Central Europe

VIENNA, 4 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today raised his concern about the draft law amending the “Statute on the Mass Media” in the Russian Federation. If adopted in its current state, the law would extend the status of “foreign agent” not only to media but to individual journalists and other authors.

The Representative made his statement ahead of the second reading of the draft law in the State Duma. According to the Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, the new legislation would, among other provisions, oblige individuals to publish reports about their financing and how they have spent it.

“I have consistently stressed that the labelling of media and journalists as “foreign agents” anywhere in the OSCE region is a stigmatizing and discriminating practice that may impact negatively their work and have a considerable chilling effect,” he said. “There should be no discriminatory policy against media or journalists based on their country of origin.”

Russian legal regulations on foreign ownership of the media and the “foreign agents” law have been raised by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in correspondence with the authorities and press releases (see https://www.osce.org/fom/368161,  www.osce.org/fom/124143 and www.osce.org/fom/357111).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

VIENNA, 4 July 2018 – With the number of people killed or injured globally by landmines having doubled in the last five years, today’s OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) meeting in Vienna, held under Slovenia’s Chairmanship, focused on the threat posed by these “silent killers” and on the different approaches the OSCE is taking in affected states to address this challenge.

Opening the meeting, Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič, Chairperson of the Forum and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the OSCE, said that demining is of great importance to Slovenia, and in 1998 the country established a humanitarian, non-profit organization - ITF Enhancing Human Security - to support mine clearance in Bosnia in Herzegovina.

“One of the challenges that still affects the Western Balkans, but also concerns other OSCE regions, is the issue of land mines. In fact, this is again becoming an alarmingly topical concern, with the global number of land mine victims doubling in the past five years,” said Ambassador Benedejčič. “The OSCE is well aware of this regrettable trend. A little more than a year ago a member of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was lost to one of these ‘silent killers.’”

ITF Enhancing Human Security, which is now present around the world, and this year marks its 20th anniversary, has at its core a human-centred approach, as individuals and societies suffer most from landmines and unexploded remnants of war, said the organization’s director, Ambassador Tomaž Lovrenčič.

“It is important to emphasize that humanitarian mine action can only be effective if demining work is complemented by mine risk education, mine victims assistance, stockpile destruction and advocacy,” he said. “Land mines hinder any possible development and importantly aggravate the humanitarian situation in affected countries, so it is of utmost importance for the international community to ensure an environment that is conducive to demining, assisting mine victims and other vital elements of mine action.”

Highlighting the gender perspective in line with the recurring theme of Slovenia’s FSC Chairmanship, Arianna Calza Bini, the Director of the Gender and Mine Action Programme, an international expert organization based in Geneva, said gender has a significant impact on the consequences of conflict and mine contamination: the majority of direct victims are men and boys, whilst the majority of indirect victims are women and girls.

“Including gender in mine action is vital to avoid exacerbating inequalities, but also to make sure that mine action operations and activities reach and benefit all groups in a community,” she said. “By engaging women in all aspects of mine action, from clearance to data collection, victim assistance and mine risk education, mine action operations are more inclusive, and better represent the concerns, and priorities of women and girls.”

The Forum for Security Co-operation then heard from two heads of OSCE Field Operations, who shared perspectives from the OSCE’s work on the ground.

“The OSCE’s added value to mine action stems from its holistic and cross-dimensional approach to security,” said Ambassador Tuula Yrjölä, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe. “In Central Asia, the Programme Office supports Mine Action and Explosive Hazards Reduction as a platform for co-operation, building capacities as well as sharing experience and best practices among governments, ministries and institutions.”

She added that Tajikistan is close to being declared a mine-free country but additional funding and support is necessary to help them reach this goal.

Ambassador Vaidotas Verba, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, highlighted two project proposals developed in 2016 in response to the needs of national authorities in the humanitarian demining.  

“The OSCE Project Co-ordinator is supporting authorities in developing national mine action standards, as well as establishing procedures for quality assurance and quality control,” he said. “The projects aim to build humanitarian mine action capacity by focusing on a legal framework for humanitarian demining operations, to set up a mine action information management system and to facilitate the exchange of experiences in this domain.”

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana in co-operation with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan organized a two-day seminar “News-making in public relations — an effective tool for securing active presence in social media” from 4 to 5 July 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Some 25 judges of the Supreme and regional (oblast) courts will discuss how to improve dialogue between the public and the court using social media.

An-OSCE supported expert from Sweden together with national media experts will discuss best international practices with respect to communication between the courts and media, the role of social media in covering court proceedings, principles of communicating via social media, as well as ways to interact and respond to critical materials in social media.

The judges will participate in group exercises to learn how to create a narrative on judicial issues for the public and write social media posts.  

The seminar is part of the Programme Office’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

386585 Steven Martin, ODIHR Senior Election Adviser, addresses workshop participants. 3 July 2018, Warsaw. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Guidelines for Public Security Providers in Elections

Enhancing the assessment of electoral security was the focus of a workshop organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw on 3 July 2018.

The workshop brought together nine experts from civil society organizations involved in electoral issues and several international election experts to discuss ODIHR’s newest election-related publication, Guidelines for Public Security Providers in Elections, and to promote its use in election observation activities.

“While countries hold elections under different circumstances, a secure electoral environment is crucial to the overall integrity of an election,” said Steven Martin, ODIHR Senior Election Adviser. “Enhancing efforts and capacity to assess the framework and conduct of public security officials during an election can serve to strengthen regulations and practice in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards.”

The participants explored ODIHR’s approach to assessing various aspects of electoral security, reviewed the guidelines and related case studies and discussed the application of ODIHR’s observation methodology to electoral security issues in their own countries.

“We look forward to working with those stakeholders throughout Mongolia who will surely benefit from the guidelines, including civil society, media, the election administration and law enforcement agencies,” said Bayasgalan Genden, Senior Officer with the Ulaanbaatar Center for Policy Studies.

The workshop was part of ODIHR’s continued efforts to improve its methodology and increase professionalism in the observation of certain specialized aspects of elections, including through regular engagement with citizen observer organizations.

