Central Europe

399290 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier launches recommendations on access to justice and national minorities Moldova’s civil servants learn to implement national interethnic relations strategy with support of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Multilingual education the focus of OSCE-organized study visit of Moldovan state and civil society representatives to Alto Adige/South Tyrol ExplAnimations: High Commissioner's thematic work explained in three short animated videos The Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies

The role of legal professionals in ensuring the adequate protection of national minorities’ rights, by way of fair and effective investigation and adjudication, especially in cases related to hate crime, was the focus of a two-day regional roundtable held in Chisinau, which concluded on 10 October 2018.

Organized by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Moldovan National Institute of Justice, the event brought together around 70 high-level representatives of the judicial authorities of Moldova as well as law practitioners and academia from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributed to the event with a session focused on hate crime.

The Director of the office of the HCNM, Henrik Villadsen, presented the High Commissioner’s Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities, the latest thematic recommendation by the HCNM, which was launched in November 2017.

“The Graz Recommendations are a practical tool for justice sector professionals to improve access to justice for persons belonging to national minorities”, said Villadsen. He reminded participants that “previously, the HCNM assisted the Moldovan Bureau of Inter-ethnic Relations and the Georgian State Ministry for Reconciliation in drafting national Integration Strategies based on the HCNM’s 2012 Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies.”

He offered support in matters pertaining to access to justice, where the HCNM could assist the countries’ relevant authorities in drafting legal and regulatory frameworks based on the Graz Recommendations.

The participants shared their experiences of how the provisions of the Graz Recommendations are being applied in practice in their respective countries, focusing particularly on the representation of national minorities in the composition of courts, tribunals, prosecution offices and law-enforcement bodies as well as access to courts, witness protection schemes, victim-support services, and targeted legal assistance programmes in situations and cases involving national minorities.

In his speech Lajos Karakas, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, said: “Respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities is an important cornerstone for social cohesion, justice, stability and democracy. International conferences like this one allow legal professionals to learn best practices and apply them to support their governments’ efforts to build inclusive societies.” 

WARSAW, 10 October 2018 – While underlining that most OSCE participating States had fully abolished capital punishment, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), expressed concern over suggestions in some countries that the death penalty be re-introduced in certain instances.

Speaking on the occasion of the International Day against the Death Penalty, she stressed that OSCE commitments call for governments to keep the idea of abolition under discussion, rather than suggesting re-instatement.

“The vast majority of OSCE participating States have either completely abolished the death penalty or maintain moratoria on executions as an important first step towards abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “But the idea of reinstating capital punishment in specific instances is worrying, and runs entirely counter to the global trend towards abolition.”

Gísladóttir cited troubling suggestions by senior politicians in certain participating States to put the death penalty back on the agenda or expand its use.  

“All countries in the OSCE have committed to keeping the complete abolition of the death penalty under consideration, and political leaders have a responsibility to promote such discussion, not the opposite,” the ODIHR Director said.

The 2018 edition of ODIHR’s Background Paper on the Death Penalty in the OSCE Area, published annually, found that 54 of the 57 OSCE participating States have either abolished the death penalty outright or do not impose the penalty in practice, although it remains in law. Kazakhstan is classified as abolitionist only for ordinary crimes, having sentenced a person to death in 2016 on terrorism charges. Belarus and the United States remain the only two OSCE participating States that continue the use of capital punishment in criminal law. 

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ANTALYA, 9 October 2018 – Participating in the Third Meeting of Speakers of Eurasian Countries’ Parliaments today, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) voiced the necessity to respect international commitments to support sustainable growth across the OSCE area and beyond.

“Enhanced co-operation on issues such as environmental protection, water management, and cross-border economic projects can be a first step towards building trust and promoting greater stability and security. But this requires constant dialogue, and more importantly, respect for agreed rules and principles,” he said. “In the OSCE area, unfulfilled agreements have failed to prevent continued human suffering, and, in the end, this has made it more difficult to work together in the pursuit of economic success.”

President Tsereteli deplored that the persistence of tensions in the Eurasian region maintained significant disparities between countries: “Conflicts are flaring at every corner of Eurasia. Commitment to OSCE principles and to international law have been set aside in the case of Ukraine, Georgia, and in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. This continues to prevent us from reaching our full potential.”

The OSCE PA President underlined that the size and scope of Eurasia’s challenges necessitate closer collaboration between Eurasian countries and regional and international organizations. He welcomed the conference as an opportunity for parliamentarians to promote the deeper ties necessary to reinforce co-operation throughout Eurasia. Tsereteli also encouraged the parliaments of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation to maintain their strong engagement with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

“The OSCE PA is ideally placed to help build more bridges between our countries,” said President Tsereteli. “Faced with an erosion of trust between our governments, OSCE parliamentarians have carried on pushing them to live up to their commitments. We have continued to encourage dialogue and the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy in our region.”

The meeting, hosted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, was held under the theme “Economic Cooperation, Environment and Sustainable Development in Eurasia” and brought together the parliamentary leadership of 39 countries.

On the margins of the conference, President Tsereteli held several bilateral meetings, including with Turkish Speaker Binali Yildirim, Slovak Speaker Andrej Danko, Kazakh Speaker Nurlan Nigmatulin, and Uzbek Speaker Nurdinjon Ismoilov. He also exchanged with Belarussian Speaker Vladimir Andreichenko, Kyrgyz Speaker Dastanbek Dzhumabekov, South Korean Speaker Moon Hee-sang and with Heads of Delegation from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia. Discussions focused on participation in OSCE PA activities, including the recent Autumn Meeting in Bishkek and future statutory meetings, election observation, and pending presidential visits.

Photos from President Tsereteli’s participation are available on Flickr.

For President Tsereteli's full remarks, please click here.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a woman who died due to natural causes at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka. It continued monitoring all three disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Staromarivka and Syvash, as well as in Michurine, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, and again near Zaichenko.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to power lines near Olenivka, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 240 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (120 explosions).

On the evening of 7 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 75 undetermined explosions 2-6km east and west. On the evening and night of 7-8 October, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk recorded about 60 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and two bursts, all 2-5km east-north-east and east. The following day, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard about 45 undetermined explosions and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east.

