Central Europe

401741 Communication and Media Relations Section

Andorra’s priorities within international organizations, its foreign policy and engagement with the OSCE were the focus of a meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Andorra, Maria Ubach Font, and Secretary General Thomas Greminger on 29 October 2018 in Vienna.

“Multilateralism is essential for the visibility of ‘small countries’ and the OSCE’s understanding of and respect for their positions is commendable,” said Ubach Font. “We need to use instruments such as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to make the work of multilateral institutions more understandable to a broader audience.”

Ubach Font said that Andorra’s foreign policy priorities are: education for democratic citizenship, especially among youth; the fight against climate change (Andorra is party to the Paris Agreement and has already undertaken significant legislative reform in this area); and migration (following the principle of solidarity and responsibility Andorra has accepted a number of Syrian refugee families, some of them in co-operation with Sant’Egidio).

Ubach Font expressed support for the Secretary General’s OSCE reform agenda, striving to make the executive structures more responsive to the needs of OSCE participating States, to maximize collective their impact, and to ensure that the funds put at the their disposal are put to the best possible use.

“Andorra’s consistent support – both political support and through extra-budgetary contributions – is of great importance for the Organization. It is important we mobilize even more synergy among the OSCE executive structures, the Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Institutions, in action-oriented dialogue on youth and security and migration,” said Greminger.

VIENNA, 31 October 2018 – A special session of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, held under the Forum’s Swedish Chair, today marked the 18th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security – a landmark document, speakers said, which stresses the importance of full and equal participation of women and men in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

“Without equal participation, women are not sufficiently heard, opportunities to find new approaches and solutions are lost, and the chance to get the full picture, encompassing both female and male perspectives, is undoubtedly missed,” said Chairperson of the Forum and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the OSCE Ambassador Ulrika Funered as she opened today’s meeting.

Noting that women remain under-represented in the OSCE’s two key decision-making fora – the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation – she introduced a video featuring the 18 female heads of delegation together calling for commitment to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

“It is my hope, that we can use this anniversary to listen just a tiny bit harder and reflect on what our speakers today have to tell us – and bring these wisdoms with us in our coming work on these issues,” added Ambassador Funered. “Then maybe, just maybe, we will be able to achieve tangible results that are worth celebrating, when the time comes to commemorate the Resolution’s 20th anniversary in 2020.”

The first speaker, Brigadier David Eastman MBE, Deputy Director for Euro-Atlantic Security at the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, recalled that Resolution 1325 is based on “the three Ps”: the participation of women, the protection and the prevention of civilians from conflict-related sexual violence.   

“The ‘three Ps’ are critical in respecting human rights and achieving human security,” he said. “The Resolution forces us to acknowledge that just because a state is secure it doesn’t mean that the individuals within in it are.”

Lieutenant Colonel Rachel Grimes MBE, Staff Officer Level 1 (Military) for Women, Peace and Security at the British Ministry of Defence, spoke about her experiences in the British Armed Forces. She highlighted the work of Female Engagement Teams which were launched by ISAF, the NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan.

“The ability of the Female Engagement Teams to search women without causing cultural offence and stoking the insurgency more, is a clear force protection capability,” she said. “It is becoming obvious that when a military is operating amongst the population, having mixed patrols enhances our interaction and reputation.”

Captain Inna Zavorotko, Officer of the Military Law Section at the Legal Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said that the country’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces had adopted action plans on implementing Resolution 1325, with gender perspectives incorporated from the level of headquarters through to ground level, as well as in recruitment and education practices.

“The integration of gender perspectives in the education and training system aim at raising gender awareness of all military personnel and encourage women to undertake active participation in the training process,” she said. “Integrating gender perspectives into the Armed Forces is not a mere trend - it is a necessity and a right to one’s professional development.”

Captain Lotta Ekvall of the Swedish Armed Forces’ Helicopter Wing, presented a new OSCE publication, Gender in military operations: Guidance for personnel working at tactical level in Peace Support Operations, which she developed at the Gender Section of the OSCE Secretariat.

“As far as I know, a publication like this that directly addresses soldiers and commanders at tactical level, giving clear direction and guidance about how gender perspectives are to be integrated into military objectives and tasks, has not existed until now,” she said. “Those at the tactical level are the implementers - the ones who are supposed to make things happen. If they are gender blind, so is the mission or organization.”

Following the meeting, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the OSCE, together with the support of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the OSCE, organized a side event on the role of military commanders in the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, both in peacetime and in crisis response operations.

During the event, experts presented challenges for armed forces in this area, as well as opportunities for awareness-raising, capacity-building, and policy-making aimed at integrating human rights-compliant and gender-sensitive approaches into their work.

"The responsibility to prevent and address sexual and gender-based violence should be a daily task for military commanders,” said Omer Fisher, Head of the Human Rights Department at ODIHR. “This task is about educating soldiers to understand the root causes of violence and make this understanding part of their work; it is about building an institutional culture which does not discriminate nor tolerates harassment, misogyny and abuse within and outside of the armed forces."  