386564 Communication and Media Relations Section

Over 40 participants from delegations of OSCE participating States, civil society organizations and academia participated in a side event of the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting dedicated to combating violence against women in conflict settings on 2 July 2018.

The event was organized by the OSCE Gender Section and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 

“While legal recourse and prosecution is already a challenge in times of peace, it is even worse when it comes to gender-based violence committed in conflict settings,” said OSCE Senior Gender Adviser Amarsanaa Darisuren in her welcoming remarks, adding that armed conflict often creates a culture of impunity, and gender-based violence crimes are seen as a ‘collateral damage’.

Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR said that states lack mechanisms to enhance the protection of women from violence when conflicts break out. “Conflict prevention strategies should be informed by measures of prevention of violence against women in peace times and should involve all parties, from lawmakers to law enforcement, from the judiciary to civil society, religious leaders, the media and all social service providers,” said Pavone.

The event included the screening of a video clip from the upcoming documentary ‘The Prosecutors’, which was introduced by international humanitarian law expert Daniela Kravetz.

Amra Hamidovic shared the experiences and results from the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina work on justice for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence: “Significant progress in judicial and prosecutorial response has been reached, but challenges remain,” she said.

Gulnara Shahinian from the Armenian NGO ‘Democracy Today’ shared recommendations from global activists on ways to improve access to justice for survivors of violence, including by implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and by increasing the documentation and reporting of gender-based crimes.

Captain Inna Zavorotko, Legal Adviser of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, shared national experiences on preventing conflict-related violence against women, highlighting “the importance of establishing solid national justice systems to ensure that survivors have access to legal recourse.”

Ambassador Marcel Peško, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, closed the event, stressing that more attention should be paid to the prevention of conflict-related gender-based violence as an integral part of conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.   

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed bullet holes in windows of residential buildings in Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it heard small-arms fire near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Lobacheve, Donetskyi and Bohdanivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. The Mission observed a gathering in Kyiv and the vandalism of a monument in Odessa. In Berehove, the SMM followed up on the killing of a member of the Roma community.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions).

During the day on 2 July, positioned near the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (six assessed as impacts, the remainder undetermined) and four bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from west to south-west, as well as 15 explosions (five assessed as impacts, the remainder undetermined) 6-10km north and two shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-north-east.

During the evening and night of 1-2 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight, an undetermined explosion, two projectiles, an undetermined explosion, 43 projectiles and an undetermined explosion, all 1-4km east-north-east. Approximately two-thirds of the projectiles recorded were in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east, the remainder were recorded flying south-south-east to north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 31 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). On 2 July, positioned 2.5km north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 8-10km south-south-west.

At the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed an electrical cable had been connected to the camera’s fuse box and that said cable led to a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound about 150m north-east of the camera site. The SMM addressed the issue to a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).

The SMM observed bullet holes in the windows of residential buildings in Dokuchaievsk (non-government controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). At a second-story apartment in a five-storey building at 86 Lenina Street, the SMM observed three holes penetrating two south-facing windows; it assessed the holes to have been caused by small-arms fire from a south-westerly direction. The owner of the apartment (woman in her seventies) told the SMM that she had heard the sound of glass breaking at around 19:30 on 1 July and then seen a hole through her window. At a fifth-floor apartment in a five-story building at 87 Tsentralna Street, the SMM observed a hole through the glass of a west-north-west-facing window. The owner of the apartment (woman in her eighties) said that she had heard the sound of breaking glass around 18:45 on 1 July and subsequently seen a hole through her window.                     

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 2 July, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM heard 170 shots of small-arms fire 6-7km west and five shots 2-3km west-south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned in the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank (T-64) near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) on 30 June.

In violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), on 30 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a 120mm mortar. The following day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 30 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk). On 2 July, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 30 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk). On 1 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Bohdanivka and ten IFVs (BMP variants), five armoured personnel carriers (two BTR-70 and three MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a compound on the southern outskirts of Donetsk city.

On 30 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two houses with destroyed roofs, one of which was connected to trenches, 15 craters assessed as caused by mortar (82mm and 120mm) rounds and an impact assessed as caused by an artillery round near civilian houses, all on the western edge of Donetskyi (none of which were visible in imagery from 7 June 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. On 2 July, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to pipelines in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and to a water channel and fibre optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk city, the SMM followed up on media reports of a raid by the armed formations on a Muslim cultural centre at 2 Berestovska Street in Kalininskyi district. The SMM found seals reading “sealed on 21 June by the investigation department of the ‘Ministry of State Security’” in Russian affixed to the centre’s doors.

On 1 July, in Kyiv, the SMM saw approximately 300 people gathered on Independence Square, many holding banners with the slogans “Free Sentsov” and “Save Oleg Sentsov.” The SMM saw four police officers present. Some of the participants continued the gathering outside the French and German Embassies, where the SMM saw about 30 and 50 National Guard and police officers, respectively.

At Kulykove Pole in Odessa, on 2 July, the SMM saw that red paint had recently been sprayed over two inscriptions on a monument (“To the fighters who died for the power of the Soviets in Odessa” and “From the labourers of Odessa 1960” – both in Ukrainian language). (For a similar incident at the same location, see SMM Daily 19 May 2018.)

In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 20 members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community cordoned off by the police. A group of about 30 people had gathered in parallel, calling loudly that they “will raid Roma”. Scuffles occurred between members of the two groups and the police intervened. The event ended without further incident.  

On 2 July, in Berehove (174km south-west of Ivano-Frankivsk) in Zakarpattia region, the SMM followed up on reports of the killing of another member of the Roma community (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018). Medical staff at a hospital in Berehove told the SMM that a woman (aged 30) had died on 1 July from wounds to her neck but refused to provide the SMM with additional information, citing an ongoing police investigation. The local police department told the SMM that the woman with severe wounds to her neck had been found unconscious near a railroad yard in Berehove and died while being transported to the hospital. The local police also said that it had opened a criminal investigation under Article 115 of the Criminal Code (murder).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other Impediments

• Staff at a hospital in Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM information regarding a civilian casualty, stating that the SMM should request “permission” for such information from the armed formations.
• Staff at a hospital in Alchevsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km south west of Luhansk) refused to provide the SMM information, stating that the SMM should request “permission” for information from the armed formations.
• Staff at a hospital in Brianka (nongovernment-controlled, 46km south-west of Luhansk) refused to provide the SMM information, stating that the SMM should request “permission” for information from the armed formations.
• Staff at a hospital in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, nongovernment-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) refused to provide the SMM information, stating that the SMM should request “permission” for information from the armed formations.
• Staff at a hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, nongovernment-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) refused to provide the SMM information, stating that the SMM should request “permission” for information from the armed formations.