On the night of 7-8 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 26 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-4km east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 7-8 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded six undetermined explosions, about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from northerly to southerly directions) and 12 bursts, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east.

During the day on 8 October, positioned 1km north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and 16 undetermined explosions, all 2-4km south-south-east.

On the same day, positioned about 2km south-south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of an artillery round and 27 undetermined explosions, all 2-3km east-north-east and east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 210 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (12 explosions).

During the day on 8 October, positioned in the eastern outskirts of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 140 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-east.

On the same day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Slovianoserbsk (non-government controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions 10km west.

On the same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons and nine bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south.

The SMM followed up on reports of a woman who died at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that on the morning of 6 October a woman (in her sixties) had collapsed as she had been walking through the checkpoint and died despite medical assistance having been provided. On 8 October, staff at the morgue of hospital no. 2 in Horlivka told the Mission that the woman’s body had been brought to the morgue and that autopsy indicated she had died of natural causes. They said the deceased woman had been a resident of Chystiakove (formerly Torez, non-government controlled, 62km east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 7 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three explosions assessed as artillery rounds and 31 projectiles in flight (from northerly to southerly and from southerly to northerly directions), all 1-4km east-south-east (the Mission was unable to assess whether they occurred inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 8 October, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) as well as 18 shots and bursts assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-north-east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

During the day on 8 October, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a piece of artillery (calibre greater than 122mm) near Zoria (80km south of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) (eight being offloaded from a train and two on train cars) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 7 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a compound in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 6 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Ahrobaza (8km west of Mariupol). On 7 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) near Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk). On 8 October, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-27) near Lyman (91km north of Luhansk), three self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) near Sloviansk (95km north of Donetsk), and in total at least 12 surface-to-air missile systems: one 9K37 near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol), two 9K35 near Shevchenko (19km north-west of Mariupol), six 9K33 Osa near Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk) and at least three 9K33 near Marynivka (39km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 October, near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant), an IFV (BMP variant) as well as positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with craters nearby assessed as caused recently by mortar and artillery fire (the craters were not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) possibly coming from a southerly direction. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-70) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) and three APCs (two BTR-70 and a BTR-80) near Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs (type undetermined) north-east of Illinka (38km west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Hnutove. On 8 October, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Artema.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 6 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP-1) and a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a 500m-long trench extension (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018) about 2km west-south-west from Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk). On 8 October, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-1) near Slovianoserbsk.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The Mission visited two border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw nine cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine and three cars and a bus (all with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw eight people (four women aged 30-60 and four men aged 25-60) entering Ukraine and nine people (three women aged 35-60, five men aged 20-40 and a child about five years old) exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two gatherings. The Mission saw about 150 people (mainly men, aged 18-35) gathered outside the headquarters of the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) at 32–35 Volodymyrska Street. The Mission saw some protestors carrying the flags of National Corps and wearing its insignia on their clothes, while others were wearing the insignia of Natsionalni Druzhyny. A member of National Corps stated that they had gathered to protest a senior SBU official (according to media reports the official is currently under investigation by the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine). On the spot, the SMM observed 20 men it assessed to be plainclothes law enforcement officers as well as about 30 uniformed police officers and no security incidents.

On 6 October, the SMM observed about 300 people (mainly men in their twenties) march from Shevchenko Park to Independence Square in Kyiv, several of whom were displaying the flags of “Democratic Axe” and “Tradition and Order”. Participants were demanding Ukrainian legislation pertaining to firearms possession to be liberalised. The SMM observed about 40 police officers near the park and no security incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying “shelling was expected in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing “demining in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromarivka (non-government-controlled, 62km south of Donetsk, three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security reasons”.
• In Michurine (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM it was not permitted to stop next to a school. The Mission immediately left the area.
• At a security post near Syvash (162km south-east of Kherson), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that it could not access the area, citing orders from his commander.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 7 and 8 October, the SMM temporarily lost communications with a long-range UAV, assessed as due to signal interference[5] between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Oleksandropillia (government-controlled, 71km west of Luhansk) and near Zolote. The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• On three separate occasions on 8 October, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference6 near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference6 near Chermalyk. The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• Medical staff at hospital no. 14 in Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about a reported civilian casualty without prior approval from senior members of the armed formations.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera on the northern edge of Popasna was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                            

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 10,636 to 10,317 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 50 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs decreased to 33 (compared to 40 last week); 24 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and nine into Ukraine (76 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, ten families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 11 were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (335 compared to 409 observed during the previous week). There were 176 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 159 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Alchevsk - Kyiv; Kyiv; Luhansk - Kharkiv; Luhansk - Kyiv-Moscow; Luhansk -Sevastopol; Luhansk - Simferopol; Luhansk - Yalta.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 903 to 834 (281 at the Gukovo BCP and 553 at the Donetsk BCP); 478 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 356 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                       

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 50 (compared to 60 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 124 to 81: of the total number of trucks scanned, 48 trucks (59 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 33 trucks (41 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 156 to 143 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 69 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 20 occasions, compared to 17 last week; the OTs assessed that 12 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with “DPR” plates and with Slovak, Polish, Lithuanian, Georgian and Belarusian licence plates.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed ambulances on four occasions, one in Gukovo and three in Donetsk BCP. On 4 October at 21:33 in Gukovo BCP, an ambulance with “LPR” plates passed from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. On 5 October at 19:30 in Donetsk BCP, an ambulance was observed crossing from the Russian Federation into Ukraine. The OT could not observe any additional details. Again on 6 October at 23:21, an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates (with two paramedics inside) entered the BCP from the Russian Federation. It bore the inscription “Ambulance 112” (in English) on the front and rear, and “Urgent Medical Help 112” (in Russian) on its sides. The ambulance stayed near to the main building until 23:43, after which it returned to Russian Federation. The OT could not observe if they had taken any patients with them. On 6 October at 04:50, the same ambulance entered the BCP from the Russian Federation. It stayed near to the main building until 05:04 and then returned to the Russian Federation.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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399176 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Enhancing responses to sexual and gender-based violence in Albania was the focus of a capacity building event that brought together police officers and civil society representatives in Tirana on 8 and 9 October 2018. The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with Albania’s Ministry of Interior and the OSCE Presence in Albania.