Ambassador Funered added: “Equal participation of women and men in military operations does not only improve operational effectiveness, for instance through the ability to reach out to the whole population instead of half, but also significantly contributes to stopping human rights violations, including sexual violence.”

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TASHKENT, 31 October 2018 – A three-day training course on protecting the rights of alleged victims and accused persons for police investigators from Tashkent and the surrounding area, conducted by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, commenced today. 

The aim of the training is to enhance the investigators’ professional understanding of and commitment to international policing and investigative standards. Emphasis is being placed on working within the framework of national and international laws on human rights-compliant policing, which uphold the presumption of innocence, prohibit the use of torture and oppressive practices, and protect the dignity of and respect for witnesses and suspects at all stages of the investigative process.

The participants will also be trained in putting the principles and concepts they learn into practice, enhancing their effectiveness and sense of personal accomplishment. The course will leave them better equipped to carry out their investigative responsibilities to the exacting standards rightly expected of them by the people of Uzbekistan.

In his opening speech, Juergen Becker, Senior Project Officer with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, stressed that “the training is part of a project intended to support the Ministry of Internal Affairs in enhancing professional capacities and skills of its investigative divisions and in promoting the respect of the law and fundamental rights and freedoms among the police through provision of expertise, information and technical support”.

“In accordance with the Uzbekistan Development Strategy for 2017-2021, the project aims at improving the capacity of the investigative divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to perform their tasks in line with OSCE commitments, applicable laws, human rights and fundamental freedoms,” he said.  

Michael Boyle, international police expert from Ireland said: “The implementation of professional investigative interviewing techniques is a critical tool in police work and is an essential step in detecting crime. By applying these methods, law enforcement officers not only greatly increase the likelihood that they will obtain actionable information and evidence to help them solve the crime under investigation, but  they will also be better able to deliver justice and strengthen the public’s trust  and the rule of law.”                                                                                                              

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401696 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

International standards in the area of legal recognition of religious or belief communities and progress towards their implementation in Spain were the focus of an event co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Madrid on 30 October 2018.

Representatives of public authorities, civil society organizations, religious and belief communities and academia took part in the event, which was organized in co-operation with Spain’s Ministry of Justice, the Spanish Diplomatic School and the Permanent Mission of Spain to the OSCE.

The event featured the release of the Spanish-language version of the Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities, originally published in English by ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. 

“Acquiring legal personality is a vital aspect of the full realization of the right to freedom of religion or belief,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR’s First Deputy Director. “It is therefore of utmost importance that participating States use the recommendations and good practice examples contained in this publication. This way they can ensure that the registration systems they design are firmly anchored in international human rights standards and OSCE commitments.”

Zoila Combalia, a member of the ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, said: “The ODIHR publication addresses the compatibility of granting a specific legal status with respect for freedom of religion or belief. This may be particularly useful in countries such as Spain, where there are co-operation agreements between religious or belief communities and the State.”

The Guidelines are a product of extensive consultations with government officials and civil society from various parts of the OSCE region. Besides English and Spanish, the publication is available in Russian, Tajik, Turkish and Ukrainian.

This report is for the media and the general public.

On 27 and 28 October, the SMM followed up on its lost long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The UAV had gone missing on 27 October at night while it was flying over an area south-east of Nyzhnokrynske (non-government-controlled, 66km east of Donetsk) following a convoy of seven trucks near the border with the Russian Federation (see SMM Spot Report 27 October 2018).

The UAV had taken off at approximately 22:03 on 26 October from its launch site at Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). At 01:18 on 27 October, the UAV had spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) east of Nyzhnokrynske. At 01:53, the SMM had suddenly lost communication with the UAV near the same location, about 30 seconds after the UAV’s flight path had become unstable. During these 30 seconds, the UAV lost its GPS signal, abruptly increased altitude by about 30 feet for a very brief moment and deviated from its heading, after which it immediately began tumbling down, rapidly losing altitude at a rate of approximately 4,800 feet per minute. At the same time, sudden changes in the UAV’s engine speed and flight controls input readings were recorded.

Prior to the loss of communication, the UAV had been flying in stable flight at an altitude of approximately 7,000 feet. The weather conditions were good with clear skies. All recorded flight parameters were normal and the UAV camera was recording.

According to a preliminary technical assessment, the most likely cause of the incident was an impact to the UAV which threw it off its flight path and disrupted the anti-jamming system and the payload power supply, and likely caused the UAV to crash. During its tumbling descent, before the communication was lost, additional systems of the UAV showed signs of failure.

On 27 and 28 October, the SMM pursued recovery efforts at presumed crash sites near Nyzhnokrynske close to the border. On 27 October, seven mini-UAV flights were conducted over an area south of Nyzhnokrynske and Serhiieve-Krynka (non-government-controlled, 69km east of Donetsk). The UAVs spotted multiple wheel tracks in a field about halfway between the aforementioned settlements. The SMM was not able to assess whether the tracks were fresh. Eight people in Nyzhnokrynske separately told the SMM that they had heard an explosion in a southerly direction between 01:45-02:00 on 27 October. On 28 October, the Mission conducted three mini-UAV flights approximately 500m east of the area it had examined the day before. To date, the SMM has not been able to locate any debris of its UAV.