 

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]     This hardware is not prescribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY
KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs. On 28 June, the seventy-six Russian convoy of 17 vehicles crossed into Ukraine and returned through the Donetsk Border Crossing Point.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 11,702 to 11,605 per day at both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 169 to plus 120 (in both occasions more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 35.8 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                       

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased 42.8 per cent (30 persons compared to 21 last week); 16 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 14 into Ukraine. Seventy-three percent of these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP, while the other 27 per cent occurred in Gukovo BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, OTs noted a slight decrease in the number of families crossing. Five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (429 compared to 346 observed during the previous week). There were 222 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 207 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Rovenky-Kyiv; Kharkiv; Odessa and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 909 to 820 (267 at the Gukovo BCP and 553 at the Donetsk BCP); 473 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 347 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.         

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased by 14.3% compared to the previous reporting period (from 84 to 72). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.
Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP went from 102 to 111: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 72 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 39 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased by 30.7 per cent (from 127 to 166 vehicles); 83 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 83 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 32 occasions, compared to 35 last week; the OTs assessed that 16 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 16 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Belarusian, Georgian, Lithuanian, and Kazakh licence plates; vehicles with “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border.

During the reporting period, the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed ambulances on three separates occasions. The first ambulance was observed on 27 June at 17:45 entering the BCP area from the Russian Federation and parking in front of the main building in the customs control area. Two medical staff from the vehicle entered the BCP’s building and at 18:06, the ambulance with the two paramedics on board returned to the Russian Federation without crossing the border to Ukraine. The ambulance had Russian Federation licence plates.

On 29 June at 10:22, an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates was observed entering the BCP from the Russian Federation. The ambulance parked close to the exit booth. Two medical officers (a male and a female) from the vehicle entered the BCP’s main building. At 10:51, the ambulance, with both the medical officers on board, returned to the Russian Federation without crossing the border into Ukraine.

On the same day, at 10:25 an ambulance with “LPR” plates entered the BCP from Ukraine. While undergoing border formalities, the OT observed two medical staff and a driver inside the vehicle. At 10:58, the ambulance crossed the border into the Russian Federation. At 15:03, the same ambulance was observed crossing back into Ukraine.
On 27 June, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a van crossing the border from Ukraine into the Russian Federation at 15:21. The van had Ukrainian licence plates and the inscription “Ritual Service” (in Russian). The OT observed a driver and a passenger (female) on board, but unable to ascertain whether there was a coffin on board or not. On the same day, at 15:40 the van was observed crossing back into Ukraine.

Convoy

On 28 June at 06:19, the seventy-sixth[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk BCP. A total of 17 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to crossing into Ukraine. All 17 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation on the same day by 13:25. (see the OM Spot Report of 28 June 2018).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 29 May to 3 July 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Rostov-on-Don Regional Administration.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

[3] According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the seventy-eighth Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” border crossing points, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this is considered the seventy-sixth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

Kunduz Rysbek

With the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek an expert review of the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Central Asian states and Belarus was held in Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan on 28 June 2018.

Taking part in the meeting were delegations from Kyrgyzstan, headed by the State Secretary of the Economy Ministry Aidin Sharsheev, together with delegations from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. They were joined by international experts from the OSCE Secretariat, the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee, the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as well as the implementation support groups of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

The meeting was in line with obligations outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution, which call on states to promote dialogue and co-operation in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was held after regional reviews on implementation of the Resolution between 2015 and 2017 proposed that the countries of the region work on developing national action plans for its implementation. Consequently, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Economy took the initiative in organizing this regional expert review.

"Kyrgyzstan is one of the states which strictly fulfils its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and we really are a leader in this matter," said Sharsheev as he opened the meeting. He added that Kyrgyzstan has already adopted a second national action plan containing further steps to be taken in order to implement Resolution 1540.

The expert review addressed how to strengthen legislation in the field of export control, biological and chemical safety, among other issues.

"The OSCE is always ready to promote dialogue, and I am pleased to provide analytical expertise and a platform for discussion, but the successful implementation of Resolution 1540 resolution depends on the active initiative of each country," said OSCE expert Anton Martyniuk.

386516 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Thirty legal and civil society professionals from both banks of Dniester/Nistru River, as well as representatives of the Moldovan Ombudsman’s office, completed a three-day training course on human rights monitoring organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 28 to 30 June 2018. The course was designed to enhance the capacity of the participants and their role in monitoring the human rights situation and to strengthen co-operation between the legal communities on both banks. 

During the training course, the participants studied the human rights monitoring cycle as well as existing international standards and principles of human rights monitoring. Under the guidance of experts, the legal and civil society professionals worked on case studies and gained hands-on experience of developing an advocacy strategy and practised strategic planning, interview techniques, reporting skills, and data collection and classification.

“Human rights monitoring is one of the most effective tools which can help protect a domestic violence victim,” said Alexandra Martynenko, Director of the Women's Crisis Centre run by the Resonance NGO from the left bank. “From a broader perspective, collecting and analysing data on human rights violations helps identify the best instruments to campaign for women’s human rights protection and create an enabling environment for change.”   

This event builds on the tradition of summer schools for participants from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River, which have been organized by the Mission since 2015. The previous schools focused on the application of the European Court of Human Rights to the Moldovan context, non-discrimination issues, and access to personal data. It is also part of the Mission’s year-long confidence-building efforts which seek to build trust between the legal communities on both banks of the river. 

VIENNA, 2 July 2018 – Strengthening law-enforcement and judicial responses to violence against women, raising awareness about its multiple and invisible forms and empowering victims are crucial elements of any effective strategy to prevent such violence, participants said today at the opening of a two-day OSCE conference in Vienna.