The 35 participants (31 women and 4 men) included 20 police officers and investigators and 15 civil society representatives. They received training and discussed current challenges and lessons learned in responding to sexual and gender-based violence while enhancing co-operation as mandated by the state’s Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, peace and security, which was adopted last month.

“The recent adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution1325 Action Plan in Albania sends a powerful message about the willingness of state authorities and civil society to work together to strengthen the country’s peace and security infrastructure. This event is a first step in this direction,” said Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR.

Romina Kuko, Deputy Minister of Interior, said: “Women’s involvement in peace and security should become a priority for national governments, international organizations and civil society. Every action to incorporate women as key actors will exponentially and efficiently create a transparent and comprehensive strategy towards lasting peace and security.”

This interactive event covered the root causes and dynamics of gender-based violence, harmful gender stereotypes and their impact on policing, as well as good practices of investigation and co-operation between the police and civil society. During the event, civil society and police participants from various regions of Albania committed to strengthening their co-operation in this area.

The training also focused on civil society oversight of police services to victims of gender-based violence.

“Gender-based violence is intolerable in any society and in particular in a democracy. Police forces play a crucial role in preventing and combating it,” said Bernd Borchardt, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania. “Albania has made progress, but a lot still needs to be done in addition to adopting legislation: concrete action is needed. Citizens’ trust in the rule of law is also based on police performance and conduct. This training comes at the right time.”

PODGORICA, 9 October 2018 – Business challenges and opportunities for the sustainability of traditional media, the importance of diversifying revenue streams and investing in quality journalism in the digital age, is the focus of a two-day conference, which opened today in Podgorica.

The conference, Media Sustainability and Successful Media Business Models, is organized by OSCE Mission to Montenegro and OSCE Mission to Skopje, in co-operation with the Media Association of South East Europe. It offers participants an in-depth overview of certain solutions that have successfully contributed to resolving important financial challenges for media outlets, thereby contributing to the sustainability of their operations.

OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Desir said that without the necessary investment, without sufficient revenues, without fair economic rules for the development of the media, we will have less and less media because of the disappearance of newspapers and of the difficulty to develop new media.

“It is crucial to ensure that the legal framework, the political climate towards the press, the safety of journalists and the economic environment is supportive of a pluralistic and quality media landscape in the region,” said Desir.

Montenegrin Prime Minster Duško Marković said that media freedom and the safety of journalists are not a condition for accession to the European Union. “It is about the moral and democratic obligation of Montenegro's authorities, which we will ultimately carry out, even if we never join the EU.”

Markovic also said that it is absolutely unacceptable to endanger the personal safety of journalists as a method for resolving misunderstandings and dissatisfaction over media reports.

Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet said that it is of paramount importance to open the dialogue on financial sustainability. “The OSCE is strongly supporting media outlets in their efforts toward achieving sustainable business models,” she said.

Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja said that in the digital age, print media face the challenge of sustaining themselves due to shifting revenue streams or an increased focus on online media. “With increased digitalization also come opportunities: Media outlets can offer content online, interact with media users in the digital sphere, and broaden reader bases.”

President of the Assembly of the Media Association of South East Europe, Željko Ivanović said that this conference marks the beginning of a new era in South-Eastern Europe, where the focus is on the sustainability of the media and less on media freedom. “The Government and its institutions create an environment in which media operate and this is one of the most important factors in media sustainability.”.

Representatives of international organizations and diplomatic missions, representatives from state institutions, media outlets and civil society organisations today discussed strategies for improving business operations of printed media in the digital era, mechanisms for cutting losses in media outlets through the prism of new media business concepts, the importance of media literacy in creating media content, as well as networking as a gate towards a successful media business.

The second day of the conference will be opened tomorrow by Montenegro’s Minister of Culture Aleksandar Bogdanović and will be dedicated to media regulatory practices and the growing influence of new media on the media market.

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MINSK, 9 October 2018 – While the widespread exploitation of the Internet and social media platforms by terrorists poses serious challenges to security, the Internet as a communication channel also plays an important role in preventing and countering terrorism, underlined participants today at the start of a two-day high-level international conference in Minsk.

Organized by the Foreign Ministry of Belarus and the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, the conference brings together more than 250 participants, including senior national representatives of OSCE participating States, OSCE Partners for Co-operation, international and regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector.

They will exchange national experiences and perspectives on recent trends and measures, and discuss challenges, responses and best practices on how to prevent and counter the misuse of the Internet by violent extremists and terrorists, while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms.

“The use by terrorists all over the world of information technologies and means of communication is one of the most dangerous challenges undermining the sustainable development of humankind,” said the President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko in a statement read aloud to conference participants by State Secretary of the country’s Security Council Stanislav Zas. “The efficient countering of this threat is only possible through co-ordinated actions by partners at the national, regional and global levels. I am confident that a constructive and interesting exchange of opinions and experience will help developing common approaches and bring us closer to resolving the problem of terrorism,” the President’s statement read.

In his own statement to the conference, State Secretary Zas added: “It is extremely important to develop interactions and information exchanges among law enforcement and special services as well as comprehensive partnerships between the state, civil society and business.”

“We favour a comprehensive approach in fighting terrorism based on the principles of international law,” stated Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makei. “Therefore we support efforts to create a united front against terrorism and call for concerted action by the UN, the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and other relevant bodies. We hope that today’s meeting will help improve synergies in international efforts to counter the terrorist threat.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger noted that the conference’s agenda goes beyond the legal and policy aspects of preventing and countering terrorism, and thanked the Government of Belarus for organizing the conference, and its timely and relevant agenda.

“The conference will integrate discussions on the importance of public-private partnerships, strengthening dialogue and co-operation between governments and non-state actors, and on the need to strategically leverage the role of the ICT while protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks emanating from cyberspace,” said Greminger.

He highlighted that the OSCE was among the very first multilateral organizations to stress the need for sustained, multi-faceted, human rights-compliant and gender-mainstreamed efforts to counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office Vladimir Voronkov said: “To win this war, we must join forces and act together to prevent and curb the risks of terrorist abuse of digital technologies, while respecting human rights and freedoms, including the freedom of expression. Enhanced co-ordination and collaboration between government agencies, the private sector, civil society and faith-based organizations is vital.”

Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Yuri Fedotov added: “The need for cross-border co-operation to prevent and counter the global threats of terrorism is abundantly clear, even more so in view of the capabilities afforded by advanced technologies and the internet. We need to urgently step up capacity building to counter the terrorism-organized crime nexus in cyber space.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 5 and 6 October, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 6 and 7 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM saw damage caused by shelling to a farm near Novoluhanske. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation, and again near Zaichenko.* The SMM saw multiple launch rocket systems near Novoamvrosiivske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including a similar number of explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 6 and 7 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 5 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north or Donetsk) recorded 16 undetermined explosions, about 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west) and a muzzle flash, all 0.5-4km south and south-south-west. During the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion, 18 projectiles and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded seven undetermined explosions and about 60 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-east to south-south-west and from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 3-7km south-east, south-south-east and south. During the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions, about 40 projectiles (mostly from east-north-east to west-south-west) and five muzzle flashes, all 3-5km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-westerly to south-easterly directions), all 3-4km east-north-east and east. On the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded six undetermined explosions, about 140 projectiles (mostly from westerly to easterly directions and from northerly to southerly directions) and 14 muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at easterly directions.

On the evening of 6 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 125 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km at southerly and westerly directions. While at the same location during the day on 7 October, the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km east and west.

On the night of 6-7 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions 2-5km west.

During the day on 7 October, positioned in Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1km north-west and their subsequent impacts 2-3km north-east and an undetermined explosion and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at undetermined distances east-north-east. Positioned 1km north-west of Pavlopil, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-4km east-north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about eight explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). Between the evenings of 6 and 7 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (12), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions, about 100 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), two bursts and four muzzle flashes, all 2-5km at south-westerly directions. On the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded seven undetermined explosions, 14 projectiles (mostly from northerly to southerly directions), eight muzzle flashes and two illumination flares, all 1-5km south-east and south-west.

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling to a pig farm in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). On 6 October, the SMM, accompanied by a representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) and the farm’s chief engineer, saw shrapnel damage and holes in the southern part of the roof of a pig enclosure. It also saw shrapnel damage to the southern and northern outer walls of the pig enclosure; most southern- and northern-facing windows of the same building had been shattered. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a possible mortar round, but it could not assess the direction of fire. The pig farm’s chief engineer told the SMM that the building had sustained damage during shelling on 29 September 2018. While present at the site, the SMM saw four armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier walking south from the area of the farm.[2]

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera positioned at the Prince Ihor monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east at undetermined distances north and west-north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 7 October, positioned 2.5km south-west of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and ten shots of small-arms fire 2-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 6 October, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 1.5km north-west (unable to assess whether outside or inside the disengagement area). On the evening of 6 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three bursts 4-5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 7 October, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire 1-4km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 7 October, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km south and heard and saw an undetermined explosion 0.5-1km north-west (both assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 6 October, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 5 October, the SMM saw an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk) heading north, a stationary tank (T-64) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and two stationary surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk). On 6 October, the SMM saw a stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and a stationary tank (T-64) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). It also noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 October, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and a recently dug 20m-long trench with two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in it east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk) (the trench and the IFV were about 50m from the closest inhabited residential house); about 300m east, it spotted a recently dug approximately 75m-long trench network. About 700m west of the latter, the same UAV spotted a truck loaded with boxes and household items, including chairs and tables. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 September 2018.) On 5 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and four IFVs (one BMP-1 and three BMP-2) near Orikhove and two IFVs (BMP-2) south of Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On 6 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk). On 7 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) north of the Zolote disengagement area.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and a probable IFV (undetermined variant) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk).

The SMM saw new mine hazard signs. On 7 October, on the north-eastern edge of Rybynske (government-controlled, 49km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw five hazard signs for the first time: two were placed on each side of a road block preventing passage; the other three were placed on the side of the road. The SMM noted that the signs were yellow with “Warning, Mines” written on them in Russian.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). On 6 and 7 October, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.[4]

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 6 and 7 October, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying “that it was unsafe for the SMM to proceed.”
• On 6 October, at a checkpoint on road E58 north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), five members of the armed formations (four of whom were visibly armed) denied the SMM passage eastward towards the border with the Russian Federation, citing “a special forces operation ongoing in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 6 and 7 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[5]
• On 6 and 7 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions. [5]
• On 6 and 7 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• On 7 October, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage. After about one hour, the SMM could proceed through the checkpoint.

Other impediments:

• On 4 October, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) and Opytne (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk).[6]
• On 5 October, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference in government-controlled areas near Zolote, Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk), Teple (31km north of Luhansk), Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk) and Mykhailiuky (48km north of Luhansk).

Further analysis of footage taken on 3 October by an SMM long-range UAV revealed four people firing small arms, assessed as in the direction of the UAV, near Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] The paragraph on an impact site assessment in Pikuzy in SMM Daily Report 29 September 2018 should have read: “At 15 Akhmatova Street, the SMM observed three fresh holes in the south-west-facing roofs of a storage building and another fresh hole in the north-east-facing roof. Inside the building, the SMM saw fresh remnants of at least four grenade (PG-7 and PG-9) rounds, assessed as fired from a direction between south and west.”

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The paragraph on reports of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer suffering an eye injury in SMM Daily Report 5 October 2018 should have read: “The SMM followed up on reports of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer suffering an eye injury on 3 October at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).”

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA, 8 October 2018 –Education is key to promoting human rights, peaceful coexistence and security in the OSCE region, participants said today at the opening of a two-day OSCE meeting in Vienna.

This Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), focused on human rights approaches in education policy, how new technologies can be leveraged for human rights education and how the effective enjoyment of the right to education can foster peace and security.

“Through human rights education we can help ensure that individuals act in a responsible manner, enhancing peaceful and inclusive societies,” said Ambassador Luca Fratini, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, on behalf of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, First Deputy Director of ODIHR, said: “What was once considered the domain of human rights and civic education has now become an indispensable mainstream. Top education experts around the world today agree that the must-have skills for our dynamic world include communication, collaboration and teamwork, leadership and responsibility, global and cultural awareness, civic literacy and citizenship. We need to make sure that education systems do not stay in the past, but equip our 21st century children with skills to become active, responsible and engaged citizens.”