The SMM followed all the established pre-flight notification procedures and implemented all the relevant loss of long-range UAV protocols after communication and control of the UAV was no longer possible. The Mission has restarted long-range UAV operations following the required suspension period.

The Mission will continue to follow up.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Kozatske, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Bezimenne.* The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple and Zolote-2/Karbonit. It facilitated repairs to civilian infrastructure in Berehove and near Artema and to residential houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 230 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 270 explosions).

On the evening and night of 28-29 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 24 explosions (one assessed as an airburst, one as an impact of an undetermined weapon round and the remainder undetermined) and about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all 0.5-3km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 28 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 440 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km at southerly directions. On the morning of 29 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 20 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south.

On the evening and night of 28-29 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 20 undetermined explosions and about 335 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all 2-6km in easterly directions.

On the morning of 29 October, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 65 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-west and north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (eight explosions).

On the evening of 28 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded ten undetermined explosions and 15 projectiles in flight (from east-north-east to west-north-west), all 2-4km south-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early morning hours of 29 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire 4-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 29 October, positioned on the northern outskirts of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire 1-2km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 28 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Illinka (38km west of Donetsk). On 29 October, the SMM saw three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by trucks near Oknyne (53km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 28 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk) and a tank (T-72) and a probable tank (undetermined variant) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 29 October, the SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and two towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that four tanks (three T-64 and one T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV),[3] an anti-aircraft gun and a radio intelligence system in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 28 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), four IFVs (BMP-2) and an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-80) and a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk), three APCs (BTR variants) near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk) and two ACVs (undetermined variants) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 26 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Stare (58km west of Luhansk). On 27 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Zemliane (11km north-west of Luhansk). On 28 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two probable APCs (BTR-80) and again spotted a TORN radio intelligence system mounted on a truck near Khoroshe (see above). On 29 October, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) with a mounted heavy machine gun behind a damaged house near the centre of Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP variants) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), as well as repairs to power lines in Berehove (non-government-controlled, 23km east of Luhansk), to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. A Voda Donbassa water company representative told the SMM that all repairs to a water pipeline between Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) had been completed. A staff member of the military-civil administration of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that repairs to houses in the city had been completed.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (non-government-controlled, 78km east of Donetsk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM observed 22 cars (five with Ukrainian and ten with Russian Federation licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), a pedestrian (man, aged 30-40) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine, and 21 cars (six with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Armenian licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates) and four pedestrians (women, aged 50-70) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 26 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a checkpoint in Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol). While present at the checkpoint, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through in both directions.
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “demining and engineering works” in the area.
• At a compound in Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access to the compound, citing “orders from their superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was prevented from proceeding north due to the presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal due to signal interference[5] on two occasions near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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401543 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Renewable energy, green technology, resources efficiency and harmonizing environmental legislation were the focus of a series of training courses conducted by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in October. Conducted in Bokhtar, Garm, Khorog and Khujand, the courses promoted the realization of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals in Tajikistan.  They brought together some 140 representatives of local government, civil society, youth and OSCE-established Aarhus Centres from all regions of the country.

The manager of the Garm Aarhus Centre, Savriniso Hafizova, said: “It is important that representatives of governmental structures, businesses and the civil society of Garm participated in this training. They increased their knowledge on environmental matters and learned how to apply green technologies in remote areas of the Rasht valley.”

“I was impressed by just how active the participants  were. These training courses are practical steps to improving the efficient use of resources and the transition to a green and inclusive economy in Tajikistan,” said an environmental specialist from Lithuania, Saulius Smalys, who conducted the courses.

KYIV, 30 October 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Wednesday, 31 October, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 31 October, at 15:00 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

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This report is for the media and the general public.

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first responder[1]. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 10,312 to 10,210 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 31 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs decreased to 19 (compared to 36 last week); 15 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 4 into Ukraine (68 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when nine families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (433 compared to 387 observed during the previous week). There were 229 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 204 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Sevastopol and Stakhanov- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 853 to 751 (262 at the Gukovo BCP and 489 at the Donetsk BCP); 423 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 328 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and in Belarus.                                                                                         

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 42 (compared to 66 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 88 to 134: of the total number of trucks scanned, 87 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 47 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 148 to 172 vehicles; 102 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 70 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 27 occasions, compared to 22 last week; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Belarusian, Georgian, Lithuanian and Polish licence plates and with “DPR” plates.During the reporting period, the OTs noted three funeral vans on separate occasions at the Donetsk BCP. On 27 October a funeral van was observed crossing from Ukraine into the Russian Federation at 06:51. On October 28, two distinct funeral vehicles were noted crossing the border: the first bore Ukrainian licence plates and crossed into Ukraine at 15:55, the second crossed from Ukraine into the Russian Federation at 19:40.

On all occasions, from their position, the OTs could not observe whether the vans carried a coffin or not.

