Central Europe

VIENNA, 28 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today strongly condemned the arson attack on the studios of the France Bleu Isère radio station in Grenoble, France.

Last night, the premises of the France Bleu Isère public radio station in Grenoble were completely burned down. No victims were reported, but the damage was extensive - broadcasters, journalists and technicians cannot currently use the premises.

The fire appears to have been started in two areas of the premises and the front door was forced. There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack so far.

“I strongly condemn this criminal attack against France Bleu Isère. I urge the authorities to do their utmost to identify and arrest the perpetrators who must be brought to justice,” said Désir. “Such an attack is exceptionally serious and could have had dramatic consequences for human life. It amounts to an unacceptable threat and pressure against the journalists of the public service radio station who provide independent and pluralistic information.”

The Representative recalled that this is not an isolated incident involving journalists in France. In recent weeks, several media premises and journalists have been attacked.

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Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

SKOPJE, 28 January 2019 – The OSCE Mission to Skopje condemns attempts to market and sell the OSCE-sponsored Commentary to the 2010 Law on Criminal Procedure.

The Commentary issued in December 2018 is a comprehensive legal resource aiming to enable the consistent application of the Law on Criminal Procedure. The publication was produced by the OSCE Mission jointly with a number of national legal experts.

"The publication sponsored by the Mission will be distributed free-of-charge to the members of the legal community in the country," said Clemens Koja, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje. "The book, as well as other similar resources developed by the Mission, is intended to help them to contribute to strengthening the rule of law in the country," he added.

The Mission owns exclusive copyrights, titles and content related to the Commentary and strongly encourages the use of the official electronic version available at www.pf.ukim.edu.mk .

Hard copies of the publication will also be disseminated among legal practitioners in the coming days.

VIENNA, 28 January 2019 – Looking into how technological change impacts security was the focus of today’s First Preparatory Meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum held in Vienna.

Under the theme “Promoting economic progress and security in the OSCE area through energy co-operation, new technologies, good governance and connectivity in the digital era” participants from the OSCE region, international organizations, civil society, academia and the business community discussed opportunities and threats related to rapid technological change, digitalization and innovation.

Opening the meeting on behalf of the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, Slovak Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council Ambassador Radomír Boháč, highlighted the positive and negative aspects of technological innovation: “Thanks to new technologies human well-being, including longevity, education and affluence have increased over time. On the other hand, technologies are evolving and spreading so quickly through all sorts of platforms that they have often outgrown the control of their creators.”

In 2019, the Slovak OSCE Chair aims to work towards a safer future for all people in the OSCE region. “Innovations are unstoppable. Even a small country like Slovakia is the birthplace of many breakthrough technologies,” Ambassador Boháč continued.

Much of today’s discussions revolved around good governance and energy co-operation, with participants arguing that digitalization is leaving its mark on both.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger noted that “the impact of the digital economy on how we produce and consume energy is already clearly visible. Increasing the use of renewable energy can only work because digital technologies make both consumers and producers more flexible and responsive.”

Greminger added that, at the same time, the increased monitoring and data gathering capacities of new technologies show a clear need for good governance and better co-operation: “We need to ensure that the technology is safe and secure and that privacy rights are respected. Our success in addressing issues such as e-governance, economic connectivity, and green energy while promoting digital security will depend in large measure on whether we can interact with the private sector in a meaningful manner.”

The Economic and Environmental Forum is the main platform for engagement within the Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE. Its objectives are to identify needs and priorities, to raise awareness and to stimulate the political will of the 57 OSCE participating States in dealing with economic, environmental and security-related challenges, and to share best practices, as well as to provide a platform for dialogue with representatives of international organizations, business and academic communities, and civil society.

The second preparatory meeting will be held on 27 and 28 May in Bratislava, Slovakia. The concluding Forum will take place from 11 to 13 September 2019 in Prague.

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410159 Željka Šulc

The Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented the Protected Documents Handbook developed with the support of the OSCE Mission to BiH, at an event in Sarajevo on 28 January 2019.