In the keynote address, Kaari Mattila, Secretary-General of the Finnish League for Human Rights, told participants: “In times when human rights are increasingly questioned across the world, we need to ensure that people know what human rights are. Teachers and schools are in an important position − they can either reproduce existing hierarchies and injustices, or dismantle them. With human rights education, they are better equipped for the latter.”

The meeting brought together some 120 representatives of governments and civil society organizations working on issues related to human rights education from the Organization’s 57 participating States to explore innovative policy initiatives and the use of new technologies to support human rights and access to education.

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SARAJEVO, 8 October 2018 – The 7 October general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were genuinely competitive but characterized by continuing segmentation along ethnic lines, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. Long-standing deficiencies in the legal framework remain, and recent discussions on reform were stalled by political disagreements, further eroding trust in public institutions, the observers said.

Voters were presented with a wide choice of candidates, who were able to campaign freely. The contestants, however, focused more on personal attacks and fearmongering than on providing political alternatives, the statement says. The dependence of media on political and business interests often led to biased coverage, and instances of improper efforts to influence voters in favour of incumbents were not effectively addressed, the observers said.

“We saw polling station commissions, many of them made up of young women and men, who showed eagerness to cope with the complex system during a long election day,” said Mavroudis Voridis, the Special Co-ordinator and Leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “The complexity and the deficiencies of the post-Dayton system should have been properly addressed a long time ago. I urge the institutions not to waste time now, but to immediately tackle the necessary reforms.”

Dame Cheryl Gillan, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, said: “Yesterday’s voting was calm, and electors made their choice freely among a large number of parties and candidates, The PACE delegation regrets that, once again, the elections were held in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights concerning discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and residency. The delegation also expressed its disappointment that the election campaign remained segmented along ethnic lines.”

The freedoms of speech, movement and association were generally respected, in a campaign that was largely segmented along ethnic lines, with contestants resorting to polarizing and negative rhetoric. There were instances of preferential treatment of incumbents by local authorities and of misuse of state resources, the statement says.

“We cannot change the past, but we can shape the future,” said Pia Kauma, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. “People of this country, and especially the younger generations, deserve more political alternatives.”

Frank Engel, Head of the European Parliament delegation, said: “Materially credible elections were held, and there will be a result. Now, the challenge for political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be to ensure that the result is used in favour of the common good, and not of particular interests.”

The legal framework is generally conducive to holding democratic elections, but important long-standing shortcomings remain, as political deadlock has stalled constitutional and electoral reforms. Restrictions on the right to stand based on ethnicity and residence are contrary to OSCE commitments and Council of Europe and other international standards, and the European Court of Human Rights judgments on this issue remain unimplemented.

“The fundamental issues with the constitutional and legal framework must be addressed, but what we saw yesterday was also many election administration officials committed to making the system work, and many voters committed to shaping their country’s future,” said Rasa Juknevičienė, Head of the delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) administered the process efficiently, despite limited budget and staff, and against the backdrop of continued criticism and allegations regarding technical preparations. There was a lack of trust in the election administration at all levels and questions about its impartiality, including due to numerous credible claims that contestants were trading positions to obtain control over particular polling station commissions. Municipal election commissions acted in a more professional manner, the observers said. On election day, polling station commissions worked transparently but faced some difficulties in following procedures, particularly during counting.

The lack of transparency in media ownership and the influence of political and business interests on editorial policies raised concerns about the ability of most outlets to provide unbiased coverage, the statement says. Public broadcasters provided contestants with free airtime in the official campaign period. Media monitoring showed that Republika Srpska’s public broadcaster provided significantly more coverage to one of the state presidential candidates.

“We saw that fundamental freedoms were respected but, at the same time, there is enduring mistrust in the country’s institutions,” said Ambassador Peter Tejler, head of the ODIHR election observation mission. “ODIHR’s final report will highlight the positive elements in these elections and provide recommendations to address the shortcomings we have identified.”

The observers heard repeated concerns over the accuracy of the Central Voters Register, in particular regarding deceased voters remaining on the list. The CEC took measures to improve the register’s accuracy and referred cases of suspected fraud in postal voting registration to the prosecutor’s office.

Gender equality was not a prominent element in the campaign, including when social and family issues were discussed. Although women appeared in electoral events, they rarely campaigned on their own and women candidates were not actively promoted by political party structures, nor covered extensively in the media, the statement says.

Mechanisms for complaints and appeals are in place and provide for timely consideration, including through judicial review. However, a restrictive interpretation by election commissions in deciding which complaints are admissible meant effective remedies were denied and alleged irregularities went unaddressed. The CEC reviewed a number of complaints in public sessions and maintained a register of these, but the transparency of the process remained an issue. It provided the reasoning for its decisions, which were usually adopted by consensus, so as to maintain the overall ethnic balance in the CEC’s approach to dispute resolution.

For further information contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +387 67 130 1572 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Iryna Sabashuk, OSCE PA, +387 62 361 066 or +45 60 10 81 73, iryna@oscepa.dk

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE, +387 62 032 847 or +33 (0) 6 50 68 76 55, chemavon.chahbazian@coe.int

Tim Boden, EP, +387 60 302 0657 or +32 498 3414, timothy.boden@europarl.europa.eu

Ruxandra Popa, NATO PA, +32 484 690 848, rpopa@nato-pa.int

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VIENNA, 7 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his shock and condemnation at the news of the brutal murder of Viktoria Marinova, anchor and administrative director at TVN in Ruse, Bulgaria.

“I am shocked by the horrific murder of investigative journalist Viktoria Marinova in Bulgaria,” said Désir. “I will closely follow the investigation opened by the authorities. I urge them to swiftly identify and bring to justice those responsible and to clearly determine whether this attack was linked to her work.”

Marinova was killed on 6 October, after being heavily beaten and raped.

“I am deeply saddened by this horrific murder and express my deep condolences to her family at this difficult time,” said Désir.

The Representative notes a trend of increased attacks against female journalists. Safety of journalists, especially female journalists, is paramount.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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BISHKEK, 6 October 2018 – In advance of the 20 October parliamentary elections to be held in Afghanistan, the leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee express their deep concern at the arbitrary exclusion of candidates from running for office.