On 26 October at 06:40, the OT observed an ambulance entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle bore licence plates issued in the Russian Federation and the inscription “Urgent medical assistance” (in Russian). After the ambulance parked next to the main building, the OT observed two paramedics entering the facilities.At 07:15 the vehicle crossed back into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 25 September to 30 October 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time.

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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401585 Thematic Recommendations and Guidelines HCNM thematic recommendations 1996–2008 ExplAnimations: High Commissioner's thematic work explained in three short animated videos Factsheet on the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Lamberto Zannier, travelled to Moscow from 28 to 30 October 2018 for an official visit to the Russian Federation.

During the visit, Zannier addressed the Second Moscow International Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism, Racism and Xenophobia. 

“Discrimination based on religion and ethnicity is on the rise. We should continue to work for the integration of our diverse societies by guaranteeing access to justice for all, by promoting a balanced use of language and by enhancing participation in public life,” said Zannier in his opening remarks at the conference.

During his meetings with representatives of the Russian Government, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, the Head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, Igor Barinov, as well as with the Deputy Minister of Education, Tatyana Sinyugina, Zannier discussed both inter-ethnic relations in Russia as well as the situation of Russian minorities in other OSCE participating States.

The visit also included meetings with representatives of national minorities in the Russian Federation, during which issues related to languages and education were discussed, among other matters.

During the visit, the High Commissioner also highlighted the importance of the HCNM thematic Recommendations and Guidelines as valuable tools to address issues related to his mandate of conflict prevention.

401588 Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), participating in the seminar. Vienna, 30 October 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) hosted the fourth annual Electoral Seminar, with a focus on election observation, fundamental freedoms and election campaigns, on 30 October 2018 in Vienna. The event brought together some 100 representatives of OSCE delegations, election management bodies, international organizations and citizen observer groups. 

“This seminar provided a valuable platform to exchange views on the current trends and challenges in the area of democratic elections, focusing on observation of electoral campaigns. One of the issues we addressed is the trend of campaigns shifting more and more to the online domain, as we explore possible ways to observe such campaigns,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “Here we need to be vigilant, to make sure that underrepresented groups are protected adequately against hate speech, discrimination and incitement to violence during the electoral campaign.”

ODIHR carries out election observation in OSCE participating States to assess the extent to which elections respect fundamental freedoms and are characterized by equality, universality, political pluralism, confidence, transparency and accountability. ODIHR has observed more than 350 elections to date. The Office also supports authorities in their efforts to improve electoral processes and to follow up on recommendations by ODIHR election observation missions, by reviewing election-related legislation, providing technical expertise and supporting the activities of citizen observer groups.

COPENHAGEN, 30 October 2018 – Some 75 members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly will soon be travelling to the United States to observe the 6 November midterm elections. Led by Special Co-ordinator of the OSCE short-term observer mission George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and Head of the OSCE PA mission Isabel Santos (MP, Portugal), the observers will participate in several days of meetings and briefings in Washington, DC, before deploying around the country for election day observation.

It is the seventh time the OSCE PA has deployed an election observation mission to the United States since 2004. The elections will be assessed for their adherence to democratic commitments laid out in the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document of 1990.

“As members of parliament from across Europe, Central Asia and North America and as representatives of the world’s largest regional security organization, OSCE parliamentarians bring a unique perspective to every election that we observe,” said Tsereteli, who also serves as President of the OSCE PA. “We have all competed in elections ourselves, so we personally understand the importance of a level playing field for electoral contestants and a clear understanding of the rules.”

Santos, who serves as Vice-President of the OSCE PA, added: “Election observation is one of the most important activities of the OSCE. Not only does it serve to uphold the democratic standards to which we have all agreed, it helps build trust within countries and between countries. In these times of heightened tensions, it is important for us to engage in these confidence-building activities.”

Parliamentarians from more than 30 of the OSCE’s 57 countries are expected to participate in the observation mission to the United States. The OSCE PA is working closely with the limited election observation mission deployed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), led by Tana de Zulueta.

Preliminary findings and conclusions of the election observation mission will be presented at a press conference in Washington on 7 November.

For background on the OSCE PA’s election observation activities, please find a factsheet here.

For previous OSCE PA statements on U.S. elections, please click here.

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Fotima Sokhibova

The OSCE Border Management Staff College concluded its first course overseas on 26 October 2018. The 22nd Border Management Staff Course for 21 mid- to senior-ranking official representing 15 countries, including Armenia, Australia, Cyprus, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine, was held at the premises of Legione Allievi, a training school of the Italian Financial Police, the Guardia di Finanza in Bari, Italy.

The one-month intensive professional development course was implemented with support from the Guardia di Finanza and the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department.

Brigadier General Vito Straziota, the commander of the Legione Allieve training school, stated that “this event gave us the occasion to share common knowledge and practices, developed by our own national judicial systems, and study their direct application in total synergy and real co-operation.”

Straziota said that this experience will help the OSCE to continue developing as an outlet for training border security and management officials to detect and intercept transnational threats within OSCE’s three-dimensional, comprehensive approach to security.