The purpose of the Handbook is to enhance the professional ability of the BiH Border Police officers to detect new document forging techniques and improve their knowledge of the latest document protection technologies. The Handbook is a part of the Border Police’s efforts to stay abreast of the continuous introduction of ever more sophisticated physical, optical and electronic document protection techniques in this field and to raise awareness of the adaptability of criminals to the new technologies.

“The abuse of identification documents presents a transnational threat to security, as it can be used for committing crimes, including those related to illegal migration, human trafficking and smuggling. Since forged travel documents are most frequently used during state border crossing, their detection is a key element of border control and a prerequisite for its efficiency,” said Sanja Fitzgerald, Project Officer in the Security Co-operation Unit of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“The Handbook provides explanations, illustrated with photographs, of the methods of designing protected documents, including all printing techniques, both conventional and digital, as well as protective features. Special attention is paid to the ways in which protected documents may be forged and how to verify whether they are genuine or not. It also explicates the latest trends in forgery, such as Morphing, which is not widely known, but is increasingly used in the course of illegal migrations," highlighted Emir Kulaglić, a police officer with the BiH Border Police, who is one of the authors of the Handbook.

Kulaglić further said that the Handbook will be available to BiH Border Police officers at all border crossing points both in print and in electronic version form, in order for the officers to learn about its content, increase their knowledge and use it during their performance of everyday document control tasks.

Other authors include Selvedin Sakić from the Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nenad Šajtinac, Miloš Voštinić and Miloš Cvetković of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Serbia.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The role of women in the political and decision-making processes and the techniques to improve professional skills to assume leadership positions was the focus of a training seminar which concluded on 28 January 2019 in Shymkent, Kazakhstan.

The three-day event was organized by Kazakhstan’s “Women’s resource centre”, non-governmental organization, with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. It gathered some 25 representatives of local administration, business structures, public associations and students from the Turkestan region.

The seminar was designed to broaden participants’ understanding of the key components of leadership, the tools and strategies of effective political campaigns and political ethics, as well as to develop and practice skills in negotiation and effective communication.

The event was part of the Programme Office’s continuous efforts to support gender mainstreaming and economic empowerment initiatives in the host country. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Damage to a house in Chermalyk and small-arms damage to a hospital in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and observed newly dug trenches inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access in all three disengagement areas continued.*

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Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in south-westerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including at least 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and north-north-west of Kadiivka (non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk). Positioned in Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 31km west of Luhansk), the SMM also heard at least ten outgoing explosions and salvos of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and ten explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS rockets, all at an assessed range of 5-10km south (assessed as live-fire training exercises outside the security zone but with the weapons being in violation of withdrawal lines).

Damage to a house in Chermalyk and small-arms damage to hospital windows in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

In Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at 25 Nikitina Street a man (in his sixties) showed the SMM eight holes in a south-south-east-facing external wall of his single-storey house. The SMM could not assess if the damage was fresh, the type of projectile(s) that caused the holes or the direction of fire. The man told the SMM that he had been at home with his wife during the afternoon of 23 January when he had heard impacts on his house.

At a functioning hospital on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed holes and broken glass in two windows on a north-north-west facing wall (one on the first floor and one on the third floor). The SMM assessed that the two holes and broken glass were caused by small-arms fire. Staff at the hospital told the SMM that they had discovered the damage on 23 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

Inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), on 24 January an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recently-dug trench about 200m south of the northern edge and about 500m west of its eastern edge, and another recently-dug trench about 150m south of its northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.   

On 25 January, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 50 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-2.1km south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of an undetermined weapon and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-5.5km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

25 January

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) being transported north on a truck  near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk),
• an anti-tank guided missile system (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) on the north-western edge of Chermalyk.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

25 January:

The SMM saw:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk), one loaded on the train platform and three lined up to be loaded,
• three self-propelled mortars (2S9) on trucks, five self-propelled mortars (2S9) loaded on railway flatbeds and three self-propelled mortars (2S9) on a railway ramp, all at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

25 January:

The SMM saw:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites:

A heavy weapons permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region:

25 January:

• seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

25 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) north-west of Chermalyk;
• an APC (BTR-60) being towed near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-60) being towed near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs

In north-eastern Sopyne (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), next to a transformer station and an antenna (about 30m tall) assessed as for telecommunications, the SMM observed two mine hazard signs affixed to a fence. The signs were red, with “Danger Mines” written in Russian in white lettering. About 3km north of Lyse (non-government-controlled, 22km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a mine hazard sign for the first time, written in Russian and placed about 2m north of the road.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one minivan (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine as well as two cars (one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates) and two passenger buses (route marked in Russian as Moscow to Donetsk) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 26 January 2019 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the thorough police action which has led to the arrest of the alleged instigator of the arson attack against journalist Milan Jovanović in Serbia.