The officers of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland), Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (MP, Germany), and Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus) issued the following statement:

“Elections are fundamentally intended to be a process through which people can select their decision-makers. Candidates must not be excluded from running based on unclear grounds.

“We express our strong hope for democratic elections in Afghanistan, to help bring peace and development to a country that has seen far too much conflict and pain. The closed-door process in Afghanistan that has barred a number of candidates for election, including the well-known human rights activist Fawzia Koofi, a former Chair of the Committee on Human Rights of the Interparliamentary Union (IPU), has not provided them with a right to respond to allegations against them or effectively defend themselves. Unless immediate steps are taken to rectify this situation, trust in the electoral process overall will almost certainly suffer.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on a casualty as a result of an explosion in Kadiivka. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Zaichenko and Yuzhna Lomuvatka.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and maintenance of critical water and electrical infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, as well as demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the night of 4-5 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north or Donetsk) recorded six undetermined explosions and 30 projectiles in flight (mostly east to west and from north-westerly to south-easterly directions), all 1-5km south-south-east, south, and south-south-west.

On 5 October, positioned in areas north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km north, south-south-east, south-west, west, and north-west.

On the evening and night of 4-5 October, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions, about 170 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north) and six bursts, all 3-5km at easterly directions. The following day, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 4-8km at south-westerly directions.

On the evening and night of 4-5 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions, about 175 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), two bursts, a muzzle flash and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-4km at easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (41 explosions).

On the evening and night of 4-5 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded five undetermined explosions, about 270 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east) and 19 muzzle flashes, all 2-5km at south-westerly directions.

On the early evening of 5 October, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 51 undetermined explosions 10-15km north and north-north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of a casualty in Kadiivka. At the Kadiivka Hospital, medical staff told the SMM that a man (39 years old) had been admitted to the hospital on 3 October at 08:00 with injuries caused by an explosion that occurred earlier the same morning at an outdoor communal refuge on Manakova Street in Kadiivka. According to medical staff, the man is homeless and refused to be hospitalised for his injuries, which included injuries to both hands, an amputation of two fingertips on his right hand and an amputation of one fingertip on his left hand. At the communal refuge on Manakova Street, four local residents (two male and two female, around 70 years old) told the SMM that on the morning of 3 October at around 07:15 they had heard an explosion and had then discovered the injured man for whom they called an ambulance.   

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 4 October, the SMM camera positioned at the Prince Ihor monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded four undetermined explosions 1-3km north-west (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Shortly after the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded one undetermined explosion 3-5km south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 5 October, the SMM observed 15 members of the armed formations (eight visibly armed) near a position of the armed formations on the south side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area, shoot a white signal flare toward government-controlled areas, which they said was an indication of the armed formations’ readiness to disengage. No flare launched in government-controlled areas was observed.

On the evening of 4 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east and south, both assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 4 October the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three projectiles in vertical flight 1-2km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

While positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area on 5 October, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 4 October an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). On 5 October the SMM observed a tank (T-64) parked on the side of the road about 2km south-west of Berestok (63km north of Donetsk), a flatbed truck transporting a tank (T-72) near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk) and eight surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) being unloaded at a train station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At sites in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) and a tank (T-64) and noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika 122mm) and a tank (T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 October an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (undetermined variant) near Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk), eight ACVs (type undetermined) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) and four APCs (BTR variants) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk). On 5 October the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 4 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Bila Kamianka (51km south-west of Donetsk) and five ACVs (type undetermined) near houses in the Kirpoty neighbourhood of eastern Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines between Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), electrical infrastructure between Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. At a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw three cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), two cargo trucks (both with Ukrainian licence plates, one covered and one uncovered) entering Ukraine and three cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) leaving Ukraine.

On 4 October, the SMM observed a protest at Lanzheron Beach in Odessa. (See SMM Daily Report 24 September 2018.) About 10-15 people (mostly men in their twenties and thirties) known to the SMM as members of National Corps, Automaidan, Right Sector, Street Front and Sokil were present. The SMM saw one of them knock on the fence surrounding the construction site and, when no one opened the gate, post a large copy of a document on the fence. Several activists spray-painted slogans on the fence, including “Illegal Construction.” The SMM observed that at least six police officers were present as well as media. The situation was calm when the SMM departed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 5 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders not to allow the SMM through.”
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied it passage to the village, citing demining in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from traveling south on the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place in the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed damage to civilian properties caused by shelling and gunfire in Chermalyk. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Zaichenko and near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and maintenance of critical water and electrical infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, as well as demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored the security situation in and around the Parliament building during proceedings in relation to legislation concerning local governance of areas outside of government control in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions).

On the evening of 3 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions and eight bursts, all 3-7km at south-south-west, south-west and west. On the evening and night of 3-4 October, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk recorded two undetermined explosions, about 130 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north) and six bursts, all 3-4km east-north-east and east. The following day, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 4-8km south-south-west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 3-4 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion, 86 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), a burst and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km at easterly directions.

During the day on 4 October, positioned on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and 18 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.5-1km north-west and north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (41), compared with the previous reporting period (about 105 explosions).

On the evening and night of 3-4 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded ten undetermined explosions, about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), two bursts and 16 muzzle flashes, all 2-5km at south-westerly directions.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by shelling and gunfire. On 3 October, at 37 Lenina Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the Mission saw debris consisting of wood and roof tiles piled up in a yard. It also saw that the roof of a barn had been recently repaired. A woman (in her seventies), who said she lived in a house at the same address, told the SMM that the roof of the barn had been hit during shelling in the afternoon on 28 September and had since been repaired. The Mission assessed the debris pattern to be consistent with damage caused by an explosion of a rocket propelled grenade; however, it could not determine the direction of fire.

At 39 Lenina Street, the SMM saw two bullet holes in the east-south-east-facing wall of a house. The Mission saw a bullet lodged in one of the holes which it assessed as a probable 5.45mm round fired from an easterly direction. The SMM assessed the damage as not fresh. A woman (in her sixties), who said she lived at the address, told the SMM that her house had been hit by small-arms fire on multiple occasions and that the damage observed by the Mission had been caused in early September 2018.