As one of the College’s core educational offerings, the Border Management Staff Course covered multiple topics within the OSCE’s three dimensions as well as a module on leadership and management, and a group research project. Two study visits were conducted to the Bari Air and Naval Ports, where Guardia di Finanza officers highlighted the operational side of their work, including through simulations of anti-smuggling operations at sea.

The course incorporated a roundtable discussion on co-operation in the prevention of trafficking in cultural property, where representatives of the Italian Carabinieri, the Guardia di Finanza, academia and international organizations emphasized the relevance of the threat to the field of border security and management, and provided insight on tackling it.

In addition to being the first staff course to be conducted outside of the College’s home campus in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the course became the first at the College to have more female participants than male. Fifty-two percent of the participants were female.

Jonathan Holland, Director of the Border Management Staff College said: “Our courses truly offer an international networking experience that cannot be replicated elsewhere.” He further emphasized that an additional incentive of being a part of the Border Management Staff College experience is the opportunity to become part of the vast alumni network, and build trust between colleagues and counterparts.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 26 and 27 October, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 27 and 28 October, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on its long-range UAV that had gone missing near non-government-controlled Nyzhnokrynske. Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Metalist. The SMM saw weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Novookhtyrka and Novoaidar. It recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novoazovsk and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.* The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple and Zolote-2/Karbonit and facilitated repairs to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering in support of election reform.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 October, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). Between the evenings of 27 and 28 October, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 270 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.[2]

On the evening and night of 26-27 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two explosions assessed as airbursts and about 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from easterly to westerly directions), all 0.1-1km at southerly directions. It also recorded 36 explosions (two assessed as impacts, four as airbursts and the remainder undetermined) and about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-west to south-east), all 1-4km at southerly directions. On the following evening and night, the same camera recorded 77 explosions (27 assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from northerly to southerly directions), all 0.1-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 26 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 190 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east, south and west-south-west. During the day and evening of 27 October, at the same location, the SMM heard about 130 undetermined explosions and about 600 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km east and at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 27-28 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 225 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all 1-4km in easterly directions.

During the day on 27 October, positioned in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), a town where the SMM has regularly been restricted access to (see below), the SMM heard three explosions (two assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and one as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon) and about 75 bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) (30mm) cannon, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-2km south, south-west and west.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 October, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (10 explosions). Between the evenings of 27 and 28 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including eight explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.[3]

On 27 October, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard at least 30 shots of small-arms fire 1.2-1.4km north-north-west, in the area where the UAV was flying, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged, and departed the area.*

During the day on 27 October, positioned in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts of  IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-7km west.  

On 27 and 28 October, the SMM followed up on its long-range UAV that had gone missing while flying over an area south-east of Nyzhnokrynske (non-government-controlled, 66km east of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 27 October 2018). The SMM had lost communication with its UAV at 01:53 on 27 October, about 30 seconds after the UAV’s flight path had suddenly become unstable. During these 30 seconds, the UAV lost its GPS signal, abruptly increased altitude for a very brief moment and deviated from its heading, after which it immediately began tumbling down, rapidly losing altitude.

On 27 October, an SMM mini-UAV flying over Nyzhnokrynske and Serhiieve-Krynka (non-government-controlled, 69km east of Donetsk) spotted multiple wheel tracks in a field about halfway between the aforementioned settlements. The SMM was not able to assess whether the tracks were fresh. Eight people in Nyzhnokrynske separately told the SMM that they had heard an explosion in a southerly direction between 01:45-2:00 on 27 October.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[4] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 28 October, positioned about 1km north of the Zolote disengagement area near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 55 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and six shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 26 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three projectiles in flight from east-north-east to west-south-west 1-2km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 28 October, the same camera recorded 17 projectiles in flight (11 from south-west to north-east and six in vertical flight) 4-5km east-south-east, (assessed as outside the disengagement area).  

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas and near the Petrivske disengagement area during the day on 27 October, the SMM observed calm situations. Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 28 October, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 27 October, the SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) loaded on trucks in Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk). On 28 October, the SMM saw four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by trucks south-west of Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 27 October, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S19) loaded onto trailers near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk). On 28 October, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B 152mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S19) stationary at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), four towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) loaded onto trucks near Oknyne (53km north-west of Luhansk) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) being towed by trucks near Sloviansk (95km north of Donetsk).

On 27 October, the SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage sites in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) remained missing.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle and an anti-aircraft gun[5] in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 28 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-variant) inside a compound in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 27 October, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

On 27 October, the SMM saw a mobile radar system (AN/TPQ-36) near Sievierodonetsk, and on 28 October it saw 20 communications and/or electronic warfare vehicles (R-330U) stationary at the train station in Rubizhne. 

On 27 October, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), as well as repairs to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). On 27 and 28 October, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM observed demining activities. On 28 October, the SMM saw three men in civilian clothing, marking terrain with wooden sticks in an area about 2.5km north-west of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), assessed by the SMM as preparation work for demining.

