that turned out to be fake. Meanwhile, exit polls conducted by opposition and independent pollsters gave González around 70 per cent.

Finally, around midnight, the CNE announced on national television that Maduro had won with 51.20 per cent against González’s 44.20 per cent. The vote totals were exact percentages to one decimal place, a near impossibility. It looked as though someone had decided on a percentage for each of the two main candidates and taken it from there. Without providing any disaggregated data, the CNE declared Maduro re-elected president.

The Carter Center, the only independent election observer allowed, left Venezuela on 29 July, saying the results were unverifiable and the election couldn’t be considered democratic. The opposition, civil society and the international community have since called on the government to produce detailed vote tallies, to no avail.

On 13 August, a UN panel of experts issued a preliminary report concluding that the CNE had failed to comply with ‘basic measures of transparency and integrity’.

What’s changed

But the story doesn’t end with massive fraud: some profound changes have taken place that suggest this is only the beginning.

For the first time in memory, no significant section of the opposition boycotted the election. Instead, the opposition held a primary vote that chose Machado as a unity candidate, with more than two million people taking part, despite threats from the authorities, censorship and physical attacks on candidates at rallies. But the results were immediately annulled by the government-aligned Supreme Court, which upheld an old disqualification against Machado, due to an unsubstantiated corruption conviction. The government then made the opposition jump through hoops to name a replacement.

Machado pulled off the seemingly impossible job of transferring her popularity to her successor, a softly spoken former diplomat who wasn’t on the political radar.

In addition to being united, the opposition developed a strategy, Plan 600K, to do everything it could to scrutinise the election. It recruited some 600,000 volunteers, organised in comanditos, groups of around 10 people each. By early July, the opposition claimed that more than 58,300 comanditos had been formed. On election day, they were present at polling stations across Venezuela.

They stayed throughout the day, and when the polls closed, took a copy of the tally sheet, photographed it, scanned the QR code and transferred the data, along with the paper documentation, to collection centres. Knowing what was coming, the opposition had worked with programmers to replicate an electoral computing centre so they could process the data and independently produce real figures down to polling station level.

This novel strategy caught the government off guard. By the time the CNE made its first announcements, the opposition had already counted 30 per cent of the ballots and knew it had won by a wide margin. The following day, opposition leaders held a press conference claiming to have counted over 70 per cent of the votes, giving González an unassailable lead. They opened up their database to the public, allowing investigative journalists and election experts to verify its accuracy.

The revelation of the crude nature of the government’s fraud brought a second major shift: the withdrawal of support from some states that customarily support Maduro. On election night, only four friendly authoritarian governments – China, Cuba, Iran and Russia – congratulated Maduro on his supposed re-election.

At the other end of the spectrum, several governments in the Americas, including Canada and the USA, refused to recognise the official results. Some, such as Argentina’s far-right libertarian president Javier Milei, did so for ideological reasons. But the rejections that carried the most weight came from Latin America’s democratic left, best represented by Chile’s President Gabriel Boric, who based his position on the unconditional defence of democracy. In response, the Venezuelan government expelled the diplomatic delegations of the seven Latin American countries that had questioned the election.

Somewhere in between, the European Union and three left-wing American governments – Brazil, Colombia and Mexico – said they’d recognise the results once the government produced the vote tallies and these were independently verified. Ahead of the election, Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Colombian President Gustavo Petro called on the government to ensure transparent elections and respect the results. They’re now in the best position to negotiate a transition behind the scenes. They’re the countries that receive most of Venezuela’s migrants, more of whom might leave if the crisis isn’t resolved.

What hasn’t changed

Before the election, Maduro warned of a ‘bloodbath’ if he didn’t win. He’s responded as expected, just as he did in the face of mass protests in 2014 and 2017 – with brutal repression that left at least 25 dead.

From the early hours of 29 July, hundreds took to the streets to protest against the implausible official results, and by the morning there were thousands across the country, mostly in densely populated working-class neighbourhoods, once government strongholds.

Maduro called the protests a ‘fascist outbreak’ and announced the construction of new prisons for detainees. Repression was often left in the hands of ‘armed collectives’ of pro-government paramilitaries who blocked marches, beat protesters and kidnapped opposition election observers. Lists of people wanted for allegedly inciting violence, including journalists and members of the opposition, were circulated on social media, and the authorities called for people to report those taking part in protests. In some Caracas neighbourhoods, pro-government groups tried to intimidate people by marking the houses of people perceived to be opposition supporters.

Security forces used pellets and teargas against protesters and arbitrarily arrested hundreds, charging them with terrorism or incitement to hatred. Over 2,400 people were arrested, according to official figures. The UN Human Rights Office found that most detainees weren’t allowed to choose their own lawyer or contact their families, and classed some of these cases as enforced disappearances.

But even when repression forced people back into their homes in fear for their lives, sporadic pot-banging protests have continued to erupt.

What must change

Whether the election marks the beginning of a democratic transition will depend on a combination of three factors, none of which is sufficient on its own: mass protest, international pressure and division and defection among the military.

Many Venezuelans saw the election as their last chance before giving up and joining the millions who’ve left. The exodus, the turnout, the results and the ensuing protests are all signs that the vast majority no longer support the government, and many actively oppose it.

So far, opposition leaders have refrained from calling people out onto the streets because, given the regime’s repressive response, more protests will inevitably mean further casualties. But without mass mobilisation, the regime could quickly regain control and opposition leaders could end up in prison. It remains to be seen how many will dare to take to the streets, for how long and how far the government will go to suppress them.

Maduro will only leave when he calculates that the cost of staying is higher than the cost of leaving, so any international negotiation should aim to lower his exit costs. This means the price of transition would likely be an unpalatable concession of immunity – and therefore impunity – for Maduro and other top officials.

But there’s only so much international pressure can do. Maduro has already shown he’s willing to take the hit of international isolation if that’s what it takes to stay in power. He has systematically reneged on all his international commitments, including the Barbados Agreement that paved the way for the election. What’s more, the states most willing to broker a deal have little leverage because Venezuela doesn’t depend on them, while the countries it relies on, China and Russia, have no incentive to promote democracy.

Two of the three elements in the equation have begun to shift: a clear majority has expressed its will at the ballot box and on the streets, and ideologically close former international allies have insisted that the will of the people must be respected. The third remains an unknown. Even under siege and internationally isolated, the regime could survive if it remains determined to tackle the crisis with violence, as it has done so far, and if security forces remain on its side. The fate of millions depends on what happens next.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

 

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