About 200m north-west of 39 Lenina Street, the SMM saw two large pieces of metal that had been torn off from a south-south-west facing fence. The Mission saw pockmarks on the fence and that parts of the fence’s concrete base had been chipped off. It also saw shrapnel damage to a tree 5m north-north-east of the fence. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a south-westerly direction. Less than 500m east of the above-mentioned impact sites, the Mission observed a recently extended 400m trench (see below).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 3 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon, a projectile in flight and a muzzle flash, all 1-2km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon and an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-south-west (both assessed inside the disengagement area), as well as an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon 1-2km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons 1-3km north-north-west assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned at the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, for about ten minutes, the Mission saw a blue light flashing every few seconds about 800m south. A member of the armed formations in Luhansk city told the Mission that the armed formations used laser equipment.

On the same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 3 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw 12 surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) stationary on flatbeds at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 3 October, an SMM long-rage UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 32 towed howitzers (ten D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm; 15 2A65 Msta-B 152mm and seven 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) and two probable armoured personnel carriers (APC) (undetermined variants) near Komuna (56km north-east of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) in Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city. On 4 October, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-80) near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 33km north-east of Mariupol).

In government-controlled areas, on 4 October, the SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), one near Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and two near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk). On 3 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted about 400m of trenches (not visible in imagery from 22 September) extending from the existing positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Chermalyk.

The SMM saw a group of at least eight people wearing the logo of an international demining organization and conducting work near areas marked for mine clearance on the western side of the road from Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) to Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk).

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines between Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), electrical infrastructure between Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and water wells near Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the Mission saw 38 cars (21 with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, 18 trucks (nine with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as seven with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians (five men and two women, aged 40-60) queuing to exit Ukraine. A member of the armed formation told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (one man and three women, aged 50-60) exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians (men, in their fifties) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM saw that the square in front of the Parliament building was cordoned off by approximately 200 police and National Guard officers. Inside the building, the SMM monitored a plenary session during which Members of Parliament voted for extension of the law “On the Special Order of Local Self-Government in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” until 31 December 2019.

The SMM followed up on reports of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer suffering an eye injury on 3 October at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 October, medical staff at a hospital in Dnipro told the Mission that a male officer had been admitted with an injury of the cornea of his eye. Medical staff added that the eye injury had been caused by an unidentified laser source and that with a series of medical treatments it was expected the officer would make a full recovery.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders not to allow the SMM through”. The Mission saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that “the SMM’s visit was not announced in advance”.
• At a pedestrian border crossing point near Izvaryne, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that “the SMM’s visit was not announced in advance”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference[4] while flying in a non-government-controlled area between Lisne (46km south-west of Luhansk) and Rodakove (22km west of Luhansk). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• On two separate occasions, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference[5] near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• Staff at a school in Luhansk city refused to provide the SMM information without prior approval from senior members of the armed formations.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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SARAJEVO, 5 October 2018 – The international observers monitoring the 7 October general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina will present their preliminary post-election statement at a news conference on Monday, 8 October, in Sarajevo.

The international observation mission is a common endeavour involving the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).

The statement will be delivered by Mavroudis Voridis, the Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, Dame Cheryl Gillan, Head of the PACE delegation, Pia Kauma, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, Frank Engel, Head of the EP delegation, Rasa Juknevičienė, Head of the NATO PA delegation, and Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission.

The International Election Observation Mission comprises some 320 observers from 43 countries, including 250 long-term and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 30 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, 18 from PACE, 9 from the EP and 8 from the NATO PA.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina operate separately and under their own specific mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the news conference on Monday, 8 October, at 15:00, in the Banja Luka Room of the Novotel Sarajevo Bristol Hotel, Fra Filipa Lastrića 2, Sarajevo.

Live stream of the press conference will be available at:

www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +387 67 130 1572 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Iryna Sabashuk, OSCE PA, +387 62 361 066 or +45 60 10 81 73, iryna@oscepa.dk

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE, +387 62 032 847 or +33 (0) 6 50 68 76 55, chemavon.chahbazian@coe.int

Tim Boden, EP, +387 60 302 0657 or +32 498 3414, timothy.boden@europarl.europa.eu

Ruxandra Popa, NATO PA, +32 484 690 848, rpopa@nato-pa.int

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PODGORICA, 5 October 2018 – More than 50 participants from police, border and customs services, and the Ministries of Justice and Culture from South-east Europe and the Caucasus completed a five-day workshop in Podgorica today on combating illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property.

The workshop, the third held as part of an OSCE project on this issue, was organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship in co-ordination with the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro. It follows similar workshops held in the past in Vicenza, Italy for the Mediterranean region and in Tashkent, Uzbekistan for the Central Asian region.

“Driven by more and more evidence on the global level that the illegal looting of cultural goods and artefacts, and destruction of common historical heritage are used by criminal groups and terrorist organizations to generate tremendous profits, we have to engage in awareness-raising activities and assist professionals from different agencies in discussing the available tools and new methods to jointly fight this phenomenon,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Ambassador Maryse Daviet.

The workshop highlighted the international legal framework and best practices in criminal justice responses to trafficking in cultural property. Experts presented the available IT systems and databases to support the fight against this phenomenon. They emphasized the importance of international co-operation and information exchange as efficient counter-measures, equally important to the monitoring and protection of archaeological sites, as well as controls in museums.

“Combating the illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property is one of the priorities of 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship,” said Counsellor Isa Ghivarelli, representing the Chairmanship. “South-East Europe and the South Caucasus are rich in history and increasingly exposed to destruction and looting. Furthermore they lie directly on the route where artefacts from other regions, including crisis and war-affected areas are trafficked. This phenomenon requires a direct and co-ordinated response from different stakeholders across borders. This workshop was designed precisely to determine the efficient responses to this phenomenon and to counteract organized crime and terrorism by cutting a significant funding source. The ideas generated during the workshop will help us to better tailor future activities to the needs of the different stakeholders.”

Experts from various agencies and bodies participated in the workshop. They included representatives of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime; the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation; the United States Homeland Security Investigations; Italy’s Carabinieri Command for the protection of cultural heritage; the International Partnerships, Trade Operations and Law Enforcement Coordination Department of Canada; INTERPOL; EUROPOL; UNESCO; the British Museum; the International Council of Museums; and the Regional Diving Centre in Bjela, Montenegro.