In Kyiv, on 28 October, the SMM monitored a public gathering in support of election reform. On the way from Taras Shevchenko Park to Independence square, the SMM saw about 500 people (20-70 years old, 50 per cent women and 50 per cent men), with some participants displaying symbols of three political movements. The SMM saw about 300 police and National Guard officers present, and the gathering ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 26 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 27 October, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol); however the SMM was allowed to pass southward to Sakhanka. On 28 October, at the same checkpoint, three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to both Sakhanka and Pikuzy, citing “orders from their superiors”. On this date, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint in both directions.
• On 27 October, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through, citing “an ongoing special operation”.
• On 27 October, at a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “demining and engineering works” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 27 and 28 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[6]
• On 27 and 28 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times. [6]
• On 27 and 28 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 27 October, an SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal due to signal interference[7] near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and Lebedynske.
• On 27 October, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Metalist, the SMM heard at least 30 shots of small-arms fire 1.2-1.4km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] On 28 October, the SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational.

[3] On 27 and 28 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational. On October 28, the SMM camera at Popasna was not operational.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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401465

Conciliation in international law as a means to peacefully resolve disputes between states was the focus of a colloquium held on 11 and 12 October 2018 in Geneva by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE in co-operation with the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The colloquium was designed as an outreach activity by the Court to raise awareness among OSCE participating States of its existence as an institution established to settle any arising disputes among them.

The colloquium for representatives of the international community in Geneva and academia brought together well-renowned legal experts to examine the theory and practice of conciliation procedures in different international contexts.

As a follow-up to a colloquium held in 2015 that focused on emerging trends in conciliation, the scope of this colloquium was enlarged in many respects, in particular by extending the research to Africa and Latin America and analysing the recent conciliation procedure between Australia and Timor-Leste.

Participants noted that successful conciliation requires flexible procedures that are applied within adequate time limits. The Bureau of the Court will compile the findings in a forthcoming publication with the aim of reminding the OSCE community of the Court’s mandate and encouraging them to make use of this institution.

Among the speakers at the event were: Prof. em. Emmanuel Decaux (Université II, Panthéon-Assas); Prof. Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University of London); Prof. Serena Forlati (University of Ferrara); Ambassador Daniel Klingele (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs); Prof. Marcelo Kohen (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies); Prof. Makane Mbengue (University of Geneva and Sciences Po Paris); Prof. Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi (University of Siena, Member of the Bureau of the Court); Prof. Pál Sonnevend (University of Budapest); Prof. em. Heinhard Steiger (University of Giessen); Prof. em. Daniel Thürer (University of Zürich, Member of the Bureau of the Court); Prof. em. Christian Tomuschat (Humboldt University Berlin, President of the Court); and Prof. Jorge Viñuales (University of Cambridge and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva).

Financial aid for the event was provided by Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which is based in Geneva, provides a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. The Court was established in 1995 by the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. Thirty-four States are Parties to the Convention. The Court is composed of recognized experts in the field of international law who are appointed by the States Parties. 

VIENNA, 29 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his serious concern over the lasting pre-trial detention of bureau chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine, Kirill Vyshinsky, which has been extended twice already since July, and hopes that the upcoming court proceeding will lead to his release on 4 November 2018, when his current detention is scheduled to end.

In May 2018, the Ukrainian security services raided the office of RIA Novosti Ukraine and arrested its chief, Kirill Vyshinsky, on charges of high treason. In July 2018, Vyshinsky was presented with additional charges of illegal handling of weapons. His pre-trial detention was extended in July 2018 and again in September 2018, and his current detention should end on 4 November. In June and October, the appeal courts also rejected the journalist’s request to be released from pre-trial detention.

“I hope that Kirill Vyshinsky’s pre-trial detention will not be further extended and will therefore end on 4 November 2018,” Désir said. “I call on the Ukrainian authorities to expedite the investigation on the serious charges brought against Vyshinsky, and to conduct such an investigation in full compliance with the principles of rule of law, necessity and proportionality.”

The Representative reiterated that the fight against propaganda must not fall short of international standards on freedom of the media and should not interfere with media activities.

“Journalists have the right to freely express views and opinions, including dissenting views, and to report on issues that could be considered controversial, sensitive or offensive. Under no circumstances should they be targeted in retaliation for their journalistic work,” Désir said.

The Representative has earlier raised his concern on this case: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/381370

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401411 Marina Živaljević

Montenegro has made substantial progress in the last decade in reducing its stockpiles of arms and ammunition, thereby cutting the risks they pose to citizens and the environment, said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet as she opened a two-day regional workshop in Podgorica on 29 October 2018 on the deactivation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in line with the international standards.

Around 50 participants from South-Eastern Europe attended the workshop, organized by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Montenegrin Ministries of Interior and Defence, which also focused on approaches and procedures to combat the diversion and illegal sales of SALW.

“This July in London, Montenegro, together with other members of the Western Balkans, pledged to adopt by 2024 the Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of SALW, and their ammunition, in the framework of the Franco-German initiative,” said Ambassador Daviet, adding that the OSCE is ready to support Montenegro in this endeavour.