Yesterday, law enforcement authorities arrested Dragoljub Simonović, President of Grocka municipality, who is suspected of ordering the arson attack on the house of Milan Jovanović, a correspondent of the news portal Žig info.

This follows the arrest of three persons for this crime in December of last year.

„I welcome the effective police investigation in identifying and bringing to justice all those responsible for this crime, the alleged perpetrators and the instigator. This is a very positive step forward in the fight against impunity for attacks against journalists in Serbia“, said Désir.

The Representative also commended the engagement of President Aleksandar Vučić in resolving this case and his strong statement yesterday that violence against journalists will not be tolerated, that journalists will be protected and attacks punished most severely.

„It is essential that all attacks against journalists are publicly and strongly condemned at the highest political level, to make it clear to everyone that they will not be tolerated and that all those involved will be brought to justice”, said Désir. “I will continue working closely with the Serbian authorities and all relevant media stakeholders on improving the media freedom situation and the safety of journalists as its key pillar“.

The arson attack against journalist Milan Jovanović that took place on 12 December 2018 was publicly condemned by the Representative. (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/406535)

 The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more

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DAVOS, Switzerland, 25 January 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger today welcomed the ratification of the Prespa Agreement by the Hellenic Parliament and commended the governments in Athens and Skopje for their commitment to pursuing peace and stability in the region. 

“This success demonstrates that vision, courage and dialogue help solve even the most complicated problems and that leaders can deliver a more secure and prosperous future for people,” said Lajčák.

Greminger added: “This achievement represents a victory for diplomacy and strengthens stability in the region.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Izvaryne.*
• In Kyiv, the SMM followed the sentencing hearing of the former President of Ukraine.

Ceasefire violations

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

During the day on 24 January, positioned at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions about 500m west of its position. At the time, about 250 civilians, ten buses and 40 cars were present at the location.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas

On the evening of 23 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four explosions (assessed as airbursts) and six projectiles, all at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 23-24 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions as well as 19 bursts and 22 shots of small-arms fire 5km south-west and west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km east and south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

23 January:

The SMM saw:

• • a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Topolivka ( 80km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• • 22 tanks (12 T-72 and ten T-64) and about 150 crates of ammunition (probable 125mm rounds) at a training area north-east of Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019).
  • a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 2km south-east of Myrne; and
  • 20 tanks (nine T-72 and 11 T-64) of which four were being used to conduct exercises (two were fitted with KMT mine ploughs), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);

Indications of military presence in the security zone

Government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians at checkpoints

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 600 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus with Ukrainian licence plates (with 40 passengers on board), two cars (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine as well as 14 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Sentencing hearing of former President of Ukraine in Kyiv

The SMM followed a court hearing which took place in the Obolonskyi District Court of Kyiv for the trial in absentia against the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. The defendant had been charged under relevant provisions of Articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with high treason (Article 111, paragraph 1), planning, preparing and waging of aggressive war (Article 437, paragraph 2) and trespassing against the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (Article 110). The court found the defendant guilty of the first two charges and acquitted him of the third one and sentenced him to 13 years of imprisonment (the defendant can appeal the verdict within 30 days). The SMM saw 20 law enforcement officers inside and about 50 law enforcement officers in front of the court building, some of whom were checking vehicles on Marshala Tymoshenka Street, as well as two police trucks, two buses and a fire engine parked nearby. It also saw that the majority of observers in the courtroom were media representatives.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• • At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• • The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• In Kyiv, the SMM followed the sentencing hearing of the former President of Ukraine.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Izvaryne.*
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.