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BISHKEK, 5 October 2018 – Enhancing security dialogue in Central Asia, countering new challenges and threats in border areas, promoting Mediterranean co-operation and strengthening citizens’ engagement in building secure societies have been among the topics of debate at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 17th Autumn Meeting in Bishkek this week.

Some 300 delegates including 160 parliamentarians from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation have participated in the meeting, hosted by the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Speakers at the event included President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sooronbay Jeenbekov, Speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) of the Kyrgyz Republic Dastanbek Dzhumabekov, Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Erlan Abdyldaev, representatives of OSCE field operations in Central Asia, and a representative of the Chairmanship of the OSCE Contact Group with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation.

In his closing remarks today, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia) highlighted the main themes and outcomes of the debates in Bishkek.

“We have analyzed how confidence-building and regional co-operation can help us counter new challenges and threats in border areas, such as trafficking in human beings along migration routes, tackling the trafficking of illicit drugs, or preventing the spread of terrorism,” he said. “We have discussed how the Mediterranean and Central Asia can learn from each other to address migration, trade, and environmental challenges.”

He also pointed out the importance of engaging citizens to provide a comprehensive answer to all these challenges. “As we return to our national parliaments, we must turn these ideas into concrete plans,” he said. “We must carry on holding our governments accountable and pushing them to live up to their commitments.”

Introducing the first session of the Parliamentary Conference, dealing with promoting regional co-operation, OSCE PA Vice-President Kari Henriksen (Norway) noted that responding to common transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, and cyber threats have had the effect of strengthening ties between the Central Asian countries.

“This increased co-operation has materialized in the form of a number of bilateral agreements on confidence-building measures at borders with a view to boosting regional security and stability,” she said. “The OSCE is particularly well positioned to address the challenges and threats associated with border areas and to strengthen regional co-operation thanks to its comprehensive security concept.”

Members of Kyrgyzstan’s Delegation underscored these points, noting that cross-border co-operation is key to many different issues and that building regional co-operation will help build security for the whole OSCE area. Enhancing trust and confidence and promoting regional economic development will also provide a basis to counter extremists, they said, noting that the OSCE PA is a key forum to build confidence and co-operation in the OSCE area.

In his opening remarks to the Mediterranean Forum Thursday, OSCE PA Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs Pascal Allizard (France) discussed priority issues for the region, including combating human smugglers and traffickers, the fight against radicalization and violent extremism, and migration management. He drew attention to the exploitation of migrant workers and noted that much work remains to be done in responding to the crisis of migrants and refugees.

“As we can see, the migration crisis in Europe is not yet over,” he said, “and we cannot say with certainty whether the ‘worst’ has passed or is yet to come. What I do know, however, is that it is not an ordinary crisis, one that we can expect to settle with half measures.”

He stressed that an effective response to the crisis must include efforts to address these conditions, while ensuring that the reception of refugees and asylum seekers be done under the best conditions.

Other topics discussed by delegates at the Mediterranean Forum, held under the theme of “Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Mediterranean: Addressing Migration, Trade and Environmental Challenges,” included counter-terrorism, climate change, promoting stability in Syria, Libya and Iraq in order to reduce human suffering and stem the flow of refugees, as well as the importance of promoting a just resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Chairing today’s session devoted to promoting citizens’ engagement in building secure societies, Hedy Fry (Canada) noted that as the OSCE PA’s Special Representative on Gender Issues, she is acutely aware of the gap in representation of women in public life. Similar challenges exist for minority populations, she said, including the Roma populations in many European countries. She urged full participation for all segments of society.

“When you have everyone in a country all able to move towards the same goals in the same fashion, you have a secure nation,” Fry said. “When you exclude minorities from equal participation and access they will rise up and you will have insecurity. Society must be based on the core principle of citizen participation.” Her remarks also focused on increasing young people’s participation in political life, noting that 18-24 year-olds are the least likely to vote in Canada.

Discussion in the session touched on issues such as free communication and movement, fighting corruption, the work of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, combating violence and discrimination against women, increasing youth and minority participation in public life, and promoting open government initiatives.

Also today, the OSCE PA’s Standing Committee met and heard reports from President Tsereteli, Secretary General Roberto Montella, Chair of the Sub-Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Working Practices Peter Bowness, Treasurer Doris Barnett, and Special Representatives. Members also discussed ongoing and upcoming activities including election observation missions and future meetings of the Assembly.

Photos from the meeting are on Flickr. Videos are being posted on YouTube as they become available. More information is available here. 

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VIENNA, 5 October 2018 – Representatives of the 57 OSCE participating States, civil society and international organizations will meet in Vienna on Monday for the two-day conference “Human Rights and Education: promoting human rights, peaceful coexistence and security in the OSCE region through education”.

This meeting, organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), will seek to promote policy making efforts to mainstream human rights education and address full access to education.

The Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting will also offer a platform to explore initiatives and programmes meant to facilitate and support policy making, as well as opportunities to leverage new technologies for advancing human rights education and promoting the right to education.

Kaari Mattila, Secretary-General of the Finnish League for Human Rights, will deliver the keynote address at the event.

Journalists are invited to attend the opening of the conference from 15:00 to 16:00 on 8 October in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. To register, please send an e-mail confirming your attendance to press@osce.org by 12:00 noon, 8 October.

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398729 Participants of the training seminar are discussing effective methods of interaction with the media, Koschi village (near Astana), Kazakhstan, 1 October 2018. Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported five-day media relations training seminar for prosecutors  concluded on 5 October 2018 in the village of Koschi (near Astana), Kazakhstan.

The seminar covered topics such as effective communication strategies between prosecutors and the media, and best practices in interaction with journalists and the general public through various channels and in different contexts. The event also included a session dedicated to the use of new media tools and social networks, as well as practical exercises on proper drafting of press releases and press briefings.

Some twenty-five prosecutors from across Kazakhstan took part in the event. They learned to prepare for public interviews and press conferences, enhance their public speaking skills, organize communication campaigns and handle conflict situations.

The event, co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the General Prosecutor’s Office’s Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to enhance co-operation between law enforcement agencies and the media.