The workshop focused on two goals of the Roadmap: to ensure that arms control legislation is fully harmonized with the EU regulatory framework by 2023, and that the collection and legalization of SALW is carried out by using deactivation procedures according to international standards.

The head of the Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section within the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre, Robin Mossinkoff, said that the Organization is a frontrunner in trying to address the issue of deactivation in practice.

“The stronger the laws on deactivation are, and the clearer deactivation procedures and the subsequent enforcement of these in practice are, the more useful this will be for all stakeholders dealing with weapons of any sort,” he said.

The State Secretary of the Montenegrin Interior Ministry, Dragan Pejanović, recalled that following the terrorist attacks in Paris in December 2015 the European Commission proposed revisions to the European Union’s Firearms Directive.

“New rules increase the security of citizens, while hunters, sports shooters and collectors can still buy weapons, under strict conditions,” said Pejanović.

Representing the German Federal Foreign Office, Hannah Dönges said that the Roadmap, drawn up as part of the Franco-German joint initiative should ensure that transfers of illicit SALW and ammunition and will not stand in the way of EU accession.

“Specific goals should be achieved by 2024 and the OSCE is a core partner in working towards achieving goals,” she said. The workshop also supports countries of the region in implementing their national action plans on illicit firearms trafficking and comprehensive SALW control.

401621 Polish torture prevention monitors introducing their portfolios during the training event. Warsaw, 30 October 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Enhancing the independent monitoring and documenting of the use of weapons and restraints in law enforcement activities was the focus of a capacity-building event for Polish torture prevention monitors on 30 October 2018 in Warsaw. The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Omega Research Foundation and the University of Exeter and supported by the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom.

Twelve members (seven men and five women) of the Polish National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) participated in the training event, designed to match the mandate of an NPM. They discussed challenges in monitoring the use of restraints and electric shock weapons, with a specific focus on Tasers, laws and regulations applicable to certain categories of weapons, and the use of force by law enforcement officials. The participants explored the related medical and human rights risks and various methods of documentation.

“This training is part of ODIHR’s continuous work on preventing torture and strengthening the independent monitoring of places of detention in the OSCE region,” said Stephanie Selg, ODIHR Adviser on Torture Prevention. “We hope that we will be able to continue to train monitors not only in Poland but across the region.”

Przemysław Kazimirski, Head of the National Preventive Mechanism of Poland, said: “Monitoring weapons and other equipment used by law enforcement officials with a view to issuing recommendations on how to better prevent torture or other ill-treatment is a crucial part of our mandate. Until very recently there was little guidance for monitors, and this training provided an excellent opportunity for us to learn more about available tools, as well as enhancing our monitoring skills in this area.”

Abi Dymond, Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Exeter, said: “It is crucial that torture prevention bodies are able to effectively document the presence, use and misuse of weapons and restraints, including those weapons sometimes referred to as 'less lethal’. This can help to ensure accountability and prevent future misuse and abuse of such weapons.”  

The training builds on the Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules, a joint publication by ODIHR and Penal Reform International (PRI).

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

New challenges and approaches to regional and global security in Central Asia were the focus of an OSCE-supported international conference held in Astana on 26 October 2018.

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and the Kazakhstan Council on International Relations, with support from the Institute of Diplomacy under the Academy of Public Administration and the Public Opinion Research Institute.

The conference aimed to promote dialogue between stakeholders from OSCE participating States on ways to address security challenges. The conference’s sessions focused on ways to enhance the co-operation of regional security organizations in Central Asia and the OSCE, to counter the involvement of youth in violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism and  the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, and to  rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign terrorist fighters.

“The OSCE promotes co-operation not only among participating States, but also between institutions, to develop new ideas and plans for further partnership to help address growing security challenges,” said György Szabó, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

“In times of increasing disagreements among OSCE participating States, it is important to continue our dialogue on common challenges where progress can only be made through co-operation,” added Henriette Kiefer, Regional Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kazakhstan “Today’s event will give us the opportunity to discuss challenges related to radicalization of youth and the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. By co-operating in these areas, we can build trust and help to ensure the stable and peaceful development of our region.”

Yerlan Karin, Chairperson of the Kazakhstan Council on International Relations, said: “The conflict in the Middle East has revealed new aspects of radicalization… A new problem has arisen involving women and children in radical activities, and the issue of their further reintegration into society. Therefore, this issue should be the main focus of attention of experts, the state and non-governmental organizations.”

Some 100 government officials, representatives of international and civil society organizations, national institutes of strategic studies, think tanks and academia, as well as international experts from Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, the United States and Uzbekistan participated in the event.

The conference is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s activities to promote dialogue and regional co-operation across all three dimensions of the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, as well as to engage experts in finding creative solutions to contemporary threats and challenges.

The conference’s organizers will distribute a summary of all presentations to the participants for their further consideration.

TBILISI, 29 October 2018 – Georgia’s 28 October presidential election was competitive and professionally administered. Candidates were able to campaign freely and voters had a genuine choice, although there were instances of the misuse of state resources, and the involvement of senior state officials from the ruling party in campaigning was not always in line with the law, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. A substantial imbalance in donations and excessively high spending limits further contributed to an unlevel playing field, the statement says.