The meeting, Countering Violence against Women – Everyone’s Responsibility, was organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and in co-ordination with the Gender Section of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General. It gathered representatives of OSCE participating States, civil society and international organizations to discuss current challenges and good practices in preventing and countering violence against women in the OSCE region.

"Promoting the empowerment of women and fighting gender-based violence are deeply intertwined,” said Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council and Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE. "The recognition of women as political, economic and social subjects can help to prevent and counter violence against them."

Among other topics, participants discussed mechanisms bringing together police and civil society organizations to provide support to the victims and raise awareness of the root causes of violence.

Amarsanaa Darisuren, OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues, said: “While the manifestations of violence and discrimination against women and girls might change over time, the root causes of gender-based violence against women have proven to be deeply ingrained in our societies.”

The participants also noted that inequality and violence are not experienced in the same way by all women. For instance, women belonging to minority groups often face multiple forms of discrimination, which exacerbate their experience of violence. It is therefore necessary to adopt approaches that take into account the diversity of experiences, the participants said.

“An inclusive approach is necessary if we are serious about changing this situation,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “As the OSCE, we need to work with lawmakers, politicians and law enforcement agencies, with prosecutors and judges, with the media, with religious leaders and – last but not least – with civil society, including at the grassroots level.”

The need to overcome traditional barriers to reporting violence, speaking up and denouncing it was therefore highlighted as critical to uncovering and preventing violence. 

“The #MeToo movement has firmly put sexual harassment and assault on the policy agenda. It set off a vital global conversation, and the game-changing momentum, led by brave women, continues,” said Purna Sen, UN Women Director of Policy Division and Executive Coordinator and Spokesperson on Addressing Sexual Harassment and Other Forms of Discrimination, in her keynote address. “A door has been opened for real change in our attitude towards sexual violence, in particular in workplaces. Our task is to stand up to this challenge.”

The second day of the event will be dedicated to discussing violence against women in public and political life, the role of the judiciary, and protection and empowerment measures.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July – and following a recommitment to the ceasefire – the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it saw a fresh crater and again Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was restricted also in Kozatske, near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation and on three occasions in Zaichenko. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Muratove. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, compared with the previous reporting period (375 explosions). Between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours. About 45 per cent of the ceasefire violations recorded between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July, including 12 explosions, were recorded after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 1 July, mostly east-north-east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and in a south-westerly direction of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk)

On the evening and night of 29-30 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk recorded, in sequence, ten projectiles in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west, seven undetermined explosions and three projectiles from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by totals of 11 undetermined explosions and 204 projectiles (190 from south-south-east to north-north-west, 11 from north-north-west to south-south-east and three from south-east to north-west), all 1-4km east-north-east. On the evening and night of 30 June-1 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, an explosion assessed as an outgoing round 1-1.5km east-north-east, a projectile in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west and two projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of six undetermined explosions and 279 projectiles (216 from south-south-east to north-north-west, 43 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 16 from south-west to north-east and four north-west to south-east), all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 29-30 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 52 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery (type undetermined) and mortar (120mm) rounds 5-15km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east, as well as six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of mortar (120mm) and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire 5-6km east-south-east and south-east. While at the same location, the SMM also heard 55 undetermined explosions and about 640 shots and bursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23, 23mm), automatic grenade-launcher, IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 5-12km at directions ranging from north-east to south.

On the evening and night of 29-30 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 2-5km west-north-west, as well as about 30 undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 30 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 32 projectiles in flight from west to east 4-6km south.

During the day on 30 June, positioned on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata for about one hour, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-6km at directions ranging from south-west to west. The following day, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata for about six hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 130 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-west and west-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (one explosion) between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, compared with the previous reporting period (88 explosions). Between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 undetermined explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All the ceasefire violations recorded between the evenings of 30 June and 1 July were recorded after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 1 July near Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk).

During the day on 1 July, positioned in Orikhove-Donetske, the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and over 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east.

On 30 June, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata. At 45 Hoholia Street, on the western edge of the town, the SMM saw two fresh holes in the north-west-facing side of a garage about 5m from a house, assessed as caused by small-arms fire from a westerly direction. A resident of the house told the SMM that he had heard gunfire between 17:30 and 18:00 on 29 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 June, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the paved road and the tailfin of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round nearby about 1km north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area (while positioned at the same location during the day on 28 June, the Mission had not observed the crater). The SMM assessed the crater as having been caused by a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fired from a northerly direction on the night of 28-29 June. A Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer at a checkpoint about 300m north of the disengagement area and a member of the armed formations at a checkpoint on its southern edge told the SMM that there had been explosions and gunfire inside the disengagement area on the night of 28-29 June.

On 1 July, positioned inside the Zolote disengagement area on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a military truck with three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers and a car with Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers enter the disengagement area.

During the day on 30 June, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations. The following day, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 1 July, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) moving west about 1.5km north-east of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 29 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Pershe Travnia (57km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft weapon[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 29 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Pershe Travnia and an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one BMP variant) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk). On 30 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (type undetermined) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Lebedynske (16km east of Mariupol). The same day, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). On 1 July, the SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4) near Muratove.

On 1 July, in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two stationary APCs (BTR-80) on either side of a former communal building and 15-20 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, some of them armed with assault rifles, on the premises of the building. The building is located about 200m from a functional school building and about 20m from its playground. Four local residents (women, aged 40-70) told the SMM that they did not feel safe with military presence in the centre of the village and that they were concerned about letting their children use the playground due to the proximity of military presence.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 29 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) near Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) and an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-variant) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk), as well as a recent 50m-long extension of a trench system near Khrystove (18km north of Luhansk), about 900m east of the contact line. On 30 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACP (BTR-80) near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed mines, demining activities, mine hazard signs and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 29 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted five anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road between Starohnativka and Bila Kamianka, about 2km east of the former (see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2018). About 2km further east, the mini-UAV also spotted 14 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across and along either side of the same road and extending into a field on the northern side of the road on the north-western edge of Bila Kamianka (see SMM Daily Report 9 March 2017).