Ceasefire violations

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

During the day on 24 January, positioned at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions about 500m west of its position. At the time, about 250 civilians, ten buses and 40 cars were present at the location.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas

On the evening of 23 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four explosions (assessed as airbursts) and six projectiles, all at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 23-24 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions as well as 19 bursts and 22 shots of small-arms fire 5km south-west and west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km east and south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

23 January:

The SMM saw:

• • a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Topolivka ( 80km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• • 22 tanks (12 T-72 and ten T-64) and about 150 crates of ammunition (probable 125mm rounds) at a training area north-east of Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019).
  • a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 2km south-east of Myrne; and
  • 20 tanks (nine T-72 and 11 T-64) of which four were being used to conduct exercises (two were fitted with KMT mine ploughs), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);

Indications of military presence in the security zone

Government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians at checkpoints

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 600 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus with Ukrainian licence plates (with 40 passengers on board), two cars (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine as well as 14 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Sentencing hearing of former President of Ukraine in Kyiv

The SMM followed a court hearing which took place in the Obolonskyi District Court of Kyiv for the trial in absentia against the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. The defendant had been charged under relevant provisions of Articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with high treason (Article 111, paragraph 1), planning, preparing and waging of aggressive war (Article 437, paragraph 2) and trespassing against the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (Article 110). The court found the defendant guilty of the first two charges and acquitted him of the third one and sentenced him to 13 years of imprisonment (the defendant can appeal the verdict within 30 days). The SMM saw 20 law enforcement officers inside and about 50 law enforcement officers in front of the court building, some of whom were checking vehicles on Marshala Tymoshenka Street, as well as two police trucks, two buses and a fire engine parked nearby. It also saw that the majority of observers in the courtroom were media representatives.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• • At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• • The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Elections, 7 October 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 7 October 2018 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights the lack of proper follow-up to previous ODIHR election-related assessments and recommends a comprehensive review of legislation to prevent the abuse of public resources for campaign purposes.

The report, published on 25 January 2019, also recommends abolishing discriminatory ethnicity- and residency-based restrictions of the right to stand for elections, in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations, as well as judgments of the European Court on Human Rights.

While acknowledging the overall efficiency of the election administration, the report encourages revising the way polling station commissions are formed, to ensure their impartiality. The report also recommends providing adequate resources to the Central Election Commission and strengthening recruitment and training methods to ensure the necessary professionalism of election management bodies.

The report encourages political parties to follow the law and refrain from exercising pressure on voters. It calls on the authorities to investigate allegations of electoral violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively, and to hold perpetrators accountable.

The report recommends a revision of voting procedures to fully guarantee the freedom and secrecy of voters’ choices. It also notes a need to enhance voter education programmes, including to prevent family voting and irregular assisted voting, and encourages the authorities to ensure that polling stations are fully accessible for persons with disabilities.

The report calls for greater transparency and accountability of campaign finance and recommends specific bank accounts be used for all campaign finance activities. It further recommends introducing proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for financial violations.

For election day observation, ODIHR was joined by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

WARSAW, 25 January 2018 – Enhanced educational efforts and stronger condemnation of anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance must be part of any commemoration of the Holocaust, OSCE officials said ahead of Sunday’s International Holocaust Remembrance Day. Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and Rabbi Andrew Baker, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism, stressed in a statement today that this was the truest way to commemorate the victims of genocide under the Nazi regime.

“We cannot forget the genocide of Europe’s Jews and of all the victims of the Nazi regime. Millions were killed simply because of who they were,” Gisladottir said. “As we commemorate the victims of the Holocaust, we must recommit ourselves to taking action against anti-Semitism. Governments and civil society must work together to address anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance and discrimination, to ensure we will never again witness such atrocities.”

Underlining the need for such work, Rabbi Baker stressed that this must come in the form of concrete, comprehensive measures.

“Our remembrance on this Holocaust Commemoration Day must also be a call to action. Anti-Semitic incidents are increasing, Jewish communities are fearful of attacks and uncertain about their future,” he said. “We know where hatred, prejudice and anti-Semitism can lead. But knowing alone is not enough. This must be coupled with strong and comprehensive measures – including security and education – and a commitment that ‘Never Again’ is not an empty phrase but our guiding principle.”