While the public broadcasters provided all candidates with a platform to present their views, the sharp polarization of the private media and a lack of analytical reporting, along with negative campaigning and harsh rhetoric by participants, limited voters’ ability to make a fully informed choice, the observers said. Legal changes that increased the representation of the ruling party at all levels of the election administration and the insufficient transparency in the selection of non-partisan members of lower-level commissions undermined public perception of their impartiality.

“In this election, Georgia showed the maturity of its democracy. This further raises expectations. Therefore, while praising the achievements, it is important to be aware of the shortcomings related to the campaign environment, finances and the legal environment in general,” said Kristian Vigenin, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “We hope that the Georgian people will actively participate in the second round and that the outcome will fully reflect their will.”

While fundamental freedoms were generally respected and contestants were able to campaign freely, several campaign events were disrupted and some party offices or campaign materials were vandalized. The campaign was dominated by polarizing topics, negative campaigning and harsh accusations between the ruling and one of the opposition parties.

“Yesterday voting was well organized, and electors made their choice without restrictions,” said Andrej Hunko, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. “An astonishing amount of money has been spent in the electoral campaign – and this in a country with a high level of poverty. Another point of concern was the substantial number of candidates apparently campaigning on behalf of others, thus undermining the equality of opportunity and weakening the citizens’ confidence in the electoral process.”

Margareta Cederfelt, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, said: “With yesterday’s vote, Georgia proved that efforts are being made to improve its electoral process. I encourage all election stakeholders, and especially the media and civil society, to exercise the highest level of professional ethics, particularly during the campaign for the second round. I would like to commend the Georgian people, and the youth in particular, for once more showing their great commitment to democracy.”

Concerns were raised about the collection of voters’ personal data by the ruling party, and pressure associated with this practice was observed on election day. Voting was assessed positively, despite some procedural issues during counting and the fact that many citizen observers and media representatives acted on behalf of political parties.

Representatives of candidates and from citizen and international organizations are allowed to observe the entire electoral process, and accreditation was inclusive and professionally managed. During the pre-election period there were intense verbal attacks on the work and representatives of citizen observer groups by high-ranking members of the ruling party and senior public officials. Nonetheless, the observation efforts of over 70 citizen observer organizations contributed to the transparency of the process.

“We welcome the competitive nature of the election and the high level of engagement by independent civil society organizations, but are concerned that some of these were targeted by verbal attacks by senior state office holders,” said Laima Andrikienė, Head of the delegation from the European Parliament. “We also regret that Russia’s occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and that the decision by the de facto authorities in South Ossetia to close the administrative border line with Georgia for the elections deprived many Georgian citizens from casting their ballots.”

A total of 25 candidates – 16 from political parties and 9 as independents – were registered in a process that was transparent and inclusive. Voter data were available for purchase, and there was no effective mechanism for checking the authenticity of support signatures. It became clear during the campaign that a significant number of candidates had registered so they could use public funding and free airtime to support other contestants, giving those an unfair advantage.

“Georgia is a positive example of reform, and a leader in Euro-Atlantic integration. Yesterday, I was impressed to see many citizens determined to exercise their democratic right,” said Rasa Juknevičienė, Head of the delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. “But these elections show that, without strong safeguards, the concentration of power and resources can be a risk for democracy.”

Positively both public national broadcasters decided to offer all candidates the same amount of free airtime and hosted numerous debates in which they could present their views. The media regulator was not always transparent and impartial when intervening in the campaign. Media monitoring results showed clear bias in private media coverage.

“The visible commitment shown by the voters should not be undermined by campaigning members of the political class. Unfortunately, we witnessed sharp confrontation, gross exaggerations, negative campaigning and personal insults,” said Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Head of the election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). “If there is a second round, the ODIHR election observation mission will remain here to observe.”

The legal framework provides an adequate basis for democratic elections. Although amendments to the election code in 2017 and 2018 introduced technical improvements, certain shortcomings remain, and recent amendments were a missed opportunity to address other prior ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations and eliminate gaps and inconsistencies, the statement says.

Party and campaign finance legislation lacks uniformity, and recent legislative amendments did not address longstanding recommendations by ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). The lack of regulation for obtaining loans for campaign expenses and reporting on the use of these funds potentially contributes to an imbalanced playing field. While the State Audit Office verified and promptly published reports before the election, the lack of clear deadlines for addressing violations and the institution’s insufficient resources raised concerns about the effectiveness of campaign finance oversight

For further information, contact:

Iryna Sabashuk, OSCE PA, +995 591 716 350 or +45 60 10 81 73, iryna@oscepa.dk

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +995 591 616 398 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +995 591 716 338 or +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int

Henrik Bliddal, NATO PA, +32 475 752 725, hbliddal@nato-pa.int

Karl Minaire, EP, +995 599 070 453 or +32 228 321 88, karl.minaire@europarl.europa.eu

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