On 30 June, the SMM observed sappers with metal detectors from non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region sweep a 300m-long section of a road between Styla (non-government controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and its intersection with a road in Petrivske. At the intersection, where the Mission had previously observed an object assessed as an anti-tank mine (TM-62) with a command wire (see SMM Spot Report 23 June 2018), another member of the armed formations told the SMM that all mines around the intersection had been removed on 28 June. The Mission did not observe any mines or wires there.

On 30 June, on road H20, about 2km south-west of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time red square mine hazard signs with “Danger Mines” written in white in the Russian language placed on a barbed wire fence. The fence was built around a central reservation area (20m-long and 3m-wide) of the road, about 50m south of a checkpoint of the armed formations. Inside the aforementioned area, the SMM saw at least ten circular, freshly dug mounds approximately 30-40cm in diameter. (The SMM has regularly observed civilians using this road.)

The same day, about 3km north-east of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a grey plastic tube with a metal bottom on the southern side of road T0519, assessed as an empty cartridge of a recently fired 152mm artillery round.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. On 30 June and 1 July, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. On 30 June, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for ten minutes, the SMM saw three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two pedestrians entering Ukraine, and 27 cars (15 with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation, two with Belarussian and one with Georgian licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with “LPR” plates), two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) and eight pedestrians in a queue to exit Ukraine. After ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 1 July, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for one hour, the SMM saw 27 cars (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 “DPR” plates), four buses (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM observed no traffic or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed about 40 people (men and women, aged 40-60) gathered in front of the SMM office. One of the participants told the SMM that the gathering was held in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation. (See SMM Daily Report 4 June 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 30 June, at a checkpoint east of Kozatske (nongovernment-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from other members of the armed formations.
• On 30 June, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 30 June, at a checkpoint in Zaichenko on two occasions, armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (nongovernment-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming that it was not safe for the SMM to proceed there. On the second occasion, two members of the armed formations also said that they had “specific orders” not to allow the SMM to visit the two villages. (See SMM Daily Report 30 June 2018.)
• On 1 July, for the fourth consecutive day at the same checkpoint in Zaichenko, two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka, claiming that it was not safe for the SMM to proceed there.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 30 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• On 30 June and 1 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times. [3]
• On 30 June and 1 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]     Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

386465 Expert meeting participants listen to a presentation by ODIHR consultant Nikolai Kovalev. 2 July 2018, Warsaw. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The functional independence of prosecutors in Eastern Europe was the topic of an expert meeting organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw on 2 and 3 July 2018.

Sixteen participants (8 women and 8 men) – prosecutors, lawyers, and representatives of the judiciary, civil society, academia and international organizations – exchanged regional good practices and discussed the findings of a needs assessment study carried out by ODIHR between March and June 2018.

The objective of the study was to evaluate how the functional independence of prosecutors is ensured when investigating criminal cases, including high-profile cases, in OSCE participating States such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

“Prosecutors should play a central role in fighting corruption and in securing investigations free from external pressure or interference,” said Marcin Walecki, Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department.

James Hamilton, a rule of law expert and former Director of Public Prosecutions of Ireland, said: “Legal and practical mechanisms should exist in every state to guarantee that prosecutors can initiate and prosecute criminal cases without improper interference.”

The outcomes of the expert meeting will inform a final report with recommendations based on the needs assessment study, which will be published by the end of 2018.

The meeting was part of the project, Strengthening the independence of prosecutors in Eastern Partnership countries, which is funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers and implemented by ODIHR. It followed a study visit by prosecutors from the project countries to Norway in May 2018, which focused on exploring the conditions that need to be in place to allow prosecutors to carry out their work without undue interference.

386130 Kunduz Rysbek

A three-day summer school for young politicians was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek together with the International Republican Institute in Kyrgyzstan, and the Legal Prosperity Foundation from 26 to 29 June 2018 in Bishkek. The school aims to strengthen the capacity of young leaders in Kyrgyzstan and promote their engagement in decision-making processes. The agenda included a panel discussion on the issues of youth employment, as well as problems with accessing higher education for people with special needs.

Firty-five young leaders of diverse backgrounds, including representatives of state bodies and civil society, journalists, bloggers, and representatives of SMEs and local self-government bodies, were selected on a competitive basis. Among the participants were also young individuals with special needs who strive to play an active role in policy- and decision making. Deputy Prime Minister  Altynai Omurbekova, parliamentarians Aida Kasymalieva and Aisuluu Mamashova, and representatives of the Ministry of Education and Science and the State Human Resources Office shared their experiences and gave recommendations on how to actively participate in the nation’s public life and decision-making processes.

“We hope that the summer school will help to motivate young people, regardless of their background, to become active in public and political life, be ambitious and make their voices heard. The school also serves as a platform for connecting youngsters and decision makers in order to discuss youth issues,” said the Acting Senior Human Dimension Officer, OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek representative, Kahramon Sanginov.

The programme of the summer school included training sessions on strategic communication, election campaigning and political debates and discussions on the fundamentals of lawmaking.

386133 Kunduz Rysbek

The Coalition against Torture in partnership with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture, the Voice of Freedom Foundation and the Office of the Ombudsman held an informative workshop dedicated to the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture on 25 June 2018 in Bishkek.

The main goal of the event was to raise the awareness of the general public of the issue of torture and draw the attention of representatives of state bodies, civil society and youth to the problem. During the workshop the participants viewed an exhibition of drawings produced by young artists depicting their perspectives on torture issues. A series of short documentary films telling real stories about victims of torture and their families was also presented.

“Knowledge of human rights is the primary step towards reaching a total eradication of torture. Therefore, there is a need for better enforcement of human rights,” said a representative of the Legal Prosperity Foundation, Nadira Eshmatova.

The event is one result of a long-term partnership of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek with the Legal Prosperity Foundation and the Coalition Against Torture, which includes 16 human rights organizations from across Kyrgyzstan. Working together, they take a complex approach to combating the problem of torture in the country. This encompasses a variety of activities to prevent torture, ranging from providing medical support to people in detention to regular monitoring of places of detention and consistent media coverage of incidents that occur in such places.      