Gísladóttir also stressed the importance of education: “We need to make sure that the history of the Holocaust is taught in every school, in every country, so that our children learn the importance of open and tolerant, democratic and inclusive societies, based on respect for human rights.”

“It is also important to honour those who had the courage to act and protect Jews, Roma and Sinti and other victims of the Nazi regime. Their individual acts of heroism are a powerful example of the ability each of us has to do good in the face of unspeakable evil,” the ODIHR Director added. “The Holocaust provides the strongest example of unbridled prejudice. Each and every one of us, especially those in positions of authority, must take responsibility for addressing anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance."

Gísladóttir and Rabbi Baker will be speaking at a conference on combating anti-Semitism in the OSCE region, which is being organized by Slovakia, as the 2019 OSCE Chair, in consultation with ODIHR. The conference will take place in Bratislava on 5 and 6 February.

ODIHR works actively to promote remembrance and education about the Holocaust and the Roma and Sinti genocide. More information on these efforts can be found on the ODIHR website, at: www.osce.org/odihr. 

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KYIV, 25 January 2019 – A fully-equipped training room designed for conducting interactive and practical simulation exercises will be officially handed over by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine to the country’s Academy of Patrol Police at a ceremony in Kyiv on Thursday, 31 January. The training room will help the Academy train new and experienced officers in responding to domestic violence incidents.

Vadym Lisnychuk, Head of Academy of Patrol Police and Jeffrey Erlich, Senior Project Officer of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator, together with experts, police trainers and cadets will take part in the ceremony, which will include presentation of the room’s equipment and a demonstration of a simulation exercise.

Media representatives are invited to cover the ceremony at 10:00 am, on Thursday, 31 January in the Academy’s premises at 9 Narodnoho Opolchennia Street, Kyiv. Media professionals should confirm their attendance by sending an e-mail to pr_app@academy.np.gov.ua  or by calling +380954170170 by 16:00, Wednesday, 30 January 2019.

For more information, please contact Anastasia Staruk, Public Relations Specialist of the Academy of Patrol Police (+380954170170) or Andrii Dziubenko, National Programme Co-ordinator of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator (+380506767734, Andrii.Dziubenko@osce.org )

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In response to the announcement of SDA’s initiative to challenge the name of the Republika Srpska, the OSCE Mission to BiH notes that the Dayton Peace Agreement and the BiH Constitution clearly recognize two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.  The OSCE Mission encourages SDA leadership and all parties to find constructive ways to improve dialogue, understanding and trust between the Constituent Peoples.

Indeed, as the High Representative has stated, SDA’s initiative is particularly unwelcome in the midst of government formation and the urgent need to resolve several politically sensitive issues. It is a distraction from addressing the real needs of citizens and does nothing to resolve the issues that SDA legitimately raises in relation to the position of returnees in Republika Srpska, such as the Bosnian language. 

Rather than divisive rhetoric and maximalist positions that only lead to crises, the citizens of this country need political leaders to work toward a better future through dialogue, mutual understanding and compromise.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Man injured by small-arms fire during repair works near the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station.
• Apartment building in Chermalyk hit by small-arms fire.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a compound near Perevalsk in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*
• In Uzhhorod, Kharkiv and Dnipro, the Mission observed public gatherings on the occasion of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine.

___________________________________________________________________________

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 15), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, were recorded in areas south-east of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).

Man injured by small-arms fire near the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station

On 22 January, positioned on the northern outskirts of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station (see SMM Daily Report 23 January 2019), the SMM saw a man with bandages on his lower back walking to an ambulance. On 23 January, the SMM saw the same man (aged 29) in a hospital in Pokrovsk (government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk). He told the SMM that he was a member of a State Emergency Service demining team; during the day of 22 January he had been in the area of the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station during repair works, when he had heard small-arms fire and had been hit by a projectile shortly thereafter. Medical staff told the SMM that the man had been transferred from a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) on the evening of 22 January with a bullet wound. 