26 June was proclaimed the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture (resolution 52/149 of 12 December) by the UN General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council, in December 1997. Marking the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture  is one way to contribute to eradicating torture and draw attention to the effective functioning of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force on 26 June 1987. The Convention was ratified by Kyrgyzstan on 26 July 1996.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. Small arms were fired in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Sabivka. The SMM observed a fresh shelling impact in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. It continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure.

In Donetskregion, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 375 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 290 explosions). About 90 per cent of the ceasefire violations were recorded at night time by the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (about 21 per cent of the total of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region), the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) (about 31 per cent) and from the SMM’s forward patrol base in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) (about 38 per cent). 

On the evening and night of 28-29 June, the SMM camera at the DFS recorded 14 undetermined explosions and 179 projectiles in flight (including 70 from west-north-west to east-south-east, 67 from north-west to south-east and 40 from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.6-2km south and south-south-west. The same camera also recorded a projectile in flight, assessed as an outgoing round of anti-tank guided missile system (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) 350m south-south-west and the subsequent projectile flying towards and passing over and beyond the camera’s field of view in a north-north-eastern direction.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west-south-west to east-north-east, an undetermined explosion and nine projectiles from south-south-west to north-north-east, followed by totals of 58 undetermined explosions, 208 projectiles in flight (including 141 from south to north and 34 from north to south) and 13 bursts, all 1-4km at directions ranging from north-east to east.

On the evening and night of 28-29 June, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 247 undetermined explosions and about 130 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-6km at directions ranging from east to north-west. During the day on 29 June, while at the same location, the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions 5-6km east.

On the evening of 28 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-west.

In Luhanskregion, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 88 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (26 explosions). 

During the day on 29 June, positioned in Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) for 35 minutes, the SMM heard 39 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 5-15km south-south-east.

Positioned in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) for 20 minutes, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions 10-13km south-east.

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Sabivka (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 20 shots of small-arms fire 1.5-2.1kmnorth of its position in the area where the UAV was flying. The SMM assessed that the shots had likely been aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged. 

On 28 June, the SMM observed a fresh shelling impact in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). About 30m west-south-west of 20 Kripkoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater, but could not assess it due to security concerns. At 20 Kripkoho Street, the SMM saw a one-storey house with a shattered west-facing window covered with foil. A man (50-60 years old) who introduced himself as the owner of the house told the SMM that in the late afternoon of 27 June he had heard between three and four loud explosions and had then found his window damaged. He also mentioned that his house had previously been damaged by shelling. (See SMM Daily Report 15 May 2017.) Approximately 25m north of the crater, at 47 Kripkoho Street, the SMM saw a second one-storey house with a broken south-facing kitchen window. A woman (60-70 years old) who introduced herself as the owner of the house told the SMM that she had noticed the damage after hearing an explosion around 17:45 on 27 June while she was inside the house. 

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

Positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about ten minutes, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote for about 35 minutes, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions assessed as artillery rounds 7-10km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 28 June an SMM mini-UAV spotted six multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Chabanivka (66km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (a 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and a 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). On 29 June, the SMM saw 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal linesin a non-government-controlled area, on 28 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Dokuchaievsk (three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were previously observed in the same area, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2018.).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 28 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zaporizke (70km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 29 June, in a storage site in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 20 self-propelled howitzers (18 2S1 and two 2S3)were again missing, as well as four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2]in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM mini-UAV spotted, on 28 June, three armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (type undetermined) near Popasne (60km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM also saw two IFVs (BMP-1) nearPopasna.In non-government-controlled areas, on 29 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC(BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1k) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitatethe operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a fibre optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska0.5 km south-west of the Prince Ihor monument along road P22. In addition, a representative from the Luhansk Water company told the SMM that the works on the Obozne-Petrivske water supply system had been completed on 28 June.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 28 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access: 

• An armedmember of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented it again from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming it was not safe for the SMM to continue. (See SMM Daily Report 29 June 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4

Other impediments: 

• While conducting a scheduled mini-UAV flight near Sabivka, the SMM heard about 20 shots of small-arms fire 1.5-2.1kmnorth of its position in the area where the UAV was flying. The SMM landed the UAV, left the area and safely returned to base.

 

[1]  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in a residential area of Pivdenne.The Mission observed fresh damage caused from gunfire in a residential area of Zolote-5 (Mykhailivka). The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Molodizhne and Zaichenko. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and a water pipeline in Obozne. 

In Donetskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1]including explosions (about 290), compared with the previous reporting period (about 550 explosions).

On the evening and night of 27-28 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east and a projectile north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of six undetermined explosions and 45 projectiles (12 from west to east, nine from north-north-west to south-south-east, seven from west-north-west to east-south-east, six from north-west to south-east, five from east to west, five from north to south, two from east-south-east to west-north-west and one in vertical flight), all 0.5-2.5km south. 

During the day on 28 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka(government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions and about 80 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km in directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

On the same day, positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east and south-west. 

During the evening and night of 27-28 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 53 explosions (50 undetermined and three assessed as impacts) and about 130 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 2-9km east-south-east and south-east. The next day, at the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km east-south-east. 

During the day on 28 June, positioned in Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, 2-6km east and south.  

On the evening and night of 27-28 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east, four projectiles from south to north and an explosion assessed as an outgoing round, followed by totals of 41 explosions (37 undetermined, three assessed as outgoing rounds and one as an impact) and 225 projectiles (the majority from south to north, north to south and south-south-west to north-north-east) all 0.75-4km east.

During the day on 28 June, positioned near Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard 120 undetermined explosions and about 25 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at undetermined distances east and south-east.   

In Luhanskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 26 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (66 explosions). 

During the day on 28 June, positioned near Syrotyne (government-controlled, 71km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 explosions assessed as impacts 20-25km south-east.  

The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in a residential area of Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). At the hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk,  government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (67 years old) with a bandage on his left forearm and a woman (55 years old), his wife, with a bandage on the right side of her back. They told the SMM that they had been in the yard of their house onKaspiiska Street in Pivdenne on 27 June when they heard two explosions. The man said that shrapnel pieces from the incident remained in his arm. Medical staff told the SMM that the couple were admitted to the hospital with shrapnel injuries on 27 June. The SMM could not reach Pivdenne due to security considerations. 

At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM saw the body of a man (80 years old) who had passed away at the checkpoint on 27 June while he was waiting to cross into non-government-controlled areas. A medic told the SMM that he had provided medical aid to the man for half an hour, however he was then announced dead of a heart attack. 

The SMM observed fresh damage from gunfire in a residential area of Zolote-5 (Mykhailivka) (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk). At a second-floor apartment of a four-storey residential building on Voikova Street, the SMM saw a broken north-north-east facing window and a hole assessed as from a bullet, two small burn marks on the windowsill, a 10cm by 8cm hole on the north-north-east facing wall of the living room, and a similarly sized shrapnel hole on a north-north-east-facing balcony with the bullet/shrapnel still embedded. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by an unknown weapon fired from a north-north-easterly direction. A resident of the apartment, woman (76 years old) told the SMM that on 23 June she was woken by a loud noise and a bullet or shrapnel then flew over her head and hit a wall. At another second floor apartment at a nearby four-storey residential building, the SMM saw that a north-west facing window had been broken. A resident of the second apartment, a woman (70-80 years old), told the SMM that on 24 June she was woken up by a loud clap or burst. The SMM noted positions of the armed formations 700m north-east of the damaged buildings.  

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

During the day on 28 June, positioned 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-1.5km north, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area. The same day, positioned 1.5km west of Zolote-4 (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round 1-2km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

On 28 June, the SMM saw reinforced trenches inside the Zolote disengagement area, 750m from the south-eastern edge of the area, but was not able to approach the site due to security restrictions. The same day, a fire lasting about 30 minutes was recorded by the SMM camera in Zolote, assessed as inside the disengagement area.  

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 28 June, the SMM observed a calm situation. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 27 June, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) on road H20 south-east of Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk): one stationary and another loaded on a transporter driving south. On 28 June, the SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) north-east of Yurivka (127km south of Donetsk) and a tank (T-64) loaded on a transporter entering Mariupol. 

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 26 June, in storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that seven towed mortars (five PM-38, 120mm, and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm),  five self-propelled howitzers  (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 18 mortars (12 2B11Sani, 120mm, and six M120-15 Molot, 120mm) were again missing. On 28 June, in storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.  

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (seven T-72 and four T-64) were again missing.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[2]in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 27 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (ARV) (BRM-1K) near Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one undetermined), an ARV (BRM-1K) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk), and an APC (BTR-80A) east of Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) and an IFV (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) one ARV (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk) and an ACV (type undetermined) east of Talakivka. On 28 June, the SMM saw two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 27 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six IFVs (BMP-1) north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) in Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk) and spotted again a TORN radio intelligence system at the same location where it had previously been reported near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 9 June 2018). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six probable IFVs (type undetermined) and three APCs (two BTR-variants and an MT-LB) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol). 

On 27 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four fresh impacts in a field north of Sentianivka, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a northerly direction.

The SMM continued to observe mines, unexploded ordnances (UXO)andmine hazard signs. On a road between Talakivka and Pikuzy about 750m north-west of Pikuzy, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted, for the first time, four anti-tank mines on 27 June. Near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Nelipivka, an SMM mid-range UAV on 27 June again spotted more than 300 anti-tank mines laid in two rows running from north to south (See SMM Daily Report 22 June 2018). On the same day, near positions of the armed formations near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted more than 150 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in two rows running from east to west. On 28 June, the SMM saw again mine hazard signs and a tree lying across the roadway restricting movement near Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk) (seeSMM Daily Report 25 June 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard about 145 ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. At a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) over about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 44 cars (15 with Ukrainian and 21 Russian Federation licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), five covered trucks (three with Ukrainian, one Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates) and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine. 

In Luhansk city, the SMM saw a humanitarian aid convoy of five cargo trucks with “Humanitarian aid from Russian Federation” written on them in Cyrillic, parked inside a logistics base. While there, the SMM also observed 15 men in dark blue uniforms with logos “MChS of Russia” and 20 pallets with blue boxes unloaded from the trucks.Two members of the armed formations refused to share information about the convoy with the SMM and said to contact other members of the armed formations for information.

At a reservoir near a phenol factory in Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), close to the contact line, recent SMM UAV footage from 15 June did not reveal new indications of military presence compared with imagery from February 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 15 February 2018). 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 28 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access: 

• Two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented it from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming it was not safe for the SMM to continue. (seeSMM Daily Report 28 June). The SMM has visited impact sites from shelling in Pikuzy on three occasions in the past week (see SMM Daily Report 26 June 2018, SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018, SMM Daily Report 23 June 2018).
• Five armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM 500m from a location that the SMM had visited on 11 June north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk). One of them told the SMM that they were carrying out fortification works in the area and the SMM could not proceed without permission from other members of the armed formations. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM on 28 June temporarily lost communication assessed as due to signal interference[4]with two UAVs; a mid-range UAV flying about 1.5km north of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Popasna and a mini-UAV flying 4.2km north-east of the same checkpoint. 
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with a long-range UAV flying near Sakhanka, assessed as due to jamming. 

 

[1]  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4]The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

 

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386372 Event participants discuss results of the study on unreported hate crimes and incidents in Poland. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in partnership with the Office of the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights, surveyed people of African descent and Muslims in Warsaw, and Ukrainians in Krakow in a study designed to provide a better understanding of the scale of unreported hate crimes against respective communities in Poland. Results of the research were presented at an event in Warsaw on 27 June 2018.

In the analysed period of 2016 – 2017, the most common incidents were insults (16.6 per cent of Ukrainians, 6.7 per cent of Muslims and 38.4 per cent of people of African descent said they were targeted by insults) while 17 per cent of people of African descent, 2.3 per cent of Ukrainians and 1.7 per cent of Muslims experienced a breach of bodily integrity.

The perpetrators were usually strangers (42 per cent) or football hooligans (12 per cent), and attacks occurred near the victim’s place of residence or work (27 per cent), on the street or in another public place (25 per cent), in the workplace (12 per cent), in public transport (10 per cent) and at school or university (8 per cent).