Apartment building in Chermalyk hit by small-arms fire

At 21 Myru Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a south-facing window pane on the second floor of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and as caused by a round of small-arms fire. The aforementioned apartment building is located about 50m west of a functioning kindergarten which the SMM previously assessed as having sustained damage by small-arms fire (see SMM Daily Report 23 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 22-23 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four bursts and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 5km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 23 January, near Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east as well as their subsequent impacts at an assessed range of 8km south-west, as well as an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 10-15km east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 January

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• seven anti-tank guided missile systems (9P418 Konkurs, 135mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk);
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) east of Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk);  
• eight self-propelled howitzers (four 2S1 and four 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) east of Maloianisol (78km south-west of Donetsk);
• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) south-west of Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk);
• four surface-to-air missile systems (S-300) in Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk); and
• four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) east of Azovske (121km south of Donetsk).

23 January

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Weapons storage sites:

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

23 January

The SMM saw that:

• six tanks (five T-64 and one T-72) were again missing and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

22 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk);
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) south-west of Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Muratove (51km west of Luhansk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) with a red cross painted on the rear in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Popasna and in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and to a powerline close to the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable snow clearance at the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Public gatherings marking the 100th anniversary of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine

On 22 January, the SMM observed peaceful gatherings on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine in Uzhhorod (about 700 participants), Kharkiv (about 150 participants) and Dnipro (about 250 participants). It also observed the presence of law enforcement officers securing all three gatherings. (See SMM Daily Report 23 January 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Near Perevalsk (non-government-controlled, 38km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound, citing the need for permission from his “superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 22 January, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government-controlled areas close to the contact line in north-western, south-western and southern parts of Donetsk region.[4]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire damaged a functioning kindergarten in Chermalyk.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near Yasynuvata.*
• The SMM followed up on reports of an incident at a newspaper office in Kherson.
• In Kyiv and Chernivtsi, the Mission observed public gatherings on the occasion of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including over 180 explosions, were recorded at northerly directions of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) during repair works to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station (see below).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 12 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including eight explosions assessed as outgoing artillery and mortar rounds, were recorded in a training area near Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) (assessed as part of live-fire exercises outside the security zone).

Small-arms fire damaged a functioning kindergarten in Chermalyk

Accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative, the SMM visited a functioning kindergarten at 21A Myru Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). Inside the kindergarten, the Mission saw a fresh hole in a south-facing window frame as well as fresh scarring on a western wall and a piano next to a northern wall. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a small-arms round (7.62mm), which had pierced the window frame and ricocheted off the wall and the piano. An employee of the kindergarten told the SMM that she had found a bullet lying on the floor near the piano on the morning of 22 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 19 January, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three fresh impact craters assessed as caused by mortar (120mm) rounds inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 1.5km west of its eastern edge – between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire.

On the evening of 21 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 22 January, positioned close to the disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) as well as inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) on stationary trains at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) moving south near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

21 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-64) about 1.5km north-west of Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

22 January

The SMM saw:

• 26 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (T-72B) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• six towed howitzers (D-30, Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Myrne (see above).

Weapons storage sites:

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 January

The SMM noted that:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five MLRS (two for the first time) were missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• three armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

21 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Lobacheve and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk).

22 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to a powerline near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on reports of an incident at a newspaper office in Kherson

On 21 January, in Kherson, at the office of the Novyi Den newspaper, the SMM saw broken glass of a door and four holes in two windows. Three journalists told the SMM that during a press conference on 18 January, they had heard the “sound of five shots”.  A local police representative told the SMM that a traumatic [non-lethal] pistol and rubber bullets had been used and that a suspect had been charged under Article 296 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code.

The SMM observed public gatherings in Chernivtsi and Kyiv

In Kyiv and Chernivtsi, the SMM observed peaceful public gatherings on the occasion of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine. At Sofiiska Square in Kyiv, the SMM saw about 2,000 people (mixed gender and ages) gathered and approximately 500 law enforcement officers present. In Chernivtsi, the SMM observed two gatherings of about 200 people (mixed gender and ages) and about 300 people (mixed gender and ages) at two different locations. The SMM saw about 20 law enforcement officers present at both locations.

Also in Kyiv, the SMM observed a peaceful march of about 80 people (mixed gender and ages) dedicated to four Maidan activists who had reportedly been killed on 22 January 2014.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for prior permission from his superiors. After about 35 minutes at the checkpoint, following an intervention by senior members of the armed formations, the Mission was allowed to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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CHISINAU, 23 January 2019 – In meetings this week with senior officials in Moldova, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) stressed the importance of holding transparent and fair elections, noting that the conduct of the 24 February parliamentary elections would be watched closely by the OSCE PA and other international observers.

President Tsereteli met in Chisinau with President Igor Dodon, President of the Parliament Andrian Candu, Prime Minister Pavel Filip, and Foreign Minister Tudor Ulianovschi and Moldova’s delegation to the OSCE PA, headed by Serghei Sirbu. He also met Vlad Plahotniuc, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Moldova, and leading members from extra-parliamentary parties, as well as representatives of civil society and the international community.

“This election is a decisive moment in the life of the country. Last year’s court decision invalidating the Chisinau mayoral race clearly had a negative impact on people’s trust in institutions and raised concerns internationally, making the conduct of this election doubly important,” said Tsereteli. “Public trust in the rule of law and democratic institutions is once again at stake in this election, and I call on all forces to contribute to ensure that these elections meet democratic standards.”

This was President Tsereteli’s second official visit to Moldova in the past year, following his travel to both sides of the Dniester/Nistru River in June 2018. At that time, he expressed his concern regarding the nullification of the Chisinau mayoral race.

President Tsereteli called on the authorities and all relevant actors to commit to ensuring equal treatment of all electoral contestants. He also urged all players to ensure that any concerns raised will be fact-based and substantiated.

“I appreciated hearing assurances from government authorities that efforts are being made to minimize shortcomings and to make these the most democratic elections in Moldova’s history. A strong team of OSCE PA observers will be on the ground to observe and, together with our international partners, carefully assess whether the elections meet OSCE commitments,” continued Tsereteli.

Elections that meet the high standards expected by Moldovan citizens can both enhance public trust in institutions and lay the groundwork for further developments including in the economic sphere, he said.

Tsereteli expressed his hope that following the election, efforts on the Transdniestrian settlement process can continue without delay. He urged both Chisinau and Tiraspol to sustain momentum in the process.

The President reiterated the importance being paid to developments in Moldova by the OSCE, noting that his trip comes just days after a visit by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak. President Tsereteli also expressed his appreciation for the excellent work being done by the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

While in Chisinau, the President also met with Matyas Eorsi, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election observation mission. OSCE PA observers of the parliamentary elections will work closely with the observer mission deployed by the ODIHR on 15 January.

The President said that he and other Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly would be closely following developments in the country in the coming weeks, and expressed appreciation for the open approach displayed toward international election observers.

The President will report on his visit to Moldova at the OSCE PA’s Winter Meeting next month. The OSCE PA has observed elections in Moldova nine times: in 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2009 (April and July), 2010, 2014 and 2016.

Photos from the visit to Moldova are available on Flickr.

Media contact: Nat ParryOffice: +45 33 37 80 40Mobile: +45 60 10 81 77Email: nat@oscepa.dk

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons was 8,227 at both BCPs. The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                     

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,000 to 8,277 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 514 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 12 this week (compared to 16 last week); eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and four into Ukraine (92 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                        

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (327 compared to 412 observed during the previous week). There were 180 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 147 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Luhansk-Kharkiv.  

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 441 to 725 (209 at the Gukovo BCP and 516 at the Donetsk BCP); 377 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 348 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation, Armenia, Georgia and in Belarus.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 59 (compared to 44 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 47 to 214: of the total number of trucks scanned, 125 trucks (58 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 89 trucks (42 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 91 to 123 vehicles; 64 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 59 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on four occasions, compared to six last week; the OTs assessed that one train was travelling to the Russian Federation and the other three to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

On 19 January at 17:17 at Donetsk BCP, a police minivan entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked behind the main building. At 17:39, the same minivan returned in the direction of the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 15 January to 22 January 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire damaged a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and continued to observe an armoured combat vehicle and anti-aircraft guns inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and near a border crossing point in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*
• The SMM observed a gathering related to LGBTI rights. 