“Insufficient reporting of hate crimes to the authorities constitutes a major obstacle in developing an adequate policy to address the issue,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. “Obtaining reliable data on the scale and nature of hate crimes in Poland is crucial for providing a targeted response to the problem. Hate crimes must be recognized as a major human rights concern and addressed in a comprehensive manner.”

As the reasons for not reporting a crime, more than one-quarter of respondents indicated that in their opinion it was not worth reporting, while 22 per cent said they believed the police would not be able to do anything. More than one-fifth of respondents indicated that they did not have evidence of the crime.

“Results of the research not only show the scale of the problem in Poland, but also provide unique insights into the experiences of the victims of hate crimes,” said Sylwia Spurek, Deputy Human Rights Commissioner for Equal Treatment in Poland. “More efforts need to be undertaken to protect these vulnerable groups within the Polish society and to build trust in state institutions to facilitate reporting of hate incidents.”

The study was based on an innovative Respondent Driven Sampling methodology. It rests upon a snowballing principle of respondents recruiting other people from the same community to participate in the study. It aims to reach hidden communities within the population, such as the victims of hate crimes who otherwise would not report the incidents to the police and would not be covered by the statistics available to the authorities.

The study was conducted as part of ODIHR’s project Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime. The lessons learnt will become part of a toolkit applicable throughout Europe and the broader OSCE region.

SARAJEVO, 29 June 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) concluded today in Zenica the last in a series of workshops on the professional reporting and protection mechanisms for journalists and media professionals. The workshops, held in Mostar, Banja Luka, Brcko, Bihac and Zenica, gathered around 100 journalists, students of journalism, photojournalists and cameramen. They were designed to familiarize journalists with the legal framework and professional standards governing their rights and obligations in order for them to be able to perform their duties and tasks in a professional manner.

“By organizing these workshops, the OSCE Mission to BiH aims to increase awareness amongst the media professionals about the existing legal instruments and mechanisms that provide for their protection and to promote professional and ethical standards in journalism,” said Zeljka Sulc, Spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to BiH. “This is especially important in times of frequent attacks and threats against journalists.”

Borka Rudic, Secretary General of BH Journalists, said that there is no right without responsibility when it comes to media professionalism. “If we exercise our right of freedom of expression, we must be prepared to abide by all provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. She emphasized that the Convention also foresees certain limitations to the freedom of expression. “These are formal limitations which have to have legitimate interests and legal justification, with the decisions on limitations of freedom of expressions being made in a transparent manner.”   

Ljiljana Zurovac, Programme Director at the BiH Press Council, said: “Both journalists and publishers are obligated to respect the citizens’ needs to have valuable, timely and relevant information.” She further underlined that the BiH Press Council, as a self-regulatory body, represents a mechanism for mediation between unsatisfied citizens and media, protecting the public from unprofessional reporting and the media from pressures that jeopardize the freedom of the media.

This was also an opportunity to present the OSCE Guidelines for Co-operation between Media and Police, which are aimed at promoting better understanding of the rights and responsibilities of police and journalists and furthering their co-operation in the field. 

The workshops are part of the OSCE Mission to BiH wider efforts in addressing the challenges related to media freedom and freedom of expression in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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386088 Communication and Media Relations Section

Members of the OSCE Mediterranean Points of Contact Network on border security and management completed an intensive and interactive five-day training course on various topics related to their work on 29 June 2018 at the headquarters of the Malta Police Force in Floriana.

Organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in close co-operation with the Malta Police Force and the Academy for Disciplined Forces of Malta, the training course brought together members of the Network, which was created in 2017. International experts on border security and countering trafficking in human beings from the United States and the United Kingdom together with staff from the OSCE’s Border Security and Management Unit conducted the course.

The participants, represented by border and customs services of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, were provided with in-depth presentations and undertook practical exercises on risk analysis and management. They discussed risk targeting, risk profiling, data ownership information and information sharing, and strategic, operational and tactical structures and procedures.

The Mediterranean Points of Contact were familiarized with the differences between the smuggling and trafficking of human beings, the respective legal frameworks in the Mediterranean region and interviewing techniques to be used when working with victims of human trafficking. They also engaged in exercises on mainstreaming gender in border security and shared experiences and good practices on implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

This training course was the fourth activity of a multi-year OSCE initiative aimed at strengthening co-operation mechanisms between the border security and management agencies of the OSCE participating States and the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation.

386238 Edita Buçaj

The first edition of a training course organized by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo for young community activists entitled “Leaders against intolerance and violent extremism (LIVE)” concluded on 29 June 2018 in Prishtinë/Priština.

The course, consisting of two modules held in April and June, respectively, focused on developing the skills of participants in recognizing and understanding issues related to violent extremism and radicalism that lead to terrorism (VERLT), building resilience and formulating counter-messages to condemn and delegitimize extremism. It also aimed at promoting alternative positive narratives and opportunities for change.

“Violent extremism and radicalism is a problem that affects many people in the world today, in different ways and shapes. The LIVE training course will help young women and men from Kosovo to recognize all forms of VERLT that may exist in their local communities, address it properly, and develop activities for its prevention at the local level,” said Oliver Schuett, Chief of the Public Participation Section at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

Three more editions of LIVE will be held. The second and third, also for young individuals and members of civic society organizations, will take place in July/September and October/December, while the fourth edition, for civil servants and employees of Kosovo institutions,  is planned for the first quarter of 2019. Upon completion of all four courses, a total of 60 young people will be equipped with the tools and skills necessary to prevent and counter violent extremism.

Participants will also develop and implement initiatives at the local level, addressing and preventing specific VERLT issues faced by their local communities.

The LIVE training initiative is part of the OSCE’s efforts to counter VERLT based on its Declaration on Preventing and Countering VERLT adopted in 2015, which calls upon the organization’s executive structures to “strengthen the role of civil society, women, youth and religious leaders” in efforts to prevent and counter VERLT.

The LIVE programme in Kosovo is the first such initiative implemented by an OSCE field operation, with funds from the Norwegian government.