___________________________________________________________________________

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (25 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-west and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Small-arms fire damaged school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

Inside a functioning school building on Myru Street, in the south-western area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a fresh hole in a first-floor west-facing window pane and a scratch to the inner pane of another adjacent west-facing window. The SMM also saw minor damage (a chip) to the wall opposite the two windows. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a small-arms round (7.62mm). (The SMM assessed that the round had penetrated the first window pane, ricocheted on the opposite wall and then either the round or shrapnel from the wall chipped the inside of the second window pane.) A school representative told the SMM that the school had sustained damage on 17 January around 06:00, but no children were present inside the building at that time. She added that the school had been damaged by gunfire three times since 25 December 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 20 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 20 January, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) (both assessed as belonging to the armed formations). The same UAV spotted again an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) about 30m east of the road bridge, assessed as inside the disengagement area and belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

During the night of 20-21 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire 2km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

20 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

21 January

The SMM saw:

• 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and
• three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

20 January

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in a residential area of Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) and
• eight tanks (T-72) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Yablunivka (49km north of Donetsk).

21 January

The SMM saw:

• 28 tanks (27 T-64 and one T-72), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) at the railway station in Bakhmut and
• four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in Azovske (121km south of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn:

At a heavy weapons holding area beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[3]

18 January

The SMM observed that:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

20 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) near Troitske;
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) and a probable IFV (BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk).

21 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (60km west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

21 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city.

Man died of heart attack at the entry-exit checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska

On 21 January, a representative of an international organization present near the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) told the SMM that at around 08:00, a man (aged 73) had been walking towards non-government-controlled areas when he had suffered a heart attack and passed away. Medical staff at a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska confirmed that the body of the man had been brought to the hospital’s morgue the same day.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Horlivka, as well as to a powerline near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 12 pedestrians (nine females and three males, aged 20-25) entering Ukraine and 12 pedestrians (nine females and three males, aged 30-65) exiting Ukraine. At a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven pedestrians (five females and two males, aged 20-45) entering Ukraine. After about 35 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw four covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and 17 cars (four with Ukrainian and three with Georgian licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM observed a gathering related to LGBTI rights

On 19 January, the SMM saw a group of about 40 young people (mixed genders) gathered at a commemoration event at Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv. The SMM observed that the participants were also expressing their support to LGBTI rights. The SMM saw another group of 50 young men gathered nearby, some of whom were making critical remarks against participants in the other group. There were about 200 law enforcement officers in riot gear onsite. The SMM saw the participants of the former group being escorted away from the site by the law enforcement officers. It did not observe further incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM found the gates of the compound locked and was told over the phone that no one was present at that moment to allow the SMM inside.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as its storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted the site was empty.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 22 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his satisfaction following a decision by Azerbaijan’s authorities to drop new charges against the imprisoned blogger and chair of the media NGO Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, Mehman Huseynov.  The OSCE Representative called on the authorities to release Huseynov as soon as possible.

“I welcome the decision of the authorities in Azerbaijan to drop new criminal charges against Huseynov,” stated Désir. “I previously expressed my serious concerns about the situation and health conditions of Huseynov, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and a public statement on 9 January, and called on the authorities to drop the new criminal charges and to release him as soon as possible.”

Reportedly, the Office of the Prosecutor-General, in accordance with recommendations of the President of Azerbaijan, instructed the investigating body to “terminate” the criminal case against Huseynov. The investigating body discontinued the criminal proceedings against Huseynov on the grounds that he is young, was not brought to disciplinary responsibility while serving his sentence, and has an elderly, widowed father who needs care; that the crime he committed was not considered serious; and that his acts and character currently do not pose a danger to society.

“I call on the authorities to use similar grounds identified by the investigating body and to release Huseynov as soon as possible. Other bloggers and journalists serving their prison sentences in Azerbaijan on trumped-up charges must be freed as well,” added Désir.

Huseynov has now reportedly ended the hunger strike which he began last month in protest against a new investigation launched against him by the authorities, reportedly on 26 December 2018. New criminal charges against him would have seen Huseynov sentenced to up to seven more years in prison. During his hunger strike, Huseynov’s health seriously deteriorated.

The OSCE Representative’s statement of 9 January is available at: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/408380

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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